Weber through the Back Door:
Protestant Competition, Elite Dispersion and the Global Spread of
Democracy*

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Abstract: Weber through the Back Door: Protestant Competition, Elite Dispersion and the Global Spread of Democracy

This article explores Protestantism’s inadvertent, historic role in dispersing elites, distributing resources, and developing and spreading democracy. Economic and political elites typically hoard resources and perpetuate class distinction. Conversionary Protestants undermined this social reproduction because they wanted everyone to read the Bible in their own language, decide individually what to believe, and create religious organizations outside state control. Thus, they consistently initiated mass education, mass printing and civil society and spurred competitors to copy. Resultant power dispersion altered elite incentives and increased the probability of stable democratic transitions.

I test my historical arguments statistically through a quasi-natural experiment: the spread of Protestant and Catholic missionaries. Protestant missions account for about half the variation in non-European democracy and remove the influence of the variables that dominate current research. These findings challenge scholars to reformulate theories about cultural and structural influences, economic development and democratization.
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What if Marx got the story backwards and Weber got it wrong? How would social and economic theories change if religion shaped class structure as much as class structure shaped religion and if religious competition had more to do with birthing “modernity” than Calvinist salvation anxiety? In this paper I explore religion’s often inadvertent role in developing and spreading democracy.

My argument is both radical and simple. I contend that as Protestants tried to spread their faith, they consistently catalyzed mass education, mass printing, and civil society, thus hampering elite attempts to “monopolize” these resources. In colonies they also moderated abuses that hampered conversions – helping foster the rule of law. These “side effects” of religious goals altered class structure and elite incentives and increased the probability of stable democracy both inside and outside Europe. Of course Protestant economic and political elites were as selfish as anyone else. Protestant slave owners fought slave literacy; Protestant settlers and officials exploited indigenous people; European Protestant elites fought independent organizations, but Protestants who tried to convert slaves, the poor, and non-Europeans undermined these elites with major (often unintended) consequences. I support this argument in multiple contexts and with both historical and statistical evidence.

Of course, scholars have long debated religion’s role in shaping democracy in Europe, but their arguments were stymied because possible causes were too intertwined. For every cultural or religious “cause,” scholars can find a previous economic or political one; for every economic or political “cause” a previous religious or cultural one. Concurrent changes, bi-directional causation, and modification of previous repertoires make causal argumentation dauntingly complex.
To escape this causality quagmire I use a “natural experiment” – the spread of Protestant and Catholic missions. In Europe, class structure, land tenure, and aristocratic power may have influenced the spread both of Protestantism and of mass education, mass printing, civil society, and democracy – making isolating casual factors difficult. But these alternate causes did not consistently predate European settlement outside Europe nor determine the spread of missionaries. Thus, religious factors were distributed “randomly” with respect to these alternate causes – this allows me to disentangle them. Moreover, for 10 years I have compiled world-wide, geo-spatial data on virtually all Protestant and Catholic missionary activity from the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries and done extensive, world-wide, historical research on missions, printing, education, civil society and colonial reform. Thus, I know precisely when and where different religious groups invested in mass education, printing, and civil society, advocated abolitionism, and so on.

Protestant missionaries quickly invested in mass education, mass printing, and voluntary non-governmental organizations (NGOs) wherever they went, regardless of whether they faced competition from other literate religions. This suggests their investments flowed from an internal cultural logic (see e.g., Thornton and Ocasio 1999). Other religious groups generally invested in these things only after competing with conversionary Protestants (CPs).¹ This implies a strategic use of “cultural repertoires” (Swidler 1986) – at least until they found internal legitimation. This quasi-natural experiment and historic timing information add substantial leverage to my arguments. The results point strongly to CPs centrality in creating conditions where democracy could flourish both inside and outside Europe.

In this article, I first review the major theories of democratization. I then describe historical evidence for CPism’s influence on democratic theory, mass education, mass printing, civil
society, and colonial reform. I continue the “natural experiment” format: suggesting CPs’ influence in Europe and testing it elsewhere. I argue broader education, printing, civil society, and rule of law expanded the size of elites, and, in former colonies, fostered pre-independence political parties and earlier devolution of power. This altered elite’s incentives and, in former colonies, created both a party system and experience with elections before independence – increasing the stability of democratic transitions.

Finally, I test theories statistically in 141 non-European countries. Protestant missions “explain” about half the variation in democracy and remove the impact of the variables that dominate current research. I try to diminish the mission coefficients by controlling factors that influenced where missionaries went, but the coefficients are robust and align with religious patterns in Europe. This suggests that scholars of democracy should take religion more seriously and that some theories of culture need reformulation.

THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY:

Most explanations are “historical” or “structural.” “Historical” explanations typically focus on ideas, individuals, and movements; “structural” ones on social patterns that shape incentives. In this section I review the major “structural” theories of democracy. I group them into (1) endogenous/“caused” causes, (2) exogenous/“uncaused” causes, and (3) alternate transmitters. I discuss “historical” theories in a later section.

ENDOGENOUS CAUSES: Some “causes” of democracy are themselves caused: education, the public sphere, civil society, economic development, and elite incentives. I argue both that CPism caused substantial variation in these “causes” and that in my quasi-natural experiment
missionaries were distributed randomly with respect to pre-existing variation in them – which makes it possible to isolate missions’ influence.

Many claim formal education increases both the level and stability of democracy (Bollen 1979; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Barro 1999) with little reverse causation (Tsai 2006). However, if education disperses power, why did some non-democratic regimes provide more education than other non-democratic regimes? Others emphasize the importance of public debate. Jürgen Habermas (1989) and David Zaret (2000) suggest printing spurred both newspapers and the rational-critical debate that forced states to justify their authority via public opinion. Habermas and Zaret imply technology and markets were sufficient to spur this revolution, but cross-nationally the timing and locations of the public sphere’s emergence do not fit this contention. Still others argue civil society (i.e., associations outside direct state control) fosters democracy by teaching democratic skills and dispositions and checking power abuses and (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Fung 2003) and that reverse causation is modest (Paxton 2002). But again the variation in civil society between countries needs explaining.

A vast literature claims economic development promotes democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Geddes 1999; Treisman 2000; Clague, Gleason and Knack 2001). However, recent research suggests this association is spurious (Heo and Tan 2001; Wejnert 2005; J. Robinson 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2008): (1) Economic growth does not predict democratic growth; (2) Country-level fixed effects (which control unmeasured country-level factors) remove the association between economic development and democracy; (3) Instrumenting economic development to minimize omitted variable bias removes the association as well (J. Robinson 2006). This implies that some unmeasured factor(s) causes both economic development and democracy, creating an artificial association between the two.
Finally, many scholars argue particular patterns of class conflict cause democracy. Under some conditions elites think democracy maximizes their control; under others, authoritarianism. These theories vary, but consistently emphasize how inequality, the size and strength of particular classes, the ability of elites to remove resources from the local economy, and the relative cost of repression and reform influence elite incentives (e.g., Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 2008).

These theories focus on economic interests and class-based coalitions, but interests and coalitions are more complex (Tilly 1995:23; Gourevitch 2008). Religious competition often divides economic and political elites and links people of different classes, inducing behavior that undermines elites’ long-term economic and political interests. This type of cross-class religious conflict helped spur the French, English/Puritan and American Revolutions (J. Clarke 1994; Van Kley 1996; Hutson 1998; Zaret 2000). Moreover, the “causal” factors in elite contestation theories (e.g., inequality, human capital distribution, liquid asset prevalence, and elite fractionalization) are all endogenous. Scholars seldom explicate why they vary between societies.²

EXOGENOUS CAUSES: Some scholars argue oil wealth, climate, geography, and European mortality exogenously shape democracy (Hadenius 1992; Clague et al. 2001; Ross 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2008; Engerman and Sokoloff 2008). According to Acemoglu et al. (2008) Europeans in disease ridden climates extracted resources quickly (before they died) and undermined rule of law; whereas Europeans in temperate climates established law to protect long-term investments. However, climate, geography, and mortality may be weak causes or work through other mechanisms (e.g., the flow of missionaries). Nor do these “causes” explain historic
variation in democracy in Europe or between neighbors (e.g., India vs. Pakistan, Dominican Republic vs. Haiti).

**ALTERNATE TRANSMITTERS:** Regardless of what caused democracy, various groups may have transmitted it cross-nationally. Many emphasize democracy’s diffusion via colonization or European settlement (although the mechanisms and motivation for this are not clear). For example, research consistently suggests former British colonies are more democratic (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Midlarsky 1998) and have more stable democratic transitions than other countries (Treisman 2000; Clague et al. 2001).³ Some claim this was because the UK was a democracy. But, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were also democracies and their former colonies are indistinguishable from those of non-democratic Spain, Portugal and Italy. In fact, colonization by a democracy does not statistically predict democracy (Clague et al. 2001), nor do democracies necessarily act democratically (or humanely) towards those who cannot vote. The British slaughtered indigenous people, used forced labor, and violently repressed resistance (as did others). British indirect rule does not explain the difference either. Colonies where the British used more indirect rule are less democratic (Lange 2004).

Another means of democratic diffusion could be European settlers. However, they typically resisted sharing power with non-whites and if they created democratic institutions, did it for themselves only. Exclusionary “democratic” institutions could foster more inclusive ones if non-whites overcame racial exclusion. But scholars should explain why some indigenous communities had more resources to overcome exclusion.

