Market Penetration Costs and Trade Dynamics

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Abstract

I introduce trade dynamics into a static model of international trade with product differentiation, heterogeneous productivity firms, and increasing marginal market penetration costs. I interpret firms as ideas that materialize into production, where an idea is a way to produce a differentiated good with a given productivity. Adapting a stochastic process similar to Reed, the model endogenously generates a right tail cross-sectional Pareto distribution of firms’ productivities based on two minimal assumptions: continuous entry of ideas at a certain rate and productivities of ideas that evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion. The cross-sectional predictions of the model for the distribution of domestic and exporting sales of firms are in line with firm-level data. In addition, the model delivers new predictions consistent with observations of the dynamics of domestic and exporting sales of firms. It predicts that many small firms enter and exit the market very frequently and that the growth rate as well as the variance of the growth rate of sales is higher for small firms.

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1 Introduction

Recent empirical research has established a series of facts on cross-sectional observations of sales of firms by exporting destination. This empirical work was followed by studies such as those by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005), and Arkolakis (2008), which have shown that models with firm productivity heterogeneity can closely predict key aspects of this empirical evidence. In addition, these models are kept highly parsimonious and are often used to perform policy research. Furthermore, the past few years new firm level data are becoming available that allow researchers to explore the intertemporal dimension on firms exporting sales (Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006), and Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007)).

In this paper, I develop a model that studies firm-level trade dynamics. In particular, I introduce dynamics into the model developed by Arkolakis (2008), where firms have to pay an increasing marketing cost to reach additional consumers in each country. Following Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2001), I assume that new ideas arrive at an exogenously given rate in each of the countries. Essentially, to each firm I associate an idea that allows it to produce a differentiated good and potentially earn profits. After an idea is “born”, its productivity is expected to increase over time. Deviations from the expected growth rate follow a Brownian motion. The resulting stochastic process of productivities is the one introduced by Reed (2001) while firm dynamics are introduced into the monopolistic competition framework of Melitz (2003) following Luttmer (2007).

The new model endogenously generates a Pareto cross-sectional distribution of productivities of firms. Given this distribution of productivities and the rest of the setup of the model that is based on the framework of Arkolakis (2008), the model delivers cross-sectional predictions for the export sales of firms that are essentially identical to the ones outlined in that paper. In particular the model predicts that the distribution of sales of firms selling to a market exhibits Pareto tails for the firms that sell the most there. Furthermore, it implies that there are more small firms in each market than the Pareto distribution would imply and thus the left tail of the distribution of sales in the model has more curvature compared to the Pareto distribution.

The introduction of firm dynamics delivers three new predictions regarding the intertemporal...
eral behavior of exporting firms, in addition to the previous cross-sectional predictions. First, the model predicts that many small firms enter and exit each market very frequently. This observation is consistent with facts presented by Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007) for Colombian exporters. Second, the growth of export sales is higher for small firms, which is consistent with the facts documented by Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007). This finding is also consistent with a series of studies on domestic sales data that report that Gibrat’s law (the independence of firms’ size and growth rates) does not hold for small firms. Such evidence can be found in Mansfield (1962), Hart and Oulton (1996), among others, and is reviewed by Sutton (1997). Third, the model predicts that the variance of growth rates of export sales is higher for firms with lower sales, when restricting attention to the sales of firms selling to a given destination. This last prediction is consistent with domestic firm-level sales data reviewed by Sutton (2002). However, the model also predicts the same pattern for firms’ exports per destination, a hypothesis that has not been tested empirically.

It is important to note that in the context of the model deviations from Gibrat’s law and the curvature of the distribution of productivities are intimately related. The early work of Simon (1955) demonstrated that independence of growth rates with size combined with entry at a certain rate, gives rise to a distribution with Pareto right tails. Therefore, the faster growth of sales of the smaller firms featured in the model implies the curvature of the distribution of productivities for these firms. Given that the growth rate of sales of larger firms is approximately independent of their size, the distribution of sales for these firms is roughly Pareto. In the data, the deviations from Gibrat’s law and the Pareto distribution of sales are patterns that are consistently repeated across destinations when looking at the sales of firms selling there. Therefore, a demand-side explanation such as the one I present in this paper seems to be the appropriate modeling framework.

Previous theoretical models with heterogeneous firms and firm dynamics include the one-country models of Jovanovic (1982), Klette and Kortum (2004), and Luttmer (2007) and the two-country model of Opromolla and Irarrazabal (2006). Jovanovic (1982) and Klette and Kortum (2004) develop a model that is consistent with panel data observations on firm dynamics such as the ones mentioned above. Luttmer develops a model that delivers a cross-sectional distribution of sales close to the one observed in the data. However, his model is not consistent with the facts
on firm dynamics stated above given that the demand structure is based solely on the CES Dixit-Stiglitz specification. Opromolla and Irarrazabal (2006) extend Luttmer (2007) in a two-country context. The model presented in this paper contributes to this literature with an analytically tractable, multi-country model of trade that is consistent with the main cross-sectional and panel data observations on firms domestic and exporting sales.

