The Impacts of Moving on Family Structure in U.S. Army Data

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Abstract

We use exogenously determined, long-distance relocations of U.S. Army soldiers to investigate the impact of moving on family structure. We find that an additional move increases the likelihood of marriage by about 14 percent relative to the mean in our sample, with larger impacts for men relative to women. Consistent with this, additional moves also increase the likelihood of having children and lower the age of marriage. These results are at odds with a conception of moves as purely disruptive to social ties, but consistent with a number of other theories about migration. We also find that additional moves raise the likelihood of divorce, again with somewhat larger impacts for men. This may indicate that moves are at least partially disruptive to social ties, or that soldiers who are relocating face a quantity-quality tradeoff with regard to marriages.

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[1] The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

I. Introduction

Deciding to make a long-distance move involves weighing many costs and potential benefits, and even aggregating these across members of a household. The results of these choices are significant, affecting a person's life course at the individual level as well as the development of whole communities. For these reasons, migration has long been of interest to social scientists.[2] Economists have tended to focus on the potential benefits of migration – better employment and earnings opportunities (Bound and Holzer 2000; Wozniak, 2010), improved neighborhood safety (see for example: Katz et al, 2001; Kling et al, 2005; Chetty et al., Forthcoming), and better schools (Sanbonmatsu et al, 2006). Economic theory conceptualizes migration as an investment in which a migrating household incurs a frontloaded cost, with benefits to the migration decision accumulating over time (Sjaastad 1962). Indeed, recent research finds that the benefits to relocating to higher opportunity areas accumulate over several decades and across generations (Chetty et al., Forthcoming).

However, the substantial benefits of migration are likely balanced by considerable costs. Long-distance moves can be highly disruptive. A migrating household may weaken family relationships and social network ties. A move could alter the path of evolving personal relationships. Moves are also risky, and anticipated benefits may not materialize, as implied by the investment model of migration. Risk and disruption lead naturally to a higher level of stress. Economists have long recognized that the psychic costs of migration were likely to be substantial, but psychology has documented a complex set of mental health outcomes associated with migration, with an emphasis in empirical work on transnational migrants (see Bhugra and Jones 2001 and Bhugra and Gupta 2011 for reviews).[3] Sociology, on the other hand, has developed several theoretical conceptions of migration, also with a focus on transnational migration. These include the individual cost-benefit framework common in applied microeconomics but also other frameworks that emphasize the role of the overall household decision-making process; the role of social capital (family and friend

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[2] Migration was first formally addressed by economists in the 1960s (Sjaastad 1962; Becker 1993; Todaro 1969).
[3] Some evidence from economics finds that migration leads to stress-related health conditions (Gibson et al, 2012), although it may help reduce mental health issues (Stillman et al, 2009). A large body of research in psychology has shown that immigrants, particularly minority immigrants, experience elevated rates of schizophrenia relative to either non-migrants from their home countries or native host country populations, but evidence for elevated rates of common mental disorders (CMD) among immigrants, such as depression, is mixed (Kirkbride and Jones 2011, in Bhugra and Gupta 2011).

networks) in the origin and destination communities; and the possibility that the impact of social factors in migration may change in non-linear ways if migration occurs at high levels over a long period of time (Massey 1999, Portes and DeWind 2007). Frequent moves can also cause disruptions for children which can have additional stress on families. Lyle (2006) finds that military relocations had negative effects on children's test scores during the Gulf War Era. [4]

To complicate the picture, migrants are likely to differ in important but difficult-to-observe ways from non-migrants. This self-selection into migration means that any differences in outcomes between migrants and non-migrants may be the result of underlying differences between the two groups, rather than the result of migration itself. The fact of self-selection in migration is so clear *a priori* that it is in itself a topic of interest to social scientists from across the disciplines. Demographic differences between migrants and the general population have been well-documented (see for example: Greenwood 1969; Greenwood, 1971; Greenwood, 1975). Selection into international migration on the basis of underlying skill has been of interest to those seeking to understand the impacts of immigration (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; Kaestner and Malamud 2014; Cortes 2004.) Differences between migrants and non-migrants on psychological measures – in particular, the willingness to take risk and locus of control – have been documented by psychologists and economists, and some research has sought to understand the direction of causality in these relationships. For example, Caliendo et al (2015) model migration as a result of the wider job search strategies adopted by individuals with internal orientation to their locus of control (meaning that these individuals believe that they can strongly influence events in their own lives.)

Furthermore, not all moves are equal. A move from an area of low employment rates, low wages and high cost of living to one of high employment rates, high wages, and low cost of living is likely a good investment. But a move between the same locations in the opposite direction – which may happen for reasons other than economic opportunity – is potentially a bad investment. To take another example, two migrants may move from the same low opportunity city to one of high opportunity, but if one has a family network in the destination city and the other does not, then the investment may involve higher payoffs for the former. Therefore, migration choices that look

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[4] Engel, Gallagher, and Lyle (2010) find that deployments in the post 9/11 era had negative effects on children's education.

similar to the econometrician can easily be a good investment for one migrant and a bad investment for another.

In this paper, we use data from moves among U.S. Army households to examine the causal impact of a long-distance move on family structure outcomes. A unique feature of this approach is that Army relocations largely eliminate individual and household preferences in determining the timing and destination of moves. Use of Army relocations specifically removes any role for economic opportunity for household members as a factor in relocation. Individual traits such as risk-taking or openness to new experiences (conditional on enlisting in the Army) are also held constant across migrants and non-migrants through the Army's relocation policy. This allows us to credibly identify the impact of moves on family formation and preservation for the population in our data.

Our data from the U.S. Army allows us to identify the impacts of moving on the likelihood of marrying, having children, and divorcing. The Army moves soldiers based on the needs of the Army over the preference of the individual, and we demonstrate that the frequency of relocations among our Army sample is random, conditional on a set of observable characteristics related to Army job, year of enlistment, and rank. We can, therefore, identify the effects of a move on family formation decisions.[5]

We use a sample of enlisted soldiers who have served five years in the Army, and we further restrict to soldiers who have not been permanently stationed abroad (which does not include deployments). We also have detailed information about a soldier's entire location history, something which is not typically available in data sets of this size on the general population.[6] The complete location history allows us to characterize location assignments on several dimensions: distance from home region; prevailing local economic conditions; and length of time a soldier was assigned there. This information helps us assess whether the quantity of moves are the primary driver of our results, or whether the nature of a location assignment is an important moderator.

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[5] Another proposed method to measure moves is to study those stationed at locations that close during the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC). Post closings under BRAC, however, were known well in advance to the actual closing, thus making their assignments non-exogenous.
[6] Some longitudinal data sets, like the PSID and NLSY, contain annual location information for respondents. The largest of these is the NLSY79, which begins with about 12,000 respondents. This shrinks considerably over successive waves. Our main sample has observations on over 180,000 individuals.

Although the Army provides a unique opportunity to learn about the causal effects of migration on families, its members and policies differ from the civilian context in important ways that should be considered when interpreting our results. Clearly, selection into the military is substantial under the all-volunteer force. The military also differs from civilian life in the programmatic support for both marriage and relocation. MacDermid et al. (forthcoming) document that the U.S. military views families as a key partner in defense readiness under the all-volunteer force. In particular, they note that Department of Defense directives "… specify an extensive list of required programs and services aimed at supporting families, including deployment support, relocation assistance, child care at subsidized rates, education, care for family members with special needs, programs to improve spouses' access to jobs and careers, counseling, and financial planning assistance." Despite this assistance, MacDermid et al. document that, since 1980, marriage rates in the military had generally converged towards those of civilians, perhaps in part, as they note, because the stress, long hours, and unpredictability of military life may counter the generally supportive environment for marriage within military policy.

Despite these special circumstances, support for marriage within the military does not differ between movers and non-movers. Therefore once we demonstrate conditional random relocations, we can credibly identify the impact of moves on family structure in our Army population. Whether the impact of moves in Army families generalizes to a wider population is an important question, but the Army population we study is of independent interest for several reasons. First, the Department of Defense devotes significant resources to supporting military families. As relocation is a major feature of military life, questions of how to support families around relocations are of interest to defense policymakers. Second, to fill enlisted positions the Army draws from a population that is of interest to a wider set of policymakers. These individuals typically hold only a high school degree or a GED, and minorities and men are significantly overrepresented. Studies have shown that enlisted soldiers tend to come from families living in middle and middle-to-high income neighborhoods, although about 10% of the enlisted population in 2006 and 2007 came from low-income neighborhoods (Watkins and Sherk, 2008). Such populations have experienced a decades-long decline in marriage prevalence and stability. To the extent that our results are generalizable to the population from which the Army draws its enlisted ranks, they can inform policies that focus on promoting both economic opportunity and family stability. Finally, researchers have drawn on

variation in the military to learn about civilian policies on numerous occasions (see for examples: Lleras-Muney (2010), Carrell and Zinman (2014), Carter and Skimmyhorn (2015)).

We find that, overall, moving within the US increases the likelihood of marriage conditional on being unmarried at the start of military service. An additional domestic move increases the likelihood of marrying by 14 percent relative to the mean in our sample overall, and by 15 and 5 percent for men and women, respectively.[7] Consistent with these positive impacts on marriage, additional moves also increase the likelihood of having children and lower the age of marriage. However, additional moves also raise the likelihood of divorce; again the impacts move in the same direction for both men and women but are somewhat larger for men – 5.7 percent versus 5 percent.

