The Governance of China’s Finance

Katharina Pistor

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Abstract:
The governance of finance comprises a set of mechanisms aimed at directing the collective behavior of market participants – whether intermediaries or regulators, investors or consumers – which in turn is constitutive for the operation of financial markets. These mechanisms can take different forms, including ownership, legal mechanisms, such as liability rules and regulatory oversight, or personal ties based on kinship, common origin, or association with a common cause. Most governance regimes for finance combine several such mechanisms. Yet, their relative importance as a dominant form of financial governance differs from country to country. This paper explores the governance of finance in the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). It argues that notwithstanding important legal, regulatory, and ownership changes over the past decade the dominant form of governance in China is a network of financial cadres that is maintained and supervised by the Communist Party (CCP). Far from being a leftover of the Maoist period, this nomenklatura regime was strengthened over the past decade in response to perceived threats to the stability of China’s financial -- and by implication, political -- system: The East Asian Financial Crisis; China’s membership in the WTO and the implied loss of control over formal entry barriers; and the global financial crisis. It is therefore unlikely to simply fade away as China becomes more integrated into the global financial system. The apparent compatibility of this system with China’s rise to prominence in global finance raises important questions about the future governance of the global financial system.

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2 Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Contact kpisto@law.columbia.edu
I. Introduction

This paper discusses the governance of China’s finances. It starts from two basic premises: First, that governance of finance can take multiple forms; and second, that the adoption of governance techniques that are common elsewhere does not necessarily imply that they will replace alternative modes of governance already in existence or designed to complement such techniques. Instead, adopting widely accepted governance techniques may serve to signal compliance but disguise the real allocation of control rights and their usage. Distinguishing between real and nominal governance requires closer inspection of governance regimes that transcends formal check lists, and instead probes more deeply into the configuration of power and influence and the channels through which such power is exercised.

This paper argues that China has largely mimicked formal governance regimes common in Western market economies. However, this regime remains largely inconclusive as control rights that flow from equity positions are partitioned among different stakeholders. The paper therefore explores an alternate mode of governing finance, namely human resource management (HRM), which uses control rights over the career path of top-level financial cadres. The paper makes use of a newly created data base of current and previous top-level administrators and board members in key financial organizations to suggest that their career path through China’s financial system is far from random; instead, financial cadres tend to be extensively groomed at different financial organizations within the state apparatus before they were appointed to financial intermediaries with greater formal autonomy, such as
commercial banks. Based on secondary sources the paper asserts that HRM is conducted by China’s Communist Party and that its reach and sophistication has increased rather than decreased over time. Indeed, one could argue that HRM has become a substitute to direct state control, which was still pervasive in China until the end of the 1990s, and a complement to the new rule based formal mechanisms of control. The CCP’s control over HR management intensified as the state apparatus loosened its direct control over the financial system, separated out different regulatory functions from the central bank’s unitary system of control, and sold important stakes in formerly state owned banks to non-state, including foreign, investors. HRM appears to work effectively for China’s domestic system as a means for maintaining control over and stabilizing the financial system. Yet, it remains to be seen how effective it can be employed for governing China’s exposure to global finance.

The paper is organized as follows. Part II describes the formal changes in China’s financial system over the past decade and asks whether the system of controls thus established has given rise to a coherent governance regime. Part III describes an alternate governance regime, one that relies less on formal mechanisms of control and instead uses controls over the careers of individuals who serve in the financial system, both in government agencies and in prominent financial intermediaries. It uses secondary sources to sketch the evolution of this system over the same period during which China introduced legal and regulatory means of governance. This evidence suggests that it would be wrong to assume that the withering away of direct state control of China’s finances has set the country on a path towards convergence with standard formal governance regimes found in the West. Against this background Part IV presents data on
patterns of China’s human resource allocation within China’s financial system. The data comprise of information on 156 persons who occupy positions as top administrators at regulatory agencies, including China’s central bank, as well as positions on the management or supervisory boards of major financial intermediaries. We employ simple network analysis to show that most of these office holders either occupy important positions at other financial organizations concurrently or have held such positions prior to their current one. The pattern of affiliation that emerges from these personal ties differs from the pattern of hierarchical control rights that follows from the formal lines of authority. Network analysis reveals the centrality of organizations and individuals within China’s HRM governance regime. However, our data also suggest that the number of people occupying management or supervisory board seats at major financial intermediaries relative to non-affiliate board members is declining at intermediaries with more diversified ownership structures and greater exposure to global markets. This raises the question whether China will be able to rely on HRM as a key component for governing its financial system as more entities diversify globally -- a topic that will be discussed in Part V of the paper. Part VI concludes.

