T.R. Prime Ministry State Planning Organization
Necatibey cad. No:108, Yucetepe
06100, Ankara, TURKEY
Institutional Affiliation: State Planning Organization
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2011||Who Should Supervise? The Structure of Bank Supervision and the Performance of the Financial System|
with Barry Eichengreen: w17401
We assemble data on the structure of bank supervision, distinguishing supervision by the central bank from supervision by a nonbank governmental agency and independent from dependent governmental supervisors. Using observations for 140 countries from 1998 through 2010, we find that supervisory responsibility tends to be assigned to the central bank in low-income countries where that institution is one of few public-sector agencies with the requisite administrative capacity. It is more likely to be undertaken by a non-independent agency of the government in countries ranked high in terms of government efficiency and regulatory quality. We show that the choice of institutional arrangement makes a difference for outcomes. Countries with independent supervisors other than the central bank...
Published: “ The Architecture and Governance of Financial Supervision: Sources and Implications ” International Finance, Vol. 15, No. 3: 309 - 325, Winter 2012. A lso, NBER Working Paper, 17401, 2011 (with Barry Eichengreen).
|March 2009||Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates|
with Barry Eichengreen: w14791
We present updated estimates of central bank for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework. We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years. Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely in countries with strong and stable political institutions. They are more likely in democracies, with their culture of transparency. Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability though not also with less inflation persistence.
Published: Theoretical Inquiries in Law. Volume 11, Issue 1, Pages 75–123, ISSN (Online) 1565-3404, DOI: 10.2202/1565-3404.1237, January 2010
|March 2007||Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?|
with Barry Eichengreen: w13003
Greater transparency in central bank operations is the most dramatic change in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years. In this paper we present new information on its extent and effects. We show that the trend is general: a large number of central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency since the late 1990s. We then analyze the determinants and effects of central bank transparency in an integrated empirical framework. Transparency is greater in countries with more stable and developed political systems and deeper and more developed financial markets. Our preliminary analysis suggests broadly favorable if relatively weak impacts on inflation and output variability.