We then investigate the reasons for these relationships, and for the differences in the impacts of moving on family structure outcomes for men and women. Preliminary evidence suggests that men hasten marriage when faced with a move: controlling for individual characteristics women are 2.8 percentage points less likely than men to get married within a three month move around their wedding date. This result could explain the stronger positive relationship between moves and marriage among men. It may also explain why we find a larger impact of moves on divorce for men. If men rush into marriage when faced with a move, then their level of marriage quality may be lower, leading to more divorce when faced with the subsequent strains of relocation. We also explore factors that could moderate the impact of migration on these outcomes. These include the longest spell in a location and the quality of the local labor market to which an Army member is assigned. Our work to date suggests that both factors contribute to the overall impact of moves on family structure outcomes.

The contribution of this project is to quantify how moving changes key family ties to advance our understanding of the full set of costs and benefits families face in relocating. Research shows that moving to a new community can provide opportunities for improved welfare through a range of mechanisms. Chetty et al. (2014) highlights the importance of place in determining long-term welfare. Specifically, Chetty et al. show that a low-income child's chances of moving up the income ladder as an adult are determined in large part by where she spent her childhood. Income is a strong

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[7] Men make up about 85 percent of our sample and thus have a large impact on point estimates for the sample as a whole.

predictor of better health, so these findings imply that place of rearing may have strong impacts on adult health through income (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010). As noted above, place can also impact neighborhood safety (Katz et al, 2001; Kling et al, 2005) and available school quality (Sanbonmatsu et al, 2006) as well as teen childbearing (Kearney and Levine 2012; Cutler and Glaeser 1997). Despite the substantial benefits from relocation, many households continue to live in cities and neighborhoods where outcomes are likely to be poor. The reasons for this decision are not well understood. Family and social ties, in particular, have been hypothesized to play an important role in limiting relocation, but so far researchers have not been able to credibly identify causal impacts of relocation on these ties. There is therefore a <u>need</u> to understand the impact of moves on these ties in order to assess the true costs of relocation and ultimately craft appropriate policies that influence relocation, including relocation subsidies to unemployment insurance, post-disaster rebuilding efforts, and public housing vouchers.[8]

II. Joint Decisions about Moving and Family

[To be added.]

III. Background on Moving and Marriage in the Army

The Army has a unique structure which supports both moves and marriages. The Army views moves as essential to defense readiness, but it also supports marriages in unique ways from civilian employers. We discuss the policies surrounding moves and marriages, but these policies do not differentially affect soldiers who are relocated versus those who are not.

IIIa. Army Relocation Policy

The military is a convenient population in which to study this question for a number of reasons. As is well-known, the Army frequently moves soldiers across military installations. Army soldiers

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[8] Caliendo et al. (2015b) evaluate the German relocation assistance program for unemployed job seekers who take jobs in distant markets. Their IV estimates indicate that relocation assistance improves wage and employment outcomes for unemployed job seekers. Gregory (2014) evaluates the impact of rebuilding grants on the location choices of New Orleans homeowners following Hurricane Katrina.

typically make at least one permanent move every 3 to 5 years, excluding temporary location changes for short training periods and including international moves.[9] The Army's overriding motivation in making these reassignments is to meet staffing needs across its units as older soldiers leave the Army or are themselves reassigned. The process of reallocating soliders across units is highly centralized. Units first inform the Army's Human Resources Command (HRC) about the number of openings they will have coming up based on individuals leaving the Army. HRC then prioritizes openings to be filled based on the needs of the Army. Lastly, HRC allocates individuals into these openings based on job, rank, and year of soldiers eligible to move.[10] The information on potential candidates is maintained in the Army's centralized personnel data base and is not provided by sending units, nor do soldiers at the enlisted level observe the set of potential openings. By moving soldiers around, the Army is able to maintain complete units with the necessary number of people in each rank and occupation. Army policy states: "[T]he primary considerations in reassigning a Soldier shall be the Soldier's current qualifications and ability to fill a valid requirement. Other factors such as availability, volunteer status, TOS, and other criteria shall be secondary."[11] In other words, the Army will place individuals in locations based on their rank and job, rather than their preferences. Soldiers, particularly at lower ranks, have minimal say in a move. At most, they can refuse one move during an enlistment contract. If they exercise that option, they will not have say over their next move, which could be in a more undesirable location. For this reason, and likely others, soldiers at lower ranks rarely refuse a move.

As the largest branch of the US armed forces, the Army also assigns soldiers across a broad range of locations. During the period of our sample, the Army operated over 50 domestic posts to which soldiers could be permanently stationed. Some soldiers may be stationed in Washington, DC while others are in Ft. Wainwright, Alaska. While similarities will exist between locations in terms of on-post services and housing options, locations vary by job opportunities for family members and distance from extended family. This variation in move types allows us to measure both the effects of moving, as well as the effects of living in areas with higher unemployment rates and away from home and potentially family support. This identification strategy has been employed in previous

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[9] In addition to permanent moves, the Army also sends soldiers to training for up to 6 months. During a training, a soldier does not typically bring his family and the military does not pay for their move.

[10] Generally, soldiers who are stationed in the continental US will not move within a year of a previous move, and soldiers who are stationed outside of the continental US will not move within three years of a previous move.

[11] Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1315.07. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/131507p.pdf

research to study the effects of location and re-location on soldiers and their families: Lyle (2006) studies the effects of relocations on children's academic achievement and Lleras-Muney (2010) examines at the effects of air quality on military dependents' health outcomes.

Army relocations differ in important ways from long-distance moves that a civilian might make. The most significant of these is that the timing and destination of Army moves are exclusively determined by Army leadership, and the consequences for refusing to relocate are severe. Army families also receive a level of support in moving that may be higher than for most civilians. Army relocations by definition guarantee employment in the destination, and soldiers face no real risk of termination if the new job is a poor fit. With a permanent relocation, the Army will pay to pack and ship all of the soldier's belongings along with the family's household items. The Army may also assist a family with finding new housing, and there is typically a supportive community in the new location that may assist families with adjusting to a new location.

However, these differences are not as great as they may at first seem. Civilians who make long distance moves predominantly say these are for job-related reasons, and in this way they are similar to Army moves (Molloy, Smith and Wozniak 2014). Army spouses who work need to find employment in the new location. Schooling or childcare arrangements also need to be made for children, although options for these on post are typically guaranteed and of high quality. Finally, some civilian moves occur because employers require a relocation, and the consequence for declining may be job loss.

Previous papers have examined the relationship between moves in the military and spousal employment (which could relate to family structure decisions). While causality has not been established, it has been well documented that being a military spouse is associated with higher levels of unemployment and lower wages (see, for example, Castaneda and Harrell (2008), Lim, et al (2007), Wardynski (2000), and Harrell et al. (2004)). Inability to find a job as a result of moves could lead to fewer spouses wanting to marry military members or, once married, increases in familial stress as spouses struggle to obtain or maintain a job. Castaneda and Harrell (2008) report the most common reasons for working are related to paying expenses and personal fulfillment, but also

boredom. Employment availability in an assigned location may play a significant role in a spouse's happiness.[12]

IIIB. Marriage Benefits in the Army

The Army supports marriages in a number of ways that differ from the civilian population. First, enlisted soldiers of lower ranks are typically required to live in on-post housing (barracks). If the individual gets married, however, she is allowed to move off post with her spouse.[13]

Those living off-post receive tax-free housing pay (BAH), in addition to their regular pay, and married soldiers receive a larger BAH than those without dependents.[14] BAH is set by duty location, and an individual without dependents will receive at least 75% of what a soldier with a family will receive.[15] Family members also receive free health care through TRICARE (the military health care system). As soldiers are often separated from their family for deployments and trainings, during these time periods a soldier is compensated with a $250 monthly family separation allowance.[16] When the Army moves a solider to a new post, the Army will pay for the whole family and their belongings travel to the new destination, either by car or plane.[17] [18] [19]

As servicemembers are compensated more while married there is an incentive to get and stay married.[20] If a couple is married for ten years while serving, the spouse may be eligible for half of the servicemembers' retirement pension. Eligibility for this benefit depends on the state where the

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[12] There is also a literature on the impact of combat deployments on military families. Angrist and Johnson (2000) use military survey data and find that deployments of a male soldier decrease wives' employment rates but that deployments of female soldiers are associated with no change in husband's employment. Deployments of female soldiers are, however, associated with higher rates of divorce. A recent study by RAND finds that marital stress increases during deployments, but marital satisfaction is similar when compared to eligible soldiers who did not deploy (Meadows et al, 2016).

[13] In some rare situations, on-post housing is overcapacity and soldiers are allowed to move off post.

[14] Housing pay does not increase with the number of dependents.

[15] For a description of how BAH is calculated, see http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/Docs/perdiem/BAH-Primer.pdf

[16] Military Pay Charts over Time: http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/military-pay-charts.html

[17] An E4 soldier with a dependent gets an extra 1,000 pounds to transport, an additional $830 in Dislocation Allowance Pay.

