

Appendix

To accompany James Andreoni and Marta Serra-Garcia,

“Time-inconsistent Charitable Giving: Self-control or Social-control?”

For Online Publication Only

Appendix A: Extensions of the Theoretical Framework

A.1. Signaling Altruism

What if social pressure is modeled as the outcome of a signaling process? This subsection sketches a simplified version of a signaling model and shows that it yields the same predictions regarding time inconsistency, but different predictions regarding commitment and flexibility demand, relative to the social pressure (and temptation) model outlined in the main text.

The signaling model we sketch here is much like the social-image signaling model of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009). We assume people care about u and their belief about the expected value of one’s own u held by others. Call this expectation $v_i = E_i(E_j(u_i))$ and suppose $U_i = u_i + \alpha v_i$ for those i who give, and $U_i = \alpha v_i$ for those i who do not give. For concreteness, assume values of u are distributed between -1 and 1, so the p.d.f. of u is $f(u)$, $-1 \leq u \leq 1$, and the c.d.f $F(u)$ is assumed continuous and strictly increasing over the domain. Then, for both the NN and NL cases, we can find the value of $u \in [-1, 1]$ that splits our population into two pools, the givers and the non-givers.

A.1.1 Time-Inconsistent Giving

Consider the NN decision. Surely all those with $u > 0$ will give. Moreover, there will be a number $u^{NN} \leq 0$ such that all those with $u > u^{NN}$ will pool as givers and earn social utility v_g , while the others will pool with non-givers and earn v_0 in social utility. We can find this u^{NN} by identifying the person who is indifferent to giving and not, that is

$$u^{NN} + v_g = v_0.$$

How do we define v_g and v_0 ? In equilibrium, everyone will know that all those with $u \in [u^{NN}, 1]$ are givers, then all givers will experience a v_g equal to the expected value of u conditional on u being greater than u^{NN} . Likewise, non-givers will experience a $v = v_0$ equal to the expected value of u conditional on being less than u^{NN} . The equilibrium value of u^{NN} is determined as the value that makes an individual with $u = u^{NN}$ indifferent between pooling with givers or non-givers:

$$u^{NN} + \alpha \int_{u^{NN}}^1 uf(u|u \geq u^{NN}) du = \alpha \int_{-1}^{u^{NN}} uf(u|u \leq u^{NN}) du. \quad (1)$$

A similar logic applies to the NL condition except that we introduce δ^k into the expression above to reflect that gift is transacted in the future. Since this lowers the signaling costs by the proportion δ^k , there will be a new level of u , $u^{NL} < u^{NN}$, such that all those with $u > u^{NL}$ will pool as givers. This solves

$$\delta^k u^{NL} + \alpha \int_{u^{NL}}^1 uf(u|u \geq u^{NL}) du = \alpha \int_{-1}^{u^{NL}} uf(u|u \leq u^{NL}) du. \quad (2)$$

As can easily be derived, when $\delta = 1$, $u^{NL} = u^{NN}$. As δ falls below 1, u^{NL} falls below u^{NN} , meaning more people give. Thus, this signaling approach can also generate time-inconsistency. Other than continuity of $F(u)$, the only other requirement is temporal discounting, $\delta < 1$.

A.1.2 Commitment vs. Flexibility Demand

What about commitment versus flexibility? The potential for revisions of the NL choice now creates three possible pools. First are those who do not give in NL. Second are those who choose to give in NL, but opt for flexibility. Third are those giving in NL who select commitment.