**RELIGION:** Finally, some theories suggest religion shaped democracy (J. Clarke 1994; Bradley and Van Kley 2001; Woodberry and Shah 2004; Witte 2007). Stable democracy first emerged in
Protestant Europe and British settler colonies. A less stable version developed in Catholic areas with large Protestant and Jansenist minorities (e.g., France) (Woodberry and Shah 2004; Philpott 2004). But this relationship is not deterministic. Early Protestants embraced absolutism in Prussia, fought it in England, and were passive in Wurttemberg (Fulbrook 1984). Contemporary Protestants are also inconsistent in supporting democracy (Woodberry and Shah 2004), but variation does not disprove causation – religion may still influence the probability of democracy.

Quantitative research consistently suggests societies with more Protestants are more democratic and have more stable democratic transitions (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Hadenius 1992; Treisman 2000) and that societies with more Muslims are less democratic and have less stable democratic transitions (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Midlarsky 1998; Barro 1999; Clague et al. 2001). Some claim secularism is crucial for democracy, yet provide no statistical evidence (Moore 2000; Harris 2004; Hitchens 2007) and others disagree (Stepan 2000; Casanova 2008). The association between Catholicism and democracy was negative, but has improved substantially. Many new democracies are predominantly Catholic and the Church facilitated these transitions (Philpott 2004). Thus, scholars who think particular religions are incompatible with democracy must account for this type of religious change.

However, the distribution of religion is not exogenous: e.g., pre-Reformation class and political conditions may have influenced both the spread of Protestantism and democracy (Moore 1966; Swanson 1967). Three quasi-natural experiments weaken this argument: (1) European-settler colonies, (2) former communist countries, and (3) non-European societies. First, among European-settler colonies, “Protestant-based” US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have been more consistently democratic than “Catholic-based” Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Both areas had similar pre-colonial conditions (e.g., temperate climates and small
indigenous populations) and the “assignment” of Protestants between areas was arguably random relative to pre-colonial conditions. This weakens theories that climate, pre-Protestant class variation or secularism caused democracy (e.g. the US is far more religious than Uruguay). Still, all predominantly “Protestant” areas were British colonies and all “Catholic” areas Spanish, thus colonial policy or differences between European immigrants may be crucial.

Second, after communism’s fall, Eastern European Catholic/Protestant countries (Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic) had earlier, more stable democratic transitions than Orthodox/Muslims ones (Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Serbia, Bosnia). Protestant/Catholic former Soviet Republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) also had earlier, more stable transitions than Orthodox/Muslim ones (Woodberry 2000). This weakens other theories because none of these countries were British colonies or had mass immigration from Northwest Europe. All had similar pre-transition institutions and entered a similar international environment. All had large secular populations and comparable exposure to Enlightenment and Marxist ideas though monopoly state education. Yet religious differences predict both who mobilized against communism and how smoothly states transitioned to democracy. Catholic and Protestant countries were similar, but the transitions were after the Catholic Church’s rapprochement with democracy and in areas where Protestant and Catholics competed for centuries.

Scholars may posit post hoc hypotheses to “explain” either of these “natural experiments,” but theories ideally work across contexts, not just in one. Thus, I propose a third, more radical natural experiment: the international spread of Protestant and Catholic missionaries. Their spread was not completely random, but (1) it was random with respect to alternate explanations for democracy in Europe (e.g., class structure, relative power of crown and aristocracy, land holdings, Enlightenment influence); (2) the spread of Protestant and Catholic missionaries was
shaped by similar pre-colonial conditions (e.g., mortality and receptivity); thus omitted variable bias would spread to both (not just Protestants); and (3) missions spread more broadly than European settlers or colonizers and had different arrival dates and penetration levels, thus we can differentiate possible transmitters statistically. Many may think missions’ influence was either too anemic or negative to foster democracy, but if they are correct, then this “natural experiment” is a conservative test of religion’s influence.

**HISTORICAL EVIDENCE:**

In this section I discuss historical evidence that CPism shaped democratic theory, class structure, civil society, and other factors that influenced the probability of democracy both inside and outside Europe. European evidence creates the plausibility that CPism was causal; not merely a transmitter. Non-European evidence undermines alternative explanations because (1) there were other possible transmitters and (2) missions spread randomly with respect to “causes” scholars use to question religions causal influence in Europe.

**THE ORIGIN OF DEMOCRACY THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS:** Both Catholics and Protestants shaped modern democratic theory and institutions, particularly conversionary/renewal movements and reactions to them. While many scholars emphasize Athenian and Enlightenment roots of modern democracy, this is a simplification. First, modern democracy is different from Athenian democracy. Enlightenment theorists incorporated many legal and institutional innovations from the Middle Ages and Reformation (H. Berman 1983; Waldron 2002; Witte 2007). Starting with the Gregorian Reforms (1075-1122), Catholic renewal movements tried to systematize Church law, regain control of clerical appointments, and mitigate corruption. The Church could do this because it had resources outside any one “state’s” control.
These reforms weakened “secular” rulers and helped establish rule of law (H. Berman 1983). For example, the Pope banned all sacraments in England to wrest control of bishops’ appointments from the king. Out of the resultant crisis the Church and nobility imposed the *Magna Carta* on him (written by the Archbishop of Canterbury) and helped prevent its revocation (H. Berman 1983).\(^8\)

Other religious conflicts: e.g., the Puritan Revolution (1640-8), the voluntary re-introduction of monarchy (1660), the forced abdication of Charles II to William and Mary (partially from fear of reintroduced Catholicism) (1688), and the imposition of the Bill of Rights and [Religious] Toleration Act (1689) further weakened monarchy. After 1689 Nonconformists could legally exist, but were discriminated against,\(^9\) giving them incentives to limit state control and expand political, organizational, and press freedom. Thus, arguments for political pluralism, electoral reform, and limitations of state power were originally framed in religious terms (J. Clarke 1994; Ihalainen 1999; Bradley and Van Kley 2001). Similar arguments work elsewhere in Europe (Bradley and Van Kley 2001; Witte and Alexander 2008).

Calvinists, in particular, tried to reconstruct states along “godly” lines and most “Enlightenment” democratic theorists came from Calvinist families and/or educations, even if some were not personally religious (e.g., John Locke, Rousseau, Hugo Grotius, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton) and secularized ideas previously articulated by Calvinist theologians and jurists (Hutson 1998; Witte 2007).\(^{10}\) For example, Hobbes’ and Locke’s social contract is a secularized version of the Puritan covenant, and Locke’s ideas about the equality of all people is explicitly religious (Waldron 2002).

Second, the strength of Calvinism and Nonconformism predicts where democracy emerged better than the strength of Greek and Enlightenment influence. Greek classics were most
consistently available in the eastern Mediterranean, the Roman Empire circled the Mediterranean, and the Renaissance flourished in Southern Europe, but democracy did not thrive in these places. The “Athenian seed” germinated only after 2,100 years in alien soil: northwest Europe and North America. Thus, areas with later and weaker exposure to Greek thought had “stronger effects.”

Moreover, religious context influenced whether Enlightenment-linked revolutions birthed stable democracy. The “Protestant” English and Scottish Enlightenments were not anti-Christian and diffused in the English-speaking world. The US revolution birthed a stable democracy. Other English-speaking countries democratized without Enlightenment revolutions. The “Catholic” French Enlightenment was virulently anti-Christian/anti-Catholic and spread throughout continental Europe and Latin America. The French Revolution disintegrated into violence and inspired both totalitarianism and democracy (Talmon 1970). After 1789, anti-clerical Enlightenment governments formed in virtually every independent “Catholic” country in Europe and Latin America, but did not lead to stable democracy (at least without many decades of instability) (Helmstadter 1997). In fact, some anti-clerical Enlightenment governments stayed in power almost a century before having significant democratization (e.g. Mexico, Uruguay).

Finally, Freemasons (major carriers of the Enlightenment) diffused to most colonies, but remained elitist allies of imperialism and did not disperse power to non-whites or the poor (Rich 1991; Fredrickson 2002; Daughton 2006:87-97; Harland-Jacobs 2007). Even in post-independence Latin American – where Masons fought old hierarchies – they limited membership to people with property and “honorable” professions – hampering dispersions of power (Solano 1990).

Thus, the origin of modern democratic theory and institutions is more a confluence of streams than an Athenian flame that jumped millennia of darkness to enlighten the 18th century.
Although the Enlightenment was important, it is not a sufficient explanation for democracy. Religious ideas, institutions, conflicts, and social bridging were important as well.

**PRINTING, NEWSPAPERS & THE PUBLIC SPHERE:** Scholars often claim printing and capitalism birthed the public sphere (Habermas 1989); but CPs contributed critical innovations that fostered mass printing, newspapers and public debate. First, they changed people’s ideas about who books were for – *everyone* needed access to “God’s word;” *everyone* needed to read: including women and the poor. Second, CPs expected lay people to make individual religious choices. People are not saved through sacraments or group membership but by “true faith in God,” thus each individual must decide. Printed material became “missionaries” and forced others to compete for ordinary people’s allegiance. Third, Protestants had less organizational and doctrinal unity than Catholics. This undermined Protestant’s ability to censor and made printing more profitable in Protestant areas (Eisenstein 1979:403-23).

