The Sword and the Shield: The Economics of Targeted Sanctions[*]

Daniel P. Ahn, U.S. Department of State and Johns Hopkins University[†]

Rodney D. Ludema, Georgetown University[‡]

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Abstract

While broad economic sanctions have long been used as instruments of foreign policy, targeted sanctions focusing on specific individuals, entities, and transactions are relatively new and less understood. We present a model of firm performance under sanctions where the target government may be incentivized to "shield" some firms. Then, using detailed firm and individual-level data, this paper empirically estimates the impact of targeted sanctions, focusing on sanctions deployed by the United States and the European Union against primarily Russian targets after its intervention in Ukraine in 2014 as a natural experiment. We find, on average, a sanctioned or associated company loses about one-quarter of its operating revenue, over one-half of its asset value, and about one-third of its employees relative to their non-sanctioned peers, suggesting targeted sanctions are quite "smart" in the sense of hitting the intended targets with relatively minimal collateral damage. We also find some evidence of spillover impact onto technically non-sanctioned targets. Finally, we find that "strategic" firms systemically outperform non-strategic firms under sanctions, consistent with our model and demonstrating the tradeoff between the tactical and the strategic impact of targeted sanctions.

1 Introduction

Economic sanctions have long been used as instruments of foreign policy. One of the earliest examples is the Megarian Decree in 432 BC banning Megarians from the harbors and marketplaces of the Athenian Empire.[1] More modern examples include the UN embargo against Iraq in 1990 and North Korea since 2006, and the U.S. embargoes against Cuba in 1960 and Iran in 1979. A common feature of these episodes is use of broad or comprehensive trade embargoes against entire states. In the last two decades, however, sanctions policy has shifted toward a more targeted approach focusing on specific individuals, companies and transactions. Targeted sanctions have emerged as practitioners and scholars have increasingly recognized that the effectiveness of a sanction in modifying behavior by a target government depends not on the overall economic damage the sanction causes but on whether the target government itself and its key domestic constituencies feel concentrated economic pain from noncompliance. Thus, sanctions are considered "smart" if they target the responsible parties while minimizing collateral damage.

How smart are targeted sanctions in practice? Do they actually cause economic harm to the specific targets? If so, is the harm confined or does it spill over to non-targets? Can the government of the sanctioned country successfully shield targets from the sanctions, and if so, at what cost? This paper addresses these questions in the context of the sanctions programs undertaken by the U.S., the European Union (EU), and others against primarily Russian targets in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and its support of the insurgency in Ukraine since 2014.

We begin by presenting a model of how firm performance is affected sanctions and use this model to study the incentive of the target government to shield certain firms from sanctions. Sanctions are modeled as limits on targeted firms' access to foreign intermediate

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[1] According to Thucydides, the Decree was a significant trigger in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War.

inputs. They thus raise targeted firms' cost of production, which feeds through to lower consumption, both private and public, and may also drive some firms to exit. If the target government places sufficient value on procuring the output of a targeted firm, it may elect to shield the firm's profits from the sanction rather than allow it to exit, thus transfering the cost of the sanction from the targeted firm to the target government.

Drawing from a detailed firm-level dataset, which allows us to match official lists of sanctioned entities (consisting of individuals and companies) to nearly 600 unique firms and over 2,000 subsidiaries throughout the world, we use a difference-in-difference approach to compare the financial performance of the targeted firms to their non-targeted peers before and after sanctions were imposed. Country-sector-time fixed effects are used to control for time-varying, sector-level shocks, which is important because the sanctions regime coincided with a period of macroeconomic turbulence, notably a dramatic decline in the price of oil, Russia's main export.

Our main finding is that targeted companies are indeed harmed by sanctions relative to their non-targeted peers. On average, a targeted company loses roughly one-quarter of its operating revenue, over one-half of its asset value, and about one-third of its employees after being added to a targeted sanctions list compared to non-targeted peer companies. These estimates, which are large and appear highly statistically robust, suggest targeted sanctions do have a powerful impact on the targets themselves.

We find some evidence of a spillover effect, but the scope is fairly narrow. For example, we find that minority-owned subsidiaries of sanctioned companies (which technically are not themselves sanctioned) suffer similar losses as majority-owned subsidiaries (which technically are).

Finally, we find strong evidence that certain targeted firms, which were designated by the Russian government as "strategic" prior to the sancions regime, are spared the effects of sanctions, which is consistent with our shielding hypothesis developed in the model. An

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important policy take-away is that shielding simply shifts the burden of the sanctions from the target firms to the target government.

The outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents our model and derives the theoretical results. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 presents the estimation of the model, robustness checks, and quantification. Section 6 concludes.

2   Literature Review

The literature, both theoretical and empirical, on economic sanctions is vast. However, most empirical studies cover the period when policymakers invoked comprehensive sanctions involving broad country-wide trade embargoes rather than selective sanctions against specific targets. The literature on comprehensive sanctions, such as those against Iraq after the 1990-91 Gulf War, has tended to give mixed support for the effectiveness of sanctions. Many studies have focused on the secondary effects of sanctions on corruption and humanitarian consequences without matching political dividends. Recent surveys are provided in Hufbauer et al. (2007), Lowenberg and Kaempfer (2007), and Drezner (2011).

Empirical studies of targeted sanctions are much fewer, partially due to the relatively short history of targeted sanctions programs and the related paucity of examples involving purely targeted sanctions instead of becoming part of a broader comprehensive sanctions program. Indeed, the U.S.-EU targeted sanctions program against Russia in the wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine represents a rare example of a purely targeted sanctions program against an economy reasonably well integrated into the global economic and financial system, and in related fashion, has relatively better quality data.

Yet economists attempting to empirically estimate the impact of sanctions on Russia face the challenge of disentangling the impact of sanctions from the confounding effects of the

broader political uncertainty stemming from the Ukraine crisis and the dramatic drop in oil prices mentioned above. However, most studies conclude that oil prices were far more important in explaining Russia's post-2014 macroeconomic weakness, with a relatively small effect ascribed to sanctions. IMF (2015), using a generic macroeconomic model, forecasted that sanctions could reduce Russia's real output by about 1 to 1.5 percent of GDP via weaker investment and consumption. A World Bank (2015) study similarly argues that sanctions against Russia and counter-sanctions may have affected investment and consumption but does not provide any specific numbers. Neither of these studies attempts to directly measure the economic impact of sanctions. Dreger et al. (2015) used a VAR model featuring oil prices, the ruble exchange rate, and a sanctions news index to argue that the oil price drop was the primary driver of the ruble depreciation but that sanctions news surprises may have had some impact on the ruble's conditional volatility. The study does not consider the effect on GDP or imports. Tuzova and Qayub (2016) presents another reduced-form VAR model featuring a variety of Russian macroeconomic variables including GDP, the real exchange rate, inflation, fiscal and consumption expenditures, and external trade to argue that oil prices were the main cause of Russia's poor macroeconomic outlook. Moret et al. (2016) also looked at country-level trade data and compared trading volumes between Russia and the EU pre- and post-crisis to conclude that the Baltic states suffered the greatest relative losses, similar to the findings of Ahn and Ludema (2016).