We can solve this by first imagining people had already faced the decision to give later and we have chosen the critical utility separating givers and non-givers. As this may be

different than the value arrived at in (2), we give this value a unique name, u^{NLF} . Those with $u \geq u^{NLF}$ can further be divided into those who commit and those who opt for flexibility. Those with the highest u do not need commitment as a self-control device—they will give regardless—but only choose to commit in order to signal their difference with those choosing flexibility. As a result, a person would only choose flexibility if she planned to use it to revise to not giving. Thus, for a particular value of u^{NLF} , we can find a new value u^{FC} the separates those with $u \geq u^{NLF}$ into those committing to give ($u > u^{FC}$) and those choosing flexibility and, accordingly, to revise to choosing to not give. This u^{FC} solves this equation:

$$u^{FC} + \alpha \int_{u^{FC}}^1 uf(u|u \geq u^{FC}) du = \alpha \int_{u^{NLF}}^{u^{FC}} uf(u|u \leq u^{FC}) du. \quad (3)$$

This will give us a value for u^{FC} as a function of u^{NLF} . For short, let $u^{FCF} = u^{FC}(u^{NLF})$.

To close the model, we need to recall that with probability p the NL decision is implemented. Thus in selecting u^{NLF} we now solve

$$\begin{aligned} & p \left[\delta^k u^{NLF} + \alpha \int_{u^{NLF}}^1 uf(u|u \geq u^{NLF}) du \right] \\ & + (1-p) \left[\alpha \int_{u^{NLF}}^{u^{FCF}} uf(u|u^{NLF} \leq u \leq u^{FCF}) du \right] \\ & = \alpha \int_{-1}^{u^{NLF}} uf(u| -1 < u < u^{NLF}) du. \end{aligned}$$

It is easily seen that the solution to this equation will be a number $u^{NLF} \leq u^{NL}$, that is, the option to revise will encourage more people to give in NL. That further implies that the solution for (3) will be a value $u^{FC} \geq u^{NN}$. The reason is that the signal of giving under NL raises the expectation of u contingent on revising to not giving. As a result, allowing the possibility of flexibility in a signaling model will both increase the number of people offering to give in NL, but reduce the number of givers in the event of an opportunity to revise. Moreover, the size of these two effects is inversely correlated. This is most easily seen if, for instance, u^{NLF} goes all the way down to -1 (so everyone

agrees to give in NL), which would mean $u^{FC} = u^{NN}$.

While the two models predict the same difference in giving behavior under NN and NL, there are qualitative differences in choices of commitment. The difference mainly comes for those who would wish to give with or without commitment. In this signaling model, such people choose commitment only as a means of differentiating themselves from those choosing commitment. The commitment itself has no instrumental value as they are otherwise indifferent to commitment or flexibility. The same is true for those who opt not to give. However, both models predict non-givers will be indifferent to commitment.

The data from the study show that, contrary to the signaling model, those who choose to donate in both NL and LL show roughly equal proportions of choosing commitment, flexibility, and indifference. On the other hand, those choosing not to give in both cases have significant majority favoring commitment. As we discuss in the main text, there appear to be a mixture of motives present in the data, and the social pressure model we focus on in the main text provides the most promising way to capture them all simultaneously.

A.2. Social Pressure and Pledging

We briefly outline the predictions of our model of social pressure for behavior in the P and PGN treatments. As before, the individual feels pressure to give, s , and this social pressure can be relieved by either giving immediately (if the option is available) or pledging to give in the future. In addition, we allow for utility to flow when the decision to confirm or renege on the pledge is elicited. This is motivated by studies of promises and lying, which have found evidence of guilt or moral costs of breaking a promise or, relatedly, of telling a known falsehood (see, for example, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Serra-Garcia et al., 2013). Hence, we allow individuals to experience a cost $r < 0$ when renegeing after having pledged.

Suppose that social pressure utility flows when pledges are made, $s > 0$, but is reduced when the person reneges on the pledge in the future, $r < 0$. As an interesting base case,

assume the reductions exactly erase the gains, that is $s+r = 0$. In the Pledge scenario, for someone to pledge and give, it must be that two conditions are satisfied. First, pledging must be better than not giving:

$$\delta u + s > 0. \tag{4}$$

Second, giving must be better than renegeing, $u > r$. Adding s to both sides of this we get our second condition:

$$u + s > r + s = 0. \tag{5}$$

Figure A.1 again shows the areas in the preference space that capture these conditions. The stripped area C indicates the values were $\delta u + s > 0$, our fist condition, meaning areas A , B , and C in the figure will pledge in the Pledge scenario. However, only A and B will give, and the area C indicates those who will pledge but not give—those who renege. This prediction is closely linked to that made for our NN and NL decisions above. Comparing Figure A.1 to Figure 1, we see that areas A , B , and C are exactly the same for both figures. This means that those who were time inconsistent between NN and NL are basically the same people who, given similar social costs, would renege on pledges to give.

