Market Design Working Group Meeting
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Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz
Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment -
Sven Seuken, Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Mary Czerwinski, Kamal Jain
Hidden Market Design: A Peer-to-peer Backup Market -
Soohyung Lee, Muriel Niederle
Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets -
Gary E. Bolton, Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information -
Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, Matthew Shum
Aggregate Matchings -
Dirk Bergemann, Johannes Horner
Should Auctions Be Transparent ? -
Isa E. Hafalir, Mehmet B. Yenmez, Muhammed A. Yildirim
Effective Affirmative Action in School Choice -
Susan Athey, Dominic Coey, Jonathan D. Levin
Subsidies and Set-Asides in Auctions -
Yinghua He
Gaming School Choice Mechanisms -
Lawrence Ausubel, Oleg V. Baranov
Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information -
Mallesh Pai, Rakesh Vohra
Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders -
Simon Board, Andrzej Skrzypacz
Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Durable Goods: Posted Prices and Fire Sales -
Marek Pycia, Utku Unver
Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources -
Fuhito Kojima, Parag Pathak, Alvin E. Roth
Matching with Couples: Incentives and Stability in Large Markets
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