

The Global Diffusion of Ideas*

Francisco J. Buera

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Ezra Oberfield

Princeton University

June 29, 2015

Preliminary and Incomplete

Abstract

We provide a tractable theory of innovation and diffusion of technologies to explore the role of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). We model innovation and diffusion as a process involving the combination of new ideas with insights from other industries or countries. We provide conditions under which each country's equilibrium frontier of knowledge converges to a Frechet distribution, and derive a system of differential equations describing the evolution of the scale parameters of these distributions, i.e., countries' stocks of knowledge. In particular, the growth of a country's stock of knowledge depends only on the its trade and FDI shares and the stocks of knowledge of its trading partners. We use the framework to quantify the contribution of bilateral trade costs to cross-sectional TFP differences (up to 14%), long-run changes in TFP (up to 12%), and individual post-war growth miracles (up to 42%).

*

Economic miracles are characterized by protracted growth in productivity, per-capita income, and increases in trade and FDI flows. The experiences of South Korea in the postwar period and the recent performance of China are prominent examples. These experiences suggest an important role played by openness in the process of development.¹ Yet quantitative trade models relying on standard static mechanisms imply relatively small gains from openness, and therefore cannot account for growth miracles.² These findings call for alternative channels through which openness can affect development. In this paper we present and analyze a model of an alternative mechanism: the impact of openness on the creation and diffusion of best practices across countries.

We model innovation and diffusion as a process involving the combination of new ideas with insights from other industries and countries. Insights occur randomly due to local interactions among producers. In our theory openness affects the creation and diffusion of ideas by determining the distribution from which producers draw their insights. Our theory is flexible enough to incorporate different channels through which ideas may diffuse across countries. We focus on two main channels: (i) insights are drawn from those that sell goods to a country, (ii) insights are drawn from technologies used domestically, whether foreign or domestically owned. In our model, openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) affects the quality of the insights drawn by domestic producers by selecting different sellers to a country and/or affecting the technologies used to produce domestically.

We use the model to explore several questions. First, we study how barriers to trade alter the learning process. At the micro level, the insights one draws depend on local interactions. At the aggregate level, the growth of a country's stock of knowledge depends on its trade shares and the stocks of knowledge of its trading partners. Starting from autarky, opening up to trade results in a higher temporary growth rate, and permanently higher level, of the stock of knowledge, as the producers are exposed to more productive ideas. We separate the gains from trade into a static component and a dynamic component. The static component consists of the gains from increased specialization and comparative advantage, whereas the dynamic component are the gains that operate through the flow of ideas. We show that the static gains from trade are relatively more

¹See [Feyrer \(2009a,b\)](#) for recent estimates of the impact of trade on income, and a review of the empirical literature. See also the discussion in [Lucas \(2009b\)](#).

²See [Connolly and Yi \(2009\)](#) for a quantification of the role of trade on Korean's growth miracle. [Atkeson and Burstein \(2010\)](#) also find relatively small effects in a model with innovation.

important for countries that are already relatively open, while the dynamic gains from trade are much more important for countries that are relatively closed. We also show that the case of costless trade does not necessarily result in the highest short-run growth rate of the stock of knowledge. For example, If learning from sellers is important, a country could increase the growth rate of its stock of knowledge by tilting the composition of its trading partners towards high productivity sources. However, this generically conflicts with maximizing the static gains from trade.

We next use our model to quantify the dynamics of a trade liberalization, studying in particular how opening to trade shapes the diffusion of ideas. In a world that is generally open, if a single closed country opens to trade, it will experience an instantaneous jump in real income, a mechanism that has been well-studied in the trade literature. Following that jump, this country's stock of knowledge will gradually improve as the liberalization leads to an improvement in the composition of insights drawn by its domestic producers. Here, the speed of convergence depends on the nature of learning process. If insights are drawn from goods that are sold to the country, then convergence will be faster, as opening to trade allows producers to draw insight from the relatively productive foreign producers. In contrast, if insights are drawn from technologies that are used locally, the country's stock of knowledge grows more slowly. In that case, a trade liberalization leads to better selection of the domestic producers, but those domestic producers have low productivity relative to foreign firms.

We specify a quantitative version of the model that includes non-traded goods and intermediate inputs, and equipped labor with capital and education, and use it to study the ability of the theory to account for cross-country differences in TFP in 1962 and its evolution between 1962 and 2000. We use panel data on trade flows and relative prices to calibrate the evolution of bilateral trade costs, and take the evolution of population, physical and human capital, i.e., equipped labor, from the data. Given the evolution of trade costs and equipped labor, our model predicts the evolution of each country's TFP.

The predicted relationship between trade and growth depends on the value of a single parameter β which we label the strength of diffusion. β indexes the contribution of insights drawn from others to the productivity of new ideas. Rather than take a strong stand on its value, we simulate the model for various values and explore how well the model can quantitatively account for cross-country income differences and the evolution of countries' productivity over time.

We find that differences in trade costs can account for up to 14% of the cross-sectional dispersion of TFP in 1962, and up to 12% of the dispersion of TFP growth between 1962 and 2000. A majority of ability of the theory to account for TFP differences is given by the dynamic gains from trade, as lower trade costs lead to an improvement in the composition of insights drawn by domestic producers. Indeed, in a version of the model with only static gains from trade accounts for only 2% of the cross-sectional dispersion of TFP, and 5% of the dispersion of TFP growth. The quantitative model is particularly capable of explaining much of the evolution of TFP in growth miracles, accounting for over a third of the TFP growth in China, South Korea and Taiwan. Interestingly, the ability of the model to account for both the dispersion of TFP and the dispersion of TFP growth is highest for intermediate values of the diffusion parameter, β .

Finally, we consider an extension with both trade and multinational production. As was true with trade, barriers to FDI alter the learning process, and the growth of a country's stock of knowledge now depends on both its trade and FDI shares as well as the stocks of knowledge of both its trading partners and that of foreign firms operating domestically. When learning is such that insights are drawn from those producing domestically, opening to FDI tends to lead to faster convergence than opening to trade; opening to FDI provides more immediate access to the ideas of foreign producers.

We also study whether trade and FDI are substitutes or complements in the diffusion of ideas. For both the static and dynamic gains from opening, this depends crucially on the correlation of multinationals' productivities across potential production locations. When this correlation is high, trade and FDI are substitutes in increasing the speed of learning and raising real incomes.