However, the studies above still generally use macroeconomic or survey data to assess the economic impact of sanctions. Studies that use more micro-focused firm, individual, or transactions-level data are much fewer. Nevertheless, we would argue the micro-targeted rather than macroscopic nature of recent targeted sanctions programs require going down to the similarly "micro" level of firms and individuals. This approach is necessary not only to effectively estimate the impact of the sanctions themselves, but also to assess potential secondary consequences, such as action by the target government to protect sensitive targets.

Furthermore, there has been widespread anecdotal reports of "de-risking" by the private sector, whereby international companies disconnect business relationships with even legitimate counterparties wholesale in certain sectors and regions out of an over-abundance of caution in managing the regulatory burden of sanctions compliance.

Crozet and Hinz (2016) use detailed monthly trade data at both the country level and firm level for France to estimate the impact of Russia sanctions. They find large impacts on trade (as much as $60 billion collectively) between Russia and many EU economies, arguing that this is 'collateral damage.' However, the authors do recognize that most of this effect is due to oil prices, Russian economic underperformance, and political uncertainty. The effect from targeted sanctions appears to be at most $3 billion. Haider (2017) uses export customs data to track the impact of sanctions and export deflection of Iranian non-oil exports after the imposition of United Nations non-oil export sanctions in 2008, and finds significant evidence of export deflection. However, the data studied goes up to 2011 and does not cover the oil-related or targeted financial sanctions from 2012 onwards. Draca et al. (2017) uses an event study methodology on the evolution of nuclear-related sanctions relief for Iran during the P5+1 negotiations in Geneva leading up to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement to study the asset prices of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, finding firms linked to sanctioned entities saw a significant positive return during the window of the diplomatic breakthrough. Similarly, and perhaps the closest to our paper, is Stone (2016), which uses a similar event study methodology to study the impact of Russia sanctions news events on the asset prices of the 11 largest energy firms and banks in Russia. The paper finds a negative impact on the asset prices of targeted sectors compared to non-targeted sectors but no significant difference between targeted and non-targeted firms within a sector, which is interpreted as evidence of "de-risking."

Compared to the literature, our paper is unique in several respects. First, ours is the first, to our knowledge, to use detailed firm and individual-level networked data to estimate

empirically the impact on the real economic performance (such as operating revenue, assets, and employment) of the targets themselves. Second, we consider a comprehensive sample of all targeted firms, including privately held firms and those firms linked to the network of sanctioned individuals, and not only the small number of publically traded firms.

3   The Model

Sanctions can harm targeted firms by limiting their ability to supply foreign markets or by limiting their access to foreign inputs. For simplicity, our model focuses on the latter channel.[2]

We consider a model of two countries, the sanctioning country (S) and the target country (T). Each country contains many vertically related firms. In the absence of sanctions, upstream firms in both S and T supply intermediate goods to downstream firms in T, which in turn supply final goods to both private consumers in T and the government of T. The model unfolds in four stages. First, the government of S imposes sanctions on select downstream firms in T. We treat this choice as exogenous, as it depends on range of political and legal factors outside of the model. A firm under sanction loses access to certain imported intermediates from S, thus forcing it to rely more on domestic inputs. Second, each downstream firm receives information about the size of its market. Third, the government of T bargains with its downstream firms to procure final goods for government consumption. Fourth, all firms produce and sell as permitted under the sanctions regime and according to the agreed procurement terms.

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[2]This channel best represents the sanctions present in our data. With the exception of energy products, the exports of which are not limited by sanctions, Russia exports very little to the U.S. or the EU. Its imports are primarily capital goods. A notable exception is food imports, but these were blocked by Russia's own counter-sanctions, which we do not consider here.

3.1 Markets

Consumer demand for final good j in country T is given by

$$q_j = \theta_j p_j^{-\sigma} \tag{1}$$

where q_j is quantity demanded, p_j is the price charged by firm j, $\sigma > 1$ is the demand elasticity and $\theta_j > 0$ is a firm-specific demand shifter. We assume θ_j is an i.i.d. binary random variable taking on the value θ^H with probability ρ and θ^L with probability $1 - \rho$.

The government's valuation of good j is given by

$$G_j(g_j) = \gamma_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} g_j^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \tag{2}$$

where g_j is the quantity procured. The term γ_j measures the importance of final good j in government consumption. It may be that the government values final good j for its usefulness in the sanctioned policy (e.g., forcibly annexing a neighbor), or it may be valuable for some unrelated government function. For simplicity we assume the government and consumers share the same demand elasticity, but none of our conclusions depend on this assumption. The distribution of γ_j across firms is given by $H(\gamma)$, with density $h(\gamma)$, on the support $\mathbb{R}^+$.

Each final producer incurs a fixed cost of production F, after which final good j is produced from a continuum of intermediate inputs on the interval $[0, n_j]$, according to a CES production function

$$y_j = \left[\int_0^{n_j} x_j(\omega)^{\frac{\xi-1}{\xi}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\xi}{\xi-1}} \tag{3}$$

where y_j is output, $x_j(\omega)$ is the firm's chosen level of input ω, and $\xi > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between inputs.

Each input is supplied by a unique upstream firm, producing in either S or T, with constant unit cost of w. Given the production function (3), each upstream firm faces constant-

elasticity of demand for its input from each downtream firm, and accordingly sets its price as a constant markup over marginal cost, $p_x = \frac{\xi}{\xi-1}w$, which by choice of units we normalize to 1. This implies that each downstream firm has a constant marginal cost that depends only on the measure of its set of available inputs

$$c_j = n_j^{1/(1-\xi)} \tag{4}$$

Let $z < 1$ be measure of upstream firms producing in country T, and let $1 - z$ be the measure of upstream firms producing in S. We index inputs such that $\omega \in [0, z]$ are domestic and $\omega \in [z, 1]$ are imported. If downstream firm j is not subject to sanction, then $n_j = 1$, whereas a complete blocking sanction would imply $n_j = z$. Any partial sanction would be represented by $n_j \in [z, 1)$. Given the one-to-one relationship between marginal cost and the number of available inputs, a sanction can be represented as a choice of marginal cost in the range $c_j \in \left[1, z^{1/(1-\xi)}\right)$.

If the downstream firm chooses to sell to the private sector, then based on (1) it charges a price $p_j = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}c_j$, and earns an operating profit from market sales equal to

$$\pi_j^m = A\theta_j c_j^{1-\sigma} \tag{5}$$

where $A = \sigma^{-\sigma}(\sigma-1)^{\sigma-1}$. Note that market revenue is proportional to operating profit, i.e., $r_j^m = \sigma A\theta_j c_j^{1-\sigma}$.

