![]() |
Market Design Working Group Meeting
Organized by Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak Supported by Microsoft October 18-19, 2024 SIEPR, Stanford University, Koret-Taube Conference Center, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA Format: 35 minute presentation, followed by 10 minute discussion. |
Friday, October 18 | |
9:00 am |
Continental Breakfast
|
9:30 am |
Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation |
10:15 am |
Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement |
11:00 am |
Break
|
11:30 am |
Social Learning in Lung Transplant Decisions |
12:15 pm |
Endogenous Priority in Centralized Matching Markets: The Design of the Heart Transplant Waitlist |
1:00 pm |
Lunch
|
2:00 pm |
Mechanism Reform: An Application to Child Welfare |
2:45 pm |
The Competitive Core of Combinatorial Exchange |
3:30 pm |
Break
|
4:00 pm |
"Bid Shopping" in Procurement Auctions with Subcontracting |
4:45 pm |
Ads in Conversations: Market Thickness and Match Quality |
5:30 pm |
Adjourn
|
7:00 pm | |
Saturday, October 19 | |
Break
|
|
8:30 am |
Continental Breakfast
|
9:00 am |
Dynamic Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders: Evidence from the Online Advertising Market |
9:45 am |
The Welfare Effects of Sponsored Product Advertising |
10:30 am |
Break
|
11:00 am |
An Empirical Analysis of the Interconnection Queue |
11:45 am |
Iterative Network Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms |
12:30 pm |
Lunch and Adjourn
|