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Market Design Working Group Meeting
Organized by Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak Supported by Microsoft October 18-19, 2024 SIEPR, Stanford University, Koret-Taube Conference Center, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA Format: 35 minute presentation, followed by 10 minute discussion. |
| Friday, October 18 | |
| 9:00 am |
Continental Breakfast
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| 9:30 am |
Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation |
| 10:15 am |
Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement |
| 11:00 am |
Break
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| 11:30 am |
Social Learning in Lung Transplant Decisions |
| 12:15 pm |
Endogenous Priority in Centralized Matching Markets: The Design of the Heart Transplant Waitlist |
| 1:00 pm |
Lunch
|
| 2:00 pm |
Mechanism Reform: An Application to Child Welfare |
| 2:45 pm |
The Competitive Core of Combinatorial Exchange |
| 3:30 pm |
Break
|
| 4:00 pm |
"Bid Shopping" in Procurement Auctions with Subcontracting |
| 4:45 pm |
Ads in Conversations: Market Thickness and Match Quality |
| 5:30 pm |
Adjourn
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| 7:00 pm | |
| Saturday, October 19 | |
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Break
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|
| 8:30 am |
Continental Breakfast
|
| 9:00 am |
Dynamic Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders: Evidence from the Online Advertising Market |
| 9:45 am |
The Welfare Effects of Sponsored Product Advertising |
| 10:30 am |
Break
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| 11:00 am |
An Empirical Analysis of the Interconnection Queue |
| 11:45 am |
Iterative Network Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms |
| 12:30 pm |
Lunch and Adjourn
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