II. The Formalization of China’s Financial System

China has been widely criticized for postponing reforms of the financial sector until well into the late 1990s – with some observers arguing that this failure might derail the success of China’s economic reform project (Nicholas R. Lardy, 2002). However, over the past decade Chinas has made major strides in
overhauling its financial system. Today China’s formal governance regime resembles in many aspects that found in developed Western market economies and can be described in conventional functional terms as follows: The Peoples’ Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank is charged with monetary and exchange rate policies. Several new regulatory agencies were established, such as the China’s Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which exercises oversight over China’s banking sector; the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which oversees stock exchanges and regulates the issuance and trading of securities on these changes; and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), which oversees the insurance sector. Formally, the PBOC and the three major regulators are subordinate to the State Council, the country’s executive with the top officers at each of these entities having vice ministerial status in China’s bureaucratic hierarchy. As elsewhere, a single bank can simultaneously be subject to oversight by more than one regulatory agency: the PBOC window guidance policy; the CBRC for prudential supervision; and the CSRC’s enforcement of securities regulations. China instituted these changes before the problems of a functional division of labor among different financial regulators became apparent in the context of the global crisis. Against this background it may be interesting to note that China had an intensive debate about whether carving out functional regulators from the unitary structure the PBOC was the right way to go before CBRC was established only in 2003, or whether it would be preferable to retain consolidated oversight and control over the financial system. In fact, PBOC has continued to be involved in key areas of banking

supervision, not the least the preparation of BOC, CCB, and ICBC for their initial public offerings in 2005 and 2006 (ACFB, 2007) – and presumably in other strategic decision as well.

China has also begun an ownership transformation of the largest banks in the country, including three of the “big four” (ABC, BOC, CCB and ICBC) as well as of other banks, such as the Bank of Communications (BComm), and China Development Bank (CDB). Cumulatively these banks control about 70 percent of China’s bank assets (ACFB, 2007). However, none of these banks have been fully transferred to private ownership. Table 1 below details the stakes held by the 5 largest owners of those banks that are publicly traded and for which, therefore, ownership data are publicly available. Consistent with the capital structure of these banks equity stakes are designated as A or H shares indicating whether they are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H shares) or on one of the major domestic exchanges (A shares).

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

As can be seen, government ownership is fairly centralized in the hands of Central Hui Jin Investment Ltd. (hereinafter Hui Jin) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as the largest blockholders. ABC has not launched an IPO and Hui Jin and MoF has split share ownership equally. Hui Jin and MoF are by no means the only state entities with substantial ownership stakes. Others include the National Council of the Social Social Security Fund (NCSSF), which holds as much as 15.3 percent in H shares in ICBC. Moreover, several state owned enterprises hold sizeable stakes in these companies. HKSCC does not represent another
blockholder; the acronym stands for the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company, which serves as a street name for other investors, each of which is likely to hold a much smaller stake than the combined share-holding of HKSCC indicated in the table.

The role of more than one state or state-controlled entities as the dominant owners of China’s banks is noteworthy, because their co-existence obfuscates the state’s use of ownership as a means of controlling them. For wholly state owned enterprises in the non-financial sector the new Law on State Owned Assets (SOA Law)\(^5\) resolves the potential conflict among several state controlled entities in the exercise of ownership rights, such as the election of management and supervisory board members by delegating this task to a single agent: the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). However, this law does not apply to financial companies. Instead, for the financial sector China has invented a new version of the famous separation of ownership and control first described by Berle and Means (Adolf Augustus Berle and Gardiner Means, 1932), namely the separation of the right to appoint the officers and board members of financial intermediaries from the economic costs and benefits associated with holding shares in such entities.

For purposes of illustration, take the example of Hui Jin, which next to the Ministry of Finance is the most important shareholder of China’s dominant banks. Hui Jin was established in 2003 as a subsidiary of the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which in turn is an administrative agency subordinate to the PBOC. Hui Jin was authorized by the State Council – i.e. by China’s executive -- to make “equity investments in major state-owned financial

\(^{5}\) The law was promulgated by the National People’s Congress on October 28, 2008 and became effective on 1 May 2009.
enterprises, and [...] to the extent of its capital contribution, [to] exercise the
rights and perform the obligations as an investor on behalf of the State in
accordance with applicable laws”. In 2007, Hui Jin, which is organized as a
limited liability company, became a wholly owned subsidiary of CIC, China’s
newly established sovereign wealth fund. To this end, MoF issued special
treasury bonds that were used to acquire Hui Jin from PBOC; subsequently Hui
Jin was transferred to CIC for a price of US$ 70 bln, i.e. almost one third of CIC’s
initial capital of US$200 bln (Michael Martin, 2008). As the parent and sole
shareholder of Hui Jin one would expect CIC to control the appointment of Hui
Jin’s management and supervisory board members. This, however, is not the
case. Instead, Hui Jin’s charter stipulates that the State Council exercises these
rights -- irrespective of the fact that the State Council never held any shares in
Hui Jin and CIC is now its parent.

This separation of control rights from ownership suggests that ownership is
not conclusive in determining who actually exercises control rights over a state
owned entity. Indeed, even the contents of Hui Jin’s charter is misleading in this
regard, because ultimately the CCP appoints top officials to financial entities –
including regulators, wholly and partially state owned entities. The CCP’s
powers are not mentioned in the Hui Jin’s or any of the banks’ charters; however
neither would it be appropriate to relegate them to ‘informal’ means of control.8
Within China the CCP continues to be recognized as an integral part of a

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6 See the statement on Hui Jin’s web page available at www.huijin-inv.cn.
7 See excerpts from Hui Jin’s articles of incorporation available at its web site at http://www.huijin-
8 A tradition has evolved in the new institutional economics literature to distinguish between formal and informal
institutions depending on whether they are promulgated by the state, or not. See North, Douglass Cecil. Institutions,
Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. This distinction,
however, can be misleading when applied to countries, such as China with more complex power relations. For a critique
of the formal-informality divide see Pistor, Katharina. “Comment: The Law and the Non-Law.” University of Michigan
dualistic power structure with the state apparatus and the CCP forming two separate yet inter-linked hierarchies that use different mechanisms of control (Barry Naughton, 2008). Whereas the state is associated with control rights exercised by way of ownership and administrative lines of control, the CCP controls the career paths of individuals in the party, the state, and in organizations that are critical to the Party or the state (Yasheng Huang, 1996, Victor C. Shih, 2008).