2 Model

The model described in this section extends the static version of Arkolakis (2008). It introduces a stochastic process for productivities found in Reed (2001). It incorporates dynamics into a model with heterogeneous productivity firms following Luttmer (2007).

I assume that time is continuous and indexed by \( t \). I will refer to the importing country with an index \( j \) and to the exporting country with \( i \), where \( i, j = 1, ..., N \). There is a continuum of consumers in each economy \( i \) of measure \( H_i = H_i e^{g_i t} \) at each point of time. The consumer in country \( i \), has preferences over a composite good \( C_{jt} \) from which she derives utility according to

\[
\mu^E Z + \int_0^{\infty} \left. r e^{-rt} C_{jt}^{\gamma-1} \right|^{\gamma} dt
\]

where \( r > 0 \) is the discount rate and \( \gamma > 0 \) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

On the balanced growth path constructed below, the aggregate variables grow at a some rate \( g_\kappa \) (to be specified), implying that \( C_{jt} = C_{jt} e^{g_\kappa t} \). To ensure that the value of the aggregate endowment is finite, the discount rate must exceed the rate of growth of the aggregate variables and thus,

**Assumption 1**

\[
r + \frac{1}{\gamma} g_\kappa > g_\kappa + g_\eta
\]

with \( g_\eta \geq 0 \).
The composite good is made of a continuum of differentiated commodities

\[ C_{jt} = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{jt}^{h}} q_{ijt}(\omega)^{\rho} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \]

where \( q_{ijt}(\omega) \) is the demand for a good \( \omega \) from a consumer from country \( j \) and \( \sigma = 1/(1 - \rho) \) is the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of goods. At a given point of time \( t \), a consumer has access to a set of goods \( \Omega_{jt}^{h} \) from country \( i = 1, \ldots, N \). Goods are produced by firms with potentially different productivities. The productivities of firms selling to country \( j \) are potentially drawn from \([0, +\infty)\). We will consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms with the same productivity from the same country \( i \) choose to charge the same price in country \( j \). Given the large number of consumers and firms and the symmetric CES Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, we can re-index variables at each point of time \( t \) as a function of productivities of the firms producing the goods, \( z \), and their country of origin \( i \). In this symmetric equilibrium, each consumer from country \( i \) has access to the same measure of goods of a given type \( M_{ijt}\mu_{ijt}(z) n_{ijt}(z) \), at time \( t \). Here, \( M_{ijt} \) stands for the measure of firms from country \( i \) selling in country \( j \) at time \( t \), \( n_{ijt}(z) \) for the fraction of goods of a given type that a consumer from country \( j \) has access to at time \( t \), and \( \mu_{ijt}(z) \) for the pdf of the distribution of productivities of firms from country \( i \) conditional on selling to country \( j \) at a given time \( t \). The measure of consumers reached by a firm of type \( z \) from country \( i \), in country \( j \) is \( n_{ijt}(z) L_{jt} \).

Each household earns labor income \( w_{jt} \), for selling his unit labor endowment on the labor market and profit flows \( \pi_{jt} \) from the ownership of domestic firms. Thus, the demand for good \( z \) from country \( i \) by a consumer from country \( j \) is

\[ q_{ijt}(z) = \frac{p_{ijt}(z)^{-\sigma}}{P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}} y_{jt} \]

where \( y_{jt} = w_{jt} + \pi_{jt} \) and

\[ P_{jt}^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{v=1}^{N} M_{vjt} \int_{0}^{+\infty} p_{vjt}(z)^{1-\sigma} n_{vjt}(z) \mu_{vjt}(z) \, dz . \]  

\(^1\)See Arkolakis (2008) for the details of this argument.
In the equation above, $p_{vjt}(z)$ is the price that a good which is produced in source country $v$ with productivity $z$ is being sold in country $j$. Given the above assumptions, we have that $C_{jt}P_{jt} = y_{jt}$. Finally, goods from source country $v$ that have drawn $z$ below the productivity threshold $z^*_{vjt}$ choose not to sell to country $j$. Given the above, total demand faced for a good of type $z$ from country $i$ when selling to country $j$ is

$$n_{ijt}(z) L_j \left( \frac{p_{ijt}(z)^{-\sigma}}{P_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}} \right) y_{jt}.$$  

### 2.1 Entry and Exit

Following Kortum (1997), an idea is a way to produce a good $\omega$ with productivity $z$. Thus, ideas become firms only if they materialize into production. I assume that each country innovates at a constant rate and thus new ideas flow at a rate $g_{\eta} (1 - \alpha)$. Each idea is exclusively owned and gives a monopoly over the good related to that idea (monopolistic competition).

