A SIMPLER THEORY OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXATION

Emmanuel Saez
Stefanie Stantcheva

Working Paper 22664
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22664

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
September 2016

We thank Robert Barro, Emmanuel Farhi, Louis Kaplow, Thomas Piketty, Matthew Weinzierl, Ivan Werning, and numerous seminar participants for useful discussions and comments. We acknowledge financial support from the MacArthur Foundation, and the Center for Equitable Growth at UC Berkeley. We thank Nina Roussille for research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

© 2016 by Emmanuel Saez and Stefanie Stantcheva. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
ABSTRACT

This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics following the methodology of optimal labor income taxation. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a simple and transparent optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences (as in the optimal labor income tax theory). These formulas have the advantage of being easily taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to a much broader class of utility functions and models. The same types of formulas carry over.

Emmanuel Saez
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
530 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720
and NBER
saez@econ.berkeley.edu

Stefanie Stantcheva
Department of Economics
Littauer Center 232
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
sstantcheva@fas.harvard.edu
1 Introduction

The public debate has long featured an important controversy about the proper level of capital taxation. Arguments typically center around an equity-efficiency trade-off: who owns the capital and how strongly would capital react to higher taxes? Away from this simple trade-off, the economics literature has developed dynamic, complex models, which have emphasized different results depending on the structure of individual preferences and shocks, the government’s objective, and the policy tools available.

Bridging the gap between economic theory and the policy debate seems especially important in the current context with growing income and wealth inequality and where a large fraction of top incomes comes from capital income (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Saez and Zucman, 2016).

Optimal labor income tax theory appears to have been more successful in providing clear policy guidance. Key reasons for this success have likely been, first, the use of a simple static model that can still capture long-run responses to taxation abstracting from transitional dynamics and, second, the close link between theoretical formulas and empirical work on responses to taxation (see Piketty and Saez (2013a) for a recent survey).

The goal of this paper is to connect the theory of capital taxation to the public policy debate by deriving robust optimal capital tax formulas expressed in terms of estimable elasticities and distributional parameters. The aim is to build a model which generates an empirically realistic response of capital to taxes (e.g.: non infinite elasticities to taxes), is sufficiently tractable, but general enough to generate results which will be robust to a broader set of models.

We start in Section 2 with the simplest model that has a steady-state with finite elasticities of capital to taxes and instantaneous transitional dynamics. Finite elasticities are necessary to obtain non-degenerate optimal capital formulas.\textsuperscript{1} Transitional dynamics arise from consumption smoothing due to concave utility. While very useful to analyze insurance issues (as in the New Dynamic Public Finance literature),\textsuperscript{2} this aspect is less important for thinking about taxation of top incomes, where most of the capital is concentrated, and long-run taxation. In this case,

\textsuperscript{1}The magnitude of capital income elasticities is an empirical question. Our model nests the case of infinite steady state elasticities from earlier models as a special case.

\textsuperscript{2}See for instance Farhi and Werning (2013b), Golosov et al. (2006), or Stantcheva (2012).
optimal capital tax theory becomes like optimal labor tax theory. Both labor income and capital income decisions are dynamic in reality, and it is possible to think about capital abstracting from transitional dynamics as is done in optimal labor tax theory.\footnote{Indeed responses of labor to taxes are also part of a dynamic decision process if we acknowledge longer-term and slowly adjusting margins such as occupational choice and human capital acquisition. Two strands of the literature have thought of labor taxation in a dynamic way: the heterogeneous agents macro literature as in Jones et al. (1993) and the modern New Dynamic Public Finance literature with Kapicka (2013) or Stantcheva (2012). While providing very useful insights, it has been more challenging to use this theory for policy guidance. The missing piece in optimal capital tax theory is a static approach that abstracts from transitional dynamics and as was adopted for labor income following the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971).} This abstraction will allow us to highlight the main forces that should drive capital taxes and which are often obscured in more complex settings.

This simple model is a standard continuous time model with the following two ingredients: First, individuals derive utility from wealth to obtain a steady-state with finite supply elasticities of capital.\footnote{Other possible modeling devices would be introducing uncertainty as in the Aiyagari (1995) model or discount rates that depend on consumption (as in Judd (1985)). We argue that utility of wealth is much simpler and more realistic. In Section 4 we consider these alternative models.} Second, utility of consumption is linear so that there are no consumption smoothing issues and individual responses to tax changes are immediate.\footnote{Anticipated tax reforms do not create any effect until they actually take place, which greatly simplifies the analysis by eliminating the need to model anticipation effects and expectations about policy (unlike in the Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) theory where unanticipated capital taxes are desirable while pre-announced long-distance capital taxes are not).} While we generalize this model later on, the simpler version is extremely tractable and amenable to studying a wide range of issues about optimal capital taxation, such as nonlinear capital taxation, income shifting, cross-elasticities between capital and labor income, consumption taxation and others.\footnote{This model becomes isomorphic to the standard static optimal labor income tax model. Even the simpler theory of optimal labor taxation started to become understandable when using utility functions linear in consumption (as shown by the pathbreaking study of Diamond (1998)).}

Using our new and tractable framework, we obtain four main results. First, we derive formulas for optimal linear and nonlinear capital income taxation that have exactly the same form as the traditional optimal labor income tax formulas. They can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of the supply of capital income with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return, the shape of the capital income distribution, and the social welfare weights at each capital income level. We show how these formulas can easily be augmented to take into account joint-preferences and cross-elasticities between capital and labor, economic growth, heterogeneous returns to capital
across individuals, and different types of capital assets and heterogeneous tastes for each of them.

Second, we derive a formula for the optimal tax on comprehensive income (labor plus capital income) that takes exactly the same form as the traditional optimal labor income formula. This justifies the use of the optimal labor income formulas to discuss optimal income taxation as has been done (without rigorous justification) in a number of studies (e.g., Diamond and Saez (2011)). The comprehensive income tax is the fully optimal tax if there is perfectly elastic income shifting between the labor and capital income bases.

Third, we can analyze consumption taxation in this model as well by making the assumption that real wealth (i.e., the purchasing power of wealth) enters individual utilities. In this case, a consumption tax makes people accumulate more nominal wealth so that their steady-state real wealth is unchanged. Hence, consumption taxation ends up being equivalent to labor taxation plus an initial wealth levy. It is thus not a sufficient tool to address capital inequality. The social welfare criterion required to justify a pure labor tax (or equivalently a pure consumption tax) is that all inequalities in capital are fair, which is a very strong requirement.

Fourth, our approach is very amenable to considering a broader range of justice and fairness principles related to capital taxation, through the use of generalized social welfare weights as in Saez and Stantcheva (2016). If differences in capital are considered fully fair (i.e., the generalized social welfare weights are uncorrelated with capital and capital is not a tag) the optimal capital tax is zero.\footnote{We can also capture horizontal equity preferences, which take priority over vertical equity considerations and which penalize systems that treat people with the same ability to pay differently (following the theory laid out by Saez and Stantcheva (2016)). The key question is then what the best measure of ability to pay is. If it is total income, then as long as no tax rate cut on either labor income only or capital income only can increase tax revenue, a tax on comprehensive income is optimal.}

In Section 3, we put our formula in sufficient statistics to use by calibrating optimal taxes based on U.S. tax data on labor and capital income. Because capital income is much more concentrated than labor income, we find that the top tax rate on capital income should be higher than the top tax rate on labor income (as long as the supply elasticities of labor and capital with respect to tax rates are the same).

In Section 4, we show that the tax formulas obtained in the specific model of Section 2 carry
over to a much broader class of models, including many of the models with concave utility for consumption used in the previous literature on capital income, as long as the elasticity of the capital income tax base is appropriately defined. Qualitatively, the lessons and intuitions from the simpler model still apply. If responses of capital to taxes are very fast, then the quantitative implications of our simpler model are also still valid. If responses are slower, the elasticity of capital to taxes builds up slowly over time which improves the equity-efficiency trade-off from the government’s point of view in the short-run and leads to higher optimal capital taxes.\(^8\)

**Related work on capital taxation:** Our paper is related to a long-standing literature studying capital taxation.

The stark result in Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) – that in the long-run the optimal capital tax should be zero– arises because the anticipation elasticity to a long-run tax increase is infinite (see Piketty and Saez (2013b) and our Appendix). This result has generated a stream of subsequent work aimed at exploring its robustness to alternative settings and assumptions.\(^9\)

Aiyagari (1995) introduced uncertainty, which generates a finite anticipatory elasticity of capital and positive optimal capital taxes. We precisely compare our findings to these benchmark models in Section 4. Farhi (2010) considers the role of incomplete markets for capital taxation. Piketty and Saez (2013b) study bequest taxation while Piketty and Saez (2012) study capital taxation and show that the Chamley-Judd result does not apply when elasticities are finite and there is two-dimensional heterogeneity in both capital (or bequest) and labor income. Farhi and Werning (2013a) consider estate taxation with heterogeneous altruism, and their setup highlights the similarity between labor income and capital (in their case, estate) taxation. Our paper builds upon their important insight.

Two more recent strands of the literature take a complementary approach to ours. Within the Ramsey tradition, Conesa et al. (2008) quantitatively show that optimal capital taxes in an overlapping generations model with uncertainty are positive. The new dynamic public finance literature following Golosov et al. (2003) explores in detail the role of idiosyncratic shocks and

\(^8\)Whether exploiting the sluggishness of capital in the short-run to set higher taxes is a sound approach to optimal policy is questionable.

\(^9\)In a recent paper, Straub and Werning (2015) call into question the validity of the Chamley-Judd result.
the resulting insurance problem that individuals and the government face. Papers by Farhi and Werning (2013b), Golosov et al. (2006), among others, shed light on the life-cycle patterns and insurance role of capital taxation. Our approach ignores such insurance issues and hence can be seen as complementary to the New Dynamic Public Finance. We also abstract from issues of political economy, which shape the role of capital taxation in Farhi et al. (2012).

Following Golosov et al. (2014), we take a variational approach and abstract from uncertainty in order to focus on the key trade-offs. Their important contribution allows us to express the elasticities in our formulas in terms of the underlying structural elasticities.

All proofs are in the Appendix and various extensions are gathered in the Online Appendix.

2 A Simpler Model of Capital Taxation

In this section, we present a simpler model of capital taxation. The key simplification comes from having utility linear in consumption, which short-cuts transitional dynamics. The key additional component is to introduce wealth in the utility, which allows for smooth responses of capital to taxation. This model usefully highlights the key efficiency-equity trade-off for capital taxation, often obscured in more complex models.

2.1 Model Setup

Time is continuous. Individual \( i \) has instantaneous utility with functional form \( u_i(c, k, z) = c + a_i(k) - h_i(z) \), linear in consumption \( c \), increasing in wealth \( k \) with \( a_i(k) \) increasing and concave, and with a disutility cost \( h_i(z) \) of earning income \( z \) increasing and convex in \( z \). The individual index \( i \) can capture any arbitrary heterogeneity in the preferences for work and wealth, as well as in the discount rate \( \delta_i \). We justify the assumption of wealth in the utility in great detail below. The discounted utility of \( i \) from an allocation \( \{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0} \) is:

\[
V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = \delta_i \cdot \int_0^\infty [c_i(t) + a_i(k_i(t)) - h_i(z_i(t))] e^{-\delta_i t} dt.
\] (1)
We normalize utility by the discount rate $\delta_i$ so that an extra unit of consumption in perpetuity increases utility by one unit uniformly across all individuals. The net return on capital is $r$. At time 0, initial wealth of individual $i$ is $k_i^{\text{init}}$. For any given time-invariant tax schedule $T(z, rk)$ based on labor and capital incomes, the budget constraint of individual $i$ is:

$$\frac{dk_i(t)}{dt} = rk_i(t) + z_i(t) - T(z_i(t), rk_i(t)) - c_i(t). \quad (2)$$

$T'_L(z, rk) \equiv \partial T(z, rk)/\partial z$ denotes the marginal tax with respect to labor income and $T'_K(z, rk) \equiv \partial T(z, rk)/\partial (rk)$ denotes the marginal tax with respect to capital income.

The Hamiltonian of individual $i$ at time $t$, with co-state $\lambda_i(t)$ on the budget constraint, is:

$$H_i(c_i(t), z_i(t), k_i(t), \lambda_i(t)) = c_i(t) + a_i(k_i(t)) - h_i(z_i(t)) + \lambda_i(t) \cdot [rk_i(t) + z_i(t) - T(z_i(t), rk_i(t)) - c_i(t)].$$

Taking the first order conditions, the choice $(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))$ is such that:

$$\lambda_i(t) = 1, \quad h'_i(z_i(t)) = 1 - T'_L(z_i(t), rk_i(t)), \quad a'_i(k_i(t)) = \delta_i - r(1 - T'_K(z_i(t), rk_i(t))),$$

and

$$c_i(t) = rk_i(t) + z_i(t) - T(z_i(t), rk_i(t)).$$

In this model, $(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))$ jumps immediately to its steady-state value $(c_i, k_i, z_i)$ characterized by $h'_i(z_i) = 1 - T'_L, a'_i(k_i) = \delta_i - r(1 - T'_K), c_i = rk_i + z_i - T(z_i, rk_i)$. This is achieved by a Dirac quantum jump in consumption at instant $t = 0$, so as to bring the wealth level from the initial $k_i^{\text{init}}$ to the steady state value $k_i$. Because of this immediate adjustment and the lack of transition dynamics, we have that:

$$V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = [c_i + a_i(k_i) - h_i(z_i)] + \delta_i \cdot (k_i^{\text{init}} - k_i),$$

where the last term $(k_i^{\text{init}} - k_i)$ represents the utility cost of going from wealth $k_i^{\text{init}}$ to wealth $k_i$ at instant 0, achieved by the quantum Dirac jump in consumption.

**Heterogeneous wealth preferences and a smooth steady state.** Wealth accumulation
in this model depends on the heterogeneous individual preferences, as embodied in the taste for wealth $a_i(\cdot)$ and in the impatience $\delta_i$. It also depends on the net-of-tax return $\bar{r} = r(1 - T'_K(z, r_k))$: capital taxes discourage wealth accumulation through a substitution effect (there are no income effects). Because of a possibly arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences for capital, steady state wealth holdings are heterogeneous across individuals and capital exhibits a smooth behavior in the steady state, with a finite elasticity to taxes.

The wealth-in-the-utility feature puts a limit on individuals’ impatience to consume. Intuitively, with linear consumption and no utility for wealth, the individual would like to consume all his wealth at once at time 0 (if $\delta_i > \bar{r}$). With utility of wealth, there is value of keeping some wealth. At the margin, the value lost in delaying consumption $\delta_i - \bar{r}$ is equal to the marginal value of holding wealth $a'_i(k)$ and the optimum for capital holding is interior. Note that we need to impose the condition that $\delta_i > \bar{r}$ for all individuals to avoid wealth going to infinity.\(^{10}\)

**Justifying wealth in the utility.** There are three arguments in favor of including wealth in the utility.

The technical reason for it is that the standard dynamic model with only utility for consumption leads to a degenerate steady state, where $\delta_i = \delta = \bar{r}$. This precludes heterogeneity in time preferences and implies an infinite elasticity of capital to taxes in the steady-state. Introducing utility for wealth appears to be the simplest, intuitive and most tractable way to smooth the model and obtain a non-degenerate steady state. It is, however, not the only way and our derived tax formulas – expressed in terms of sufficient statistics – do not depend on it. Indeed, in section 4, we discuss two other assumptions used in the literature to obtain non-degenerate (and more realistic) responses of capital to taxes: introducing uncertainty, as in Aiyagari (1995), or consumption-dependent discount rates $\delta_i(c_i)$ as in Judd (1985).

Second, and more fundamentally, there are many reasons to think that wealth brings utility benefits, above and beyond the sheer consumption flow that can be bought with it. It may in fact be too restrictive to assume that people only care about the consumption flow from wealth.

That there must be other benefits from wealth was already recognized by Weber, Keynes

---

\(^{10}\) In practice, wealth does not go to infinity because of shocks to the rate of return or to preferences (Piketty (2011, 2014)). The treatment of the case with uncertainty is relegated to Section 4.
and Smith among others. Max Weber called the phenomenon of individuals valuing wealth *per se* the “capitalist spirit” (Weber, 1958).\(^{11}\) Keynes (1931) regretted people’s “love of money as a possession.” In Keynes (1919), he also lamented that “the duty of saving became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of true religion,” the cake being total wealth. Even more important was his observation that saving was seemingly only done for the sake of holding wealth. “Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory—the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.”

The non-consumption rewards from wealth—which our wealth-in-the-utility specification captures in a reduced-form way—can be grouped as follows:

(i) *Social status:* Wealth can bring direct utility flow if people care about social status, which is positively linked to wealth. That wealth lent social status and moral prestige was already lamented by Smith (1759).\(^{12}\) Wealth can be perceived as a measure of how well one performs in one’s job and how able and successful one is. It can be a very visible—even ostentatious—signal of one’s innate abilities and strengths.\(^{13}\)

(ii) *Power and political influence:* Wealthier households weigh disproportionately in the electoral process (Gilens, 2012).\(^{14}\) In business, ownership of capital is often directly legally linked to power: e.g: one receives voting rights from owning shares in a company.

(iii) *Philanthropy and moral recognition:* Wealth allows people to endow institutions, engage in large-scale charitable foundations and philanthropy and receive social and moral recognition for it. It allows them to target their givings to causes that they most care about, and, through donations to the arts or to universities also permits leaving one’s mark in history (e.g., endowing

---

\(^{11}\)Weber (1958) viewed it as a result of Protestant values promoting saving, frugality, and capital accumulation.

\(^{12}\)“This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, [...] is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue: and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages.”

\(^{13}\)Christophera and Schlenker (2000) show in a randomized experiment, that people perceived to be wealthier are also perceived to be more able and talented (see also Dittmar (1992)).

\(^{14}\)Kalla and Broockman (2016) show in a randomized experiment that higher donations lead to more access to politicians. Rossi (2014) uses random assignment of plots of land (i.e., wealth) to households around Buenos Aires and finds that those with more valuable land have a higher chance of gaining subsequent political power.
(iv) Entrepreneurship and wealth management: Wealth may be used by entrepreneurs to invest in their businesses. In this case, instead of having a positive utility for wealth as in our basic model, \( a_i(k) \) would be negative and would represent a disutility cost of running a business of size \( k \). For instance, if \( a_i(k) = -\eta_i k_i^\gamma / \gamma \) with \( \gamma > 1 \), entrepreneurs would chose a capital level such that: \( \bar{r} = \delta_i + \eta_i k_i^{\gamma-1} \). The same type of arguments can be made for an individual actively managing a wealth portfolio, which may also require a cost of time or utility, but yields a return.\(^{16}\)

In either of these cases, there are more utility flows from holding wealth than simply the direct consumption enjoyment.\(^{17}\)

Third, there is no compelling empirical evidence that a model with only utility for consumption captures microeconomic behavior better than the model with wealth in the utility. Quite the contrary, the very large wealth inequalities observed in the data are hard to reconcile with a model without “the capitalist spirit.” Carroll (2000) compares several life-cycle models and argues that a model in which wealthier households save to finance future consumption (even if they were to be more patient) cannot explain well the very high wealth holdings at the top of the wealth distribution. That households want to keep wealth for purposes other than consumption is also suggested by behavior in retirement: very little wealth is annuitized, especially among the very wealthy, many assets are still available at death, and indeed, wealthy households do not appear to be rapidly de-accumulating wealth closer to their death. Furthermore, Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) show that, among a sample of US elderly single households, about four-fifths of their net wealth will be bequeathed but only half of this is due to a bequest motive. A model in which wealth is intrinsically desirable or yields flows of non-consumption utility such as those listed above can better explain the data.\(^{18}\) Note that a bequest motive in which parents care

---

\(^{15}\)The targeting and social recognition achieved are arguably what makes private philanthropy – and the wealth accumulation it requires – much more attractive to the wealthy than government redistribution.

