Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India

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Abstract

Disclosure laws for politicians exist in over a hundred countries. But can public disclosures about politician performance and qualifications influence electoral accountability in settings characterized by weak institutions and less educated populations? In the run-up to the 2008 elections in Delhi we implemented a field experiment where we provided slum dwellers with newspapers containing report cards giving information on candidate qualifications and legislator performance obtained under India’s disclosure laws. Access to report cards increased voter turnout; this effect is larger when incumbent performance is worse. We also observe reductions in the incidence of cash-based vote buying and electoral gains for better performing incumbents. Finally, we observe significant voter sophistication in the use of information – voters make comparisons across spending categories and candidates to overcome political agency problems and reward better performing incumbents.

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1 Introduction

The poor numerically dominate the electorate in many low-income democracies, yet have largely failed to translate their political weight into effective service delivery and other economic gains (see, for instance, Mauro (1995); UNDP (2002)).

Explanations abound. The use of clientelistic policies (which target along ethnic lines) may cause poor voters to value a politician’s group identity over and above his other qualifications (Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2004; Banerjee and Pande, 2009). Weak electoral institutions – ballot stuffing, vote buying, voter intimidation – may allow the political elite to subvert democracy (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Simpser, 2008). Voters may be unable to identify politicians who would serve them well, either because they lack the information or because they are unable to interpret the available information (Djankov et al., 2010).

The empirical challenge of distinguishing between these views comes from the fact that weak institutions, clientelistic policies and poorly informed voter populations often coexist. In this paper we use a large field experiment in urban India to evaluate one channel of influence – information about politician performance and qualifications. Building on insights from political agency models, we test whether providing such information via the media influences voter turnout and incumbent voteshare.

Our field experiment occurred in the run-up to the 2008 state legislature elections in Delhi, India’s capital city. Legislators in Delhi are elected from single-member jurisdictions. Recent disclosure laws allowed our partner NGO to obtain detailed information on legislator performance and characteristics.1 We published this information in the form of jurisdiction-specific report cards in a leading vernacular newspaper. Each report card contained information about incumbent performance along three dimensions – legislative activity, committee attendance and spending of discretionary constituency development funds (divided among ten spending categories). It also provided information on the wealth, education and criminal record of the incumbent and two main challengers in that jurisdiction.

In a random sample of 200 slums, households received a pamphlet on legislator responsibilities and a free copy of the newspaper that featured the report card for their jurisdiction. Households in the 575 control slums did not receive any informational material.

The publication of report cards was unanticipated by politicians and occurred after the last date for candidate entry. Hence, the primary channel of influence we identify is how information influences selection by voters.2 We observe change along three dimensions. The campaign

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1These include the 2005 Indian Right to Information Act and a 2003 Indian Supreme Court ruling.

2Political agency models identify several reasons for why electoral accountability improves politician performance. In the incentive view, the threat of being voted out of office constrains politicians to act in the social interest (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). In the selection view voters use elections to select politicians who they
increased voter turnout by 3.5 percent, or two percentage points (from 57.5% to 59.5%). While it did not influence average incumbent vote share, worse performing incumbents and those facing better qualified challengers received significantly fewer votes. We do not observe significant changes in party campaigning. However, cash-based vote-buying was 19 percentage points less likely to occur in treatment polling stations.

Survey data shows that the treatment increased citizen knowledge of legislator responsibilities and performance. While literate voters are more likely to remember the statistics reported in the newspaper, gains in knowledge about incumbent performance and use of information in deciding voting behavior occurred among both literate and illiterate voters. We use features of our information campaign to provide evidence on the nature of learning.

Information about incumbent performance led to non-linear turnout effects, with voters more energized by worse performers. This finding is consistent with results on expressive voting reported in the literature (Bloom and Price, 1975; Washington, 2006; Hastings et al., 2007). Using a simple political agency model we show that this result can be explained by voter pessimism about incumbent quality – a fact which is consistent with the incumbency disadvantage seen in many low income countries, including India.

Consistent with the selection effect emphasized in political agency models, performance information also influenced incumbent vote shares. Voters rewarded incumbents who attended oversight committees and spent more of their constituency development funds in slums (in contrast, the extent of legislative activism left incumbent vote share unaffected). The spending results are striking as voters appear to have used information on extent of slum spending (possibly derived from what they observed in their slum) to evaluate the relative merits of spending in different public good categories.

Finally, we exploit the fact that a newspaper contained report cards for two neighboring jurisdictions to provide further evidence on the rational use of information by slum dwellers. Voters may want to use the performance of other incumbents as a yardstick if there are common shocks to performance. Arguably, the two performance indicators that voters cared about differ in this respect. Committee attendance should be similar across jurisdictions. And in this case voters do use the performance of the incumbent in the neighboring jurisdiction as a yardstick. This, however, is not the case for slum spending where voters instead use local information to calibrate performance. We also find that voters use yardsticks in evaluating qualifications. Specifically, voters compare incumbent and challenger qualifications within the jurisdiction. Incumbents who were richer or less well educated than their challengers received fewer votes.
Moreover, voters ignore information about relative qualifications of non available candidates (challengers in the neighboring jurisdiction).

Our paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on electoral accountability. Several of these papers identify the net impact (selection and incentive) of information on policy-making in democratic setting (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Stromberg, 2004; Snyder and Stromberg, 2010). Broadly, increased media penetration makes governments more responsive to voter needs, as measured by policy outcomes. More closely related to our paper is Ferraz and Finan (2008) who show that electoral outcomes respond to information about incumbent corruption record. We extend this literature in several ways.

First, unlike the existing literature, our intervention holds fixed party response and isolates the pure selection effect of information. We can, therefore, directly show that voters respond to incumbent performance and are willing to act on credible information. Second, by considering measures of politician performance and qualifications obtained under existing disclosure laws we evaluate the relevance of laws which provide broad information about politician qualifications and performance (which is not just the corruption record). Our results demonstrate that voters are able to process performance information in a sophisticated manner.

This evidence is particularly salient in the case of discretionary spending from constituency development funds (CDF). CDFs are a popular decentralization initiative in many low income democracies, which provide local legislators with discretionary funds to spend on local development needs. Many have expressed concern that such earmark funds increase political corruption (Tshangana, 2010). Others argue that the main constraint on the use of these funds remains legislator effort, with fewer funds utilized in party strongholds (Keefer and Khemani, 2009). Our results suggest that information disclosures can play an important role in disciplining politicians and rewarding good performance. More broadly, our results support the optimistic view of the power of information disclosures suggested by Djankov et al. (2010), based on the negative cross-country correlation between disclosure laws and corruption.

By using newspapers as the channel of dissemination we also provide direct evidence on how the print media can increase accountability in a low income setting. In this sense, our paper is also related to several recent studies that relate information from media sources to turnout and governance outcomes (Stromberg, 2004; Gentzkow, 2006; della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007). More broadly, our findings further emphasize the importance of an independent and credible media source in enhancing the quality of government (Besley and Prat, 2006; Djankov et al., 2003).

India was one of the first countries to introduce CDFs in 1993; since then, the following countries have adopted CDFs: Southern Sudan, Philippines, Honduras, Nepal, Pakistan, Jamaica, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda, Ghana, and Malaysia. The last six countries distribute a fixed amount of funds annually per constituency/legislator, while Kenya and Tanzania partially adjust the formula according to to population, poverty levels, and geographical size of each constituency (Tshangana, 2010).
Finally, our results contribute to the growing literature that use field experiments to evaluate voter behavior in low income countries (for an overview, see Pande (2011)). This literature builds on the insights of the US based Get Out the Vote literature (Gerber and Green, 2000). Papers in this literature show significant turnout effects for non-partisan motivational campaigns (Gine and Mansuri, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2010) and campaigns that exhort voters to use their electoral influence to protest against malpractices (Collier and Vicente, 2008). Evidence on whether information disclosures improve electoral accountability is more limited but tends to support the view that citizens seek to base their voting choices on incumbent performance (Chong et al., 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2010).