Literature Review Our work builds on a large literature modeling innovation and diffusion of technologies as a stochastic process, starting from the earlier work of [Jovanovic and Rob \(1989\)](#), [Jovanovic and MacDonald \(1994\)](#), [Kortum \(1997\)](#), and recent contributions by [Alvarez et al. \(2008\)](#) and [Luttmer \(2012\)](#).³ We are particularly related to recent applications of these frameworks to study the connection between trade and the diffusion of ideas ([Lucas, 2009a](#); [Alvarez et al., 2013](#); [Perla et al., 2013](#); [Sampson, 2014](#)).

Our theory captures the models in [Kortum \(1997\)](#) and [Alvarez et al. \(2008, 2013\)](#) as special

³[Lucas and Moll \(2014\)](#) and [Perla and Tonetti \(2014\)](#) extends these models by studying the case with endogenous search effort, a dimension that we abstract from.

cases. When the contribution of insights to the development of new technologies is zero, $\beta = 0$ in our notation, our framework simplifies to a version of [Kortum \(1997\)](#) with exogenous search intensity. When insights from domestic sellers are the only input to the development of new technologies, $\beta = 1$, our framework simplifies to the model in [Alvarez et al. \(2008, 2013\)](#) with stochastic arrival of ideas. Beyond analyzing the intermediate cases, $\beta \in (0, 1)$, the behavior of the model is qualitatively different from either of the two special cases $\beta = 0$ or $\beta = 1$. With $\beta = 0$, there is no diffusion of ideas and thus no dynamic gains from trade. With $\beta = 1$, changes in trade costs alter a country's growth rate, and the equilibrium frontier of knowledge is closer to a logistic distribution. More importantly, when $\beta = 1$ and trade barriers are finite, changes in trade barriers have no impact on the tail of the distribution of productivity, and therefore, the model has a more limited success in providing a quantitative theory of the level and transitional dynamics of productivity. With $\beta < 1$, the frontier of knowledge converges to a Frechet distribution. This allows us use the machinery of [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#), [Bernard et al. \(2003\)](#), [Alvarez and Lucas \(2007\)](#), and [Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare \(2013\)](#) which have been remarkably successful as quantitative trade models. We therefore believe that studying the intermediate case of $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is a step toward a quantitative model of the cross-country diffusion of ideas. Finally, we are able to nest alternative sources of insights, e.g., learning from those who sell goods to a country, learning from those that produce within a country, and study the role of both trade and FDI in determining the distribution of insights.

[Eaton and Kortum \(1999\)](#) also build a model of the diffusion of ideas across countries in which the distribution of productivities in each country is Frechet, and where the evolution of the scale parameter of the Frechet distribution in each country is governed by a system of differential equations. In their work insights are drawn from the distribution of potential producers in each country, according to exogenous diffusion rates which are estimated to be country-pair specific, although countries are assumed to be in autarky otherwise. Therefore, changes in trade and FDI costs do not affect the diffusion of ideas.

Our work relates to a large literature studying the connection between trade and growth, including the early contributions by [Grossman and Helpman \(1991\)](#) and [Rivera-Batiz and Romer \(1991\)](#). The one that is closest to ours is [Grossman and Helpman \(1991\)](#). They consider a small open economy in which technology is transferred from the rest of the world as an external effect,

and the pace of technology transfer is assumed to depend on the volume of trade. Our model incorporates this channel along with several others and embeds this in a quantitative framework.

The model shares some features with [Oberfield \(2013\)](#) which models the formation of supply chains and the economy’s input-output architecture. In that model, entrepreneurs discover methods of producing their goods using other entrepreneurs’ goods as inputs.⁴

1 Technology Diffusion with a General Source Distribution

We begin with a description of technology diffusion in a single country given a general source distribution. The source distribution describes the set of insights that producers might access. In the specific examples that we explore later in the paper, the source distribution will depend on the profiles of productivity across all countries in the world, but in this section we take it to be a general function satisfying weak tail properties. Given the assumption on the source distribution, we show that the equilibrium distribution of productivity in a given economy is Frechet, and derive a differential equation describing the evolution of the scale parameter of this distribution.

We consider an economy with a continuum of goods $s \in [0, 1]$. For each good, there are m producers. We will later study an environment in which the producers engage in Bertrand competition, so that (barring ties) at most one of these producers will actively produce. A producer is characterized by her productivity, q . A producer of good s with productivity q has access to a labor-only, linear technology

$$y(s) = ql(s), \tag{1}$$

where $l(s)$ is the labor input and $y(s)$ is output of good s . The state of technology in the economy is described by the function $M_t(q)$, the fraction of producers with knowledge no greater than q . We call M_t the distribution of knowledge at t .

The economy’s productivity depends on the frontier of knowledge. The frontier of knowledge is characterized by the function

$$\tilde{F}_t(q) \equiv M_t(q)^m.$$

⁴Here, the evolution of the distribution of marginal costs depends on a differential equation summarizing the history of insights that were drawn. In [Oberfield \(2013\)](#), the distribution of marginal costs is the solution to a fixed point problem, as each producer’s marginal cost depends on her potential suppliers’ marginal costs.

$\tilde{F}_t(q)$ is the probability that none of the m producers of a good have productivity better than q .

We now describe the dynamics of the distribution of knowledge. We model diffusion as a process involving the random interaction among producers of different goods or countries. We assume each producer draws insights from others stochastically at rate α_t . However there is randomness in the adaptation of that insight. More formally, when an insight arrives to a producer with productivity q , the producer learns an idea with random productivity zq'^β and adopts the idea if $zq'^\beta > q$. The productivity of the idea has two components. There is an insight drawn from another producer, q' , which is drawn from the source distribution $\tilde{G}_t(q')$. The second component z is an original contribution that is drawn from an exogenous distribution with CDF $H(z)$. We refer to $H(z)$ as the exogenous distribution of ideas.⁵

This process captures the fact that interactions with more productive individuals tend to lead to more useful insights, but it also allows for randomness in the adaptation of others' techniques to alternative uses. The latter is captured by the random variable z . An alternative interpretation of the model is that z represents an innovator's "original" random idea, which is combined with random insights obtained from other technologies.⁶

Given the distribution of knowledge at time t , $M_t(q)$, the source distribution, $\tilde{G}_t(q')$, and the exogenous distribution of ideas, $H(z)$, the distribution of knowledge at time $t + \Delta$ is

$$M_{t+\Delta}(q) = M_t(q) \left[(1 - \alpha_t \Delta) + \alpha_t \Delta \int_0^\infty H\left(\frac{q}{x^\beta}\right) d\tilde{G}_t(x) \right]$$

The first term on the right hand side, $M_t(q)$, is the distribution of knowledge at time t , which gives the fraction of producers with productivity less than q . The second term is the probability that a producer did not have an insight between time t and $t + \Delta$ that raised her productivity above q . This can happen if no insight arrived in an interval of time Δ , an event with probability $1 - \alpha_t \Delta$, or if at least one insight arrived but none resulted in a technique with productivity greater than q , an event that occurs with probability $\int_0^\infty H\left(\frac{q}{x^\beta}\right) d\tilde{G}_t(x)$.