\(^{16}\)Conversely, \( a_i(k) > 0 \) and increasing in \( k \) could represented non-pecuniary benefits from owning a business or managing a portfolio.

\(^{17}\)Kurz (1968) and Zou (1995) are two other models which include directly wealth in the utility. A more recent example is the business-cycle model of Michaillat and Saez (2015).

\(^{18}\)Francis (2009) also shows using numerical simulations that a model with “spirit of capitalism” can much better explain the highly unequal wealth distribution in the U.S. than standard preferences.
about the warm glow benefit from bequests – and do not altruistically care about the welfare of their children – would generate a wealth-in-the-utility component like ours.

**Instant adjustments to the steady state and equivalence to the static model.** With utility linear in consumption, there are no consumption smoothing considerations. As a result, all dynamic adjustments occur instantaneously and there are no transitional dynamics.

The dynamic model of equation (1) is mathematically equivalent to a static representation. I.e., the optimal choice \((c_i, k_i, z_i)\) from the dynamic problem also maximizes the static utility equivalent:

\[
U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i) = c_i + a_i(k_i) - h_i(z_i) + \delta_i \cdot (k_i^{\text{init}} - k_i),
\]

subject to the static budget constraint 
\(c_i = r k_i + z_i - T(z_i, r k_i)\).

Therefore a social welfare objective based on the original discounted utility \(V_i\) from equation (1) is equivalent to a social welfare objective based on the static equivalent \(U_i\) from equation (3). It also seems natural to impose a constraint \(k \geq 0\) for those who do not like wealth (i.e., who have \(a_i(k) \equiv 0\)). Such individuals optimally choose \(k = 0\) and behave entirely like in the static labor supply model.

**Announced vs. unannounced tax reforms:** With linear utility of consumption and the resulting lack of transitional dynamics, announced and unannounced tax reforms have exactly the same effect. If at time \(t = 0\) a capital tax reform is announced to take place at time \(T\), there is no behavioral response until the actual time of the reform. At time \(T\), the capital stock jumps to its new steady level thanks to a Dirac quantum jump in consumption, exactly as in the unannounced tax reform case. The same optimal taxes apply in the short-run and long-run. As a result, as long as the tax on the return to capital is bounded (e.g. limited to 100%), issues of policy commitment and policy discretion are irrelevant in our model.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)There is no temptation to increase the tax rate on capital returns unannounced, as individuals adjust instantaneously, so that the gain from such a tax hike goes to zero. If unanticipated wealth levies are allowed then the capital stock can always be expropriated. In our time continuous model, a wealth levy can be approximated by an infinite tax on capital income for an infinitesimal time. If the capital tax rate is bounded (say at 100%), wealth levies are ruled out. If wealth levies are anticipated, they can be fully avoided in our model with a
Isomorphism of labor and capital taxation. The isomorphism of capital taxation with labor taxation (in the case of no income effects) is here apparent. A model of the form: $U_i = c_i + a_i(k_i) + \delta_i \cdot (k_i^{init} - k_i)$ with $c_i = rK(k_i) + z_i$ (taking $z_i$ as exogenous) is mathematically isomorphic to a static labor income model: $u_i(c_i, z_i) = c_i - h_i(z_i)$ with $c_i = z_i - T_L(z_i)$. Standard labor income tax analysis, such as in Mirrlees (1971) also abstracts from transitional dynamics and turns the labor supply decision into a static one. In reality, labor income decisions are far from instantaneous as they depend on dynamic human capital accumulation or occupational choices. Building human capital is akin to building physical capital. Our model allows to bypass transitional dynamics simplifying greatly optimal tax analysis, much like the analysis in Mirrlees (1971) greatly simplified labor tax analysis.

The key takeaway is that – when it comes to taxation questions– labor is not that different from capital and the differences are differences of degree rather than of kind. The same key considerations of equity and efficiency that drive labor taxation also drive capital taxation. Most arguments given in the public debate about the differences between capital and labor are quantitative, and not qualitative differences. For instance, it may well be that capital is more reactive to tax rates, and that can be captured by a higher elasticity of capital to taxes. It is also the case that capital is more concentrated which will appear clearly in the income distribution factors entering optimal tax formulas below.

### 2.2 Optimal Tax Formulas

The government sets the time invariant tax $T(z, rK)$, subject to budget-balance, to maximize its social objective:

$$SWF = \int \omega_i \cdot U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i)di,$$

where $\omega_i \geq 0$ is the Pareto weight on individual $i$. We denote by $g_i = \omega_i \cdot U_{ic}$ the social marginal welfare weight on individual $i$. With utility linear in consumption, we have $g_i = \omega_i$. Without suitable Dirac quantum consumption just before the wealth levy followed by a corresponding Dirac quantum saving just after the wealth levy.
loss of generality, we further normalize the weights to sum to one over the population so that \( \int \omega_i di = 1 \). We first consider linear taxes and then turn to nonlinear taxes.

### 2.2.1 Optimal Linear Capital and Labor Taxation

We start by studying the optimal linear taxes at rates \( \tau_K \) and \( \tau_L \) on capital and labor income. Recall that \( \bar{r} \equiv r \cdot (1 - \tau_K) \) denotes the net-of-tax return on capital. The individual maximizing choices are such that

\[
a_i'(k_i) = \delta_i - \bar{r} \quad \text{and} \quad h_i'(z_i) = 1 - \tau_L
\]

so that \( k_i \) depends positively on \( \bar{r} \) and \( z_i \) depends positively on \( 1 - \tau_L \). For budget-balance, tax revenues are rebated lump-sum and the transfer to each individual is

\[
G = \tau_K \cdot r k^m(\bar{r}) + \tau_L \cdot z^m(1 - \tau_L)
\]

where \( z^m(1 - \tau_L) = \int z_i di \) is aggregate labor income that depends on \( 1 - \tau_L \) and \( k^m(\bar{r}) = \int k_i di \) is aggregate capital which depends on \( \bar{r} \). The government chooses \( \tau_K \) and \( \tau_L \) to maximize social welfare \( SWF \) in (4), with

\[
c_i = (1 - \tau_K) \cdot r k_i + (1 - \tau_L) \cdot z_i + \tau_K \cdot r k^m(\bar{r}) + \tau_L \cdot z^m(1 - \tau_L)\]

and

\[
U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i) = c_i + a_i(k_i) - h_i(z_i) + \delta_i \cdot (k_i^{init} - k_i).
\]

Let the elasticity of aggregate capital \( k^m \) with respect to \( \bar{r} \) be denoted by \( e_K \) and the elasticity of aggregate labor income \( z^m \) with respect to the net of tax rate \( 1 - \tau_L \) be \( e_L \). Because there are no income effects, we have \( e_L > 0 \) and \( e_K > 0 \). Standard optimal tax derivations using the individuals' envelope theorems for the choice \( k_i \) yield:

\[
\frac{dSWF}{d\tau_K} = r k^m \cdot \left[ \int \omega_i \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{k_i}{k^m} \right) di - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \cdot e_K \right]
\]

The social marginal welfare weight on individual \( i \) is \( g_i = \omega_i \). At the optimal \( \tau_K \), we have \( dSWF/d\tau_K = 0 \), leading to the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** *Optimal linear capital tax.* The optimal linear capital tax is given by:

\[
\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_K + e_K} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g}_K = \frac{\int g_i \cdot k_i}{\int k_i} \quad \text{and} \quad e_K = \frac{\bar{r} \cdot \frac{dk^m}{d\bar{r}}}{k^m} > 0.
\]  

(5)

The optimal labor tax can be derived exactly symmetrically:

\[
\tau_L = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_L}{1 - \bar{g}_L + e_L} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g}_L = \frac{\int g_i \cdot z_i}{\int z_i} \quad \text{and} \quad e_L = \frac{1 - \tau_L}{z^m} \cdot \frac{dz^m}{d(1 - \tau_L)} > 0.
\]  

(6)
Remarks:

The optimal capital tax is zero if $\bar{g}_K = 1$ or $e_K = \infty$. $\bar{g}_K = 1$ happens when there are no redistributive concerns along the capital income dimension ($g_i$ is uncorrelated with $k_i$).

We discuss social preferences embodied in the social welfare weights $g_i$ in Section 2.3.1. Briefly, as long as wealth is concentrated among individuals with lower social marginal welfare weights (such that $g_i$ is decreasing in $k_i$ and, hence $\bar{g}_K < 1$) the optimal capital tax is strictly positive.

We can also recover a few benchmark cases. The revenue maximizing tax rates (which arise when $\bar{g}_K = 0$ and $\bar{g}_L = 0$) are

$$\tau^R_K = \frac{1}{1 + e_K} \quad \text{and} \quad \tau^R_L = \frac{1}{1 + e_L}. \quad (7)$$

2.2.2 Optimal Nonlinear Separable Taxes

We now turn to the nonlinear tax system separable in labor and capital income, characterized by the tax schedules $T_L(z)$ and $T_K(rk)$. The individual’s budget constraint is given by:

$$c_i = rk_i - T_K(rk_i) + z_i - T_L(z_i), \quad (8)$$

so that utility is:

$$U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i) = rk_i - T_K(rk_i) + z_i - T_L(z_i) + a_i(k_i) - h_i(z_i) + \delta_i \cdot (k_i^{\text{init}} - k_i). \quad (9)$$

The first-order conditions characterizing the individual’s choice of capital and labor income are:

$$a_i'(k_i) = \delta_i - r(1 - T_K'(rk_i)) \quad \text{and} \quad h_i'(z_i) = 1 - T_L'(z_i).$$

We denote the average relative welfare weight on individuals with capital income higher than $rk$, by $\bar{G}_K(rk)$ and the average relative welfare weight on individuals with labor income higher
than \( z \), by \( \bar{G}_L(z) \):

\[
\bar{G}_K(rk) = \frac{\int_{\{i: r_k i \geq rk\}} g_i di}{P(r_k i \geq rk)} \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{G}_L(z) = \frac{\int_{\{i: z_i \geq z\}} g_i di}{P(z_i \geq z)}.
\] (10)

Let the density distributions of capital and labor income be, respectively, \( h_K(rk) \) and \( h_L(z) \) and the cumulatively distributions be \( H_K(rk) \) and \( H_L(z) \). Define the local Pareto parameters of the capital and labor income distributions as:

\[
\alpha_K(rk) \equiv \frac{rk \cdot h_K(rk)}{1 - H_K(rk)} \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_L(z) \equiv \frac{z \cdot h_L(z)}{1 - H_L(z)}.
\]

Clearly, the income distributions and local Pareto parameters depend on the tax system.\(^{20}\) The local elasticity of \( k \) with respect to the net of tax return \( r(1 - T'_K(rk)) \) at income level \( rk \) is denoted by \( e_K(rk) \), while the local elasticity of \( z \) with respect to \( 1 - T'_L(z) \) is denoted by \( e_L(z) \).

Because wealth and labor choices are separable, due to the lack of income effects and separable preferences, each tax satisfies the standard Mirrlees (1971) formula and can be expressed in terms of elasticities as in Saez (2001), as shown in the next proposition (the proof is in appendix).

**Proposition 2. Optimal nonlinear capital and labor income taxes.**

The optimal nonlinear capital and labor income taxes are:

\[
T'_K(rk) = \frac{1 - \bar{G}_K(rk)}{1 - \bar{G}_K(rk) + \alpha_K(rk) \cdot e_K(rk)} \quad \text{and} \quad T'_L(z) = \frac{1 - \bar{G}_L(z)}{1 - \bar{G}_L(z) + \alpha_L(z) \cdot e_L(z)}.
\] (11)

**Asymptotic Nonlinear Formula.** In Section 3 we show that capital income is very concentrated, with top 1% capital income earners earning more than 60% of total capital income. The

\(^{20}\) Technically, in the definition of the local Pareto parameters, the densities \( h_K(rk) \) and \( h_L(z) \) should be replaced by the “virtual densities” \( h^*_K(rk) \) and \( h^*_L(z) \) defined as the densities at \( rk \) and \( z \) that would arise if the nonlinear tax system were replaced by the linearized tax system at points \( rk \) and \( z \) (see Saez (2001) for complete details).
asymptotic formula when \( rk \to \infty \) in (11) is likely relevant for most of the tax base.

\[
T'_K(\infty) = \frac{1 - \bar{G}_K(\infty)}{1 - \bar{G}_K(\infty) + \alpha_K(\infty) \cdot e_K(\infty)}.
\] (12)

The revenue maximizing rate obtains if \( \bar{G}_K(\infty) = 0 \).

**Optimal linear tax rate in top bracket.** It is also easy to derive a formula for the optimal linear tax rate in the top bracket above a given capital income threshold. The formula takes the standard form \( \tau_{K}^{\text{top}} = (1 - \bar{g}_K^{\text{top}})/(1 - \bar{g}_K^{\text{top}} + \alpha_{K}^{\text{top}} \cdot e_{K}^{\text{top}}) \) with \( \bar{g}_K^{\text{top}} \) the average social marginal welfare weight in the top bracket, \( e_{K}^{\text{top}} \) the elasticity in the top bracket, and \( \alpha_K^{\text{top}} \) the Pareto parameter in the top bracket. The Pareto parameter is defined as \( \alpha_K^{\text{top}} = \frac{E[k_i | k_i \geq k_{\text{top}}]}{E[k_i | k_i \geq k_{\text{top}}] - k_{\text{top}}} \) where \( k_{\text{top}} \) is the threshold for the top bracket. This formula is the same as in labor income tax theory (Saez, 2001). As capital income is so concentrated, it has even wider applicability (see our numerical simulations below).

### 2.3 Topics

We now consider how our framework can shed light on several salient issues in the public debate about capital taxation.

#### 2.3.1 Ethical Considerations

Our approach in terms of sufficient statistics is very amenable to the use of generalized social welfare weights \( g_i \) as in Saez and Stantcheva (2016), which can better capture the normative considerations which are relevant for capital taxation. We discuss four ethical standpoints.\(^{21}\)

**Inequality in wealth deemed unfair:** If inequality in wealth is considered unfair, social welfare weights \( g_i \) are decreasing in \( k_i \). This could be the case if preferences for wealth and higher patience are perceived as a skill that allows some individuals to accumulate more and

\(^{21}\)The generalized social welfare weights are given by \( g_i = g(c_i, k_i, z_i; x_i^b, x_i^s) \) where \( x_i^b \) is a vector of characteristics which enter both utility and the weights, while \( x_i^s \) is a vector of characteristics that only enters the weights. This allows to introduce a gap between individual preferences and social considerations. Hence, it allows for a wider range of normative considerations to be taken into consideration than with standard welfare weights.
be better off in the long-run (in the same way that a higher earning ability allows people to
earn more and be better off in the traditional optimal labor income tax model). In that case,
redistributing from wealth lovers to non-wealth lovers could be deemed socially desirable.\textsuperscript{22} In
this case and considering linear taxes, $\bar{g}_K < 1$ and $\tau_K > 0$.

**Inequality in wealth deemed fair:** Conversely, if inequality in wealth is considered fair and
irrelevant for redistribution, social welfare weights do not depend on $k_i$ and are uncorrelated
with $k_i$. People supporting this view may argue that higher wealth comes from a higher taste
for savings (rather than consuming). It is through sacrificing earlier consumption, that an
individual has accumulated wealth. There is no compelling reason to redistribute “from the
ant to the grasshopper” because the grasshopper could have saved as well. In this case, if we
further assume that wealth $k_i$ is uncorrelated with other characteristics affecting social welfare
weights (see discussion just below), then $\bar{g}_K = 1$ and $\tau_K = 0$.

**Wealth as a tag:** Wealth can be a marker and tag for a characteristic that society cares
about, but that taxes cannot directly condition on. In this case, $g_i$ may not depend on $k_i$
directly (as discussed in the previous paragraph), but is correlated with $k_i$, leading to $\bar{g}_K \neq 1$.
For instance, society may care about equality of opportunity and may want to compensate
people from poorer backgrounds for their initial difficult start in life. Even if society does not
care about tastes for wealth and wealth per se, higher wealth could be a tag for a richer family
background. For example and following Saez and Stantcheva (2016), if $g_i = 1$ for people from a
low background and is zero for others, then $\bar{G}_K(rk)$, the average social welfare weight on those
with capital income above $rk$ will be the representation index of those from a low background
among individuals with capital income above $rk$. If people with high capital income come
disproportionately from wealth backgrounds, then $\bar{G}_K(rk)$ is less than one, leading a positive
nonlinear capital income tax rate using formula (11).

Similarly, wealth can be a tag for earnings ability. Suppose there is inequality in both capital
and labor income, but that the government only cares about the latter, so that $g_i$ only depends
on $z_i$ and $T_L(z_i)$. If capital and labor income are uncorrelated, then $\bar{g}_K = 1$ and the optimal

\textsuperscript{22}The case for this argument may be even stronger if wealth comes from inheritances.
\( \tau_K \) is zero. If they are positively correlated, then \( \tilde{k} < 1 \) and hence \( \tau_K > 0 \): in this case, high wealth individuals also have higher labor income on average, and wealth acts as a form of tag (see Gordon and Kopczuk (2014) for an empirical analysis using such a framework).

**Horizontal equity concerns.** Horizontal equity concerns mean that society does not want to treat differently people with the same “ability to pay.” The key issue, which involves non-trivial value judgements, is to define “ability to pay” is. It could be total income, capital income, labor income, or even the consumption of some particular goods. For instance, should ability to pay be measured by labor income only?

On the affirmative side are those who criticize the “double taxation” of income, first in the form of earned labor income and then in the form of an additional tax on capital income earned on savings out of labor income. In addition “equality of opportunity” type of arguments for savings (as opposed to equality of outcomes, in analogy to labor taxation) state that conditional on a given labor income, everybody has the same opportunities to save. This is the view that the grasshopper and the ant, with the same labor income, simply made different choices the consequences of which they have to bear.

On the negative side, an increase in returns on assets more generally would benefit savers and, conditional on a given labor income, individuals with a strong preference for wealth could end up with much higher incomes in the rate of return on capital is high. Indeed, in conceptual debates about the desirability of taxing capital income in the tax law and economics literature, proponents of the tax tend to use high rate of return scenarios (e.g., Warren (1980)) while opponents tend to use low rate of return scenarios (e.g., Weisbach and Bankman (2006)).

Overall, the most natural concept seems total income \( y = z + rk \). A higher return on capital \( r \) is an advantage for wealth lovers, but this advantage is taken into account in the comprehensive income concept. With strong horizontal equity preferences, this justifies the comprehensive income tax (barring a Pareto improvement of providing a component specific tax break) (see Online Appendix A.3).\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\)An alternative case is if labor income inequality is viewed as fair while capital income inequality is viewed as unfair. In that case, a pure capital income tax should be used first up to revenue maximizing and, only then should a labor tax be added if more revenue is needed.
2.3.2 Economic Growth

Suppose that there is technological progress at an exogenous rate \( g > 0 \), leading to economic growth, so that all per capita variables grow at rate \( g > 0 \). We can perform the normalization that: \( \tilde{z}(t) = z(t)e^{-gt} \), \( \tilde{k}(t) = k(t)e^{-gt} \), \( \tilde{c}(t) = c(t)e^{-gt} \). To sustain a balanced growth path with quasi-linear utility, the sub-utility functions need to take the form \( h_{ti}(z(t)) = e^{gt} \cdot h_i(\tilde{z}(t)) \) and \( a_{ti}(k(t)) = e^{gt} \cdot a_i(\tilde{k}(t)) \). We also assume that \( T_i(z(t), rk(t)) = e^{gt} \cdot T(\tilde{z}(t), r\tilde{k}(t)) \).