Consider now the Pledge-or-Give-Now scenario. Those for whom $u > 0$, segment A in the figure, would definitely prefer to give now, since this moves up a positive. Otherwise, areas B and C should be unchanged. This means that ultimate total giving should be unaffected by the option to give now, and the fraction of the population making and renegeing on pledges should also be the same. At the same time, there will be *selection* into pledging. The rate of renegeing on pledges should be significantly higher when the option to give now is available.

Further, given that people who select into pledging are potentially motivated by social pressure, the likelihood of renegeing can be modified by introducing pressure between the moment of the pledge and the moment that the pledge must be confirmed. We introduce




Figure A.1: Utility Parameters, Pledging, Giving, and Reneging

a manipulation of this kind by thanking individuals for their pledge. We hypothesize that such thank-you emails increase r , and hence reduce the rate of reneging among individuals who pledge.

Appendix B: Instructions and Decision Screens

Note: the text in square brackets was not read aloud. The instructions below are those that were used in the sessions with a show-up fee of \$15 for each week. The instructions for the first set of sessions in the NN and NL treatments, which had a show-up fee of \$6 in the first week, and \$20 in the second week, were the same except for the show-up fees.

Welcome

Thank you for participating in this experiment. During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to answer a series of questions. Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.

This experiment consists of two parts.

- Part 1: Today we will ask you to answer a series of questionnaires.
- Part 2: A follow up survey that you will be asked to fill out a week from today.

Payment

You receive for the participation in this experiment \$30. Please note that in order to obtain you all payments you need to answer both parts of the experiment.

- Today you receive \$15 for showing up to the experiment and answering the first part of the experiment. You can collect the \$15 from the experimenter after the session is finished.
- The remaining \$15 you will receive at the end of the next week's session.

[GiveDirectly Pitch

Slides of GiveDirectly are shown on the screen. Experimenter reads the slides]

[At the end of the pitch:]

- [Treatment NN]: We would like to ask you whether you would like to donate \$5 of your show up fee for today’s session to GiveDirectly. You will be asked to answer this question on your screens in a minute. If you answer “YES, I’d like to donate \$5 today,” \$5 of your show up fee today will be donated. If you say “NO,” no donation will be made. Your decisions are final today.
- [Treatment NL]: We would like to ask you whether you would like to donate \$5 of your show up fee for next week’s session to GiveDirectly. You will be asked to answer this question on your screens in a minute. If you answer “YES, I’d like to donate \$5 next week,” \$5 of your show up fee next week will be donated. If you say NO, no donation will be made. Your decisions are final today.

Decision Screens

NN:

GiveDirectly

As we mentioned, in this study we are giving you the opportunity to support an exciting new charity, called GiveDirectly.

Would you like to donate to GiveDirectly?

- YES, I'd like to donate \$5 today.
- NO

NL:

Would you like to donate to GiveDirectly?

- YES, I'd like to donate \$5 next week.
- NO

Treatment NL&LL

Your Donation Decision

In this study we will ask you to make two donation decisions, but only one of these two will end up being the decision that counts. One donation decision will be made today. Call this your week-1 donation decision. Your second donation decision will be made next week, when you return to the lab to complete this study. Call this your week-2 donation decision.

Here is how it works.

Week-1 donation decision

Today we will ask you whether you would like to donate \$5 of your show up fee for next week's session to GiveDirectly. You will be asked to answer this question on your screens in a minute. If you answer "YES, I'd like to donate \$5 next week," \$5 of your show up fee next week will be donated. If you say NO, no donation will be made.

