University College London
Department of Economics
London WC1E 6BT
Institutional Affiliation: University College London
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2019||Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills|
with Manoj Mohanan, Katherine Donato, Grant Miller, Yulya Truskinovsky: w25499
A central issue in designing performance incentive contracts is whether to reward the production of outputs versus use of inputs: the former rewards efficiency and innovation in production, while the latter imposes less risk on agents. Agents with varying levels of skill may perform better under different contracts as well – more skilled workers may be better able to innovate, for example. We study these issues empirically through an experiment enabling us to observe and verify outputs (health outcomes) and inputs (adherence to recommended medical treatment) in Indian maternity care. We find that both output and input incentive contracts achieved comparable reductions in post-partum hemorrhage rates, the dimension of maternity care most sensitive to provider behavior and the largest cause ...
|June 2015||Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOs? School Administrator Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China|
with Renfu Luo, Grant Miller, Scott Rozelle, Sean Sylvia: w21302
Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
|October 2009||Risk Protection, Service Use, and Health Outcomes Under Colombia's Health Insurance Program for the Poor|
with Grant Miller, Diana M. Pinto: w15456
Unexpected medical care spending imposes considerable financial risk on developing country households. Based on managed care models of health insurance in wealthy countries, Colombia's Régimen Subsidiado is a publicly financed insurance program targeted to the poor, aiming both to provide risk protection and to promote allocative efficiency in the use of medical care. Using a "fuzzy" regression discontinuity design, we find that the program has shielded the poor from some financial risk while increasing the use of traditionally under-utilized preventive services - with measurable health gains.
Published: Grant Miller & Diana Pinto & Marcos Vera-HernÃ¡ndez, 2013. "Risk Protection, Service Use, and Health Outcomes under Colombia's Health Insurance Program for the Poor," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 61-91, October. citation courtesy of