The discounted normalized utility should now be written as:

\[
V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = \delta_i \cdot \int_0^\infty [c_i(t) + a_{ti}(k_i(t)) - h_{ti}(z_i(t))]e^{-\delta_i t} dt
\]

\[
= \delta_i \cdot \int_0^\infty [\tilde{c}_i(t) + a_i(\tilde{k}_i(t)) - h_i(\tilde{z}_i(t))]e^{-(\delta_i-g)t} dt.
\]

The budget constraint of individual \( i \) is:

\[
\dot{k}_i(t) = rk_i(t) + z_i(t) - T(z_i(t), rk_i(t)) - c_i(t) \quad \text{i.e.} \quad \dot{k}_i(t) = (r-g)\tilde{k}_i(t) + \tilde{z}_i(t) - T(\tilde{z}_i(t), r\tilde{k}_i(t)) - \tilde{c}_i(t).
\]

Hence, this problem is mathematically equivalent to our earlier problem. Similar derivations show that the normalized solution \( (\tilde{c}_i, \tilde{k}_i, \tilde{z}_i) \) for individual \( i \) at any time \( t > 0 \) is such that:

\[
h'_{i}(\tilde{z}_i) = 1 - T'_{L}(\tilde{z}_i, r\tilde{k}_i) \quad \text{and} \quad a'_{i}(\tilde{k}_i) = \delta_i - r(1 - T'_{K}(\tilde{z}_i, r\tilde{k}_i)) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{c}_i = (r-g)\tilde{k}_i + \tilde{z}_i - T(\tilde{z}_i, r\tilde{k}_i).
\]

The actual levels of \( (c_i, k_i, z_i) \) are then simply equal to: \( (\tilde{c}_i \cdot e^{gt}, \tilde{k}_i \cdot e^{gt}, \tilde{z}_i \cdot e^{gt}) \).

Again, \( (\tilde{k}_i, \tilde{z}_i) \) immediately jumps to its steady-state value through an instantaneous Dirac quantum jump in consumption and wealth at date 0. We have:

\[
V_i(\{\tilde{c}_i, \tilde{k}_i, \tilde{z}_i\}_{t \geq 0}) = \frac{\delta_i}{\delta_i-g} \cdot \left[ \tilde{c}_i + a_i(\tilde{k}_i) - h_i(\tilde{z}_i) + (\delta_i-g) \cdot (k^{init}_i - \tilde{k}_i) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{\delta_i}{\delta_i-g} \cdot \left[ (r-g)\tilde{k}_i + \tilde{z}_i - T(\tilde{z}_i, r\tilde{k}_i) + a_i(\tilde{k}_i) - h_i(\tilde{z}_i) \right] + \delta_i \cdot (k^{init}_i - \tilde{k}_i)
\]

Therefore, with growth, maintaining normalized wealth \( \tilde{k}_i \) requires saving \( g \cdot \tilde{k}_i \) in perpetuity, hereby lowering consumption by \( g \cdot \tilde{k}_i \).
Intuitively, with economic growth, maintaining a given level of normalized wealth (put differently, a given wealth per capita) requires higher savings and hence reduced consumption. Suppose the economy moves from $g = 0$ to $g > 0$ at time $t_0$. At time $t_0$, there is no jump in wealth as normalized wealth is not affected by $g$. The equation for $V_i$ above shows that wealth lovers (who choose a high $\tilde{k}_i$) gain relatively less than non wealth lovers (who choose for example $\tilde{k}_i = 0$). Economic growth benefits those with no capital more than wealth lovers owning capital.

Let us consider linear taxes on capital for simplicity, with again $\bar{r} = r(1 - \tau_K)$. If $\bar{r} < g$, then wealth lovers would hold more wealth, but have lower consumption than those with less wealth. Conversely, if $\bar{r} > g$, then wealth lovers would hold more wealth and also have higher consumption. In a world in which society disregards wealth per se and cares mostly about consumption (i.e., social welfare weights are based on consumption $c$ only), $\bar{r}_K = 1 - g/r$ may be a natural upper bound on the capital tax. This discussion connects with the famous $r$ vs. $g$ discussion at the heart of Piketty (2014).

### 2.3.3 Jointness in preferences for labor and capital

We can also address the topic of jointness in the preferences for work and capital, which introduce cross-elasticities between the capital and labor taxes. The discounted utility is:

$$V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = \delta_i \int_0^\infty [c_i(t) + v_i(k_i(t), z_i(t))] e^{-\delta_i t} dt, \quad (13)$$

with $v_i(k, z)$ increasing concavely in $k$ and decreasing concavely in $z$. With linear taxes $\tau_K$ and $\tau_L$, the budget constraint of individual $i$ is:

$$\frac{dk_i(t)}{dt} = \bar{r}k_i(t) + (1 - \tau_L) \cdot z_i(t) + r\tau_K k^m_i(t) + \tau_L z^m_i(t) - c_i(t).$$

The choice $(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))$ for individual $i$ at any time $t > 0$ is such that:

$$-v_{iz}(k_i(t), z_i(t)) = 1 - \tau_L, \quad v_{ik}(k_i(t), z_i(t)) = \delta_i - \bar{r},$$
and $c_i(t) = \bar{r} k_i(t) + (1 - \tau_L) \cdot z_i(t) + r r K m(t) + \tau_L z^m(t)$.

The dynamic model is again equivalent to the static specification:

$$U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i) = c_i + v_i(k_i, z_i) + \delta_i(k_i^{init} - k_i).$$

Denote by $e_{L,(1-\tau_K)} = (1 - (1-\tau_K) z^m m) \cdot dz^m d(1-\tau_K)$ the cross-elasticity of average labor income to the net-of-tax return and by $e_{K,(1-\tau_L)} = (1 - (1-\tau_L) r K m) \cdot d(r K m) d(1-\tau_L)$ the cross-elasticity of average capital income to the net-of-tax labor tax rate.

**Proposition 3. Optimal labor and capital taxes with joint preferences.** With joint preferences, the optimal linear capital tax (respectively, labor tax) taking the labor tax (respectively, the capital tax) as given is:

$$\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K - \tau_L e_{L,(1-\tau_K)}}{1 - \bar{g}_K + e_K} \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_L = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_L - \tau_K e_{K,(1-\tau_L)}}{1 - \bar{g}_L + e_L}.$$ 

The formula for each tax applies even if the other tax is not optimally set. The effects of jointness in preferences on the optimal labor and capital taxes depend on the complementarity or substitutability of preferences for capital and labor. If having more capital decreases the cost of work, then $e_{L,(1-\tau_K)} > 0$ and, at any given $\tau_L$, the capital tax should optimally be set lower.

### 2.3.4 Comprehensive Income Tax System $T(z + r k)$

Within our framework, we can easily solve for the optimal nonlinear tax on comprehensive income $y \equiv r k + z$, of the form $T_Y(y)$. In this case, the optimal tax formula takes exactly the form of the Mirrlees (1971) model as in Saez (2001).

Define the average welfare weight on individuals with total income higher than $y$ as:

$$\bar{G}_Y(y) = \frac{\int_{\{y_i \geq y\}} g_i di}{P(y_i \geq y)}.$$ (14)

Let $h_Y(y)$ and $H_Y(y)$ be the density and cumulative distribution functions of the total income distribution. $\alpha_Y(y) \equiv \frac{\mu_Y(y)}{1-H_Y(y)}$ is the local Pareto parameter for the distribution of total income.
y and $e_Y(y)$ is the elasticity of total income to the net of tax rate $1 - T'_Y(y)$ at point $y$.

Using the envelope theorem, we obtain a standard optimal tax formula on full income.

**Proposition 4. Optimal tax on comprehensive income.**

(i) The optimal nonlinear tax on comprehensive income (labor and capital income) $y = rk + z$ is given by:

$$T'_Y(y) = \frac{1 - \bar{G}_Y(y)}{1 - G_Y(y) + \alpha_Y(y) \cdot e_Y(y)}.$$

(ii) The optimal linear tax on comprehensive income is:

$$\tau_Y = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_Y}{1 - \bar{g}_Y + e_Y}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

with $\bar{g}_Y \equiv \int g_i y_i \frac{y^m}{y^m} = \frac{z^m L^m + rk^m K^m}{z^m + rk^m}$ and $e_Y \equiv \frac{dy^m}{d(1 - \tau_Y)} \frac{(1 - \tau_Y)}{y^m} = \frac{(z^m e_L + rk^m e_K)}{z^m + rk^m}$.  \hspace{1cm} (16)

A tax system based on comprehensive income may be optimal for equity reasons (discussed in Section 2.3.1) or for efficiency reasons, due to the existence income shifting opportunities between the capital and labor income bases (in Section 2.3.5).

### 2.3.5 Income Shifting

Suppose that individuals can, at some cost, shift income between the labor and capital bases. More precisely, they can shift an amount of labor income $x$ from the labor to the capital tax base at a utility cost $d(x)$, increasing and convex in $x$. Hence, if reported labor income at time $t$ is $z_i^R(t)$, we have $x_i(t) = z_i(t) - z_i^R(t)$. The aggregate shifted amount at time $t$ is $x^m(t) = \int x_i(t) di$.

We consider linear taxes in this section.

We can easily show that in this case again, the dynamic and static problems are equivalent. The discounted normalized utility of individual $i$,

$$V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t), x_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = \delta_i \cdot \int_0^\infty [c_i(t) + a_i(k_i(t)) - h_i(z_i(t)) - d_i(x_i(t))] e^{-\delta_i t} dt,$$
under the budget constraint:

\[ \dot{k}_i(t) = \bar{r}k_i(t) + (1 - \tau_L)z_i(t) - c_i(t) + (\tau_L - \tau_K)x_i(t) + \tau_L(z^m(t) - x^m(t)) + \tau_K(rk^m(t) + x^m(t)), \]

is equivalent to the static model:

\[ U_i(c, k, z, x) = c + a_i(k) - h_i(z) - d_i(x) + \delta_i \cdot (k^i_{\text{init}} - k), \]

subject to the static budget constraint

\[ c = \bar{r}k + (1 - \tau_L)z + (\tau_L - \tau_K)x + \tau_L(z^m - x^m) + \tau_K(rk^m + x^m). \]

This static model of tax shifting was analyzed in Piketty and Saez (2013a). The individual’s choice is characterized by the following conditions:

\[ h_i'(z_i) = 1 - \tau_L \quad \text{and} \quad a_i'(k_i) = \delta_i - \bar{r}, \]

\[ d_i'(x_i) = \tau_L - \tau_K \quad \text{and} \quad c_i = \bar{r}k_i + (1 - \tau_L)z_i + (\tau_L - \tau_K)x_i + \tau_L(z^m - x^m) + \tau_K(rk^m + x^m). \]

Hence, labor income is a function \( z_i(1 - \tau_L) \) of the net-of-tax rate, capital income is a function of the net-of-tax return \( \bar{r} \), and shifted income is a function \( x(\Delta\tau) \) of the tax differential \( \Delta\tau \equiv \tau_L - \tau_K \).

In the same way that we previously defined the distributional factors for capital and labor income in (5) and (6), we can define the distributional factor for shifted income as: \( \bar{g}_X = \int \omega_i x_i / z^m \). As long as the distributional factor \( \bar{g}_X \) is small enough (in a way made precise in the proof in the Appendix) so that allowing income shifting is not an attractive way of redistributing income, we have the following results.

**Proposition 5. Optimal Labor and Capital Taxes with Income Shifting.**

i. If \( e_K > e_L(1 - \bar{g}_K) \), then \( \frac{1 - \bar{g}_L}{1 - \bar{g}_L + e_L} \geq \tau_L > \tau_K \geq \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_K + e_K} \) and conversely, if \( e_K < e_L(1 - \bar{g}_K) \), then \( \frac{1 - \bar{g}_L}{1 - \bar{g}_L + e_L} \leq \tau_L < \tau_K \leq \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_K + e_K} \).

ii. If there is no shifting, the linear tax rates are set according to their usual formulas in (5) and (6).

iii. If shifting is infinitely elastic, then the tax differential \( \Delta\tau \) goes to 0 and \( \tau_K = \tau_L = \)
\[ \tau_Y = \frac{1-\bar{g}_Y}{1-\bar{g}_Y+e_Y} \] where \( \bar{g}_Y = \frac{z^m \bar{g}_L + r k^m \bar{g}_K}{z^m + r k^m} \) is the distributional factor of total income, and \( e_Y = \frac{(z^m e_L + r k^m e_K)}{z^m + r k^m} \) is the elasticity of total income.

Thus, as long as there is shifting with a finite elasticity, the labor and capital taxes are compressed toward each other, away from their optimal values with no shifting. With an infinite shifting elasticity, the optimum is to set a comprehensive tax on full income \( y = r k + z \), as solved for in (15). Strong shifting opportunities, with elasticities tending to infinity, can thus provide a justification for a tax based on total comprehensive income which is orthogonal to the social ethical considerations discussed in Section 2.3.1.

### 2.3.6 Consumption taxation

Can a consumption tax achieve more redistribution than a wealth tax and be more progressive than a tax on labor income? Our simple model allows us to cleanly assess the role of and the scope for a consumption tax.

Let us define real wealth as wealth expressed in terms of purchasing power, or, equivalently, wealth as normalized by the price of consumption. It seems natural that individuals should care about real wealth, rather than nominal wealth, for the real economic power or status that it confers. As long as individuals care about real wealth, a consumption tax is equivalent to a tax on labor income augmented with a tax on initial wealth as in the standard model with no utility for wealth (see e.g., Kaplow (1994); Auerbach (2009)). Hence, the consumption tax cannot achieve a more equal steady state than the labor tax. In the simplest case with a linear consumption tax, it is immediate to see this equivalence.\(^{24}\)

If the tax exclusive rate is \( t_C \), so that the implied price of consumption is \( 1 + t_C \), the equivalent tax inclusive rate is \( \tau_C \), which is such that \( 1 - \tau_C = 1/(1 + t_C) \). Real wealth is here \( k^r = k \cdot (1 - \tau_C) \) and flow utility is \( u_i = c + a_i(k^r) - h_i(z) \). The budget constraint of the individual becomes \( \dot{k} = [\bar{r} k + z - T_L(z)] - c/(1 - \tau_C) + G \), where \( G = \tau_L z^m + \tau_K r k^m + t_C c^m \) is the lump-sum transfer rebate of tax revenue. The budget constraint can be rewritten in terms of real wealth as: \( \dot{k}_r = \bar{r} k^r + (z - T_L(z)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) + G \cdot (1 - \tau_C) - c \).

\(^{24}\)With a progressive consumption tax, the equivalence is less immediate, but nevertheless present and we consider this case in Online Appendix A.4.
In real terms, the consumption tax $\tau_C$ then just adds a layer of taxes on labor income, leaving $\bar{r}$ unchanged. For the individual, the steady state (i.e., the static model) $(\bar{r}, T_L, \tau_C)$ is equivalent to $(\bar{r}, \bar{T}_L, \tau_C = 0)$ with $\bar{T}_L$ such that $z - \bar{T}_L(z) = (z - T_L(z)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C)$.

The difference between these two tax systems is that consumption taxation also taxes initial wealth by reducing its real value from $k_i^{\text{init}}$ to $k_i^{\text{r,init}} = (1 - \tau_C) \cdot k_i^{\text{init}}$. This means that a consumption tax does successfully tax initial wealth, but has no long term effect on the distribution of real wealth. If the government undoes this initial wealth redistribution by giving a lump-sum transfer $\tau_C \cdot k_i^{\text{init}}/(1 - \tau_C)$ to an individual $i$ with initial wealth holdings $k_i^{\text{init}}$, the equivalence between a consumption tax system $(\bar{r}, T_L, \tau_C)$ and a modified labor tax system with no consumption tax $(\bar{r}, \bar{T}_L, \tau_C = 0)$ becomes complete both in the dynamic consumer problem, the steady-state of the consumer, and the intertemporal government budget. Hence we have:

**Proposition 6. Equivalence of consumption taxes and labor taxes.** A linear consumption at inclusive rate $\tau_C$ is equivalent to a tax on labor income combined with a tax on initial wealth.

To refute a common fallacy on the redistributive power of consumption taxes, suppose that there is no initial wealth (and, hence, no need for a compensating transfer if a consumption tax were to be introduced) and that labor income is inelastic and uniform across individuals. Differences in wealth then only arise from differences in tastes for wealth. It is clear that a pure labor income tax achieves no redistribution in this setting: it just taxes the inelastic and equal labor income and rebates it back as an equal lump-sum transfer to all individuals. If there were a consumption tax in this setting, those with higher preferences for wealth would end up having higher income, higher consumption, and pay higher taxes than those with lower preferences for wealth. But recall that the consumption tax is fully equivalent to the labor income tax in this setting and that the labor income tax achieves no redistribution. Thus, while wealth lovers look like they pay higher taxes in the steady state on their higher consumption, this is because they paid less taxes while building up their wealth at instant 0. This initial wealth accumulation is what gives them higher steady state consumption in the first place. Wealth lovers build up more nominal wealth with consumption taxation so that their real wealth is the same as under the
equivalent labor income tax (and no consumption tax). With a consumption tax only, wealthy individuals pay more taxes in steady state, but they also accumulate more nominal wealth so that inequality in real wealth is unaffected in the steady state.

It is hence important to draw a distinction between the observed cross-section and the lifetime distribution of resources. In our simple model, in the cross-sectional steady-state, the consumption tax looks redistributive, when, in reality, it is not.

2.3.7 Heterogeneous Returns to Capital

In practice, individuals may have very different returns on their wealth. Financially savvy people may be able to hold optimized portfolios with higher returns for instance. Higher wealth individuals empirically seem to reap a higher return, potentially because of smarter investments or economies of scale in financial management (Piketty, 2014). Entrepreneurs investing their capital in a business may have different abilities for running their business and generating returns.

With heterogeneous returns to capital, the full dynamic model with utility as in (1) subject to the budget constraint in (2), where $r$ is replaced by a heterogeneous return $r_i$ is again equivalent to the same static model as above, with the following budget constraint:

$$c_i = r_i(1 - \tau_K) k_i + (1 - \tau_L) z_i + \tau_K \int_i r_i k_i (\bar{r}_i) + \tau_L z^m (1 - \tau_L).$$

At the optimal $\tau_K$, we have $dSWF/d\tau_K = 0$, so that:

$$\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_r K}{1 - \bar{g}_r K + e_{rK}} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g}_r K = \frac{\int_i g_i \cdot r_i k_i}{\int_i r_i k_i} \quad \text{and} \quad e_{rK} = \frac{(1 - \tau_K)}{\int_i r_i k_i} \cdot \frac{d \int_i r_i k_i}{d(1 - \tau_K)} > 0.$$

Heterogeneous returns do not affect the formula in terms of sufficient statistics, $\bar{g}_r K$ and $e_{rK}$. However, they may affect our ethical judgments on taxes, especially if there is a systematic correlation (as discussed in Piketty (2014)) between wealth and the return on wealth.

Different returns on capital could be perceived as unfair: for a given amount of sacrificed consumption, some individuals reap higher returns, much like for a given amount of sacrificed leisure, some individuals reap a higher labor income in the standard labor tax model. Redistribution across individuals with different returns may then be perceived as desirable, even
conditional on total capital income.\footnote{Put differently, someone with a high \( r_i \) (a “luck” shock) should be deemed less deserving than someone with a high \( k_j \) (a higher consumption sacrifice) conditional on \( r_i k_i = r_j k_j \). On the other hand, if returns are deemed fair, then social welfare weights should be the same conditional on \( r_i k_i = r_j k_j \) (regardless of whether the high capital income comes from a higher capital stock or a higher return on capital).}

### 2.3.8 Different Types of Capital Assets

In practice, there is not one single type of capital, but rather different assets, with different liquidity and payoff patterns. Different types of individuals may have heterogeneous tastes for assets. Indeed, because our model contains a direct utility component for wealth, we can rationalize why people would hold assets with different returns above and beyond the standard risk-return trade-off considerations. For instance, a home can yield direct utility benefits. Government bonds or shares in one’s own company may also have an individual-specific value, if people care about the national or company-specific contribution that their capital makes. Our model is flexible enough to incorporate different types of capital assets and heterogeneous preferences for them.

