Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak, Organizers

October 19-20, 2018

SIEPR, Stanford University, Koret-Taube Conference Center, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA

Friday, October 19
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Olivier Terceiux, Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Markets, a synthesis of:
	Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Matching: An Irrelevance of Priorities in Large Markets
	Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp
9:45 am	Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Efficient and Incentive Compatible Mediation: An Ordinal Market Design Approach
11:45 am	Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
12:30 pm	Lunch Speaker: Michael Schwarz, Microsoft
	Market Design, Reputation Systems, UX, and the Cost of User Time
2:00 pm	The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
2:45 pm	Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
3:30 pm	Break
4:00 pm	A Monetary Market for Kidneys
4:45 pm	Recent Developments in Kidney Exchange: Market Design in a Large World
5:30 pm	Adjourn
6:30 pm	Dinner Joya Restaurant 339 University Avenue Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, October 20
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Impact Evaluation in Matching Markets with General Tie-Breaking
9:45 am	Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (slides)
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Trading Networks with Frictions
11:45 am	Redistribution through Markets
12:30 pm	Adjourn