The Impact of Comparative Effectiveness Research on Health and Health Care Spending

by

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Abstract

Public subsidization of technology assessments in general, and Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) in particular, has received considerable attention as a tool to simultaneously improve patient health and lower the cost of health care. However, little conceptual and empirical understanding exists concerning the quantitative impact of public technology assessments such as CER. This paper analyses the impact of CER on health and medical care spending interpreting CER to shift the demand for some treatments at the expense of others. We trace out the spending and health implications of such demand shifts in private- as well as subsidized health care markets. In contrast to current wisdom, our analysis implies that CER may well increase spending and adversely affect patient health, particularly when treatment effects are heterogeneous across patients. We simulate these economic effects for antipsychotics that are among the largest drug classes of the US Medicaid program and for which CER has been conducted by means of the CATIE trial in 1999. Using conservative estimates, we find that if Medicaid would have eliminated coverage for the least cost-effective treatments of the CATIE trial then under homogeneous effects, it would save about 90% of the $1.3B Medicaid class sales annually in non-elderly adult patient with schizophrenia. However, taking into account the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects, it would incur a loss of health valued annually at about 98% of class spending and thus a net loss of about 8% of annual class spending.
Section 1: Introduction

The debate about the appropriate role of public technology assessments has a long history in the US. More recently, as both private and public payers attempt to improve the efficiency of health care spending, comparative effectiveness research (CER) has been offered as a potential solution. The rationale for CER is to generate better evidence about what works and does not work in health care and to thereby improve the productivity of health care spending through improved patient outcomes at lower spending levels. (FCCCER Report 2009; IOM 2009) Moreover, recent public subsidization of CER through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) has raised awareness and funding for CER.

Although CER has been positioned as a means to improve health and potentially lower costs, little is understood about how exactly this will take place and how CER as it is practiced currently, will translate into different health care decisions. Indeed, despite the importance of comparative effectiveness research in the policy debate, there has been little explicit and quantitative analysis of the potential impact of CER on health or medical care spending. Given this lack of understanding of the consequences of CER, the purpose of this paper is to attempt to provide a framework to quantitatively evaluate the effects of CER. Such a framework is needed to identify relevant designs and studies of CER and also to estimate whether the costs of investments in CER are outweighed by their benefits.

The paper may be outlined as follows. Section 2 specifies the economic context in which we analyze the impact of public technology assessments such as CER. We interpret the evidence generated by public subsidies for CER to raise the demand of some treatments at the expense of others. Section 3 considers the health- and costs implications of such demand shifts induced by CER in a private market. Section 4 analyzes these impacts in a subsidized market where the treatments that fare better under CER are the ones that receive better coverage, e.g. through less formulary restrictions, changes in prior authorization requirements, or lower co-pays.

Section 5 discusses the impacts of such CER-responsive coverage decisions when there is heterogeneity in treatment effects. An important issue here is that CER may favor one treatment, deemed “the best” by some summary statistic, even though the best treatment varies across patients. Heterogeneity is necessary but not sufficient for welfare losses from product-specific reimbursement responses to CER. Rather, what’s central is negative dependence across treatments; a patient may not respond to a reimbursed “winner” of CER study but may respond to a non-reimbursed “loser”.

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2 They date back at least to the 1970s with the National Center for Health Services Research and the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment.
Overall, our main conclusions from the conceptual analysis is that CER has indeterminate effects on spending and patient health and, under natural assumptions on how markets respond to new quality information, may even adversely affect both. Among the factors that govern the health and spending impact of CER are the price-elasticity of supply of treatments as well as the evidence-elasticity of demand.

Section 6 provides an illustrative empirical simulation for antipsychotic drugs. This drug class is among the top spending classes covered by Medicaid and there has been considerable interest in the comparative effectiveness issues surrounding them. This is partly due to the 1999 CATIE trial that found that second generation therapies were equally effective as first-generation therapies. Following the release of this study, a policy debate emerged around how Medicaid coverage policy might respond. Many argued that Medicaid should preferentially subsidize first generation over second generation treatments. Subsequent to the release of CATIE, approximately 40% of the state-run Medicaid programs have instituted prior authorization restrictions on some second generation drugs. Little is known about the quantitative health and spending effects of such coverage proposals and policies. To better understand such effects, we simulate the impact on health and spending for the counter-factual case of providing no coverage for second generation antipsychotics\(^3\). We find that if Medicaid coverage policy had responded to the CER results of CATIE to by limiting second generation use then under a standard assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, it would save about 90% of class spending. However, taking into account the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects, limiting access to second generation drugs would incur a net loss valued at about 98% of class spending. Thus, for one the largest drug classes in one of the major health care subsidy programs, heterogeneity alters not only the magnitude but also the sign of the effect reimbursement responses to CER studies.

Lastly, section 7 concludes by discussing the future research and the policy implications our analysis suggest. In particular, given the discussed problems with simplistic uses of CER as commonly discussed, we discuss new research avenues on how more useful forms of CER may be conducted.

**Section 2: The Basic Framework**

This section specifies the framework in which health and spending implications are analyzed and estimated. There are two aspects to CER – one is the generation of comparative information between two treatment alternatives. This is usually accomplished using randomized trials or other appropriate evaluation methodologies that produces estimates of the treatment effects. The second is the potential

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\(^3\) This reimbursement response is inconsistent with current law, but our analysis is aimed at understanding the desirability of future policies and laws that may potentially those currently in place.
response by the market\textsuperscript{4} or public payers to this information affecting the use or uptake of treatments in the population.

Consider two treatments with true treatment effects \(q = (q_1, q_2)\) which we interpret as product qualities. For example, these two treatments may be first-and second generation treatments for a given clinical condition. The beliefs over the unknown levels of quality for the two treatments are specified as \(F = F(q_1, q_2)\) before the CER and \(F' = F'(q_1, q_2)\) after the CER. Throughout, un-primed quantities denote variables, functions or levels prior to the CER and the primed quantities denote the corresponding items after the CER. The demand functions for the two treatments are given by \(D_1\) and \(D_2\) and depend on the perceived qualities through \(F\) as well as prices. For example, demand functions may be governed by the expected quality levels given the evidence. We consider the impact that CER has not only on the evidence of quality of products but also on market prices and quantities. We let \(Y = (Y_1, Y_2)\) and \(P = (P_1, P_2)\) denote the equilibrium quantities and prices of the two treatments. The total spending \(S\) and health outcomes \(Q\) in this class of treatments for the condition are determined by the use of both the treatments and their average cost-effectiveness is determined by their ratio

\[
\frac{S}{Q} = \frac{(Y_1P_1 + Y_2P_2)}{(Y_1q_1 + Y_2q_2)}
\]

CER has two possible effects on market outcomes. First, it may generate evidence that changes quality beliefs and shifts demand and second may thereby affect equilibrium prices and quantities observed. The CER changes the average health outcome according to

\[
\Delta Q = (Y_1' - Y_1)q_1 + (Y_2' - Y_2)q_2
\]

Regardless of the perceived health benefits of the treatments, this states that the true quality level determines the actual health impact. Thus, the true quality differences and quantity changes complement each other in determining the overall health impact of CER so that equilibrium responses matter more when there are big quality differences.

