
Benefit-Cost Analysis & Equity

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FEMA is deciding between funding two levy projects to protect homes against flooding, each costing \$10 million:



A hypothetical example

FEMA is deciding between funding two levy projects to protect homes against flooding,

each costing \$10 million:



Protect 50 homes in high-income neighborhood, valued at \$210,000 each Protect 100 homes in low-income neighborhood, valued at \$90,000 each

(For simplicity, assume 100% chance of destruction without levy.)

Which should FEMA fund?

What FEMA has historically chosen: (A) rich neighborhood

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT

How FEMA helps white and rich Americans escape floods

An investigation by POLITICO's E&E News reveals systemic favoritism toward wealthy and white people in a federal program that lifts homes above rising floodwaters.



The Federal Emergency Management Agency gave Nanci and Jonathan Lewis \$100,000 to raise their home in Fairfield, Conn., in 2018 (left). The agency rejected a request to demolish public housing in a Black neighborhood in Wilson, N.C., that was condemned after repeated flood damage (right). | Thomas Frank/E&E News (left photo); Francis Chung/E&E News (right photo)

By **THOMAS FRANK** 05/27/2022 04:30 AM EDT

Why? Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) procedures (in part)

- FEMA grant spending goes through benefit-cost analysis (BCA)
 - Requires: benefits > costs

Here is the standard analysis:

• Recall costs are \$10m

	Project A	Project B
Benefits	50 houses * \$210,000 = \$10.5m	100 houses * \$90,000 = \$9m



...and wealthy communities will tend to win...

Result: Project A wins

The Administration has a proposal to allow agencies to change this, which has been controversial

WSJ OPINION

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Biden's OMB Politicizes Cost-Benefit Analysis

The guidance threatens to upend the longstanding bipartisan reliance on best practices and evidence.

By Susan Dudley and W. Kip Viscusi

Aug. 28, 2023 5:44 pm ET

"[A]II the former presidents of the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis, along with editors of the Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis" object to this change.

This talk:

- 1. The current approach does not maximize social welfare
- 2. An approach with distributional weights does maximize social welfare
 - Current proposed revisions accomplish this
 - Notwithstanding recent criticisms in the WSJ, etc.
- 3. There are remaining implementation questions

Two notes:

- 1) Although I worked on these issues as Chief Economist at OMB (including leading the process to revise the BCA of spending programs), I am speaking on my behalf, not the Administration's.
- 2) Much of this is based on a soon-to-be released draft with Cass Sunstein

1. The current approach does not maximize social welfare

• Return to the example

	Project A	Project B
Benefits	50 houses * \$210,000 = \$10.5m	100 houses * \$90,000 = \$9m
Household income	\$150k/year	\$50k/year

• Recall costs are \$10m for each 🙀



- Put this in a social welfare function (SWF)
 - Assume all are owner-occupied & 100% incident on them, over 10 years
 - SWF: assume log utility

1. The current approach does not maximize social welfare

- Calculate social welfare gain from the project:
 - Welfare with the project welfare without the project
 - = # years * # households * [log (full income) log (income after annual housing losses)]

	Project A	Project B
Social welfare gain from project	10 yrs * 50 hh * [log (\$150k) – log(\$150k - \$21k)] = 33	10 yrs * 100 hh * [log (\$50k) – log (\$50k - \$9k)] = 86
• What's going o	on here?	Result: Project B wins

- The declining utility of income means that it is much more valuable to direct resources to the low-income households
- Implication:
 - The current approach does not maximize social welfare

2. An approach with distributional weights does maximize social welfare

First, some context:

- I have been focusing and am going to focus on the BCA of spending (e.g., a FEMA grant), rather than regulation (e.g., requiring industry to reduce pollution)
 - Spending is actually governed by different OMB guidance (Circular A-94) than governs regulation (Circular A-4)
- BCA for spending is quite important
 - FEMA, for example, distributes several billion dollars a year in resilience grants to communities
 - Also Army Corps, DOT, etc.: in total \$40-\$50 billion / year
- I do this for two reasons:
 - It is clearer for discussing distributional considerations
 - It is the process that I led and the BCA that I oversaw at OMB, so I know institutional details

2. An approach with distributional weights does maximize social welfare

- The Administration has proposed revisions to benefit-cost analysis
- Administration's proposal:
 - Allows (but does not require) agencies to use distributional weighting
 - For log utility, that means a weight of 1/income (normalized by 1 / median income of \$75k)
 - The higher the income, the lower the weight
 - Long been in UK guidance
 - Being piloted by FEMA

2. An approach with distributional weights does maximize social welfare

Recall the current method with weights of 1: Project A Project B Benefits 50 houses * 100 houses * \$210,000 = \$10.5m \$900,000 = \$9m

Result: Project A wins

Redo BCA analysis with distributional weights other than 1:

	Project A	Project B
Household income	\$150k/year	\$50k/year
Weight	(1/\$150k) / (1/\$75k) = 1/2	(1/\$50k) / (1/\$75k) = 1.5
Reweighted benefits	10.5m * 1/2 = 5.25m	\$9m * 1.5 = \$13.5m

...social welfare maximized... but there are costs...