III. China’s Other Governance Regime: The CCP’s Human Resource Management (HRM)

A critical component of financial governance in China is the CCP’s management of human resource. The CCP controls key positions in government, administration, and government controlled sectors in the economy. This function has evolved over time and has been exercised via different channels. Critically, and perhaps counter-intuitively given China’s economic rise and embrace of market mechanisms in many aspects of economic organization, it has not diminished in recent time. Indeed, the CCP’s power of the financial sector by way of HRM seems to have increased arguably as a way of ensuring continued control over finance given its central role to economic, social and political stability.

The role of the CCP in controlling key personnel is well established; in an attempt to bolster its legitimacy in China’s evolving governance structure by making its own operations more transparent the CCP has even promulgated a set of “Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government
Leading Cadres” (Zhiyue Bo, 2004, John P. Burns, 1994). These regulations are not published, but are widely circulated among administrators and managers in government and in practice they operate as binding rules. Neither the corporate law nor the charters of the major banks refer to these rules. Nonetheless, the CCP rules explicitly state that it selects and appoints the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, President and Vice-Presidents of the Bank of China and the equivalent positions at the other banks. Indeed, when CIC was established a press report explicitly mentioned that the CCP’s Organizational Department selected the top managers of CIC -- whereas based on CIC’s ownership structure one would have presumed the MoF to exercise these rights.

In order to understand the importance of CCP’s HRM as a means of governing China’s finance it is useful to analyze how the CCP’s governance of human resources has co-evolved with the formal changes in China’s financial system described above. At the end of 1998 the basic governance structure of China’s finances had not changed much from 1980 (Victor C. Shih, 2008). Consistent with the co-existence of state and party structures linked by the general oversight of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, state and party governance formed two partly overlapping vertical governance regimes: The State Council formally controlled the PBOC, which in turn controlled the four state banks; they in turn oversaw their own. There were no specialized regulators so that the PBOC acted as lender, regulator and de facto owner in one. Parallel to this structure, the CCP imposed its own control mechanism in the form of Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC) subordinate to the Central Committee, staffing the members of disciplinary CCP committees at each of the state owned banks; and local Party committees exercised similar powers
over local branches of the major banks. In addition to disciplinary supervision, the CCP appointed the PBOCs’ key management personnel and the PBOC in turn appointed the leadership at the major banks (Victor C. Shih, 2008).

This structure optimized centralized control of the CCP but did not easily accommodate a more differentiated division of labor among functional regulators that was created as China’s financial sector evolved; nor could it easily fit an ownership structure that included non-state owners including foreign investors. The latter was deemed important not only for China to comply with the opening of financial services under the GATS agreement, but also to impose greater financial discipline on the banks and expose them to foreign expertise (Franklin Allen, 2005, Lamin Leigh and Richard Podpiera, 2006).

The East Asian financial crisis served as a wake-up call to those concerned with the governance of finance around the world, including politicians and party leaders in China. China was not directly affected by the crisis, because it had insulated itself from global markets by capital controls, tight exchange rate management and a state controlled financial system. Nonetheless, leaders in China quickly recognized the risk of financial de-stabilization not only to the Chinese economy, but also to the stability of the political regime (brought home in particular by the overthrow of the government in Indonesia), and sought to address these concerns at the same time as they were embarking on reforming the financial system, which had seriously lagged behind institutional and governance reforms (Nicholas R. Lardy, 2002).

In response to these challenges, the CCP began to tighten its control over the financial sector (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005). The vehicle for this strategy was the Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC), a newly established body that was
directly and exclusively answerable to the CCP’s Central Committee. Wen Jiabao, vice premier and Politburo member, served as its chairman. The changes implied that the CCP gained direct control over appointing and dismissing key personnel at China’s four largest banks – which had previously been vested with the PBOC. Now, key personnel was nominated by the banks and approved by the CFWC (Victor C. Shih, 2008). In the words of Heilmann who conducted numerous interviews in China to establish the role of the CFWC:

“After the establishment of the CFWC, the appointment procedures and authority relationships changed fundamentally. Thereafter, the CFWC, in cooperation with the financial institution and state regulatory body concerned, actively investigated, appraised and appointed financial cadres who were deemed loyal to the Party centre and professionally qualified to take leading positions. The headquarters of financial institutions still recommended persons to become senior managers. But they now had to submit and justify their choice to the CFWC for approval. The final decision rested with the CFWC (…) Moreover, the CFWC installed vertical leadership authority by newly established full Party committees between the national and subnational management levels.” (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005).

These powers did not make the CFWC a hands-on manager; its own rules prohibited it from taking up such a role. However, by appointing all members of the newly created supervisory boards of banks and other financial intermediaries that were corporatized at the time, the CFWC was able to place 200 members it had selected to 16 new supervisory boards in 2000 alone (ibid at 12).