New goods can be potentially produced with an initial productivity, $\bar{z}_{it}$, where

$$\bar{z}_{it} = \bar{z}_i \exp (g_E t),$$

where $\bar{z}_i$ is drawn from an initial distribution $G(\bar{z}_i)$. The productivity of producing a good will evolve stochastically and will be specified in the next paragraph. Ideas cannot disappear, but if are not used in production (and thus do not appear as firms), they remain idle while waiting for a chance to be used (if their productivity surpasses $z^*_{ijt}$ at a given time $t$).\(^4\)

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\(^{2}\)This rate is the one necessary to solve for a balanced growth path. Ideas could be related to population and thus the rate of arrival of these ideas could be ultimately thought of as a function of the population. Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) show that under the assumption of Pareto distribution of firm efficiencies the same solution can arise from a model where new firms can choose to pay a cost and enter the market (as in Melitz (2003)). Pareto distribution of firm efficiencies will endogenously arise in the context I consider here.

\(^{3}\)The context of exclusivity of ideas can be also interpreted within the framework of Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005). In particular, the exclusivity of ideas can arise as a limit case of a model where firms can choose to produce a single good out of a number of potential varieties and where this number tends to infinity.

\(^{4}\)It is straightforward to add an assumption that ideas dissapear at an exogenous rate $g_\delta$. The entry rate has to be adjusted to $g_{\eta} (1 - \alpha) + g_\delta$. This will affect the steady state distribution accordingly. The balanced growth path will be the same as the one specified later on. However, the growth rates of firms will have to be adjusted for the probability of death.
2.2 Firms and Ideas

Productivities evolve independently across ideas according to

\[ z_{\tau,a} = \bar{z}_i \exp \left( g_E \tau + g_I a + \sigma_z W_{\tau,a} \right) \]  

(2)

where \( z_{\tau,a} \) is the labor productivity of the firm of age \( a \) that was born in time \( \tau \), \( \tau = t - a \), \( W_{\tau,a} \sim N(0,\sigma^2) \) is a standard Brownian motion and \( \bar{z}_i \) is an initial condition. This stochastic process for productivities is similar to the one introduced by Luttmer (2007) and can be also interpreted as a similar process for the quality of a good. Notice that the productivity of incumbent ideas is generally improving at a rate \( g_I \) with deviation from this trend due to the Brownian shocks on the growth rate. The incumbent ideas also face competition from new ideas, and thus new potential firms, that arrive continuously.

Only ideas that are chosen to be produced in positive amounts appear as operating firms. Firms decide on the quantity of the good produced using a constant returns to scale production function \( q(z_{\tau,a}) = z_{\tau,a} l \), where \( l \) is the amount of labor used in production. The firms have to pay market penetration costs that are a function of the number of consumers reached at a given market. I model these market penetration costs as in Arkolakis (2008) and I assume that they have to be incurred at each instant by the firm. While this assumption is clearly abstracting from reality, it becomes more tangible when compared to a fixed cost that is necessary to be paid at each period of time required by previous models (see for example Melitz (2003), Luttmer (2007)). A more detailed development of the dynamics of the market penetration costs induced by state dependence on previous market penetration is left for future research.

The labor requirement of a firm willing to reach a fraction of consumers \( n \) in a market of population size \( L \) is

\[ f(n, L_j) = \frac{L_j^\alpha}{\psi} \frac{1 - (1 - n)^{-\beta + 1}}{-\beta + 1} \]

where \( \beta \in [0, +\infty) \) and \( \alpha \in [0, 1) \). Assuming, as in Arkolakis (2008), that firms incur these costs in both domestic and foreign wages yields the following total market penetration cost faced by a
firm from country $i$ selling to country $j$:

$$f(n, L_j) = w_j^\gamma w_i^{-\gamma} \frac{L_j^\alpha}{\psi} \frac{1 - (1 - n)^{-\beta+1}}{-\beta + 1}.$$ 

In addition to the marketing cost to reach consumers, the firm has to pay a variable trade cost modeled in the standard iceberg formulation. This implies that a firm operating in country $i$ and selling to country $j$ must ship $\tau_{ij} > 1$ units in order for one unit of the good to arrive at the export destination. For simplicity, I assume that $\tau_{ii} = 1$.

