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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 25-26, 2013

Stanford University

Lucas Conference Center, Room 134A

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA

PROGRAM

Participant List

Friday, October 25:

8:30 am

Continental Breakfast

9:00 am

Bo Cowgill, University of California at Berkeley
Eric Zitzewitz, Dartmouth College and NBER
Corporate Prediction Markets




Hoyt Bleakley, University of Chicago and NBER
Joseph Ferrie, Northwestern University and NBER
Land Openings on the Georgia Frontier and the Coase Theorem in the Short- and Long-Run

10:20 am

Break


10:35 am


Paul Asquith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Thom Covert, Harvard University
Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
The Effects of Mandatory Transparency in Financial Market Design: Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market



Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
John Shim, University of Chicago
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response

12:25 pm

Lunch


1:30 pm


Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
An Empirical Model of the Medical Match



Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University
Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications

2:30 pm

Break


3:20 pm


Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Johannes Horner, Yale University
Optimal Design for Social Learning




Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University
Gregory Stoddard, Northwestern University
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Cornell University
Social Status and the Design of Optimal Badges

5:00 pm

Adjourn

6:30 pm

Group Dinner
Zibibbo Restaurant
430 Kipling Street
Palo Alto, CA

Saturday, October 26:

8:30 am

Continental Breakfast


9:00 am


Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder
The Combinatorial Clock Auction, Revealed Preference and Iterative Pricing




Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University
Steven Williams, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Konstantinos Zachariadis, London School of Economics
Optimality versus Practicality in Market Design: A Comparison of Two Double Auctions

10:20 am

Break


10:40 am


Federico Echenique, California Institute of Technology
M. Bumin Yenmez, Carnegie Mellon University
How to Control Controlled School Choice

Itai Ashlagi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Yashodhan Kanoria, Columbia University
Jacob Leshno, Columbia University

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets


12:00 pm

Adjourn

 

 

 

PARKING MAP AND INSTRUCTIONS