3.2 The Bargaining Game

The government and the downstream firm bargain over g and a transfer payment t (we drop the subscripts for the remainder of this section). The net payoff of the government is thus $\Gamma = G(g) - t$, and the net profit of the firm is $\Pi = \pi^m + t - cg - F$. We assume the

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pair (g, t) solves the generalized Nash bargaining problem,

$$\max_{g,t} \Gamma^\alpha \left(\Pi - \bar{\Pi}\right)^{1-\alpha} \qquad (6)$$

where $\bar{\Pi}$ is the firm's outside option, and α is a measure of the government's "bargaining power." The government's outside option is to not purchase the good, the payoff from which is normalized to zero.

The firm's outside option depends on whether or not the firm is profitable without a government contract (i.e., $\pi^m - F > 0$). If so, then its outside option is to supply only the private market. If not, then its outside option is exit the market and receive zero. Hence, $\bar{\Pi} = \max \left[\pi^m - F, 0\right]$. Henceforth, we assume $\theta^H > \frac{F}{A}c^{\sigma-1} > \theta^L$ for all $c \in \left[1, z^{1/(1-\xi)}\right)$, so that in the high state the firm is profitable without a government contract and in the low state is it is not, regardless of the level of sanction.

Solving (6) produces,

$$g = (\sigma - 1) A\gamma c^{-\sigma}$$
$$G = \sigma A\gamma c^{1-\sigma} \qquad (7)$$
$$t = G - \alpha \left(\Gamma + \Pi - \bar{\Pi}\right)$$

provided the total surplus is non-negative, or $\Gamma + \Pi \geq 0$.

If market demand is high, then $\bar{\Pi} = \pi^m - F > 0$, giving rise to the following payoffs:

$$\Pi = \pi^m - F + (1 - \alpha)(G - cg)$$
$$\Gamma = \alpha (G - cg) \qquad (8)$$

In this case, the firm collects all profits from market sales net of the fixed cost, while the government and the firm share the gross surplus from the government contract.

If market demand is low, the outcome will depend on the government's demand for the firm's output. The key threshold is defined by $\gamma^e = \frac{F}{A}c^{\sigma-1} - \theta^L$. If $\gamma \geq \gamma^e$, the total surplus

is positive $(\pi^m - F + G - cg > 0)$, even when the firm is not viable without the government contract. In this case, the government contract supports the firm, and the payoffs become,

$$\Pi = (1 - \alpha)(\pi^m - F + G - cg)$$
$$\Gamma = \alpha(\pi^m - F + G - cg)$$

(9)

The government and the firm share the total surplus, and in particular, the government assumes a share α of the firm's market loss. This is because government would rather compensate the firm for its market loss than allow the firm to exercise its outside option and fail to supply the government. Indeed, if the government has all the bargaining power $(\alpha = 1)$, it absorbs all of the firm's market loss (and all of the contract surplus), which means the firm is completely *shielded* from variation in profits. Finally, if $\theta = \theta^L$ and $\gamma < \gamma^e$, then the total surplus is negative and the firm exits without a contract. Both the firm and the government receive zero in this case. Figure 1 illustrates the three possible firm outcomes depending on demand parameters.

The marginal effects of a sanction on the payoffs of the firm and the government can be found by differentiating (8) and (9) with respect to marginal cost. If $\theta = \theta^H$, the marginal effects on payoffs are $\partial \Pi / \partial c = -q^H - (1 - \alpha)g$ and $\partial \Gamma / \partial c = -\alpha g$. Thus, the sanction negatively affects both firm and government payoffs, with firm profits declining by the full amount of market sales. If $\theta = \theta^L$ and $\gamma \geq \gamma^e$, then the marginal payoffs are $\partial \Pi / \partial c = -(1 - \alpha)(q^L + g)$ and $\partial \Gamma / \partial c = -\alpha(q^L + g)$. In this case, the government absorbs α of the firm's market loss from sanctions. If $\theta = \theta^L$ and $\gamma < \gamma^e$, sanctions have no effect, as the firm does not produce.

3.3 Effect of Sanctions on Firm Performance

In this section, we dig deeper into the marginal effects of a sanction on the performance of the targeted firm. Our data allow us study firm survival rates and as well changes in various

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firm performance measures, conditional on survival.

Survival. In the absence of sanctions, a firm survives with probability ρ if $\gamma < \gamma^e$, and with probability 1 if $\gamma > \gamma^e$. These probabilities do not change with the imposition of sanctions but the threshold γ^e increases. Thus, sanctions would cause a firm at the threshold to exit. On average, the survival probability is equal to $\rho + (1-\rho)[1 - H(\gamma^e)]$, and thus the average marginal effect of the sanction on survival probability is

$$-(\sigma - 1)(1 - \rho)h(\gamma^e)\frac{F}{A}c^{\sigma-2} < 0 \tag{10}$$

Log Output. Conditional on survival, the elasticity of output with respect to marginal cost is $-dln\,(q + g)\,/dln(c) = \sigma$. This impact on output is the same whether the firm enjoys high demand or low demand with a shielding government contract. The reason is that in both cases, output is chosen to maximize the surplus, and the optimal quantity declines as the cost of production increases. Shielding therefore occurs entirely through the transfer the government makes to the firm, not in the quantity the government procures. In the data, we proxy quantity with employment.

Log Revenue. We observe operating revenue in our data, which theoretically is the sum of market revenue and the transfer, $R = r^m + t$. If $\theta = \theta^H$, then log revenue is equal to,

$$ln(R) = ln\left(\sigma A\theta^H + (\sigma - \alpha)A\gamma\right) + (1 - \sigma)ln(c) \tag{11}$$

and the elasticity of revenue with respect to marginal cost is $-dln(R)/dln(c) = \sigma - 1$. However, if $\theta = \theta^L$ and $\gamma \geq \gamma^e(c)$, log revenue equals,

$$ln(R) = ln\left[(\sigma - \alpha)A\left(\theta^L + \gamma\right)c^{1-\sigma} + \alpha F\right] \tag{12}$$

and the revenue elasticity is $-dln(R)/dln(c) = (\sigma - 1)\Phi^L$, where $\Phi^L = \frac{(\sigma-\alpha)A\left(\theta^L+\gamma\right)c^{1-\sigma}}{(\sigma-\alpha)A(\theta^L+\gamma)c^{1-\sigma}+\alpha F} <$

1. Thus, if $\gamma < \gamma^e$, the expected revenue elasticity, conditional on survival, is

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{-dln(R)}{dln(c)} \mid \theta = \theta^H\right] = \sigma - 1 \tag{13}$$

while if $\gamma \geq \gamma^e$, the expected revenue elasticity is,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{-dln(R)}{dln(c)} \mid \gamma \geq \gamma^e\right] = (\sigma - 1)\left\{\rho + (1 - \rho)\Phi^L\right\} < \sigma - 1 \tag{14}$$

Finally, note that operating profit is proportional to revenue, similar expressions apply.

To summarize the predictions of the model, sanctions lower the survival rate of targeted firms on average but have no effect on survival if the government's valuation of the good γ is sufficiently high. Conditional on survival, log revenue and log operating profit and log output all decline with sanctions; however, the declines in log revenue and profit (but not log output) are mitigated for firms with high γ. This mitigation occurs because the government wishes to maintain its access to the firm's product when market demand is low demand, and thus must offer a more generous contract to keep the firm alive.

