# Comments on "The constraint on public debt when r < g but g < m" by Ricardo Reis

#### John H. Cochrane

Hoover Institution, Stanford University and NBER

February 26 2021

#### Important!

The single most important macro question of our time.


$$\frac{d}{dt}\left(\frac{b_t}{y_t}\right) = (r_t - g_t)\frac{b_t}{y_t} - \frac{s_t}{y_t}$$

r < g: Raise debt (with s < 0) then roll over (s = 0), b/y gently declines? "Fiscal expansion" with "no fiscal cost?"</p>

- Washington understands logic better than economists!
- Obviously not.
- Theory wall between r < g manna and r > g austerity? 0.01%?
- Obviously not.
- Conventional response: 1) r will rise. An upper bound on b/y. Crowding out? Liquidity premium?
- 2) 50-100 years of large b/y threatens doom loop. What if there is another crisis, a WWII budget need starting at b/y = 200%?
- ▶ Today: *r* < *g* is irrelevant to US fiscal policy issues.

## Radical objection – perpetual deficits with steady b/y?


The whole r - g debate is irrelevant to current US fiscal policy issues.



- ▶ r < g by 1% and b/y = 100% allow s/y = -1%.
- ▶ not s/y = -5% in good times, s/y = -25% in 1/10 year crisis, and then entitlements, *and then* "one-time" expansion.

## Radical objection - one time expansion and grow out?

The whole r - g debate is irrelevant to current US fiscal policy issues.



- r < g by 1% allows "one-time b/y expansion" and then s = 0.</li>
  s = 0 would be big austerity / conservative dream!
- ▶ r < g by 1% does not allow exponentially growing b/y!

## Discontinuity at r = g?

r = g divides bond vigilantes from garden of eden? Look at flows.

- ▶ r g = +0.01% with b/y = 100% means s/y = 0.01% = \$2 billion.
- ▶ r g = -0.01% means s/y = -0.01% = -\$2 billion.
- This transition is clearly continuous.

Look at growing out of "one time" expansion

- ▶ r g = -0.01%, means b/y=150% resolves with s = 0 back to b/y = 50% in 11,000 years.
- ▶ r g = +0.01% means b/y=150% grows to 450% in 11,000 years, on the way to  $\infty$ .
- "Wealth effect" in transversality condition, is likely the same.

#### Lessons

- Economic meaning of solving integrals forward vs. backward should be continuous.
- Economically sensible reading: Small r < g is not discontinuously different from small r > g.

## R, g and present values

Summary: r < g in perfect foresight modeling

- ▶  $r < g \approx 1\%$  shifts the *average* surplus to a slight perpetual deficit  $s/y \approx -1\%$ , while it lasts.
- Any substantial variation in deficits about that average must be met by a substantial period of above average surpluses, to bring back debt to GDP in a reasonable time.
- Like seigniorage.
- A quantitative question. r < g of 10% would be different.
- ▶ The *r* < *g* debate is irrelevant to current US fiscal policy issues.

Liquidity, uncertainty, paper?

- Liquidity, uncertainty: Many *r* to choose from.
- Do not measure r from a world with liquidity and uncertainty, and use it in perfect foresight modeling!
- Two examples: r = rate of return on government debt < g, but present values converge and no fiscal opportunity if done right.

#### Liquidity value of government debt

- Example: All debt is money.  $r = -\pi < g$ .
- Steady state can finance small deficit.

$$(\pi + g)rac{M}{Py} = -rac{s}{y}$$

but big deficits need to be repaid by later surpluses.

**•** PV? Discount with  $r^{f}$ , i.e. with  $e^{-\delta t}u'(c_{t})$ :

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t y_t} = \int_{\tau=t}^T e^{-\left(r^f - g\right)(\tau - t)} \left(\frac{s_\tau}{y_\tau} + i_\tau \frac{M_\tau}{P_\tau y_\tau}\right) d\tau + e^{-\left(r^f - g\right)(\tau - t)} \frac{M_\tau}{P_\tau y_\tau}$$

Debt = PV of surpluses, including seignorage. Terminal value converges. Can fund s < 0. Big s < 0 need to be repaid by s > 0.
▶ Discount with gov't debt return r = -π:

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t y_t} = \int_{\tau=t}^T e^{(\pi+g)(\tau-t)} \left(\frac{s_\tau}{y_\tau}\right) d\tau + e^{(\pi+g)(\tau-t)} \frac{M_T}{P_T y_T}.$$

Explosive "bubble," negative PV.

Same  $M/(Py) < \infty$ . Which is useful? "Mine bubble"? See s limit?