Before the Reformation, Italy had the largest printing industry, but Protestantism made little headway there and printing did not increase rapidly or birth either and early “public sphere” or mass literacy (Graff 1987:112-119). In contrast, England initially had little printing (Graff 1987:115), but CPs used print to mobilize ordinary people, forcing their elitist enemies to respond. This spurred newspapers, printed debates, and an early public sphere (Zaret 2000). CPs had similar effects in continental Europe – e.g., Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Febvre and Martin 1976:287-319; Eisenstein 1979:312-452; Melton 2001). However, non-state Protestants were weaker there and extended religious wars destroyed early gains. Still, the major French, Dutch, German, and even Spanish printing centers moved from Catholic to Protestant areas between the 16th and 18th centuries. From the 1600s on, Protestant
areas consistently had and exported more printed material per capita than Catholic areas (Eisenstein 1979: 403-23).

CP Bible and tract societies also sparked a 19th century printing explosion. Their drive to print mass quantities of inexpensive texts preceded major technological innovations and spurred technological and organizational transformation in printing, binding, and distribution that created markets and eased adoption by commercial printers (Howsam 1991; Bayly 2004:357; C. Brown 2004; Nord 2004; I. Bradley 2006: 38-9). Before this, commercial publishers generally fought mass printing to keep prices high, even in Great Britain (St. Clair 2007). Markets and technology are not sufficient to explain either the timing or locations of major increases in printing.

CP’s importance is even clearer outside Europe. Religion influenced both whether countries printed and whether printing led to mass literacy, newspapers and a public sphere. First, religion influenced whether elites valued printing. Christians, Jews, and Mahayana Buddhists adopted printing without CP competition (all were not primarily monastic and all had long, non-poetic religious texts that are difficult to memorize). Muslim, Hindu, Theravada Buddhist and other societies throughout Asia and North Africa were directly exposed to printed books and presses by the Chinese, Mongols, Jews, Asian Christians (e.g., Armenians), Catholic missionaries, and European trading companies for a minimum of two- to three-hundred years before they printed any books. By the 1600s, Europeans had created accurate fonts for most major Asia languages and both Protestants and Catholics exported texts in them. The Portuguese even gave the Mogul emperor a printing press and fonts in the early 1600s, but no one used them (Woodberry 2007). Yet, many Asian economies rivaled or surpassed Europe through the late 18th century (Maddison 2001), so the delay was not caused by lack of exposure, technology, markets, or economic development.
To most elites, printing was “ugly,” spread books to people “who were not qualified to interpret them,” and undermined elite distinction/control. Jews, Eastern Christians and trade companies printed for themselves (mostly in “foreign” languages) and Catholics printed few texts (never for mass propaganda). This did not threaten indigenous elites’ or overwhelm their ability to respond orally or with manuscripts. Thus, they resisted change.

When Muslims, Hindus, and Theravada Buddhists printed, it was usually a response to mass printing by Protestant missionaries or those trained by them (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Thailand) (Woodberry 2007). \(^{12}\) CPs printed so many vernacular texts that it forced elite response. For example, within 32 years of importing a press to India in 1800 three British missionaries printed over 212,000 copies of books in forty languages and, along with other mission presses, created the fonts and paper that dominated South Asian printing for much of the 19\(^{th}\) century (Khan 1961). This spurred both Hindu and Muslim response, but the earliest Indian printers learned their skills at mission presses and most early non-Christian Indian imprints were religious - often rebuttals to missionary tracts (Khan 1961; Aggarwal 1988:2; Ghosh 2003; Shaw 2007; F. Robinson 2000:77). In fact, in most Asian societies early indigenous printers gained their skills and equipment from Protestant missionaries (Woodberry 2007).

Second, CPism shaped the “consequences” of printing. If printing caused mass literacy, newspapers and the public sphere, then we would expect them to originate in China, Korea, or Japan, but they did not. All three printed six- to eight-hundred years before Europe; China and Korea had movable-font metal type before Europe; and Korea and Japan had phonetic alphabets – which facilitate literacy and make moveable-fonts efficient. But until Protestant missionaries arrived in the 19\(^{th}\) century, printing never supplanted manuscripts, newspapers did not develop, and literacy remained the prerogative of elites (Davis 1994; Duchesne 2006:82-3; Reed 2007).

Technological knowhow is necessary for printing, newspapers, and the public sphere, but not sufficient. Protestant missionaries were sufficient; they transformed who books were for and printed content that threatened elites; spurring reaction. Other mechanisms may be possible,\(^{14}\) but an internal cultural logic seems to explain Protestants’ consistent role in spurring the democracy-friendly patterns suggested by Habermas and Zaret. Societies that excluded Protestant missionaries started mass printing later and expanded it more slowly. CPs were not perpetually necessary to sustain a print revolution (markets took over), but CPs were a crucial catalyst.

**EDUCATION:** CPs wanted mass literacy so everyone could read the Bible. Their attempt to convert people through education threatened other elites and spurred them to also invest in mass education. High education rates by non-conversionary religions (i.e., Jews after the 2\(^{nd}\) century CE) did not lead to similar imitation.\(^{15}\) CPs centrality is clear from (1) who advocated and
resisted educational expansion, (2) when education expanded, (3) which regions got more education, and (4) which individuals got more education.

Prior to the late-19th century, economic elites throughout Europe resisted educating women and the poor fearing it would undermine stability (Graff 1987; Vincent 2000:26, 77, 80). Religious groups (particularly CPs) consistently countered elite pressure, educated women and the poor, and developed techniques that made mass schooling possible, such as teacher training, child-focused texts, dividing students into age/ability groups, etc. (Graff 1987; Bacchus 1988; Vincent 2000: 38-48; I. Bradley 2006). Even when European governments formed state school systems, they often merely nationalized religious schools (Graff 1987; Bebbington 2006).

Education expanded rapidly after the Reformation and similar religious revival movements not with the advent of printing, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment or the Industrial Revolution (Johansson 1977; Graff 1987; Vincent 2000:28-32). Economic development did not spur mass literacy either. The earliest places with near universal literacy (Scandinavia, Iceland, New England, Protestant cantons in Switzerland, Puritan parts of England, and lowland Scotland) were typically economic backwaters, but had Protestant sponsored literacy campaigns (Graff 1987:13, 246, 292-3; Johansson 1977).

Prior to the 20th century, countries with large Protestant populations had higher literacy, regions of countries with more Protestants typically had higher literacy, and Protestant individuals in the same country had higher literacy (especially for women and non-elites). The Catholic Church invested heavily in education where they faced competition from CPs (i.e., Ireland, North America, and British colonies) or a secularizing state (France), but not in areas with a Catholic monopoly (e.g., Spain, Portugal, and Italy) or Orthodox/Muslim competition (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Balkans) (Johansson 1977; Graff 1987; Woodberry 2004).


Religious variation in education within the same countries further reveals missions’ importance. Wherever we have data from Africa, Asia, and Oceania, Christians (especially Protestants) are disproportionately educated and have higher educational expectations for their children (East Asia: Zhai 2007; Roemer 2008; South Asia: Ingleby 2000:284, 311; Middle East: Prasad 1999:26; Sharkey forthcoming; Africa: Sundkler and Steed 2000:650-54; Blunch 2008; Worldwide: Woodberry 2004). In Latin America, Protestants are disproportionately poor, yet still put a greater emphasis on education than their neighbors (Annis 1987; Brusco 1995; Sherman 1997; Robbins 2004 – although see Steiginga 2001).
Elites have had good education regardless of religion, but until recently only CPs educated non-elites sufficiently to alter class structure. In competitive environments, religious differences dissipate through imitation and compulsory state schooling, but early investors reaped disproportionate rewards. New educational systems require resources (trained teachers, books, buildings, educational expectations) and societies that started mass education earlier have more resources to ease expansion. Plus, former colonies often created state education systems by nationalizing mission schools (Woodberry 2004; Sharkey forthcoming). Thus, while education may help democracy, the distribution of education partially has religious roots.

**CIVIL SOCIETY**: Pre-Reformation Catholics founded and expanded legal space for humanitarian organizations (H. Berman 1983; Lynch 2003); Protestants systematized and laicized them (Gorski 2003). Calvinists and Nonconformists were especially important in expanding legal protection for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and popularizing acceptance of religious and political pluralism (J. Clarke 1994; Ihalainen 1999; Hamburger 2002; J. Bradley 2005; Witte 2007).

In the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, new modular forms of social protest and special purpose organizations emerged in Great Britain and North America, crystallizing in the 1820s and 1830s (Tilly 1995; Tarrow 1998). These two countries had the greatest density of Nonconformist Protestants. Tilly and Tarrow claim urbanization, expanding states and emerging markets spurred these changes. But, Nonconformist and Evangelical Protestants (i.e., CPs)\textsuperscript{17} pioneered most of the non-violent tactics and organizations they describe. The French developed the violent tactics: “secular” urban insurrections and barricades (Tarrow 1998:39-41).

Protestant reformers first used mass publicity and petitions for political campaigns (Walzer 1971; Zaret 2000). After 1765 these practices re-emerged and increased in Great Britain and
North America. Some innovators were not religiously motivated (e.g., Wilkes), but CPs disproportionately mobilized and signed petitions (Anstey 1975; Drescher 1986; J. Bradley 1990). Most other tactical and organizational innovations were closely linked to CPs (e.g., abolitionist’s tactics) and virtually all the organizations and movements that crystallized these tactics in the early 1800s were CP (Drescher 1986; Morris 1990; I. Bradley 2006).