Week-2 donation decision

Next week, when you return to the lab to complete this study, you will have the opportunity to renew or revise your donation decision. In particular, next week you will be asked again whether you would like to donate \$5 of your show up fee for next week's session to Give Directly. If you answer "YES, I'd like to donate \$5 today," \$5 of your show up fee next week will be donated. If you say NO, no donation will be made.

IMPORTANT: Only one of your decisions, either your week-1 or your week-2 donation decision, will be implemented. That is, only one decision will be the decision-that-counts. We will not use both! The most you will ever donate in this study is \$5. The least you can donate is \$0.

How will we decide whether your week-1 donation decision or your week-2 donation decision is the decision-that-counts?

Next week, after you make your week-2 donation decision, we will ask someone in the room to roll a 10-sided die to determine which decision is the decision-that-counts. All 10 numbers on the die are equally likely. Based on your decision, there will be a 1 in 10 chance or a 9 in 10 chance that the decision-that-counts is your week-1 decision.

Today you will have two options to choose from:

- A. Your **week-1 donation decision** will count with a **1 in 10 chance**, and so your week-2 donation decision will count with a 9 in 10 chance.
- B. Your **week-1 donation decision** will count with a **9 in 10 chance**, and so your week-2 donation decision will count with a 1 in 10 chance.

If you chose Option A today, the following will occur. A volunteer will roll a 10-sided die and:

- Your **week-1** donation decision will be the decision-that-counts if number “1” is the outcome of the die roll.
- Your **week-2** donation decision will be the decision-that-counts if numbers “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9” or “10” are the outcome of the die roll.

If you choose Option B today, the following will occur. A volunteer will roll a 10-sided die and:

- Your **week-1** donation decision will be the decision-that-counts if numbers “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9” or “10” are the outcome of the die roll.
- Your **week-2** donation decision will be the decision-that-counts if number “1” is the outcome of the die roll.

In summary:

- Today you make a decision about donating \$5 out of your show-up fee for next week’s session to Give Directly. This decision will be carried out next week with a 1 in 10 or a 9 in 10 chance.

- Next week you will be asked again to make a decision about donating \$5 out of your show up fee for next week's session to Give Directly. This decision will be carried out next week with a 9 in 10 or a 1 in 10 chance.
- Only one of these two decisions will be carried out.
- You make both donation decisions before you know which decision will be carried out.
- You decide today whether you would like your week-1 donation decision to count with a 1 in 10 chance (and so your week-2 donation decision will count with a 9 in 10 chance) or whether you would like your week 1 donation decision to count with a 9 in 10 chance (and so your week-2 donation decision will count with a 1 in 10 chance).
- After you have made your week-2 donation decision, a die will be rolled to determine whether your week-1 or your week-2 donation decision is the decision that counts.

Next you will be asked about your donation decision on the screens.

Remember: Your donation decision today could be the decision-that-counts so treat this decision as if it were the decision that will count.

Decision Screens

Week 1 decision:

GiveDirectly

As we mentioned, in this study we are giving you the opportunity to support an exciting new charity, called GiveDirectly.

Would you like to donate to GiveDirectly?

- YES, I'd like to donate \$5 next week.
- NO

Commitment decision (on screen following week 1 decision):

As we mentioned, we will also ask you next week about your donation decision. Here you can choose whether you would like your donation decision today to be the decision-that-counts with a 1 in 10 chance or a 9 in 10 chance. You can also say that it doesn't matter to you which option is chosen, in which case we will flip a coin to decide for you.

Please select below what option you would prefer:

- A:** I definitely want my donation decision **today** to count with a **1 in 10 chance** (and so my donation decision **next week** to count with a **9 in 10 chance**.)
- B:** I definitely want my donation decision **today** to count with a **9 in 10 chance** (and so my donation decision **next week** to count with a **1 in 10 chance**.)
- C:** I truly don't care which option A or B above is chosen. Please flip a coin to decide.