The CFWC’s control over human resources extended also to key regulators. Between 1998 and 2003 the CFWC controlled the appointment of senior executives across all key institutions in finance, including regulators, administrative agencies and banks (see Table [2] below).

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
CFWC was disbanded in 2003 and its more regulatory functions were transferred to the newly created CBRC – formally a spin-off from PBOC. However, its operation has left a decisive mark on the management of China’s financial sector. First, CFWC was deeply involved in the establishment and staffing of CBRC as the new regulator and the new banking supervision law prepared by it (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005). Indeed, according to Heilmann, of the CBRC’s 16 new departments, only five were transferred from the PBOC, whereas eleven had previously been housed inside the CFWC (ibid). Similarly, the newly appointed top officials at CBRC had all previously been members of CFWC.

More generally, the formal dissolution of CFWC – or perhaps rather its transformation into a regulatory body -- did not put an end to Party control over HRM in China’s financial sector. Instead, CFWC’s HRM functions were transferred to the CCP Central Organization Department (COD) – much to the critique of China’s financial press.9 The COD now exercised the power to appoint senior executives at China’s national state supervisory organs (PBOC, CBRC, CSRC, CIRC) and ten national financial companies under central administration, including the big 4 national commercial banks, the three policy banks, Bank of Communications, Everbright Group and CITIC Group (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005). Appointment powers for top cadres at the PBOC and the three functional regulators were delegated to CCP Committees at these organizations. Moreover, the appointment of lower level appointees at these organizations’ regional branch offices were transferred to corresponding local Party committees (ibid at 18). Interestingly, the administrative heads of the three regulatory agencies no

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9 Heilmann quotes Caijing, China’s leading financial paper as bemoaning the lack of profound reform reflected in this decision. See Ibid at p. 17 and footnote 59.
longer combined the roles of Party secretary and state or bureaucratic leader; instead a greater functional division was implemented, whereby the ‘Number 1’ at these agencies with the power to exercise overall strategic leadership is now appointed by a CCP committee, but does not operate simultaneously as the representative of the Party within the organization. Instead, this function is exercised by the “Number 2” with the mandate to conduct human resource management (Barry Naughton, 2008). Rather than indicating a diminished role of the CCP at these entities, it can also be viewed as a sign for the increasing importance attributed by the Party to HRM.

The continuing pervasive role of the CCP in China’s financial system by way of controlling HRM should leave its marks on appointment patterns and promotions of key individuals. We will explore this in the following section, which introduces a new data set and brings to bear basic network analysis to explore the governance of China’s finances.

IV. Scale and Scope of the CCP’s HRM: Empirical Evidence

This section presents empirical evidence on the scale and scope of the CCP’s management of human resources over China’s finances. To this end we have collected data on the key positions in management and supervision at China’s major regulators and financial intermediaries. For each person who was identified as a current top-level administrator at a regulatory entity (PBOC, CBRC, CSRC etc.), or as a member of either the management board or the supervisory board of a financial intermediary (BOC, CCB, ICBC, ABC, etc), we recorded his or her concurrent position at other entities as well as positions that
person has held previously. These data were hand collected using information made available on the web sites and annual reports of the organizations in question. The database includes 155 people and a total 41 entities or organizations with which they are or have been affiliated. Initially, we included 13 entities in the analysis: PBOC, SAFE, CBRC, CSRC, CIC, Hui Jin, BOC, CCB, ICBC, ABC, Import Export Bank (IEB), BComm, and Chinas Development Bank (CDB). We coded all top level executives and board members at these entities and traced their current and previous ties to other entities throughout China’s financial system. Indeed, we also included other important government positions, such as governor or vice governor of a province. However, we did not include in our data set previous postings at multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank.

We use this database to establish the imprint of HRM on the governance of China’s finances. As posited earlier, HRM can be regarded as an alternative governance regime to the formal control structure that China has established over the past decade. In order to establish the relation between formal control structures rooted in legally and administratively established lines of authority on one hand, and the scope of HRM within China’s financial system on the other, we compare the governance structures of these two alternative regimes. Figure 1 depicts the governance regime that emerges from the analysis of formal lines of control, i.e. ownership relations and lines of administrative or regulatory authority. It includes the largest owners of the banks listed in Table 1 above

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10 The full data base names and affiliations, including explanations for the role of different organizations is on file with the author.
(except for HKSCC) as well as regulatory and supervisory authorities embedded in China’s legal infrastructure.

The picture that emerges is a bi-furcated governance structure headed by the State Council and divided into monetary and exchange rate policy represented by PBOC and SAFE on one hand (the right side of the figure) and financial intermediation, represented by banks and their regulators on the other (the left side of the figure). The central role of Hui Jin as a major owner in China’s “big 4” is readily apparent. Contrast this picture with the one found in Figure 2 below, which depicts the relations among the same entities as those depicted in Figure 1, but this time the ties among entities are not determined by ownership or administrative lines of authority; instead, they depict interlocking positions held by senior executives or board members at two or more entities.