Consider \( J \) assets with different returns denoted generically by \( r^j \), taxes \( \tau^j_K \), and net-of-tax return \( \bar{r}^j \). Individual \( i \) holds a level \( k^j_i \) of asset \( j \), with initial level \( k^{init,j}_i \). For simplicity, assume exogenous and uniform labor income \( z \). The static utility equivalent for individual \( i \) can feature joint preferences in the assets:

\[
U_i = c_i + a_i(k^1_i, \ldots, k^J_i) + \delta_i \cdot \sum_{j=1}^J (k^{init,j}_i - k^j_i),
\]

with the budget constraint:

\[
c_i = \sum_{j=1}^J \bar{r}^j k^j_i + z + \sum_{j=1}^J \tau^j_K r^j k^{m,j}.
\]

It is straightforward to derive the tax rates on each asset, analogous to the formula for capital and labor taxes with joint preferences in Section 2.3.3:

**Proposition 7. Different types of capital with heterogeneous, joint preferences.** The
The optimal tax on capital asset \( j \), given all other tax rates \( \tau^s_K \) for \( s \neq j \) (not necessarily optimally set) is given by:

\[
\tau^j_K = 1 - \bar{g}^j_K - \frac{\sum_{s \neq j} \tau^s_K \frac{k^m,s}{k^m,j} e^{K^s,(1-\tau^s_K)}}{1 - \bar{g}^j_K + e^j_K}
\]  

(17)

with \( \bar{g}^j_K = \frac{\int g_i \cdot k^j_i}{\int k^j_i} \), \( e^j_K = \frac{\bar{r}^j}{k^m,j} \cdot \frac{dk^{m,j}}{d\bar{r}^j} > 0 \), and \( e^{K^s,(1-\tau^s_K)} = \frac{\bar{r}^j}{k^m,s} \cdot \frac{dk^{m,s}}{d\bar{r}^j} \).  

(18)

The tax on each type of capital asset is first determined by the two standard considerations of equity and efficiency. Indeed, with no cross-elasticities,\(^{26}\) the formulas are simply:

\[
\tau^j_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}^j_K}{1 - \bar{g}^j_K + e^j_K}.
\]

Assets with higher elasticities \( (e^j_K) \) should be taxed less. Those with a higher redistributive impact, i.e., for which holdings are concentrated among high welfare weight individuals \( (\bar{g}^j_K \text{ high}) \) should be taxed less, all else equal.\(^{27}\) Society may have very different value judgements regarding different assets, embodied in very different weights \( \bar{g}^j_K \), leading to different optimal tax rates.

Second, the efficiency cost of taxing asset \( j \) depends on its cross-elasticities with other assets and its fiscal spillovers to the other assets’ tax bases. If the asset is complementary to many other assets the efficiency cost of taxing it may be much larger than the own-price elasticity.

In addition, if the government cannot freely optimize the tax rate on some asset \( s \), then, when asset \( j \) and asset \( s \) are complements \( (e^{K^s,(1-\tau^s_K)} > 0) \), the higher existing tax on asset \( s \) would push towards a lower optimal tax on asset \( j \).

\(^{26}\)This case arises with separable utilities across different assets: \( a_i(k_1^i, \ldots, k_J^i) = \sum_{j=1}^J a_j^i(k_j^i) \).

\(^{27}\)Conversely, assets equally distributed \( (\bar{g}^j_K \approx 1) \) should not be taxed much for redistributive purposes.
2.3.9 The aggregate capital stock and an endogenous return to capital

In practice, the return to capital may not be exogenously given by $r$ and may endogenously depend on an aggregate production function $F(K, L)$ where $K = \int k_i di$ is aggregate capital and $L = \int l_i di$ is aggregate labor, with $l_i$ the effective labor supplied by individual $i$. Earnings are equal to $z_i = w \cdot l_i$ with $w = F_L$ the wage per unit of effective labor. $r = F_K$ is the marginal return to capital.

A direct application of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) theory implies that the optimal tax formulas for capital and labor would be unchanged with an aggregate production function. In other words, optimal tax rates depend solely on the supply side elasticities and general equilibrium price effects are irrelevant. The intuition is simple: consider for instance increasing $\tau_L$. This creates an indirect transfer from capital owners to labor (human capital) owners because a lower labor supply depresses the endogenous returns to capital and increases the returns to labor. However, this transfer can be offset at no fiscal cost through a higher capital tax such that the post return to capital is unchanged relative to the situation in which the labor tax was not increased.

Thanks to the Diamond-Mirrlees theory, the question of how to tax capital holdings of different individuals can be treated separately from the question about the optimal aggregate capital stock.

3 Numerical Application to U.S. Taxation

In this section, we give empirical content to the optimal tax rates derived in Section 2. One of the advantages of our method is that the sufficient statistics that appear in the optimal tax formula provide a clear link to the data. We use IRS tax data for 2007 on labor and capital income distributions.\footnote{We choose 2007 as this is the most recent year of publicly available micro-level US tax data available before the Great Recession. By September 2016, the most recent year available was 2010.} We follow the conventions of Piketty and Saez (2003) to define income and percentile groups. The individual unit is the tax unit defined as a single person with dependents if any or a married couple with dependents if any. Capital income is defined...
as all capital income components reported on individual tax returns, and includes dividends, realized capital gains, taxable interest income, estate and trust income, rents and royalties, net profits from businesses (including S-corporations, partnerships, farms, and sole proprietorships). Labor income is defined as market income reported on tax returns minus capital income defined above. It includes wages and salaries, private pension distributions, and other income. We recognize that the tax based income components we use to classify capital and labor incomes do not perfectly correspond to economic capital and labor incomes. Yet, any tax system that taxes capital and labor separately has to use the existing tax based income components. For simplicity, any negative income is set at zero. In aggregate, capital income represents 26% of total income and labor income represents 74% of total income (see Figure 2). As our theory boils down to a static model, it is directly suited for thinking through optimal taxation of annual labor and capital income, as actual income tax systems operate.

3.1 Empirical Distributions of Capital and Labor Income

Three key facts about the distributions of labor and capital income stand out.

i. **Capital income is more unequally distributed than labor income.**

The distributions of both labor and capital income (and, thus, of total income) exhibit great inequalities, but capital income is much more concentrated than labor income, as shown in the Lorenz curves in Figure 1. The top 1% people as ranked by capital income earn 63% of all capital income, while the bottom 80% earn essentially zero capital income.

ii. **At the top, total income is mostly capital income.**

At the top of the income distribution total income comes mostly from capital income. Figure 2 shows capital and labor income as a fraction of total income for the full population (P0-P100) and for several subgroups as ranked by total income. At the top of the income distribution, capital comes close to 80% of total income.

---

29Our definition of capital income is broad (and correspondingly, our definition of labor income is narrow), as business profits are actually a mix of labor and capital income.

30See Piketty et al. (2016) for an attempt to reconstruct the economic capital and labor incomes starting from tax data.
iii. Two-dimensional heterogeneity in both labor and capital income.

There is an important two-dimensional heterogeneity in labor and capital income. Conditional on labor income, capital income continues to exhibit a lot of inequality. Figure 3 plots the Lorenz curves for capital income (the cumulative share of capital income owned by those below each percentile of the capital income distribution), but conditional on being in four groups according to labor income: all individuals, the bottom 50% by labor income, the top 10% by labor income and the top 1% by labor income. Even conditional on labor income, there is still a very large concentration of capital income.

3.2 Optimal Separable Tax Schedules

3.2.1 Methodology

We first start by considering the optimal separable tax schedules for capital and labor income of the form $T_L(z_i)$ and $T_K(rk_i)$, making use our sufficient statistics non-linear formulas derived in Section 2.2.2.

We assume constant elasticities for labor and capital income, denoted by, respectively, $e_L$ and $e_K$. Starting from the micro-level IRS tax data, we invert individuals’ choices of labor and capital income, given the current U.S. tax system to obtain the implicit latent types which are consistent with these observed choices and these constant elasticities. The distribution of types is hence such that, given the constant behavioral elasticities and the actual U.S. tax schedule, the capital and labor income distributions match the empirical ones (Saez (2001) developed this methodology in the case of optimal labor income taxation). We then fit non-parametrically the distribution of latent types. We repeat the same procedure for total income.

At the top, the distributions of labor, capital, and total income exhibit constant hazard rates and approximate a Pareto distribution with tail parameters denoted by, respectively, $a_L$, $a_K$, $a_T$. For labor income, as is well known, this requires a disutility of work of the form $h_i(z) = z^0_i \cdot (z/z^0_i)^{1+1/e_L}/(1+1/e_L)$ where $z^0_i$ is exogenous potential earnings equal to actual earnings when the marginal labor income tax rate is zero. Similarly, for capital income, this requires a utility of wealth of the form $a_i(k) = \delta_i \cdot k - r \cdot k^0_i \cdot (k/k^0_i)^{1+1/e_K}/(1+1/e_K)$ where $k^0_i$ is exogenous potential wealth equal to actual steady state wealth when the marginal capital income tax rate is zero. This disutility of wealth function has to depend on the discount rate $\delta_i$ and the rate of return $r$. It is first increasing and then decreasing in wealth $k$. However, in equilibrium, the individual always chooses $k_i$ in the increasing portion of the $a_i(k)$ function.
The empirical Pareto parameters are plotted in Figure 4 for labor, capital, and total income. For labor income the Pareto parameter is around $a_L = 1.6$, for capital income it is $a_K = 1.38$, and for total income it is $a_Y = 1.4$ (given that the tail of total income is mostly capital income).

To capture social preferences for redistribution, we assign exogenous weights $g_i$ which decline in observed disposable income at the current tax system, i.e., such that the weight for individual $i$ in the data is equal to $g_i = 1/((z_i + r_k)(1 - \tau^{US}) + R^{US})$ where $\tau^{US} = 25\%$ and $R^{US}$ mimic the U.S. average tax rate on total income and demogrant. Such weights decline to zero as income goes to infinity, implying that optimal top rates are given by the asymptotic revenue maximizing tax rates derived earlier.

3.2.2 Results

Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5 show, respectively, the optimal marginal labor income tax as a function of labor income and the optimal marginal capital income tax as a function of capital income, each for three different values of the elasticity parameters, namely 0.25, 0.5, and 1. We use a range of possible elasticities given the uncertainty coming out of the empirical literature (see Saez et al. (2012) for a recent survey).

The optimal labor and capital income taxes both follow closely the shape of the empirical Pareto parameter from Figure 4. The labor income tax hence takes the familiar shape as in Saez (2001) and naturally is lower when the elasticity of labor income to the net of tax rate is higher.

The capital income tax schedule is new. Because capital is so concentrated, the asymptotic nonlinear tax rate, which approximates the linear top tax rate, as explained in Section 2.2.2, kicks in very rapidly, covering the vast majority of the capital income tax base. Above the top 1%, the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is essentially constant, so that the nonlinear tax schedule at the top is very well approximated by a linear tax rate. Naturally, the level of that optimal linear top tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of capital income to the net of tax return.

Because capital income is more concentrated than labor income, the Pareto parameter for
capital income is lower than for labor income, leading to a higher top tax rate for capital income than for labor income when the elasticities $e_L$ and $e_K$ are the same. In another words, $e_K$ would need to be significantly higher than $e_L$ to justify imposing the same top tax rate on capital and labor incomes.

### 3.3 Optimal Comprehensive Tax Schedule

We then turn to exploiting the optimal tax on comprehensive income, $T_Y(y)$, with $y = z + rk$, making use of the nonlinear formulas derived in Section 2.3.4 in terms of sufficient statistics. We repeat the same procedure outlined above for labor and capital income, assuming that the elasticity of total income $e_Y$ is constant. We again consider three possible values. Panel (c) in Figure 5 plots the optimal marginal tax rate $T_Y'(y)$ as a function of total income $y$.

The optimal marginal tax rate on total income has a shape similar to that on labor income. Often, in numerical applications of the Mirrlees (1971) labor income tax model, total income is used for the calculations. We can here rigorously compare the resulting two schedules. The asymptotic top tax rate on total income is closest to the asymptotic top tax rate on capital income from panel (b) as capital income dominates labor income among top incomes.

### 4 Generalized Model

In this section, we generalize the results from the previous simple model to the case with an arbitrary concave utility. We start by deriving optimal taxes and show that the formulas from Section 2 still apply in this generalized model with transitional dynamics, as long as the elasticity of the tax base – which now features slow adjustments – is appropriately taken into account. It is hence only the quantitative implications of the elasticities that differ. If responses of capital are fast, our simpler model’s assumption of instant adjustment is a good one and all our previous results, including the nonlinear capital tax formulas from Section 2 are quantitatively robust. If responses are slow, then the government can tax more in the short run, when taking advantage of the sluggish adjustments of capital. We argue, however, that exploiting the slow responses is normatively unappealing. We also compare our results to those of earlier models.
4.1 Generalized wealth in the utility model

In the generalized model with concave utility for consumption and wealth in the utility, the discount rate of individual $i$ is $\delta_i$ and his instantaneous utility is $u_i(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))$. With time-invariant taxes $T(r_k, z)$, individual $i$ choices $(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))$ converge to a steady state characterized by:

$$\frac{u_{ik}}{u_{ic}} = \delta_i - r(1 - T'_K), \quad u_{ic} \cdot (1 - T'_L) = -u_{iz}, \quad \text{and} \quad c_i = r k_i + z_i - T(z_i, r k_i).$$

Aggregating across of individuals, in the steady state, capital has a finite elasticity with respect to taxes. Conditional on labor income, wealth is heterogeneous across individuals due to differences in the taste for capital (embodied in the utility $u_i$) and in impatience (embodied in the discount rate $\delta_i$). Relative to the simpler model in Section 2, consumption smoothing considerations now kick in, the convergence to the steady state is no longer instantaneous and there are transitional dynamics.

The government maximizes a standard dynamic social welfare function equal to:

$$SWF = \int \omega_i V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) di,$$

where

$$V_i(\{c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = \delta_i \cdot \int_{t=0}^{\infty} u_i(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) e^{-\delta_i t} dt.$$

4.1.1 Optimal linear tax formulas in the generalized model

For given linear taxes on capital and labor income, $\tau_K$ and $\tau_L$ – the revenues from which are rebated to individuals in a lump-sum fashion every period– the economy converges to a steady state. To simplify the presentation, let us assume that at time 0 the economy starts from a steady state with tax rates ($\tau_K$, $\tau_L$). We consider a small reform $d\tau_K$ that takes place at time

---

32Maximizing the individuals’ steady state welfare $SWF = \int \omega_i \cdot u_i(c_i, k_i, z_i) di$ is paternalistic and does not respect the envelope theorem. An infinitesimal change in wealth $dk_i$ has a positive effect on individual $i$ steady state instantaneous utility equal to $(u_{ic}r(1 - T'_K) + u_{ik})dk_i = u_{ic} \delta_i dk_i$ where the equality comes from the steady state condition $u_{ik}/u_{ic} = \delta_i - r(1 - T'_K)$. This artificially creates a positive welfare effect that will tend to lower the optimal capital income tax. Intuitively, increasing wealth looks good because the steady state “forgets” that accumulating wealth requires to sacrifice past consumption.
0 (and is, hence, unanticipated). We are going to derive conditions such that the small reform has zero first order effect on welfare, which effectively implies that the initial tax rate $\tau_K$ is optimal.\textsuperscript{33}

Let $e_K(t)$ be the elasticity of aggregate capital in period $t$, $k^m(t)$, with respect to the net of tax rate $\bar{r}$, i.e.: $e_K(t) = (\bar{r}/k^m(t)) \cdot (dk^m(t)/d\bar{r})$. This elasticity converges to the steady state elasticity $e_K$. In contrast to Section 2, the convergence is not immediate because individuals smooth consumption and hence adjust their wealth slowly. Hence, under regularity assumptions, $e_K(t)$ starts at zero at $t = 0$ and then builds up with $t$ until it converges to $e_K > 0$. We define as well the elasticity of aggregate labor income $z^m(t)$ to the net of tax return on capital as $e_L(1-\tau_K) = (\bar{r}/z^m(t)) \cdot (dz^m(t)/d\bar{r})$.

We define the social marginal welfare weight on person $i$ as $g_i = \omega_i u_{ic}|_{t=0}$ and we assume without loss of generality (by normalizing the Pareto weights $\omega_i$) that they sum to one: $\int_i g_idi = 1$. Using the envelope theorem (i.e., that behavioral responses $dk_{it}$ can be ignored when computing the change in individual welfare $dV_i$), we can consider the welfare impact of the small tax change and derive the optimal linear capital tax rate.

**Proposition 8. Optimal linear capital tax in the Steady State.**

The optimal linear capital income tax takes the form:

$$\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K - \tau_L \frac{z^m}{k^m} \bar{e}_{L,(1-\tau_K)}}{1 - \bar{g}_K + \bar{e}_K} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{e}_K = \int_i g_i \delta_i \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt,$$

$$\bar{e}_{L,(1-\tau_K)} = \int_i g_i \delta_i \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e_{L,(1-\tau_K)}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{g}_K = \int_i g_i \cdot k_i/k^m.$$

The formula is qualitatively exactly the same as in the simpler model in Section 2.3.3. The quantitative difference lies in the elasticity of the capital tax base $\bar{e}_K$ which replaces $e_K$ from Section 2 and the elasticity of the labor tax base $\bar{e}_{L,(1-\tau_K)}$ which replaces $e_{L,(1-\tau_K)}$. $\bar{e}_K$ is the average of build up elasticities that converge to the long-run elasticity $e_K$. Hence, typically $\bar{e}_K < e_K$. In addition, the same cross-elasticity effects already discussed in Section 2.3.3 still

\textsuperscript{33}It is also possible to start from an arbitrary tax system $(\tau_{K0}, \tau_{L0})$ and away from the steady state, and then derive the optimal unanticipated new tax system $(\tau_K, \tau_L)$ implemented at time 0 that maximizes social welfare. The formulas would be similar but would require keeping track across time of all variables that converge slowly to the new steady-state, requiring more cumbersome notations.
apply here: all else equal, and at any positive labor income tax rate \( \tau_L \), if capital and labor income are complements (so that \( e_L, (1 - \tau_K) t > 0 \)), the optimal capital tax is pushed down relative to the case with no cross-elasticities.

4.1.2 Generalizing the results from the simpler model

The optimal fully nonlinear tax system with transitional dynamics is more complex and derived in Online Appendix A.2. Here, we consider the much simpler tax system with a linear labor income tax at rate \( \tau_L \) and a capital income tax with constant tax rate \( \tau_K \) for capital income above \( r_k \).

Let \( e_K^\text{top} (t) \) to be the average elasticity of total capital income of those individuals with capital income above threshold \( r_k \). It is measured at time \( t \) following a small reform of the top bracket tax rate \( d \tau_K \) taking place at time 0. The elasticity is weighted by capital income. Let \( e_L, 1 - \tau_K \) be the elasticity of labor income of those individuals with capital income above threshold \( r_k \).