Of course, this model does not provide an exhaustive picture of the all the ways sanctions affect firms or all the reasons the government might wish to bail out firms under sanction. It is, however, a workable model, with plausible assumptions and sharp predictions.

4 Data

4.1 Overview of the Targeted Sanctions Program

On March 6, 2014, the President of the United States declared a national emergency and issued the first of four Executive Orders to deal with the threat posed by the situation

in Ukraine, including the actions of the Government of the Russian Federation.[3] Issued in March and December of 2014, these Executive Orders provided the authority for various agencies of the U.S. Government, including Treasury, State, Commerce, and others, to impose targeted sanctions on primarily Russian entities. The U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control is the primary entity responsible for implementing targeted sanctions, with the targets determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, after an exhaustive investigation and vetting process.

U.S. targeted sanctions with respect to the Ukraine/Russia crisis broadly fall into two categories:

- SDN Sanctions: Blocking sanctions against individuals and entities on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List

- SSI Sanctions: Sectoral sanctions against entities operating in the financial, energy, and defense sectors of the Russian economy listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) List

Designated SDN entities and individuals face asset freezes and travel bans in the United States. And unless otherwise authorized or exempted, all trade and financial transactions and other economic activities by U.S. persons (individuals or entities) with these designated SDN individuals and entities are prohibited. Furthermore, the U.S. goverment adopted the following "50% Rule" where transactions with an entity that is 50 percent or more owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by an SDN designated entity or individual, are also implicitly sanctioned, regardless of whether the entity itself is explicitly listed.

Finally, according to FAQ 400 [08-13-2014], U.S. sanctions generally prohibit transactions involving, directly or indirectly, a blocked person, absent authorization from OFAC,

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[3]These are E.O. 13660 (March 6, 2014), E.O. 13661 (March 16, 2014), E.O. 13662 (March 20, 2014), and E.O. 13685 (December 19, 2014).

even if the blocked person is acting on behalf of a non-blocked entity. Therefore, "U.S. persons should be careful when conducting business with non-blocked entities in which blocked individuals are involved."

Meanwhile, the SSI entities represent those entities for which U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in certain transactions. Notably, U.S. persons cannot transact in or issue debt of longer than 30 days maturity or acquire new equity with targeted companies in the Russian financial sector or the Russian defense sector. Similar restrictions also apply to debt of longer than 90 days maturity with targeted companies in the Russian energy sector. Furthermore, U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting in certain technology and services related to deep-water, Arctic offshore, or shale oil activity with the Russian energy sector. The 50% Rule also applies to SSI entities.

The EU also developed a targeted sanctions policy in the form of EU Council Regulations starting in March 2014.[4] From these EU Council Regulations, the European Union maintains a categorization of targeted sanctions similar to that of the United States in response to the events in Ukraine/Russia in 2014:

- Restricted Measures List: Asset freezes and visa bans apply to entities and individuals designated on the EU Restricted Measures List.

- Sectoral Sanctions List: The EU also prohibits EU nationals and companies from transacting in equity or debt instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days with entities on the EU Sectoral Sanctions List.

Analogous to the U.S. SDN sanctions, EU persons are restricted from engaging in business transacitons with funds and economic resources owned or controlled by targeted individuals or entities. Also, similar to U.S. sectoral sanctions, the EU imposed an embargo on trade in arms and dual-use goods/technology with Russia, covering all items on the EU common

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[4]EU Council Regulations No. 269/2014, 284/2014, 433, 2014, 833/2014, and No 960/2014.

military and dual-use lists, as well as on the export of certain energy-related equipment and technology for offshore deep-water, Arctic, or shale oil exploration and production. Like the United States, the EU also adopted a 50% ownership rule whereby an entity that is 50 percent or more owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by an EU restricted entity or individual, is also considered sanctioned.[5]

4.2 Identification of Targets

Our empirical approach first requires an examination of the sanctions lists of the U.S. and the EU for potential overlap to identify all unique targets. Our micro-level firm and individual networked data come from business intelligence provider Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Orbis database.[6]

We consider the list of entities and individuals explicitly targeted by the U.S. and EU via its Russia/Ukraine-related sanction authorities from March 17, 2014 to December 1, 2016. Figure 2 provides a summary of the targets categorized by type and by sanctioning government and 3 shows the timeline of when these various sanctioned targets were designated. Altogether, the U.S. has designated 128 individuals and 102 entities on its SDN List as related to its Russia/Ukraine-related sanctions program. Also, the U.S. has explicitly designated 229 entities on its SSI List facing sectoral sanctions. Meanwhile, the EU placed 149 individuals and 37 entities on its EU Restricted Measures List and 20 entities onto its EU Sectoral Sanctions List. Figures 4and 7 show the Venn diagrams of overlap between U.S. SDN and EU Restricted Entities and U.S> SSI and EU Sectoral Entities respectively.

Given the large number of sanctioned individuals which U.S. and EU persons are also

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[5]The U.S. and EU also imposted restrictions on economic investment and trade with the Crimea region, and the economic impact of this is only considered in so far as individuals or entities engaged in Crimea also face explicit or implicit sanctions.

[6]Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database compiles and standardizes financial data on over 200 million firms (and the network of relationships with over 140 million individuals) around the world, both publically traded and private, from a variety of regulatory and other sources. More information about the database can be found on Bureau van Dijk's homepage at www.bvdinfo.com.

prohibited from having economic transactions with, we further classify sanctioned individuals into two categories: political and business figures, using BvD's standardized positions database, which tracks the network of significant business individuals and their economic relationships with firms. Figure 5shows the Venn diagram of overlap between U.S. SDN and EU Restricted Individuals, divided into political and business figures. We classify a political figure as an individual whose primary occupation is political rather than commercial in nature, such as a legislator, a government official, or a militia commander. However, a named individual would still be classified as a business figure (even if he/she worked in public service) if the individual could be identified as being "associated" with a company according to BvD's standardized positions database. These standardized positions include being a major shareholder of the firm, part of corporate management, or on the board of directors.

According to this classification, of the 128 individuals on the U.S. SDN List, 104 appear to be purely political figures, while 24 appear to have business associations. Hence, of the U.S. SDN individuals, about one-fifth are business figures. Meanwhile, the EU sanctions against individuals are skewed even more heavily toward political figures. Of the 149 individuals on the EU Restricted List, only 6 appear to have business associations. We subsequently identified 269 distinct companies as being "associated" with U.S. or EU sanctioned business figures, and Figure 6 shows the Venn diagram of overlap between U.S. and EU Associated Companies.

There can be considerable overlap between the 6 lists of sanctioned firms: U.S. SDN entities, companies associated with U.S. SDN individuals, U.S. SSI entities, EU restricted entities, companies associated with EU restricted individuals, and EU sectorally sanctioned entities. Figures 8 and 9 present Venn diagrams of the space of U.S. and EU sanctioned entities by category, including those firms associated with sanctioned individuals. As discussed above, this tabulation captures only those entities or individuals explicitly listed by the U.S. and EU governments. Altogether we have identified 584 unique targets.