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a conceptual framework to help interpret what we find. Section 3 describes the context, the experimental intervention and empirical design. Section 4 provides the results and Section 5 concludes.

2 A Conceptual Framework

We are interested in understanding how information about candidate performance and qualifications influenced electoral outcomes. The release of this information (via report cards in newspapers) was unanticipated and occurred after candidate entry. Therefore, we use the model to examine how information affected voter inference about candidate quality and the twin decisions of whether to vote and who to vote for.

2.1 Basic Model

Consider an economy composed of a single jurisdiction and populated by three groups of voters. A fraction $\mu$ are partisan voters, of which fraction $\xi$ always vote for the incumbent and fraction $1-\xi$ always vote for the challenger. The remainder $(1-\mu)$ are swing voters who are non-strategic but face a cost of voting. If they vote, they vote for the candidate whose expected performance is the highest.

The timing of the model is as follows. We begin with an incumbent $I$ in office. Nature determines his quality $\theta_k(I)$ which can take two values, $\theta_H$ and $\theta_L$. An election then occurs with two candidates, the incumbent and challenger denoted as $i = I, C$ respectively. In voting swing

\footnote{Chong et al. (2010) evaluates an information campaign in Mexico where program information was provided to voters. Since incumbent politicians cannot stand for re-election the voters faced the more complicated metric of using this information to hold parties (not candidates) accountable. One interpretation of their main finding (that voter turnout is lower when incumbents perform worse) is that party affiliations are relatively strong in Mexico. In ongoing work, Humphreys and Weinstein (2010) examine the incentive effects of providing information and preliminary results suggest that voters care about information.}
voters care about candidate $i$’s performance $y_i$, which takes the values 0 or 1, and is determined by his quality $\theta_k(i)$ such that $\Pr[y = 1|\theta_H] = \alpha > 1/2$ and $\Pr[y = 1|\theta_L] = 1 - \alpha < 1/2$.

Voters have priors about candidate quality, where $p_H(i)$ is the prior probability that the candidate $i$ is quality $\theta_H$. We assume that $\theta_k$ for the incumbent and challenger are independently drawn from the respective prior distributions. Voters use available information to update this prior, and $\pi_H(i)$ denotes the corresponding posterior probability. A swing voter votes for the candidate with a higher $\pi_H(i)$. However she only votes if the expected payoff gain from voting for candidate $i$ exceeds her cost of voting $\bar{c}$. That is, a voter with cost $\bar{c}$ only votes if

$$|\alpha(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C)) + (1 - \alpha)[(1 - \pi_H(I)) - (1 - \pi_H(C))]|$$

$$= |2\alpha(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C))| \geq \bar{c}.$$

Defining a variable $c = \frac{\bar{c}}{2\alpha - 1}$, we can write this inequality as

$$|(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C))| \geq c.$$

Assume that $c$ for each voter is independently drawn from a uniform distributed over $[0, \bar{c}]$ where $\bar{c}$ is large enough that we do not have to worry about everyone voting.

At this point, it is useful to note two features of the model. First, our formulation of politician performance explicitly suppresses incentive effects allowing us to focus on the selection effects. Second, we assume voting is expressive not strategic. While this provides the simplest internally consistent explanation for our voting results, our empirical results also remain consistent with strategic voting.

Citizens update their beliefs about candidates on the basis of signals received before the election. All voters observe the same three signals. These include signals on quality for incumbent and challenger: $\theta^s(i)$, a signal for $\theta_H(i), i = I, C$ and a signal for incumbent performance $y(I)$ in period 1: $y^s(I)$.

$$\Pr[y^s(I) = 1|y(I) = 1] = \Pr[y^s(I) = 0|y(I) = 0] = \beta > 1/2.$$

$$\Pr[\theta^s(i) = \theta_H|\theta(i) = \theta_H] = \Pr[\theta^s(i) = \theta_L|\theta(i) = \theta_L] = \gamma > 1/2, i = I, C$$

Voters update their priors of $\theta(i)$ using these signals.

The independence of quality signals derives from our assumption that candidate quality is independently drawn. If this were violated, then we would learn about both candidates from a signal about one candidate. However, as long as a signal is more informative about the candidate it refers to, it should not change our main results.
2.2 Results

We are interested in how turnout and incumbent vote shares are influenced by the release of report cards. We model the delivery of report cards as improving the precision of the signals $\beta$ and $\gamma$.

To evaluate this we start by describing voters’ belief updating process. Consider a voter who observes a generic signal vector $\{\theta^s(I), y^s(I), \theta^s(C)\}$. He updates his posterior using Bayes rule.

$$
\pi_H(I)_{\theta^s(I), y^s(I)} = \frac{\Pr\{\theta^s(I), y^s(I) | \theta_H\} p_H(I)}{\Pr\{\theta^s(I), y^s(I) | \theta_H\} p_H(I) + \Pr\{\theta^s(I), y^s(I) | \theta_L\}(1 - p_H(I))}
$$

and

$$
\pi_H(C)_{\theta^s(C)} = \frac{\Pr\{\theta^s(C) | \theta_H\} p_H(C)}{\Pr\{\theta^s(C) | \theta_H\} p_H(C) + \Pr\{\theta^s(C) | \theta_L\}(1 - p_H(C))}
$$

Computing the probabilities in this expression (see Appendix) gives us

$$
\pi_H(I)|_{\theta_{H,1}} = \frac{p_H(I)[\alpha \beta + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)] \gamma}{p_H(I)[\alpha \beta + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)] \gamma + (1 - p_H(I))[1 - \alpha \beta + (1 - \beta) \alpha](1 - \gamma)}
$$

and

$$
\pi_H(I)|_{\theta_{H,0}} = \frac{p_H(I)[(1 - \alpha) \beta + \alpha(1 - \beta)] \gamma}{p_H(I)[(1 - \alpha) \beta + \alpha(1 - \beta)] \gamma + (1 - p_H(I))[\alpha \beta + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)](1 - \gamma)}
$$

Since $\alpha > 1/2$, an increase in $\beta$ will increase $\pi(I)_{\theta_{H,1}}$ and reduce $\pi(I)_{\theta_{H,0}}$. We are interested in how a small increase in $\beta$ influences electoral outcomes.

**Claim 1** If for the initial value of $\beta$, $\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C) > 0$, then a small increase in $\beta$ increases turnout and incumbent vote share when the incumbent has performed well and reduces turnout and his vote share when he has performed badly. If, however, $\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C) < 0$, a small increase in $\beta$ reduces turnout but increases incumbent vote share when the incumbent has performed well and increases turnout and reduces his vote share when he has performed badly.

This proposition tells us that information will always have a more positive effect on the vote shares of incumbents who have performed well than those who have performed badly. Importantly, for small changes in $\beta$ the turnout effects allow us to infer something about the underlying distribution of priors.\(^5\) Specifically, the effect on turnout goes the same direction as the incumbent’s vote share when the incumbent is perceived to be better than the challenger.

\(^5\)If information has large effects then it is possible that the increase in $\beta$ or $\gamma$ actually makes incumbent go from being worse than the challenger to being better (or the other way around), which would complicate the turnout analysis of turnout.
based on public information but goes the other way when he is perceived to be worse. The proof is in the Appendix.

A very similar result holds for characteristic information, though the argument is somewhat more involved. The basic point is that the gap between the vote share of a "good" incumbent and a "bad" incumbent should go up with a small increase in $\gamma$, but whether this increases or reduces turnout depends on whether the incumbent was perceived to be better than the challenger based on public information (in which case it moves with the incumbent vote share), or whether he was seen as worse, in which case it goes the other way.

2.3 Extensions

We have assumed that the "production" function for $y$ is known. If this is uncertain then the voter will try to infer something about the production function by observing other incumbents and his decision will depend not just on $y^S$ but also on signals about the qualities of the other incumbents. In other words there will be an yardstick effect. We examine this effect empirically below.

