NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Stephan Litschig

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku
Tokyo 106-8677
Japan

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2017Can Audits Backfire? Evidence from Public Procurement in Chile
with Maria Paula Gerardino, Dina Pomeranz: w23978
Audits are generally intended to monitor compliance with existing rules. However, audits can also create unintended impacts and incentives through the specific protocol by which they are executed. In particular, audits can discourage the use of complex administrative procedures with more rules for auditors to check. This paper investigates the effects of procurement audits on public entities' choice of purchase procedures in Chile. While the national procurement legislation tries to promote the use of more transparent and competitive auctions rather than discretionary direct contracts for selection of suppliers, auctions are significantly more complex and the audit protocol mechanically leads to more scrutiny and a higher probability of further investigation for auctions than for direct co...
 
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