Market Design Working Group Meeting

Eric Budish, Jakub Kastl, and Marzena Rostek, Organizers

November 4-5, 2022

Stanford University Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA

Conference Code of Conduct

Friday, November 4

Stanford Information
8:00 am
Continental Breakfast
Session 1. Matching Markets
9:00 am
Alex Chan, Stanford University
Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER

Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market Design Lab Experiment
Hulya Eraslan, Rice University and NBER
Jeremy T. Fox, Rice University and NBER
YingHua He, Rice University
Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University

Measuring the Welfare Gains from Cardinal-Preference Mechanisms in School Choice (slides)
10:20 am
Coffee Break
Session 2. Markets and Algorithms
11:00 am
Giovanni Cespa, City University London
Xavier Vives, IESE Business School

Market Opacity and Fragility
John Asker, University of California, Los Angeles and NBER
Chaim Fershtman, Tel Aviv University
Ariel Pakes, Harvard University and NBER

Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design
12:20 pm
Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard
Session 3: Young Scholars Session I: Financial Market Design
2:00 pm
Jason Allen, Bank of Canada
Milena Wittwer, Boston College

Intermediary Asset Pricing: Capital Constraints and Market Power (slides)
Ji Hee Yoon, University College London

Endogenous Market Structure: Over-the-Counter versus Exchange Trading
3:20 pm
Coffee Break
Session 4: Young Scholars Session II: Market Design Theory
4:00 pm
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Harvard University
Ori Heffetz, Cornell University and NBER
Clayton Thomas, Princeton University

Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions
Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University
Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford

Matching and Prices
5:20 pm
Adjourn
6:00 pm
Group Dinner
Joya Restaurant, 339 University Ave, Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, November 5
8:00 am
Continental Breakfast
Session 5. Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms
9:00 am
Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics

Optimal Queue Design
Eduardo Perez-Richet, Sciences Po
Vasiliki Skreta, UT Austin & UCL

Fraud-proof Non-market Allocation Mechanisms
10:20 am
Coffee Break
Session 6. Environment and Transportation
11:00 am
Marek Pycia, University of Zurich
Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina

Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design
Milena Almagro, University of Chicago
Felipe Barbieri, University of Pennsylvania
Juan Camilo Castillo, University of Pennsylvania
Nathaniel G. Hickok, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Optimal Urban Transportation Policy: Evidence from Chicago (slides)
12:20 pm
Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard
Session 7. Auctions and Mechanism Design
This session: 25 minutes presenter, 5 minutes Q&A.
1:30 pm
Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
Tibor Heumann, PUC Chile
Stephen Morris, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Screening with Persuasion
Stephan Lauermann, University of Bonn
Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University

Auctions with Frictions
Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University

Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction
3:00 pm
Adjourn