3 Experimental Design and Data

This section describes the context of our intervention and the design of report cards.

3.1 Setting

A. Elections in Delhi

Delhi is India’s national capital and second-largest metropolis. It is also designated as an Indian state, and has an independent legislature composed of seventy legislators. Elections occur every five years with each legislator elected via plurality rule from a single member jurisdiction.

It is easy to see why the hypothesis of limited information has prima facie plausibility in the context of elections in Delhi election and developing countries more generally: First, each legislator represents over a hundred thousand citizens; Few have talked to him or even met him. Second, a large majority of the poorer voters, even in a place like Delhi, which has high literacy rates by Indian standards, do not regularly read newspapers, which are the main source of relatively unbiased information about politics and politicians.\footnote{In a household survey among slum dwellers in our sample 40% of the men and 66% of the women stated that they do not read newspapers, compared to 50% of men and women in the U.S. with household incomes less than $20,000 (NAA, 2008).} Third, there has been a steady accretion in the responsibilities assigned to the legislators over the last two decades, as a part of
an overall push towards decentralization and devolution of powers away from the bureaucracy, with the consequence that voters do not know exactly what they should expect from their legislator.

Our field experiment occurred in the run-up to the November 2008 State election. The three major parties contesting were the incumbent party Congress and two opposition parties Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). All three parties saw issues relating to the urban poor as central to their campaign. Congress campaigned on a platform of local development, and emphasized the regularization of slums undertaken since 2007.\(^7\) In contrast, BJP campaigned on the platform of controlling price rise and combatting terrorism.\(^8\) The third party, BSP, was a lower-caste party which was the ruling party in the state of Uttar Pradesh. This election marked BSP’s first entry in Delhi elections.

Our campaign was timed to coincide with the two week official campaign period (ending 48 hours before polling starts). This period saw widespread party campaigning, especially in slums. According to newspapers and local observers, political parties plied slum voters with bribes, most often in the form of liquor and cash. This was, for instance, reflected in a 400 percent rise in reported liquor smuggling cases two weeks prior to the election, with the Delhi excise department registering over 1,500 bootlegging cases in the month prior to the election (IANS, 2008).

**B. Public Disclosure Laws in India**

Our experiment makes use of two Indian disclosure laws. In October 2005 the Indian Right to Information (RTI) Act was implemented. The Act gives Indian citizens access to all non-classified government records. Under the provisions of the Act, a citizen may request information from a public authority and be legally entitled to an expeditious reply (typically within thirty days). It is estimated that roughly a million RTI petitions have been filed annually since 2005 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). Our partner NGO filed over 70 RTIs in 2008, through which it obtained information about legislator responsibilities and incumbent performance along several dimensions.

Our second source of disclosures is the 2003 Supreme Court ruling that made it compulsory for candidates contesting national and state elections to submit affidavits at the time of filing their nomination, containing information on criminal charges, assets and liabilities and

\(^7\)In 2007 the Congress government initiated slum regularization, whereby slum dwellers could purchase property rights to the government land they illegally inhabited at a heavily discounted rate. The regularization process also included a government drive to provide basic amenities to illegal settlements located on both public and private land, such as water supply, sanitation, drainage and roads.

\(^8\)Their main campaign slogan was *Mehengi Padi Congress* ("Congress is Expensive"); during 2008, Delhi saw sharp price inflation of food, fuel, and other consumer goods. Coincidentally, Delhi elections occurred three days after the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks, which many predicted would bolster the BJP in elections.
Our measures of candidate qualifications are based on this affidavit information for candidates of the three major parties.

3.2 Report Cards

The central plank of our information campaign was door to door distribution of newspapers containing report cards on legislator characteristics and performance. Below, we describe these data and Table 1 provides a summary.

A. Performance measures

The RTI responses told us that Delhi legislators have three main responsibilities. First, to attend the legislature and act as a voice for their constituency during the legislative process. Table 1 shows that mean attendance in the legislature in 2007 was 16.9 out of 18 sessions and nearly 70% of legislators had perfect attendance. There is more variation in participation – during the 2007 legislative session, approximately half the legislators asked no questions, while the remaining half asked between 2 and 77 questions each.

Second, legislators participate in three oversight committees – the Ration Vigilance Committee, the Police Vigilance Committee, and the District Development Committee. The first two are jurisdiction-level committees tasked with ensuring that the local ration shops, which provide subsidized food to below-poverty-line residents, function effectively and that the local police station, functions well and the police do not harass locals, take bribes, or engage in other types of corruption respectively. The District Development Committee, in contrast, is a district-level committee that provides oversight of development projects. Unlike the first two committees, it is not convened by the legislator, though legislators do play a role as members. Across Delhi we observe that 70% of legislators attended their jurisdictions most recent ration committee meeting, 46% attended the police vigilance committee meeting and only 29% attended the district development committee meetings. However, in our experimental sample no legislator attended the district development committee.

Finally, each legislator enjoys access to a constituency development fund. He receives 20 million Rupees a year (roughly $ 45,000) to spend on development in their jurisdiction, known as the MLALADS (Local Area Development Scheme) Fund, along with five million Rupees annually to be spent exclusively on water development (known as the Delhi Water Board Priority

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9This judgment was implemented by the Indian Election Commission which made filing an affidavit disclosing this information a precondition for appearing in the ballot.

10Delhi legislature rules state that any question raised must relate to a matter of administration for which the Government is responsible.
Fund). The legislator is responsible for fund allocation, with implementation undertaken by the involved municipal corporation.\textsuperscript{11}

A first indicator of spending performance is total spending under the scheme, since unallocated funds are lost to the jurisdiction (unspent money can be rolled over into the next year, but is forfeit at the end of the legislative term). Our report card provided information on how legislator spent money between 2004 and 2007. In this period, the average legislator spent 512 lakh - more than 80\% of the funds available to him. We observe significant variation in MLALADS allocation across spending category. Across Delhi, spending on roads and sidewalks accounted for an average of 300 lakh, 60\% of a legislator’s total allocation. In contrast to MLALADS spending, we observe no variation in spending under Delhi Water Board Scheme.

Our analysis exploits variation across report cards for our sample of ten jurisdictions along three dimensions: First, attendance and number of questions asked in the legislature in 2007. Second, legislator attendance at the most recent meeting of two committees: Ration Vigilance Committee and Police Vigilance Committee. Third, legislator spending from MLALADS from 2004 to 2007 under the following categories; roads (including sidewalks), water (referring to water supply infrastructure such as borewells, pumps, and tanks), parks and statues, sewage (sewage pipes and public toilets), drains, lights, community halls, and boundary walls and others.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{B. Qualification Indicators}

Affidavits filed by candidates provided information on value of assets owned by the candidate and his/her spouse, criminal charges and educational qualifications.

91 candidates had pending criminal charges. These candidates featured prominently on the rolls of the major parties (a quarter of the major party candidates faced criminal charges). Half the incumbents in our sample faced criminal charges.

A common characterization of wealth in India is being a \textit{crorepati}, i.e. have assets in excess of Rs. 10 million. In the 2008 election close to 20\% of the candidates (153 candidates) were crorepati. Delhi Election Watch, a consortium of NGOs that independently monitors elections, analyzed the change in personal assets of the 45 incumbents who were recontesting. The average increase in assets per MLA over a single five-year term was 211\%, amounting to an average of almost 1.8 crore.

Finally, candidates in Delhi are relatively well-educated. Overall, only 3\% (18 candidates)\textsuperscript{11}After deciding on a particular development project, the legislator must obtain cost and feasibility analysis from the implementing municipal corporation. He then allocates funds to the municipal corporation, which carries out the work.

