NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Nikolaj A. Harmon

Department of Economics
University of Copenhagen
Oester Farimagsgade 5, bygning 26
DK-1353 Copenhagen K
Denmark

E-Mail: nikolaj.harmon@econ.ku.dk
Institutional Affiliation: University of Copenhagen

NBER Working Papers and Publications

January 2020Is Parental Leave Costly for Firms and Coworkers?
with Anne A. Brenøe, Serena P. Canaan, Heather N. Royer: w26622
Most existing evidence on the effectiveness of family leave policies comes from studies focusing on their impacts on affected families - mothers, fathers, and their children - without a clear understanding of the costs and effects on firms and coworkers. We estimate the effect of a female employee giving birth and taking parental leave on small firms and coworkers in Denmark. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences design, we compare small firms in which a female employee is about to give birth to an observationally equivalent sample of small firms with female employees who are not close to giving birth. Identification rests on a parallel trends assumption, which we substantiate through a set of natural validity checks. We find little evidence that parental leave take-up has negative eff...
January 2012Labor Supply of Politicians
with Raymond Fisman, Emir Kamenica, Inger Munk: w17726
We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institut...

Published: Raymond Fisman & Nikolaj A. Harmon & Emir Kamenica & Inger Munk, 2015. "LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 13(5), pages 871-905. citation courtesy of

 
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