The CER changes overall spending on the two treatments according to

\[
\Delta S = (Y_1'P_1 + Y_2'P_2) - (Y_1P_1 + Y_2P_2)
\]

There are thus two ways in which CER may affect spending. One is to through substitution across treatments and the other is through changes in equilibrium prices. Although CER is typically concerned with only evaluating effectiveness of treatments, it naturally has consequences for the cost-effectiveness of treatments through affecting both the health and spending patterns in equilibrium. More precisely, the impact of CER on cost-effectiveness is the ratio of the increased spending and health

\textsuperscript{4} Such responses may include the shift in physician practices and behaviors.
impact, $\Delta S/\Delta Q$. Cost-effectiveness of use is raised if spending responds less than the levels of health and is lowered if spending responds much more than health governed by price or quantity responses to the CER.

**Section 3: Impact of CER in a Private Market**

Consider first the implications of CER in a private and competitive market, although our analysis carries over to non-competitive market structures. As illustrated in Figure 1 we assume that, without loss of generality, the demand for the superior (first) product shifts weakly outward and the demand for the inferior (second) product shifts weakly inward as a consequence of the CER; $D_2' \geq D_1$ and $D_1' \leq D_2$. Moreover, we assume that the evidence of the CER is valid in the sense that these demand shifts are consistent with true quality levels; $q_1 \geq q_2$. For illustrative purposes only, the Figure concerns the case when both the demand and supply curves prior to the CER coincide.

![Figure 1: Demand shifts associated with CER](image)

The supply functions of the two products are not assumed to be affected by the CER but determined by the costs of production of the two treatments. An outward (inward) shift in demand holding supply constant raises (lowers) both the equilibrium quantity and price. In other words, for the superior treatment 1 its price and quantity rises as opposed to for the inferior treatment 2 for which they fall

$$P_1' \geq P_1 \quad \text{and} \quad P_2' \leq P_2 \quad \text{and} \quad Y_1' \geq Y_1 \quad \text{and} \quad Y_2' \leq Y_2$$
By standard arguments, when demand for the two products shifts in response to the evidence generated by the CER, the equilibrium quantities and prices that result will “trace out” the supply curve as in the Figure above. Thus, the impact of CER on health and spending are not merely driven by how sensitive demand is to the evidence generated by the CER but more importantly how responsive supply is to price.

Now consider the health and spending implications of these market responses to CER. As both quantity and price rise for the superior treatment, it follows directly that spending on the superior treatment rises. By analog arguments, spending on the inferior treatment falls. The impact on overall spending, \( \Delta S \), is thus indeterminate as it may rise or fall dependent on whether the positive spending effect of the superior treatment dominates the negative spending effect of the inferior treatment. However, the overall health effect is clearly positive, \( \Delta Q \geq 0 \), as long as the evidence of the CER is valid. This is because quantity is raised for the superior treatment and lowered for the inferior second treatment. The magnitude of the health effect induced by CER is determined by the price-elasticities of supply.

To illustrate, consider the example when demand and supply for a treatment is linear \( D(p)=a(F)-bp \) and \( S(p)=c+dp \) where the demand is shifted by the treatment beliefs by assuming the intercept is a function of the beliefs \( F \). The equilibrium quantity that equates demand and supply is then given by

\[
Y = \frac{(a(F)d + cb)}{b+d}
\]

This implies the CER induces a change in quantity for each treatment given by

\[
Y' - Y = (a(F') - a(F))\left(\frac{d}{b+d}\right)
\]

If a change in the beliefs \( F \) shifts the demand through raising (lowering) the intercept \( a(F) \) for the first (second) treatment then the impact on health, \( \Delta Q \), is governed to a large extent on how sensitive supply is to price, \( d \). For example, it is generally true that in the standard long-run case of an infinitely elastic industry supply, corresponding to free entry, then there are no price-effects from CER. For example, this may be the case for markets for generic drugs or the market for procedures that are not patentable. In this case, \( \Delta Y \) converges to \( a(F)-a(F') \) above as \( d \) goes to infinity so that the impact on health and spending is driven only through quantity effects induced by how sensitive demand is to the evidence generated by the CER.

**Section 4: Impact of CER in Subsidized Market**

In most countries, health care markets are subsidized thereby separating supply-prices received by sellers and demand prices paid by patients. For example, the US government through the Medicare and
Medicaid program pays manufacturers and providers at prices above the co-pays of those eligible for the programs. In a market subsidized at rate \( s \), let the equilibrium quantity, supply- and demand price for a treatment be denoted by \( Y(s) \), \( P_s(s) \) and \( P_D(s) \) as depicted in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: Multiplier Effects of CER in a Subsidized Market](image)

As illustrated in Figure 2, for a given market it is well known a rise in the subsidy \( s \) raises the supply price, lowers the demand price, and raises the equilibrium quantity; \( dP_s/ds \geq 0 \), \( dP_D/ds \leq 0 \), \( dY/ds \geq 0 \).

In a subsidized market, CER will impact health and spending not only through the demand shifts discussed earlier but also through any changes in subsidy levels set by governments as a consequence of the CER. For example, Medicare or Medicaid may expand coverage or reimburse more heavily those treatments that did well in CER through lower co-pays, reduced prior authorization, or higher reimbursement rates to manufacturers. We denote by \( s=(s_1,s_2) \) the subsidy levels for the two treatments prior to the CER and \( s'=(s'_1,s'_2) \) the corresponding subsidies after the CER. We term the coverage policy as responsive when CER leads governments to subsidize the first superior treatments relatively more compared to the second inferior treatment

\[
    s'_1 \geq s_1 \quad \text{&} \quad s'_2 \leq s_2
\]

We denote by \( \Delta Q(s,s') \) and \( \Delta S(s,s') \) the corresponding impact on overall health and spending of the treatment class for a given subsidy policy. In Figure 2, we can trace out the impact on prices and quantities under a responsive coverage or subsidy policy. For the superior first treatment, demand shifts outward as before, but in addition the subsidy-wedge between the demand- and supply price increases. For the inferior second treatment, the demand shifts inward as before, but in addition the
subsidy-wedge decreases. It follows that a responsive subsidy policy has a reinforcing multiplier-effect on prices and quantities compared to the private market effects. The subsidies act in the same direction as the changes induced by the shifts in demand implied by the CER.