\textsuperscript{12}The two performance indicators which show no variation across our sample (and are, therefore, dropped from the analysis) are attendance in District Development Committee (no legislator attended) and spending from water board fund (all legislators spent the full amount).
were illiterate. 18% had up to 10 years of schooling, and 19% had up to twelve years of schooling. 19% held a college degree and 15% a post graduate or professional degree.

The report card for a jurisdiction provided information on total assets, criminal charges and education qualifications for the three major party candidates (which always included the incumbent).

3.3 Experimental Design

A. Sample

Our sample comes from ten jurisdictions with a high density of slums and where the incumbent was standing for re-election. Table 1, column (5) shows that incumbent performance and characteristics in treatment jurisdictions was very similar to other jurisdictions.

Within a jurisdiction our sample frame consisted of polling stations located in slums. Households are assigned to polling stations on the basis of a door to door survey conducted by the Indian Election commission. A polling station serves roughly 400 households (1000 adult voters) who live in the same or adjacent neighborhoods. In our jurisdictions we identified slum polling stations in conjunction with our partner NGO. Our sampling frame consisted of the 775 polling stations in the ten jurisdiction which served voters living in slums. In each jurisdiction, we randomly selected twenty polling stations for treatment. This yielded a sample of 200 treatment slum polling stations and 575 control polling stations.

B. Intervention

Our intervention targeted households with at least one adult voter who featured on the voter list of a treatment polling station. These households were exposed to a three-phase voter information campaign.

*Pamphlet Campaign* The first phase was a door to door campaign, in which treatment households received a pamphlet containing three types of information. First, information about the voting process including the actual mechanics of voting, such as how to determine if one is eligible to vote, accepted forms of identity proof, and what to do if one felt they were being unfairly denied the right to vote. Voters were reminded that vote-buying is illegal and they should not let party workers accompany them to the polling station. and roles and responsibilities of an MLA (see Figure 2). Second, legislator responsibilities were listed. Third, voters were informed about politician disclosure laws and encouraged to read our partner newspaper to learn about candidates’ backgrounds. During this phase, no candidate-specific information was provided.

On average, a two-member NGO team covered the households associated with a polling station in one and half days. Monitoring reports show that, on average, two-thirds of the
households in a polling station were reached with the NGO spending 15 minutes at a household.

Newspaper Campaign Between 20 and 25 November 2008 (roughly ten days before the election) our partner newspaper published report cards on incumbent performance and candidate qualifications. Each day the newspaper featured two report cards (an example is provided in Figure 3). The choice of the two jurisdictions featured in a single newspaper was made by the research team on the basis of geographic proximity. On the morning of the newspaper publication NGO workers placed a free copy of the newspaper on the doorstep of each household included in the treatment slums. Four hundred newspapers were disseminated in each slum, yielding a total delivery of 80,000 newspapers.

After the distribution of newspapers, independently hired monitors visited 20 households in 172 of the 200 treatment polling stations to check for the presence of the Hindustan newspaper and door to door pamphlets. The free Hindustan newspapers were observed in 80% of households, and 76% of households either had a copy available or reported seeing the pamphlet that was distributed in the door to door campaign.

Focus Group Discussions In the final phase, NGO workers organized focus groups, where they facilitated a detailed public discussion of the information provided in the newspapers and door-to-door campaign. These discussions occurred within 48 hours of newspaper distribution. At least one focus group discussion was conducted in neighborhood(s) associated with each treatment polling station. These discussions were held in a public locality in the neighborhood. Monitors were assigned to observe 155 focus group discussions. In 130 instances, monitors successfully located and observed the focus group discussions. The meetings lasted an average of one and a half hours and average attendance was 20 women and 14 men. The monitoring reports indicate that the observed discussions mainly focused on the newspaper content, and complied with the campaign’s directive to remain non-partisan.

3.4 Data

Our empirical analysis utilizes several datasets. The first is official electoral returns which are available at the polling station-level. The two outcomes of interest are voter turnout and incumbent vote share. Average voter turnout in the control polling stations was 57%, and the average incumbent vote share was 46%. Nine of the ten incumbents were from the ruling party (Congress). Nine of the ten incumbents in our sample won the election, and the margin of victory (in our sample) varied from 0.53% to 30%.

The second is from a observational survey: in 29 treatment and 32 control polling stations, a surveyor spent approximately four hours on the eve of the election noting any visible evidence
of party campaigning and/or distribution of cash, liquor, food, clothes or milk/refreshments as enticement. We first use these data to measure whether the observer saw any door to door campaigning or public rallies. Both types of campaigning was widespread. 95% of the polling stations witnessed door to door campaigning and public rallies were conducted in over 70%. Second, we examine whether the observer noted any instances of either cash or non-cash gift giving by outsiders in the slum. Such gift giving was prevalent in roughly 80% of the slums.

Third, we use data from a household survey that was conducted in the six day interval between election day and when results were announced. The survey was conducted in the 200 treatment polling stations and a randomly selected 200 control polling station localities. In each polling station ten randomly selected individuals were administered a brief pop-quiz on their civic knowledge.

Our analysis also uses report card data to identify whether voter responsiveness varied with incumbent performance and qualifications. On spending, the report card provided category-wise information. It is likely that categories differ in their relevance for slum dwellers – for example, road spending may be less useful for slum dwellers who have unpaved roads. Therefore, after the elections we recruited the NGOs that had previously carried out the door-to-door campaign to identify whether each of the spending items that incumbent legislator had allocated money towards benefited slum residents. Each NGO was provided a list of all projects in their jurisdiction that had been allocated funding by the incumbent. The NGO then dispatched fieldworkers to visit the location of each individual spending item and assess whether or not it mainly benefitted residents living in areas we had defined as slums. This allows us to identify ex post development spending that occurred in slums (overall and category-wise).

In Table 2 we report a randomization check. Panel A uses electoral roll data and Panel B survey data from the household survey conducted just after the election. The average polling station had a thousand electors, and panel B shows that these electors are relatively poor – the average per capita household income is a dollar a day. In column (3) we observe balance on electoral roll covariates across treatment and control polling stations for the electoral data sample (775 polling stations). In column (6) we observe similar balance for both electoral and survey data for the household sample (3896 respondents across 388 jurisdictions). In column (9) we consider the smaller sample of 61 polling stations for which we have observational data. The electoral data and observer reports on fraction temporary housing are balanced. However, in the household survey we observe imbalance on two covariates – monthly income and literacy. It is unclear whether this reflects household sample imbalance (which we do not use for the vote-buying regressions) or imbalance at the polling station level. Here, we report pure experimental estimates but we have checked that our results are robust to controlling for average household covariates.
4 Did Information Influence Voter Behavior?

This section discusses estimation and campaign impacts on citizen knowledge and electoral behavior.

A. Estimation Strategy and Inference

The survey data measures outcomes at the individual level and the electoral data at polling station level. The latter is also the unit of randomization. Equation (1) describes the Intent to Treat (ITT) estimator defined for individual \( i \) in slum \( s \) located in jurisdiction \( j \)

\[ Y_{isj} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{sj} + \epsilon_{isj} \]  

We estimate this regression using survey data. \( T_{sj} \) is a dummy indicating whether the polling station was assigned to treatment, and \( \beta \) is the unbiased ITT effect. To examine whether receptiveness to information (i.e. reading the newspaper) was influenced by respondent’s literacy status (seventy six percent of the respondents in our sample are literate) we also estimate

\[ Y_{isj} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 T_{sj} + \beta_2 L_{isj} + \beta_3 T_{sj} \times L_{isj} + \epsilon_{isj} \]  

\( L_{isj} \) is a literacy dummy. In all cases we include a jurisdiction fixed effect \( \alpha_j \) to account for stratification and cluster standard errors by polling station.