[18] Dislocation Allowance (DLA) by rank and year can be found here:
http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/otherratesDLA.cfm

[19] Weight Allowances: http://www.belvoir.army.mil/jppsoma/files/Outbound/WeightAllowance.pdf

[20] Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) states that adultery is a punishable office, although enlisted soldiers are not often prosecuted.

individual applies for divorce, although they have a choice over where they apply (home state, previous state where they lived, etc.).

IIIC. The Enlisted Army Population: Comparisons to Civilians

[To be added.]

IV. Data: The Army Five-Years of Service Sample

We draw our sample from military personnel data for all non-civilian active duty Army employees who served at some point between 1991 until 2013. The data includes a number of demographic characteristics: race, gender, education, AFQT score, age, marital status, and number of dependents. We also have information on where a soldier is located, whether they are in training or not, their rank in the Army, and their pay.

We condition our sample to include only enlisted soldiers (non-officers) who stay in the Army through 5 years of service. The individuals in our sample therefore began their Army employment between 1991 and 2008. Importantly, we further restrict our sample to soldiers assigned to posts within the United States during their first five years. We exclude anyone who is stationed abroad at some point during that period. These sample restrictions balance a desire for generalizability against the need to have a sample that has sufficient years of service over which to be subject to relocations. By restricting to moves within the U.S., we have a sample in which relocations are more similar to those taken by the general population.

A somewhat more generalizable sample might be to look only at soldiers in their first enlistment contract. However, rates of moves are lower in such a sample. After five years of service, 53% of soldiers will have moved at least once with 7% of soldiers moving more than once. Officers in the Army have made a more substantial career commitment to the Army and therefore are likely less similar to the civilian population than enlisted soldiers who have made more limited commitments. On the other hand, many enlisted individuals leave the Army after an initial contract of three or four years, though some initially enlist for five or six years.

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Summary statistics, both overall and by gender, are reported in Panel A of Table 1. The demographics represent the characteristics of individuals at the end of their fifth year.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

The military has traditionally been male dominated, and consistent with that women make up only 13% of our main sample. The Army also has a long history of disproportionately high service from African-Americans. Nearly 20% of our overall sample is black, but these rates differ markedly between men and women with a greater share of women (38%) being African American. The Armed Forced Qualification Test (AFQT) is given to all soldiers entering the military. It measures cognitive ability, helps screen individuals into the Army, and helps determine their military occupation within the Army. In our sample, the average AFQT was 59 (the cutoff for entering the Army is a score of 30, and the highest is 100). Women in our sample score slightly lower than men on average. This difference represents about a 3.4 point higher mean for men (56.70 versus 60.10). Although the difference is statistically different at the 1% level, it is economically small when compared to a standard deviation on AFQT score of nearly 20 points for both women and men.

Men and women in our sample are similar on a number of other characteristics. The average soldier is 26 years old, and 12-13% are Hispanic. Because we limit our sample to enlisted individuals, 76 percent are high school graduates, and roughly another 10 percent have some post-secondary education but no BA. The shares with other levels of educational attainment are small. About 20 percent of our sample is still serving a first term; the remaining 80 percent have re-enlisted. Ultimately, roughly one-quarter to one-third stay for at least ten years.

To understand the impact of relocations on family structure outcomes we construct variables to measure both the frequency and nature of moves. Summary statistics on these measures are reported in Panel B of Table 1. The first measure, *total moves*, is a simple count of the number of times that an individual moved between cities.[21] Our count excludes temporary training moves, as it is uncommon for soldiers' families to accompany them on these moves. Our count therefore reflects

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[21] We define a move to be a change in a soldier's posted location of more than 70.9 miles. A study by the Census Bureau defines an "extreme" commute to be one that is longer than 90 minutes. The average distance of one of these commutes is 70.9 miles. http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/poster_megacommuting_in_the_u.s.pdf

the number of times a soldier was reassigned. We also condition our sample on moves that are within the United States and exclude anyone who is stationed abroad. An individual in our sample moves, on average, 0.6 times during their 5 years. Most individuals (52%) in our data will have moved at least once with only 6% of the population moving more than once.

Other measures in Panel B characterize the moves we observe. We define *longest spell* as the longest time someone spends in a single location to measure the impact of stability in location. This allows us to distinguish between soldiers with the same number of moves but who experienced assignments of different lengths of time.[22] The average length for this variable is four years. We examine separation time away from extended family by measuring the time spent not in the soldier's home region of the United States.[23] Soldiers spend about half of their time away from their home region with an average of 2.4 of their first five years spent on assignment outside their home region. Finally, we measure the local economic conditions prevailing in the areas of assignment using the average employment-to-population ratio that a soldier experiences in the course of his location assignments in the first five years. Although soldiers are employed by the Army, local economic conditions could impact family structure through other channels. Foremost among these: spouses or potential marriage partners likely have better labor market prospects in high-employment markets. The average employment-to-population ratio in the areas of assignment averages 48% over a soldier's first five years which is similar to the yearly national average of 47%.[24]

By the time women and men reach five years of Army service, they face notably different family structures, as show in Panel C. Women in our sample have somewhat fewer dependents than men (1.10 versus 1.45) and are much more likely to be married to another service member. Women and men in our sample marry at similar rates, but women are less likely to have children, conditional on being married in our observation period, and are more likely to divorce in that period.

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[22] Longest spell is not censored at five years, but includes the time an individual spends in his year-five location until the next reassignment. For example, if someone moved after 2 years of service, and then moved again at 7 years of service, the longest spell in a location would be 5 years.

[23] We use the census measures of regions in the United States (North East, West, Midwest, South East, South West)

[24] For the average employment to population ratio of a soldier we only include individuals that have never been stationed abroad. We use county employment data for those stationed in a county and state employment data for those that are not stationed in a county. State and county employment totals are from published BEA series for 1969-2011. We combine the BEA employment estimates with state and county population estimates from SEER data available on the NBER website.

V. Estimating Equations and Tests for Random Reassignment of Soldiers

Our goal is to examine causal effects of moves on family structure, so our main specification is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Move_{it} + \theta_{jrys} + X_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (1)$$

where Y_{it} is one of four main outcomes of interest. The subscript t indicates years after the enlistment year y. By virtue of our sample construction, $t=5$ throughout our analysis. These are identity variables for married status, presence of children, or divorced status, or a continuous variable for age of marriage. θ_{jry} is a vector of variables that the Army Human Resources Command uses to determine where to station individuals—specifically, job (MOS), military rank, and year of enlistment (joint) fixed effects. We also interact that with sex of the individual, as restrictions on jobs and assignments for women during this time could affect HRCs decisions. The vector X_{it} includes other background characteristics--specifically civilian education, AFQT score, gender, race, age, and a control for months deployed. These are known to Army personnel when determining relocation, but as we discuss below, it is primarily the variables in θ that determine future job assignments.

In our main specification, the variable $Move_{it}$ is the constructed *total moves* measure, which is simply the total number of permanent, long-distance location changes a soldier experienced during his five years in our sample (excluding temporary location changes for training). If $Move_{it}$ is conditionally independent of other factors that would affect the outcome variables, then β_1 can be interpreted as a causal impact. It would be difficult to defend this assumption using observational data on civilians. The Army, however, uses minimal information when reassigning soldiers to new locations, and soldiers have little to no input into the timing of a move or the location of their new post, as discussed in Section III. This means that soldiers should be randomly reassigned, conditional on the information the Army uses to make its assignments.

To test for conditional random assignment of total moves we check that factors which are affecting the number of moves are not also affecting our outcome variables. We employ two methods to

ensure that moves are conditionally randomly assigned. First, we regress *total moves* on characteristics of the individual which are related to assignment, specifically the individual's job, rank, and the year of observation:

$$Moves_{it} = c + \theta_{jrys} + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (2)$$

where θ_{ijys} is the same job, rank, year, and sex of entry fixed effects in Equation (1) and c is the intercept. Second, we regress *total moves* on these same base characteristics as well as observable demographic characteristics. If the demographic characteristics do not explain a large portion of the outcome variable, as measured by the partial R-squared, then it suggests that other characteristics of the individual that we cannot see are also not explaining the move. Specifically, we run the following regression:

$$Moves_{it} = c + X_{it}\beta + \theta_{jrys} + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (3)$$

which is the same regression as (2) except for the addition of X_{it} , a vector of demographic characteristics including civilian education, marital status, AFQT score, gender, race, and age.

The results for these regressions are in Table 2. The first two columns show the R-squared results for equations (2) and (3) for all those with 5 years of service. Adding the demographic characteristics increases the R-squared by less than 0.01 when looking at total moves. An F-Test of the joint significance of all of the demographic variables is included at the bottom of the table. Its value is 0.85 indicating that the variables are not jointly significantly related to the number of moves. Columns (3) through (6) report the same tests for subsamples split by gender with similar results. In Panel B, we run the same test with average employment rate experienced by a soldier over the course of his location assignments (a measure of the quality of location assignments used later) as the outcome. We again find that adding additional controls has minimal impact on the average employment rate, suggesting that, conditional on job, rank, and year, individuals are not differentially assigned to areas with higher or lower employment rates based on their observable characteristics. Finally, we run these same regressions for those entering before and after 9/11 and report the R-squards for each regression, as well as an F-Test on the joint significance of the additional variables.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

Our second method for checking conditional random assignment involves testing for the stability of the coefficient on *total moves* with the addition of the demographic characteristics. If it is stable when adding observables, then we can be confident that there are not unobservable characteristics simultaneously affecting the reason for moves and the outcome variable. We also check for stability of coefficients following the methodology outlined in Oster (2015) and present results for this test alongside our main results. Additionally, we will include in all of our regressions the information that HRC has when making decisions on where to send people: job, rank, gender, age, AFQT, education, and race as well as months deployed.