Unlike the first picture, the PBOC now takes a much more central role as a result of its many interlocking senior positions with the CCP Committees, SAFE, CBRC and CSRC as well as CIC – China’s new Sovereign Wealth Fund. Hui Jin remains a central player, but less because of its ties to major banks – although it does have concurrent board seats at CCB – but instead, because

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11 Note that all top level officials at PBOC concurrently serve on PBOC’s CCP Commission. In other words, the division of labor between strategic and human resource management described above is absent at the PBOC.
members of its boards concurrently hold positions within the NPC, the Accounting Society of China as well as CIC and indirectly -- via an interlocking board members at CCB -- with China’s International Economic Arbitration Commission.

In order to formally establish the relative importance of these various entities in the web of financial relations, we calculate the centrality of these different organizations based on *Betweenness*. It measures the relation of a given actor to other actors in the system by calculating its relative to other pairs of actors. The idea is that an actor that links multiple pairs of related actors confers power on that actor. The coefficient for *Betweenness* increases with the number of geodesic paths to which it is linked; i.e. in our case the coefficient increases as a single entity is linked with each additional pair of organizations. According to this measure, CIC occupies the position of highest centrality for concurrent interlocking positions followed by the CCP.\(^{12}\)

Figure 3 depicts the same affiliations, but this time we have included not only concurrent positions, but also the positions senior executives or board members had previously held at other entities within China’s financial sector. The number of entities has increased and so has the complexity of the network. Visually it is apparent that CIC, Hui Jin, the CCP as well as the PBOC occupy central positions within this network; in other words, each of them is linked to many other institutions by way of positions held by their top level financial cadres either concurrently or sequentially. However, the numerical analysis reveals that three of the “big 4” banks outperform CIC and PBOC on the

\(^{12}\) The coefficient for CIC is 0.389 and for the CCP 0.283
centrality measure of Betweenness\textsuperscript{13} -- even though CIC, the CCP as well as the PBOC are close followers on this measure and outrank other state entities.\textsuperscript{14} This suggests that they are more deeply embedded in the HRM governance regime as a result of previous appointments executive and supervisory board members at these entities have held than is apparent from analyzing only the current interlocking positions they occupy. It is also worth noting that whereas ICBC and IEB lack ties with other organizations in the financial system by way of current interlocking positions, many of their board members previous occupied such positions. Again, this suggests that they may in fact be less autonomous than their concurrent affiliations indicate.

**INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE**

Network analysis allows us not only to identity the centrality of different organizations in China’s financial system, but also the centrality of individuals. The more positions a person occupies in a system, and the more other individuals are tied to it by holding positions at entities with which that individual is affiliated, the more powerful such person. Figure 4 below reveals the relation among the 155 individuals in our database via organizations with which they are currently affiliated. The picture clearly insulates the people currently holding positions at ICBC and IEB from the rest of the financial cadres who maintain many ties with multiple entities throughout financial system by way of concurrent affiliation.

\textsuperscript{13} The coefficients for BOC, CCB and ICBC are respectively 0.192, 0.252, and 0.244
\textsuperscript{14} CIC 0.181, CCP 0.149 and PBOC 0.155.
The measure we use to assert their centrality in this case is the Degree of centrality, which measures not only how many ties a given node (here a financial cadre) maintains with other nodes, but also how many of these ties lead to yet other nodes. In contrast to the Betweenness measure used above measuring centrality by Degree is less concerned with how many dependency relations that individual intercepts. On this measure, three individuals, all affiliated with CIC, score the highest: Lou Jiwei, the Chairman of CIC, Jin Liqun, the chairman of Hui Jin who also serves on CIC’s board, and Cui Guangqin also a concurrent board member of CIC and Hui Jin.\(^\text{15}\) While perhaps not all personal ties should be given equal weight as they not necessarily confer the same level of influence in the governance of CIC, it is still remarkable how closely CIC is intertwined with other entities in China’s financial system.

In practice, CIC portrays itself as an autonomous actor – an ordinary financial intermediary whose task it is to maximize financial returns on its assets without a political agenda or much explicit political interference. Yet, CIC has on its supervisory board representatives from virtually every important government entity within China’s financial system and its executives previously served on important posts in other financial entities – including the PBOC, the MoF, and the CSRC.

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\(^{15}\) All three share the same score of 7.723. Note that for the purpose of this analysis we have excluded individuals that are only linked to ICBC or IEB as their score indicates relations to a much smaller network.
Based on this analysis it seems fair to say that the 155 cadres currently occupying key positions in finance form a fairly dense network that links important entities to each other and collectively comprise China’s system of finance. The most striking result of this analysis is the contrast between the dense network relations depicted in Figures 2 through 4 with the simple control structure in Figure 1. While it may be too strong to suggest that personal ties substitute for formal control based on ownership ties, they appear to dominate them. This is nowhere more apparent than in the role of the PBOC. Judging from the formal lines of control alone PBOC occupies a rather marginal place in China’s financial system (see Figure 1 above). However, based on the personal ties revealed in Figures 2 and 3, there is little doubt that PBOC, or rather the financial cadres serving at PBOC are central players within China’s system of finance. Moreover, as in the early days of China’s transition to a market economy, PBOC continues to operate as the link between state and Party control over China’s financial sector. All of its leading cadres concurrently hold positions at PBOC’s party committee and as such exercise HRM controls over key regulators within the system.