**Proposition 9. Optimal top capital tax rate in the steady state.**

The optimal top capital tax rate above capital income level \( r_k \) takes the form:

\[
\tau_K^\text{top} = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K^\text{top} - \tau_L \bar{g}_K^{(k_m, r_k^\text{top} - k_k^\text{top})} e_{L,(1 - \tau_K)}}{1 - \bar{g}_K^\text{top} + a_K^\text{top}}
\]

with \( \bar{e}_K^\text{top} \equiv \int_i g_i \delta_i \int_0^\infty e_K^\text{top} (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt \). \( \bar{g}_K^\text{top} = \int_i g_i \delta_i \int_{k_i > k_k^\text{top}} g_i (k_i - k_k^\text{top}) \cdot (k_i - k_k^\text{top}) \) is the average capital income weighted welfare weight in the top capital tax bracket, and \( a_K^\text{top} = \frac{k_m, r_k^\text{top} - k_k^\text{top}}{k_m, r_k^\text{top} - k_k^\text{top}} \) is the Pareto parameter of the capital income distribution. \( e_{L,(1 - \tau_K)} \equiv \int_i g_i \delta_i \int_0^\infty e_{L,(1 - \tau_K)} (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt \).

We can also generalize the other results from Section 2.3. The optimal tax on total income \( y_i = r_k i + z_i \) takes the same form as in Proposition 4 with the long-run elasticity \( e_Y \) replaced by the total elasticity of the income tax base, taking into account the transitional adjustments, \( \bar{e}_Y = \int_i g_i \delta_i \int_0^\infty e_Y (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt \). Similarly it is straightforward to generalize the results in Subsections

\[34\] The capital income tax schedule below \( r_k \) can be nonlinear. As we saw in Section 3, capital income is very strongly concentrated, so that even for the fully nonlinear optimal tax schedule, the asymptotic tax rate applies for most of the capital income tax base. Therefore, this constant top tax rate is without much loss of generality relative to the fully nonlinear capital income tax system.
2.3.7 and 2.3.8. Regarding the latter, with transitional dynamics, the government will be more tempted to tax more heavily assets which are slower to adjust (holding fixed the long-run elasticity $e^i_K$ and the distributional factor $g^i_K$).

4.1.3 Discussion

If the responses of capital to tax changes are very fast, then $\bar{e}_K$ is very close to the steady state elasticity $e_K$, as in Section 2.2.1. In this case, the quantitative implications of our simple and generalized models will be similar as well. With fast adjustments of capital, our previous results are robust.

Empirically, policy makers in general worry about capital adjustments happening very fast following tax changes by, for instance, capital flights abroad (Johannesen, 2014). Companies can modify their dividend payouts quickly to changes in dividend taxation for the sake of their shareholders (Chetty and Saez, 2005; Alstadsaeter and Fjaerli, 2009).

If responses are slow on the other hand, then $\bar{e}_K < e_K$. In the short-run, the equity-efficiency trade-off for capital taxation looks more favorable if individuals are not able to adjust their capital as quickly as with linear utility. As a result, and considering formula (20), the government can tax more by taking advantage of these slow responses in the short-run.

However, exploiting such slow responses does not seem very appealing from a normative perspective. A well-designed policy cannot or should not endlessly exploit short-run adjustment costs. If nothing else, this will create a commitment problem for the government as it will always look favorable to unexpectedly increase taxes on existing capital. Using the long-term elasticity seems to be the soundest approach from a public policy perspective.

A comparison to labor taxation can be enlightening here as well. The Mirrlees (1971) model

---

35 Johannesen (2014) shows that the introduction of a withholding tax for EU individuals with Swiss bank accounts led immediately, within two quarters of the reform, to a drop of 30-40% in deposits. Empirical evidence on the short-run versus long-run responses of capital to taxes is very difficult to come by. Saez et al. (2012), surveying the literature on taxable income elasticities, argue that the long-term responses, although particularly important in the case of a dynamic decision such as capital are understudied. Slemrod and Shobe (1989) is an exception, trying to estimate the short-term (transitory) and long-term (permanent) effect of tax changes on capital gains realizations. They find that the first year response has an elasticity of 2.38, while the long-run elasticity is slightly lower, at 1.75.

36 These authors find that the introduction of the Norwegian shareholder income tax led to immediate effects on payouts, emphasizing that capital income can react very quickly and flexibly to tax changes.
can be narrowly interpreted as a labor supply model with the elasticity of hours of work to taxes. It can also be interpreted more broadly as a model of earnings supply incorporating long-run responses of human capital accumulation or occupational choice. For labor too there is a short-run elasticity in which hours are adjusted, and a long-run, potentially larger, elasticity based on skill choice or occupational choice. The same formulas—which we routinely use—carry over simply substituting the short-run labor supply elasticity by the long-run elasticity of earnings \( e_L \) with \( \tau_L = (1 - \bar{g}_L)/(1 - \bar{g}_L + e_L) \). The exact same reasoning applies to capital. There is a short-run capital income elasticity (where past savings decisions are fixed) and a long-run capital income elasticity where savings have fully adjusted. The issue of government wanting to tax existing capital is similar to the issue of government wanting to tax existing human capital. In this view, a meaningful way to think about policy is to consider a static problem with a long-run elasticity and not exploit the transitional dynamics (as in Section 2).

### 4.2 Anticipated Reforms

In this section, we extend the analysis to anticipated reforms, that occur at time \( T > 0 \). With anticipated reforms, if individuals have heterogeneous discount rates, the timing of the reform \( (T) \) has non-trivial welfare consequences. We thus suppose for this section only that \( \delta_i = \delta \) for all \( i \). This will also allow an easier comparison to earlier models in section 4.3. Appendix A.2 provides the formal derivations. We again assume that we start form a steady state at time 0 with time invariant linear taxes \( (\tau_K, \tau_L) \).

We consider a change \( d\tau_K \) in the tax rate \( \tau_K \) that takes place at time \( T \geq 0 \) and is announced at time 0. Individuals start changing their consumption and wealth accumulation decisions at time 0 in anticipation of the reform. We denote again by \( e_K(t) = (\bar{r}/k^m(t)) \cdot (dk^m(t)/d\bar{r}) \) the elasticity of aggregate capital in period \( t \). \( e_K(t) \) converges again toward the steady state elasticity \( e_K \) as \( t \to \infty \). Following Piketty and Saez (2013b), we denote by \( \bar{e}_K = \delta \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e_K(t)e^{-\delta(t-T)}dt \) the total elasticity of the present discounted value of the capital tax base (as of time \( T \) as the tax change starts at time \( T \)). We can split this total elasticity into pre-reform responses with
elasticity $e_{K}^{ante}$ and post-reform responses with elasticity $e_{K}^{post}$:

$$
\bar{e}_{K} = \delta \int_{t<T} e_{K}(t)e^{-\delta(t-T)}dt + \delta \int_{t\geq T} e_{K}(t)e^{-\delta(t-T)}dt. \quad (21)
$$

The sluggish adjustment post-reform typically implies that $e_{K}^{post} < e_{K}$. In the previous section with unanticipated reforms, we had $\bar{e}_{K} = e_{K}^{post} < e_{K}$. In Section 2, $\bar{e}_{K} = e_{K}^{post} = e_{K}$ since responses were instantaneous (whether the reform was anticipated or not).

For anticipated reforms, the optimal linear capital income tax, starting from a steady state, takes the form:

$$
\tau_{K} = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_{K} - \tau_{L} e_{L,1-\tau_{K}}^{m}}{1 - \bar{g}_{K} + \bar{e}_{K}} \text{, with } \quad (22)
$$

$$
\bar{e}_{K} = \delta \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e_{K}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta(t-T)}dt, \quad \bar{e}_{L,1-\tau_{K}} = \delta \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e_{L,1-\tau_{K}}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta(t-T)}dt, \text{ and } \bar{g}_{K} = \int g_{i} \cdot k_{i}/k_{m}. \quad (22)
$$

Anticipation effects add the elasticity component $e_{K}^{ante}$ to the total elasticity, so that the appropriate elasticity to use in the formula is $\bar{e}_{K} = e_{K}^{ante} + e_{K}^{post}$.

In Online Appendix A.1, we show that in our model with wealth in the utility, the anticipation elasticity will be infinite for $T \to \infty$ with full certainty. While this would lead to a zero optimal capital tax rate, it does not occur except in a particularly unrealistic policy setting, namely if the reform is announced infinitely in advance with perfect certainty. It also breaks down with uncertainty: the anticipation elasticity is then finite.\footnote{Labor income also exhibits pre-reform anticipation cross-elasticities.\footnote{It is important to distinguish which results arise from the primitives of each model versus from the reforms considered. Both in our wealth-in-the-utility model and the Chamley-Judd model, anticipated reforms at $T \to \infty$ generate infinite anticipation elasticities. As argued, such reforms rarely occur in practice. However, the Chamley-Judd model also generates infinite steady state elasticities, whereas our model features a non-degenerate steady state with smooth responses of capital to taxes and wealth heterogeneity.}}
4.3 Comparison with Earlier Models

We next compare the optimal capital tax rates in our model to those in three benchmark models of capital taxation: the Aiyagari model (Aiyagari, 1995), the Chamley-Judd model (Chamley, 1986; Judd, 1985), and the Judd endogenous discount rate model (Judd, 1985). While these papers mostly focus on anticipated reforms, we can consider both anticipated and unanticipated reforms for each model, which lead to quantitatively different optimal tax rates. The goal of this section is to show the robustness of our formula. In the end, what matters for optimal tax policy are the elasticities properly defined. Conditional on the elasticities, the primitives of the model are largely irrelevant. Table 1 summarizes the elasticities and optimal tax rates for these different models and for different reforms.

4.3.1 Comparison to the Aiyagari Model with Uncertainty

We first consider the Aiyagari (1995) model with uncertainty, in discrete time. Individual per-period utility is $u_{ti} = u_{ti}(c_{ti})$. Earnings $z_{ti}$ are stochastic and exogenous for simplicity, and we assume no labor income tax $\tau_L = 0$. Again, the discount rate $\delta$ is homogeneous across individuals.

Assume a standard structure for the stochastic process of earnings $z_{ti}$ and preferences $u_{ti}$ so that, under a time invariant tax rate $\tau_K$, the economy converges to an ergodic steady state with a time invariant distribution for $(u_{ti}, k_{ti}, c_{ti})_{i \in I}$ independent of the distribution of initial wealth. All derivations are in Appendix A.3.

The Aiyagari paper considers an anticipated tax reform at time $T$. If $T$ is sufficiently large, so that anticipation responses only start once the economy is in its ergodic steady state, then the optimal linear capital tax rate takes the form:

$$
\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_K + \bar{e}_K} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{e}_K = e_K^{ante} + e_K^{post},
$$

(23)

where, $e_K^{ante}$ and $e_K^{post}$ are the equivalents of the elasticities in the previous section in discrete time: $e_K^{ante} = \frac{\delta}{1+\delta} \sum_{t<T} \left( \frac{1}{1+\delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt}$, and $e_K^{post} = \frac{\delta}{1+\delta} \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1+\delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt}$. Hence our previous

\footnote{We relax this assumption in Appendix A.3.}
formula in (22) exactly applies (setting the labor cross-elasticity \( e_{L,1-\tau_K} \) to zero with inelastic labor). The quantitative implications may, however, be different.

First, we show that the steady state elasticity \( e_K \) is finite, exactly like in our model with wealth in the utility since the uncertainty effectively smoothes the response of capital to taxes. Second, the anticipation elasticity is also finite for any \( T \), so that the Aiyagari model has a non-zero optimal capital tax rate even in the long-run steady state (i.e., for anticipated reforms with \( T \to \infty \). This would also be true in our wealth-in-the-utility model if we added uncertainty. Third, whether the tax rate given by (22) is higher or lower in the wealth-in-the-utility model relative to the Aiyagari (1995) model is ambiguous and depends on whether uncertainty generates larger and/or faster responses of capital to tax rates than does wealth in the utility.

### 4.3.2 The Chamley-Judd model

In the Chamley-Judd model (Chamley, 1986; Judd, 1985), individuals have a standard utility \( u(c_{it},z_{it}) \) and there is no uncertainty. Formula (22) also applies in the Chamley-Judd model, but the elasticities implied by that model are quantitatively different.

First, the steady state is degenerate unless \( \delta = \bar{\delta} \), which means that in the steady state, any change in the capital income tax rate leads to an infinite response. Hence, \( e_K = \infty \) and the optimal capital tax in the steady state is zero. By contrast, in our model the steady state elasticity is always finite and the steady state non-degenerate. Second, as shown in Piketty and Saez (2013b), the anticipation elasticity \( e_{ante}^K \) is also infinite when \( T \to \infty \), leading to a zero optimal tax rate.

### 4.3.3 The Judd endogenous discount factor model

In Judd (1985), the discount rate \( \delta_i = \delta_i(c_i) \) depends smoothly on consumption. Utility is:

\[
V_i(\{c_i(t), z_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0}) = \int_0^{\infty} u_i(c_i(t), z_i(t))e^{-\int_0^t \delta_i(c_i(s))ds}dt.
\]

In Appendix A.4, we derive the optimal linear tax formula starting from a steady state and
considering an unanticipated reform, which is the same as in (20), except that $\bar{g}_K$ is redefined to take into account that the welfare impact of taxes now also goes through the discount factor $\delta_i(c_i)$ which depends on consumption:

$$g_i = \frac{\omega_i \frac{1}{\delta_i(c_i)} \left( u_{ic} + \frac{\delta_i'(c_i)}{\delta_i(c_i)} u_i \right)}{\int_i \omega_i \frac{1}{\delta_i(c_i)} \left( u_{ic} + \frac{\delta_i'(c_i)}{\delta_i(c_i)} u_i \right)}$$

and $\bar{e}_K = \int_i g_i \delta_i(c_i) \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} e_K(t) dt$.

Again, the faster capital adjusts, the closer $\bar{e}_K$ is to the long-run elasticity $e_K$. As with wealth-in-the-utility, the steady state of this model is non-degenerate, with $\delta_i(c_i(t)) = \bar{r}$ and generates a finite long-term elasticity $e_K$. In addition, as shown in Piketty and Saez (2013b), the anticipation elasticity $e^K_\text{ante}$ is infinite, and hence the long-run optimal capital tax is zero.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we propose a tractable new model for capital taxation, which allows to focus on the key efficiency-equity trade-off for capital taxation and creates a link to the policy debate and empirical analysis. We first presented a simple model with linear utility for consumption and a concave wealth-in-the-utility component which generates immediate adjustments of capital in response to taxes, a non-degenerate, smooth response of capital to taxes, and allows for arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences for capital, work, and discount rates.

We derive formulas for optimal linear and nonlinear capital income taxation which take the same form as the traditional optimal labor income tax formulas and are expressed in terms of the elasticity of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return, the shape of the capital income distribution, and the social welfare weights at each capital income level. We also consider the cases with joint-preferences and cross-elasticities between capital and labor, economic growth, heterogeneous returns to capital across individuals, and different types of capital assets and heterogeneous tastes for each of them. We consider optimal taxes on comprehensive income, which take the same form as the standard Mirrleesian labor tax formulas, using total income instead of labor income.

We show how our results are robust in a model with a general, concave utility function as
long as the elasticities of the capital tax base are appropriately adjusted to take into account transitional dynamics and potentially slow adjustments.

We make use of our sufficient statistics formulas to numerically simulate optimal taxes based on U.S. tax data. Given how concentrated the distribution of capital is, the asymptotic tax rate for capital applies for the majority of capital income in the economy and should be higher than the top tax rate on labor income (as long as the supply elasticities of labor and capital with respect to tax rates are the same).

We also discuss a range of ethical considerations regarding capital taxation. As long as conditional on labor income, social marginal welfare weights depend directly on wealth (which is the case if wealth is perceived as unfairly distributed for many possible reasons) or are correlated with wealth (as in the case of the use of wealth as a tag), there is scope for capital taxation.
References


Notes: Computations based on IRS tax return data for year 2007. The figure represents the Lorenz curves for labor income, capital income, and total income (capital + labor income). The Lorenz curve is the cumulative share of income owned by those below each income percentile (x-axis). The distributions of both labor and capital income (and, thus, of total income) exhibit great inequalities, but capital income is much more concentrated than labor income.
Notes: Computations based on IRS tax return data for year 2007. The figure shows the composition of total income within several groups, ranked by total income, and marked on the horizontal axis. The first observation represents the overall population P0-P100. P0-P20 denotes the bottom 20% tax units, etc. At the top of the income distribution, most of total income comes from capital income.
**Figure 3: Two-dimensional heterogeneity:**
**Lorenz curves for capital, conditional in labor income**

Notes: Computations based on IRS tax return data for year 2007. The figure depicts the Lorenz curves for capital income (the Lorenz curve is the cumulative share of capital income owned by those below each percentile of the capital income distribution), for four groups defined by labor income: all individuals, the bottom 50% by labor income, the top 10% by labor income and the top 1% by labor income. Even conditional on labor income, there are large inequalities in capital income. Put differently, there is a lot of two-dimensional heterogeneity in both labor and capital income.
Notes: Computations based on IRS tax return data for year 2007. The figure depicts the empirical Pareto parameters for the labor income distribution (panel (a)), the capital income distribution (panel (b)) and the total income distribution (panel (c)). For labor income, we compute the top bracket Pareto parameter $z_m/(z_m - z^*)$ relevant for the optimal linear tax rate above $z^*$ and the local Pareto parameter $\alpha(z^*) = z^* h_L(z^*)/(1 - H_L(z^*))$ where $h_L(z)$ is the density and $H_L(z)$ the cumulated distribution, which is relevant for the optimal nonlinear $T'_L(z^*)$. The x-axis depicts $z^*$. The vertical lines depict the 90th and 99th percentiles of each distribution. We repeat the same for capital income $r_k$ and total income $y = r_k + z$. At the top, all three distributions are very well approximated by Pareto distributions with constant tail parameters of around $a_L = 1.6$ for labor, $a_K = 1.38$ for capital, and $a_Y = 1.4$ for total income.
Figure 5: Optimal Marginal Tax Rates

(a) Optimal labor income tax rate $T'_L(z)$

(b) Optimal capital income tax rate $T'_K(rk)$

(c) Optimal comprehensive income tax rate $T'_Y(rk + z)$

Notes: Computations based on IRS tax return data for year 2007. Optimal marginal tax rates based on the formulas in Section 2.2.2. Panel (a) plots the optimal marginal tax rate on labor income. Panel (b) plots the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income. Panel (c) plots the optimal marginal tax rate on total income. In each panel, optimal marginal tax rates are plotted for three different elasticity values: 0.25, 0.5, and 1. In each panel, the three vertical lines represent, respectively, the median, the top 10% and the top 1% thresholds of the 2007 the labor, capital, and total income distributions in the U.S. (the median capital income is zero).
Table 1: Comparison of Elasticities and Taxes in Capital Taxation Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Transitional Dynamics?</th>
<th>Uncertainty or Certainty?</th>
<th>Reform anticipated or unanticipated?</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$e_{ante}^K$</th>
<th>$e_{post}^K$</th>
<th>$e_K$</th>
<th>$\bar{e}_K$</th>
<th>Optimal $\tau_K$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth in the Utility</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Either</td>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$= e_K$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$= e_K$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Anticipated</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unanticipated</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>Anticipated</td>
<td>Aiyagari (1995)</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$\leq e_K, &lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unanticipated</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Anticipated</td>
<td>Chamley-Judd</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unanticipated</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous $\delta(c_t)$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Anticipated</td>
<td>Judd (1985)</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>$\infty$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unanticipated</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$&lt; e_K$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&lt; \infty$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents a comparison of supply elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return and optimal capital income tax rates across various models. Column (1) indicates the type of utility function. Column (2) indicates whether there are transitional dynamics (which is equivalent to whether the utility is linear vs. concave in consumption). Column (3) indicates whether there is uncertainty in future labor incomes and preferences. Column (4) indicates whether the tax reform determining the optimal tax rate is anticipated (in the long-distance future) or unanticipated (at time zero). Column (5) indicates the Section in the paper covering the model or whether an existing paper in the literature covers it. Columns (6)-(9) describes the magnitude of the four elasticities: $e_{ante}^K$ the anticipation response elasticity, $e_{post}^K$ the post-reform elasticity, $e_K$ the long-run steady state elasticity. Recall that $\bar{e}_K = e_{ante}^K + e_{post}^K$ and typically $e_{post}^K < e_K$. Column (10) describes the sign and magnitude of the optimal linear tax rate $\tau_K$ on capital income. It is assumed that $\bar{g}_K < 1$ so that taxing capital income is desirable (absent any behavioral response). Adding wealth in the utility to the Aiyagari model does not change the predictions.
Appendix

A.1 Proofs for Section 2

Proof of Proposition 2.

