The World Bank
Institutional Affiliation: The World Bank
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2017||Trade Policy and Redistribution when Preferences are Non-Homothetic|
with : w23237
We compare redistribution through trade restrictions vs. domestic lump-sum transfers. When preferences are non-homothetic, even domestic lump-sum transfers affect relative prices. Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, domestic lump-sum transfers are not necessarily superior to distortionary trade policy. We develop this argument in the context of food export bans imposed by many developing countries in the late 2000s.
Published: Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2017. "Trade policy and redistribution when preferences are non-homothetic," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 92-95. citation courtesy of
|October 2015||Comparative Advantage, International Trade, and Fertility|
with , : w21677
We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of comparative advantage in international trade on fertility. We build a model in which industries differ in the extent to which they use female relative to male labor, and countries are characterized by Ricardian comparative advantage in either female-labor or male-labor intensive goods. The main prediction of the model is that countries with comparative advantage in female-labor intensive goods are characterized by lower fertility. This is because female wages, and therefore the opportunity cost of children are higher in those countries. We demonstrate empirically that countries with comparative advantage in industries employing primarily women exhibit lower fertility. We use a geography-based instrument for trade patterns to isolate th...
Published: Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A. & Raddatz, Claudio, 2016. "Comparative advantage, international trade, and fertility," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 48-66. citation courtesy of
|October 2014||Trade Insulation as Social Protection|
in The Economics of Food Price Volatility, Jean-Paul Chavas, David Hummels, and Brian D. Wright, editors
In a world with volatile food prices, countries have an incentive to shelter their populations from the induced real income shocks. When some agents are net food producers while others are net consumers, there is scope for insurance between the two groups. A domestic social protection scheme could transfer resources away from the former group to the latter in times of high food prices, and do the reverse otherwise. We show that in the presence of consumer preference heterogeneity, implementing the optimal social protection policy can potentially induce higher food price volatility. Such a policy indeed generates a counter-cyclical demand shock that amplifies the effects of the underlying food shortage.