Yet, our data also indicate that this system is not without vulnerabilities. As indicated in Figures 2 and 4, some entities lack any current interlocking ties with other organizations – most notably ICBC and IEB. ICBC is particularly interesting, as it is traded on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges and calls not only private investors, but also major foreign investors, such as Goldman Sachs, among its owners. This raises the question whether HRM as a governance regime can adapt China’s increasing role in global finance.
V. China’s Global Ambitions and the Future of HRM

The transformation of China’s financial sector over the past ten years has gone hand in hand with its increasing globalization. BOC, CCB, and ICBC, as well as Bank of Communications (BComm) were listed on Hong Kong’s stock exchange and sold shares to foreign investors, including important strategic investors (Katharina Pistor, 2010). While some of these foreign investors have meanwhile shed their holdings in Chinese banks, mostly because they needed to raise fresh capital during the global financial crisis (Katharina Pistor, 2009a), the bank’s exposure to typically two or more foreign investors has given them an opportunity to learn from other business models and adapt them to China’s circumstances. Representatives of foreign banks serve on the boards of China’s commercial banks -- albeit not in executive positions, giving them access to information on how the Chinese system of finance operates in practice, but also exposing other board members to the views of representatives of foreign financial intermediaries.

China’s major banks have also themselves become more active globally. BOC, which was carved out from the PBOC in 1984 took over the central bank’s foreign currency portfolio at the time and has established branches and subsidiaries around the globe.\(^{16}\) CCB and ICBC have followed suit more recently and expanded their global operations. In fact, ICBC has moved beyond opening representative or branch offices and has recently acquired a twenty percent stake in South Africa’s Standard bank in 2008. The two banks are now cooperating across the African Continent in numerous ventures related to mining and natural

\(^{16}\) For details on BOC branches in different countries see http://www.BOC.cn/en/aboutBOC/.
resource exploration. Last but not least, China established a new sovereign wealth fund in 2007. CIC has made several widely reported foreign investments, including in the US private equity firm Blackstone and the investment bank Morgan Stanley (Katharina Pistor, 2009a), and more recently in the natural resource sector. In addition to CIC, the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and the National Security Fund are engaging in foreign investments. In contrast to CIC, which has taken substantial minority stakes, SAFE and NSF seem to be taking smaller stakes and maintain a more diversified portfolio that includes both equity and debt securities.

The involvement of foreign investor in China’s state controlled banks, the outwards expansion of financial intermediaries, as well as the greater openness of China’s financial system to foreign investments (including wholly owned banks and other financial intermediaries) raises questions about the viability of the described HRM governance regime as a long term governance strategy.

A similar question can and should be asked about any governance regime, including those based on conventional formal mechanisms, such as ownership and regulatory controls. National regulators have only limited reach over their own banks with global operations and have had at best limited success in controlling financial intermediaries operating on their shores. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the recent global crisis. A good example is Iceland, which had allowed its bank Landsbanki to expand rapidly in foreign markets by using the inter-bank lending market for its liquidity needs and attracting foreign

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18 For details on CIC’s recent investments see http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/cic.php.
depositors with high interest rates in internet retail operations primarily in the UK (Lord Adair Turner, 2009). When the inter-bank lending market froze Islandic bank collapsed and Iceland was unable to cover deposit insurance for depositors in the UK. Legally, Iceland was responsible for insurance as well as lender of last resort functions of Islandic bank, because the UK operations were technically branch operations of the parent bank and as such under the jurisdiction of Iceland. On the flip side, the UK had paid only scant attention to Islandic’s operations in the UK – after all, this was the responsibility of the Iceland’s regulators. When that bank collapsed and amidst fears of another bank run, the UK government stepped in to provide coverage and in return froze all asset of Iceland under an anti-terrorism law. Similarly, regulators in Austria, Sweden and other European countries witnessed their banking industry expand aggressively into Central and Eastern Europe. Again, these banking groups greatly contributed to a rapid credit expansion that proved unsustainable. Unlike the case of Icelandic Bank, the foreign operations usually took the form of wholly owned subsidiaries, which placed them under the jurisdiction of the host countries when it came to covering depositors and offering lender of last resort functions. Most of the CEE countries had tried to stem the flow of credit, but found this to be largely ineffective, because foreign parent banks quickly outmaneuvered them by switching to alternative channels for their continued credit expansion. As the result, most CEE saw themselves unable to rescue their own financial system and ended up seeking help from the IMF and other

20 For Iceland this followed not only from the Basel Concordat, but also from relevant EU legislation, as Iceland is a member of the EEA and as such subject to EU regulations and directives, which follow the Basel model in dividing responsibilities between home and host country regulators and lenders of last resort.

multilaterals (Katharina Pistor, 2009b). In short, neither the property rights regime of trans-nationally operating banking groups nor thirty years of international cooperation in developing common standards for banking supervision within the BIS framework and the EU (which largely incorporated the BIS framework) have shielded countries that rely on those governance mechanisms from the prospects of financial collapse.

Similarly, both systems – the formal and the HRM governance regimes, have had their fair shares of rogue traders. For China, the wakeup call that HRM might be insufficient for governing personnel located abroad came with the collapse of China Aviation Oil Company (CAO) on the Singapore Stock Exchange in December of 2004.22 However, other governance regimes have experienced similar failures – one needs only to point to Barings or the more recent case of Société General.