In the case of electoral outcomes we first use the polling station to estimate average impacts using regression of the form given by equation (1). Next, to examine whether electoral outcomes vary with politician performance and qualifications we estimate

\[ Y_{sj} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 T_{sj} + \beta_2 P_j \times T_{sj} + \epsilon_{sj} \]  

where \( P_j \) is the performance (or qualification) indicator for the incumbent. The polling station was the unit of randomization and all polling stations assigned to treatment successfully received the campaign. We, therefore, report robust standard errors when estimating average impacts. However, in estimating equation (3) we need to account for the fact that our performance measures vary at a more aggregate level than the unit of observation. The small number of jurisdictions implies that clustering standard errors by jurisdiction is not appropriate. In these cases we, therefore, report the results from a randomization inference which tests the sharp null of no treatment effect.
B. Impact on Voter Knowledge

We start by using our survey data to examine whether the campaign influenced voter knowledge. We have two sets of outcomes. First, we asked each respondent about legislator responsibilities, the incumbent’s spending performance and the relative qualifications of candidates in the jurisdiction. We code the response for each question as correct or incorrect.\footnote{We code the answer to how much money was spent by the legislator as correct if the answer was within 1 standard deviation of actual spending. Similarly, we code the answer to how much did you legislator spend relative to the average legislator as correct if the answer is ”more” and the legislator spent more than average, if answer is ”less” and the legislator spent less than average, or if answer is ”same” and legislator the spent within 1 standard deviation of average.}

Second, we asked the respondent to rank the amount of work done by the incumbent across multiple categories. We consider responses regarding the two largest categories of spending which featured in the report card and for which we observe spending in every jurisdiction (and know the extent of slum spending).\footnote{A printing error in the questionnaire meant that the third such category of parks mistakenly featured twice, once in combination with community hall and once with lights. Thus, we are unable to identify perceptions on spending on parks (or the other two categories). The other categories of sewage, schools, and crime do not correspond to categories on the report card and cannot be matched. The last category we can match to aggregate spending is water. However, as we lack slum spending measures for this category we do not use it.} For both categories we create an indicator variable for whether the respondent believed that the incumbent did a lot of work.

Table 3 reports the results. We start with the average score across the eleven questions. Respondent knowledge levels are low and the average respondent has a score of 2.7 out of 11. The campaign had a positive but insignificant effect on aggregate quiz score (column 1). However, we observe significant heterogeneity when we allow the effects to vary by respondent’s literacy status (column 2). Literate respondents are able to answer half a question more and this effect is significantly accentuated by the treatment. In columns (3)-(5) we break down the aggregate score into three component parts – knowledge about legislator responsibilities, candidate qualifications and spending behavior. In all cases, literate respondents demonstrate higher knowledge with the treatment accentuating this difference. We observe significant treatment effects among literate respondents for knowledge about responsibilities. The effects are positive but insignificant for qualifications and performance (as measured by spending).

In the case of spending it is possible that respondents updated their beliefs about the extent of work done by incumbent even if they did not remember precise spending amounts. We, therefore, examine respondent perceptions on amount of work done by the incumbent by category of spending. 32% of the respondents state that the incumbent had done a lot of work on roads and 12% believe this to be the case for drains. In column (6) we see that the likelihood that treatment causes the respondent to believe the incumbent did a lot of work is increasing in the fraction of total road spending that occurred in slums. In column (8) we observe the
same pattern for drains. These results are striking because the report cards provided category-specific spending but not broken down by whether it occurred in slums. Thus voters are able to use other available information to correctly evaluate the incidence of slum spending within a category (on this, also see Tables 5 and 6). In columns (7) and (9) we examine whether these effects vary by literacy status and find much weaker evidence of differential treatment effects. One interpretation is that slum dwellers discussed the report cards and, therefore, information spread to illiterate residents as well.

To explore the last issue we turn to slum dwellers’ self report on how they decided to vote. The survey question asked respondents the basis for their vote choice. We group the responses into two categories: informative sources which include relied on newspaper and discussed with friends. We code as non-informative sources - relied on family, caste, religion or had no clear source. Across these six categories we construct an equally weighted index for reliance on informative sources (respondents were allowed to give multiple responses). The average value of this index is 0.59 (on a scale of 0 to 1). In column (10) we see that respondents in treatment slums are more likely to state that they used a more informative basis for decision-making. Further, in column (11) we see no differential effect across literate and illiterate respondents suggesting that the campaign led to an across-the-board increase in the use of information (either through newspaper or via discussion with friends).

C. Average Impacts on Electoral Outcomes

Next we use the electoral data and observation data to examine whether changes in voter knowledge were accompanied by changes in voter turnout, incumbent vote share and the nature of party campaigning.

The results from estimating regressions of the form given by equation (1) are in Table 4. In column (1) the dependent variable is log number of voters (and log number of registered voters is included as a control variable). The campaign increased turnout by 3.6%. In column (2) we consider incumbent vote share as the outcome variable and do not observe any impact on average incumbent vote share. In columns (3) to (6) we use the observational data on party campaigning and vote-buying. These data were collected for a sample of 61 slums (randomly selected from the treatment and control slum samples). Columns (3) and (4) show that campaigning was widespread on election eve but unaffected by treatment. In contrast in column (5) we observe a 19 percentage point decline in the incidence of cash bribes in treatment polling stations. We do not observe a decline in non-cash vote-buying, prominent among which is distribution of liquor.

These findings are consistent with several theories of voter choice. For instance, the campaign may have influenced voter behavior by increasing their awareness of democratic practices. This
could cause more citizens to vote and reject vote-buying practices even when voter preferences for the incumbent remain unaffected. Alternatively, the absence of an average campaign impact on incumbent vote share may reflect voter sophistication in processing information. If citizens seek to reward better performing incumbents and punish those who are doing badly, then we would not expect any obvious effect on the average incumbent vote share across jurisdictions. For this reason we now differentiate treatment effects by incumbent performance.

D. Do Impacts Vary with Incumbent Performance and Qualifications?

Our report cards provided information along three dimensions of incumbent performance - legislative behavior, committee attendance and spending (both overall and by category). To summarize incumbent performance we conduct a principal component analysis using data on legislative performance, committee attendance, total spending and fraction slum spending. We use the highest eigenvalue as a summary statistic (now on, PCA). For this summary indicator and for each separate performance indicator we estimate regressions of form given in equation (3).

Columns (1) and (2) show that turnout is decreasing in incumbent performance while the incumbent’s vote share is increasing in his performance. The randomization inference also rejects the null of no treatment effects. We calibrate the estimated effects for two values of PCA. For the median legislator in our sample (PCA value of $-0.305$) the turnout in treatment slums was 5.3% higher relative to control slums and there was no impact on vote share. For the best performing legislator in our sample (PCA value of 3.681) the turnout was 3.8% lower in treatment slums than control slums and the incumbent vote share was 6.9% higher.

In columns (3)-(10) we separately evaluate the different components of legislator performance. Columns (3)-(4) show that information about an incumbent’s attendance in the legislature and his record of asking questions in the legislative assembly did not influence voting outcomes. This is consistent with the view that poor slum dwellers see the main responsibilities of their legislator as relating to local development and grievance redressal not the enacting of bills.

Columns (5)-(6) consider committee attendance. The report cards provided information on whether last meeting of the committee was held according to schedule and whether the incumbent attended the meeting. We construct an aggregate committee attendance index based on attendance record in the ration committee and police committee meetings. Committee attendance does not influence voter turnout. In contrast, going from attending neither committee to attending both increases the incumbent’s vote share by over 7 percentage points.

In Columns (7)-(8) we examine whether turnout and an incumbent vote share is sensitive
to the extent of discretionary fund spending. Over their five year term, the incumbent could have spent up to Rs. 100 million. However, the average incumbent in our sample only spent Rs. 50 million. It could be that lack of spending measures an unwillingness on the part of the incumbent to exert effort. Alternatively, the widespread belief that discretionary spending is subject to significant corruption may lead respondents to infer that higher spending reflects greater corruption. Possibly reflecting this ambiguity, we fail to observe voter responsiveness to total spending by the incumbent.