To further explore the random component of relocation in the military, we compare the role of various controls in explaining (in a variance accounting sense) moves among civilians. We construct a comparison sample of civilians from Census and American Community Survey data to match as best we can our Army sample on years of observation, age, educational attainment, race, ethnicity and sex. Our relocation measure is a dummy variable for moving across state lines in the last year. This is equal to one for 2.7 percent of our matched ACS sample, as compared to 31 percent in our Army sample.

We regress the *moved last year* measure on various sets of controls and present the results in Appendix Table 1. Columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table 1 show specifications that approximate those used on the Army data in Table 2. These use year dummies and a set of more than four hundred occupation dummies to approximate the baseline specification in Table 2. The demographic variables are the same as those used in Table 2, with the exception of AFQT, which is not reported in our Census/ACS data.

Two differences between the civilian sample and the Army sample are immediately apparent.[25] First, our covariates do a much better job of predicting a move in the last year in the Army data than in

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[25] A similarity is that occupation is an important determinant of moving for both samples. In the civilian sample, this raises the R-squared by an order of magnitude. In the Army sample, occupation (or MOS) is a major determinant of location assignments.

the civilian sample. The comparable R-squared values in the bottom row of Table 2 are considerably larger than those for the civilian sample: 0.014 to 0.029 as compared to 0.035 to 0.055. Second, F-tests show that the demographic variables are significant predictors of moving among civilians, but not in our Army sample. Also, given the lower R-squared values in the baseline specifications of Appendix Table 1, demographics play a larger explanatory role in the civilian data, despite the fact that partial R-squared values from adding demographics to the baseline regressions are similar across the two samples.

V. Results: The Impact of Moves on Family Structure

In this section, we present our main results from estimating the impact of additional moves on family structure outcomes using Equation 1. We follow this with a summary of further analysis we performed to assess the robustness of the main results, before turning to a discussion of mechanisms in the following section.

A. Estimation Results from Main Specification

Table 3A presents results from estimation of Equation 1. Each panel-column contains results from a separate regression. The panels report results for four family structure outcomes: ever married in the course of a subject's five years in the sample (Panel A); age of marriage (Panel B), both of which we observe conditional on marrying while in the Army and not before; presence of children as dependents (Panel C); divorce (Panel D), both of which are observed conditional on marriage; and marriage at 5 years (Panel E) which includes the full sample of individuals staying through 5 years of service.

[Table 3 about here.]

Panel A shows that additional moves increase the likelihood that a subject is married in the fifth year of Army service. An additional moves raises the probability of marriage by 8 percentage points. This represents an increase of a little less than 15 percent relative to the mean of 0.55. This effect is largest for men, both in percentage and absolute terms, as shown in the second and third columns of Panel A. An additional move for men prior to their fifth year of service raises their likelihood of marriage by 8 percentage points. This is again an increase of 15 percent relative to the mean, and it

drives the positive impact of moves on marriage in the overall sample. Among women in our sample, additional moves have a smaller effect, increasing the probability of marriage by 3 percentage points, or 5 percent of the mean. The impacts for men, women, and the combined sample are all significant at the 1 percent level. The positive effect of more moves on marriage rates is also economically significant, particularly for men.

The impact of additional moves on other family structure outcomes are shown in the remaining panels of the table. Additional moves decreases the age at which the subject enters marriage by about three months overall, with larger point estimates for women than for men, as shown in Panel B. Panel C shows that additional moves also increase the likelihood that a subject has children by the fifth year of service. An additional move raises this likelihood by 2 percentage points for the population overall. The effect is larger for men, and translates to an increase of 3.6 percent of the mean for men (and the overall population) and about 3 percent for women.

Panel D shows that, in addition to their positive effects on marriage and fertility, moves also raise the likelihood that a subject has dissolved a marriage by the fifth year of service. Note that we only observe divorces that occur within the time of Army service, so a soldier must have been married at some point while also serving in the Army in order to be coded as divorced by the fifth year. The point estimates of an additional move are larger for women than for men, but because divorce is much less frequent for men, the impact relative to the mean is about 6 percent for men and closer to 5 percent for women. The point impact of additional moves on divorce is small. As confirmed in Panel E, the net impact on marriage probability *at* five years – versus marriage *by* five years, which is our preferred measure – is still significantly positive and economically substantial. An additional move raises the probability of marriage at five years by 6 percentage points, equivalent to 10 percent at the mean.

B. Robustness Analysis

We provide evidence on the robustness of our estimates of the impact of additional moves on family outcomes from Table 3 in three main ways. First, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the inclusion (or exclusion) of demographic controls. Our preferred specification in Table 3 includes these controls, but omitting them allows us to further test our assumption of conditional random assignment. We then estimate Equation 1 on a variety of alternative time periods and

samples to test the sensitivity of our results. We then check whether moves have a non-linear relationship with our outcomes and examine the effect when including international moves.

In Table 3B, we report coefficients for total moves both with and without demographic controls. In all cases, the coefficients remain relatively stable across specifications with and without controls. Adjusted coefficients following the method in Oster (2015), which take into account both the changes in coefficient size and changes in R-squared with the addition of other demographic characteristics, are also reported in the bottom row of each panel. Specifically, the adjusted coefficient is calculated as: $\beta^* = \tilde{\beta} - [\dot{\beta} - \tilde{\beta}]\left(\frac{1.3\tilde{R}-\tilde{R}}{\tilde{R}-\dot{R}}\right)$ where $\tilde{\beta}$ is the coefficient on *moves* in Equation 1 with additional covariates included and $\tilde{R}$ is the R^2 from that regression. $\dot{\beta}$ is the coefficient on *moves* in Equation 1 when no additional covariates are included included and $\dot{R}$ is the R^2 from that regression. Hence, this adjustment produces a single coefficient using the information in the two specifications estimated for each sample in a panel, and serves as a bound with the original coefficient. In every case for the full sample and just men, the coefficient is the same sign and of similar magnitude to our main effects with controls, which we take as evidence that the causal effects we report in Table 3 are accurate in their direction and magnitude.

[Table 3B about here.]

Table 4 reports estimates when we split our results by the time period someone entered the Army. In the mid to late 2000s, permanent moves may be more likely driven by deployments. Although the conditional random assignment assumption still holds, as seen in the bottom of Table 2, we separate those soldiers entering before 2002 and those entering after 2001 to identify potentially differing effects during these two different periods of serving in the Army. Our results for getting married while in the Army hold for both samples: men are more likely to get married when they experience an additional move (20% in the pre-2002 period and 12.5% in the post period) than women (6.7% in the pre-2002 period and 3.5% in the post period). The results for divorce rates (panel D), however, seem to be driven by the pre-period for men. Men are 14% more likely to get divorced during their first 5 years if they enlisted prior to 2002 with an additional move, but the result is no longer statistically significant in and the magnitude falls in the post period. For women, however, an additional move does not influence divorce for those entering prior to 2002, but a move increases divorce rates by 0.019pp for those entering post 2001.

[Table 4 about here.]

Table 5 reports results from estimating our main equations of interest using several alternative samples. In the first panel, the impact of additional moves on ever being married is estimated on two samples of alternative contract length: those soldiers whose first term was exactly five years (Col. 2), and those at the end of their first term, be that 3, 4, 5, or 6 years (Col. 7). Because re-enlistment and marriage decisions may be made jointly, it is reasonable to ask whether estimates from our preferred five-year sample might differ across soldiers who originally selected different contract lengths, or across those who re-enlist or do not re-enlist. The results show that an additional move significantly increases the likelihood of ever marrying regardless of initial term length. The size of the effect is little changed when we restrict to those with an initial term of five years, and it is somewhat smaller, though still significant and positive, for a sample that observes soldiers at the end of their first contract, regardless of length.

[Table 5 about here.]

In columns 3 through 6, we add samples conditioned on being married when a soldier entered; *not* being married when a soldier entered; those who married close to a move; and those who married *not* close to a move. The additional samples address concerns that soldiers (and marriages) who are married at entry may differ from those who are not. They also address concerns that hasty marriages around the time of a move may differ from those that form outside an approaching relocation. For those married and not married when they enter, additional moves again increase divorce rates, but they are higher for those that are married when they enter: an additional marriage increases divorce rates by 24% on the sample mean of 12% divorce rate. For those that get married while in the Army, an additional move increases divorce rates by 7.5%. This result may arise because there is greater time for someone to be married. In Columns 5 and 6, which look at the timing of moves, we condition on people who have ever had a move and whether they were married within a 6 month window of a move. For those that get married within the 6 month time window of a move, an additional move increases divorce by 0.7 percentage points, a 14% effect, but it is not statistically significant. For those that get married outside of the 6 month time window (Col. 5), an additional move increases divorce by 17 percent. Panel E is a little more informative on this topic: regardless of

when they get married in relation to a move, for those who get married while in the Army and have at least one move, an additional move reduces their likelihood of being married at 5 years.