In the US, CPs also birthed and consolidated these new organizations and tactics. These emerged concurrently in both the urban Northeast and rural Western frontier (an area with little urbanization or state penetration). Both leadership and supporters were closely linked to missions (Hall 1992: 33-36; Young 2006; Masters and Young 2007). In India similar organizations and tactics emerged in the 1820s and ‘30s - initiated by Protestant missionaries and copied by those reacting to them (Ali 1965; Oddie 1969; 1978; Woodberry 2004). They did not emerge in France or Northern Europe until the 1840s or in Southern Europe until much later (Tilly 1995:15).

If scholars think that state and market expansion caused social movement organizations (SMOs) and modular, cross-regional, non-violent protest, then what did the governments and economies of London, the US frontier, and Calcutta India have in common? Was their capitalist development and state capacity uniformly greater than continental Europe or East Asia? The consistent prevalence of CPs is both more obvious and more consistent with descriptions by 19th century observers (e.g., Tocqueville).

Religious movements linked CP elites with ordinary congregants. These elites lacked power to institute reforms without popular backing, but feared popular agitation would spawn chaos. They borrowed SMO forms and tactics from CP organizations and revivals and promoted non-violent tactics (Woodberry 2004; Young 2006; I. Bradley 2006: 122-38). Moreover, Quakers and
some other CPs had theological reasons for non-violence. Once CPs used these forms and tactics politically, others learned and developed them without needing religious connections.


These organizations and tactics had no precedent internationally (Anheier and Salamon 1998:14-15). Thus, societies with early religious liberty and more Protestant missionaries have more vital voluntary sectors regardless of their current religious makeup (James 1989; 1993; Woodberry 2004). In fact, the connection between Protestant missions and the rise of NGOs is so pervasive that NGO scholar Estelle James writes, “…a similar institutional form may not exist in economies that do not have a colonial missionary background…” (1989:291).

Current data on both organizations and individual behavior reflect these CP origins. Wherever we have statistics, Christians – especially non-state Protestants – are the most active creators of organizational civil society, and Protestant or mixed Protestant/Catholic countries and regions have the highest voluntary association involvement (James 1987; Anheier 1989; Grabb

Moreover, surveys consistently shows that highly religious people volunteer more time and give more money to support both religious and nonreligious organizations (in the US: Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Regnerus, Smith and Sikkink 1998; Smidt 2003; internationally: Gill 2004; Chang 2006; Trinitapoli 2007). Even after controls, Christians (particularly Protestants) are the most likely to volunteer and give both formally and informally, while Buddhists and Hindus are least likely (Uslaner 2002; Kim 2003; Chang 2006; Ecklund and Park 2007; Trinitapoli 2007; Bekkers and Schuyt 2008). The consistency of these findings around the world and across levels of analysis (i.e., between countries, regions, and individuals) suggests the association is causal. It is also difficult to argue that urbanization, capitalist development and state penetration are still greater in the US and UK (where voluntary organizations are prevalent) than in continental Europe and Japan (where they are less so).

Protestants’ disproportionate role in forming NGOs may be because of (1) weekly face-to-face meetings (2) beliefs that God holds people responsible for suffering/sin (Young 2006), and (3) their history of non-state religious movements. Cut off from state funds, Nonconformists must instill voluntarism and charity in their congregants to survive. In the process, people gain skills and networks that facilitate broader civil society (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; C. Smith 1996; Robbins 2004). Through competition, others absorbed these forms.

Religious civil society is crucial for dissipating elite power because the poor are generally as involved in religious groups as the wealthy (unlike other civil society promoters, e.g., education) (Verba et al. 1995:309-20). Moreover, because religious groups are not primarily political, they are more likely to spread and survive during authoritarian regimes (C. Smith 1996:1-25).
COLONIALISM: CPs may also explain differences between colonizers. All historically-Catholic colonizers (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Belgium) and post-colonial Latin American states controlled religious groups. These states appointed/approved bishops, paid priests salaries, and excluded or severely restricted CPs (Helmstandter 1997; Tudesco 1980; Woodberry 2004). Although most historically-Catholic states had periods with anti-clerical governments, these did not birth religious liberty. Anti-clerical governments either continued pro-Catholic/anti-Protestant policies or imposed draconian restrictions on both.

Initially the British acted similarly; they funded Anglican priests to serve whites and restricted missionaries. In Asia Protestant missionaries retreated to Danish colonies and in the Caribbean they had no right to work with slaves. However, in 1813 CP lobbying blocked the British East India Company (BEIC) charter, forcing the BEIC to allow missionaries and non-BEIC traders (i.e., free trade) and to finance education for non-Europeans. Over time, CP lobbying further expanded missions’ independence and education (Walls 1996:241-54; Helmstandter 1997; Turner1998). The US, Australia, and New Zealand instituted similar religious freedom in their colonies, but the Dutch did not. Until 1935, the “Protestant” Dutch controlled missionaries (Neill 1966:170-202; Van den End 2001). Thus, I expect Dutch colonies to have similar democratic outcomes to “Catholic” ones.

Religious liberty increased Protestant missions, religious competition, and mission independence from the state. This expanded education, printing, newspapers, and civil society, and limited colonial abuses. Together these shaped post-colonial democracy. Below I argue CPs and religious liberty explain these colonial differences.

After 1813, the British could not ban Protestant missionary printing, education, or SMOs without risking sanction at home, but they needed Hindu, Muslim, and other elite cooperation to
run their colonies, thus officials could not ban organized response easily (e.g., Frykenberg 2008). This put “religious liberty colonizers” in a quandary. For example, if the British allowed missionaries to print freely in the vernacular, they had difficulty preventing other religious groups from responding. However, once vernacular printing flourished, it was difficult to control and spurred political organization/ agitation. Thus, “religious liberty colonies” had a more vital indigenous press. These colonial differences perpetuated because elites often attempt to perpetuate their control (“rents”) by block innovation (Rajan 2009).

Similarly, British colonies received more education than others (Kamens 1988; P. Clarke 1997; D. Brown 2000), but the British had no educational predilection. Protestant missionaries initiated it, pressured the government to fund it, and spurred others to copy. Once we control for Protestant missions, British colonies have no educational advantage over other societies (Woodberry 2004). Large mission-educated populations motivated the British to hire more non-Europeans - who gained skills running Western bureaucratic institutions prior to independence. This increased postcolonial stability and state capacity (T. Smith 1978; Lipset 1994).

Local elites also reacted to missionary reform organizations. Originally local SMOs were anti-missionary, not anti-colonial, and so allowed to thrive. But, they developed cross-national networks, resources, newspaper readerships, and experienced, publically-recognized leaders and became increasingly anti-colonial. Nationalists deployed these resources to resist colonialism and form political parties: e.g., in India many leaders of the Indian National Congress Party and RSS came from SMOs originally developed in reaction to Protestant missions (Prasad 1999; Deol 2000; Zavos 2000; van der Veer 2001; Frykenberg 2008).

When religious SMOs became anti-colonial they were too powerful to crush easily. They forced the British to gradually transfer power and allow people to run political parties and
participate in local elections before decolonization. Civil society was more anemic in colonies without religious liberty and Protestant missions (Woodberry 2004). Countries that had multiple political parties and elections prior to independence were more likely to have stable transitions to democracy (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005; Wilkinson 2008).

Non-state missionaries also moderated colonial abuses because of their unique bridging position and incentives. Indigenous peoples were hurt most by abuses but had little power in colonizing states. Colonial officials, businesspeople and settlers had power, but benefited from abuses and had no incentive to fight them. Missionaries both had political influence in colonizing states and were hurt by abuses. Abuses angered indigenous people against Christianity – which many associated with the colonizers – and made missionary-work harder. Hence, missionaries had incentive to selectively fight them (Miller and Stanczak 2009; Woodberry 2004).

Mission organizations also had significant power. Missionaries were one of the largest and most educated groups of Westerners in the nonwestern world (most had college degrees when that was rare) (Hutchison 1987; Daughton 2006). Missionary organizations were also among the wealthiest organizations of any kind. In 1900, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had an annual budget of $71,000; in the same year the mission board of the Northern Methodists (a single US denomination) had an annual budget of over one million dollars—over 14 times larger. In fact, in the 19th century, the largest mission agencies outstripped all but a few commercial banks as the largest and wealthiest corporations in the US (Hutchison 1987; Hall 1994). Moreover, prior to the early 20th centuries, missionaries were the main source of information about life in the colonies (Tudesco 1980:56; Fairbank 1985; Stanley 1990:111-12; Walls 1996:241-54). Most Westerners would have had little knowledge of what occurred there without missionary reports (Fairbank 1974; Hutchison 1987:1; Manning 1998).
In British and American colonies, religious liberty and private mission financing weakened officials’ ability to punish missionaries – freeing them to critique abuses (Greenlee and Johnston 1999:34-38). Moreover, popular support allowed missionaries to mobilize pressure to punish colonial officials and settlers (Oddie 1978; 1996; Stocking 1987:240-54, 272; Turner 1998; Woodberry 2004; Etherington 2005). Missionaries spurred immediate abolitionism and movements to protect indigenous land rights, prevent forced labor, and pressure the British to apply similar legal standards to whites and non-whites (Knaplund 1953; Oddie 1978; Chaudhuri 1998; Turner 1998; Clements 1999; Woodberry 2004; Grant 2005; Etherington 2005; Gladwin 2007).