Given the constant returns to scale production technology and the separability of the marketing cost function across countries, the decision of the firm to sell to a given country is independent of the decision to sell to other countries. Thus, a firm with productivity $z$ at time $t$ from country $i$ solves the following maximization problem for each given country $j$:

$$\pi_{ijt}(z) = \max_{n_{ijt}} \left\{ n_{ijt} L_j y_j \frac{p_{ijt}}{p_{ijt}^\sigma} - n_{ijt} L_j y_j \frac{\tau_{ijt} p_{ijt}^\sigma w_{it}}{p_{ijt}^{\sigma+\gamma} z} - w_{jt}^\gamma w_{jt}^{1-\gamma} \frac{L_j^\alpha}{\psi} \frac{1 - [1 - n_{ijt}]^{-\beta+1}}{-\beta + 1} \right\}$$

s.t. $n_{ijt} \in [0, 1] \forall t$.

Total profits of a particular firm are the summation of the profits from exporting activities in all the $j = 1, ..., N$ countries (or a subset thereof). Notice that given the current set-up, the decision of the firm is essentially static. Thus, at a given moment of time, the firm’s problem is the same as in Arkolakis (2008).

For the case of $\beta \geq 0$, the optimal decisions of the firm in the multi-country model are:

$$p_{ijt}(z) = \hat{\sigma} \frac{\tau_{ijt} w_{jt}}{z}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where

$$\hat{\sigma} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}$$

For $z \geq z_{ijt}^*$,

$$n_{ijt}(z) = 1 - \left[ \tau_{ijt} \frac{1 - 1 / (\hat{\sigma} \tau_{ijt} w_{jt})^{1-\sigma} \psi P_{jt}^{\sigma-1}}{w_{jt}^{1-\gamma} \sigma} \right]^{-1/\beta}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

\footnote{Slighty abusing the notation, I denote the decision of the firm as a function of its productivity $z$, supressing time of birth and age information. Given that the optimization decision is static, what is important is the current level of productivity rather than the time path. I will keep the notation parsimonious throughout the text whenever is possible.}
and $n_{ijt}(z) = 0$ for $z < z^*_{ijt}$, where $z^*_{ijt}$ is given by

$$z^*_{ijt} = \sup \{ \pi_{ijt}(z) = 0 \} . \quad (5)$$

The above implies that firms from country $i$ that choose to operate at period $t$ in market $j$ have

$$(z^*_{ijt})^{\sigma-1} = \left( L_{jt}^{1-\alpha} y_{jt} w_{jt}^{-\gamma} z^{\sigma-1} (\sigma \tau_{ijt} w_{it})^{1-\sigma} \psi P_{jt}^{\sigma-1} / (w_{it}^{1-\gamma} \sigma) \right)^{-1} . \quad (6)$$

Solving for the first order conditions and substituting them out together with (6) in the expression for the sales per firm, we have that sales of a firm $z$ from country $i$ in country $j$ are

$$r_{ijt}(z) = \begin{cases} L_{jt}^{\alpha} y_{jt} y_{it}^{1-\gamma} \psi \left[ \left( \frac{z}{z^*_{ijt}} \right)^{\sigma-1} - \left( \frac{z}{z^*_{ijt}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)/\beta} \right] \quad & \text{if } z \geq z^*_{ijt} \\ 0 \quad & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

where

$$\tilde{\beta} = \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1}, \quad \tilde{\psi} = \frac{\psi}{\sigma (1 - \lambda)} ,$$

and $\lambda$ is the fraction of profits out of total income. In the balanced growth path equilibrium that we will consider the fraction of profits will be constant and thus, for simplicity of notation, we denote them by $\lambda$.

### 2.3 Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium

For simplicity of exposition I consider a simple case regarding the entry of ideas: at each moment of time, all the entry happens at one level of productivity, $\bar{z}_{it}$, but because of technological progress, this level increases over time at a given rate (in particular $\bar{z}_{it} = \bar{z}_i \exp (g_E t)$). Extending this simple case to one in which new entrants arrive with a productivity that is distributed according to a particular distribution is straightforward (see for example Reed (2002)). To solve for the cross-sectional distribution, I consider the stationary balanced growth path. I define the
detrended variable \(^6\)

\[
\phi = \bar{z}_i \exp (g_E \tau + g_I a + \sigma_z W_{\tau,a}) / \exp (g_E (\tau + a)) = \\
= \bar{z}_i \exp ((g_I - g_E) a + \sigma_z W_{\tau,a})
\]

The logarithm of this expression gives

\[
\phi' = \ln \phi = \ln \bar{z}_i + (g_I - g_E) a + \sigma_z W_{\tau,a}
\]

and thus the variable \(\phi'\) follows a simple Brownian motion with a drift and an initial condition \(\bar{z}'_i = \ln \bar{z}_i\). Standard arguments for Brownian motion imply that a given generation of ideas will have a cross-sectional probability density that will be given by \(^7\)

\[
f(\phi', a | \bar{z}'_i) \frac{1}{\sigma \sqrt{\alpha 2 \pi}} \exp \left\{ - \frac{(\phi' - \bar{z}' - (g_I - g_E) a)}{\sigma \sqrt{\alpha}} \right\}^2 / 2 \right\}. 
\]

