Armando Gomes

Olin School of Business
Washington University
Campus Box 1133
1 Brookings Drive
St Louis, MO 63130

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Washington University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2005Why Do Public Firms Issue Private and Public Securities?
with Gordon Phillips: w11294
We examine a comprehensive set of private and public security issuance decisions by publicly traded companies. We study private and public issues of debt, convertibles and common equity securities - a total of 6 different security-market choices. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market. We find that asymmetric information and moral hazard problems play a large role in the public versus private market choice and the security type choice. Our findings show that asymmetric information impacts security choice in a particular pattern: Conditional on issuing in the public market we find a pecking order of security issuance holds, firms with higher measures of asymmetric information are less li...

Published: Armando Gomes & Gordon Phillips, 2012. "Why do public firms issue private and public securities?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol 21(4), pages 619-658. citation courtesy of

June 2004SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the Cost of Capital
with Gary Gorton, Leonardo Madureira: w10567
We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure ( Reg FD') by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure,' in which companies give material information only to a few analysts and institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. We find that the adoption of Reg FD caused a significant reallocation of information-producing resources, resulting in a welfare loss for small firms, which now face a higher cost of capital. The loss of the selective disclosure' channel for information flows could not be compensated for via other information transmission channels. This effect was more pronounced for firms communicating complex information and, consistent with the inve...

Published: Gomes, Armando, Gary Gorton and Leonardo Madureira. "SEC Regulation FD, Information, and the Cost of Capital.” Journal of Corporate Finance 13, 2-3 (June 2007): 300-334. citation courtesy of

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