#### The technical problem

▶ You can discount one-period payoffs with ex-post returns.

$$1 = E_t \left( \frac{\beta u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} R_{t+1} \right) = E_t \left( R_{t+1}^{-1} R_{t+1} \right).$$

You cannot always discount infinite payoffs with ex-post returns.

$$p_{t} = E_{t} \sum_{j=1}^{T} \frac{\beta^{j} u'(c_{t+j})}{u'(c_{t})} d_{t+j} + E_{t} \frac{\beta^{j} u'(c_{t+j})}{u'(c_{t})} p_{t+T}$$

each term converges, yet

$$p_t = E_t \sum_{j=1}^T \prod_{k=1}^j \frac{1}{R_{t+k}} d_{t+j} + E_t \prod_{k=1}^T \frac{1}{R_{t+k}} p_{t+T}$$

terms can explode in opposite directions.

#### Bohn's (1995) example – uncertainty

• 
$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \sim \text{iid.} \ \frac{1}{1+r^f} = E\left[\beta\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma}\right]. \ r^f < g \text{ is possible.}$$

• Government keeps a constant debt/GDP. Borrows  $c_t$ , repays  $(1 + r^f)c_t$  at time t + 1.  $b_t = c_t$ . See as present value?

▶  $s_t = (1 + r^f)c_{t-1} - c_t$ . Discounting with marginal utility,

$$b_t = E_t \sum_{j=1}^T \beta^j \left(\frac{c_{t+j}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma} s_{t+j} + E_t \beta^T \left(\frac{c_{t+T}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma} c_{t+T}$$

$$= E_t \sum_{j=1}^T \beta^j \left(\frac{c_{t+j}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma} \left[ (1+r^f)c_{t+j-1} - c_{t+j} \right] + E_t \beta^T \left(\frac{c_{t+T}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma} c_{t+T}$$

$$b_{t} = \left[c_{t} - E_{t}\beta^{T}\left(\frac{c_{t+T}}{c_{t}}\right)^{-\gamma}c_{t+T}\right] + E_{t}\beta^{T}\left(\frac{c_{t+T}}{c_{t}}\right)^{-\gamma}c_{t+T}$$

### Bohn's (1995) example

• Discounting with gov't bond return =  $r^{f}$ ,

$$b_{t} = \sum_{j=1}^{T} \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} \frac{1}{R_{t+k}} \right) s_{t+j} + \left( \prod_{k=1}^{T} \frac{1}{R_{t+k}} \right) c_{t+T} =$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{T} \frac{(1+r^{f})c_{t+j-1} - c_{t+j}}{(1+r^{f})^{j}} + \frac{1}{(1+r^{f})^{T}} c_{t+T}$$

$$b_{t} = \left( c_{t} - \frac{c_{t+T}}{(1+r^{f})^{T}} \right) + \frac{c_{t+T}}{(1+r^{f})^{T}}.$$

Taking expected value,

$$b_t = c_t \left( 1 - rac{\left( 1 + g 
ight)^T}{\left( 1 + r^f 
ight)^T} 
ight) + c_t rac{\left( 1 + g 
ight)^T}{\left( 1 + r^f 
ight)^T}$$

## Bohn's (1995) example

• Discounting with marginal utility  $c_t^{-\gamma}$ ,

$$b_t = \left[c_t - E_t \beta^T \left(\frac{c_{t+T}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma} c_{t+T}\right] + E_t \beta^T \left(\frac{c_{t+T}}{c_t}\right)^{-\gamma} c_{t+T}.$$


• Discounting with government bond return  $= r^{f}$ ,

$$b_t = c_t \left( 1 - rac{(1+g)^T}{(1+r^f)^T} 
ight) + c_t rac{(1+g)^T}{(1+r^f)^T}.$$

Both right. Which is more useful?


At least be careful about offsetting infinite limits! Can miss b/y = 1, not ∞, that deficits are repaid in PV terms. No "mineable bubbles"!

#### Ex post consumption and debt paths



Borrow 1, roll over at r<sup>f</sup> < g forever. Certainty: g beats r<sup>f</sup>. Uncertainty: there are sample paths of low consumption (high u').

#### Ex post debt to GDP ratio



Certainty: b/y declines. Uncertainty: Some low growth sample paths lead to huge b/y, fiscal adjustment in low c, high u' state.
 If you weight by u', transversality is violated. Like writing puts.

## Bottom line

Paper

Paper has liquidity from frictions, mpk ≠ r<sup>f</sup> ≠ r from uncertainty. Important for realistic values. Same basic point (?) in many, simpler, models.

Lessons

- $r < g \approx 1\%$  is fun but irrelevant for US fiscal problems.
- r < g ≈ 1% allows steady small deficits like seignorage. Larger deficits need to be repaid with subsequent surpluses.</li>
- Grow out of debt opportunity is like writing out of the money put options and calling it arbitrage.
- With liquidity or uncertainty, discounting with ex post return can lead to terminal condition and PV that explode in opposite directions, while discounting with marginal utility is well behaved.
- ▶ If you do it, be careful. Discounting with marginal utility is safer.
- Do not pluck r measures from the world and use risk free models for quantitative questions.