Raising concerns about the vulnerability of HRM in the context of globalization is therefore not meant to benchmark this particular regime against an allegedly superior standard, but to detect the specific strengths and weaknesses of this regime in the global context.23 China’s HRM regime as described above is built around the notion that there is a centralized vetting of cadres for the financial sector not only when they first enter the system, but also as they advance through the system. For every major position at the central bank, regulators, or financial intermediaries, the CCP or CCP committees at the PBOC or the CBRC vet and ultimately approve the relevant financial cadres. Indeed, as our data analysis suggests a substantial number of persons in this universe have

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23 This approach is explained in greater detail in Milhaupt and Pistor supra note 22.
held other positions in finance before being appointed to the one they hold currently; moreover, they typically maintain direct and indirect ties to other entities where they served before or hold concurrent positions. The question then is, whether this system can adapt to the global operation of Chinese banks and/or the increase in job opportunities in China’s expanding financial system, which includes an increasing number of entities that at least to our knowledge are not part of the CCP’s HRM system.

In seeking to answer this question, this part of the paper examines affiliations of members of management and supervisory boards of only those financial intermediaries that have substantial global operations. The purpose of this exercise is to analyze how deeply these entities are embedded in China’s HRM system. This new database comprises of 127 individuals at 18 entities. 24 of the 127 individuals concurrently occupy another position within China’s financial system, while the remaining 103 do not. Of those that are currently without interlocking positions, 54 have held positions at other financial organizations prior to their current position and 39 held positions at state entities in finance, such as the PBOC, SAFE, the CBRC etc. The other 15 individuals occupied positions at another bank – typically at a time when these banks were still an integral part of a state controlled financial system. Still, this leaves 49 individuals without any current or previous affiliations – some of which other representatives of foreign investors, others ‘independent’ directors recruited, among others, from academic institutions in China.

As can be seen in Figure 5 below, the density of current affiliations varies. As already noted, ICBC and IEB have no current affiliations. However, the number of current affiliates at other commercial banks with global operations, including
BOC and CCB is also strikingly low. In part this seems to be compensated by what one may want to call ‘strong’ ties within China’s HRM system. Thus, Xiao Gang, the CEO of BOC is head of the CCP Commission at BOC, and thus closely tied to the Party; but this is not the case for CCB’s CEO, Guo Shuqing. Guo’s future career may still be entirely dependent on the CCP’s HRM system and that might suffice to ensure that his interests and the interests of the bank he heads are aligned with those of the China’s leaders. However, as CCB continues to expand globally, increasing tensions between global opportunities and concerns about China’s internal stability may arise and at least for an outside observer it is difficult to determine how such a conflict might be resolved.

It may be too strong to assert that some banks with global operations are ‘growing out’\(^{24}\) of the HRM used to govern China’s financial system. Nonetheless, the examples suggest that some entities have enjoyed greater leeway in recruiting from a pool of people with fewer ties to the broader network of China’s financial cadres. Within China, this is a new experiment. There is little doubt that underperformance of these individuals too would be sanctioned were they return to the state controlled financial system. However, today they may well find job opportunities elsewhere. Moreover, as China’s own financial system becomes more diverse with new banks, including new foreign owned start-ups entering the market, HRM may be insufficient for holding the system together.

\(^{24}\)This terminology is borrowed from Naughton’s book title *Naughton, Barry. Growing out of the Plan*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. and the accompanying analysis, which suggests that China’s path to economic success has been a gradual transformation of economic relations.
VI. Concluding Remarks: HRM and Global Governance

This paper has shown that governance of China’s finances can be explained at best incompletely using conventional paradigms that rely on ownership and legal or regulatory controls alone. Instead, China’s governance regime relies heavily on HRM. The regime evolved and strengthened during the transition from complete state control over finance, which lasted until the early 2000s, to a more diverse system that allows for more diverse ownership patterns, more players within China’s domestic financial system, and greater opportunities for Chinese entities globally. Further diversification, in particular the greater job opportunities for financial cadres outside the CCP controlled HRM system might undermine the logic of this regime, i.e. control over future career prospects of financial cadres.

Still, from this does not follow that China will inevitably converge on a Western style governance regime rooted in law and ownership -- not the least because as the global crisis has amply demonstrated, this system has its own inherent vulnerabilities. It does suggest, however, that the current governance regime needs to adapt to these ongoing changes. The possible direction of such changes can be gleaned from emerging patterns of governance employed by Chinese entities that operate globally. The relation between CIC with Blackstone and Morgan Stanley may serve as an example. CIC holds over 10 percent in ownership stakes in both entities – in Blackstone, which is a limited partnership in the form of non-voting ‘units’, and in Morgan Stanley in the form of preferred stock as well as debt instruments. Yet in neither company does CID hold board positions. While executive positions were excluded in the original investment
agreements, CIC had the option to appoint representatives to the board of directors in both companies. The choice not to exercise these options could be interpreted to suggest that CIC has decided to operate as a purely passive investor. This, however, might not capture the whole story. As a 10 percent owners and potential future funder, CIC undoubtedly has a ‘voice’ with the management of these organizations. Moreover, CIC has recently announced that Blackstone and Morgan Stanley have been chosen by CIC to manage hundreds of millions of dollars in new global investments. The Wall Street Journal captured this move with the headline “CIC turns to friends”. Notably, CIC’s investments in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley have yet to produce positive returns – and this might strike some as an awkward friendship. However, CIC appears to have invested not only, and perhaps not even primarily, in financial assets, but in relational bonds comprising of human capital. That investment appears to be paying off handsomely for Blackstone and Morgan Stanley; and may prove a smart investment by CIC in the long term. It might also point the way towards a new form of HRM in the global context: one that does not rely primarily on controlling future careers, but access to future finance and markets – and on this front China has at least for now a comparative advantage.

