Umut M. Dur
North Carolina State University
College of Management
Institutional Affiliation: North Carolina State University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2018||Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism|
with Parag A. Pathak, Fei Song, Tayfun Sönmez: w25024
This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the well-known Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use.
|March 2016||Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools|
with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez: w22109
Affirmative action schemes must confront the tension between admitting the highest scoring applicants and ensuring diversity. In Chicago's affirmative action system for exam schools, applicants are divided into one of four socioeconomic tiers based on the characteristics of their neighborhood. Applicants can be admitted to a school either through a slot reserved for their tier or through a merit slot. Equity considerations motivate equal percentage reserves for each tier, but there is a large debate on the total size of these reserve slots relative to merit slots. An issue that has received much less attention is the order in which slots are processed. Since the competition for merit slots is influenced directly by the allocation to tier slots, equal size reserves are not sufficient to ...
|April 2013||The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice|
with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez: w18981
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at their neighborhood schools. This paper demonstrates how the precedence order, i.e. the order in which different types of seats are filled by applicants, has quantitative effects on distributional objectives comparable to priorities in the deferred acceptance algorithm. While Boston's school choice plan gives priority to neighborhood applicants for half of each school's seats, the intended effect of this policy is lost because of the precedence order. Despite widely held impressions about the importance of neighborhood priority, the outcome of Boston's implementation of a 50-50 school split is nearly identical to a system without neighborhood priority. We formally establish that either increasi...