Given these results, we investigate whether voters respond to the nature of spending rather than the total amount spent. The report card listed incumbent spending by category - these included roads, drainage, light, parks etc (the full list is in the report cards shown in Figure 3). As a first cut, we parse these data through the lens of whether the spending occurred in a slum. Columns (9) and (10) present the results. Turnout is decreasing in amount spent in slum while incumbent vote share is increasing in slum spending.

In Table 6 we demonstrate that these results are present for each of the three largest spending categories – roads, parks and drains. These are also the three categories in which we see spending in every jurisdiction. In each case, voters respond not to the overall level of spending (odd columns) but only to slum-specific spending in the category (even columns). Turnout is higher when incumbent spends less in slums while incumbent vote share is increasing in slum spending in each category.

The spending results suggest significant sophistication on the part of voters. They have a (correct) heuristic about the fraction of spending within each category that is in slums and use this to evaluate the relevance of total spending by the incumbent in a category. The most likely explanation for how voters form the heuristic is by observing spending in that category in own slum or nearby slum. The report card information then helps them translate this information into an estimate of how much of the spending within a category was relevant for them (i.e. occurred in slums). Voters rewarded incumbents who spent more in slums. Further, the results suggest that voters used turnout to express displeasure with worse performing incumbents.

Another way of examining whether voters make rational use of available information is to examine how they used information about other candidates. Each newspaper featured two report cards from neighboring jurisdictions. In Table 7 we start by examining whether voters used information on the performance of the incumbent in the neighboring jurisdiction to benchmark their own incumbent’s performance. Our estimating equation is of the form

\[ Y_{sj} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 T_{sj} + \beta_2 P_j \times T_{sj} + \beta_3 P_k \times T_{sj} + \epsilon_{sj} \]  

\[ \text{(4)} \]

15Legislators also had access to a separate fund for spending on water related issues. Interestingly, all incumbents spent the entire amount of this funding.
where \( P_k \) is the performance of the incumbent in the neighboring jurisdiction.

Columns (1) and (2) show no yardstick effects when we consider the aggregate performance measure (PCA). However, in columns (3)-(6) we see that this is due to differential effects by category. In the case of oversight committees we observe yardstick competition (columns 3 and 4). Turnout is increasing in the committee attendance record of the neighboring incumbent and the vote share of the incumbent is lower when the neighbor attends. In contrast, in columns (5) and (6) we observe no evidence of yardstick competition for spending. This finding is consistent with the observation that voters use jurisdiction-specific information about how spending in a public good category translates into slum spending in evaluating the incumbent. To the extent that such jurisdiction-specific information relies on personal exposure to slum spending we would not expect voters to be able to evaluate spending in other jurisdictions.

Finally, in columns (7)-(12) we examine whether and how voters use information on candidate qualifications. For each of the three qualification categories we estimate

\[
Y_{sj} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 T_{sj} + \beta_2 Q_j \times T_{sj} + \beta_3 CQ_j \times T_{sj} + \beta_4 CQ_i \times T_{sj} + \epsilon_{sj}
\]

where \( Q_j \) is the relevant qualification and \( CQ_j \) is the fraction of challengers who have this qualification. As a robustness check we also include the fraction of challengers in the neighboring jurisdiction \( i \) with the qualification \( CQ_i \). This information should be irrelevant for the voter.

We start by considering educational qualifications, as measured by whether the candidate attended college. In general, college education is relatively high at 80% for the incumbents. In column (7) we see that, unlike the case of performance, turnout responds positively to qualifications. Voters are more likely to turnout in treatment slums when the incumbent has a college education. In column (8) we see that voters care about the relative qualifications of challengers. Incumbent vote share is increasing in the fraction of non-college educated challengers. Importantly, voters place no weight on irrelevant information - the educational outcomes of challengers in the neighboring jurisdiction does not influence vote shares.

In columns (9)-(10) we consider candidate wealth. Here, we choose to use a wealth indicator that is salient in the particular cultural context. An incumbent’s qualification is having more than a crore (10 million) rupees in declared wealth, while the challenger variable is the fraction of challengers who do not have that much. The results suggest that voters discriminate against rich candidates. Interestingly, this effect only shows up for the challengers. Turnout is higher when the challengers are better qualified (i.e. when the incumbent looks worse). In column (6) we see that the incumbent also receives significantly more votes when his opponents are “crorepatis”. If it is disclosed that both his opponents are crorepatis his vote share is 6.6% higher than when it is disclosed that both of them are crorepatis and he is not. One possibility is that for the incumbent voters have other performance information which they consider as more relevant than
wealth. In contrast, for challengers they have less information and are, therefore, more willing to condition their vote on characteristics such as wealth.

Finally, in columns (11)-(12) we examine a clearer measure of candidate quality - criminal charges. Half the incumbents in our sample faced criminal charges. Here, the challenger variable is the fraction of candidates who face criminal charge. We observe no significant effect on vote share but some evidence of higher voter turnout when the incumbent does not face a criminal charge.\(^{16}\)

These results, with the possible exception of the weak criminality results, accord with intuition. The poor are suspicious of rich candidates, either because they feel that the rich are less likely to care about what they care about or because they see wealth as a signal of corruption, but like candidates who are educated, probably because education signals competence.

They also suggest that voters are quite sophisticated in how they interpret evidence: For one, voters are responding to the relative qualifications of the incumbent suggesting that they do not react naively to the incumbent’s wealth or education, but compare him with the challengers and favor the one that looks better to them.

Another important check on voter rationality involves including the qualifications of candidates in the neighboring jurisdiction that was also featured in the same issue of the newspaper in the qualification regressions. Given that those candidates are not in the choice set, their presence should not matter, and this is indeed what we find.

5 Conclusion

The idea that voters in an otherwise well-functioning democracy might be severely constrained by information about the candidates’ qualifications and past record is both striking and important. We see that voters when given the information move quite substantially and if this information had reached the entire jurisdiction, outcomes may have been quite different. We also see evidence that voters are somewhat sophisticated in how they use the information, allaying fears that information would simply confuse them.

\(^{16}\)The results are similar when we use any criminal charge but since any criminal charges includes charges that politicians often end up with while doing their job (being a demonstration, for example) this variable is intrinsically less interesting and is not reported.
6 Appendix

Computing Probabilities

\[ \Pr\{\theta^*(I) = \theta_H, y^*(I) = 1|\theta_H\} = [\alpha \beta + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)] \gamma \]
\[ \Pr\{\theta^*(I) = \theta_H, y^*(I) = 0|\theta_H\} = [(1 - \alpha)\beta + (1 - \beta)\alpha] \gamma \]

and

\[ \Pr\{\theta^*(I) = \theta_H, y^*(I) = 1|\theta_L\} = [(1 - \alpha)\beta + (1 - \beta)\alpha](1 - \gamma) \]
\[ \Pr\{\theta^*(I) = \theta_H, y^*(I) = 0|\theta_L\} = [\alpha \beta + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)](1 - \gamma) \]

Proof of Claim 1 Let us start by looking at effect of a small increase in \( \beta \) on turnout and vote shares. If for the initial value of \( \beta \), \( \pi_H(C) > \pi_H(I)|_{\theta_H,1} \), then an increase in \( \beta \) reduces \( |(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C))| \) and hence reduces turnout. All the voters who stop voting as a result of the increase in \( \beta \), would have voted for the challenger. Hence the incumbent’s vote share goes up.

Next assume that for the initial value of \( \beta \) \( \pi_H(C) < \pi_H(I)|_{\theta_H,1} \). In this case an increase in \( \beta \) increases \( |(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C))| \) and hence increases turnout. All the new voters who turnout will vote for the incumbent. Hence the incumbent’s vote share goes up.

Next consider what happens to an incumbent whose performance signal is negative: \( y^* = 0 \). If for the initial value of \( \beta \), \( \pi_H(C) > \pi_H(I)|_{\theta_H,0} \), then an increase in \( \beta \) increases \( |(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C))| \) and hence increases turnout. All the voters who vote as a result of the increase in \( \beta \), vote for the challenger. Hence the incumbent’s vote share goes down.