Others participated in these movements, but missionaries provided inside information, photographs, guides, and translation that facilitated documenting atrocities. They also provided emotional connections to distant people and mobilized large groups through church talks and mission presses. Without missionaries, mobilizing mass protests would have been difficult (Woodberry 2004; Grant 2005; Etherington 2005).

Missionaries had their own abuses; some were even racist. Moreover, they often did not oppose abuses as quickly or strongly as later nationalists would have liked. They had to balance outrage with pragmatism to avoid government restrictions. Most missionaries viewed conversion as their primary goal and often ignored abuses that did not hamper it (Miller and Stanczak 2009). When colonial officials selected missionaries or paid their salaries, missionaries generally did not protest abuses. Still, they initiated most reforms that occurred and popularized the idea of “trusteeship” – i.e., the only justification of colonization was the “social uplift” of colonized people (Porter 2004; I. Bradley 2006). While missionaries were often paternalistic; colonization and settlement would have been far worse without them.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS:

If my historical arguments are correct, Protestant missions should strongly predict democracy and substantially diminish other factors, whereas Catholic missions should have little effect. Protestants did not record religious activity among European Christians so I drop Europe and British settler colonies from the sample. Because of the strong association between Protestantism and democracy in both Europe and her settler colonies, and because the activity of indigenous Protestants is not measured, the following regressions are a conservative test of CP influence.

MEASURES:

Democracy (Dependent Variable): To measure political democracy, I use data from 1950 – 1985 compiled by Ken Bollen (2001) and extended from 1986 - 1994 by Pam Paxton (2002) (BP). To avoid confusing the reader with many tables, the dependent variable is each country’s mean democracy scores from 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994.18 BP’s variable has many advantages over others. It covers more countries than most and has good distributional properties (i.e., a range of 0-100 and normal distribution); this allows OLS with unbiased standard errors. Techniques for limited dependent variables have fewer diagnostics and accentuate omitted variable bias. Finally, BP demonstrate that other widely used democracy scales systematically favor particular types of countries. BP’s scale minimizes rater bias by combining information from several in an SEM format (1998; 2000). I do not know of any other democracy scale that has checked for or attempted to minimize this problem.

Mission Variables: To compute “Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 inhabitants in 1923” I found the longitude and latitude of every Protestant mission station in 1923, entered data on the personnel at each station and grouped the data to match current national borders. For “Length of
Protestant Missionary Activity” I conducted an exhaustive history of Protestant missions in each country and summed the years. “Percent Evangelized by 1900” comes from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and estimates the percent exposed to Christian witness by 1900.

To compute “Catholic Priests per 10,000 inhabitants in 1923” I created digital maps of all Catholic ecclesiastical jurisdictions in 1923, entered data on foreign priests in each, and linked them to modern national boundaries. For “Length of Catholic Missionary Activity” I made an exhaustive history of Catholic missions in each country and summed the years. To measure Protestant/Catholic competition I multiplied the 1923 Protestant and Catholic missionary variables (“Interaction of Catholic and Protestant Missionaries”). All interaction terms are means differenced and should be interpreted at their means not the intercept.

Other Means of Diffusion: Two alternate means of democratic diffusion are European settlers and colonization. To measure “Percent European” I recoded racial and ethnic data from Barrett (1982). To measure European colonialism I coded who controlled the territory corresponding to each modern country every year from 1444 to the present. I grouped this data into five categories: “British colony,” “Other Protestant religious liberty colony” (US, Australian, New Zealand, South African, and Danish),19 “Protestant religious restriction colony” (Dutch), “Catholic colony” (French, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, and Italian), and “Non-colony.” Catholic colonies are the reference category. Alternate groupings predicted democracy more weakly. I also tested several measures of colonial influence: length of colonization by each colonizer, log length of colonization, main colonizer, and last colonizer. “Main colonizer” predicts democracy most strongly so I use this measure. A “written language prior to missionary contact” is likely to hamper diffusion of ideas and institutions from Europe. I coded this from mission records. For details on methods and sources see (Woodberry 2004; Woodberry et al. 2008)
**Measured Exogenous Variables:** In most tables I use four geographic/resource control variables: “Latitude,” “Island nation,” “Landlocked nation” and “Major oil producer.” “Latitude” (the mean latitude of each country) comes from the World Bank (2002). “Island Nations” are countries completely surrounded by water, plus Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea. “Landlocked Nations” lack direct access to the ocean. “Major Oil Producers” are countries that produce as much or more oil per capita than Algeria. I also tested a variable for “OPEC member” but results were virtually identical. “Settler mortality” data come from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). In ancillary analyses I controlled for eleven additional geo-climatic variables from (Woodberry et al. 2008).

**Latent Exogenous Variables:** I also coded the process of colonization and missions. “Date Country 1st Sighted by Europeans” measures when Europeans first sighted each country after 1444 (i.e., the date when Europeans first sailed down Africa’s coast). Once Europeans sighted a territory I consider it at risk for colonization, missions, or both. “Gap between Sighted and Missions” measures how promising missionaries considered each country relative to cost of entry. “Gap between Sighted and Colonized” measures how valuable colonizers considered a country relative to cost of colonization. Presumably, they colonized “valuable” and “strategic” territories more quickly, but two major factors blocked them: disease and militaries. I proxy disease with distance from the equator (“Interaction of Gap and Latitude”), and military strength with “Interaction of Gap and Pre-Mission Literacy”. Areas that are closer to the equator are hotter and rarely freeze, thus pathogens mutate quickly and mosquitoes and bacteria thrive. Societies with written languages before mission contact were larger and more complex and better able to organize large militaries with sophisticated weaponry.
“Number of Times Territory Switched Colonizers” also measures perceived value: e.g., Guadalupe switched hands 8 times because Europeans valued sugar growing islands. “Protestant’ Colonizer Took Colony from Other Europeans” measures whether Protestants “won” this struggle. If “Protestants” took the “best” colonies from “Catholics,” then both colonial and missionary coefficients could be biased (Protestant missionaries disproportionately went to “Protestant” colonies).

**Endogenous & Intervening Variables:** GDP and Education may be intervening variables between missions and democracy. They also limit sample size, so I only enter them in Table 4. “GDP per capita” data come from the World Bank (2002). I computed mean GDP for each country from 1960, 1965, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994 (to match the years with democracy data). The natural log of this variable has a stronger association with democracy than GDP per capita. Data on education come from Barro and Lee (1994). For each country I computed mean enrollment in 1960, 1965, 1975, 1980, and 1985. Data begin in different years so I also control for “Year of first GDP Data” and “Year of First Education Data” (coefficients not show to save space). “Percent Muslim,” “Percent Protestant,” and “Percent non-religious” come from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001). I consider “Percent Protestant” and “Percent non-religious” intervening variables between missions and democracy. Muslims hampered the spread and freedom of Christian missionaries and is not intervening.

**METHODS:** I initially ran all regressions in OLS to assess statistical assumptions with the tests and plots from Stata 10 (Stata 2007:102-45). Most models fare extremely well after I control Protestant missions. A few have influential cases or heteroskedasticity, but influential cases are always balanced in number and magnitude, with about half increasing the slope and half
reducing it. I then re-ran all analyses in robust regression (205-212) to moderate influential cases, and with robust White-corrected standard errors (87-92) to dampen heteroskedasticity. Results were virtually identical to OLS. Rather than confuse reader with three virtually identical regressions, I use coefficients and standard errors from robust regression and adjusted R-squareds from OLS. I discuss all models where the method changed the significance of coefficients.

RESULTS: Table 1 indicates Protestant missions are the most important predictor of democracy. The first regression (column 1) is similar to previous studies and suggests colonialism was important. On average, colonies that had religious liberty are far more democratic. British colonies are almost 14 points more democratic than former “Catholic” colonies on a 100 point scale; other “religious liberty” colonies are over 25 points more democratic. Dutch colonies and “non-colonies” are indistinguishable from “Catholic” ones. These results imply two things. First, European colonialism did not inherently undermine democracy – “religious liberty” colonies are more democratic than “non-colonies” and others are indistinguishable from them. Second, whether the colonizer was “Protestant” or a democracy is not a sufficient explanation. The Dutch were both, but their colonies are not more democratic. France and Belgium were also democracies, but their colonies are not unusually democratic either (analysis not shown). Disease prevalence (latitude), access (island, landlocked), having more Europeans, fewer Muslims, and no written language prior to missionary contact all also predict democracy. Being a major oil producer does not (after controls).

(Table 1 about here)
Model 2 adds three missionary variables: years of exposure to Protestant missions, number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 inhabitants in 1923, and percent evangelized by 1900. These variables measure the cumulative impact of Protestant missions (length, breadth, and pervasiveness of exposure) and *all three strongly predict democracy*. This consistent association strengthens the plausibility of causality. Each variable comes from completely different sources and is unlikely to share measurement error or omitted variable bias. While some might fret that population estimates in 1923 are inexact and add error to one variable, the other two do not use population. While “percent evangelized” is an estimate, the others are not. Reverse causation is also impossible given the dearth of democracy in the sample prior to 1923.