⁵From the perspective of this section, both $\tilde{G}_t(q)$ and $H(z)$ are exogenous. The distinction between these distributions will become clear once we consider specific examples of source distributions, in which the source distribution will be an *endogenous* function of countries' frontiers of knowledge.

⁶If $\beta = 0$ our framework simplifies to a version of the model in [Kortum \(1997\)](#) with exogenous search intensity. The framework also nests the model of diffusion in [Alvarez et al. \(2008\)](#) with stochastic arrival of ideas if $\beta = 1$, H is degenerate, and $\tilde{G}_t = \tilde{F}_t$.

Rearranging and taking the limit as $\Delta \rightarrow 0$ we obtain

$$\frac{d}{dt} \ln M_t(q) = \lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{M_{t+\Delta}(q) - M_t(q)}{\Delta M_t(q)} = -\alpha_t \int_0^\infty [1 - H(q/x^\beta)] d\tilde{G}_t(x).$$

With this, we can derive an equation describing the frontier of knowledge. Since $\tilde{F}_t(q) = M_t(q)^m$, the change in the frontier of knowledge evolves as:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \ln \tilde{F}_t(q) = -m\alpha_t \int_0^\infty [1 - H(q/x^\beta)] d\tilde{G}_t(x).$$

To gain tractability, we make the following assumption about the exogenous component of ideas.

Assumption 1 *The exogenous distribution has a Pareto right tail with exponent θ , so that*

$$\lim_{z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - H(z)}{z^{-\theta}} = 1.$$

We thus assume that the right tail of the exogenous distribution of ideas is regularly varying. The restriction that the limit is equal to 1 rather than some other positive number is without loss of generality; we can always choose units so that the limit is one.

We also assume that the strength of diffusion, β is strictly less than one.

Assumption 2 $\beta \in [0, 1)$.

For this section we make one additional assumption: the source distribution \tilde{G}_t has a sufficiently thin tail.⁷

Assumption 3 *At each t , $\lim_{q \rightarrow \infty} q^{\beta\theta} [1 - \tilde{G}_t(q)] = 0$.*

We will study economies where the number of producers for each good is large. As such, it will be convenient to study how the frontier of knowledge evolves when normalized by the number of producers for each good. Define $F_t(q) \equiv \tilde{F}_t\left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q\right)$ and $G_t(q) \equiv \tilde{G}_t\left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q\right)$

⁷In later sections when we endogenize the source distribution, this assumption will be replaced by an analogous assumption on the right tail of the initial distribution of knowledge, $\lim_{q \rightarrow \infty} q^{\beta\theta} [1 - M_0(q)] = 0$ and a restriction that β is sufficiently small.

Proposition 1 *Suppose that Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 hold. Then in the limit as $m \rightarrow \infty$, the frontier of knowledge evolves as:*

$$\frac{d \ln F_t(q)}{dt} = -\alpha_t q^{-\theta} \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_t(x)$$

Motivated by the previous proposition, we define $\lambda_t \equiv \int_{-\infty}^t \alpha_\tau \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_\tau(x) d\tau$. With this, one can show that the economy's frontier of knowledge converges asymptotically to a Frechet distribution.

Corollary 2 *Suppose that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_t = \infty$. Then $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} F_t(\lambda_t^{1/\theta} q) = e^{-q^{-\theta}}$.*

Proof. Solving the differential equation gives $F_t(q) = F_0(q) e^{-(\lambda_t - \lambda_0) q^{-\theta}}$. Evaluating this at $\lambda_t^{1/\theta} q$ gives $F_t(\lambda_t^{1/\theta} q) = F_0(\lambda_t^{1/\theta} q) e^{-(\lambda_t - \lambda_0) \lambda_t^{-1} q^{-\theta}}$. This implies that, asymptotically, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} F_t(\lambda_t^{1/\theta} q) = e^{-q^{-\theta}}$ ■

Thus, the distribution of productivities in this economy is asymptotically Frechet and the dynamics of the scale parameter is governed by the differential equation

$$\dot{\lambda}_t = \alpha_t \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_t(x). \quad (2)$$

We call λ_t the stock of knowledge.

In the rest of the paper we analyze alternative models for the source distribution G_t . A simple example that illustrates basic features of more general cases is $G_t(q) = F_t(q)$. This corresponds to the case in which diffusion opportunities are randomly drawn from the set of domestic best practices across all goods. In a closed economy this set equals the set of domestic producers and sellers. In this case equation (2) becomes

$$\dot{\lambda}_t = \alpha_t \Gamma(1 - \beta) \lambda_t^\beta$$

where $\Gamma(u) = \int_0^\infty x^{u-1} e^{-x} dx$ is the Gamma function. Growth in the long-run is obtained in this framework if the arrival rate of insight grows over time, $\alpha_t = \alpha_0 e^{\gamma t}$. In this case, the scale of the Frechet distribution λ_t grows asymptotically at the rate $\gamma/(1 - \beta)$, and per-capita GDP grows at the rate $\gamma/[(1 - \beta)\theta]$. In general, the evolution of the de-trended stock of knowledge $\hat{\lambda}_t = \lambda_t e^{\gamma/(1-\beta)t}$

can be summarized in terms of the de-trended arrival of ideas $\hat{\alpha}_t = \alpha_t e^{\gamma t}$

$$\hat{\lambda}_t = \hat{\alpha}_t \Gamma(1 - \beta) \hat{\lambda}_t^\beta - \frac{\gamma}{1 - \beta} \hat{\lambda}_t,$$

and on a balanced growth path on which $\hat{\alpha}$ is constant, the de-trended stock of ideas is

$$\hat{\lambda} = \left[\frac{\hat{\alpha}(1 - \beta)}{\gamma} \Gamma(1 - \beta) \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \beta}}.$$

In the model that follows, potential producers engage in Bertrand competition. In that environment, an important object is the joint distribution of the productivities of best and second best producers of a good. We denote the CDF of this joint distribution as $\tilde{F}_t^{12}(q_1, q_2)$, which, for $q_1 \geq q_2$, equals⁸

$$\tilde{F}_t^{12}(q_1, q_2) = M_t(q_2)^m + m [M_t(q_2) - M_t(q_1)] M_t(q_2)^{m-1}.$$