Pledge Treatments (P and PGN)

Note: The instructions of the Pledge and Pledge or Give Now treatments were the same as those for the NN and NL treatments, except for the text below. The screen shots for these treatments are also shown below

- [Treatment Pledge]: We would like to ask you whether you would like to donate \$5 of your show up fee for next week's session to GiveDirectly. You will be asked to answer this question on your screens in a minute. If you answer "YES, I'd like to donate \$5 next week," we will ask you again next week and you can make your decision final at that time, then \$5 of your show up fee next week will be donated. If you say "NO," no donation will be made, and that decision will be final today.

- [Treatment Pledge or Give Now]: We would like to ask you whether you would like to donate \$5 of your show up fee to GiveDirectly. You will be asked to answer this question on your screens in a minute. If you answer “YES, I’d like to donate \$5 today,” \$5 of your show up fee today will be donated. This decision will be final. If you answer “YES, I’d like to donate \$5 next week,” we will ask you again next week and you can make your decision final at that time, then \$5 of your show up fee next week will be donated. If you say “NO,” no donation will be made, and that decision will be final today.

Pledge:

Would you like to donate to GiveDirectly?

- YES, I'd like to donate \$5 next week.
Ask me again next week and I'll make my final decision.
- NO

Pledge or Give Now:

Would you like to donate to GiveDirectly?

- YES, I'd like to donate \$5 today.
- YES, I'd like to donate \$5 next week.
Ask me again next week and I'll make my final decision.
- NO

Appendix C: Additional Analyses

C.1. Analysis of show-up rates

Table C.1 examines the determinants of the decision to show-up in week 2, in the NN, NL and NL&LL treatments. We do not find that the treatment, or the decision to give within each treatment, or any individual characteristic is related to show-up in week 2.

Table C.1. Determinants of show-up in week 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Show-up in Week 2		
NL Treatment	0.039 (0.027)	0.040 (0.033)	0.044 (0.036)
NL&LL Treatment	0.026 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.051)
NL X Give		-0.004 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.031)
NL&LL Treatment X Give		0.048 (0.036)	0.046 (0.035)
NL&LL Treatment X Commitment		0.067 (0.050)	0.066 (0.047)
NL&LL Treatment X Flexibility		-0.013 (0.067)	-0.012 (0.065)
Female student			0.015 (0.029)
Asian origin			-0.012 (0.037)
Economics major			0.012 (0.026)
Senior year			0.008 (0.029)
Native English speaker			0.006 (0.017)
Nr. of correct questions in Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2002)			0.011 (0.015)
Observations	535	535	535

Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects (calculated at the means of all variables) from probit regressions on show-up in week 2. Column (1) presents the marginal effect from probit regressions on the treatment. Column (2) adds interactions with the decision made in week 1. Column (3) adds individual characteristics: female, which takes value one if the subject is a woman, zero otherwise; Asian origin, which takes value one if the subject's ethnicity is Asian, zero otherwise; Economics major, which takes value one if the subject is majoring in economics, zero otherwise; Senior student, which takes value one if the subject is in his or her senior year of studies or higher, zero otherwise; Native English speaker, which takes value one if the subject speaks English as a native language, zero otherwise; and Nr. of correct questions in the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2002). A fixed effect for the show-up fee structure is included in all specifications. Robust standard errors, clustered at the session level, were used in each individual regression. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table C.2. extends the analysis of attrition to the Pledge and Pledge-or-Give-Now

treatments. In week 2, 110 out of 118 subjects showed up (93.2%) in the Pledge treatment. In the Pledge-or-Give-Now treatment, 197 of 215 subjects showed up to the week 2 session (91.6%). As shown in Table C.2., the rate at which subjects showed up does not depend on the treatment or on the decision made by subjects. There are minor differences in the show-up rate depending on gender, and cognitive reflection, but these results should be interpreted with care, due to multiple hypotheses testing.

