Organizational Economics Working Group

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• Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume Frechette
  The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
• Ricard Gil, Justin Marion
  The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence for California Highway Procurement Auctions
• Hideshi Itoh, Hodaka Morita
  Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem
• Simon Board
  Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty
• David Cooper, Kai-Uwe Kuhn
  Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
• Yuk-fai Fong
  Relational Contracts, Limited Liability, and Employment Dynamics
• Giacomo Calzolari, Giancarlo Spagnolo
  Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening
• Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Klaus Schmidt
  Screening, Competition and Job Design
• Claudine Desrieux, Eshien Chong, Stephane Saussier
  Putting All One's Eggs in One Basket: Relational Contracts and the Provision of Local Public Services
• David Miller, Joel Watson
  A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Renegotiation
• David McAdams
  Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership

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