Since the frontier of knowledge at t satisfies $\tilde{F}_t(q) = M_t(q)^m$, the joint distribution can be written as

$$\tilde{F}_t^{12}(q_1, q_2) = \left[1 + m \left\{ \left(\tilde{F}_t(q_1) / \tilde{F}_t(q_2) \right)^{1/m} - 1 \right\} \right] \tilde{F}_t(q_2), \quad q_1 \geq q_2.$$

Normalizing this joint distribution by the number of producers, $F_t^{12}(q_1, q_2) \equiv \tilde{F}_t^{12} \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q_1, m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q_2 \right)$, we have that for large m ,

$$F_t^{12}(q_1, q_2) = [1 + \log F_t(q_1) - \log F_t(q_2)] F_t(q_2), \quad q_1 \geq q_2.$$

2 International Trade

We first consider a world where n economies interact through trade, and ideas diffuse through the contact of domestic producers with those who sell goods to the country as well as with those that produce within the country. Given the results from the previous section, the static trade theory is given by the standard Ricardian model in [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#), [Bernard et al. \(2003\)](#), and [Alvarez and Lucas \(2007\)](#), which we briefly introduce before deriving the equations which

⁸Intuitively, there are two ways the best and second best productivities can be no greater than q_1 and q_2 respectively. Either none of the productivities are greater than q_2 , or one of the m draws is between q_1 and q_2 and none of the remaining $m - 1$ are greater than q_2 .

characterize the evolution of the profile of the distribution of productivities of countries in the world economy.

In each country, consumers have identical preferences over a continuum of goods. We use $c_i(s)$ to denote the consumption of a representative household in i of good $s \in [0, 1]$. Utility is given by $u(C_i)$, where the the consumption aggregate is

$$C_i = \left[\int_0^1 c_i(s)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} ds \right]^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

so goods enter symmetrically and exchangeably. We assume that $\varepsilon - 1 < \theta$, which guarantees the price level is finite. Let $p_i(s)$ be the price of good s in i , so that i 's ideal price index is $P_i = \left[\int_0^1 p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$. Letting X_i denote i 's total expenditure, i 's consumption of good s is $c_i(s) = \frac{p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon}}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} X_i$.

In each country, individual goods can be manufactured by many producers, each using a labor-only, linear technology (1). As discussed in the previous section, provided countries share the same exogenous distribution of ideas $H(z)$, the frontier of productivity in each country is described by a Frechet distribution with curvature θ and a country-specific scale λ_i , $F_i(q) = e^{-\lambda_i q^{-\theta}}$. Transportation costs are given by the standard ‘‘iceberg’’ assumption, where κ_{ij} denotes the units that must be shipped from country j to deliver a unit of the good in country i , with $\kappa_{ii} = 1$ and $\kappa_{ij} \geq 1$.

We now briefly present the basic equations that summarize the static trade equilibrium given the vector of scale parameters $\lambda = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n)$. Because the expressions for price indices, trade shares, and profit are identical to [Bernard et al. \(2003\)](#), we relegate the derivation of these expressions to [Appendix B](#).

Given the isoelastic demand, if a producer had no direct competitors, it would set a price with a markup of $\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}$ over marginal cost. Producers engage in Bertrand competition. This means that lowest cost provider of a good to a country will either use this markup or, if necessary, set a limit price to just undercut the next-lowest-cost provider of the good.

Let w_i denote the wage in country i . For a producer with productivity q in country j , the cost of providing one unit of the good in country i is $\frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q}$. The price of good s in country i is determined as follows. Suppose that country j 's best and second best producers of good s have productivities

$q_{j1}(s)$ and $q_{j2}(s)$. The country that can provide good s to i at the lowest cost is given by

$$\arg \min_j \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)}$$

If the lowest-cost-provider of good s for i is a producer from country k , the price of good s in i is

$$p_i(s) = \min \left\{ \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{q_{k1}(s)}, \frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{q_{k2}(s)}, \min_{j \neq k} \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} \right\}$$

That is, the price is either the monopolist's price or else it equals the cost of the next-lowest-cost provider of the good; the latter is either the second best producer of good s in country k or the best producer in one of the other countries.

In [Appendix B](#), we show that, in equilibrium, i 's price index is

$$P_i = B \left\{ \sum_j \lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta} \right\}^{-1/\theta}$$

where B is a constant.⁹

Let $S_{ij} \subseteq [0, 1]$ be the set of goods for which a producer in j is the lowest-cost-provider for country i . Let π_{ij} denote the share of country i 's expenditure that is spent on goods from country j so that $\pi_{ij} = \int_{s \in S_{ij}} (p_i(s)/P_i)^{1-\varepsilon} ds$. In [Appendix B](#), we show that the expenditure share is

$$\pi_{ij} = \frac{\lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\sum_{k=1}^n \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta}}.$$

A static equilibrium is given by a profile of wages $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_n)$ such that labor market clears in all countries. The static equilibrium will depend on whether trade is balanced and where profit from producers is spent. For now, we take each country's expenditure as given and solve for the equilibrium as a function of these expenditures.

Labor in j is used to produce goods for all destinations. To deliver one unit of good $s \in S_{ij}$ to i , the producer in j uses $\kappa_{ij}/q_{j1}(s)$ units of labor. Thus the labor market clearing constraint for

⁹ $B^{1-\varepsilon} = \left[\left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \left(1 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}\right)^{-\theta}\right) + \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}\right)^{-\theta} \right] \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right).$

country j is

$$L_j = \sum_i \int_{s \in S_{ij}} \frac{\kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} c_i(s) ds.$$

Similarly, the total profit earned by producers in j can be written as

$$\Pi_j = \sum_i \int_{s \in S_{ij}} \left(p_i(s) - \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} \right) c_i(s) ds.$$

In [Appendix B](#), we show that these can be expressed as

$$w_j L_j = \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \sum_i \pi_{ij} X_i$$

and

$$\Pi_j = \frac{1}{\theta + 1} \sum_i \pi_{ij} X_i$$

Under the natural assumption that trade is balanced and that all profit from domestic producers is spent domestically, then $X_i = w_i L_i + \Pi_i$ and the labor market clearing conditions can be expressed as

$$w_j L_j = \sum_i \pi_{ij} w_i L_i$$

As a simple benchmark, it is useful to consider the case with costless trade, $\kappa_{ij} = 1$, all j , and countries of equal size $L_i = L_j$, all $j \neq i$. In this case, relative wages are

$$\frac{w_i^{FT}}{w_{i'}^{FT}} = \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_{i'}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}}$$

and the relative expenditure shares are

$$\frac{\pi_{ij}^{FT}}{\pi_{ij'}^{FT}} = \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_{j'}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}}. \quad (3)$$

Given the static equilibria, we next solve for the evolution of the profile of scale parameters $\lambda = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_n)$ by specializing (2) for alternative assumptions about source distributions. We consider

source distributions that encompass two cases: (i) domestic producers learn from sellers to the country, (ii) domestic producers learn from other producers in the country.