We derive the optimal capital tax. The optimal labor tax is derived exactly in the same way.

Consider a small reform $\delta T_K(rk)$ in which the marginal tax rate is increased by $\delta \tau_K$ in a small band from capital income $rk$ to $rk + d(rk)$, but left unchanged anywhere else. This reform has a mechanical revenue effect, a behavioral effect, and a welfare effect.

The mechanical revenue effect above capital income $rk$ is

$$d(rk)\delta \tau_K[1 - H_K(rk)].$$

The behavioral effect comes only from taxpayers with capital income in the range $[rk, rk + d(rk)]$. Thanks to the linear utility (i.e., no income effects), taxpayers above $rk$ do not respond to the tax rates since they do not face a change in their marginal tax rate. Taxpayers in the small band have a behavioral response to the higher marginal tax rate. They each reduce their capital income by $\delta K(rk) = -e_K \delta \tau_K / (1 - T'_K(rk))$ where $e_K$ is the elasticity of capital income $rk$ with respect to the net-of-tax return $r(1 - T'_K(rk))$. As there are $h_K(rk)d(rk)$ taxpayers affected by the change in marginal tax rates, the resulting loss in tax revenue is equal to:

$$-d(rk)\delta \tau_K \cdot h_K(rk)e_K(rk)rk \frac{T'_K(rk)}{1 - T'_K(rk)};$$

with $e_K(rk)$, as defined in the text, the average elasticity of capital income in the small band.

The change in tax revenue is rebated lump-sum to all taxpayers. The value of this lump-sum transfer to society is $\int_i g_i = 1$ due to the absence of income effects (the lump-sum rebate also does not change any behavior with linear utility).

By definition of the average social marginal welfare weight above $rk$, $\bar{G}_K(rk)$, in (10), the welfare effect on the tax payers above $rk$ who pay more tax $\delta \tau_K \cdot d(rk)$ is:

$$-\delta \tau_K \cdot d(rk) \int_{i:rk \geq rk} g_i = -\delta \tau_K \cdot d(rk)(1 - H_K(rk))\bar{G}_K(rk).$$

At the optimum, the sum of the mechanical revenue effect, the behavioral effect, and the
welfare effect needs to be zero, which requires that:

\[
d(rk)\delta \tau_K \cdot \left[ 1 - H_K(rk) - h_K(rk) \cdot e_K(rk) \cdot rk \cdot \frac{T'_K(rk)}{1 - T'_K(rk)} \right]
\]

\[
- d(rk)\delta \tau_K \cdot (1 - H_K(rk)) \cdot \bar{G}_K(rk) = 0.
\]

We can divide everything by \(d(rk)\delta \tau_K\) and re-arrange to obtain:

\[
\frac{T'_K(rk)}{1 - T'_K(rk)} = \frac{1}{e_K(rk)} \cdot \frac{1 - H_K(rk)}{rk \cdot h_K(rk)} \cdot (1 - \bar{G}_K(rk)).
\]

Using the definition of the local Pareto parameter \(\alpha_K(rk) = \frac{rh_K(rk)}{1 - H_K(rk)}\), we obtain the capital tax formula in the proposition. The optimal marginal labor tax formula is derived in the same way, replacing capital income \(rk\) with labor income \(z\).

**Proof of Proposition 3.**

Let \(G\) be government revenue. The change in revenue from a change in the capital income tax \(d\tau_K\) is:

\[
dG = rk^m \left[ 1 - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \cdot e_K - \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_K} \cdot e_L \cdot (1 - \tau_K) \cdot \frac{z^m}{rk^m} \right] \cdot d\tau_K.
\]

Hence the change in social welfare is:

\[
\frac{dSWF}{d\tau_K} = \int g_i \left( -rk_i + \frac{dG}{d\tau_K} \right) = \left( \int g_i \right) \cdot \left( -\int g_i rk_i + \frac{dG}{d\tau_K} \right).
\]

Setting this to zero and using the definition of \(\bar{g}_K = \frac{\int g_i k_i}{\int g_i k^m}\), yields:

\[
\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K - \tau_L e_L (1 - \tau_K) \cdot \frac{z^m}{rk^m}}{1 - \bar{g}_K + e_K},
\]

which is the optimal capital tax formula with joint preferences and cross-elasticities. The optimal labor tax formula with cross elasticities can be derived exactly symmetrically.

**Proof of Proposition 4.**

The derivation of the optimal tax on comprehensive income follows exactly the proof of Proposition 2 above, replacing capital income \(rk\) with total income \(y\).

**Proof of Proposition 5.**
The government maximizes:

\[ SWF = \int_i \omega_i U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i, x_i) \]

with \( U_i(c_i, k_i, z_i, x_i) = \dot{r}k_i + (1 - \tau_L)z_i + (\tau_L - \tau_K)x_i + \tau_L(z^m - x^m) + \tau_K(rk^m + x^m) + a_i(k_i) - h_i(z_i) - d_i(x_i) + \delta_i \cdot (k_i^{init} - k_i). \)

The first order conditions with respect to \( \tau_L \) and \( \tau_K \) are:

\[
\int_i \omega_i (z^m - x^m - (z_i - x_i)) - \tau_L \frac{dz^m}{d(1 - \tau_L)} - (\tau_L - \tau_K) \frac{dx^m}{d\tau_L} = 0,
\]

\[
\int_i \omega_i (rk^m + x^m - (rk_i + x_i)) - \tau_K r \frac{dk^m}{d(1 - \tau_K)} - (\tau_L - \tau_K) \frac{dx^m}{d\tau_K} = 0.
\]

Since \( x_i \) depends only on \( \tau_L - \tau_K \), we have that: \( \frac{dx^m}{d\tau_L} = -\frac{dz^m}{d(1 - \tau_L)} = \frac{dx^m}{d(\tau_L - \tau_K)}. \) Let \( \Delta \tau \equiv \tau_L - \tau_K. \) The FOCs can be rewritten as:

\[
\frac{z^m - x^m - \int_i \omega_i (z_i - x_i)}{\frac{dz^m}{d(1 - \tau_L)}} - \Delta \tau \frac{\frac{dz^m}{d(\tau_L - \tau_K)}}{\frac{dx^m}{d(1 - \tau_L)}} = \tau_L,
\]

\[
n\frac{rk^m + x^m - \int_i \omega_i (rk_i + x_i)}{r \frac{dk^m}{d(1 - \tau_K)}} + \Delta \tau \frac{\frac{dk^m}{d(\tau_L - \tau_K)}}{r \frac{dx^m}{d(1 - \tau_K)}} = \tau_K.
\]

Let us simplify notation a bit and denote:

\[ z' \equiv \frac{dz^m}{d(1 - \tau_L)} \quad k' \equiv \frac{dk^m}{d(1 - \tau_K)} \quad x' \equiv \frac{dx^m}{d(\tau_L - \tau_K)}. \]

Taking the difference of those two equations, we can express \( \Delta \tau \) as

\[
\Delta \tau \left(1 + x' \left(\frac{1}{z'} + \frac{1}{rk'}\right)\right) = \frac{z^m - x^m - \int_i \omega_i (z_i - x_i)}{z'} - \frac{rk^m + x^m - \int_i \omega_i (rk_i + x_i)}{rk'}, \quad (A1)
\]

Since \( (1 + x' \left(\frac{1}{z'} + \frac{1}{rk'}\right)) > 0 \), the sign of \( \Delta \tau \) is that of the right-hand side of the above expression.

\[
\Delta \tau > 0 \iff \frac{z^m - x^m - \int_i \omega_i (z_i - x_i)}{z'} > \frac{rk^m + x^m - \int_i \omega_i (rk_i + x_i)}{rk'}.
\]

Define the distributional factor of shifted income, by analogy to the distributional factors \( \bar{g}_K \)
and \(\bar{g}_L\) for capital and labor income.

\[
\bar{g}_X = \frac{i \omega_i x_i}{z_m}.
\]

The right-hand side of (A1) can be rewritten as:

\[
\text{RHS} = 1 - \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_L + \bar{g}_X}{e_L} \cdot \frac{\tau_L}{1-\tau_L} - 1 + \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_K - \bar{g}_X z_m^m}{e_K} \cdot \frac{\tau_K}{1-\tau_K}.
\]

Hence:

\[
\Delta \tau > 0 \iff \frac{1 - \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_L + \bar{g}_X}{e_L}}{\tau_L} > \frac{1 + \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_K - \bar{g}_X z_m^m}{e_K}}{\tau_K}.
\]

Suppose that \(\bar{g}_X\) is small enough – otherwise, encouraging “shifting” may be good for distributional reasons. Formally, for \(x_m > 0\),

\[
\frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_X z_m^m}{r_k^m} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_X}{z_m^m} > 0.
\]

Conversely, for \(x_m < 0\), we have \(\bar{g}_X < 0\), and we assume that \(\bar{g}_X\) is small relative to \(x_m\) in absolute value.

\[
\frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_X z_m^m}{r_k^m} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_X}{z_m^m} < 0.
\]

We can then write:

\[
\Delta \tau > 0 \iff e_K > e_L \cdot \frac{1 - \tau_K}{1-\tau_L} \cdot \frac{(1 + \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_K - \bar{g}_X z_m^m}{r_k^m})}{(1 - \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_L + \bar{g}_X}{e_L})}.
\]

If \(\Delta \tau = 0\), there is no shifting and hence \(x_i = 0\) for all \(i\) and \(x_m = 0\), and hence \(\bar{g}_X = 0\). Therefore,

\[
\text{If } \Delta \tau = 0: \quad e_K = e_L \cdot \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_L}.
\]

If \(\Delta \tau > 0\), then \(x_m > 0\) and \(e_K > e_L \cdot \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_L}\).

Conversely, if \(\Delta \tau < 0\), then \(x_m < 0\) and \(e_K < e_L \cdot \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_L}\).

Thus:

\[
\Delta \tau \leq 0 \iff e_K \geq e_L \cdot \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_L}.
\]

We can now rewrite the FOCs as:

\[
z_m^m(1 - \frac{x_m^m - \bar{g}_L + \bar{g}_X}{z_m^m}) - \Delta \tau x^i = z_m^m e_L \frac{\tau_L}{1-\tau_L},
\]

55
\[ rk^m(1 + \frac{x^m}{rk^m} - \bar{g}_K - \bar{g}_X \frac{z^m}{rk^m}) + \Delta \tau x' = rk^m \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K}. \]

We distinguish three cases:

- If \( e_K > e_L \frac{(1 - \bar{g}_K)}{(1 - \bar{g}_L)} \), then \( \Delta \tau > 0 \) and

\[ e_L \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_L} < 1 - \frac{x^m}{z^m} \bar{g}_L + \bar{g}_X < 1 - \bar{g}_L. \]

and in this case:

\[ e_K \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} > (1 + \frac{x^m}{rk^m} - \bar{g}_K - \bar{g}_X \frac{z^m}{rk^m}) > 1 - \bar{g}_K. \]

So that the optimal tax rates with shifting are bracketed by their revenue maximizing rates.

- If there is no shifting, \( x \equiv 0 \) then revenue maximizing rates apply.

- If \( x' \) is very large (very sensitive shifting to any tax differential), then from equation (A1), we have that \( \Delta \tau \approx 0 \) and hence \( \tau_L \approx \tau_K \). Summing the FOCs and using this equality yields \( \tau_L = \tau_K = \tau_Y \) where \( \tau_Y \) is the optimal linear tax rate on comprehensive income derived in Proposition 4.

**Proof of Proposition 6.**

Let us compare the following two regimes considered in the text:

- **Regime 1** - Consumption tax regime: \((\bar{r}, T_L, \tau_C)\), with an initial lump-sum transfer \( \tau_C \cdot k_{i}^{\text{init}} / (1 - \tau_C) \) to wealth holders with initial wealth \( k_{i}^{\text{init}} \).
- **Regime 2** - No consumption tax regime: \((\bar{r}, \hat{T}_L, \tau_C = 0)\) with \( z - \hat{T}_L(z) = (z - T_L(z)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) \). Let \( \tilde{k}_i \) denote the steady state wealth choice under this regime.

We will show that these regimes are equivalent in the steady state, in the consumer’s dynamic optimization problem, and in the government’s revenue raised, as claimed in the text.

**Steady-state equivalence:**

The budget constraint in regime 1 is: \( \dot{k} = [\bar{r}k + z - T_L(z)] - c / (1 - \tau_C) + G \), where \( G = \tau_Lz^m + \tau_Krk^m + t_{C} \cdot c^m \) is the lump-sum transfer rebate of tax revenue. The budget constraint can be rewritten in terms of real wealth as: \( \dot{k}^r = \bar{r}k^r + (z - T_L(z)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) + G \cdot (1 - \tau_C) - c. \)
Utility is:

$$u_i = c_i + a_i(k_i^r) - h_i(z_i).$$

The first-order conditions of the individual are:

$$(1 - T'_L(z_i)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) = h'_i(z_i), \quad a'_i(k_i^r) = \delta_i - \bar{r}. \quad (1 - T'_L(z_i)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) = (1 - T'_L(z_i)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) \quad \text{for all} \quad z_i,$$

Given that $$(1 - T'_L(z_i)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C)$$ is the same in regime 1 and regime 2 as long as the real lump-sum transfer $$G \cdot (1 - \tau_C)$$ is not affected, which we prove right below. The link between the two capital levels is: $$\tilde{k}_i = (1 - \tau_C) \cdot k_i$$ (since real steady state wealth is unaffected).

**Equivalence of the dynamic consumer optimization problem.**

The law of motion in real-wealth equivalent, $$\ddot{k'} = \bar{r}k' + (z - T_L(z)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) + G \cdot (1 - \tau_C) - c$$, is the same in regime 1 and regime 2 as long as the real lump-sum transfer $$(1 - \tau_C) \cdot G$$ is the same, which we show below. The initial wealth after the lump-sum transfer $$\tau_C \cdot k_{i \text{init}} / (1 - \tau_C)$$ from the government becomes $$k_{i \text{init}} + \tau_C \cdot k_{i \text{init}} / (1 - \tau_C) = k_{i \text{init}} / (1 - \tau_C)$$, so that real wealth after the transfer is $$k_{i \text{init}}$$, the same it was in the tax regime without a consumption tax.

**Equivalence of government revenue.**

In regime 1, there is first the initial cost of providing the lump-sum $$\tau_C \cdot \int k_{i \text{init}} / (1 - \tau_C)$$ to all initial wealth holders. At the same time, the initial consumption change is taxed, which yields: $$\tau_C \cdot \int (k_{i \text{init}} - k_i) / (1 - \tau_C)$$.

In real terms, this is worth:

$$A = -\tau_C \cdot \int k_i.$$

The nominal tax flow per period under this regime is (which is also equal to the lump-sum transfer per-period in nominal terms is $$G$$):

$$G = \frac{\tau_C}{1 - \tau_C} \int c_i + \int T_L(z_i) + \int \tau_K r k_i.$$  

We can express consumption under this regime as:

$$c_i = (z_i - T_L(z_i)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C) + \bar{r}(1 - \tau_C)k_i + G(1 - \tau_C).$$

and aggregate consumption as:
\[
\int_i c_i = (1 - \tau_C) \int_i (z_i - T_L(z_i)) + \bar{r}(1 - \tau_C) \int_i k_i + G(1 - \tau_C).
\]

Solving for \(G\) using the definition of \(G\) and the expression for aggregate consumption yields:

\[
G = \int_i T_L(z_i) + \frac{\tau_C}{1 - \tau_C} \left( \int_i z_i + \bar{r} \int_i k_i \right) + \frac{1}{1 - \tau_C} \int_i \tau_K r k_i.
\]

In real terms, revenue is:

\[
(1 - \tau_C) \cdot G = (1 - \tau_C) \int_i T_L(z_i) + \tau_C \int_i z_i + \tau_C \bar{r} \int_i k_i + \int_i \tau_K r k_i.
\]

In Regime 2, the (real) revenue is:

\[
\int_i \hat{T}_L(z_i) + \int_i \tau_K r k_i.
\]

Using the map between the labor income taxes: \((z - \hat{T}_L(z)) = (z - T_L(z)) \cdot (1 - \tau_C)\), we obtain that the real revenue in Regime 2 is:

\[
\int_i (\tau_G z + T_L(z) \cdot (1 - \tau_C)) + \int_i \tau_K r k_i.
\]

The difference between the per-period real revenue in regime 1 and that in regime 2 is hence: \(\tau_C \int_i r k_i\). Recall that the initial change in revenue in regime 1 was \(A = -\tau_C \cdot \int_i k_i\), which, converted into a per-period equivalent is exactly \(A \cdot r = -\tau_C \cdot \int_i r k_i\) and cancels out perfectly the change in per-period revenue between the two regimes.

### A.2 Proofs for Section 4

#### A.1 Generalized Model

**Proof of Proposition 8**

The steady state is characterized by: \(u_{ik}/u_{ic} = \delta_i - r(1 - T_K')\), \(u_{ic} \cdot (1 - T_L') = -u_{iz}\) and \(c_i = r k_i + z_i - T(z_i, r k_i)\).

With linear taxes, this simplifies to: \(u_{ik}/u_{ic} = \delta_i - \bar{r}\), \(u_{ic} \cdot (1 - \tau_L) = -u_{iz}\) and \(c_i = \bar{r} k_i + z_i(1 - \tau_L)\).

First, consider the case with exogenous labor income. Let us assume that the economy has converged to the steady state. Consider a small reform \(d\tau_K\) that takes place at time 0 and is
unanticipated. Let us denote by $e_K(t)$ the elasticity of aggregate $k^m(t)$ with respect to $1 - \tau_K$. $e_K(t)$ converges to $e_K$ from the original analysis (the long-run steady state elasticity). Using the envelope theorem (i.e., behavioral responses $dk_{ki}$ can be ignored when computing $dV_i$), the effect on the welfare of individual $i$ is:

$$dV_i = d\tau_K \cdot \delta_i \left[ \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t)) r k^m(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} - \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t)) r k_1(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} \right. $$

$$- \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t)) r k^m(t) e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt.$$

In the steady state, $k^m(t)$ and $c_i(t)$, $k_i(t)$ are time-constant so that:

$$dV_i = d\tau_K \cdot r k^m \left[ u_{ic}(c_i, k_i) - u_{ic}(c_i, k_i) \frac{k_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_{ic}(c_i, k_i) \int_0^\infty e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt. \right]$$

The change in social welfare is $dSWF = \int i \omega_i dV_i$ so that:

$$dSWF = \int_i d\tau_K \cdot r k^m \omega_i \left[ u_{ic}(c_i, k_i) - u_{ic}(c_i, k_i) \frac{k_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_{ic}(c_i, k_i) \int_0^\infty e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt. \right]$$

Recall the normalization of social welfare weights: $\int i \omega_i u_{ic} = 1$ and $g_i = \omega_i u_{ic}$. Hence,

$$dSWF \propto 1 - \int_i g_i \frac{k_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_i g_i \int_0^\infty e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt.$$

With endogenous labor supply, the change in individual $i$’s welfare, $dV_i$:

$$dV_i = d\tau_K \cdot \delta_i \left[ \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) r k^m(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} - \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) r k_1(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} \right. $$

$$- \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) r k^m(t) e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt$$

$$- \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) e_{L,1 - \tau_K}(t) z^m(t) e^{-\delta t} dt.$$

In the steady state, $k^m(t)$, $z^m(t)$, $c_i(t)$, $z_i(t)$, and $k_i(t)$ are time-constant, so that the change in individual $i$’s utility is:

$$dV_i = d\tau_K \cdot r k^m \left[ u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) - u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) \frac{k_i}{k^m} \right.$$

$$- \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) \int_0^\infty e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt - \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) z^m(t) \int_0^\infty e_{L,1 - \tau_K}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt.$$

59
and the change in social welfare is:

\[
dSWF = \int \omega_i dV_i = \int d\tau_K \cdot r k^m \omega_i \left[ u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) - u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) \frac{k_i}{k^m} \right] - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) \int_0^\infty e_K(t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt - \int \delta_i u_{ic}(c_i, k_i, z_i) \int_0^\infty e_{L,1-\tau_K(t)} \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt.
\]

Using the normalization of social welfare weights: \( \int \omega_i u_{ic} = 1 \) and \( g_i = \omega_i u_{ic} \).

\[
dSWF \propto 1 - \int \frac{g_i k_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int \delta_i g_i \int_0^\infty e_K(t) e^{-\delta_i t} dt - \int \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_K} \frac{z^m}{r k^m} \int \delta_i g_i \int_0^\infty e_{L,1-\tau_K(t)} e^{-\delta_i t} dt,
\]

which yields the formula in the text.