This distribution is not stationary. However the continuous entry of new ideas will create a different cross-sectional distribution of productivities when we look across ideas with different ages. Given the entry process, the differential equation (8) generates the following Kolmogorov forward equation, \(\forall i\), and for \(\forall \phi \in (-\infty, \bar{z}'_i) \cup (\bar{z}'_i, +\infty)\), \(^8\)

\[
0 = -(g_I - g_E) f'(\phi') + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 f''(\phi') - g_\eta (1 - \alpha) f(\phi'),
\]

where \(J_i e^{g_\eta (1 - \alpha) t} f(\phi')\) the density of firms with productivity \(\phi'\). Intuitively, the net changes at each point \(\phi'\) of the distribution, due to the stochastic flows of productivities in and out of that point and new entry which implies discounting at a rate \(g_\eta (1 - \alpha)\), have to equal to zero for the distribution to be stationary.

The process of productivities that was considered above has to satisfy a set of conditions. A

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\(^6\)Essentially, considering the detrended variable \(\phi\), I consider a no-growth version of the model and thus follow the notation of Arkolakis (2008).

\(^7\)See for example Harrison (1985) p. 37.

\(^8\)In an appendix available online I provide a different proof by explicitly calculating \(f(\phi'|\bar{z}) = \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-g_\eta (1 - \alpha) a} f(\phi', a | \bar{z}) \, da\). This proof, though more straightforward provides less intuition on the exact forces that give rise to the cross sectional distribution of productivities across all ideas.
first requirement is that \( f(\phi') \) is a probability density which implies that

\[
f(\phi') \geq 0 \quad \forall \phi' \in (-\infty, +\infty),
\]

and

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{z_i^*} f(\phi') d\phi' + \int_{z_i^*}^{+\infty} f(\phi') d\phi' = 1.
\]

Also, \(-\infty\) is an absorbing barrier and thus,

\[
\lim_{\phi' \to -\infty} f(\phi') = 0.
\]

Finally, the requirement that net flows into the distribution at point \( z_i^* \) equal the entry rate \( g_\eta (1 - \alpha) \):

\[
-(g_I - g_E) [f(z_i^* -) - f(z_i^* +)] + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 [f'(z_i^* -) - f'(z_i^* +)] = g_\eta (1 - \alpha).
\]

The solution of the above system is (see appendix):

\[
f(\phi'|z_i^*) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\theta_1 \theta_2 \theta_1 (\phi' - z_i^*)}{g_1 + \theta_2} & \text{if } \phi' < z_i^* \\
\frac{\theta_1 \theta_2 e^{-\theta_2 (\phi' - z_i^*)}}{g_1 + \theta_2} & \text{if } \phi' \geq z_i^*
\end{cases}
\]

where

\[
\theta_1 = \frac{g_I - g_E + \sqrt{(g_I - g_E)^2 + 2\sigma_z^2 g_\eta (1 - \alpha)}}{\sigma_z^2} > 0
\]

\[
\theta_2 = -\frac{g_I - g_E - \sqrt{(g_I - g_E)^2 + 2\sigma_z^2 g_\eta (1 - \alpha)}}{\sigma_z^2} > 0
\]

which implies the following assumption.

**Assumption 2**

\[
g_\eta (1 - \alpha) > 0.
\]

\[\footnote{Similar conditions are commonly used in labor models to characterize the behavior of the distribution at a point of entry to or exit from a particular occupation (see Moscarini (2005)).}\]
This constraint is the one that guarantees that a time-invariant distribution exists and that an ever increasing fraction of firms is not concentrated in either of the tails of the distribution.

The resulting distribution of $\phi \in [0, +\infty)$ for the point of entry $\bar{z}_i$ is the so-called double Pareto distribution (Reed (2001)) with probability density function\(^{10}\)

$$f(\phi|\bar{z}_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta_1 \theta_2}{\theta_1 + \theta_2} \frac{\phi^{\theta_1 - 1}}{\bar{z}_i^{\theta_1}} & \text{if } \phi < \bar{z}_i \\ \frac{\theta_1 \theta_2}{\theta_1 + \theta_2} \frac{\phi^{-\theta_2 - 1}}{\bar{z}_i^{-\theta_2}} & \text{if } \phi \geq \bar{z}_i \end{cases}$$

(17)

The double Pareto distribution is illustrated in figure (1). A closer look at the probability density of productivities, (17), reveals that at each moment of time, a constant fraction of ideas $\theta_1/ (\theta_1 + \theta_2)$ is above the threshold $\bar{z}_i$. Thus, for the shake of exposition, I assume that the parameters of the model are such that $z^*_{ijt}/ \exp(gEt) > \bar{z}_i$, $\forall i$, for the rest of the paper. This implies that (detrended) cross-sectional distribution of idea is Pareto at $[\bar{z}_i, +\infty)$ with parameter $\theta_2$.

