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Market Design Working Group Meeting
Organized by Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak October 18-19, 2019 NBER, Feldstein Conference Room, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA |
| Friday, October 18 | |
| 8:30 am |
Continental Breakfast
|
| 9:00 am |
Supply Reduction in the Broadcast Incentive Auction |
| 9:45 am |
Machine Learning-Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions |
| 10:30 am |
Break
|
| 11:00 am |
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations |
| 11:45 am |
Choice and Consequence: Assessing Mismatch at Chicago Exam Schools |
| 12:30 pm |
Lunch
|
| 2:00 pm |
Evaluating with Statistics: Which Outcome Measures Differentiate Among Matching Mechanisms? |
| 2:45 pm |
Information Acquisition Costs in Matching Markets |
| 3:30 pm |
Break
|
| 4:00 pm |
Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money |
| 4:45 pm |
Voluntary Regulation: Evidence from Medicare Payment Reform |
| 5:30 pm |
Adjourn
|
| 6:30 pm |
Group Dinner at Bambara
(across the street from the Royal Sonesta Hotel) |
| Saturday, October 19 | |
| 8:30 am |
Continental Breakfast
|
| 9:00 am |
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements |
| 9:45 am |
Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study |
| 10:30 am |
Break
|
| 11:00 am |
Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation |
| 11:45 am |
Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation |
| 12:30 pm |
Adjourn
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FORMAT |