However, as mentioned above, both the U.S. and EU follow a 50% ownership rule whereby those subsidiaries 50% or more owned, directly or indirectly, by an explicitly sanctioned entity also implicitly face the same sanctions. The United States appears to be more forward-leaning in explicitly adding to its lists by subsidiaries subsequently identified to be facing sanctions according to this rule. We therefore used BvD's corporate ownership data to compile all known subsidiaries of the explicitly sanctioned entities before sorting them into those whose ownership stake by the sanctioned entity either directly or indirectly exceeds 50% or is below 50%.

4.3 Strategic Firms

We observed that some firms facing explicit restrictive sanctions appeared to see large *increases* in their financial performance metrics and found numerous anecdotes documenting how the target government (i.e. the Government of the Russian Federation) may be providing various firms of state largess to some of these targeted firms via a variety of mechanisms. These include the granting of government contracts and monopolies, state-backed loan guarantees, capital injections by the state, and tax breaks. This endogenous response by the target government are systemically shielding some targeted firms deemed sensitive for political, economic, or national security reasons from the full effect of sanctions.

For example, the Russian government gave sanctioned Bank Rossiya the sole contract to service the $36 billion dollar domestic wholesale electricity market, which comes with it several hundred millions of dollars in revenue. Sanctioned VTB Bank also asked for $5.4 billion in state capital aid to offset losses from sanctions. Often these shielded firms appear to be providing critical services to the government, such as managing Russia's sovereign bond issuance, providing banking services to the annexed territory of Crimea, or helping build the Kerch bridge connecting Crimea to the Russian mainland.[7]

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[7]Newspaper reporting from The Moscow Times in 2014 document some of this state-firm relationships.

We construct a list of 374 strategic firms which the Government of the Russian Federation may be motivated to shield by combining three official lists. The first is a list of 165 'national security' firms the Russian government deems of "strategic importance for national defense and state security, protection of morality, health, rights, and the lawful interest of Russian citizens."[8] The second is a list of 201 'backbone' firms which have a "significant effect on the formation of GDP, employment, and social stability."[9] The last is a list of 35 systemically important financial institutions required to have improved capitalization measures.[10]

While the motivations for the target government shielding a particular firm may be opaque and context-specific and the form of shielding diverse, the strategic firms that appear on these lists appear to be more likely candidates for receiving state aid. Many (though not all) of the firms that are anecdotally reported to have been shielded by the state appear on one or more of these strategic lists. Figure XX shows the Venn Diagram of the overlap between these three lists, while Figure XX shows the overlap between the overall strategic list and the list of sanctioned targets.

4.4 Description of the Data

As mentioned above, our firm-level data come from the Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) Orbis database, which tracks over 200 million firms and 140 million indviiduals worldwide, including over 18 million firms in the Russian Federation alone.[11] From this larger database, we isolate 80,902 firms, including 545 of the 584 firms identified as being explicitly sanctioned

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[8]The original list was made by a Presidential Decree on August 4, 2004 and we used the version of the list updated on March 28, 2015.

[9]This list was made by the Commission on Economic Development, February 5, 2015, N. 1.

[10]As established by the Deposit Insurance Agency on February 2, 2015 and the Central Bank of Russia, Ordinance No. 3737 dated July 22, 2015.

[11]We paste together the firm-level data using the Ruslana historical data discs provided by BvD to get as comprehensive and nationally representative a dataset as possibly, as recommended by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015).

above that are also present in the BvD database.[12] Also included are 2,392 firms that BvD identified as being subsidiaries of the 545 explicitly sanctioned firms. The remainder is a control group of 77,995 companies peer companies, constructed by collecting all companies that share the same home country and sector of business operation as the sanctioned companies in the global BvD database as well as the 334 non-sanctioned strategic firms described above.[13] For each company, we track its home country location, sector of business operation (according to the 4-digit NACE Rev. 2 code specification), and its total Operating Revenue, Total Assets, and Number of Employees at the end of the years 2012 to 2016. We also track the status of the firm, whether it remains active or whether it has become bankrupt, liquidated or dissolved, or changed to some other non-active status. Altogether, the sanctioned targets and their subsidaries are based in 66 countries around the world, although almost three-quarters are in Russia.

Table 1 and 2 show the summary statistics for the sanctioned and non-sanctioned firms respectively. As we shall discuss further in the robustness section, sanctioned firms tend to be larger in every measuire of financial health than non-sanctioned firms.

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Sanctioned Entities

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
d_Active	14,160	.911	.285	0	1
OpRev	6,995	695,624	6,009,979	0	1.61e+08
Asset	7,078	1,341,157	1.42e+07	0	5.56e+08
Emp	6,738	1,349	13,428	0	450,000

[12]We match firm and individual names on the U.S. and EU sanctions blacklists to the firms and individuals in the BvD databases using Bayesian fuzzy logic and machine-learning methods to handle the potentially multiple ways in which Cyrillic names can be Romanized. Those explicitly sanctioned firms that could not be found in the BvD database appear to be mainly Ukrainian rather than Russian entities.

[13]Bureau van Dijk assigns a unique identification number that tracks a company through potential name and ownership changes.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Non-Sanctioned Control Group

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
d_Active	389,975	.982	.132	0	1
OpRev	146,056	10,708	258,042.7	0	3.43e+07
Asset	155,054	35,638	1,280,498	0	2.68e+08
Emp	144,105	48	2,012	0	330,447

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Estimation Strategy

Our benchmark econometric specification is a standard difference-in-differences ordinary least-squares (OLS) approach as follows:

$$ln\left(y_{isct}\right) = \alpha_i + \lambda_{cst} + \beta d_{it} + \epsilon_{isct}$$

where the subscript i denotes the unique company identification, s denotes the sector, c denotes the home country, and t denotes the time period. The left-hand side dependent variable y_{isct} tracks the particular firm i's financial metrics of total Operating Revenue, Total Asset value, and Number of Employees. Also, for our final left-hand side dependent variable, we construct a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is active in that year versus 0 if the firm loses its active status due to a bankruptcy, liquidation, etc.

The variables α_i capture company fixed-effects, λ_{cst} capture country-sector-time fixed effects, and d_{it} are the sanction treatment dummies. Our sanctions dummies d_{it} switch from 0 to 1 when firm i faces any of our three categories of targeted sanctions by either U.S. or EU authorities.

Table 3: Headline Regression Results

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp
d_Sanc	-0.0295***	-0.3001***	-0.6996***	-0.4326***
	(0.003)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.030)
Observations	398,715	92,896	145,920	135,685
R-squared	0.665	0.897	0.884	0.855

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_Active and d_Sanc are dummies capturing when firms are active and sanctioned respectively. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, Assets log Total Asset Holdings, and Emp log Total Number of Employees.

5.2 Benchmark Results

5.2.1 Headline Regression

Columns 1 through 4 in Table 3 displays our headline results, which shows the coefficients from regressing our dummy indicating firm active status, log Operating Revenue, log Assets, and log Employee Count on the simplest sanctions dummy d_Sanc, which turns on in the time period when it faces any type of sanction from either the U.S. or the EU. The number of observations can vary across the various regressions due to missing or non-reported data for many companies.