Result: Project B wins 12

- 1. "Taxes are a better way of redistributing"
 - Maybe so. That doesn't mean that they actually redistribute.
 - Good reason to think that taxes won't redistribute. (Liscow, "Redistribution for Realists," 2022)
 - Public sentiment: psychological evidence that the public cares about the <u>means</u> of redistribution, not just amount views in silos, not holistically
 - Taxation: Resists "giving out" cash and having close to revenuemaximizing at the top because of feelings that income is "earned"
 - o Instead, prefers necessities (Liscow & Pershing 2022)
 - And cares about fairness (e.g., BCA?)
 - Empirically, tax system is wildly far off from reasonable utilitarian benchmarks
 - Implicit valuation of \$1 at 10th percentile vs. 90th of income:
 - Tax system implicitly:1.5x (Hendren 2020)
 - Log utility: 13x

- 2. "This kind of redistribution is illegitimate. Look at how little we redistribute through taxes as a judge of what the public wants."
 - See previous argument: we shouldn't expect to see the same amount of "redistribution" across different domains
 - Does it even seem like "redistribution" to ensure that a low-income individual has the same shot as a high-income individual at receiving federal funding?
 - Nothing in statutes says that funding should be directed toward richer neighborhoods
 - There are broader notions of fairness

- 3. "Efficiency is better because the winners can compensate the losers, and everybody wins."
 - The current A-94 is explicitly based on this "Kaldor-Hicks" reasoning
 - What does it mean for FEMA to compensate losers when it is giving out money?
 - Putting that aside, that compensation rarely happens
 - It can't happen institutionally from the agency providing the grants
 - Little evidence that it happens more generally
 - China & WTO (Autor et al. 2016)
 - Example from litigation: State supreme courts require more funding for low-income schools. Do the relative losers receive offsetting benefits later? Not at all. (Liscow, "Are Court Orders Sticky?" 2018)

- Institutional concerns 1) this isn't what BCA is, 2) it is too value-laden, and 3) it lacks transparency
- Dudley & Viscusi in WSJ a few weeks ago:
 - "OMB's draft revisions to longstanding guidance stray from widely accepted principles and methods in several areas, including . . . by 'weighting' impacts by income to exaggerate their benefits to low earners. . . ."
 - "[T]hese changes would embed values other than economic efficiency in the benefit-cost analysis, rather than encourage career staff to present the best evidence and leave value judgments to politically accountable officials. OMB's draft opens the door to putting scientific-sounding numbers on inherently qualitative values like social justice. . . . That would vitiate the transparency and integrity of regulatory-impact analysis, which for decades has served as a ballast across administrations with widely varying policy objectives."
- Dudley & Viscusi approach:
 - Do efficiency-based BCA and then have political actors decide

Several responses to these institutional concerns:

- 1) <u>There is no one way to do BCA</u>. BCA is a quantitative tool to achieve goals.
 - Distributional concerns have been stated goal in federal guidance for decades. There is almost nothing to show. The current approach has not worked.
 - This suggests that a new approach would be helpful.
- 2) <u>BCA is always value-laden</u>: Those values can't be avoided. And current system (with weights of 1) is designed in a way that funds rich more than poor places.
- 3) <u>It wouldn't help transparency for spending</u>: The analyses aren't public! If benefitcost analyses for spending were released, it could make sense to do 2 analyses for transparency purposes: with weights of 1 and with different weights.

<u>Their proposal isn't workable under BCA for spending as currently practiced</u>: For BCA of spending, this is not how things work. Projects with a BCR < 1 are not even considered. The BCA is decisive in this respect.

- <u>Even if it were workable, it is a bad proposal</u>. It is <u>good</u> to guide decisionmakers rigorously rather than for them to act in an ad hoc way. And helpful for applicants.
- In any case, it is the political actors choosing the weighting. This is <u>discretionary</u>.

- Example of why efficiency-based analysis works poorly: tax regulations
 - Context:
 - June 9 Memorandum of Agreement between OMB and Treasury: taxes aren't subject to OIRA review
- This is good
 - Under efficiency-based analysis, rules increasing tax enforcement will tend to be cost-INeffective
 - Revenue = transfer from taxpayers to government
 - Cost of government administration + taxpayer compliance / behavioral distortion
 - So, no benefits and some costs \rightarrow bad rules
 - This is not sensible. Need distributional weighting (or other things).

3. There are remaining implementation questions on distributional weighting

- Should weights be mandatory?
 - No. Legal risk.
- What weights?
 - Leave to agencies, but have a default
 - Should not be based on weights implicit in tax system (see earlier argument)
 - And base on post-tax/transfer income
- Measurement questions
 - Not hard with income (easy from the Census)
 - But what level of geography?

3. There are remaining implementation questions on distributional weighting

- Administrative burden
 - Localities often spend tens of thousands of dollars on their BCA
 - Reason to do less
- Incidence
 - Hendren & Kaplow have done important work on "fiscal externalities"
 - Ex: people pay more taxes when their homes are not destroyed
 - Benefits should be counted <u>net of their effect on the budget</u>
 - And increase in tax revenue should be deducted from costs
 - Important for proper measurement & targeting to consider

Conclusion

- The current approach to BCA does not maximize social welfare
 - It also is arguably unfair
- A social welfare approach justifies distributional weighting
- Taking a step back:
 - Shows a deep relationship between tax and non-tax policy
- Reforming big rules is never easy
 - The US federal government has never used (to my knowledge) distributional weighting
 - Take time to figure out how exactly to do it best
 - But we're making important progress