We have so far found that additional moves lead to higher marriage rates. Tables 6 and 7 next look at the effects of moves while taking into account the fact that additional moves may have a non-linear impact on family decisions. Column 1 conditions on those who have at most one move while Column 2 conditions on having at most three moves and includes dummies for having 1, 2, or 3 moves. Focusing on Table 6, in both samples, a single move increases the likelihood of marriage by 9.3 percentage points. Having two moves increases marriage rates by 13.3 pp and having three moves increases it by 15.7pp, suggesting that additional moves increase the likelihood of marriage, but each move has a diminishing effect.

[Table 6 about here.]

In column 3 and 4, we test this further by expanding our sample to include soldiers who are relocated abroad. In this sample, additional moves can be either domestic to the US (as was the case in all previous estimates) or international. The effect on marriage rates is much smaller whether the total moves includes all moves (Col. 3) or just conditions on 1 move (Col. 4). This result suggests that international moves must have either no effect or a negative effect on move rates. This is exactly what we find in Columns 5, 6, and 7 where we split these total moves into domestic and abroad and condition on number of moves. These results imply there are limits to the marriage-enhancing effects of relocation. Not surprisingly, this results in domestic moves lowering the age of marriage and increasing the likelihood of having children while international moves increase age of marriage and lower likelihood of having children by 5 years (Appendix Tables 2 and 3).

Table 7 reports results for these same samples on marriage dissolution. A single move increases divorce rates by 5.5%. Having two or three moves more than doubles that impact (Col 2). When we include international moves, however, the effect is little changes, suggesting similar impacts on divorce rates as domestic moves. This result is confirmed in columns 5-7 when we split the moves into international and domestic and find positive effects for both.

[Table 7 about here.]

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V. Mechanisms: The Impacts of Time in Location, Time in Home Region, and Local Employment Conditions

In addition to number of total moves, a soldier's relocation history can differ in terms of how her career is divided into spells in different locations and whether any assignments were in a more familiar part of the country. To explore the role that the nature of relocation plays in family structure outcomes, we re-estimate Equation 1 adding in additional summary measures of a subject's location history. This specification allows us to answer the question: Does the nature of a relocation history – e.g. more time in a home region – matter for family structure outcomes, controlling for number of moves? Specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Move_{it} + \beta_2 condition_{it} + \beta_3 condition_{it} * Move_{it} + \theta_{jry} + X_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (4)$$

Here, *condition* is one of three summary measures of a soldier's relocation history: the longest spell length someone is in a single location; an indicator if the solider is ever stationed in their home region; a measure of total distance traversed between location assignments; and a measure of the average employment to population ratio that an individual faces. For each of these variables (except the home region), we have normalized them to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. We interact each of these variables with the number of moves an individual faces. We are interested in both the main effects of these conditions and in their interaction with total moves. The main effect estimates allow us to answer questions about how the types of locations a soldier is exposed to affect family formation outcomes, while the interactions indicate whether certain types of relocation histories moderate or enhance the average effect of an additional move on our outcomes of interest. The results for marriage and divorce are shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.

We first explore the effects of these various conditions on the likelihood of marriage, in Table 8. The first column repeats our previous estimation of Equation 1 and reports the effect of an additional move on the likelihood that a soldier is married at five years of service. Column 2 adds the indicator for ever stationed in home region and its interaction with total moves to Equation 1. The results show that a soldier who is stationed in his home region at some point is less likely to be married at five years, but the effect of a home assignment enhances the positive effect of moves on

marriage. As shown in Column 3, the direction and magnitude of the impact of having a longer spell length in a single location are similar to the impacts of a home location assignment.

Taken together, the results for a home region assignment and a longer-than-usual assignment suggest that community ties may substitute for family ties (because the main effect is negative and zero), but that when faced with relocation, greater familiarity with a community is marriage enhancing (because the interaction term is positive). However, the impact of moves per se is only modestly reduced by adding controls for these types of location history. This implies that the main impact of moves on marriage propensity is robust across assignments that allow for more or fewer ties to the local community.

[Table 8 about here.]

Column 4 adds a control for the average labor market quality experience by a soldier across her assignments. This is measured as the average employment-to-population ratios in the MSAs, weighted by the time spent in each location that a soldier was assigned to. Local labor market conditions may affect marriage formation if they provide stronger outside (non-marriage) options for the substantial majority of spouses who are non-military. Consistent with this, average epop experienced is negatively related to marriage in our sample. This variable is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one, so the estimate in Table 6 implies that assignment to labor markets that are on average one standard deviation stronger, as measured by employment ratios, reduces the likelihood of marriage by 1.4 percentage points. However, experienced local economic conditions have no effect on the overall impact of additional moves on marriage formation. Additional moves are marriage enhancing, even if soldiers stationed in better labor markets are less likely to marry overall.

In column 5 we show results including the total distance someone travels for their moves. The effect of the total number of moves is still positive and statistically significant. The results imply that moving a total distance of one standard deviation more than the average will increase the likelihood of marriage by 3.5 percentage point but that for each additional move, this impact is diminished.

In column 6 we examine whether total moves continue to have the effects we saw in our baseline analysis in Table 4 after controlling for the full set of location history summary measures. The coefficient on total moves remains relatively constant and statistically significant. Even when controlling for the types of places people spend time, more moves increase the likelihood of marriage.

The results for other family structure outcomes, reported in Appendix Tables 4 and 5, are broadly similar to those for marriage. Our main finding from these tables is that the impact of additional moves on other family structure outcomes is little affected by the inclusion of measures that control for the types of relocations a soldier experienced. Similar to the findings in Table 8, Appendix Tables 4 and 5 show that location history that involves time in the home region or a longer spell in one place generally raises the age of marriage and reduces the likelihood of having children, while modestly enhancing the likelihood of these outcomes in the presence of an additional move. The impacts of local economic conditions on age of marriage and on childbearing are also consistent with their impact on marriage: better local conditions raise the age of marriage and reduce the likelihood of children, but they have no moderating effect on the impact of additional moves on these outcomes.

In Table 9, we report results for marriage dissolution. The results show that the conditions of moves have little impact on the likelihood of divorce at five years, either overall or in conjunction with additional moves. An additional move increases the likelihood of divorce for those that are married at some point in the Army between 0.4 and 0.8 percentage points (a 5 to 9 percent effect).

[Table 9 about here.]

IV. Conclusion

We use conditionally exogenous relocations of U.S. Army soldiers to examine the impact of long-distance moves on family structure. We show that additional moves encourage nuclear family formation, raising the likelihood of marriage and of having children present as dependents. These effects are economically significant as well. In our preferred sample, the likelihood of marrying prior to five years of Army service rises by 7.5 percentage points with an additional domestic move. This

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result is driven by the impact of the first move. Second and third domestic moves still have positive, but much smaller, impacts on marriage likelihood. Additional moves also lower the age of marriage by a statistically significant 2.5 tenths of a year, or about 3 months, and raise the likelihood of having children present by about 3 percent off the mean. These results are robust to a variety of specification changes to using a range of alternative samples in estimation. However, results differ for soldiers who are moved internationally, suggesting that it is only domestic long-distance moves that encourage nuclear family formation.

These results are surprising if moving is viewed as either a disruption or as an investment that competes with other investments of time and money (like marriage) for an individual's resources. On the other hand, moving may be complimentary to family investments. This may be because family and community are substitutes, so individuals who have to relocate choose to put more resources into family formation when they know their community ties will be severed. Alternatively, relocation likely requires investment in thinking about long-term plans that may be compliments to other types of long-term commitments, like marriage. Finally, relocations may provide an opportunity to sample from additional marriage markets, thereby increasing the likelihood of marriage and subsequent family outcomes.