Moreover, all variables behave exactly as expected if Protestant missions were an important cause. After controls for Protestant missions, all previously significant associations disappear: i.e., variables related to missionary access and mortality (latitude, island, landlocked), alternative means transmission (percent European, British colonization, other Protestant colonization) and resistance to mission influence (percent Muslim, and written language prior to mission contact).

The changing pattern of colonial coefficients perfectly matches colonizers’ policies on religious liberty. Originally all religious liberty colonies were more democratic (i.e., British and US/Australian/New Zealand), but the religiously restrictive Dutch were not – despite being Protestant and democratic. After controls for Protestant missions both sets of “religious liberty” colonizers are indistinguishable from Catholics, and the Dutch are worse (the Dutch had early Protestant missionaries but paid and chose them and blocked religious competition, mass education, mass printing, civil society, and colonial reform). Thus, if colonialism mattered, it seems primarily because of variations in CPs and religious liberty. If climate and access matter, they work by channeling missionaries. Similarly, acrimonious debates about whether Islam
inhibits democracy can transition (Lewis 1996; Hamdi 1996). Perhaps Islamic beliefs matter less than restricting religious liberty and the unintended consequences that restrictions unleash.

The changes in adjusted R-squared between models 1, 2, & 5 also highlight Protestant missions’ importance. When I control for Protestant missions, adjusted R-squared jumps from .336 to .442 (compare models 1 & 2). When I drop all variables except Protestant missions and Dutch colonization, adjusted R-squared increases to .447 (model 5). This implies the variables in model 1 add no predictive power to the Protestant missions regression – none.

Neither length of Catholic missions nor prevalence of foreign priests in 1923 predict democracy (model 3). The interaction between Protestant and Catholic missions is also insignificant (model 4). The insignificant Catholic variables make it difficult to argue that the association between Protestant missions and democracy is spurious. Ease of access, disease, local receptivity to conversion, and other factors presumably influenced Protestants and Catholics similarly and omitted variable bias would spread to both.

Tables 2-4 further minimize concerns about omitted variable bias. Table 2 controls for ease of access and perceived desirability of countries to missionaries and colonizers. Table 3 controls for European mortality – although in a smaller sample (58 rather than 141). These controls predate or coincide with the mission variables. Table 4 controls factors that came after the mission variables. In Tables 2 & 4, I initially add controls to the thirteen already in Table 1 (i.e., colonizers, geography, climate, percent European, percent Muslim, etc.). However, to save space I do not show these 13 coefficients. In some later models I drop insignificant controls to minimize collinearity and expose other variables’ minimal influence. Whenever I drop any of the original controls, I indicate this at the top of the column.
Table 2 tests for three types of omitted variable bias: (1) ease of access by sailing vessel from Europe (measured by date of “discovery”); (2) the perceived value of each territory to missionaries (measured by the gap between “discovery” and the arrival of the first missionary), and (3) the perceived value of each territory to colonizers (measured with five variables). This process matters because colonizers determined where Protestant missionaries went, but not where Catholics did (Woodberry 2004).

Because “Protestant” colonization came after “Catholic,” Protestants either colonized areas Catholics ignored (North America and parts of Africa and Oceania) or invaded Catholic colonies. Because Protestants developed more powerful navies, they presumably took territories they considered most valuable and strategic. If so, Protestant missionaries would flow to already advantaged areas. Thus, unless I control for the process of colonization, I may credit missionaries for creating preexisting conditions.

(Table 2 about here)

Table 2 mitigates these fears. Neither ease of access nor the perceived desirability to missionaries either predicts democracy or affects the mission coefficients (model 2). Although the process of colonization predicts democracy, it does not influence the mission coefficients (model 3). In societies with a pre-missionary written language, late colonization hampered democracy and in societies farther from the equator, late colonization was less detrimental to democracy. Territories that “Protestants” took from “Catholics” are more democratic (almost 16 points higher on the 100 point scale). This implies “Protestants” took territories with preferential conditions and that previous research about colonization’s impact is biased because it treats both the length of colonization and the identity of colonizers as exogenous.
Yet despite 25 controls and 141 cases, mission coefficients barely budge. The association between both “Protestant missionaries in 1923” and “percent evangelized by 1900” and democracy becomes stronger. The coefficient for “years of Protestant missions” moves just outside \( p \leq 0.05 \) (two-tailed test), but remains significant at \( p \leq 0.1 \) (two-tailed) and I have a strong directional theory that justifies a one-tailed test. In ancillary analysis I also controlled for eleven additional geographic and environmental conditions but they did not weaken the Protestant missionary coefficients so I dropped the table (available upon request).²³

(Table 3 about here)

Table 3 tests a third type of omitted variable bias: European mortality. Missionaries were less likely to work where mortality was high. Even if they went, death and sickness minimized years of service. If mortality also influenced democracy through another mechanism, this would bias mission coefficients. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2008) (AJR), European mortality determined the institutions colonizers created. In colonies with high mortality, Europeans did not protect private property. In countries with low mortality, Europeans created institutions to protect property and foster long-term investment. AJR claim this shaped countries long-term prospects for both economic growth and democracy. Although AJR provide little historical evidence for this and Albouy severely criticizes their data (2008), AJR’s mortality variable is widely used. As of March 2009 AJR’s 2001 American Economics Review article has over 530 citations on the Social Science Citation Index and the NBER working paper it is based on has over 2,600 citations on Google Scholar.

However, mortality data is sparse and the sample plummets to 58, thus I dropped previously insignificant variables to minimize collinearity.²⁴ Model 1 shows the Protestant mission
coefficients in the full sample (N = 141); model 2 the same coefficients in AJR’s sample (N = 58) without controlling “settler” mortality. Model 3 shows the coefficient for the natural log of AJRs mortality variable without controlling for missions. Protestant missions predict democracy much better than mortality; the adjusted R-squared is .466 versus .139 (compare models 2 & 3).

Models 4 – 5 test Protestant missions against mortality; only missions remain significant. Collinearity does not cause mortality to become insignificant; the standard error for mortality actually decreases (compare models 3 & 5). Moreover, adding mortality to the Protestant missions model shrinks adjusted R-squared (compare model 2 with 4 & 5), whereas controlling mortality barely influences mission coefficients: all remain significant at the $< .1$ level (using a 2-tailed test despite a strong directional theory). The Protestant mission variables are amazingly robust.

These regressions challenge previous research about mortality’s effect on political institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001; 2008). Even if we ignore Albouy’s critiques (2008), “settler” mortality does not influence democracy after controls for Protestant missions. The association AJR found is either spurious or works through missions. Moreover, the adjusted R-squared for the mission variables is over three times as large as for “settler” mortality. Thus, missions are more than an intervening variable. Given that AJR’s research has garnered over 3,000 citations, this is an important finding.

(Table 4 about here)

Table 4 analyzes factors that came after missions: current religion, GDP, and educational enrollment. We can view these variables in two ways: as controls for endogeneity and/or ways missions influenced democracy. Perhaps Protestant missionaries flocked to places where people
converted, religious openness was related to other types of openness, and openness facilitated
democracy. Similarly, perhaps Protestant missionaries went to places with economic advantages
unmeasured in my regressions; these advantages spurred higher GDP and eventually democracy.
Finally, perhaps Protestants focused on areas with more educational potential, and this local
education fostered democracy. However, even if all these arguments are true, controlling for
post-colonial religion, GDP, and education creates a conservative test of mission influence
because missionaries presumably influenced these outcomes as well (i.e., religion, GDP, and
education are intervening).

However, Table 4 suggests that current religion has little effect on mission coefficients. Neither percent Protestant nor percent non-religious are significant. Percent non-religious has a
huge negative association with democracy but also a large standard error. This indicates
secularization does not foster democracy. The insignificant Protestant coefficient suggests (1)
competition diffused democracy-friendly behaviors to others or (2) religion is crucial only when
institutions first form or (3) religion’s influence is slow. The religion data are from 2000 (after
the democracy data) and conversion to Protestantism occurred primarily after colonization and in
poor regions (Montgomery 1999), thus there may not have been time for influence to accrue.

The association between \( \ln \) GDP and democracy also seems spurious and does not diminish
the association between missions and democracy (compare models 1, 3, & 4). In fact, controlling
\( \ln \) GDP diminishes the adjusted R-squared. Given the vast literature on economic development
and democracy (e.g., see Geddes 1999), the insignificant negative association between \( \ln \) GDP
and democracy is extraordinary. I repeated the analysis with GDP and with GDP and GDP
squared, but the results were identical.
Similarly, education does not remove missions’ association with democracy. Reducing the sample from 141 to 85 removes the association between “Protestant missionaries in 1923” and democracy, but not the association for the other Protestant mission variables (compare models 1 & 5). In model 6, I control for the earliest available secondary enrollment data (plus a control for the year that data become available), but it is not significant and does not influence the association between the two significant Protestant mission variables and democracy.