**Proof of Proposition 9**

We consider the top tax rate \( \tau_K \) on capital above threshold \( k^{top} \). As \( r \) is uniform, this is equivalent to a top tax rate applying above capital income threshold \( rk^{top} \). Let \( N \) denote the fraction of individuals above \( k^{top} \). We again use the notation \( k^{m, top} \) to denote the average wealth above the top threshold, i.e.:

\[
k^{m, top} = \frac{\int_{i: k_i(t) \geq k^{top}} r k_i}{N},
\]

Suppose we change the top tax rate on capital by \( d\tau_K \). As defined in the text, let \( \epsilon_{K}^{top}(t) \) be the elasticity of capital holding of top capital earners (the wealth elasticity of total wealth to the tax rate of those with capital income above \( rk^{top} \)). For all individuals above the cutoff, the change in utility is:

\[
dV_i = d\tau_K \delta_i \left[ \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t)) N r (k^{m, top}(t) - k^{top}) e^{-\delta_i t} dt - \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t)) r (k_i(t) - k^{top}) e^{-\delta_i t} dt \right] - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t)) N r k^{m, top}(t) \epsilon_{K}^{top}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt.
\]

Starting from the steady state, capital levels are constant so that:

\[
dV_i = u_{ic} r (k^{m, top} - k^{top}) N d\tau_K \left[ 1 - \frac{(k_i - k^{top})}{(k^{m, top} - k^{top}) N} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \frac{\epsilon_{K}^{top}(t)}{N} \int_0^\infty e_{K}^{top}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta_i t} dt \right],
\]

where \( \epsilon_{K}^{top} = \frac{k^{m, top}}{(k^{m, top} - k^{top})} \).
For individuals below the cutoff, the change in utility is:

\[ dV_i = u_{ic}(k_{\text{m, top}} - k_{\text{top}})N \delta \int_0^\infty \delta u_{ic}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt. \]

The change in social welfare is such that:

\[ dSWF \propto 1 - \int \frac{g_i(k_i - k_{\text{top}})}{(k_{\text{m, top}} - k_{\text{top}})N} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty e_{i,K}^\top(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt. \]

Let

\[ \bar{g}_K^\top \equiv \int_i g_i(k_i - k_{\text{top}}) \quad \text{and} \quad e_{i,K}^\top \equiv \int_i g_i \int_0^\infty e_{i,K}^\top(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt. \]

Then, we obtain the optimal tax rate \( \tau_K \) such that \( dSWF = 0 \):

\[ \tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K^\top}{1 - \bar{g}_K^\top + a_{K}^\top \bar{e}_{K}^\top}. \]

With endogenous labor, let

\[ e_{L,(1-\tau_K)}(t) = \frac{dz^m(t)}{d(1 - \tau_K)} \frac{(1 - \tau_K)}{z^m(t)} = \frac{dz^m(t)}{d\tilde{r}} \frac{\tilde{r}}{N z^m(t)}. \]

be the elasticity of aggregate (average) labor income \( z^m \) with respect to the top capital tax rate, normalized by \( N \), in the two bracket tax system.

For all individuals with capital income above the cutoff:

\[ dV_i = d\tau_K \cdot \delta_i \left[ \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))N r(k_{\text{m, top}} - k_{\text{top}}) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt \right. \]

\[ - \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))z^m(t)N e_{L,(1-\tau_K)}(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt \]

\[ - \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))r(k_i(t) - k_{\text{top}}) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt \]

\[ - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t))N k_{\text{m, top}} e_{i,K}^\top(t) \cdot e^{-\delta t} dt. \]
Starting from the steady state, capital and labor income are constant over time:

\[
dV_i = u_i \cdot N r (k^{m, top} - k^{top}) d\tau_K \cdot \left[ 1 - \frac{(k_i - k^{top})}{(k^{m, top} - k^{top})} \right]
\]

\[
- \frac{\tau_L}{1 - \tau_K} \frac{z^m}{r (k^{m, top} - k^{top})} \int_0^\infty \delta_1 e_L (1 - \tau_K) (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt = - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \frac{a_{K, top}}{L} \int_0^\infty \delta_1 e_{K, top} (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt.
\]

The change in social welfare is:

\[
dSWF = \int_i \omega_i dV_i \propto 1 - \int_{i : r_i \geq r_{K, top}} \frac{(k_i - k^{top})}{(k^{m, top} - k^{top})} N g_i \left[ \int_0^\infty \delta_1 e_L (1 - \tau_K) (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \frac{a_{K, top}}{L} \int_0^\infty \delta_1 e_{K, top} (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt \right].
\]

Define \( e_{K, top} \), \( e_L (1 - \tau_K) \), and \( g_{K, top} \) as in the text. The optimal formula in the text is then obtained by rearranging the previous condition.

### A.2 Anticipated Reforms in the Generalized Model

Consider anticipated reform to the capital income tax \( d\tau_K \) at time \( T > 0 \). Capital and labor already start adjusting in anticipation of the reform before time \( T \). The change in the utility of individual \( i \) is:

\[
dV_i = d\tau_K \cdot \delta_i \left[ \int_T^\infty u_i (c_i (t), k_i (t)) r k^m (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt - \int_T^\infty u_i (c_i (t), k_i (t)) r k_i (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt \right.
\]

\[
- \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \int_0^\infty u_i (c_i (t), k_i (t)) r k^m (t) e_k (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 t} \, dt \left].
\]

In the steady state, \( k^m (t) \) and \( c_i (t), k_i (t) \) are time-constant, hence we have:

\[
dV_i = d\tau_K r k^m e^{-\delta_1 T} \cdot \left[ u_i (c_i, k_i) - u_i (c_i, k_i) \frac{k_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_i (c_i, k_i) \int_{t < T} e_k (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 (t - T)} \, dt \right.
\]

\[
- \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta_i u_i (c_i, k_i) \int_{t \geq T} e_k (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 (t - T)} \, dt \right].
\]

As explained in the text, we assume homogeneous discount rates across individuals. Using that \( \int_i g_i = \int_i u_i \omega_i = 1 \), we can write \( dSWF = \int_i \omega_i dV_i \):

\[
dSWF \propto 1 - \int_i \frac{g_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta \int_{t < T} e_k (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 (t - T)} \, dt - \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \delta \int_{t \geq T} e_k (t) \cdot e^{-\delta_1 (t - T)} \, dt.
\]
Defining the distributional factor \( \bar{g}_K = \int_i g_i k_i^m \) and the anticipation elasticity \( e^\text{ante}_K \), the post elasticity \( e^\text{post}_K \) and the total elasticity \( \bar{e}_K = e^\text{ante}_K + e^\text{post}_K \), we obtain the optimal tax rate \( \tau_K \) such that \( dSWF = 0 \):

\[
\tau_K = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_K}{1 - \bar{g}_K + \bar{e}_K}.
\]

With endogenous labor, the anticipation effects through the cross-elasticities can also start before the reform. The effect on labor is then also augmented by the anticipation cross-elasticities, yielding the elasticity \( \bar{e}_{L_1} \) as defined in the proposition.

### A.3 Aiyagari (1995) Model with and without anticipation effects

Note that all proofs below would be exactly the same as the proofs for wealth-in-the-utility if we reformulated it in discrete time, replacing the standard utility without wealth in the utility, \( u_{ti}(c_{ti}) \), by \( u_{ti}(c_{ti}, k_{ti}) \). This is done by letting \( u'_{ti} \) denote \( \frac{\partial u_{ti}(c_{ti}, k_{ti})}{\partial c_{ti}} \) instead of \( \frac{\partial u_{ti}(c_{ti})}{\partial c_{ti}} \).

We apply the envelope theorem, which states that the changes in the capital tax rate \( d\tau_K \) only has a direct impact on utility through the direct reduction in consumption that it causes. Using this, and taking the derivative of the social welfare \( SWF \) with respect to \( d\tau_K \) yields:

\[
dSWF = \sum_{t < T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} \cdot (r \tau_K k_i^m + r \tau_K k_i^m) + \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} \cdot (r \tau_K k_i^m - k_{ti}) + \tau_K r k_i^m \right)
\]

\[
= -d\tau_K \left( \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \left[ \sum_{t < T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t r k_i^m e_{Kt} \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} + \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t r k_i^m e_{Kt} \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} \right] \right)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} \cdot r (k_i^m - k_{ti})
\]

\[
= -d\tau_K \left( \frac{\tau_K}{1 - \tau_K} \left[ \sum_{t \geq 0} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t r k_i^m e_{Kt} \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} \right] - \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^t \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} \cdot r (k_i^m - k_{ti}) \right).
\]

If variables have already converged to their ergodic paths when the anticipation responses start: then all terms in \( e_{Kt} \) are zero before the steady state has been reached and hence, we can divide through by \( \int_i \omega_i u'_{ti} k_i^m = \int_i g_i k_i^m \) which is constant across \( t \). Thus:

\[
dSWF \propto \frac{\tau_K}{(1 - \tau_K)} \left( \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} \sum_{t < T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt} + \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt} \right) - 1 + \int_i g_i k_i^m.
\]
Define the anticipation responses \( e_{K}^{ante} \), the post-reform response \( e_{K}^{post} \), and the total response \( \bar{e}_{K} \) to be:

\[
e_{K}^{ante} = \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} \sum_{t < T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt}, \quad e_{K}^{post} = \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt}, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{e}_{K} = e_{K}^{ante} + e_{K}^{post}.
\]

and the distributional factor \( \bar{g}_{K} = \frac{\int_{i} g_{Kt}}{\int_{i} \bar{g}_{K}} \). Then we have as in the text that the optimal capital tax in the Aiyagari (1995) model is given by:

\[
\tau_{K} = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_{K}}{1 - \bar{g}_{K} + \bar{e}_{K}}.
\]

For the unanticipated reform at time \( T = 0 \) that is studied in the text, assume that the economy is already in the steady state as of time 0, and set \( e_{K}^{ante} = 0 \) so that:

\[
\bar{e}_{K} = \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta} \sum_{t \geq 0} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} e_{Kt}.
\]

If variables have not converged to their ergodic paths when the anticipation responses start: we have to take into account the transition of the marginal utilities and the capital stock across time.

\[
dSWF = -d\tau_{K} \left( \frac{\tau_{K}}{1 - \tau_{K}} \right) \left[ \sum_{t < T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} r k_{t}^{m} e_{Kt} \int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \right] - \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot r (k_{t}^{m} - k_{ti}) \right].
\]

Dividing by \( \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{t}^{m} \) yields:

\[
dSWF \propto \frac{\tau_{K}}{1 - \tau_{K}} \left[ \sum_{t < T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} k_{t}^{m} e_{Kt} \int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \right] \frac{\int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{t}^{m}}{\sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{t}^{m}} - 1 + \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \frac{\int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{ti}}{\sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \int_{i} \omega_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{t}^{m}}.
\]

Now we have to redefine the average welfare weight as:

\[
\bar{g}_{K} = \sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \frac{\int_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{ti}}{\sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \right)^{t} \int_{i} u_{ti}^{'} \cdot k_{t}^{m}}.
\]
In the steady state, we can hence write

$$\overline{e}_K = \sum_{t \geq 0} \left( \frac{1}{1+\delta} \right)^t k_t^m e_{Kt} \frac{\int_1 u'_{ti}}{\sum_{t \geq T} \left( \frac{1}{1+\delta} \right)^t \int_1 u'_{ti} \cdot k_t^m}.$$ 

With these redefined variables, the same formula holds.

**A.4 Judd (1985) Model**

In the Judd (1985) model, individual utility is:

$$V_i\{c_i(t), z_i(t), k_i(t)\}_{t \geq 0} = \int_0^\infty u_i(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) e^{-\int_0^t \delta_i(c_i(s)) ds} dt.$$ 

The effect on $V_i$ from a small change in the capital tax $d\tau_K$ is now:

$$dV_i = d\tau_K \left[ \int_{t=0}^\infty \left( u_{ic}(c_i(t), k_i(t), z_i(t)) e^{-\int_0^t \delta_i(c_i(s)) ds} + \delta_i'(c_i(t)) \int_t^\infty u_i(s) e^{-\int_0^s \delta_i(c_i(m)) dm} ds \right) \times \left( rk^m(t) - r k_i(t) - \frac{\tau_K}{1-\tau_K} r k^m(t) e_{Kt} \right) dt \right].$$

In the steady state, we can hence write $dV_i$ as:

$$d\tau_K \left[ \int_0^\infty \left( u_{ic} e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} + \delta_i'(c_i) u_i e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\delta_i(c_i)(s-t)} ds \right) \left( k^m(t) - k_i(t) - \frac{\tau_K}{1-\tau_K} k^m(t) e_{Kt} \right) dt \right]$$

$$= d\tau_K \left[ \left( u_{ic} \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} dt + \delta_i'(c_i) u_i \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} \frac{1}{\delta_i(c_i)} dt \right) \times \left[ k^m(t) - k_i(t) \right] 
- \left( u_{ic} e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} + \delta_i'(c_i) u_i e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} ds \right) \frac{\tau_K}{1-\tau_K} k^m(t) e_{Kt} \right]$$

$$= d\tau_K k^m \left( u_{ic} + \frac{\delta_i'(c_i)}{\delta_i(c_i)} u_i \right) \left[ 1 - \frac{k_i}{k^m} - \frac{\tau_K}{1-\tau_K} \delta_i(c_i) \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta_i(c_i)t} e_{Kt} \right].$$

We can hence see that the formulas from our model apply but with $g_i$ and $\overline{e}_K$ as redefined in the text.
A.1 Steady State and Anticipation Elasticities

We now prove two further results.

Steady state elasticities are finite with wealth in the utility.

With a general utility and wealth in the utility, the first-order condition for agent $i$ in the steady state is:

$$u_{ki} = (\delta_i - \bar{r})u_{ci}$$

In the steady state, the budget constraint is:

$$c_i = \bar{r}k_i + z_i$$

hence the steady state can be rewritten as: $(\delta_i - \bar{r})u_{ci}(\bar{r}k_i + z_i, k_i) = u_{ki}(\bar{r}k_i + z_i, k_i)$ which is a
smooth function of $k_i$, as long as the function $u_i(c_i, k_i)$ is smooth and concave in consumption and capital. Hence, the responses of consumption and capital to the net-of-tax return $\bar{r}$ are smooth and non-degenerate. The same argument holds with endogenous labor supply, which is chosen smoothly.

**Anticipation elasticities are infinite with wealth in the utility and certainty, but finite with uncertainty (with or without wealth in the utility).**

We can also show that the anticipation elasticities to a reform $d\tau_K$ for $t \geq T$ is infinite when there is full certainty, even with wealth in the utility. The proof is as in ? for the Chamley-Judd model (without wealth in the utility).

With full certainty, the first-order condition of the agent with respect to capital always holds:

$$u_{ci,t} = \frac{(1 + \bar{r})}{(1 + \delta_i)}u_{ci,t+1} + 1/(1 + \delta_i)u_{ki,t+1}$$

Suppose we start from a situation in a well-defined steady state: $(\delta_i - \bar{r})u_{ci} = u_{ki}$ where we have perfect consumption smoothing.

The intertemporal budget constraint is:

$$\sum_{t \geq 0} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r} \right)^t c_{ti} + \lim_{t \to \infty} k_{ti} = \sum_{t \geq 0} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r} \right)^t z_{ti} + k_{0i}$$

Consumption smoothing implies:

$$u_{ci}(\bar{r}k_i + z_i, k_i) = \lambda$$

for the multiplier $\lambda$ on the budget constraint. Hence, $k_i^\infty = \lim_{t \to \infty} k_{ti} > 0$. Given that there is perfect consumption smoothing, using the budget constraint to solve for consumption yields:

$$c = \left(1 - \frac{1}{1 + r}\right)\left(\sum_{t \geq 0} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r} \right)^t z_{ti} + k_{0i} - k_i^\infty\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A1)
Consider what happens if the capital tax rate increases by \( d\tau_K > 0 \) for \( t \geq T \). The present discounted value of all resources, denoted by \( Y_i \) for agent \( i \) is:

\[
Y_i = k_{i0} + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t z_{ti} + \sum_{t>T} \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t z_{ti}
\]

The change in resources evaluated at \( \tau_K = 0 \) is:

\[
dY_i = \left( \frac{1}{(1+r)} \right)^T \sum_{t \geq T} t \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^{t-T+1} z_{ti} d\tau_K \propto \left( \frac{1}{(1+r)} \right)^T d\tau_K
\]

Hence, consumption pre-reform will shift down by a factor proportional to \( \left( \frac{1}{(1+r)} \right)^T d\tau_K \). From the aggregated budget constraint we have that:

\[
k_{t}^m = (1+r)^t k_{0}^m - e_0^m (1 + (1+r) + (1+r)^2 + ... + (1+r)^{t-1}) + (z_{t-1}^m + .. + (1+r)^{t-1}z_{0}^m)
\]

Therefore, the change in the aggregate capital stock is:

\[
dk_{t}^m = -dc_{0}^m \left( \frac{(1+r)^{t-1} - 1}{r} \right)
\]

Recall that the change in consumption (from (A1)) is proportional to \( \left( \frac{1}{(1+r)} \right)^T d\tau_K \). Hence:

\[
dk_{t}^m \propto -\left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^T \left( \frac{(1+r)^{t-1} - 1}{r} \right) d\tau_K = -(1+r)^{-T} \left( \frac{(1+r)^{t-1} - 1}{r} \right) d\tau_K
\]

Hence:

\[
e_{Kt} \propto k_{t}^m (1+r)^{-T} \left( \frac{(1+r)^{t-1} - 1}{r} \right) d\tau_K
\]

Recall that the anticipation elasticity \( e_{Kt}^{ante} \) is defined as:

\[
e_{Kt}^{ante} = \frac{\delta}{1+\delta} \sum_{t<T} \left( \frac{1}{1+\delta} \right)^{t-T} e_{Kt} \propto \frac{\delta}{1+\delta} \sum_{t<T} \left( \frac{1}{1+\delta} \right)^{t-T} k_{t}^m (1+r)^{-T} \left( \frac{(1+r)^{t-1} - 1}{r} \right) d\tau_K
\]
Since we have $\delta > r$, $\lim_{T \to \infty} (1 + \frac{\delta}{1 + r})^T = \infty$, which makes the sum above (to which the anticipation elasticity is proportional) converge to infinity when $T$ goes to infinity.