Finally, assume that for the initial value of \( \beta \) \( \pi_H(C) < \pi_H(I)|_{\theta_H,0} \). In this case an increase in \( \beta \) reduces \( |(\pi_H(I) - \pi_H(C))| \) and hence decreases turnout. All the new voters who dont turnout would have voted for the incumbent. Hence the incumbent’s vote share goes down

References


Table 1: Politician Characteristics and Voter Behavior: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Incumbent Performance</th>
<th>Max. Value</th>
<th>Fraction = 0</th>
<th>Mean for All Incumbents</th>
<th>Mean for Sampled Incumbents</th>
<th>Sampled and Non-sampled Incumbents p-value (of diff)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Attendance</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>16.885 (3.401)</td>
<td>16.000 (5.268)</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Legislature Questions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.485 (0.504)</td>
<td>0.400 (0.516)</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ration Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.700 (0.462)</td>
<td>0.714 (0.488)</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.457 (0.504)</td>
<td>0.444 (0.527)</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Committee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.293 (0.459)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MLA LADS Spending (INR crore)</td>
<td>6.007</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>5.122 (1.058)</td>
<td>5.018 (0.888)</td>
<td>0.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA LADS Road Spending</td>
<td>5.232</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.073 (1.118)</td>
<td>3.270 (1.207)</td>
<td>0.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA LADS Park Spending</td>
<td>2.219</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.579 (0.615)</td>
<td>0.624 (0.746)</td>
<td>0.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA LADS Drain Spending</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.515 (0.427)</td>
<td>0.497 (0.312)</td>
<td>0.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums</td>
<td>5.935</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.411 (2.060)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Board Spending</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.989 (0.053)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Candidate Qualifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charged with Crime</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.286 (0.455)</th>
<th>0.500 (0.527)</th>
<th>0.146</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Assets (INR crore)</td>
<td>1.196</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.773 (0.772)</td>
<td>0.803 (0.406)</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has One Crore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.293 (0.459)</td>
<td>0.500 (0.535)</td>
<td>0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Attend College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.350 (0.481)</td>
<td>0.200 (0.422)</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Electoral Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>54.65</th>
<th>0.000</th>
<th>44.892 (10.933)</th>
<th>46.003 (7.786)</th>
<th>0.646</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter Turnout</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.577 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.575 (0.107)</td>
<td>0.679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Panel A and B report candidate outcomes compiled from RTI data and candidate affidavits, respectively. Sample size for columns D and E is 70 and 10, respectively. Panel C reports jurisdiction-level outcomes for vote shares of incumbents recontesting during the 2008 MLA election (observations are 61 and 10). Panel C reports jurisdiction-level outcomes for Delhi-wide voter turnout and polling station-level outcomes for in sample voter turnout (observations are 70 and 775).
2. Columns (1) and (2) refer to values for legislators in sample. Column (5) reports p-values of tests of differences in means across the preceding two columns.
3. The committee variables equal one if legislator attended most recent meeting and zero if legislator did not attend the most recent meeting or if no committee meeting was held during the last 3 quarters.
### Table 2: Randomization Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Diff (1) and (2):</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Household survey sample</th>
<th>Diff (4) and (5):</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Observation sample</th>
<th>Diff (7) and (8):</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Electoral Rolls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Electors</td>
<td>1013.977</td>
<td>1000.510</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>1016.979</td>
<td>1002.546</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>933.094</td>
<td>1044.034</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(321.010)</td>
<td>(305.698)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(327.605)</td>
<td>(305.837)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(379.542)</td>
<td>(374.847)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Female Electors</td>
<td>424.424</td>
<td>427.495</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>418.536</td>
<td>428.603</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>382.531</td>
<td>440.103</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(142.392)</td>
<td>(138.124)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(139.553)</td>
<td>(137.951)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(145.307)</td>
<td>(173.622)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electors per Household</td>
<td>4.404</td>
<td>4.542</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>4.375</td>
<td>4.556</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>4.292</td>
<td>4.980</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.069)</td>
<td>(2.135)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.388)</td>
<td>(2.153)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.859)</td>
<td>(1.697)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elector Age</td>
<td>35.501</td>
<td>35.333</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>35.215</td>
<td>35.307</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>34.686</td>
<td>35.469</td>
<td>0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.340)</td>
<td>(2.408)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.456)</td>
<td>(2.412)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.984)</td>
<td>(2.980)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Slum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint F Test (excluding Percent Slum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: Survey Data**

|                                |            |                   |         |                         | 0.815   |         | 0.831             | 0.960   |
|                                |            |                   |         |                         | 0.220   |         |                   |         |

**Notes:**

1. Panel A reports polling station-level outcomes. Panel A, columns (4) - (6) are restricted to polling stations included in the postpoll household survey. Panel A, columns (7) - (9) are restricted to polling stations included in the observational study of polling stations on the eve of elections. Panel B reports individual-level outcomes from the household survey, restricted to the corresponding subset of polling stations from Panel A.

2. Two columns. Panel A calculations include jurisdiction fixed effects and robust standard errors. Panel B calculations include jurisdiction fixed effects and standard errors clustered by polling station.

3. "Electors per Household" is the average number of registered voters per household. "Percent Slum" is the percent of homes in the polling station identified as jhopdi, kachhiji hogi, or polythene by monitors in the observational study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Quiz Score (All Questions Below)</th>
<th>Responsibilities (Q: 80, 81, 83)</th>
<th>Qualifications (Q: 76 - 79)</th>
<th>Spending (Q: 86 - 89)</th>
<th>Much Road Development</th>
<th>Much Drain Development</th>
<th>Used Informative Source to Decide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment</strong></td>
<td>0.082 (0.084)</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literate</strong></td>
<td>0.476***</td>
<td>0.146***</td>
<td>0.237***</td>
<td>0.092**</td>
<td>-0.146*</td>
<td>-0.062*</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment * Literate</strong></td>
<td>0.196*</td>
<td>0.177***</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.195*</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending (INR crore)</strong></td>
<td>-0.036*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literate * Total MLA LADS Spending</strong></td>
<td>0.051*</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending * Literate</strong></td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums</strong></td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literate * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums</strong></td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums * Literate</strong></td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 | 3898 |
| Control Mean  | 2.707 | 2.309 | 1.184 | 0.358 | 0.767 | 0.327 | 0.101 | 0.125 | 0.152 | 0.591 | 0.541 |

**Randomization Inference:** p-values for Probability (Actual Coefficient = Estimated Coefficient)

- Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending (INR crore)
- Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums
- Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums * Literate

**Notes:**
1. We report OLS regression with jurisdiction fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the polling station level. All columns use household survey data.
2. The dependent variables are: columns (1) and (2): total quiz score (out of 11), (3): score on question 80, 81, and 83 (out of 3), (4): score on questions 76-79 (out of 4), (5): score on questions 86-89 (out of 4), (6) and (7): dummy for whether respondent observed "lots of work" on road development in jurisdiction during past 4-5 years, (8) and (9): dummy for whether respondent observed "lots of work" on drain development in jurisdiction during past 4-5 years. "MLALADS" variables refer to incumbent spending from 2004 to 2007, (10) and (11): average over 6 dummies, each representing whether respondent used some source to make voting decision.
3. Control means in columns (1), (6), (8), and (10) are restricted to control-group individuals. Control means in columns (2), (3), (4), (5), and (11) are restricted to control-group individuals who are illiterate. Control means in columns (8) and (10) refer to responses of control-group individuals. Control means in columns (7) and (9) are restricted to control-group individuals whose MLA spent a less-than-average amount in that category both overall and in slums.