2.1 Learning from Sellers

Following the framework introduced in Section 1, we model the evolution of technologies as the outcome of a process where managers combine “own ideas” with random insights from technologies in other sectors or countries. We first consider the case in which insights are drawn from sellers to the country. In particular, we assume that insights are randomly drawn from the distribution of sellers’ productivity in proportion to the expenditure on each good.¹⁰ In this case, the source distribution is given by the expenditure weighted distribution of productivity of sellers

$$G_i(q) = G_i^S(q) \equiv \sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij} | q_j(s) < q} \frac{p_i(s)c_i(s)}{P_i C_i} ds$$

As we show in Appendix B specializing equation (2) to this source distribution, the evolution of the scale of the Frechet distribution, i.e., the stock of ideas, is described by

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\lambda}_{it} &= \alpha_{it} \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_i^S(q) \\ &= \alpha_{it} B^S \sum_j \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^\beta \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where B^S is a constant that involves β , θ and ε . That is, the evolution of the stock of ideas is a simple weighted sum of the stock of ideas in all countries, where the weights are given by expenditure shares.

For the change in i ’s stock of knowledge to be finite, it must be that $\beta + \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} < 1$. When ε is high, consumers substitute toward the lower cost–or higher productivity–goods. If this condition were violated, then consumers would substitute enough toward these goods that the average insight would be unbounded. We therefore assume for the remainder of the paper that this condition holds.

¹⁰For the case of learning from sellers, the assumption that insights are randomly drawn in proportion to the expenditure on a good is not central. Alternative assumptions, e.g., insights are uniformly drawn from the set of sellers, give the same law of motion for the each country’s stock of knowledge up to a constant. See Appendix C.1.1.

Assumption 4 $\beta + \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} < 1$

Equation (4) shows that trade shapes how a country learns in two ways. Trade gives a country access to the ideas of sellers from other countries. In addition, trade leads to tougher competition, so that there is more selection among the producers from which insights are drawn.¹¹ In fact, the less a country is able to sell, the stronger selection is among its producers. The amount i learns from j is given by $(\lambda_j/\pi_{ij})^\beta$, where λ_j/π_{ij} is the average productivity of sellers from j to i . Holding fixed j 's stock of knowledge, a smaller π_{ij} reflects more selection into selling, which means that the insights drawn from sellers from j are likely to be higher quality insights.

Nevertheless, the quality of insights is not necessarily maximized in the case of free trade. To optimize the quality of insights a country must bias its trade toward those countries with higher technologies. In particular, in the short run the growth of country i 's stock of knowledge is maximized when its expenditure shares are proportional to the stock of ideas of its trading partners.¹²

$$\frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{ij'}} = \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_{j'}}. \quad (5)$$

whereas in equilibrium, country i 's expenditure shares will satisfy

$$\frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{ij'}} = \frac{\lambda_j(w_j\kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\lambda_{j'}(w_{j'}\kappa_{ij'})^{-\theta}}. \quad (6)$$

Notice that (5) and (6) coincide only if differences in trade costs perfectly offset differences in trading partners' wages. For example, suppose trade costs are symmetric. A country that is the technological leader can implement this by increasing the cost of trading with less technologically developed countries. In turn, countries that are not at the technological frontier need to subsidize trade with technological advanced countries to maximize the growth rate of the stock of ideas.¹³

As discussed before, to obtain growth in the long-run we assume that the arrival rate of insights

¹¹This mechanism is emphasized by Alvarez et al. (2013).

¹²This is the solution to $\max_{\{\pi_{ij}\}} \sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \lambda_j^\beta$ subject to $\sum_j \pi_{ij} = 1$.

¹³To be clear, iceberg trade costs are not tariffs (which both distort trade costs and provide revenue), so the preceding argument does not show that the distorting trade represents optimal policy. However, if the shadow value of a higher stock of knowledge is positive, a planner that maximizes the present value of a small open economy's real income and can set country-specific tariffs would generically set tariffs that are non-zero and not uniform across countries.

grow over time, in which case it is convenient to analyze the evolution of the de-trended stock of ideas $\hat{\lambda}_{it} = \lambda_{it}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}t}$

$$\dot{\hat{\lambda}}_{it} = \hat{\alpha}_{it}B^S \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_{jt}^\beta - \frac{\gamma}{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_{it}, \quad (7)$$

On a balanced growth path where the arrival rate of insights grows at rate γ , the de-trended stock of knowledge solves the system of non-linear equations

$$\hat{\lambda}_i = \frac{(1-\beta)\hat{\alpha}_i}{\gamma} B^S \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_j^\beta. \quad (8)$$

2.2 Learning from Production

Another natural source of ideas is given by the interaction of technology managers with other domestic producers, or workers employed by these producers. Along these lines, in this section we consider the case in which the insights are drawn from the distribution of productivity among domestic producers, in proportion to the labor used in the production of each good.¹⁴ Under this assumption, the source distribution is given by the labor weighted distribution of productivity of domestic producers.

If a producer in i is the lowest cost supplier of good s to country j ($s \in S_{ji}$), the fraction of i 's labor used to produce the good is $\frac{1}{L_i} \frac{\kappa_{ji}}{q_{i1}(s)} c_j(s)$. Summing over all destinations, i 's source distribution would then be

$$G_i(q) = G_i^P(q) = \sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ji} | q_{i1}(s) \leq q} \frac{1}{L_i} \frac{\kappa_{ji}}{q_{i1}(s)} c_j(s) ds$$

As we show in [Appendix B](#) specializing [equation \(2\)](#) to this source distribution, the evolution of

¹⁴For this case, the assumption that insights are randomly drawn in proportion to the labor used or the value added produced, instead of been randomly drawn from the set of producers, is more important. See [Appendix C.1.1](#) for a characterization of the dynamics of the stock of ideas under alternative assumptions.

the scale of the Frechet distribution, i.e., the stock of ideas, is described by

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\lambda}_{it} &= \alpha_{it} \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_i^P(q) \\ &= \alpha_{it} B^P \sum_{j=1}^n r_{ji} \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\pi_{ji}} \right)^\beta.\end{aligned}$$

where $r_{ji} = \frac{\pi_{ji} X_j}{\sum_k \pi_{ki} X_k}$ is the share of i 's revenue coming from sales to country j and B^P is a constant involving β , θ and ε . Thus, the source distribution of country i is a function of the fraction of domestic goods purchased by other countries, π_{ji} , the expenditure (and hence the income) of these countries, and the domestic stock of knowledge, λ_i .