More precisely, if \( Y_1(F,s) \) and \( Y_2(F,s) \) denote the equilibrium quantities under a given demand and subsidy structure then a responsive subsidy policy implies that not only does demand itself change quantities, but that subsidy changes those quantities further in the same direction

\[
Y_1(F',s') \geq Y_1(F',s) \geq Y_1(F,s) \quad \text{and} \quad Y_2(F',s') \leq Y_2(F',s) \leq Y_2(F,s)
\]

This multiplier effect implies that the impact of CER on health is magnified under responsive subsidy policy compared to an unresponsive policy and in turn compared to no subsidies

\[
\Delta Q(s,s') \geq \Delta Q(s,s) \geq \Delta Q(0,0)
\]

In a subsidized market, the total spending effects are governed by the supply prices as that covers both consumer and government spending on the treatment. However, as before, there is an indeterminate effects on the spending levels, as spending on the superior first treatment rises and spending on the inferior treatment falls, although both at greater magnitudes due to the multiplier effect induced by a responsive subsidy policy.

**Section 5: Impact of CER under Heterogeneous Treatment Effects**

This section extends the previous analysis of health- and spending impacts of CER by considering heterogeneity in treatment effects or quality across patients. As opposed to the previous sections, responsive subsidy policy may adversely affect health in this case under some specific forms of heterogeneity described below.

We consider expectations about treatment effects that are heterogeneous, \( F(q, h) \), where the parameter \( h \) may vary across patients distributed according to \( G(h) \). The demand function for the entire patient population is the aggregated demand across these types of patients.

\[
D_k = \int D_k(h) dG(h)
\]

where \( D_k(h) \) is the demand for treatment \( k \) for the patients of type \( h \). The demand functions \( D' \) after the CER is determined similarly by

\[
D'_k = \int D'_k(h) dG(h)
\]

When subsidies are responsive to overall assessments of treatments they are *product-specific*. This is a problem when treatment effects are *patient-specific* as subsidies may favor one treatment, deemed “the best”, even though the best treatment varies across patients. For this to be true, though, it is not sufficient to just have heterogeneity in treatment effects. The joint distribution of treatment effects
must also span both sides of the 45-degree line as illustrated in Figure 3. In other words, each
treatment is the best for some part of the population. In Figure 3, a given point in the figure corresponds
to the two qualities q for patients of a given type h and the distribution of points in the Figure
corresponds to the distribution F(q) across all subgroups. The patients below (above) the 45-degree line
are those benefitting more from the first (second) treatment. As revealed in the Figure, say the first
treatment had a higher mean treatment effect than the second treatment and therefore was deemed
“the best” by the CER. Contrary to the case of homogeneous effects where CER improved health and
responsive subsidies had a multiplier effect on that improvement, heterogeneous treatment effects, as
illustrated, may imply that health is adversely affected.

Consider when a responsive subsidy policy favored the first treatment, say because it had a higher mean
or median treatment effect than the second treatment. To illustrate, consider the extreme case when
the second treatment was not reimbursed at all, s’2=0, and the patients of the program were too poor
to be able to afford it as a consequence, Y’2=0. Then the patients above the 45-degree line would suffer
a loss in quality corresponding to the vertical distance from their point down to the 45 degree line
because the best treatment for them was not the one deemed best by the CER. This is illustrated for one
such subgroup in the Figure 3. The relative size of this negative health impact of some patients

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5 Technically, this implies Pr(q1>q2)×Pr(q1<q2) > 0
compared to the previously discussed positive impact of the rest of the population now makes the overall health impact effect indeterminate. Heterogeneity is necessary but not sufficient for this to occur. What’s more important is negative dependence so that some treatments are above the 45 degree line and other below it. Negative dependence means that the patients who did not respond on the reimbursed winner of the CER may respond on the non-reimbursed looser.

More generally, the average quality before and after the CER are given by

\[ Q = Y_1 E_1 + Y_2 E_2 \]
\[ Q' = Y'_1 E'_1 + Y'_2 E'_2 \]

where the quality expectations \( E_k \) and \( E'_k \), \( k=1,2 \) are the average quality levels conditional on selecting the treatment before and after the CER. The impact on health \( Q' - Q \) therefore partly determined by the effects among people who change their treatment choices due to the responsive policy, as is also the case under homogenous treatment effects. However, in the heterogeneous case, this impact comprises of the effect on those whose new choices lead to better outcomes and the effect on those whose new choices lead to inferior outcomes. The degree of heterogeneity and the extent of self-selection before the responsive policy would determine the overall effect of these two groups.

A responsive subsidy policy may alter quantity towards the first treatment that is superior on average but, due to heterogeneity, the overall effect on those selecting into that treatment may very well be negative. For example, if due to a responsive subsidies the demand for the first treatment absorbs the demand for the second treatment, then \( Y'_1 = Y_1 + Y_2 \). This implies that the impact on health is given as

\[ \Delta Q = Y_1 (E'_1 - E_1) + Y_2 (E'_2 - E_2) \]

which is determined by the changes in average effects for those who selected into either treatment prior to the CER. If, prior to CER, patients were able to select treatment that were more beneficial on average for them, then \( E'_1 < E_1 \) & \( E'_2 < E_2 \) and the overall health impact of CER could be negative. However, if patents were incorrect in their choice prior to CER, then the impact could be positive.

Because of the potential negative impact on health from responsive subsidies or coverage policies, CER may have indeterminate effect on incremental cost-effectiveness, \( CE = \Delta S/\Delta Q \). This is because the cost per unit of quality may fall or rise dependent on the patient heterogeneity in the population. For example, in Figure 3 above if responsive subsidies induces everyone to choose the first treatment even

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6 See Meltzer et al. (2003) for evidence of such self-selection among diabetes patients. See also Basu (2009) for a discussion of these effects.
when it is not optimal then clearly average quality of care is lowered, thereby lowering cost-effectiveness under constant prices.