Evidence presented in this paper – and which we plan to expand in future versions – provides some insight into these potential mechanisms. First, we rule out that hasty marriages around the time of a reassignment drive our results. We find similar impacts of moves on marriage probabilities for soldiers who married within six months (on either side) of a reassignment as for soldiers who married outside this window. We also find that while postings in which a soldier has a chance to form stronger community ties do lower marriage probabilities, they do not explain the impact of additional moves on marriage. In ongoing work on this paper, we plan to look at roles for marriage market sampling as well as that of complementarities in planning future investments in explaining the impacts we document.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

	All	Men	Women	Pre 2002	Post 2001
Panel A: Demographics					
Fraction Female	13.19%			14.68%	11.93%
Age	26.03	26.01	26.15	25.72	26.30
	(3.76)	(3.72)	(4.07)	(3.44)	(4.00)
Fraction Black	19.66%	16.84%	38.22%	24.07%	15.93%
Hispanic	11.96%	11.75%	13.35%	10.43%	13.25%
Other Race	5.94%	5.61%	8.17%	6.39%	5.56%
AFQT Score	59.65	60.10	56.70	59.76	59.56
	(19.08)	(19.18)	(18.11)	(18.49)	(19.56)
GED	10.42%	11.27%	4.83%	6.61%	13.65%
High School Dropout	0.75%	0.79%	0.46%	0.71%	0.78%
High School Graduate	76.09%	76.27%	74.90%	80.96%	71.97%
Some College / Associates	9.39%	8.60%	14.65%	8.42%	10.22%
College Plus	3.34%	3.07%	5.17%	3.30%	3.38%
Ever Deployed	85.00%	87.27%	70.10%	72.59%	95.52%
Months Deployed	10.30	10.78	7.14	4.12	15.53
	(8.81)	(8.81)	(8.16)	(5.98)	(7.31)
Still in First-Term	19.3%	19.1%	20.7%	19.5%	19.1%
Stay in through 10 Years of Service	44.3%	45.7%	36.1%	45.0%	42.3%
Currently married to another Military Member	6.7%	3.7%	26.2%	7.3%	6.1%
Ever Married to another Military Member	10.5%	6.3%	37.7%	11.7%	9.4%
Panel B: Moves					
Total Moves	0.58	0.58	0.62	0.66	0.51
	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.63)	(0.59)
Longest Spell	4.60	4.62	4.42	4.71	4.50
	(1.73)	(1.75)	(1.60)	(1.94)	(1.51)
Total Distance	690.53	685.69	722.35	835.45	567.76
	(1013.47)	(1012.65)	(1018.27)	(1125.34)	(889.71)
Time not in Home Region	2.35	2.38	2.14	2.32	2.37
	(1.82)	(1.81)	(1.81)	(1.80)	(1.83)
Average Employment / Population	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel C: Outcomes					
Number of Dependents	1.40	1.45	1.10	1.23	1.54
	(1.38)	(1.39)	(1.31)	(1.34)	(1.41)
Ever Married	64.80%	64.34%	67.80%	61.91%	67.25%
Kids | Married	65.41%	66.22%	60.36%	62.13%	67.95%
Divorced | Married	8.71%	6.62%	21.79%	6.65%	10.31%

Note: Department of Defense Data. Includes active duty enlisted soldiers that stay in the Army for at least 5 years of service who are never stationed abroad. Staying in for 10 years is conditioned on entering the Army before 2013. Standard deviations are in parentheses below the means for continuous variables.

Table 2: Randomization Checks

	Panel A: Total Number of Moves						**Panel B: Average Employment Rate**					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			All						**All**			
	All		Men		Women		All		Men		Women	
GED		0.0477***		0.0462***		0.0649***		-0.0461***		-0.0463***		-0.0423
		(0.0049)		(0.0050)		(0.0212)		(0.0100)		(0.0102)		(0.0420)
High School Dropout		0.0401**		0.0442***		-0.0099		-0.1057***		-0.1040***		-0.1325
		(0.0164)		(0.0169)		(0.0629)		(0.0309)		(0.0316)		(0.1316)
Some College		0.0132**		0.0094		0.0331**		0.0140		0.0145		0.0093
		(0.0055)		(0.0060)		(0.0138)		(0.0108)		(0.0118)		(0.0276)
College Plus		-0.1062***		-0.1131***		-0.0660**		0.1063***		0.1095***		0.0835
		(0.0106)		(0.0114)		(0.0290)		(0.0212)		(0.0227)		(0.0592)
AFQSC		-0.0020***		-0.0022***		-0.0009***		0.0009***		0.0010***		-0.0008
		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0003)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)		(0.0006)
Black		-0.0054		-0.0147***		0.0415***		0.0175**		0.0135		0.0283
		(0.0042)		(0.0046)		(0.0110)		(0.0080)		(0.0087)		(0.0212)
Hispanic		-0.0119**		-0.0148***		0.0151		-0.0087		-0.0074		-0.0146
		(0.0047)		(0.0050)		(0.0143)		(0.0091)		(0.0096)		(0.0280)
Other Race		-0.0008		0.0026		-0.0053		-0.0021		0.0065		-0.0475
		(0.0063)		(0.0068)		(0.0170)		(0.0123)		(0.0132)		(0.0340)
Age		0.0212***		0.0217***		0.0149		-0.0241***		-0.0278***		0.0063
		(0.0037)		(0.0040)		(0.0107)		(0.0083)		(0.0087)		(0.0250)
Age Squared		-0.0003***		-0.0003***		-0.0003		0.0003**		0.0004**		-0.0001
		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0004)
Constant	0.5815***	0.3901***	0.5758***	0.3849***	0.6190***	0.4433***	-0.0178***	0.3306***	-0.0276***	0.3725***	0.0464***	0.0141
	(0.0014)	(0.0546)	(0.0015)	(0.0583)	(0.0038)	(0.1573)	(0.0026)	(0.1190)	(0.0028)	(0.1260)	(0.0072)	(0.3602)
Observations	182,694	182,694	158,592	158,592	24,102	24,102	161,957	161,957	140,461	140,461	21,496	21,496
R-squared	0.1723	0.1764	0.1567	0.1614	0.2692	0.2713	0.1416	0.1424	0.1248	0.1257	0.2479	0.2486
Mean	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.62	0.62	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	0.05
F-Test p-value		0.85		0.40		0.29		0.31		0.42		0.51
			Sample Entering Before 2002						**Sample Entering Before 2002**			
R-Squared	0.2179	0.2207	0.2000	0.2034	0.3199	0.3211	0.1773	0.1779	0.1569	0.1575	0.2844	0.2857
F-Test p-value		0.11		0.25		0.32		0.21		0.12		0.84
			Sample Entering After 2001						**Sample Entering After 2001**			
R-Squared	0.1047	0.1107	0.0921	0.0985	0.1919	0.1968	0.1080	0.1096	0.0959	0.0979	0.2013	0.2025
F-Test p-value		0.219		0.084		0.518		0.606		0.903		0.174

Notes: This table reports results from regressions of the total number of moves someone has during their first five years (Panel A) and the Average Employment Rate, Normalized (Panel B) on individual characteristics. The odd columns include job, rank, and year structural controls. The even columns include additional individual controls. P-values on the F-Tests of the joint significance of the individual controls added in the even columns are included in the last row. We also include R-Squared and F-Test p-values for the subsamples of individuals entering before 2002 or after 2001 in the bottom of the table. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 3A: The Effect of Number of Moves on Family Outcomes

	All	Male	Female
Panel A: Ever Married | Not Married when Enter			
Total Number of Moves	0.079***	0.085***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Observations	144,254	125,395	18,859
R-squared	0.129	0.116	0.240
Mean of Marriage Rates	0.55	0.55	0.59
Average Number of Moves	0.57	0.56	0.61
Panel B: Age Married | Getting Married in the Army			
Total Number of Moves	-0.037**	-0.025	-0.130**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.060)
Observations	79,944	68,845	11,099
R-squared	0.271	0.244	0.413
Mean Age	23.13	23.21	22.64
Average Number of Moves	0.63	0.63	0.64
Panel C: Ever Kids | Marriage			
Total Number of Moves	0.023***	0.024***	0.018**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Observations	118,072	101,810	16,262
R-squared	0.183	0.160	0.328
Average Likelihood of Children	0.65	0.66	0.60
Average Number of Moves	0.63	0.63	0.64
Panel D: Dissolve Marriage | Marriage			
Total Number of Moves	0.005***	0.004***	0.011*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Observations	118,072	101,810	16,262
R-squared	0.176	0.102	0.257
Mean of Marriage Dissolution	0.09	0.07	0.22
Average Number of Moves	0.63	0.63	0.64
Panel E: Marriage at 5 Years			
Total Number of Moves	0.064***	0.071***	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Observations	182,694	158,592	24,102
R-squared	0.141	0.134	0.203
Mean of Marriage	0.61	0.62	0.57
Average Number of Moves	0.58	0.58	0.62

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. The dependent variable is denoted in the title of each panel. Panel A includes everyone that stays in the Army for 5 years, Panel B includes those at the 5 year mark who get married while in the Army, Panel C and Panel D include those who are ever married during those 5 years. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. The regressions for Panel C and Panel D also include controls for whether someone was married to another Army member. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 3B: The Effect of Number of Moves on Family Outcomes

	All		Male		Female	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Ever Married | Not Married when Enter						
Total Number of Moves	0.087***	0.079***	0.094***	0.085***	0.038***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	144,254	144,254	125,395	125,395	18,859	18,859
R-squared	0.118	0.129	0.103	0.116	0.221	0.240
Mean of Marriage Rates	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.59	0.59
Average Number of Moves	0.57	0.57	0.56	0.56	0.61	0.61
Oster Adjust Coefficients		0.051		0.061		-0.0003
Panel B: Age Married | Getting Married in the Army						
Total Number of Moves	-0.069***	-0.037**	-0.058***	-0.025	-0.150**	-0.130**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Observations	79,944	79,944	68,845	68,845	11,099	11,099
R-squared	0.237	0.271	0.210	0.244	0.372	0.413
Mean Age	23.13	23.13	23.21	23.21	22.64	22.64
Average Number of Moves	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64
Oster Adjust Coefficients		0.042		0.045		-0.070
Panel C: Ever Kids | Marriage						
Total Number of Moves	0.029***	0.023***	0.028***	0.024***	0.036***	0.018**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Observations	118,072	118,072	101,810	101,810	16,262	16,262
R-squared	0.132	0.183	0.109	0.160	0.257	0.328
Average Likelihood of Children	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.60	0.60
Average Number of Moves	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64
Oster Adjust Coefficients		0.017		0.020		-0.007
Panel D: Dissolve Marriage | Marriage						
Total Number of Moves	0.004***	0.005***	0.003**	0.004***	0.007	0.011*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	118,072	118,072	101,810	101,810	16,262	16,262
R-squared	0.168	0.176	0.094	0.102	0.237	0.257
Mean of Marriage Dissolution	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.22	0.22
Average Number of Moves	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64
Oster Adjust Coefficients		0.012		0.008		0.026
Panel E: Marriage at 5 Years						
Total Number of Moves	0.074***	0.064***	0.081***	0.071***	0.022***	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Observations	182,694	182,694	158,592	158,592	24,102	24,102
R-squared	0.107	0.141	0.094	0.134	0.183	0.203
Mean of Marriage	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.57	0.57
Average Number of Moves	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.62	0.62
Oster Adjust Coefficients		0.052		0.061		-0.010

