Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak, Organizers

October 21-23, 2021


Conference Code of Conduct

Thursday, October 21
FORMAT: 40 minutes for the presenter + 5 minutes for questions
12:00 pm
Francisco Castro, University of California, Los Angeles
Hongyao Ma, Columbia University
Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California
Chiwei Yan, University of California Berkeley

Randomized FIFO Mechanisms
12:45 pm
Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University
Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Stanford University
Shengwu Li, Harvard University
Amin Saberi, Stanford University

The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Charles Hodgson, Yale University and NBER
Paulo J. Somaini, Stanford University and NBER

Choices and Outcomes in Assignment Mechanisms: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys
2:45 pm
Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University
Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago
Amin Saberi, Stanford University
Pengyu Qian, Purdue University

Price Discovery in Waiting Lists: A Connection to Stochastic Gradient Descent
3:30 pm
Friday, October 22
12:00 pm
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Mitchell L. Watt, Stanford University

Linear Pricing Mechanisms without Convexity
12:45 pm
Elizabeth C. Baldwin, University of Oxford
Omer Edhan, University of Manchester
Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University
Paul D. Klemperer, University of Oxford
Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford

The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities and Income Effects
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER
Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
Albert "Pete" Kyle, University of Maryland
Jeongmin (Mina) Lee, Federal Reserve Board of Governors
David Malec, University of Maryland

Flow Trading (slides)
2:45 pm
Xintong Wang, Harvard University
David Pennock, Microsoft Research
Nikhil Devanur, Amazon
David M. Rothschild, Microsoft Research
Biaoshuai Tao, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Michael Wellman, University of Michigan

Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market
3:30 pm
Saturday, October 23
12:00 pm
Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER

Choice Screen Auctions
12:45 pm
Kyle Greenberg, West Point
Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College

Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
Julien Grenet, Paris School of Economics
Yinghua He, Rice University
Dorothea Kübler, WZB

Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions
2:45 pm
Julien Combe, CREST - Ecole polytechnique
Umut M. Dur, North Carolina State University
Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics
Camille Terrier, University of Lausanne
M. Utku Ünver, Boston College

Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re) assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools
3:30 pm