Section 6: Empirical Analysis of Responsive Subsidies for Antipsychotics

In this section, we conduct an illustrative empirical analysis of the potential impact of CER responsive subsidies using the case of antipsychotic drugs. These drugs represent one of the largest drug classes in one of the major US public subsidy programs, Medicaid (Bruen and Ghosh, 2004). Antipsychotic drugs represent the primary treatments for patients with schizophrenia. Beginning from 1990 a second generation of antipsychotic drugs, also known as the atypical antipsychotics (AA) were introduced. These drugs are believed to cause less movement disorders as side effects compared to the first generation antipsychotics (also known as typical or neuroleptics) (Kane, 2004; Meltzer 2009). More recently, some of the second generation antipsychotics have been linked to increased metabolic side-effects such as weight gain and diabetes (Meltzer, 2005).

We consider the recent CER (CATIE trial) that was conducted for antipsychotics in the US (Lieberman et al., 2005), following a series of other comparative effectiveness studies conducted on this issue (Polsky et al., 2006; Leucht et al., 2009). The CATIE results found equivalence in the effectiveness for a first generation (typical) and all the second generation (atypicals) antipsychotic drugs (Lieberman et al, 2005; Rosenheck et al, 2006). This sparked a vigorous debate about coverage of the expensive second generation drugs as costs of antipsychotics have been one of the fastest growing pharmaceutical expenditures within Medicaid in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (Banthin and Miller, 2006). Several CATIE investigators, including the authors of the CATIE study, have stated that that study was not designed to directly answer questions of policy regarding access to antipsychotic drugs, while others have suggested that the CATIE results clearly established that it is wasteful to use public funds to pay for second-generation antipsychotics, a perspective that has been adopted by some influential media outlets, and some pharmacy benefit managers (Rosenheck, 2007; NY Times, 2005; Soumerai and Law, 2007 ). This has put pressure on various states’ public health officials to cut their budgets by restricting coverage on the AAs (Carey, 2005) and has led to considerable policy debate on whether the effectiveness evidence generated by the CATIE trial should be used as basis for limiting reimbursement or coverage for AAs, that is, whether subsidies should be responsive to the CER (Parks et al., 2008). Debate about the comparative effectiveness of these drugs persists (AHRQ EPC Project, 2009).

We examine two highly debated counter-factual policy options, which severely restricts access to AAs and compare them to the pre-CATIE scenario where AAs were not restricted. Using results from the CATIE trial, we trace out the health and spending effects of the two responsive policy positions and examine what determines those effects. Since Medicaid is one of the primary payer of antipsychotic
medications, and since much of the policy debate has been about appropriate public reimbursement responses to CER, our discussions will surround the Medicaid population of non-elderly adult patients with schizophrenia. We stress the fact that none of these policy positions we consider, which severely restricts access to AAs, were actually implemented in real practice, partly owing to concerns regarding design issues of the CATIE trial and to avoid the potential adverse impact on health associated with such restrictions for this very vulnerable population (Parks et al., 2008; Meltzer et al., 2009). Nevertheless, as described previously, access to some AAs was restricted through prior authorization (PA) policies by approximately 40 percent of state Medicaid programs in 2005, many having PA requirements for multiple drugs (Polinski et al, 2007). Even with the recognition in the research literature on the biological heterogeneity in treatment effects and outcomes in schizophrenia, CER studies such as CATIE may have reinforced the will for instituting these stringent access restriction policies.

However, less is understood about the consequences of such policies especially when different subgroups of the patient population find the largest benefits from different drugs. The goal here is therefore to trace out the implications of these policies by intentionally using very drastic coverage restriction scenarios, not to argue that they should or should not be implemented. The rationale is that, if we see welfare is enhanced even in these restricted scenarios, we will be more confident about the impact of CER-responsive policy changes. Otherwise, our illustration points out the implications of CER and the potential consequences of responsive policies.

6.1. Evidence on treatment effect heterogeneity

Our concern about the effects of responsive subsidies applied to treatments, when different subgroups of patients may find alternative treatments to be beneficial, can be highlighted by illustrating responses to different drugs by the same patient. This can be achieved using data from the CATIE trial, as unlike traditional randomized designs, CATIE followed a novel approach where patients, who discontinued their first drug assignment, were re-randomized to receive an alternative drug. This design aspect of CATIE helps to establish the joint distribution of effects from alternative drugs for the same individuals, conditional on the fact that these individuals discontinued from one of them.

We reanalyze the individual level CATIE data to estimate the joint distribution of treatment effects between risperidone as the 1st line and olanzapine or quetiapine as the second line drug. The data only allowed us to estimate the effects of these second generation drugs, but nevertheless illustrates our point about treatment effect heterogeneity. Since these drugs influence both the symptoms and the

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7 Even though these observed policies were not as restrictive as full denial of drugs that we study as counterfactual policies in our simulations, these policies do highlight the CER results can considerably influence coverage decisions even without a formal mechanism as in a UK-based system.
side-effect profile in patients, we study the health effects of these drugs in terms of quality-adjusted life year that integrates these effects into a single metric. We use the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) scores, which measure severity of psychotic symptoms among patients with schizophrenia, to compute a severity index (Mohr et al., 2004) and then assign quality of life weights to each severity category. Similarly, we assign quality of life weights to each of the most common side-effects, akathisia, akinesia and weight gain. Overall quality of life for a patient at any given time is computed by taking the minimum of the symptom-based QOL and side-effects based QOL. The key outcome on which comparisons are made is the average monthly change in QOL, modeled using linear mixed-effects models.

Figure 4: Joint distribution of monthly changes in QOL from risperidone in Phase I and either olanzapine or quetiapine in phase II, where these individuals discontinued their risperidone use.

Figure 4 illustrates such a joint distribution of effects by showing the individual patient level monthly changes in QOL from a second generation drug risperidone in Phase I and one of two other second generation drugs olanzapine or quetiapine in Phase II, where these individuals discontinued their
risperidone use. The figure illustrates that all patients who discontinued risperidone are expected to obtain a positive benefit from switching to either olanzapine or quetiapine. For some (individuals above the 45-degree line), the benefits on the second generation drugs are larger than that they were experiencing while using the first generation drug. Such evidence raises concern regarding restricted access to these drugs. Likewise, for those below the 45 degree line, the benefits of risperidone therapy were larger.