In model 7, I control for mean secondary school enrollment (1960-1985). It is marginally significant in robust regression (p<.1), but not in OLS with robust standard errors. Secondary enrollment may explain some of the effect of “Protestant missionaries in 1923” on democracy because this coefficient moves closer to zero (compare models 5-7). Still, sample reduction causes most of the coefficient’s reduction. Mean education does not explain the association between either “years of Protestant missions” or “percent evangelized in 1900” and democracy.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:**

Historical and statistical evidence consistently suggests that CPs influenced democracy: e.g., Protestant missions explain about half the variation in democracy outside Europe and survive dozens of controls. After controlling Protestant missions, none of the variables that dominate current literature remains significant. Moreover, the consistency of religious differences across all three quasi-natural experiments (settle colonies, East Europe, and mission territories) makes finding an alternate explanation difficult.

I do not think historic CPs are the only cause of democracy, but they seem both important and neglected. CPs do not necessarily support democracy more than others, nor is mass conversion necessary. But by trying to spread their faith, CPs expanded religious liberty, overcame resistance to mass education and printing, fostered civil society, moderated colonial
abuses, dispersed elites and laid a foundation for democracy and long-term economic growth. Once CPs catalyzed these transformations and other groups imitated them, CP’s unique role diminished. Eventually other traditions justified religious liberty, mass literacy, etc., within their own traditions and began promoting conditions that foster democracy (e.g., the Catholic Church in Vatican II (1965)). Thus, Protestantism will increasingly be less uniquely important for these developments.

Still conversionary, non-state religions (like CPism) seem particularly able to undermine elite social reproduction. Elites can “monopolize” economic, educational and political resources, but not “souls.” Even marginalized people retain the power of private belief/conversion. Elites may restrict public alternatives (fostering syncretism or irreligiosity), but when religious options emerge, marginalized people disproportionately convert (e.g., African-Americans in the US or “tribal”/indigenous people in Asia and Latin America). If one religious group provides resources to non-elites, the dominant group must respond or risk losing converts. For example, high caste Hindus did not organize to assist lower castes prior to mass dalit/“untouchable” conversion to Christianity (Oddie 1978; van der Veer 2001; Frykenberg 2008). Similarly, Catholic mobilization on behalf of indigenous peoples in Latin America was a direct response to inroads by Protestants (Smith 1991; Trejo 2009). Finally, the Catholic Church provided far more education in places it competed with CPs (e.g., US and Ireland) than in places it could block competition (e.g., Mexico, Spain and Italy). This dispersion of education and other resources diminished power distinctions and undermined elite social reproduction. Thus, religious competition and conversion often anger elites, but benefits the poor and marginalized. Effective threats to elites could be non-religious, but in the cases I analyzed few seem to have been.
Pluralism, exposure to new ideas, and retarded economic development were not sufficient to spur mass education, printing, etc; elites had to feel their local position threatened before undermining distinction between themselves and others. For example, most South and West Asian societies had both religious pluralism and functioning markets, were aware of printing for centuries, and recognized Europe’s economic and military prowess. But until CPs printed masses of conversionary literature, indigenous elites did not print. Similarly, broad male literacy financially benefited Jews in Europe, North Africa, and Asia (Botticini and Eckstein 2005). But Jews did not use education to proselytize and their financial success did not spur imitation; CP education did.

Elites may respond to conversion with resource transfers or with violence and regulation, but bigotry is not free. It stifles diffusion of resources and innovation and has unintended political and economic costs. Monopolies are lazy regardless of religious tradition and people (including clergy) are more likely to defend those who pay their bills. Thus, religious liberty is not merely a religious issue – it is an economic and political one.

However, not all religious competition has spurred mass education, printing, and civil society – CPs competition did. Earlier Catholic, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist missions did not (although they may have spurred other changes); nor did markets and secular elites (at least until much later). Because different types of religious competition lead to different outcomes, cultural analysis is necessary, not just formal models of “economic” interests.

I do not have space in this article to outline a full culture theory, but CPs’ consistent behavior across hundreds of contexts, denominations and years challenges theories that emphasize its incoherence and detachment from values. CPs’ consistency suggests an internal cultural logic, not grabbing cultural tools. Religious imperatives to convert individuals and
have them read the Bible in their own language seem to have consistently spurred CPs to create
new cultural tools for mass education and text distribution. Equal exposure to markets and
technology did not produce equal investment by other traditions unless competing with CPs.

Still, regardless of the details of cultural theory, social scientists should take culture and
religion more seriously. Many assume class, education, and “material” factors are “hard” and
determine culture and religion – which are “soft.” Thus, both historical and statistical analyses
often give class and “material” factors pride of place. If religion is associated with an outcome,
many assume it is “really” caused by omitted “hard” variables, but if income inequality is
associated with this outcome, they do not assume the reverse. Yet, the prevalence of religious
liberty and competition with CPs has profoundly influenced class structure by dispersing
education to women and the poor, making texts widely available, spawning civil society among
non-elites, and moderating abuses of power. While “class structure” may shape elites’ economic
and political incentives, “class structure” is not as “solid” or “foundational” an explanation as it
seems. It is, in fact, caused. Like yin and yang, “material” and “cultural” factors continually
influence each other.

A century ago Weber argued that activist Protestantism shaped what we consider
“modernity.” Some of his causal mechanisms may be wrong (Calvinist salvation anxiety has
nothing to do with my argument), but his main intuition seems right – religious incentives matter.
Thus, while some scholars may think they have closed the door on Weber and can explain
economic and political outcomes merely with material self-interest maximization and class-based
analyses; Weber’s “spirit” may merely reenter through a different door.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Colony</td>
<td>13.97**</td>
<td>(4.99)</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>(5.85)</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>(5.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestant Colony</td>
<td>24.32*</td>
<td>(12.22)</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>(12.01)</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>(11.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Colony</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>(17.89)</td>
<td>-34.83</td>
<td>(21.35)</td>
<td>-44.73**</td>
<td>(16.49)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Colonized Significantly</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>(8.96)</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>(8.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
<td>.57*</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Nation</td>
<td>13.86*</td>
<td>(5.71)</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>(5.46)</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>(5.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlocked Nation</td>
<td>-12.57*</td>
<td>(5.95)</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>(6.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% European</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslim</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Oil Producer</td>
<td>-7.35</td>
<td>(6.31)</td>
<td>-3.39</td>
<td>(5.77)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate Culture Prior to Missionary Contact</td>
<td>-11.16*</td>
<td>(5.65)</td>
<td>-4.46</td>
<td>(5.31)</td>
<td>-4.00</td>
<td>(5.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Protestant Missions</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>3.77*</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>3.91*</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>4.94**</td>
<td>(1.89)</td>
<td>4.39***</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Evangelized by 1900</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Catholic Missions</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Catholic &amp; Protestant Missionaries</td>
<td>-2.25</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.443</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space. Regressions also control “Year of 1st Democracy Data” & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only." Coefficients and standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R-squared from OLS. 

* Uses a mean differentiated interaction term.
## Table 2: OLS Regression Controlling for the Process of Colonization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3 from Table 1</th>
<th>Perceived Value to Missionaries</th>
<th>Perceived Value to Colonizers</th>
<th>Drop Insignificant Variables (except direct effects for interaction terms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Regressions also Control for Every Variable in Table 1, Model 3</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Protestant Missions</td>
<td>.13* (.05)</td>
<td>.13* (.06)</td>
<td>.10+ (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>3.91* (1.59)</td>
<td>4.02* (1.59)</td>
<td>4.51** (1.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Evangelized by 1900</td>
<td>.18* (.08)</td>
<td>.18* (.08)</td>
<td>.20** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Catholic Missions</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>.02 (.03)</td>
<td>.04 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>.89 (1.00)</td>
<td>.82 (1.00)</td>
<td>.64 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date 1st sighted by Europeans after 1444</td>
<td></td>
<td>- .03 (.03)</td>
<td>- .01 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between Sighted &amp; 1st Missionaries</td>
<td>- .01 (.02)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between Sighted &amp; Colonized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.04 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Gap &amp; Pre-Mission Literate Society*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- .07* (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Gap &amp; Latitude*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.003** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Times Territory Switched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- .20 (1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Protestant&quot; Colonizer Took Colony from Other Europeans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.86** (5.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Variables in Regression</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>.477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space. Coefficients and standard errors from robust regression (reg in Stata), R-squared from OLS regression.