Our headline results suggest that targeted sanctions have a statistically significant negative impact on firm-level financial health relative to non-sanctioned peer companies. We find that a targeted firm on average faces a 3 percent increased likelihood of losing its active status. Also, its operating revenue falls by about one-quarter, total assets by about one-half, and employee count by about one-third compared to non-sanctioned peers. These results are highly statistically significant at the 1% confidence level for all of our financial metrics.[14]

We repeat that our results arise after controlling for both firm-specific fixed effects and

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[14]A simple size-varying extrapolation of the impact of sanctions on the operating revenue of the entire sample of sanctioned firms results in an impact of roughly 1 percent of Russia's GDP in 2014, which is consistent with other macroeconomic studies.

country-sector-time fixed effects, which should eliminate oil and other factors that may apply to companies in particular sectors or countries. In particular, the sectors are determined by the 4-digit NACE Rev. 2 core codes, providing a high degree of granular control.

Although the magnitudes of the estimated losses are large, these results should be interpreted with some caution. First, these are the average effect but it does not necessarily apply uniformly to all targeted companies. The effect on each particular target may vary according to firm-specific characteristics and also the type of the sanction it faces. Many of the largest Russian companies tended to face only sectoral sanctions which are deliberately designed not to have a large immediate impact but affect their long-term health via their access to credit and technology. This is one reason why the concentrated impact at the firm level does not necessarily translate into a large macroeconomic impact, despite the target list containing some of the largest state-owned enterprises that comprise a large share of overall Russian national output.

On the other hand, the results capture the differential impact of sanctions on the performance of targeted or associated companies compared to non-targeted companies. They do not measure factors that might affect all firms equally in a sector or a country. For example, if targeted sanctions deter counter-parties from engaging in trade with any firm in a suspect sector (e.g. firms may "de-risk" and stop trade with all arms manufacturers) and not just the targeted one, then this impact of sanctions would not be reflected in the performance differential exploited by the regression. This would contrawise bias our results toward zero.

5.2.2 Regression by Country

Table 4 shows the regression results once we split the sanctions treatment by the origin country of the sanction. We find the impact on the target's financial metrics, such as operating revenue, assets, and number of employees, appears to be largely driven by U.S. rather than EU sanctions. Only on the firms' status does EU sanctions have a signicant effect.

Given the high degree of policy coordination and overlap in the U.S. and EU sanctions lists and the relative paucity of targets that are sanctioned only by the EU and *not* by the United States, this result may not be that meaningful.[15]

Table 4: Impact by Origin Country of Sanction

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp
d_US	-0.0080	-0.5305***	-0.8327***	-0.4646***
	(0.007)	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.076)
d_EU	-0.0513***	0.4071	-0.0518	0.0794
	(0.014)	(0.274)	(0.179)	(0.128)
Observations	391,180	89,524	141,759	131,678
R-squared	0.650	0.881	0.870	0.824

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_US and d_EU are dummies capturing when firms were sanctioned by the U.S. or the EU respectively. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, lAssets log Total Asset Holdings, and lEmp log Total Number of Employees. We drop those subsidaries that are minority-owned by explicitly sanctioned targets from the sample as they are technically not sanctioned.

5.2.3   Regression by Type

Next, we split the sanctions treatment into its type: 1) Blocking or Restrictive sanctions on the entity itself; 2) Blocking or Restrictive sanctions on an Individual who is economically associated with the target firm; and 3) Sectoral sanctions that only limit certain transactions in certain sectors. Our results appear in Table 5.

The largest channel of the impact appears to be via association with sanctioned individuals. Sectoral sanctions are also negative and statistically signicant, but at a smaller impact than via association with sanctioned individuals. And interestingly, the effect via a sanction explicitly on a target firm itself, does not seem to be negative and statistically signicant except on the firm's Active Status.

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[15]On the other hand, in private discussions with the authors, a number of large international banks reported a dichotomy of sanctions enforcement and magnitude of penalties between U.S. and EU regulators.

Table 5: Impact by Type of Sanction

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp
d_Rest	-0.0236**	0.1592	0.1128	0.0060
	(0.010)	(0.120)	(0.092)	(0.068)
d_Assoc	-0.0430***	-0.4319***	-0.8033***	-0.3869***
	(0.008)	(0.135)	(0.092)	(0.071)
d_Sect	-0.0209***	-0.3118***	-0.6573***	-0.4548***
	(0.004)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.031)
Observations	398,715	92,896	145,920	135,685
R-squared	0.665	0.897	0.884	0.855

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthese. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_Rest, d_Assoc, and d_Sect are dummies capturing when a firm faces restrictive sanctions, sanctions via association with a sanctioned individual, or sectoral sanctions respectively. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, lAssets log Total Asset Holdings, and lEmp log Total Number of Employees.

The fact that individual and sectoral rather than firm-specic sanctions have a stronger impact may be, at first blush, puzzling. A firm associated to a sanctioned individual technically can mitigate that linkage by, e.g. forcing the individual to sell stake or remove from board or management. A firm that is explicitly sanctioned by name has no such recourse. It is possible that "de-risking" may be impacting all firms in that sector, and not just targeted ones. In the case of Russia sanctions, we found the set of firms explicitly targeted via blocking/restrictive sanctions are clustered in the weapons manufacturing and finance sectors. Meanwhile, the set of firms associated with sanctioned individuals appear to cover a much wider set of business sectors. This would bias the coefficient on the restrictive sanction treatment toward zero.

We can test for wether this "de-risking" may be occuring by considering coaser granularities on sectors. Defining sectors not by the 4-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes but on NACE's high-level aggregation of 12 groups, Table6 shows the sanctions treatment by type again but using broader sector group definitions. We find that the coefficient for assets becomes

Table 6: Impact by Type of Sanction using Primary Sector Groups

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp
d_Rest	-0.0353***	0.1822	-0.1742*	-0.0616
	(0.009)	(0.115)	(0.089)	(0.065)
d_Assoc	-0.0392***	-0.5078***	-0.8879***	-0.5073***
	(0.008)	(0.121)	(0.086)	(0.071)
d_Sect	-0.0210***	-0.5013***	-0.9773***	-0.6662***
	(0.003)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.028)
Observations	401,015	93,574	146,693	136,358
R-squared	0.667	0.898	0.884	0.855

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_Rest, d_Assoc, and d_Sect are dummies capturing when a firm faces restrictive sanctions, sanctions via association with a sanctioned individual, or sectoral sanctions respectively. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, Assets log Total Asset Holdings, and Emp log Total Number of Employees.

negative and marginally significant, suggest some "de-risking" away from sectors in which explicitly sanctioned entities operate. However, magnitudes still remain below that for associated and sectoral sanctions.

5.2.4 Regression on Targets and their Subsidiaries

Using BvD ownership data, we also split the impact of sanctions on explicitly named firms/individuals vs. on the subsidiaries of those targets that are implicitly sanctioned via the 50% Rule. Also, we consider the impact on any subsidiaries that are minority (less than 50 percent) owned by the sanctioned firm/individual and are therefore technically not sanctioned.