Note that heterogeneity in treatment effects is a necessary but not sufficient condition for responsive subsidies to induce welfare loss. Even if there was heterogeneity but the entire joint distribution was below or above the 45-degree line, there would be little loss from responsive subsidies. What central is whether there the best treatment differs across patients. For example, if there is positive covariance then not responding on a first-line therapy may imply the patient won’t respond on second-line therapies as well. However, if there is independence or negative correlation, then failing one treatment means the next is more likely to succeed. The lack of dependence illustrated in the figure above is therefore central for the negative health impact we simulate below.

6.2 Simulated Pre-CER levels (Pre-CATIE scenario)

We consider when prior to the CER (CATIE) both generation antipsychotics are covered under the Medicaid program. Since the second generation drugs are costlier, this resembles a greater subsidy on the second generation drugs compared to first generation drugs (i.e. \( s_2 \geq s_1 \)). Demand for these drugs are partly determined by the demand prices faced by the patients, which were close to zero, i.e. \( P_0(s) = 0 \), so that overall spending closely coincide with the supply prices \( P_s \) and has been substantial incurred by Medicaid for this class. Demand is also affected by heterogeneity in treatment effects as with unrestricted coverage physicians were able to try out alternative drugs and often settle on a drug that appears to produce better quality for an individual patient. That is, irrespective of the drug that a patient initiates on, the physician can switch patients as needed to an alternative drug that may be more efficacious for that patient. Since this resembles the standard practice in the pre-CATIE era, we capture the overall effect of these switches using the intention-to-treat effects of specific drug initiation from CATIE data.

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8 Note that we could not establish such a joint distribution of effects for the use of first generation pherphenazine in Phase I due to limited sample size in the CATIE trial.

9 Total Medicaid expenditures on antipsychotic medication increased from $484 million in 1995 to $1.3 billion in 1998 (Lewin Group, 2000). In 2004, the annual health care costs for patients with schizophrenia is estimated to be about US $28 billion, of which nearly one-third can be attributed to pharmacy costs (Gilmer et al., 2004). More recent estimates suggest that expenditures on antipsychotic medications across all payers have crossed $10 billion this year and account for a third to a half of all mental health expenditures (NIMH, 2006).
We focus on three second-generation antipsychotic drugs, risperidone, olanzapine, quetiapine as well as one first generation drug perphenazine. These comprise nearly 70% of the market of antipsychotic prescriptions written in the United States.

Wu et al. (2006) estimated prevalence of diagnosed schizophrenia among non-elderly Medicaid patients to be 1.66%. We apply this estimate to about 15 million non-elderly adult Medicaid enrollees (www.statehealthfacts.org) to obtain a total number of 250,000 non-elderly adult enrollees with schizophrenia. We assume that the drug-specific shares of scripts estimated from the 2005 IMS data represent equilibrium shares of use both across patients at the initial assignment and within each initial assignment over a one year period. Therefore, we use these shares to split the 250,000 patients with schizophrenia to obtain the number of patients initiating with each of these drug. The Pre-CATIE scenario is now shown in Figure 5.

![Pre-CATIE scenario diagram]

Figure 5: Pre-CATIE scenario.

The total number of scripts ($N_i$) for each drug over a one year period is calculated by multiplying the number of patients initiated on a drug times twelve 30-day scripts.\(^{10}\) Similarly, the total health effect $E_i$ generated from a drug initiation is calculated by multiplying the number of patients initiated on this drug with the corresponding intention-to-treat monthly change in QOL that are estimated from CATIE data (shown in Figure 5 and summarized in Table A1).\(^{11}\) For example, 90,000 patients initiated on quetiapine. They are expected to experience 0.003 monthly increments in their quality of life. Therefore

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\(^{10}\) All patients do not continue on their initially assigned drug but can switch to alternative drugs as they have access to all the alternatives. However, in equilibrium, the estimated share of scripts from IMS data will reflect these switching.

\(^{11}\) These intention-to-treat effects represent the average quality levels for a given initial drug assignments after incorporating the effect of trial-and-error selection into the best treatment. We apply mixed effects linear models to individual-level longitudinal quality of life data from CATIE and estimate the intention-to-treat effects of the initial assignment of alternative drugs. Specifically, we look at look at the coefficients on treatment-time interaction to compare the average rate of change in QALYs under alternative first line treatment.
the total annual QALYs experienced by this cohort is calculated as 90,000 X 0.003 X 12 = 3240 QALYS. Similar calculation are made for each drug initiation and then the total benefits are summed across all the drug initiations. Similarly, total costs under this policy is calculated by multiplying the number of patients initiated on a drug with the corresponding intention-to-treat effects (Figure 5 and summarized in Table A1) on total drugs and services costs that were reported by Rosenheck et al (2005) in their Supplemental Table C (reproduced here in Table A1). Of these costs, about 18 - 34% is due to the use of any of the antipsychotic medications under study (Table A1). Note that the overall health outcomes and costs across each drug initiation-arm in the figure are relatively homogeneous, partly due to that these are intent to treat effects that involved substantial switching to drugs not started on.

6.3 Simulated Post-CER levels (Post-CATIE scenarios)

To simulate the effects of a highly restrictive CER-responsive subsidy policy, we compare the pre-CATIE scenario with two hypothetical (counter-factual) post-CER scenarios. In the first scenario, in response to the CATIE results the responsive subsidy policy entails the second generation drug not being covered; $s_2' = 0$. Given the low income of the Medicaid population, this is assumed to eliminate demand in this population so that the post-CER quantity satisfies $Y_2' = 0$.$^{12}$ This case is included as it provides an upper bound on the harmful effects of a subsidy response, the lower bound being induced by no response occurring at all (i.e. pre-CER policy remains). In the second scenario, under the responsive subsidy policy the second generation drugs are again subsidized less than before, $s_2' < s_2$, but only one of the second-generation drugs is covered, thereby allowing $Y_2'$ to be positive.