How does trade alter a country's stock of knowledge? In autarky, insights are drawn from all domestic producers, including very unproductive ones. As a country opens up to trade the set of domestic producers improves as the unproductive technologies are selected out. This raises the quality of insights drawn and increases the growth rate of the stock of knowledge.¹⁵

For each of the two specifications of learning, trade induces selection, which alters the composition of insights drawn. However, there are two important differences across the two specifications. First, with learning from sellers, a country gets insights from its trading partners' stocks of knowledge, whereas with learning from producers, insights are drawn from a country's own stock of knowledge. Second, with learning from sellers, the composition of expenditures is important, whereas with learning from producers the composition of sales plays an important role.

As before, the evolution of the de-trended scale $\hat{\lambda}_{it} = \lambda_{it} e^{-\gamma/(1-\beta)t}$ is given by

$$\dot{\hat{\lambda}}_{it} = \hat{\alpha}_{it} B^P \sum_{j=1}^n r_{ji} \left(\frac{\hat{\lambda}_{it}}{\pi_{ji}} \right)^\beta - \frac{\gamma}{(1-\beta)} \hat{\lambda}_{it}, \quad (9)$$

and on a balanced growth path it solves the following system of non-linear equations

$$\hat{\lambda}_i = \frac{(1-\beta)\hat{\alpha}_i}{\gamma} B^P \sum_{j=1}^n r_{ji} \left(\frac{\hat{\lambda}_i}{\pi_{ji}} \right)^\beta. \quad (10)$$

¹⁵This mechanism is emphasized by [Perla et al. \(2013\)](#) and [Sampson \(2014\)](#).

3 Gains from Trade

As in other gravity models, a country's real income and welfare can be summarized by its stock of knowledge (or some other measure of aggregate productivity), its expenditure share on domestic goods, and the trade elasticity:

$$y_i \equiv \frac{w_i}{P_i} = B^{-1} \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\pi_{ii}} \right)^{1/\theta} \quad (11)$$

In our model gains from trade have a static and dynamic component. The static component, holding each country's stock of knowledge fixed, is the familiar gains from trade in standard Ricardian models, e.g., [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#).¹⁶ The dynamic gains from trade are the ones that operate through the effect of trade on the flow of ideas.

In this section we consider several simple examples that illustrate the determinants of the static and dynamic gains from trade, both in the short and long run. We first consider an example of a world with symmetric countries. We study both the consequences of a simultaneous change in common trade barriers as well as the case of a single deviant country that is more isolated than the rest of the world. We also study how a small open economy responds when its trade barriers change, a case that admits an analytical characterization. The details of each are worked out in [Appendix D](#).

3.1 Gains from Trade in a Symmetric Economy

Consider a world with n symmetric countries in which there is a common iceberg cost κ of shipping a good across any border. Specializing either [equation \(8\)](#) or [equation \(10\)](#), each country's de-trended stock of knowledge on a balanced growth path is

$$\hat{\lambda}(\kappa) = \left[\frac{(1-\beta)\hat{\alpha}}{\gamma} B^X \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \left[\frac{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta})^{1-\beta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}. \quad (12)$$

¹⁶See [Arkolakis et al. \(2012\)](#) for other examples.

where B^X equals B^S or B^P depending on the specification.¹⁷ The de-trended real per-capita income is obtained by substituting [equation \(12\)](#) into [equation \(11\)](#)

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}(\kappa) &= \frac{1}{B} \hat{\lambda}(\kappa)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \\ &\propto \left[1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}\right]^{\frac{1}{\theta} \frac{1}{1-\beta}}\end{aligned}\tag{13}$$

Using [equation \(13\)](#), we derive a simple expression for the gains from trade. For the case of a world with symmetric populations, the long-run gains from trade as measured by the per-capita income on a balanced growth path with costless trade relative to one with autarky, can be decomposed as follows

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{y^{FT}}{y^{AUT}} &= n^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(\frac{\lambda^{FT}}{\lambda^{AUT}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \\ &= \underbrace{n^{\frac{1}{\theta}}}_{static} \underbrace{n^{\frac{\beta}{(1-\beta)\theta}}}_{dynamic} = n^{\frac{1}{\theta} \frac{1}{1-\beta}}.\end{aligned}\tag{14}$$

The gains from trade depend on three parameters n , θ , and β . As in standard trade models, the gains from trade depend on the size of the country $1/n$ and the curvature of the distribution of productivity θ . The smaller each individual economy in this symmetric world, the more they gain by having access to the best producers abroad. In turn, the higher the curvature θ , the thinner the right tails of productivities. That is, there are fewer highly productive producers abroad which individuals can buy from under free-trade. The novel parameter determining the gains from trade is β . The parameter β controls the importance of insights from others in the quality of new ideas, i.e., the extent of technological spillovers associated with trade. With higher β , insights from others are more important, and therefore, more is gained by being exposed to more productive producers in a world with free trade. In the limit as β goes to 1, holding fixed θ , the gains from trade relative to autarky grow arbitrarily large. This limiting case is the one analyzed by [Alvarez et al. \(2013\)](#).¹⁸

¹⁷For the special case of a symmetric world, it turns out that learning from producers or learning from sellers deliver exactly the same law of motion for countries' stocks of knowledge up to a constant. This can be seen by inspecting [equation \(4\)](#) and [equation \(9\)](#) and noticing that $\lambda_i = \lambda_j$ and $r_{ij} = \pi_{ij} = \pi_{ji}$ for all i, j . In general, the two specifications of idea flows are not equivalent.

¹⁸When $\beta = 1$, the steady state gains from moving from autarky to free trade are infinite because integration raises the growth rate of the economy. In contrast, for any $\beta < 1$, integration raises the level of incomes but leaves the growth rate unchanged.

Another way of interpreting [equation \(14\)](#) is that the diffusion of ideas causes the static gains from trade to compound itself. The expression for the static and dynamic gains from trade shares features with an analogous expression in a static world in which production uses intermediate inputs.¹⁹ In that world, a decline in trade costs reduces the costs of production, lowering the cost of intermediate inputs, which lowers the cost of production further, etc. Here, when trade costs decline, producers draw better insights from others, raising stocks of knowledge, and this improves the quality of insights others draw, etc. The parameter β gives the contribution of an insight to a new idea, just as the share of intermediate goods measures the contribution of the cost of intermediate inputs to marginal cost.