Table C.2. Determinants of show-up in week 2 in Pledge Treatments

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Show-up in Week 2		
Pledge or Give Now Treatment	0.016 (0.027)	0.038 (0.041)	0.021 (0.043)
Pledge		-0.009 (0.037)	-0.011 (0.032)
Pledge or Give Now Treatment X Pledge		-0.034 (0.058)	-0.007 (0.056)
Pledge or Give Now Treatment X Give Now		-0.045 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.029)
Female student			-0.038* (0.023)
Asian origin			-0.012 (0.025)
Economics major			-0.040 (0.033)
Senior year			0.029 (0.025)
Native English speaker			-0.021 (0.018)
Nr. of correct questions in Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2002)			-0.031** (0.014)
Observations	333	333	330

Notes: This table presents the average marginal effects (calculated at the means of all variables) from probit regressions on show-up in week 2. Column (1) presents the marginal effect from probit regressions on the treatment. Column (2) adds interactions with the decision made in week 1. Column (3) adds individual characteristics, as defined in Table C.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the session level, were used in each individual regression. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

C.2. Behavior of no-shows

Table C.2 displays week 1 decisions in the NN, NL and NL&LL treatments, by show-up to week 2 of the experiment. Decisions made in week 1 are not related to the decision to show-up in week 2.

Table C.2. Week 1 decision, by week 2 show-up rate

Treatment	Week 1 decision	Week 2 Show-up		χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value
		Yes	No	
NN	Give	31%	29%	0.856
NL	Give	46%	45%	0.949
NL&LL	Give in week 1	48%	55%	0.546
	Commitment ($p = 0.9$)	38%	55%	
	Indifference ($p = 0.5$)	27%	20%	
	Flexibility ($p = 0.1$)	34%	25%	

C.3. Robustness tests: Results including no-shows

We examine the robustness of our results for the NN and NL to the inclusion of participants who did not show-up for the second week of the experiment (no-shows). The rate of giving in the NN treatment is 30.7%. It is 45.7% in the NL treatment. The difference is highly significant, as in the main text (χ^2 -test, $p < 0.01$).

C.4. Uncertainty and Flexibility: Detailed Results

At the end of the week 2 session, we asked individuals to provide their agreement or disagreement with the following statements: “Over the last week... (a) I thought about GiveDirectly” (GD thought); (b) I read or did research about GiveDirectly” (GD read); (c) I learned about other charities like GiveDirectly” (Thought others); (d) I thought about whether my financial situation allows me to donate to GiveDirectly” (Thought budget). Answers were provided on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Based on these statements we construct an index, that we label as Resolving Uncertainty index, that measures the extent to which the individual thought and did research about her donation decision. We also elicited the extent to which the

search for information about GiveDirectly changed the subject’s opinion, through the statement “Over the last week I became more favorable about GiveDirectly.” (GD more favorable). We present average responses to each variable in Table C.4. A regression analysis of each individual question on behavior between week 1 and week 2, used to construct the Resolving Uncertainty index, and donation decisions is presented in Table C.5.

Table C.4. Self-reported behaviors between week 1 and week 2 sessions (NL&LL treatment)

	GD thought	GD read	Thought others	Thought budget	GD more favorable
(Donate, Donate)					
Flexibility Demand	3.6	2.8	2.9	4.3	3.0
Indifference	3.3	2.1	2.2	2.9	3.1
Commitment Demand	3.4	2.1	2.6	3.1	3.0
(Not Donate, Not Donate)					
Flexibility Demand	3.3	2.5	2.8	3.7	2.8
Indifference	3.0	1.9	1.9	3.4	2.3
Commitment Demand	3.5	2.3	2.4	4.3	2.8
(Donate, Not Donate)					
Flexibility Demand	3.1	2.3	2.8	3.6	3.0
Indifference	4.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.3
Commitment Demand	3.4	2.0	2.1	2.7	2.6
(Not Donate, Donate)					
Flexibility Demand	4.4	3.4	3.0	4.4	3.6
Indifference	3.3	2.0	2.3	3.0	2.3
Commitment Demand	3.3	2.7	2.3	4.2	3.1

C.5. Gender Differences in Time Inconsistency

Table C.6. disaggregates the results of the experiment by gender. In the NN and NL treatments the number of male participants is 124 and the number of female participants is 194. In the NL&LL treatment the number of male participants is 75 and that of female participants is 88.