The requirements that the distribution of productivities and sales of firms has a finite mean as well as that their average sales are finite are necessary and are guaranteed by the following two assumptions:

**Assumption 3**

$$g_\eta (1 - \alpha) > g_I - g_E + \sigma^2 / 2 ,$$

**Assumption 4**

$$g_\eta (1 - \alpha) > (g_I - g_E) (\sigma - 1) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} (\sigma - 1)^2 .$$

These two assumptions imply that the entry rate of new ideas and firms is larger than the growth of the productivities and sales of the most productive incumbent firms. Given the above assumptions the model at each point of time collapses to the model of Arkolakis (2008) with

\(^{10}\)See appendix for the proof. This distribution can also be thought of as a limit case in the distribution of firms derived by Luttmer (2007) when the entry-exit cutoff goes to $-\infty$. However, in the case of Luttmer (2007), this would imply that firms never exit and this is not consistent with the existence of indivisibilities in the production that are postulated there.
the number of potential entrants being $\theta_1/(\theta_1 + \theta_2) J_t e^{g_\eta (1-\alpha) t}$. In addition, the rate of growth of aggregate variables is $g_a = g_E + g_\eta (1-\alpha)/ (\sigma - 1)$. It is straightforward to verify that there exists a balanced growth path that satisfies all the steady state equations appearing in Arkolakis (2008) replaced for the variables defined in this paper for each different time $t$.\footnote{In this equilibrium the share of profits out of total income is $\lambda = (\sigma - 1)/(\sigma \theta)$. See Arkolakis (2008) for the proof.}

Finally, I will restrict the analysis to a parameterization that will allow me to match the facts about growth rates of firms as a function of firm size:

**Assumption 5**

$$(g_l - g_E) (\sigma - 1) + (\sigma - 1)^2 \sigma^2 z^2 > 0.$$ 

**Proposition 1** Given assumptions 1-5, there exists a balanced growth path for the economy described above.

**Proof.** By assumption we have that $H_t = H_t e^{g_\eta t}$ and $J_t = J_t e^{g_\eta (1-\alpha) t}$, $z_{it} = \bar{z}_i \exp (g_E t)$. Define $z^*_{ijt} = z^*_{ij} e^{g_E t}$, $w_{it} = w_i e^{g_\eta t}$, $C_{it} = C_i e^{g_\eta t}$, $P_{it} = P_i$. Given these assumptions and definitions, the cross-sectional distribution of productivities of operating firms is Pareto. In addition, when we replace the static variables considered by Arkolakis (2008) with their dynamic analogs in this paper all the steady state equations of the equilibrium are satisfied $\forall t$. The values of $z^*_{ij}$, $w_i$, $P_i$, and $C_i$ can be found by solving the system of equations when $t = 0$. □

2.4 Firm Dynamics

The static framework in Arkolakis (2008) is successful in delivering the stylized cross-sectional firm-level predictions as documented by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005). Given this success, the extension to a dynamic framework allows to focus on the new theoretical predictions related to firm dynamics. However, generalizing the framework of this model in order to allow the cross-sectional distribution of productivities of operating firms to be double-Pareto, rather than Pareto, will give additional testable cross-sectional implications. It implies a skewness of the distribution of operating productivities, particularly for ideas with low productivities. The threshold productivity of exporting from country $i$ to $j$, $\phi^*_{ij}$, will be typically smaller when looking at destinations where exports from $i$ are higher. Thus, the skewness of the distribution of...
productivities and consequently the one of sales of firms selling to these destinations will be higher. This is consistent with the facts reported by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005). Simultaneously, the Pareto tail of the distribution of productivities allows to match the Pareto-like distribution of sales for the largest exporters to each country.

The productivity process that is introduced in this paper, while following Reed (2001), is quite different from other processes proposed in the literature that generate a right tail Pareto cross-sectional distribution of productivities (see Gabaix (1999), Luttmer (2007)). In previous models a lower bound productivity was required to bound the size of the firm and prevent the distribution from becoming degenerate. In the setup proposed in this paper, entry is the only force that keeps the distribution from becoming degenerate while ideas have a productivity without a lower bound. The entry of new firms close to the threshold of operation, is the force that prevents the distribution from widening out and that creates the Pareto tails.

The first important observation is that, due to the stochastic nature of productivities, firms with a productivity close the threshold of entry \(z^*_{ijt}\) continuously enter and exit a particular market \(j\). Given that the firms that just surpassed the threshold of entry \(z^*_{ijt}\) when \(\beta > 0\) and that the distribution of productivities is Pareto a large part of the new entrants will have tiny sales. All these implications of the model are very consistent with the trade data reported by Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007).