More generally, we can analyze the gains from trade for intermediate trade costs. For several values of β , the left panel of [Figure 1](#) illustrates the common value of each country's stock of knowledge relative to its level under free trade. The right panel shows the corresponding real income per capita. The dashed line in the right panel represents $\beta = 0$, which corresponds to the [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#). As trade costs rise, countries become more closed and their stocks of knowledge decline. When β is larger, the dynamic gains from trade are larger.

Note that the dynamic gains from trade are largest when the world is relatively closed, whereas the static gains from trade are largest when the world is relatively open. To understand this, consider a country close to autarky. If trade costs decline, the marginal import tends to be made by foreign producers with high productivity and the marginal export tends to be made by domestic producers with high productivity. While the high trade costs imply that the static gains from trade remain relatively small, the insights drawn from these marginal producers tend to be of high quality. In contrast, for a country close to free trade, the reduction in trade costs leads to large infra-marginal static gains from trade, but the insights drawn from the marginal producers are likely to be lower quality.

3.2 Asymmetric Economies

What is the fate of a single country that is more open than others? Or one that is closed off from world trade? This section studies gains from trade in an asymmetric world in two simple ways. We first describe how trade costs affect real income of a small open economy. We then return to

¹⁹We thank Arnaud Costinot for this observation.




Figure 1: Gain from Reducing common trade barriers

example of a symmetric world discussed in the previous section but with a single “deviant” country that is more isolated.

Small Open Economy Consider first a small open economy that is small in the sense its actions do not impact other countries’ stocks of knowledge, real wages, or expenditures. Let i be the small open economy, and suppose that all trade costs take the form of $\kappa_{ij} = \kappa \tilde{\kappa}_{ij}$ and $\kappa_{ji} = \kappa \tilde{\kappa}_{ji}$ for $j \neq i$. The claim below summarizes, to a first order, the long-run impact of a change in κ on country i ’s real income.

Claim 3 *Consider the small open economy described above. The long-run response of steady state income per capita to trade costs in each specification of learning is*

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Sellers:} \quad \frac{d \log y_i}{d \log \kappa} &= - \frac{1 + 2\theta}{\frac{1 - \Omega_{ii}^S \beta}{1 - \Omega_{ii}^S} \frac{\pi_{ii} + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})}{(1 - \beta) + \beta(1 - \pi_{ii})} + 1} \\
 \text{Producers:} \quad \frac{d \log y_i}{d \log \kappa} &= - \frac{(1 - \beta)(1 + 2\theta) + \beta(1 - \pi_{ii})}{\frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \Omega_{ii}^P} [\pi_{ii} + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})] + 1 + \beta \pi_{ii}}
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\Omega_{ii}^S = \frac{\pi_{ii}^{1-\beta} \lambda_i^\beta}{\sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \lambda_j^\beta}$ and $\Omega_{ii}^P = \frac{r_{ii}(\lambda_i/\pi_{ii})^\beta}{\sum_j r_{ji}(\lambda_i/\pi_{ji})^\beta}$.

With learning from sellers, the term Ω_{ii}^S is the share of the growth in i ’s stock of knowledge that is associated with purchasing goods from i ; with learning from producers, Ω_{ii}^P is the share

associated with producing goods for i . One implication is that, holding fixed π_{ii} , the response of real income to a decline in trade costs is larger when Ω_{ii}^S is smaller. In words, this means that, among small open economies with the same trade shares, the response of real income to trade will be larger when the country relies more on others for growth in its stock of knowledge. For example, a country with a low stock of knowledge will rely more on others for good quality insights. When such a country reduces trade barriers, the impact on income is larger. This is one form of catch-up growth.

Single Deviant Economy We consider an asymmetric version of the model with $n - 1$ open countries, $i = 1, \dots, n - 1$, and a single deviant economy, $i = n$. The $n - 1$ open countries can freely trade among themselves, i.e., $\kappa_{ij} = 1$, $i, j < n$, but trade to and from the deviant economy incurs transportation cost, i.e., $\kappa_{nj} = \kappa_{jn} = \kappa_n \geq 1$, $j < n$.²⁰

The top panels of [Figure 2](#) show the deviant country’s stock of knowledge changes with the degree of openness. The x-axis measures openness as the inverse of the cost to trade to and from the deviant economy, $1/\kappa_n$. On the y-axis we report the stock of ideas relative to the case with costless trade ($\kappa_n = 1$). The bottom panels graph the corresponding real incomes. The different lines correspond to alternative values of β , which controls the importance of insights from others. The solid line shows the effect of openness in the case with no spillovers, $\beta = 0$, which also equals the effect in the standard static trade theory of [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#). The other two curves correspond to cases with positive technological spillovers. The left panels correspond to learning from sellers while the right panes show learning from domestic producers.

When ideas diffuse through learning from sellers, we see that, across balanced growth paths, as deviant economy becomes more isolated its stock of ideas contracts relative to that of the balanced growth path of n economies engaging in costless trade. As discussed earlier, through their effect on the stock of ideas trade costs have effects on per-capita income beyond the static gains from trade.

[Figure 2](#) has two curious features. The upper right panel shows how a the deviant country’s

²⁰In the numerical examples that follow, we consider a world with $n = 50$ economies with symmetric populations, so that each country is of the size of Canada or South Korea. We set $\theta = 5$, the curvature of the Frechet distribution, which itself equals the tail of the distribution of exogenous ideas. This value is in the range consistent with estimates of trade elasticities. See [Simonovska and Waugh \(2014\)](#), and the references therein. Given a value of β , the growth rate of the arrival rate of ideas is calibrated so that on the balanced growth path each country’s TFP grows at 1%, $\frac{\gamma}{(1-\beta)\theta} = 0.01$. The parameter $\hat{\alpha}$ is normalized so that in the case of costless trade, $\kappa_n = 1$, the de-trended stock of ideas equals 1.