*In models 3 & 4 both direct effects and interactions are mean differentiated.
Table 3: OLS Regression Predicting Democracy in Nonwestern Societies: Mean Level of Democracy from 1950-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Reduced to AJR Sample</th>
<th>Ln AJR Colonial Mortality</th>
<th>AJR Colonial Mortality</th>
<th>Ln AJR Colonial Mortality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Protestant Missions</td>
<td>.12*** (.03)</td>
<td>.22*** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.26*** (.04)</td>
<td>.24*** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>4.04*** (1.19)</td>
<td>2.33 (1.90)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.13+ (2.17)</td>
<td>4.05+ (2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Evangelized by 1900</td>
<td>.29*** (.05)</td>
<td>.32*** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.19+ (.10)</td>
<td>.18+ (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJR Colonial Mortality Rate (from AJR 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.001 (.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log of AJR Colonial Mortality Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.52** (2.66)</td>
<td>-2.14 (2.20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>.416</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.440</td>
<td>.452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Coefficients and standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R-squared from OLS regression.
## Table 4: Mechanisms through which Protestant Missions may have Influenced Democracy (OLS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressions also Control for Variables in Table 1, Model 3</th>
<th>Model 3 from Table 1</th>
<th>Control for Religion</th>
<th>Reduced to GDP Sample</th>
<th>Control for Ln GDP</th>
<th>Reduced to Educ. Sample</th>
<th>1st Secondary Education</th>
<th>Mean Secondary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Protestant Missions</td>
<td>.13* (0.05)</td>
<td>.13* (0.06)</td>
<td>.10+ (0.06)</td>
<td>.12+ (0.06)</td>
<td>.16+ (0.08)</td>
<td>.18* (0.09)</td>
<td>.19* (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>3.91* (1.59)</td>
<td>3.67* (1.81)</td>
<td>3.49* (1.70)</td>
<td>4.05* (1.81)</td>
<td>1.33 (3.22)</td>
<td>.77 (3.30)</td>
<td>.13 (3.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Evangelized by 1900</td>
<td>.18* (0.08)</td>
<td>.17* (0.08)</td>
<td>.31*** (0.08)</td>
<td>.27** (0.09)</td>
<td>.23* (0.12)</td>
<td>.28* (0.12)</td>
<td>.27* (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Exposure to Catholic Missions</td>
<td>.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>.04 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923</td>
<td>.89 (1.00)</td>
<td>.90 (1.01)</td>
<td>1.11 (1.05)</td>
<td>.98 (1.12)</td>
<td>.75 (1.51)</td>
<td>.51 (1.53)</td>
<td>.65 (1.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Percent Protestant</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
<td>- .02 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Percent Non-Religious</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
<td>-118.57 (116.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log of GDP: Mean 1960-1994a</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
<td>- .87 (1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earliest Available Secondary Educ. Enrollment Rateb</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
<td>.49 (.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 141 141 112 112 84 84 84

# of Variables in Regression: 18 20 18 20 17c 19 19


+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space

a Also controls for year GDP data first available.

b Also controls for year education data first available.

c Control for Dutch Colonialism dropped due to insufficient N for robust regression.
CPs are not necessarily orthodox or conservative: initially some were Unitarian/Socinian; recently many were modernists. What matters theoretically is that they tried to convert/change others through persuasion (not force), emphasized lay vernacular Bible reading, and believed salvation was determined individually through grace/faith/choice not corporately through sacrament.

Acemoglu *et al.* (2008) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2008) propose “exogenous” causes which I discuss in the next section and test against my own theories.

Two studies find little impact of British colonialism on current democracy (Barro 1999; Kurzman and Leahey 2004). But, they control for previous experience of democracy and colonialism’s influence is fixed: it has not increased since independence.

Jansenists were a Calvinist-like Catholic renewal movement which the Pope condemned as heresy.

Jose Casanova claims that although “inaccurate as a factual historical reconstruction, [the secular origins of democracy] serves as one of the foundational myths of contemporary European identity” (2008:64).

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had major Protestant influence. The Catholic Church invested heavily in educational and warfare to re-Catholicize them. East Germany, Latvia and Estonia were mostly Protestant; Slovakia had a Protestant minority; Lithuania Protestant rulers (Latourette 1975).

Athenian democracy was direct, limited to elite hereditary Athenian families, excluded over 80% of Athenians, never expanded to Athenian controlled territories, and was unstable. Modern democracy has elected representatives, separation of powers, constitutions, “natural” rights, legal equality, and broad citizenship (J. Berman 2008:169-70).

The king was unpopular for multiple reasons, but the long interdict was an important component.

Nonconformists belonged to churches other than the state church; most were CP. Nonconformists flourished during the Commonwealth (1648-60) and became too pervasive to crush after the Restoration. Most could not vote, hold high public office or attend university, and all paid taxes to the state church.

E.g., natural rights, social contract, separation of powers, and freedom of expression, association “…every one of the guarantees in the 1791 [US] Bill of Rights had already been formulated in the prior two centuries by Calvinist theologians and jurists…” (Witte 2007:31).
11 19th century Bible and tract societies were among the largest corporations of any kind (Hall 1994:34, 44). From 1829 to 1831 the American Bible Society printed and distributed over a million Bibles when the US had about three million households, no railroad system, and a dispersed rural population (Nord 2004:84).

12 The three possible exceptions (Egypt, Ottoman Turkey, and Persia) are too complex to expound here, but missions may still be crucial. Protestant missionaries printed and distributed thousands of texts in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and other local languages and visited some of the initial printers just before they bought presses and fonts. Still, the lack of scholarship and its often nationalist tone makes “proving” missions’ influence difficult.

13 The Chinese, Korean, and Japanese governments printed earlier gazettes of official regulations and views and supplied them to officials, but not ordinary people. These government mouthpieces did not spur broad public debate or a “public sphere” (Reed 2007). Most historians distinguish these from newspapers.

14 Fear of military defeat probably also influenced Persia, Ottoman Turkey, and Japan, but does not explain why military defeats and threats did not cause similar outcomes before Protestant missionary printing.

15 Jews emphasized mass male literacy before Protestants existed. The Temple’s destruction in 70 AD precluded priestly rituals (the Bible forbids sacrifices elsewhere). Jews preserved their faith by keeping Torah and expected men to read it. Jews did this before printing, when most were rural agriculturalists, and even in areas they could own land or pursue any occupation. Thus, neither printing, urbanization, high-skill occupations, nor discrimination explain their literacy. Education helped Jews financially in Europe, North Africa, and Asia, but Jews avoided proselytizing and their financial success did not spur educational imitation (Botticini and Eckstein 2005).

16 Islamic education was widespread for boys, but emphasized memorizing the Koran in classical Arabic and produced little literacy (F. Robinson 2000).

17 “Evangelicals” were Trinitarians who emphasized Biblical authority and evangelism (i.e., most Nonconformists and some Anglicans). In this section I use CP as an abbreviation for “Nonconformists and Evangelicals.”

18 I reran the regressions in Table 1 for each year; but results were similar. Mean scores create two issues: (1) some countries gained independence before others and (2) Bollen adjusted his methods in 1975. Thus, I control “Year of First Democracy Data” and “Countries with only post-1975 data” in all regressions. These controls have little influence so I cut their coefficients from the tables to save space.

19 South Africa allowed Protestant and Catholic missions, but nationalized mission schools and restricted mission influence. Lumping it in the “religious liberty” category biases results against my theories. The Germans severely
limited non-German missionaries and sometimes burned mission stations (Neill 1966:386-411), but lost their colonies during WWI and others became the “primary colonizers.”

20 AJR’s “settler” mortality data come from soldiers on campaigns, soldiers in barracks, bishops, and forced African laborers. The natural log has a stronger association with democracy than the unlogged variable.

21 To ensure the dependent variable is consistent between countries I also control for years of democracy data and post-1975 data. Neither variable is significant nor improves adjusted R-squared.

22 To test robustness I reran regressions using Polity IV (1950-1994 & 1950-2007); results were similar but less dramatic. “Length of Protestant missions” and “Percent evangelized by 1900” were significant, “Protestant missionaries in 1923” was not. Some controls remained significant. However Polity IV has 24 fewer cases, a less stringent coding of democracy (it does not code civil liberties), may suffer from rater bias (Bollen and Paxton 2000: 61-2), and has face validity problems (e.g., North Korea is “more democratic” than most Arab Muslim societies and many Latin American countries more democratic than France). Still, results confirm missions importance.

23 These controls are temperature in hottest month, annual precipitation, high temperature * precipitation, temperature in coldest month, freezes during year, % wetlands, % mountains, % with river access, mean distance to coast, mean elevation, and malaria endemic.

24 I also drop the Dutch colonization variable because low N caused problems for robust regression.

25 There are two influential cases: Indonesia (a Dutch colony that restricted missions) and the Bahamas (a British colony with strong mission influence). If I drop these cases, coefficients for “years of Protestant missions” and “percent evangelized by 1900” become larger and more significant. “Protestant missionaries in 1923” becomes insignificant. Mortality remained unchanged (insignificant). Thus, the overall story is consistent: Protestant missions matter, mortality does not.

26 In OLS with White-corrected errors “Percent evangelized by 1900” is not significant. This is also true in model 4. “Percent evangelized” is the one variable with heteroskedasticity (Szroeter test). Still, the overall interpretation is identical: Protestant missions matters, the new controls do not.

27 The AJR, GDP, education, and Polity sample reductions influence mission coefficients because these samples have less data for: (1) non-British colonies (low democracy, low missions) (2) islands (i.e., high democracy, high missions), (3) non-democracies; and (4) places with few Protestant missionaries (all 3 variables) (Woodberry 2004).
Swidler’s (1986) theory recognizes a close connection between values and behavior in “unsettled” times, but this concept is under-theorized. It is not clear why some periods or lives are “unsettled” and other are not, nor why some groups would be “unsettled” for such a long period of time (e.g., CPs consistent emphasis on mass literacy and printing). This type of cultural theory could also be improved by better articulating the relationship between conscious and unconscious mental processing. For example, although people may not be able to articulate the grammatical rules they follow when speaking their native language and may even misarticulate what those rules are (creating surface-level incoherence between “beliefs” and “behavior”), this does not mean their speech does not follow grammatical rules. Yet, if language can follow complex, subconscious rule patterns that many native-users are unable to coherently articulate, why not other aspects of culture (Woodberry 1997; Vaisey 2008).