Before proceeding to the predictions regarding growth rates of sales, it will be useful to give some intuition for the main mechanisms at work in this model. The assumption of the geometric Brownian motion implies that the expected growth rate of productivity is the same for all incumbent firms, independent of their size. Given the assumption on constant returns to scale and the CES Dixit-Stiglitz demand specification (constant price elasticity), this translates into identical expected growth rate of sales per consumer across all incumbent firms as in Luttmer (2007). However, the marketing cost function exhibits increasing cost elasticity for reaching additional consumers. Thus, the same expected growth rate in per-consumer sales for the incumbent firms translates into percentage increases in the number of consumers reached that are larger for initially smaller firms. In order to compute the (instantaneous) expected growth and variance of the sales of the firm we may apply Ito’s lemma to expression (7). Notice that \(s = \ln \left( \frac{z}{z^*_{ijt}} \right)\) is a Brownian motion with drift \(g_I - g_E\) and standard deviation \(\sigma_z\). Applying Ito’s lemma for firms
of age $a$ from country $i$ selling positive amounts, $r_{ija}(s)$, to country $j$ we have that\(^{12}\)

\[
dr_{ija} = r_{ija} \left[ \left( \alpha g_a + g_\kappa + (g_I - g_E) \frac{h'(s)}{h(s)} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 \frac{h''(s)}{h(s)} \right) da + \sigma_z \frac{h'(s)}{h(s)} dW(a) \right]
\]  

(18)

where

\[
h(s) = e^{s(\sigma - 1)} - e^{s(\sigma - 1)}/\beta
\]

The following proposition is a straightforward implication of the mechanism that has been described above:

**Proposition 2** Given assumptions 1-5,

a) If $\beta \to 0$ the growth rate of all the firms is the same.

b) There exist a $\beta_0 \in (0, +\infty)$, such that $\forall \beta > \beta_0$, $\partial (dr_{ija}(s)/r_{ija}(s))/\partial s < 0$, $\forall \beta < \beta_0$, $\partial (dr_{ija}(s)/r_{ija}(s))/\partial s > 0$ for for all firms from market $i$ selling to market $j$. The growth rate of the largest firms tends to $\alpha g_a + g_\kappa + (g_I - g_E) (\sigma - 1) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} (\sigma - 1)^2$.

**Proof.** The expected growth rate for firm of size $r_{ija}(s)$ is

\[
\frac{dr_{ija}(s)}{r_{ija}(s)} = \alpha g_a + g_\kappa + (g_I - g_E) (\sigma - 1) \frac{h'(s)}{h(s)} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} (\sigma - 1)^2 \frac{h''(s)}{h(s)}.
\]

In order to prove part a) of the proposition notice that

\[
\frac{h'(s)}{h(s)} \xrightarrow{\beta \to 0} (\sigma - 1),
\]

(19)

\[
\frac{h''(s)}{h(s)} \xrightarrow{\beta \to 0} (\sigma - 1)^2.
\]

(20)

To prove part b) we look at the derivative of the growth rate with respect to $s$. The sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of the following equation

\[
f(\beta) = -\left( \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} \right)^2 \left( (g_I - g_E) (\sigma - 1) + (\sigma - 1)^2 \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \right) + (g_I - g_E) (\sigma - 1) \frac{\beta}{\beta - 1} + (\sigma - 1)^2 \frac{\sigma^2}{2},
\]

\(^{12}\)The application of Ito’s Lemma requires the sales function to have a continuous second derivative. Though continuous, the function $h(s)$ does not attain continuous derivatives at $s = 0$. 

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which implies that the growth rates are decreasing in size iff

\[
\beta > \frac{(\sigma - 1)^2 \sigma_z^2}{2 \left[ (g_I - g_E) (\sigma - 1) + (\sigma - 1)^2 \sigma_z^2 \right]} \in (0, +\infty) .
\]

Thus, if assumption 5 is not satisfied then there does not exist a range of \( \beta \)'s such that the growth rates are decreasing in size. The growth rate of the largest firms can be found by considering the following two limits:

\[
h'/h \xrightarrow{s\rightarrow+\infty} (\sigma - 1), \tag{21}
\]

\[
h''/h \xrightarrow{s\rightarrow+\infty} (\sigma - 1)^2 . \tag{22}
\]

Notice that the growth rate of wage per capita and population imply that nominal GDP grows at a rate \( g_\kappa + g_\eta \). Assumption 3 and 4 ensure that the expected growth rate of sales and productivities of the largest incumbent firms is not larger than the growth rate of nominal GDP. This guarantees that the distribution of productivities and sales of firms has a finite mean. Deviations from the independence of growth rates of sales from firms' size have been recognized as early as Mansfield (1962). These deviations have been recently verified from a large literature reviewed by Sutton (1997) and similarly for exporting sales by destination by Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007). On the other hand, this deviation appears to be vanishing when considering samples of large firms as Hart and Oulton (1996) point out. All these facts are also predicted by the model given the results in proposition 2. It is important to note that the same mechanism at work in the model is the one that implies the higher growth rates of smaller exporters in trade liberalization episodes, consistent with the theoretical and empirical analysis of Arkolakis (2008).