*Post-CATIE scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario #1:*

The *post-CER scenario #1* is illustrated in Figure 6. In this scenario, the typical antipsychotic (perphenazine) is the only drug subsidized and the atypicals are not reimbursed. That is, $s_1'$ is set so that the consumer price is zero and the second subsidy is eliminated, $s_2' = 0$. We will assume that all patients are initiated with perphenazine, 25% these patients (estimated using CATIE data) will find perphenazine to be efficacious and tolerable and therefore continue on it. The remaining 75% will discontinue perphenazine after six months (median time to discontinuation estimated using CATIE data) but will not be able to switch to other drugs due to lack of subsidies (i.e. $Y_2' = 0$), and thus will be without drug therapy for the remaining six months. We run separate mixed effects models to estimate the effect of the initially assigned drug on monthly changes in quality of life over the duration of the trial for those

$^{12}$ It is stressed that this is a very extreme form of restriction. Usually, such a scenario, if at all exists, would often have the appeals process through which the patient can get an atypical drug. Appeals process is a more stringent version of PA policies. It is not clear how long such appeals usually takes and whether patients are more likely to give up switching to another drugs given this hurdle. We certainly see effects to this end for PA policies (Soumerai et al., 2007).
who continued on their initial assignment and till the time of discontinuation for those who discontinued the initially assigned drug. These estimates are shown in Figure 6 and also summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix.

Figure 6: Patterns of utilization under the post-CATIE scenario # 1 with a responsive subsidy policy.

Among the discontinuers, we assume that 11% of them will have a relapse (Weiden and Olsson, 1995) and the remaining will not experience any more gain in their quality of life in that year. Patient who relapse, will on average experience two hospitalization (Weiden and Olsson, 1995) worth $14,000 each and a loss in quality of life of 0.45 per patient (Lenert et al. 2004).

Total QALYs under this scenario are calculated as follows. Continuers accumulate the average monthly change in QOL, estimated from among perphenazine continuers in the CATIE data, over 12 months. Discontinuers accumulate the average monthly change in QOL, estimated from among perphenazine discontinuers from CATIE data, for 6 months before they discontinue perphenazine, and zero QOL change thereafter. Among discontinuers, those who relapse experience an additional loss of 0.45 QOL units per patient (Lenert et al. 2004). For example, 1,875,000 (75%) patients would discontinue perphenazine at the 6 month mark. 20,625 (11%) of these patients will experience a relapse in the next six months. The total annual QALYs for these 20,625 patients are calculated as: (20,625*6*0.0024) + (20,625 * - 0.45) = 297 + (-9281) = -8984 QALYS.

Similarly, total costs are calculated as follows. Continuers accumulate the estimated average monthly costs (drugs plus services use) among perphenazine continuers over 12 months. Monthly costs for the compliant group are calculated based on the estimates on total drugs and services reported by Rosenheck et al (2005) in their Supplemental Table D, where treatment crossovers were excluded. The same monthly costs are applied to the noncompliant group during the first 6 month when they were on
perphenazine. After discontinuation, patients continue to accumulate the average monthly services costs (but not any drug costs\textsuperscript{13}) and also additional costs of hospitalization due to relapse.

\textit{Post-CATIE scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario \#2:}

The \textit{post-CER scenario \#2} is illustrated in Figure 7. In this second scenario, the typical antipsychotic (perphenazine) but also one atypical antipsychotic are subsidized with the other atypicals still not reimbursed. That is, \( s'_{2} \) for one atypical and \( s'_{1} \) are set so that the consumer prices are zero for each while \( s'_{2} = 0 \) for all other atypicals. We will consider risperidone to be the atypical reimbursed, as it is the only generic AA available in the market and also consistently finds itself in the top tier of preferred drug lists across most Medicaid. We assume that all patients who had chosen an atypical to initiate their treatment under the pre-CER policy would now choose to initiate treatment with risperidone as it is the only atypical covered.

Similar to Scenario \#1 above, we will assume that among all patients who initiate with risperidone, 26\% (estimated using CATIE data) will find risperidone to be efficacious and tolerable and therefore continue on it. The remaining 74\% will discontinue risperidone after 5 months (median time to discontinuation estimated using CATIE data). Patients initiating with perphenazine will follow the same route as in scenario \#1, with 25\% of the patients staying on the drug for the full year and 75\% discontinuing after 6 months.

Unlike Scenario \#1 where there is only drug available, in this scenario, discontinuers of either perphenazine or risperidone can switch to the alternative and prevent relapse. Since we do not directly have an estimate for the magnitude of such an effect from the CATIE data, we will assume that the relapse rate among discontinuers from either arm reduces from 11\% to 5\%. Patient who relapse, will on average experience two hospitalization (Weiden and Olfson, 1995) worth $14,000 each and a loss in quality of life of 0.45 per patient (Lenert et al. 2004).

\textsuperscript{13} To obtain a conservative estimate on costs, we did not include costs of concomitant medications, as part of these costs may be due to the use of antipsychotics themselves.
Figure 7: Patterns of utilization under the post-CATIE scenario # 2 with a responsive subsidy policy. Final payoffs are shows as $ Billions / 1000 QALYS.

Following Scenario #1, we use the QOL effects for continuers and discontinuers for the corresponding drug assignment (as indicated in Figure 7 and summarized in Table A2) to calculate the total effect of this assignment. For risperidone, the QOL-effect among those who discontinue is found to be negative but not statistically significant (Table A2). Therefore, we assume a zero monthly change in QOL for the discontinuers during the first five months when they are on risperidone. Similarly, costs for the compliant groups under each drug initiation are calculated based on the estimates on total drugs and services reported by Rosenheck et al (2005) in their Supplemental Table D, where treatment crossovers were excluded. The same monthly costs are applied to the noncompliant group during the month when they were on their initial assignment. After discontinuation, patients continue to accumulate the assignment-specific average monthly services costs and additional costs of hospitalization due to relapse.

In order to be conservative, we ignore the number of scripts sold to patients who switch to risperidone after discontinuing from perphenazine and vice versa. We will defer the discussion of price responses for risperidone that is expected as its equilibrium quantity soars to the next section.

We compare the expected incremental costs and benefits, in terms of Quality adjusted life years (QALYs), between the pre- and post CER scenarios.

6.3 Results

Pre-CATIE Scenario:
The number of 30-day scripts (Y) for each drug sold in a year are estimated to be 1.1 million for quetiapine, 0.9 million for risperidone, 0.6 millions for olanzapine and 0.4 million for perphenazine. Based on the intention-to-treat effects of initial assignment, the total annual QALYS (Q) generated across all treatments adds to 8,732 while the total costs adds to $4.5B.

Based on estimates from the CATIE trial (Table A1), the class spending on antipsychotics by Medicaid for this target population is $1.33B. This amounts to 29.5% of total health care spending for these patients.