We find in Table 7 that the impact on implicitly sanctioned entities is also negative and statistically signicant, with magnitudes comparable to that of explicit sanctions. Also, the impact on minority-owned subsidiaries is also negative and statistically signicant, with magnitudes moderately less (and not statistically different) than that for explicitly and

Table 7: Impact by Ownership Level

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp	
d_Sanc_Exp	-0.0299***	-0.3138***	-0.7268***	-0.3821***	
	(0.006)	(0.119)	(0.088)	(0.064)	
d_Sanc_Imp	-0.0309***	-0.3004***	-0.6865***	-0.4461***	*Notes: Robust standard*
	(0.004)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.030)	
d_Sanc_Min	-0.0170***	-0.2949***	-0.7051***	-0.3747***	
	(0.006)	(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.054)	
Observations	401,120	93,999	147,190	136,859	
R-squared	0.675	0.900	0.887	0.863	

errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_Active and d_Sanc are dummies capturing when firms are active and sanctioned respectively. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, lAssets log Total Asset Holdings, and lEmp log Total Number of Employees. We keep all firms in our sample including those minority-held subsidiaries of explicitly sanctioned firms that are not implicitly sanctioned as they fall below the 50% ownership threshold.

implicitly sanctioned targets. This may be evidence that counter-parties may be finding it challenging to distinguish between those subsidiaries that are implicitly sanctioned vs. those that are not, and are "de-risking" against any subsidiary.

5.3   Strategic Firms and State Shielding

Columns 1 through 4 of Table 8 shows our headline regressions repeated after controlling for state shielding by having an interaction term between the sanctions treatment and whether the firm is strategic. We find that the headline impact remains negative and highly statistically significant, but that the interaction term is also positive and statistically significant.

We find that if a firm is strategic, the predicted negative impact on both the probability of bankruptcy and Operating Revenue is entirely negated. Meanwhile, the impact on Assets and on Employment is reduced by about one-half, although the mitigating impact on Employment is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of our model whereby the target regime may have an incentive to

Table 8: Sanctions on Strategic and Non-Strategic Firms

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp
d_Sanc	-0.0303***	-0.3099***	-0.7080***	-0.4355***
	(0.003)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.030)
d_Sanc_Strat	0.0375***	0.2999**	0.3189***	0.2117*
	(0.014)	(0.144)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Observations	398,715	92,896	145,920	135,685
R-squared	0.665	0.897	0.884	0.855

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_Active and d_Sanc are dummies capturing when firms are active and sanctioned respectively. d_Sanc_Strat is an interaction term capturing when a firm is both sanctioned and strategic. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, lAssets log Total Asset Holdings, and lEmp log Total Number of Employees.

make transfers to sanctioned entities in order to "shield" them from bankruptcy and maintain the continued flow of goods and services to the government. Furthermore, the weaker impact on employment is consistent with our theoretical model above if employment can proxy for output. This is also consistent with the anecdotal evidence of government shielding of firms deemed sensitive for economic, political, or national security reasons.

This sword vs. shield effect has significant policy implications for the sanctioning government. On the one hand, shielding may mitigate the tactical benefit of imposing concentrated economic harm upon an entity or individual doing behavior undesirable to the sanctioning regime. On the other hand, by shielding the firm, the target government is transfering the economic harm away from and onto its own balance sheet, with strategic dividends if the ultimate policy goal of the sanctioning government is to modify the objective function of the target regime. Indeed, from this perspective, shielding may be precisely the desired outcome of the sanctioning government and strategic firms are thus a target-rich environment for sanctions policy practionners seeking to incentivize a chance in state behavior.[16]

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[16]Private discussions by the authors with ex-U.S. senior government officials closely involved in U.S. sanctions against Russia confirm the calculated targeting of firms that the Russian government both could and would shield.

5.4 Robustness Checks

5.4.1 Parallel Trends and Matching Estimation

Our difference-in-differences methodology relies on the parallel trends assumption, i.e., that targeted firms would have experienced the same average change in performance as their non-targeted peers (same sector and country) had they not been targeted. This assumption could be violated if, for example, targeted companies tend to grow more slowly than non-targeted peers for reasons other than sanctions. It seems unlikely that there is an inherent bias for slow-growing firms in the sender government's choice of targets; however, it is something to explore.

Table 9: Placebo Test, DID and Matching Estimation

| | | (1) | (2) | (3) |
VARIABLES		lOpRev	lAsset	lEmp
$dlnX_{pre}$	$everSanc$	0.048	-0.113	0.014
		(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.035)
	Observations	3,185	5,815	4,073
$dlnX_{post}$	$everSanc$	-0.314***	-1.41***	-0.697***
		(0.091)	(0.118)	(0.045)
	Observations	3,640	9,038	7,194
$dlnX_{2013}$	$everSanc$	3.26***	5.90***	2.25***
		(0.114)	(0.132)	(0.051)
	Observations	5,391	12,131	10,132
ATE	$everSanc$	-0.384***	-0.816***	-0.428***
		(0.123)	(0.104)	(0.097)
	Observations	7,699	13,593	13,040

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates indicate the coefficient of ever_Sanc, controlling for sector, country and strategic status. ATE is the average treatment effect over sanction cohorts, using Mahalanobis nearest-neighbor matching on lagged lAsset, strategic status, a small employer dummy (2 employees or less in the previous year), country, and sector group. Sample is restricted to firms that report some data prior to 2014.

We first examine whether targeted firms grew more slowly than non-targeted firms in the years prior to sanctions. For this purpose, we define $dlnX = lnX_{2013} - lnX_{2012}$ for each

$X = OpRev, Asset, Emp$ and regress it on a dummy variable $everSanc$ which is equal to 1 if the firm is sanctioned in any year and zero otherwise, controlling for country, sector and strategic status. The coefficient on $everSanc$ should be statistically insignificant if there is no pre-sanctions bias for slowgrowing firms in target selection. The first row of Table 9 shows this to be the case.[17] By contrast, the second row shows the same regressions with dependent variables $dlnX_{post} = lnX_{2015} - lnX_{2013}$, which produce results in line with our headline fixed effects regressions in levels.

Targeted firms were significantly larger on average in 2013 than their non-targed peers on all three measures, as shown in the third row of Table 9. Hypothetically, if larger firms in 2013 had dimmer growth prospects than smaller firms, conditional on survival, then parallel trends assumption may be violated. To address this concern, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of sanctions on $dlnX_t = lnX_t - lnX_{t-1}$ for each cohort of sanctioned firms t (defined by the first year of sanction) using Mahalanobis nearest-neighbor matching. Specifically, for each cohort t, we match each sanctioned firm with the non-sanctioned firm that is most similar in terms of industry, country and size, measured by lagged log of assets, strategic status and a small employer dummy (2 employees or less in the previous year). The resulting ATEs are averaged across cohorts to produce the ATE shown in last row of Table 9. The ATE indicates that impact of sanctions is to reduce the performance of targeted firms relative to their matched non-targeted peers. For all three performance measures, the ATEs are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and the magnitudes are in line with our headline results reported in Table 1.

