Market Design Working Group Meeting

Eric Budish, Jakub Kastl, and Marzena Rostek, Organizers

November 4-5, 2022

Stanford University Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA

Friday, November 4
	Stanford Information
8:00 am	Continental Breakfast
	Session 1. Matching Markets
9:00 am	Alex Chan, Harvard University Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market Design Lab Experiment
	Hulya Eraslan, Rice University and NBER Jeremy T. Fox, Rice University and NBER YingHua He, Rice University Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University Measuring the Welfare Gains from Cardinal-Preference Mechanisms in School Choice (slides)
10:20 am	Coffee Break
	Session 2. Markets and Algorithms
11:00 am	Giovanni Cespa, City University London Xavier Vives, IESE Business School Market Opacity and Fragility
	John Asker, University of California, Los Angeles and NBER Chaim Fershtman, Tel Aviv University Ariel Pakes, Harvard University and NBER Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design
12:20 pm	Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard
	Session 3: Young Scholars Session I: Financial Market Design
2:00 pm	Jason Allen, Bank of Canada Milena Wittwer, Boston College Intermediary Asset Pricing: Capital Constraints and Market Power (slides)
	Ji Hee Yoon, University College London Endogenous Market Structure: Over-the-Counter versus Exchange Trading
3:20 pm	Coffee Break
	Session 4: Young Scholars Session II: Market Design Theory
4:00 pm	Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Harvard University Ori Heffetz, Cornell University and NBER Clayton Thomas, Microsoft Research Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions
	Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford Matching and Prices
5:20 pm	Adjourn
6:00 pm	Group Dinner Joya Restaurant, 339 University Ave, Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, November 5
8:00 am	Continental Breakfast
	Session 5. Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms
9:00 am	Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics Optimal Queue Design
	Eduardo Perez-Richet, Sciences Po Vasiliki Skreta, University of Texas, Austin Fraud-proof Non-market Allocation Mechanisms
10:20 am	Coffee Break
	Session 6. Environment and Transportation
11:00 am	Marek Pycia, University of Zurich Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design
	Milena Almagro, University of Chicago and NBER Felipe Barbieri, University of Pennsylvania Juan Camilo Castillo, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Nathaniel G. Hickok, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Optimal Urban Transportation Policy: Evidence from Chicago (slides)
12:20 pm	Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard
	Session 7. Auctions and Mechanism Design
	This session: 25 minutes presenter, 5 minutes Q&A.
1:30 pm	Dirk Bergemann, Yale University Tibor Heumann, PUC Chile Stephen Morris, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Screening with Persuasion
	Stephan Lauermann, University of Bonn Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University Auctions with Frictions
	Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction
3:00 pm	Adjourn