*Post- CATIE Scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario#1:

When all of the 250,000 patients are started on perphenazine, 25% of them continue with it and generate a total of 2,175 QALYs and $0.7B in total annual costs. Those who discontinue perphenazine but do not relapse obtain an additional 2,403 of QALYs and incur $1.8B in spending. Those who discontinue perphenazine and relapse suffer a loss of 8,984 QALYs and add $0.8B in spending. Consequently, this post- CER scenario would produce a loss of 4,406 QALYs at total annual costs of $3.3B, mainly due to the severe effect on the quality of life of those who relapse due to the unavailability of drugs.

*Post- CATIE Scenario with responsive subsidies, Scenario#2:

When the first generation drug perphenazine and the second generation drug risperidone are the only two drugs that are subsidized, 35,000 patients initiate with perphenazine and the rest with risperidone. Patients initiating with risperidone will generate a net loss of 1,504 QALYs and those initiating on perphenazine will generate a net gain of 90 QALYs, totaling to a net loss of 1,414 QALYs for this scenario at a cost of $4.0B.

*Incremental cost-effectiveness of alternative policies

Table 1 presents the cost-effectiveness results for the two alternative responses in subsidies compared to the pre-CER policy. The first part of the table presents a standard cost-effectiveness table. Here policies are presented in order of increasing costs. The second and the fourth columns present the incremental costs and QALYs respectively for a policy compared to a less costly policy. The last column reports the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, which is the ratio of the incremental costs over the incremental QALYs. For example, Post CER#2 policy incurs $0.7B in additional costs and produces 2,992 additional QALYS compared to Post CER#1 policy and therefore has an ICER of $0.7B/2,992 = $222,816/QALY.

The second part of the table present the net monetary benefits (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998) of alternative policies when each QALY is valued at $100,000.
Table 1: Cost-effectiveness of CER-responsive policies for 250,000 non-elderly adult patients with schizophrenia under Medicaid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Costs (Billions)</th>
<th>Incr. Costs (Billions)</th>
<th>QALYs</th>
<th>Incr. QALYs</th>
<th>ICER ($/QALY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-CER#1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-4,406</td>
<td>(vs post #1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-CER#2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-1,414</td>
<td>(vs post #2)</td>
<td>2,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-CER</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8,732</td>
<td>(vs post #1)</td>
<td>10,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net Monetary Benefits (NMB) at $100,000/QALY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>QALYS</th>
<th>QALYS (in $B)</th>
<th>COSTS</th>
<th>NMB ($B)</th>
<th>Incr. NMB ($B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-CER</td>
<td>8,732</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-3.63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-CER#1</td>
<td>-4,406</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-3.74</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-CER#2</td>
<td>-1,414</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-4.14</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Post-CER#1: The most stringent policy with access only to first generation perphenazine
Post-CER#2: Access only to first generation perphenazine and second generation risperidone.
NMB = QALYS (in $B) - COSTS

CATIE-responsive subsidies in Scenario #1 will incur $3.3B in costs and an average loss of 4,406 QALYs. Compared to the pre-CATIE policy, this corresponds to an addition of 13,138 QALYs (ΔQ) and cost savings of $1.2B (ΔS). The savings in costs with such a CATIE-responsive policy are about 90% of the $1.3B Medicaid class sales annually in non-elderly adult patient with schizophrenia but are only worth the money if the societal willingness to pay for an additional QALY falls below $90,000. At a threshold of $100,000 per QALY, the CATIE-responsive policy scenario #1 in comparison to pre-CATIE policy will incur a loss of health valued annually at about 98% of class spending and thus an annual net loss of about $110 million dollars (Table 1), or about 8% of total class spending on antipsychotics by Medicaid in this population. CATIE-responsive subsidies in Scenario #2 will incur $4.0B in spending and a loss of 1,414 QALYs. Compared to the pre-CATIE policy, Scenario #2 will generate an additional loss of 10,146 QALYs and cost savings of $0.5 billion dollars. These savings are only worth the money if the societal willingness to pay for an additional QALY falls below $50,000. At a threshold of $100,000 per QALY, this CATIE-responsive policy scenario #2 will result in an annual loss of $0.5 billion dollars in value compared to pre-CATIE policy (Table 1), or about 38% of total class spending by Medicaid in this population.

The Importance of Price Responses
More generally, the debate about whether second generation treatments should be reimbursed at par with first generation drugs is somewhat misguided as it relies on the wrong evidence to argue that higher-priced second generation treatments are equally effective but less cost-effective than lower-priced first generation treatments. First, in the presence of treatment heterogeneity, cost-effectiveness of treatments often do not translate to cost-effectiveness of coverage policies. Second, cost-effectiveness analysis often use effectiveness evidence after the CER but prices before the CER, that is, \( F' \) and \( p \) in our framework. Rather, what should matter is the evidence and prices both after the CER, \( F' \) and \( p' \) in our framework. The important point here is that the prices after the CER will adjust dependent on whatever the responsive subsidy rules are. Thus, endogenous pricing is central to any conclusion of appropriate reimbursement after the CER. Even if, hypothetically, the social willingness to pay was less than $90K/QALY and the estimates from scenario #1 were considered to be precise, which would have favored the CATIE-responsive subsidy policy #1, prices of atypical could have adjusted in response to the new evidence. Any estimates of cost-savings from not reimbursing second generation treatments assuming that \( p' = p \) are unlikely to be consistent with actual pricing behavior after the CER. Those cost-savings may be an upper bound and should contrasted to cost-savings that occur under a given reimbursement rule in place. The endogenous nature of prices given government subsidy rules is central to determine the welfare effects of reimbursement of first vs second generation antipsychotics.

Section 7: Concluding Remarks

Given the growth in public subsidization of CER to raise quality and lower cost, little conceptual and empirical understanding exists concerning the quantitative impact of CER. This paper analyzed the impact of CER on patient health and costs interpreting CER to shift the demand from some treatments at the expense of others. We traced out the general spending and health implications of such shifts in private- as well as subsidized health care markets. In contrast to commonly held views, our analysis implies that CER may well increase quality of care but also spending when treatment effects are homogenous; in contrast, CER may increase spending and adversely impact health under plausible assumptions of how markets respond to quality information. This was particularly relevant when treatment effects are heterogeneous as product specific coverage policies failed to account for patient-specific treatment effects. We illustrated these economic effects for antipsychotics that are among the largest drug classes of the US Medicaid program and for which CER has been conducted. We simulated that if subsidies were eliminated for atypical based CATIE trial, a loss of value at 8% of class spending would be observed.