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. The dependent variable is denoted in the title of each panel. Panel A includes everyone that stays in the Army for 5 years, Panel B includes those at the 5 year mark who get married while in the Army, Panel C and Panel D include those who are ever married during those 5 years. Each regression includes job, rank, and year structural controls. The even columns include individual controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. The regressions for Panel C and Panel D also include controls for whether someone was married to another Army member. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient. We provide Oster-Adjusted-Coefficients, calculated following Oster (2015), to address concerns over potential omitted variable bias.

Table 4: The Effect of Number of Moves on Family Outcomes by Period Enterin

	Panel A: Enter Pre 2002			Panel B: Enter Post 2001		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
Panel A: Ever Married | Not Married when Enter						
Total Number of Moves	0.092***	0.100***	0.038***	0.067***	0.073***	0.021**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Observations	66,648	56,886	9,762	77,606	68,509	9,097
R-squared	0.159	0.141	0.274	0.098	0.088	0.204
Mean of Marriage Rates	0.52	0.51	0.57	0.58	0.58	0.60
Average Number of Moves	0.65	0.65	0.68	0.50	0.49	0.54
Panel B: Age Married | Getting Married in the Army						
Total Number of Moves	-0.063**	-0.044	-0.183**	-0.019	-0.013	-0.074
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.081)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.088)
Observations	34,731	29,133	5,598	45,213	39,712	5,501
R-squared	0.347	0.317	0.478	0.224	0.201	0.361
Mean Age	22.9	23.0	22.6	23.3	23.4	22.7
Average Number of Moves	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6
Panel C: Ever Kids | Marriage						
Total Number of Moves	0.039***	0.040***	0.034***	0.010***	0.012***	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Observations	51,566	43,505	8,061	66,506	58,305	8,201
R-squared	0.222	0.196	0.354	0.147	0.127	0.298
Average Likelihood of Children	0.62	0.63	0.57	0.68	0.69	0.63
Average Number of Moves	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.56	0.55	0.57
Panel D: Dissolve Marriage | Marriage						
Total Number of Moves	0.007***	0.007***	0.004	0.004*	0.002	0.019*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.010)
Observations	51,566	43,505	8,061	66,506	58,305	8,201
R-squared	0.223	0.154	0.294	0.147	0.072	0.211
Mean of Marriage Dissolution	0.07	0.05	0.16	0.10	0.08	0.27
Average Number of Moves	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.56	0.55	0.57
Panel E: Marriage at 5 Years						
Total Number of Moves	0.076***	0.085***	0.017*	0.054***	0.060***	0.010
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)
Observations	83,787	71,486	12,301	98,907	87,106	11,801
R-squared	0.169	0.162	0.233	0.116	0.108	0.173
Mean of Marriage	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.63	0.64	0.57
Average Number of Moves	0.66	0.66	0.68	0.51	0.51	0.55

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. The dependent variable is denoted in the title of each panel. Panel A includes everyone that stays in the Army for 5 years, Panel B includes those at the 5 year mark who get married while in the Army, Panel C and Panel D include those who are ever married during those 5 years. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. The regressions for Panel C and Panel D also include controls for whether someone was married to another Army member. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 5: The Effect of Number of Moves on Family Outcomes by Sub Category

	Term 5	End of First-Term	Married when Enter	Not Married when Enter	Married Less than 6 Months	Married Greater than 6 months
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Ever Married | Not Married when Enter						
Total Number of Moves	0.088***	0.102***		0.079***		
	(0.009)	(0.003)		(0.002)		
Observations	15,909	229,888		144,254		
R-squared	0.235	0.146		0.129		
Mean of Marriage Rates	0.52	0.26		0.55		
Average Number of Moves	0.45	0.11		0.57		
Panel B: Age Married | Getting Married in the Army						
Total Number of Moves	0.056	0.231***		-0.037**	-0.416***	-0.249***
	(0.070)	(0.032)		(0.019)	(0.067)	(0.060)
Observations	8,261	59,046		79,944	14,370	30,874
R-squared	0.471	0.344		0.271	0.436	0.363
Mean Age	23.12	22.55		23.13	23.73	22.81
Average Number of Moves	0.53	0.18		0.63	1.20	1.07
Panel C: Ever Kids | Marriage						
Total Number of Moves	0.024**	0.019***	0.033**	0.024***	0.044***	0.037***
	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Observations	11,356	107,957	7,142	79,641	14,370	30,876
R-squared	0.325	0.218	0.373	0.174	0.342	0.271
Average Likelihood of Children	0.60	0.56	0.61	0.55	0.51	0.59
Average Number of Moves	0.53	0.15	0.51	0.63	1.20	1.07
Panel D: Dissolve Marriage | Marriage						
Total Number of Moves	0.009	0.013***	0.029***	0.006***	0.007	0.017***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	11,356	107,957	7,142	79,641	14,370	30,876
R-squared	0.319	0.201	0.387	0.224	0.413	0.316
Mean of Marriage Dissolution	0.09	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.05	0.10
Average Number of Moves	0.53	0.15	0.51	0.63	1.20	1.07
Panel E: Marriage at Last Date (5th year or End of First Term)						
Total Number of Moves	0.074***	0.061***	-0.011	0.075***	-0.010**	-0.010**
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Observations	19,024	279,298	7,142	144,263	14,370	30,879
R-squared	0.238	0.192	0.377	0.124	0.352	0.287
Mean of Marriage	0.56	0.37	0.93	0.53	0.97	0.94
Average Number of Moves	0.47	0.11	0.51	0.57	1.20	1.07

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. The dependent variable is denoted in the title of each panel. The title of each column denotes the conditioning sample: Col. 1 includes individuals who are not married when they enter the Army, Col. 2 includes just individuals who are married when they enter the Army, Col. 3 includes those who get married during their first year in the Army, Col. 4 includes those at the end of their first term (even if it is less than 5 years), and Col. 5 includes those with a 5 Year term length. Panel A includes everyone that stays in the Army for 5 years, Panel B includes those at the 5 year mark who get married while in the Army, Panel C and Panel D include those who are ever married during those 5 years. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. The regressions for Panel C and Panel D also include controls for whether someone was married to another Army member. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 6: Ever Married | Not Married when Enter

	(1) Max 1 Move	(2) Move Dummies, Max 3 Moves	(3) Including Abroad Moves	(4) Including Abroad Moves, max 1 move	(5) Domestic and Abroad Moves	(6) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 3 Moves	(7) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 1 Move
Domestic Moves					0.033*** (0.002)		0.056*** (0.003)
One Move	0.093*** (0.003)	0.093*** (0.003)				0.045*** (0.002)	
Two Moves		0.133*** (0.006)				0.079*** (0.004)	
Three Moves		0.157*** (0.023)				0.119*** (0.015)	
Total Moves (Include Abroad)			0.0076*** (0.0013)	0.0445*** (0.0024)			
International Moves					-0.033*** (0.002)		0.004 (0.004)
One Abroad Move						-0.026*** (0.002)	
Two Abroad Moves						-0.056*** (0.006)	
Three Abroad Moves						-0.051** (0.022)	
Observations	134,996	144,192	300,138	218,312	300,138	299,236	218,312
R-squared	0.131	0.130	0.0850	0.1021	0.088	0.078	0.103
Mean	0.548	0.554	0.525	0.527	0.525	0.525	0.527
Indep Mean							

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of marriage on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. Col. 7 includes people that have an international move. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. PEach regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 7: Ever Dissolve Marriage

	(1) Max 1 Move	(2) Move Dummies, Max 3 Moves	(3) Including Abroad Moves	(4) Including Abroad Moves, max 1 move	(5) Domestic and Abroad Moves	(6) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 3 Moves	(7) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 1 Move
Total Moves					0.007***		0.005***
					(0.001)		(0.002)
One Move	0.005**	0.005**				0.005***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)				(0.001)	
Two Moves		0.012***				0.009***	
		(0.004)				(0.002)	
Three Moves		0.006				0.001	
		(0.013)				(0.009)	
Total Moves (Include Abroad)			0.0079***	0.0052***			
			(0.0008)	(0.0016)			
International Moves					0.009***		0.004*
					(0.001)		(0.002)
One Abroad Move						0.010***	
						(0.001)	
Two Abroad Moves						0.016***	
						(0.004)	
Three Abroad Moves						0.016	
						(0.014)	
Observations	109,275	118,015	229,249	168,765	229,249	228,589	168,765
R-squared	0.182	0.176	0.1374	0.1541	0.137	0.126	0.154
Mean	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of having children, conditional on ever being married, on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, and whether someone was married to another Army member, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 8: Ever Married | Not Married when Enter