**Post-Poll Quiz Questions:**
- Q 76: Which candidate is the most educated?
- Q 77: Which candidate is the wealthiest?
- Q 78: Which candidate is most criminal?
- Q 79: Which candidate is least criminal?
- Q 80: Does your MLA get money to spend on local dev?
- Q 81: How much money is given to MLA for local dev?
- Q 82: How much money did MLA spend on local dev?
- Q 83: Name government committees
- Q 84: How much did MLA spend on local dev?
- Q 85: How much did MLA spend on local dev?
- Q 86: How much did MLA spend on local dev?
Table 4: Average Treatment Effects and Vote Buying

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>Door to Door Campaign</th>
<th>Meeting or Rally</th>
<th>Cash Bribe</th>
<th>Non-Cash Bribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.035** (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.034 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.088)</td>
<td>-0.194** (0.091)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Mean</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Columns (1) and (2) use electoral roll data. Columns (3) through (6) use observation sample.
2. We report OLS regressions with jurisdiction fixed effects and robust standard errors. Column (1) regression includes a control for log number of registered voters.
3. The dependent variables are: (1) log number of voters, (2) percent of votes for incumbent, (3) whether a door to door campaign on behalf of any party was observed, (4) whether a public meeting or rally on behalf of any party was observed, (5) whether any cash bribe was observed, and (6) whether any bribe of liquor, clothes, milk, or ration was observed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Principal Component Analysis</th>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>MLALADS Spending</th>
<th>MLALADS Slum Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>log(Turnout)</td>
<td>Incumbent Vote Share</td>
<td>log(Turnout)</td>
<td>Incumbent Vote Share</td>
<td>log(Turnout)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Incumbent Performance</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Legislature Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Any Questions Raised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Committee Attendance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending (INR crore)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Randomization Inference: p-values for Probability(Actual Coefficient = Estimated Coefficient)

| Treatment * Incumbent Performance | 0.007 | 0.004 |
| Treatment * Legislature Attendance | 0.303 | 0.221 |
| Treatment * Any Questions Raised | 0.354 | 0.110 |
| Treatment * Committee Attendance | 0.343 | 0.028 |
| Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending (INR crore) | 0.152 | 0.279 |
| Treatment * Total MLA LADS Spending in Slums | 0.007 | 0.009 |

Notes:
1. We report OLS regressions containing jurisdiction fixed effects and robust standard errors. All columns use data from electoral rolls and report cards.
2. Legislature Attendance refers to incumbent attendance in 2007. Committee Attendance refers to whether the incumbent attended the last ration committee meeting (.5), the last police committee meeting (.5), neither (0), or both (1). "MLALADS" variables refer to incumbent spending from 2004 to 2007. The incumbent performance variable is the first component resulting from a principal component analysis of z_score(total spending), z_score(total slum spending), ration committee attendance, police committee attendance, any legislature questions asked, and z_score(legislature attendance). Z scores use means and standard deviations from the 10-jurisdiction sample.
3. The dependent variable for odd-numbered columns is log number of voters at polling station; these regressions include a control for log number of registered voters. The dependent variable for even-numbered columns is percent of votes for incumbent at polling station.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Roads Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Parks Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Drains Incumbent Vote Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Category Spending</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Total MLA LADS Category Spending in Slums</td>
<td>-0.029**</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
<td>-0.071*</td>
<td>0.056**</td>
<td>-0.155***</td>
<td>0.092**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775, 775
Control Mean: 0.575, 0.479, 0.420, 0.290, 0.565, 0.565, 0.472, 0.472, 0.566, 0.556, 0.484, 0.472

Randomization Inference: p-values for Probability(Actual Coefficient = Estimated Coefficient)

Treatment * Total MLA LADS Category Spending: 0.434, 0.405, 0.201, 0.235, 0.269, 0.197, 0.396, 0.055, 0.390, 0.230, 0.125, 0.326
Treatment * Total MLA LADS Category Spending in Slums: 0.006, 0.028, 0.054, 0.009, 0.006, 0.016

Notes:
1. We report OLS regressions containing jurisdiction fixed effects and robust standard errors. All columns use electoral roll and report card data. All variables are as defined in notes to Table 5.
2. Control means for odd-numbered columns include control-group polling stations whose incumbent spent a less than average amount on that category. Control means for even-numbered columns include control-group polling stations whose incumbent spent a less than average amount on that category both overall and in slums.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>Incumbent Vote Share</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
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<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
<th>Log(Turnout)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.031**</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Incumbent Performance</td>
<td>-0.029**</td>
<td>0.015**</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Opposite Performance</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Incumbent Committee Attendance</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Opposite Committee Attendance</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Total Incumbent MLA LADS Spending in Slums</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Total Opposite MLA LADS Spending in Slums</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Incumbent Charged with Crime</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Incumbent Has One Crime</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Incumbent Charged with Crime</td>
<td>-0.128*</td>
<td>0.066*</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Opposite Committee Attendance</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Incumbent Did Not Attend College</td>
<td>-0.064*</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Incumbent Has One Crime</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.068*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Treatment * Incumbent Has One Crime</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Incumbent Charged with Crime</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment * Treatment * Treatment * Incumbent Has One Crime</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.031</td>
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Notes:
1. We report OLS regressions containing jurisdiction fixed effects and robust standard errors. All columns use electoral roll and report card data.
2. “Incumbent” and “Challenger” variables refer to the incumbent and challengers from the current jurisdiction respectively. Report cards were presented for 2 jurisdictions side by side. “Opposite” variables refer to the constituency whose report card appeared alongside the current jurisdiction report card. “Performance”, “Committee”, “MLA LADS”, and dependent variables are as defined in Table 5.
Figure 1: MLALADS Booking of Slum-Area Projects across 10 Sample Assembly Constituencies

(*Road figures divided by 10 for scale)
In your neighborhood…

- Are you not getting rations properly?
- Are there problems with water supply?
- Is the road/footpath broken?
- Do the police harass people without justification?
- Are there no street lights?
- Is there no community hall?
क्या आप जानते हैं?
- आपके क्षेत्र के विकास के लिए सालाना 2 करोड़ रुपए एम.एल.ए फंद में होते हैं। इनमें से 50 लाख रुपए का बजट क्षेत्र में पानी, नाली और सीवर बनाने के लिए होता है।
- बौद्ध वाला, स्कूल, सड़कें और कृषि क्षेत्र जैसे क्षेत्रों के लिए भी कर्मचारी योजना के आधार पर खर्च करने के लिए होता है।
- मतदान से पहले ध्यान दें:
  - क्या आपका नाम वोटर शूली में है? अगर है, तो आप वोट दे सकते हैं।
  - पता करें कि किस वोटर क्षेत्र का भाग आपका नजरी आता है। उसी क्षेत्र में अपना वोट दें।
  - वोटर पहचान पत्र अपने साथ रखें।
  - वोटर पहचान पत्र नहीं होते पर भी आप मतदान कर सकते हैं। उसके लिए आपका नाम वोटर क्षेत्र द्वारा सुनिश्चित किया जाता है।

क्या सरकारी कामकाज पर नजर रखने के लिए समितियों में नामांकन गई गई?
एम.एल.ए:
- राशन निगरानी समिति के अध्यक्ष हैं।
- धारा समिति के अध्यक्ष है।
- मुख्य मंत्री समिति के सदस्य है।

प्रारंभिक सामग्री:

Did you know:
- Your MLA gets two crore every year to spend on his constituencies’ local development. He can spend it on schools, drainage, water facilities, roads, community halls, sanitation, etc.

Is there anyone watching over the workings of the government? Your MLA:
- Is a member of the Ration Vigilance Committee.
- Is a member of the Police Oversight Committee.
- Is a member of the District Development Committee.
- Is a member of the Complaint Redressal Committee.

• A copy of the Hindustan containing this information will be given to you between X and X. It is your responsibility to read this information carefully and learn about your candidates’ background.
Figure 3: Report Cards in The Hindustan Times on November 24, 2008