Table C.5. Flexibility and Uncertainty: Individual behaviors

	(1) GD thought	(2) GD read	(3) Thought others	(4) Thought budget
(Not Donate, Not Donate)	-0.317 (0.522)	-0.283 (0.597)	-0.300 (0.504)	0.467 (0.332)
(Donate, Not Donate)	0.733** (0.262)	-0.133 (0.321)	-0.200 (0.588)	1.067* (0.552)
(Not Donate, Donate)	0.067 (0.500)	-0.133 (0.588)	0.133 (0.274)	0.067 (0.541)
Demand Commitment	0.162 (0.240)	-0.062 (0.466)	0.371 (0.500)	0.138 (0.474)
(Not Donate, Not Donate) X Demand Commitment	0.421 (0.496)	0.488 (0.669)	0.162 (0.621)	0.795** (0.336)
(Donate, Not Donate) X Demand Commitment	-0.733 (0.783)	0.062 (0.609)	-0.229 (0.664)	-1.424 (0.791)
(Not Donate, Donate) X Demand Commitment	-0.162 (0.589)	0.729 (0.677)	-0.371 (0.557)	1.029 (0.654)
Demand Flexibility	0.317 (0.305)	0.617 (0.327)	0.717 (0.463)	1.400** (0.501)
(Not Donate, Not Donate) X Demand Flexibility	-0.017 (0.628)	0.079 (0.687)	0.217 (0.383)	-1.133* (0.539)
(Donate, Not Donate) X Demand Flexibility	-1.233*** (0.343)	-0.367 (0.452)	0.033 (0.805)	-1.775** (0.711)
(Not Donate, Donate) X Demand Flexibility	0.725 (0.732)	0.758 (0.533)	-0.050 (0.318)	-0.025 (0.538)
Constant	3.267*** (0.262)	2.133*** (0.418)	2.200*** (0.317)	2.933*** (0.354)
Observations	163	161	163	163
R-squared	0.072	0.096	0.107	0.144

Table C.6. Results by Gender

	Men	Women
NN and NL Treatments		
Decide Now to Give Now (NN): Share of giving	0.323 (0.058)	0.300 (0.046)
Decide Now to Give Later (NL): Share of giving	0.390 (0.058)	0.500 (0.046)
NN vs. NL: χ^2 -test (p -val)	0.438	0.004
NL&LL Treatment		
Week 1 Decision (NL): Share of giving	0.413 (0.057)	0.534 (0.053)
Week 2 Decision (LL): Share of giving	0.387 (0.056)	0.398 (0.052)
NL vs. LL: Wilcoxon signed ranks test (p -val)	0.670	0.052
Dynamic Inconsistency and Commitment Demand		
(Donate, Not Donate) & $p=0.1$	0.093	0.193
(Donate, Not Donate) & indifference	0.027	0.045
(Donate, Not Donate) & $p=0.9$	0.040	0.045
(Donate, Donate) & $p=0.1$	0.080	0.068
(Donate, Donate) & indifference	0.080	0.102
(Donate, Donate) & $p=0.9$	0.093	0.080
(Not Donate, Donate) & $p=0.1$	0.053	0.045
(Not Donate, Donate) & indifference	0.013	0.023
(Not Donate, Donate) & $p=0.9$	0.067	0.080
(Not Donate, Not Donate) & $p=0.1$	0.093	0.057
(Not Donate, Not Donate) & indifference	0.160	0.091
(Not Donate, Not Donate) & $p=0.9$	0.200	0.170

Notes: This table presents the behavior of male and female participants in the NN, NL and NL&LL treatments of the experiment. The table presents the frequency of each behavior unless otherwise noted. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses for giving rates.

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