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				Employment to		All Additional
	Full Sample	Time at Home	Length of Stay	Population	Distance of Moves	Move Controls
Total Moves	0.079***	0.073***	0.086***	0.079***	0.048***	0.066***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Ever in Home Region		-0.007*				0.000
		(0.004)				(0.003)
Ever Home x Moves		0.014***				
		(0.005)				
Longest Spell			0.001			0.006***
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Longer x Moves			0.014***			
			(0.003)			
Average Employment to Pop				-0.014***		-0.015***
				(0.002)		(0.001)
Emp x Moves				-0.001		
				(0.002)		
Total Distance of Moves					0.035***	0.019***
					(0.003)	(0.002)
Distances x Moves					-0.016***	
					(0.002)	
Observations	144,254	139,203	138,134	128,827	144,254	120,298
R-squared	0.129	0.131	0.133	0.132	0.130	0.136
Mean	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.55	0.54
Indep Mean	0.57	0.49	0.58	0.56	-0.59	

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of marriage on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. Col. 7 includes people that have an international move. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. PEach regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Table 9: Ever Dissolve Marriage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Employment to	(5)	(6) All Additional
	Full Sample	Time at Home	Length of Stay	Population	Distance of Moves	Move Controls
Total Moves	0.005***	0.004*	0.004**	0.0056***	0.0081***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.0016)	(0.0022)	(0.002)
Ever in Home Region		-0.008***				-0.005***
		(0.002)				(0.002)
Ever Home x Moves		0.002				
		(0.003)				
Longest Spell			-0.002*			-0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Longer x Moves			0.002			
			(0.002)			
Average Employment to Pop				-0.0001		0.000
				(0.0011)		(0.001)
Emp x Moves				-0.0001		
				(0.0014)		
Total Distance of Moves					-0.0030	-0.002*
					(0.0020)	(0.001)
Distance x Moves					0.0004	
					(0.0012)	
Observations	118,072	112,893	112,943	102,954	118,072	95,190
R-squared	0.176	0.179	0.180	0.1834	0.1762	0.190
Mean	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08
Indep Mean	0.63	0.47	0.54	0.54	-0.53	

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of having children, conditional on ever being married, on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, and whether someone was married to another Army member, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Appendix Table 1: ACS Comparisons: Regressions of Moved Last Year on Controls

Control Set:	Baseline 1: Year dummies (θ_t)	θ_t + Demographics	Baseline 2: Year dummies (θ_t) + Occupation dummies (θ_j)	$\theta_t + \theta_j$ + Demographics
Total ACS matched sample				
R2	0.000029	0.0018	0.014	0.015
Partial R2		0.0018		0.001
N	103956	103956	103956	103956
F-test		15.63		9.08
Women				
R2	0.00035	0.0027	0.027	0.029
Partial R2		0.0024		0.002
N	14339	14339	14339	14339
F-test		3.50		3.10
Men				
R2	0.000014	0.0018	0.016	0.017
Partial R2		0.0018		0.001
N	89617	89617	89617	89617
F-test		15.06		8.51

Notes: Data from the 1990, 2000 Census and 2001-2013 American Community Survey. Balanced on education, race, ethnicity, age and sex to approximate the 5-years of service Army sample. Demographics include age, age squared, some college indicator, race (black), ethnicity (Hispanic), and sex if applicable. Occupation is the occ2010 variable (493 categories) from IPUMS USA.

Appendix Table 2: Age Married | Marriage

	(1) Max 1 Move	(2) Move Dummies, Max 3 Moves	(3) Including Abroad Moves	(4) Including Abroad Moves, max 1 move	(5) Domestic and Abroad Moves	(6) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 3 Moves	(7) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 1 Move
Total Moves					0.042*** (0.012)		0.033 (0.021)
One Move	-0.036 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.024)				0.022 (0.017)	
Two Moves		-0.112** (0.048)				0.039 (0.028)	
Three Moves		-0.052 (0.170)				-0.008 (0.119)	
Total Moves (Include Abroad)			0.0803*** (0.0104)	0.0652*** (0.0206)			
International Moves					0.140*** (0.016)		0.125*** (0.031)
One Abroad Move						0.147*** (0.019)	
Two Abroad Moves						0.339*** (0.058)	
Three Abroad Moves						0.066 (0.196)	
Observations	73,950	79,900	157,647	114,990	157,647	157,167	114,990
R-squared	0.276	0.272	0.2341	0.2520	0.234	0.191	0.252
Mean	23.13	23.13	23.19	23.19	23.19	23.19	23.19
Indep Mean							

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of the age someone gets married, conditional on getting married during this time period, on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. Panel A includes everyone that stays in the Army for 5 years, Panel B includes those at the 5 year mark who get married while in the Army, Panel C and Panel D include those who are ever married during those 5 years. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. The regressions for Panel C and Panel D also include controls for whether someone was married to another Army member. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Appendix Table 3: Have Kids | Married

	(1) Max 1 Move	(2) Move Dummies, Max 3 Moves	(3) Including Abroad Moves	(4) Including Abroad Moves, max 1 move	(5) Domestic and Abroad Moves	(6) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 3 Moves	(7) Domestic and Abroad Moves, Max 1 Move
Total Moves					0.009*** (0.002)		0.013*** (0.003)
One Move	0.024*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.003)				0.015*** (0.002)	
Two Moves		0.042*** (0.006)				0.017*** (0.004)	
Three Moves		0.063*** (0.024)				0.062*** (0.017)	
Total Moves (Include Abroad)			-0.0050*** (0.0014)	0.0044* (0.0027)			
International Moves					-0.028*** (0.002)		-0.026*** (0.004)
One Abroad Move						-0.018*** (0.003)	
Two Abroad Moves						-0.029*** (0.007)	
Three Abroad Moves						-0.012 (0.026)	
Observations	109,275	118,015	229,249	168,765	229,249	228,589	168,765
R-squared	0.187	0.183	0.1462	0.1620	0.147	0.093	0.163
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Indep Mean							

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of having children, conditional on ever being married, on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, and whether someone was married to another Army member, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Appendix Table 4: Moving Conditions on Age Married | Marriage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Employment to	(5)	(6) All Additional
	Full Sample	Time at Home	Length of Stay	Population	Distance of Moves	Move Controls
Total Moves	-0.037**	0.003	0.005	-0.030	-0.013	0.070**
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Ever in Home Region		0.155***				0.117***
		(0.033)				(0.024)
Ever Home x Moves		-0.039				
		(0.036)				
Longest Spell			0.038**			0.048***
			(0.017)			(0.015)
Longer x Moves			0.017			
			(0.020)			
Average Employment to Pop				0.005		0.021*
				(0.014)		(0.011)
Emp x Moves				0.017		
				(0.017)		
Total Distance of Moves					-0.025	-0.028*
					(0.025)	(0.017)
Distance x Moves					0.004	
					(0.016)	
Observations	79,944	76,975	76,576	70,133	79,944	65,338
R-squared	0.271	0.272	0.274	0.281	0.271	0.283
Mean	23.13	23.11	23.11	23.07	23.13	23.03
Indep Mean	0.63	0.48	0.54	0.54	-0.52	

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of the age someone gets married, conditional on getting married during this time period, on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. Panel A includes everyone that stays in the Army for 5 years, Panel B includes those at the 5 year mark who get married while in the Army, Panel C and Panel D include those who are ever married during those 5 years. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. The regressions for Panel C and Panel D also include controls for whether someone was married to another Army member. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.

Appendix Table 5: Moving Conditions on Having Kids | Married

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Employment to	(5)	(6) All Additional
	Full Sample	Time at Home	Length of Stay	Population	Distance of Moves	Move Controls
Total Moves	0.023***	0.013***	0.028***	0.023***	0.027***	0.027***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Ever in Home Region		-0.031***				-0.023***
		(0.004)				(0.003)
Ever Home x Moves		0.014***				
		(0.005)				
Longest Spell			0.004*			0.006***
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Longer x Moves			0.001			
			(0.003)			
Average Employment to Pop				-0.017***		-0.017***
				(0.002)		(0.002)
Emp x Moves				0.000		
				(0.002)		
Total Distance of Moves					-0.004	-0.000
					(0.003)	(0.002)
Distance x Moves					0.001	
					(0.002)	
Observations	118,072	112,893	112,943	102,954	118,072	95,190
R-squared	0.183	0.185	0.186	0.190	0.183	0.194
Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.65	0.64
Indep Mean	0.63	0.47	0.54	0.54	-0.53	

Notes: This table reports linear probability regression results of having children, conditional on ever being married, on the number of moves someone experiences during their first five years in the Army. Each column adds additional characteristics on the type of move people experience. The data includes those who enlist between 1991 and 2008. Each regression includes controls for education, gender, AFQT score, race, deployment months, age, age squared, and whether someone was married to another Army member, as well as job, rank, and year structural controls. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively with robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coefficient.