The final theoretical result of this paper refers to the variance of the growth rate of sales of firms and its relation to the size of firms. At this time, there is no study in the trade data reporting this fact. However, a large body of empirical literature, reviewed by Sutton (2002), uses domestic sales data to establish an inverse relationship between the sales of firms and the variance of their growth rates.

The following proposition identifies this fact in the model.
Proposition 3  a) For the case of $\beta \to 0$, the variance of the instantaneous growth rate of sales of firms in a destination is independent of their sales there.

   b) For the case of $\beta > 0$, the variance of the instantaneous growth rate of sales of firms in a destination is bigger the smaller their sales there. The variance of the growth rate of the largest firms tends to $\sigma^2_\beta (\sigma - 1)^2$.

Proof. The variance of the instantaneous growth rate of firms characterized by the expression (18) is given by the term

$$V(s) = \sigma^2_\beta \left( \frac{h'(s)}{h(s)} \right)^2$$

(23)

Given (19) expression (23) is equal to $\sigma^2_\beta (\sigma - 1)$ for $\beta \to 0$. For the second part of the proposition, given $\beta > 0$, the derivative of expression $h'(s)/h(s)$ with respect to $s$ is always negative. Thus, variance of growth rates of firms selling to a destination is inversely related to their size there. In the limit for $s \to +\infty$ we have that expression (23) is $\sigma^2_\beta (\sigma - 1)^2$ completing the proof of the proposition. ■

3 Conclusion

The model presented in this paper has all the potential to be used in applied empirical work: it is highly tractable, closely matches the key cross-sectional observations on firms’ domestic and exporting sales data, and is qualitatively consistent with some of the key observations related to the time dimension of the domestic or exporting sales of firms. Predictions of the new model could also be used as a compass for new empirical research. For example, the new model predicts that the variance of export sales of firms is larger for firms that sell small amounts, a fact already documented for domestic sales. Ongoing empirical research such as the one of Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007) will help to precisely quantify key aspects of the panel dimension of the firm-level data on trade and allow for the calibration of this model and for future quantitative policy analysis. The construction of a model of trade that is highly tractable and matches important aspects of firm-level trade data could allow to take important steps toward understanding dynamic firm-level behavior.
4 Appendix

4.1 Deriving the Stationary Distribution of Productivities

A simple guess for the solution of the Kolmogorov equation (9) is

\[ f(\phi^0) = A_1 e^{\theta_1 \phi^0} + A_2 e^{-\theta_2 \phi^0} \]

where \( \theta_1 \) and \(-\theta_2\) are given by the two solutions of the quadratic equation \( \frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 \theta^2 - (g_I - g_E) \theta - g_\eta (1 - \alpha) \). Using condition (12) set \( A_2 = 0 \) for \( \phi^0 < \bar{z}'_i \) and using the requirement that \( f(\phi') \) is a probability density set \( A_1 = 0 \) for \( \phi^0 \geq \bar{z}'_i \).

Finally, from the characterization of the flows at the entry point (13), we pick \( A_1, A_2 \) such that

\[
\frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 [f'(\bar{z}'_i^-) - f'(\bar{z}'_i^+)] = g_\eta (1 - \alpha) \Rightarrow \\
\frac{1}{2} \sigma_z^2 \left( A_1 \theta_1 e^{\theta_1 \bar{z}'_i} + A_2 \theta_2 e^{-\theta_2 \bar{z}'_i} \right) = g_\eta (1 - \alpha)
\]

which in combination with (11) that gives

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{z}'_i^i} A_1 e^{\theta_1 \phi'} d\phi' + \int_{\bar{z}'_i^i}^{+\infty} A_2 e^{-\theta_2 \phi'} d\phi' = 1
\]

imply that

\[
A_1 = \frac{\theta_1 \theta_2}{\theta_1 + \theta_2} e^{-\theta_1 \bar{z}'_i} \\
A_2 = \frac{\theta_1 \theta_2}{\theta_1 + \theta_2} e^{\theta_2 \bar{z}'_i}
\]

Notice, that the solutions also satisfy the first term in the LHS of (13) since the above solutions imply that \( f(\bar{z}'_i^-) = f(\bar{z}'_i^+) \). In other words the distribution is continuous, but the derivative has a kink at \( \bar{z}'_i \).
References


Figure 1: Double Pareto distribution