M. Utku Unver
Department of Economics
140 Comm. Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467
Institutional Affiliation: Boston College
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2009||Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation|
with Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth: w15006
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.
Published: Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ãnver, 2013. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 243-282, June. citation courtesy of
|June 2005||Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market|
with Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez: w11402
Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on th...
Published: Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences." American Economic Review 97, 3 (June 2007): 828-851.
|August 2004||Pairwise Kidney Exchange|
with Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez: w10698
In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sonmez, and Unver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely first step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be indifferent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the ...
Published: Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory 125(2): 151-188, December 2005 citation courtesy of
|September 2003||Kidney Exchange|
with Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez: w10002
Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone on the queue for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving the highest priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. We explore how such exchanges can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly. The problem resembles some of the housing' problems studied in the mechanism design literature f...
- Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory 125(2): 151-188, December 2005
- Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver. "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 457-488, May 2004 citation courtesy of