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[17]Despite using the historical Ruslana discs from 2010-2012, most of our firms did not report data in 2012. Thus, it is possible that small sample size accounts for the insignificance of the result. However, we continue to find a significant sanctions effect after 2014, even on this restricted sample. The remaining regressions in the table drop all firms that did not report data in 2012 or 2013.

Table 10: Sanctions on Strategic Firms vs. SOEs

VARIABLES	(1) d_Active	(2) lOpRev	(3) lAsset	(4) lEmp
d_Sanc	-0.0302***	-0.3099***	-0.7080***	-0.4355***
	(0.003)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.030)
d_Sanc_Strat	0.0380***	0.3054**	0.3114**	0.2368*
	(0.015)	(0.148)	(0.125)	(0.126)
d_Sanc_SOE	-0.0165	-0.1228	0.1701	-0.2618
	(0.016)	(0.593)	(0.371)	(0.354)
Observations	398,715	92,896	145,920	135,685
R-squared	0.665	0.897	0.884	0.855

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. d_Active and d_Sanc are dummies capturing when firms are active and sanctioned respectively. d_Sanc_Strat is an interaction term capturing when a firm is both sanctioned and strategic. d_Sanc_Strat is an interaction term capturing when a firm is both sanctioned and a state-owned enterprise. lOpRev stands for log Operating Revenue, lAssets log Total Asset Holdings, and lEmp log Total Number of Employees.

5.4.2 State-Owned Enterprises

We also tested to see whether the differences in sanctions impact between strategic and non-strategic firms could be accounted for by the fact that many strategic firms are state-owned enterpises. Presumably, a target state would face different incentivizes to shield a firm if it was also the ultimate owner of the firm. Hence, using BvD ownership data, we constructed a dummy variable d_SOE which activates when the ultimate beneficial owner of a firm is an arm of the Russian government. Table shows that the interaction of the sanctions treatment with the SOE dummy does not seem to have any significant extra explanatory power beyond the strategic dummy.

6 Conclusion

We estimate the impact of sanctions on the performance of sanctioned companies using detailed firm and individual-level data, using the case study of U.S.-EU sanctions against Russia

since 2014 crisis as a natural experiment. We find very significant impacts on sanctioned firms relative to non-sanctioned peers. Thus, targeted sanctions do appear to be "smart", in the sense of hitting those targeted with relatively small collateral damage, despite some evidence of spilloever into non-sanctioned firms.

While assessing whether this concentrated economic damage is sufficient to change Russian government behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest damaging the financial health of firms directly involved in undesirable actions (e.g. an arms manufacturer providing weapons to a conflict) may still have significant tactical benefits.

Furthermore, we documented both theoretically and empirically how the target state may systemically shield some targeted firms deemed to be strategic. This is not a free lunch but merely redirects the economic pain away from the target firm and onto the target regime instead while potentially imposing transactions costs. Therefore, shielding behavior transforms what the tactical benefit of concentrating harm upon a target firm into a strategic benefit by forcing the target government to ultimately absorb the losses.

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
Figure 1: Possible Firm Outcomes

θ

θ^H

Firm viable without contract

$\pi_m = F$

Firm exits

Firm shielded by
government

θ^L

$\pi_m + G - cg = F$

γ

γ^e

Figure 2: Overview of U.S. and EU Targets

As of December 1, 2016:

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union

Figure 3: Targeting Timeline

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, BBC

Figure 4: U.S. SDN and EU Restricted Entites

Aggregate
Total: 121

U.S. SDN Entities

Total: 102

84   18   19

EU Restricted Entities

Total: 37

U.S./EU Overlap

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union

Figure 5: U.S. SDN and EU Restricted Individuals

Political Total: 180

U.S. SDN Individuals (Political)
Total: 104

37   67   76

EU Restricted Individuals (Political)
Total: 143

U.S. SDN Individuals (Business)
Total: 24

20   4   2

EU Restricted Individuals (Business)
Total: 6

Business Total: 26

U.S. and EU
Political + Business
Total = 206

U.S. and EU sanctioned individuals were classified into political figures (e.g. politicians, government officials, etc.) and those with business interests, as recognized in the BvD Orbis database, (e.g. corporate officers, board members, shareholders).

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, Bureau van Dijk, Authors' Calculations

Figure 6: U.S. SDN and EU Associated Companies

Aggregate
Total: 268

Associated Companies to U.S. SDN Individuals

Associated Companies to EU Restricted Individuals

Total: 242

145   97   26

Total: 123

Then, for those individuals classified as business figures, we collected all firms to which the individuals have or have had a business "association", e.g. a corporate officer, a director, a board member, shareholders, etc., according to the BvD Orbis database.

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, Bureau van Dijk, Authors' Calculations

Figure 7: U.S. SSI and EU Sectoral Sanctioned Entities

Aggregate
Total: 238

U.S. SSI Entities

EU Sectoral Sanctions

Total: 232

218   14   6*

Total: 20

This chart displays the overlap between those entities <u>explicitly</u> listed by the U.S. and EU governments as facing sectoral restrictions on certain transactions and technology transfers. However, both the U.S. and EU follow a 50% ownership rule whereby those subsidiaries 50% or more owned, directly or indirectly, by an explicitly sanctioned entity, also face the same sanctions.

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, Bureau van Dijk, Authors' Calculations
*4 of 6 EU sectorally sanctioned entities are not in U.S. SSI List, but are in U.S. SDN List

Figure 8: U.S. Targeted Sanctions

U.S. SDN Entities
Total: 102

Aggregate
Total: 538

72

U.S. SDN Associated
Companies
Total: 242

29   0

1

205   7   224

U.S. SSI
Total: 232

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, Bureau van Dijk, Authors' Calculations
* This intersection includes a company Technopromexport that was designated on the U.S. SSI List (3/20/14) and the U.S. SDN List (12/19/14)

Figure 9: EU Targeted Sanctions

EU Restricted Entities
Total: 37

Aggregate
Total: 175

36

EU Restricted
Associated Companies
Total: 123

0   0

1

119   3   16

EU Sectoral
Sanctions List
Total: 20

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, Bureau van Dijk, Authors' Calculations
*This intersection includes a company Almaz-Antey that was designated on the EU Restrictive Measures List (7/30/14), the EU Sectoral Sanctions List (9/8/14), and is associated with Sergei Chemezov who is a sanctioned individual.

39

Figure 10: Strategic Firms

Backbone
Total: 201

Aggregate
Total: 374

176

Systemic Bank

0   24

1

33   1   139

Security

Total: 35

Total: 165

Source: Government of the Russian Federation

Figure 11: Sanctioned vs. Strategic Firms

Aggregate
Total: 878

Sanctioned
Companies

Strategic
Companies

Total: 584

544   40   334

Total: 374

Source: U.S. Treasury OFAC, Council of the European Union, Government of the Russian Federation