A.2 Optimal Nonlinear Taxes in the Generalized Model

Consider a small reform $\delta T_K(rk)$ in which the marginal tax rate is increased by $\delta \tau_K$ in a small band $[rk^*, rk^* + d(rk^*)]$, as in the proof of Proposition 3. Let us first derive the change in revenue from the reform in any period $t$. We start from the steady state. Since the reform has to be budget-neutral every period, the change in transfer to the agent will depend on the change in tax revenues at each period.

First, for any capital income $rk$ above capital income $rk^*$, additional revenue equal to $d(rk^*)\delta \tau_K$ is raised. The total additional tax collected is $(1 - H_K(rk^*))d(rk^*)\delta \tau_K$. Second, for taxpayers in the small band $[rk^*, rk^* + d(rk^*)]$, the change in marginal tax rates generates changes in capital income through two channels. The first channel is a pure substitution effect due to the change $\delta \tau_K$ in marginal tax rates. The second channel is through the shift in capital income along the nonlinear tax schedule, which leads to an additional change in marginal tax rates equal to $dT_i' = T_K''(rk_i)\delta(rk_i, t)$. Let $\varepsilon^c_K(rk, t)$ be the elasticity in period $t$ at capital income level $rk$ to a small change in the marginal tax rate that i) is unanticipated and occurs at time 0 and ii) lasts for all periods $t \geq 0$. $\varepsilon^c_K(rk, t)$ is thus a policy elasticity. Formally, $\varepsilon^c_K(rk, t) = \frac{dk}{d(1 - T_K(rk))} \frac{(1 - T_K(rk))}{k}$ where $dk$ is the total change in capital for the reform described.

Hence the total change in capital income from taxpayers in the small band is:

$$\delta(rk, t) = -\varepsilon^c_K(rk^*, t)rk^* \delta \tau_K + T_K''(rk^*)\delta(rk, t) \frac{1 - T_K'(rk^*)}{1 - T_K(rk^*)}$$

Rearranging this yields:

$$\delta(rk, t) = -\varepsilon^c_K(t)rk^* \frac{\delta \tau_K}{1 - T_K'(rk^*)} + \varepsilon^c_K(rk^*, t)rk^* T_K''(rk^*)$$
The total behavioral effect in the small band is hence:

\[-e'_K(rk^*, t)rk^* \frac{T'_K(rk^*)}{1 - T'_K(rk^*)} + e'_K(rk^*, t)rk^*T''_K(rk^*)h_K(rk^*, t)\delta \tau_Kd(rk^*)\]

Because we start from the steady state, the density is constant across time and \(h_K(rk^*, t) = h_K(rk^*), \forall t\).

Third, for taxpayers above \(rk^*\), there is a change in the average tax liability. Let \(\eta(rk, t)\) be the elasticity of capital income in period \(t\) at capital income level \(rk\) for a small change in virtual income that i) is unanticipated and occurs at time 0 and ii) lasts for all periods \(t \geq 0\). \(\eta(rk, t)\) is thus also policy elasticity.

There are again two channels: the direct impact of the tax change, equal to \(\eta(rk, t)\delta \tau_Kd(rk^*)\) and the indirect effect due to the move along the nonlinear tax schedule, which increases marginal tax rates by \(dT'_i = T''_K(rk)\delta (rk, t)\). The total effect is hence:

\[\delta (rk, t) = \eta(rk, t)\frac{\delta \tau_Kd(rk^*)}{1 - T'_K(rk) + rke'_K(rk, t)T''_K(rk)}\]

Integrating over all taxpayers with incomes above the small band, the total tax revenue raised through this third component is:

\[\delta \tau_Kd(rk^*) \int_{rk^*}^{\infty} -\eta(s, t) \frac{T'_K(s)}{1 - T'_K(s) + se'_K(s, t)T''_K(s)}h_K(s)d(s)\]

The total change in revenue \(dG(t)\) is:

\[d(rk^*)\delta \tau_K \cdot [(1 - H_K(rk^*)) - e'_K(rk^*, t)rk^* \frac{T'_K(rk^*)}{1 - T'_K(rk^*)} + rke'_K(rk^*, t)T''_K(rk^*)h_K(rk^*)] + \int_{rk^*}^{\infty} -\eta(s, t) \frac{T'_K(s)}{1 - T'_K(s) + se'_K(s, t)T''_K(s)}h_K(s)d(s)\]

For agents below the small band, there is no change in the tax paid, but they benefit from the lump-sum rebate in revenue \(dG\). For them \(dT_i(t) = dG(t)\). Hence, the welfare impact for agents with \(rk_i \leq rk^*\) is \(\int_{i:rk_i \leq rk^*} g_i dG(t)di\). On the other hand, above the small band, agents receive the lump-sum increase in revenue \(dG(t)\) but also pay an extra tax \(\delta \tau_Kd(rk^*)\), so that for
them \(dT_i(t) = (-\delta \tau_K d(rk^*) + dG(t))\). Hence, the welfare effect on agents above the small band is: \(\int_{i: rk_i \geq rk^*} g_i(-\delta \tau_K d(rk^*) + dG(t))\). Thus the total change in welfare is:

\[
\int_i \delta_i g_i \int_t dG(t)e^{-\delta t} - \int_{i: rk_i \geq rk^*} \delta_i g_i \int_t \delta \tau_K d(rk^*)e^{-\delta t}
\]

Welfare weights \(g_i\) do not depend on time is because we start from a steady state (even if they are standard social welfare weights with \(g_i = \omega_i u_i\)). We normalize \(\int_i g_i = 1\).

Substituting for the change in revenue from (A2), the change in welfare is:

\[
d(rk^*)\delta \tau_K \cdot [(1 - H_K(rk^*)) - \int_t e_K^c(rk^*,t)rk^* \frac{T'_K(rk^*)}{1 - T'_K(rk^*) + rk^*e_K^c(rk^*,t)T''_K(rk^*)}h_K(rk^*) \int_i \delta_i g_i e^{-\delta t} dt] - \int_t \int_{rk^*} \eta(s,t) \frac{T'_K(s)}{1 - T'_K(s) + se_K^c(s,t)T''_K(s)}h_K(s)ds \int_i \delta_i g_i e^{-\delta t} dt - \int_{i: rk_i \geq rk^*} g_i di
\]

Thus at the optimum, the optimal marginal tax schedule is characterized by the differential equation:

\[
(1 - H_K(rk^*)) - \int_t e_K^c(rk^*,t)rk^* \frac{T'_K(rk^*)}{1 - T'_K(rk^*) + rk^*e_K^c(rk^*,t)T''_K(rk^*)}h_K(rk^*) \int_i \delta_i g_i e^{-\delta t} dt - \int_t \int_{rk^*} \eta(s,t) \frac{T'_K(s)}{1 - T'_K(s) + se_K^c(s,t)T''_K(s)}h_K(s)ds \int_i \delta_i g_i e^{-\delta t} dt - \int_{i: rk_i \geq rk^*} g_i di = 0 (A3)
\]

### A.3 Optimal Taxation with Horizontal Equity Concerns.

In this section, we formally consider optimal capital and labor taxation under horizontal equity concerns.

As derived in Section 2.3.4, the optimal revenue-maximizing rates are: \(\tau_L^R = \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_L}\) and \(\tau_K^R = \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_K}\). Without loss of generality, we suppose that capital is more elastic so that \(\tau_K^R < \tau_L^R\).

The optimal linear comprehensive tax on income is, as derived in (16):

\[
\tau_Y = \frac{1 - \bar{g}_Y}{1 - \bar{g}_Y + e_Y} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g}_Y = \frac{\int_i g_i \cdot y_i}{\int_i y_i}
\]

Suppose that the distribution of capital and labor income is dense enough, so that at every
total income level \( y = rk + z \), there are agents with \( y = rk \) (capital income only) and \( y = z \) (labor income only).

Generalized social welfare weights that capture horizontal equity concerns are such that:

(i) If \( \tau_L = \tau_K \), then \( g_i \) are standard, for instance \( g_i = u_{ci} \) for all agents. Any reform that changes taxes should put zero weight on those who after the reform are such that \( \tau_L z_i + \tau_K rk_i < \max_j \{ \tau_L z_j + \tau_K rk_j | z_j + rk_j = z_i + rk_i \} \), i.e., on those who pay less taxes at a given total income \( y = rk_i + z_i \), or, equivalently, have the highest disposable income and consumption at any income. This means that if labor taxes are increased, \( g_i = 0 \) for those with any positive capital income at each total income level. Conversely, increasing capital taxes will yield \( g_i = 0 \) for those individuals with some labor income at each total income level.

(ii) If \( \tau_L > \tau_K \), then all the social welfare weights are concentrated on those with \( \tau_L z_i + \tau_K rk_i > \max_j \{ \tau_L z_j + \tau_K rk_j | z_j + rk_j = z_i + rk_i \} \), i.e., on those agents with only labor income. Conversely, if \( \tau_L < \tau_K \), all the social welfare weights are on agents with only capital income.

Suppose that, starting from a situation with \( \tau_L = \tau_K \) we introduce a small tax break on capital income, \( d\tau_K < 0 \). Capital income earners now get an unfair advantage and all the weight is concentrated on those with no capital income (equivalently, everyone with \( k_i > 0 \) receives a weight \( g_i = 0 \)). As a result, a small tax break on capital can only be optimal if it raises tax revenue and, hence, allows to lower the tax rate on labor income as well. This can only occur if \( \tau_Y > \tau_R^R \), i.e., the optimal comprehensive tax rate is above the revenue-maximizing rate on capital income.

**Proposition 1. Optimal labor and capital taxation with horizontal equity concerns.**

(i) If \( \tau_Y \leq \tau_R^R \), taxing labor and capital income at the same comprehensive rate \( \tau_L = \tau_K = \tau_Y \) is the unique optimum.

(ii) If \( \tau_Y > \tau_R^R \), a differential tax system with the capital tax rate set to the revenue maximizing rate \( \tau_K = \tau_R^R < \tau_L \) (with both \( \tau_K \) and \( \tau_L \) smaller than \( \tau_Y \)) is the unique optimum.

**Proof.** Let us consider the two cases in turn.

(i) If \( \tau_Y \leq \tau_R^R \).
To see why $\tau_L = \tau_K = \tau^*$ is an equilibrium, suppose that we tried to lower the tax rate on capital income. Then, all the weight will concentrate on people with only labor income, which will then in turn make it optimal to increase the tax on capital again.

This equilibrium is unique. There is no other equilibrium with equal taxes on capital and labor that can raise more revenue with a lower tax rate, by definition of $\tau_Y$ as the optimal rate on comprehensive income. There is also no equilibrium with non-equal tax rates on capital and labor. Suppose that we tried to set (without loss of generality) $\tau_K < \tau_L$. Then to raise enough revenue we would require that $\tau_K < \tau_Y < \tau_L$. Since capital owners are now advantaged, all the social welfare weight concentrates on people with only labor income. Since then a fortiori $\tau_K < \tau^R_K$, increasing $\tau_K$ would mean that more revenue would be raised, which would allow us to lower $\tau_L$, which is good since all weight is on people with only labor income.

(ii) If $\tau_Y > \tau^R_K$.

In this case, the equilibrium has $\tau_K = \tau^R_K < \tau_Y$ and $\tau_Y > \tau_L > \tau^R_K$. Clearly this is an equilibrium since we cannot decrease $\tau_L$ without losing revenue and we cannot raise more revenue through $\tau_K$ (since it is already set at the revenue-maximizing rate for the capital tax base). In addition, we cannot decrease $\tau_K$ further without increasing $\tau_L$, which is not desirable since it would benefit people capital income earners, who already receive a weight of zero.

This equilibrium is also unique. If we set $\tau_L = \tau_K$ equal, we should set them equal to $\tau_Y$ which is the optimal tax rate on comprehensive income. But then, since $\tau_K$ is now above its revenue maximizing rate, we could lower both $\tau_K$ and $\tau_L$ without losing revenues, so this would not be an equilibrium. On the other hand, as long as we set $\tau_K < \tau_L$, capital income earners get zero weight and the only possibility is to go all the way to $\tau_K = \tau^R_K$ since only people with only labor income have a non-zero weight.

As a result, horizontal equity concerns will be a force pushing towards the comprehensive income tax system derived in Section 2.3.4. In the text, we provided an efficiency argument in favor of a tax on comprehensive income (based on income shifting opportunities) while the argument here is based on equity considerations. With horizontal equity preferences, deviations
from a comprehensive income tax system can only be justified if they raise more revenue and
generate a Pareto-improvement, which drastically reduces the scope for them. In ? we argue that
this is akin to a generalized Rawlsian principle whereby discrimination against some groups (e.g.,
capital owners versus labor providers) is only permissible if it makes the group discriminated
against better off, i.e., if it generates a Pareto improvement.

A.3.1 Horizontal Equity with Nonlinear Taxation

The same reasoning as for linear taxation with horizontal equity also applies to nonlinear taxes.
Starting from a comprehensive tax system $T_Y(z + rk)$ as derived in Section 2.3.4, lowering the
tax rate on capital income, conditional on a given total income level, will generate a horizontal
inequity and concentrate all social weight on those with no capital income conditional on that
total income level. Such a preferential tax break for capital income earners will only be accept-
able if it generates more revenue and allows to lower the tax rate on labor income as well. We
show this below.

Formally, suppose that we start from the optimal tax on comprehensive income, $T_Y(rk + z)$, as derived in Section 2.3.4 which does not discriminate between capital and labor income conditional on total income. We say that a tax system unambiguously favors capital (respectively, labor) at income level $y = rk + z$, if for any $(rk, z)$ such that $y = rk + z$, and any $\varepsilon \in [0, z]$, $T_Y(rk, z) > T(rk + \varepsilon, z - \varepsilon)$ (having more capital income, conditional on a given total income leads to lower taxes). (Note that it may be the case that a tax system favors capital only at some $y$ levels or only at some $rk, z$ ranges.)

Denote a change in the tax by $\delta T(rk, z)$.

A deviation $\delta T(rk, z)$ is said to introduce horizontal inequity, if, starting from a comprehen-
sive tax system $T_Y(rk + z)$, the resulting tax system $T_Y(z + rk) + \delta T(rk, z)$ cannot be expressed as $\tilde{T}_Y(rk + z)$ for some function $\tilde{T}_Y$.

With nonlinear taxes, we can again define the generalized social welfare weights as follows.

i) If there is a comprehensive tax $T_Y(z + rk)$, then everybody has standard weights, such as, for instance, $g_i = u_{ci}$. For any deviation $\delta T(rk, z)$ that introduces horizontal inequity, the
weights concentrate on the agents who pay the highest tax at a given total income level, i.e., on those with \( T_Y(z_i + rk_i) + \delta T(rk_i, z_i) = \max_j \{ T_Y(z_j + rk_j) + \delta T(rk_j, z_j) | z_j + rk_j = rk_i + z_i \} \) (which is equivalent to putting all the weight on the agent(s) with lowest disposable income at any total income level).

Hence, the weights also need to depend on \( \delta T(z, rk) \), the direction of the tax reform.

ii) If the tax is such that \( T(rk, z) \) cannot be expressed as \( \tilde{T}_Y(rk + z) \) for some function \( \tilde{T}_Y \), then the weights concentrate on those with \( T(z_i, rk_i) = \max_j \{ T(z_j, rk_j) | z_j + rk_j = rk_i + z_i \} \), i.e., on the agents which pay the highest tax (equivalently, have the lowest disposable income) conditional on total income.

**Equilibria:**

Suppose that, at the comprehensive tax rate, no small reform \( \delta T(rk, z) \) that introduces horizontal equity and favors capital (according to our definitions above) can increase total tax revenues, i.e., for all \( \delta T(rk, z) \) that favor capital and introduce horizontal inequity, the alternative tax system \( \tilde{T}(rk, z) = T(rk + z) + \delta T(rk, z) \) is such that:

\[
\int T_Y(rk_i(T) + z_i(T))di > \int \tilde{T}_Y(rk_i(\tilde{T}) + z_i(\tilde{T}))di
\]

where naturally, the choices \( z_i(T) \) and \( k_i(T) \) depend on the tax system \( T \). Then the unique equilibrium has the comprehensive tax system in place, as derived in 2.3.4. No horizontal inequity can be an equilibrium unless it introduces a Pareto improvement.

Suppose on the other hand that if the revenue maximizing tax rate on capital, \( T^R_K(rk) \) were implemented, and a labor income tax \( T^L_L(z) \) was used to complement it, more revenue could be raised than with the tax on comprehensive income \( T_Y(rk, z) \) and the tax burden on all agents would be lower than under the comprehensive income tax. Then, the optimum is to set differential taxes on capital and labor income, with the capital tax at its optimal revenue-maximizing schedule. Horizontal inequity is an equilibrium because it generates a Pareto improvement.
A.4 Progressive Consumption Taxes

The progressive consumption tax is defined on an exclusive basis as $t_C(.)$ such that

$$\dot{k} = \bar{r}k + z - [c + t_c(c)]$$

Equivalently, we can again define the inclusive consumption tax $T_C(y)$ on pre-tax resources $y$ devoted to consumption such that $c + t_c(c) = y$ is equivalent to $c = y - T_C(y)$, i.e., $y \to y - T_C(y)$ is the inverse function of $c \to c + t_c(c)$ and hence $1 + t'_C = 1/(1 - T'_C)$.

The case of a progressive consumption tax is most easily explained with inelastic labor income (possibly heterogeneous across individuals). Real wealth $k^r$ in the presence of the progressive consumption tax is:

$$k^r(k) = k - \frac{T_C(\bar{r}k + z) - T_C(z)}{\bar{r}}$$

Recall that real wealth is defined as nominal wealth adjusted for the price of consumption. There are to see why the above is the right expression. First, wealth $k$ provides an income stream $\bar{r}k$ which translates into extra permanent consumption equal to the income minus the tax paid on the extra consumption $\bar{r}k - [T_C(\bar{r}k + z) - T_C(z)]$ which can be capitalized into wealth $k^r$ by dividing by $\bar{r}$. If labor income is heterogeneous across agents, then $k^r(k, z)$ should also be indexed by $z$. Another way to see this is to ask what the capital $k^r$ would be that would yield the same disposable income as the nominal capital under the consumption tax. Disposable income in terms of real capital $k^r$ is $\bar{r}k^r - T_C(z)$. Disposable income expressed in terms of nominal capital is: $\bar{r}k - T_C(\bar{r}k + z)$. These two must be equal, which yields the expression for $k^r$ above. $k^r$ has three natural properties: with no consumption tax, real and nominal wealth are equal, $dk^r/dk = 1 - T'_C$, i.e., and extra dollar of nominal wealth is worth $1 - T'_C$ in real terms, and $k^r(0) = 0$.

In that case, we have in steady-state

$$c = \bar{r}k + z - T_C(\bar{r}k + z) = \bar{r}k^r + z - T_C(z)$$
and the first order condition for utility maximization is $a_i'(k^r) = \delta - \bar{r}$. Hence, real capital is chosen to satisfy the same condition as nominal capital when there is no consumption tax. Put differently, any consumption tax will be undone by agents in terms of their savings and will have no effect on the real value of their wealth held (and, hence, by definition of the real wealth, on their purchasing power). Hence, the consumption tax is equivalent to a tax on labor income only.

The equivalence is not exact with elastic labor supply, as in that case, the marginal consumption tax depends on the labor choice and the first-order condition for labor income is

$$h'_i(z) = 1 - T'_C(\bar{r}k + z) + a_i'(k^r)[T'_C(\bar{r}k + z) - T'_C(z)]/\bar{r}.$$