Concerns about the implications of CER-responsive subsidy policies in the face of heterogeneous treatment effects cut across many other clinical scenarios. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a single drug
class where the drug that is best for one patient is always best for every other patient. The literature is
voluminous on the many other classes to which our analysis may generalize including, for example, the
use of antipsychotics drugs in Alzheimer’s disease (Schneider et al., 2006), use of antihypertensive drugs
(Matchar et al., 2008) and the treatments for clinically localized prostate cancer (Wilt, 2008). The fact
that the vast majority of drug classes involve several drugs priced differentially certainly suggests that
there is product differentiation, that is, treatment effect heterogeneity. Price differences would not be
able to survive under homogeneous treatment effects.

The main conclusion of our analysis is that simplistic thinking about the impact of traditionally perceived
CER may have adverse effects. However, this does not mean that CER may not have useful role to play
and that good forms of CER should not take place. The analysis thereby suggests several future research
issues to consider in improving the use of CER. First, our analysis of the impact of CER-responsive
subsidies suggests that a better understanding is needed as to how CER should be stratified towards
obtaining the right treatments for the right subpopulations rather than focused on the best treatment
for all patients. There may not be a “one size fits all” for the entire patient population so having
reimbursement based on such a policy induces inefficiencies. (Lewin 2009) In particular, our analysis
suggests that the data generated by CER should not only consider aggregate measures of response but
more individualized measures beyond standard demographics such as gender, age, or race (Basu, 2009).

Second, traditional RCTs that focus on intention-to-treat effects are not useful when there is sequencing
of treatments over time with a first line therapy, second line therapy and so on. This is because RCTs
generate marginal distributions of treatment responses. What would be more valuable to know would
be conditional distributions of treatment responses of the second stage conditional on failure of a first-
stage treatment. If there is dependence in treatment responses, as suggested by the data we
considered for the CATIE trial, learning about the joint distribution is of great value (Basu, 2009). CER
should be tailored to incorporate such dependence when trial and error of finding the right treatment
for the right patient is of importance.

Beyond improving the forms of CER that are done to go beyond mean treatment effects for large
populations, our analysis needs to be extended in several directions. First, future analysis should
consider the impact of market power on the analysis, but we refrained from this analysis here as it
would yield similar implications to the competitive case discussed. The basic quantity and price
implications of CER will likely carry over to some non-competitive market conditions as well. For
example, standard monopoly analysis would imply that an outward (inward) shift in demand raises
(lowers) price and quantity, just as in the competitive case discussed here. Under the case when both
treatments have market-power, many differentiated oligopoly models may also imply the quantity and
price implications discussed in response to the demand shifts discussed to be induced by CER.
Second, evaluating the effects of CER is a special case of the general issue of assessing the value of randomized clinical trials for understanding real treatment choices in a real health care setting. This is so because a RCT investigates effects under different prices and information than what is present after the RCT. Using the discussed framework for a more general examination of the value of RCTs for assessing patient welfare in real world markets is an important area of future research.

Third, a better understanding needs to be developed when and in what areas public technology assessment offers an added value beyond similar private market activities (Meltzer et al, 2007). For example, intellectual property on medical products such as drugs and devices implies strong incentives on manufacturers to get the right information generated about the quality of their products or the lack of quality of their competitors’ products. This is in opposition to procedures which without patents have no owners with similar protective interests. In addition, many countries mandate quality evidence to be produced, in the US through the FDA, before marketing. This suggests that the biggest impact of public subsidies for these activities will be for procedures and not products. This would be supported by evidence showing that the share of private funding for technology assessments was higher for patented medical products than it was for generic products or procedures.

As a better understanding develops along these lines, we hope that improved evaluation can take place regarding the value of public technology assessments in general and CER in particular. As it stands right now, there are no methods to quantitatively assess the impact from these activities and why they improve on private sector activities aimed at the same purpose. We hope that quantitative frameworks similar to the ones discussed here will help to bridge that gap, making precise assessments of the value of public subsidies for technology assessments feasible and more common.
**Appendix: Estimates from CATIE analysis**

**Table A1: Intention-to-treat effectiveness and cost estimates from CATIE data used for pre-CER policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Assignment</th>
<th>Effect of initial assignment on average monthly changes in QOL</th>
<th>Effect of initial assignment on average monthly total costs (drugs and services)*</th>
<th>Effect of initial assignment on costs of antipsychotic drugs only*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quetiapine</td>
<td>0.0030 (0.0006)*</td>
<td>$1657</td>
<td>$415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risperidone</td>
<td>0.0028 (0.0005)*</td>
<td>$1529</td>
<td>$440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olanzapine</td>
<td>0.0030 (0.0005)*</td>
<td>$1428</td>
<td>$595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perphenazine (typical)</td>
<td>0.0028 (0.0006)*</td>
<td>$1139</td>
<td>$196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on Rosenheck et al (2005), Supplemental Table C

**Table A2: Estimated treatment effectiveness and costs stratified by continuers and discontinuers of initial treatment assignment, used for post-CER responsive policy.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Assignment</th>
<th>Effect of initial assignment on average monthly changes in QOL</th>
<th>Effect of initial assignment on average monthly total costs **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All Drugs &amp; services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMONG THOSE WHO CONTINUED ON INITIAL ASSIGNMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quetiapine</td>
<td>0.0027 (0.0008)*</td>
<td>$1478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risperidone</td>
<td>0.0031 (0.0007)*</td>
<td>$1532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olanzapine</td>
<td>0.0030 (0.0009)*</td>
<td>$1404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perphenazine (typical)</td>
<td>0.0029 (0.0009)*</td>
<td>$960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AMONG THOSE WHO DISCONTINUED ON INITIAL ASSIGNMENT |                                                               |                                                                           |
| Quetiapine            | 0.0019 (0.001)                                               | -                         |                |
| Risperidone           | -0.0020 (0.001)                                              | -                         |                |
| Olanzapine            | 0.0038 (0.001)*                                              | -                         |                |
| Perphenazine (typical)| 0.0024 (0.001)                                               | -                         |                |

Note: Joint test for treatment-time interaction for QOL effect among continuers not significant (p= 0.94); Joint test for treatment-time interaction for QOL effect among discontinuers significant (p= 0.015)
*P-value < 0.05
*** Based on Rosenheck et al (2005), Supplemental Table D, crossovers excluded.
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