References:


_____ "Global Network Finance." Journal of Comparative Economics, 2009a,

forthcoming.


Table 1: Ownership of China’s Largest Banks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank Name</th>
<th>#1</th>
<th>#2</th>
<th>#3</th>
<th>#4</th>
<th>#5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Bank of China Limited</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Hui Jin</td>
<td>HKSCC Nominees Ltd</td>
<td>National Council for Social</td>
<td>Li Ka Shing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as of January 2009 when ABC completed its</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>24.64 (H Shares)</td>
<td>Security Fund PRC</td>
<td>1.21 (H Shares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reorganization and incorporated in form of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.30 (H Shares)</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stock company under the Company Law of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20 (H Shares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of China Limited (H Share Code</td>
<td>Hui Jin</td>
<td>HKSCC Nominees Ltd</td>
<td>National Council for Social</td>
<td>Li Ka Shing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3988; A Share Code 601988) (updated as of</td>
<td>67.53 (A Shares)</td>
<td>21.91 (H Shares)</td>
<td>Security Fund PRC</td>
<td>1.21 (H Shares)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 2009)26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Communications Co., Ltd. (H Share</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>HKSCC Nominees Ltd</td>
<td>HSBC</td>
<td>Capital Airports Holding</td>
<td>State Grid Asset Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code 3328; A Share Code 601328) (updated as</td>
<td>26.48</td>
<td>21.91 (H Shares)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company35 OE</td>
<td>Co.Limited35 OE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of June 30, 2009)27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.01 (A Shares)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Construction Bank Corporation (H</td>
<td>Hui Jin</td>
<td>HKSCC Nominees Ltd</td>
<td>Bank of America</td>
<td>Baosteel Group35 OE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Code 939; A Share Code 601939) (</td>
<td>57.08</td>
<td>26.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>updated as of June 30, 2009)31</td>
<td>(57.02% H and 0.06% A)32</td>
<td>10.9513 (H Shares)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Bank of China</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limited (H Share Code 1398; A Share Code</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>601398) (updated as of June 30,</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009)34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 The total number of outstanding shares is 253,839,162,009, of which the 76,020,251,269 shares are H Shares, and 177,818,910,740 shares are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange.)
27 Li Ka Shing is a famous HK billionaire, wealthy individual.
28 The total number of outstanding shares is 48,994,383,703, of which the 23,064,468,136 shares are H Shares, and 25,929,915,567 are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange.)
29 Out of the 12,974,982,648 shares that MoF owns, all the 9,974,982,648 A Shares are subject to Selling Restrictions.
30 S OE denotes State Owned Enterprise
31 The total number of outstanding shares is 233,689,084,000, of which the 224,689,084,000 are H Shares, and 9,000,000,000 are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange.)
32 In July 2009, Jianyin (HuiJin's wholly-owned subsidiary) transferred all of the H Shares it originally owned to HuiJin for free, and thus increased HuiJin’s shareholding percentage in CCB by 8.85% (i.e., 20,692,250,000 H Shares subject to Selling Restrictions).
33 Bank of America cannot sell those shares without CCB’s written approval until August 29, 2011.
34 The total number of authorized shares is 334,018,850,026, of which the 83,056,501,962 shares are H Shares, and 250,962,348,064 are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange).
35 The “Selling Restrictions” refer to the restrictions imposed on the shareholders for reselling these shares on the market. These restrictions were imposed as part of the “Share Reform”, which was launched in 2005 in China with the purpose of converting the non-tradable state-owned shares in public companies into tradable shares, though subject to certain selling restrictions. Typically these restrictions impose certain lockup periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Financial Institutions, from vice-ministerial level (formally appointed by COD) down to the deputy bureau chief level</th>
<th>National commercial financial institutions with control over senior executives and supervisory board members</th>
<th>National commercial financial institutions with control over senior executives only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBOC</td>
<td>BOC</td>
<td>Minsheng Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSRC</td>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Minsheng Securities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>ICBC</td>
<td>Minsheng Life Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Merchants Bank</td>
<td>Minzu Securities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>Sci-Tech Securities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Import Export Bank</td>
<td>Galaxy Securities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 AMC</td>
<td>Government Securities Depository Trust &amp; Clearing Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITIC Group</td>
<td>Chung Mei Trust &amp; Investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everbright Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Insurance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Life Insurance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>China Reinsurance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>China Export &amp; Credit Insurance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Formal Governance
Figure 2: HRM -- Concurrent Entity Affiliations
Figure 3: HRM -- Previous and Concurrent Entity Affiliations
Figure 4: Current Personal Affiliations
Figure 5: HRM for Global Players