Figure 2: The Stock of Ideas and Per Capita Income of the Deviant Economy.

stock of knowledge varies with openness when insights are drawn from domestic producers. Starting from the case of costless trade, the stock of knowledge in the deviant economy initially *improves* as the trade cost to and from this country increases, and it becomes isolated. The dynamic gains from trade are negative in this range. As trading becomes more costly, there is a first order improvement in the quality of insights because of more stringent selection into exporting. For an economy in which most of production is exported, this outweighs the deterioration of the quality from less stringent selection into producing for domestic consumption.²¹ Eventually, the negative selection

²¹If insights were to be randomly drawn from the set of active domestic producers and trade barriers satisfy the

effects of inefficient domestic producers entering dominates, and the stock of ideas in the deviant economy deteriorates. The dynamic gains from trade are positive, and can be very large as the deviant economy approaches autarky. These effects are more pronounced the higher the degree of spillovers as measured by the parameter β .²²

Second, if the deviant economy is moderately open, the gains from trade are non-monotonic in β . This holds across both specifications of learning. When β is zero, there are no dynamic gains from trade. When β is large, the dynamic gains are very large near autarky but are much smaller once the country is moderately open. This stems from the concavity generated by β in the combination of insights with exogenous components of ideas. When β is large, the difference between a high and low quality insight is magnified. Thus when β is large, a country's growth depends much more heavily on insights from the most productive producers. When a country is only moderately open, most of these most productive producers will have already entered. Indeed, for the case of learning from sellers, as $\beta \rightarrow 1$ then $\lambda_n \rightarrow 1$ for any finite κ_n .²³

Figure 3 demonstrates how the arrival rate α affects the cost of isolation. Consider a world in which $n - 1$ of the economies have de-trended arrival rate $\hat{\alpha} = 1$ and can trade costlessly among themselves, and a single deviant economy has arrival rate $\hat{\alpha}_n < 1$ and faces iceberg costs κ . The top panels show the deviant country's stock of knowledge relative to that of the open countries in a world in which all trade is costless. The bottom panels show the deviant country's stock of knowledge relative to its own stock of knowledge in a world with costless trade. The left panels show learning from sellers while the right panels show learning from producers.

As would be expected, a lower arrival rate reduces the deviant country's stock of knowledge. Inspection of the top panels reveals that when insights come from domestic producers, a reduced arrival rate has a bigger impact on the stock of knowledge, even with costless trade ($\kappa = 1$). This happens because the reduced stock of knowledge is compounded; the same producers that have the lower arrival rate are those that provide insights.

triangle inequality, the evolution of the stock of knowledge is $\dot{\lambda}_{it} = \Gamma(1 - \beta)\alpha_{it}(\lambda_i/\pi_{ii})^\beta$. In this case, the growth rate of the stock of ideas would be maximized in the case of costless trade, $\pi_{ii} = 1/n$, provided we abstract from import subsidies. The only effect of higher trade costs in this version of the model is to worsen the selection of domestic producers.

²²When insights are drawn from domestic producers, in the neighborhood of costless trade $\partial\lambda_n/\partial\kappa_n|_{\kappa_n=1} = \frac{n-2}{n} \frac{n-1}{n} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta\theta/(\theta+1)} \frac{\theta}{\theta+1}$. The effect of a small increase in the trade cost of the deviant country in its stock of knowledge is strictly positive provided $n > 2$, and it is increasing in β .

²³Alvarez et al. (2013) analyzed the limit point $\beta = 1$. In particular, their Proposition 7 and 8 show that the behavior of the tail of the distribution of productivity is independent of trade costs, as long as they are finite.




Figure 3: The arrival rate of ideas: The Stock of Ideas and Per Capita Income of the Deviant Economy.

Does the arrival rate impact the cost of isolation? The bottom panels reveal that for economies that are open at least a moderate amount, the arrival rate does not impact the dynamic gains from trade. However, for countries close to isolation, the low arrival rate compounds the cost of isolation. The logic is similar to that of the last paragraph: when an economy is close to isolation, learning from sellers resembles learning from producers.

3.3 Trade Liberalization

We now study how a country's stock of knowledge and real income evolve when it opens to trade. Does the country experience a period of protracted growth or does it converge relatively quickly?

We first address this question by studying a small open economy. For this economy, we can log-linearize around its long-run real income to derive an exact expression for the speed of convergence. Even though the world may have arbitrary bilateral trade costs, [Claim 4](#) provides a relatively simple expression for the speeds of convergence in terms of the small open economy's share of expenditures on domestic goods π_{ii} and the share of growth in its stock of knowledge that comes from insights from domestic firms.

Claim 4 *For any variable x , let \check{x} denote the log deviation from its long run value, and let \bar{x} (no decoration) denote its long run value. When agents learn from sellers, the speed of convergence in a small open economy is*

$$\frac{d}{dt} \log [\check{w}_i - \check{P}_i] = -\gamma \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Omega_{ii}^S - \pi_{ii}}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} (1 - \Omega_{ii}^S) \right\}$$

If agents learn from producers, the speed of convergence is

$$\frac{d}{dt} \log [\check{w}_i - \check{P}_i] = -\gamma \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Omega_{ii}^P - \pi_{ii}}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{(1 - \Omega_{ii}^P)(1 + \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \right\}$$

The expressions for the speed of convergence gives several immediate implications. First, convergence is faster when diffusion is more important (β is larger), and this effect is magnified when insights from others contributes more to growth (Ω_{ii}^S or Ω_{ii}^P is small). Second, the arrival rate of ideas does not appear anywhere.

In addition, convergence is faster with learning from sellers than with learning from domestic producers under assumptions that make the two specifications comparable.²⁴ When insights are drawn from sellers, a trade liberalization gives immediate access to insights from goods sold by high productivity foreign producers. In contrast, when insights are drawn from domestic producers, the insights are initially low quality, although they become more selected, and only gradually improve

²⁴The two specifications are comparable if each is moving toward the same steady state and if $\Omega_{ii}^P = \Omega_{ii}^S$. In that case learning from sellers has a faster transition because $\frac{(1 + \pi_{ii}^{ss})}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii}^{ss})} < 1$.

as the country's stock of knowledge increases.

These implications can be illustrated by a world economy that starts with $n - 1$ open economies and a single deviant economy that are on a balanced growth path. Initially, the trade costs among the $n - 1$ open economies are such that each spends one fifth of expenditures on domestic goods, whereas the deviant economy is in autarky. We then trace the evolution of the stock of ideas and per-capita income as trade costs to and from the (former) deviant economy are lowered to be in line with the trade costs among the other $n - 1$ economies. The paths of the (de-trended) stock of knowledge solve the differential equations in (7) and (9), depending on whether insights are drawn from sellers or producers.²⁵




Figure 4: Dynamics Following a Trade Liberalization for Alternative Sources of Insights.

Figure 4 shows the evolution of the stock of ideas (left panel) and per-capita income (right panel) in the initially deviant economy, following the elimination of trade costs. The solid line corresponds to the transitional dynamics in the model where learning is from sellers to a country, while the dashed line gives the dynamics for the model in which insights are drawn from domestic producers.

Following the reduction in trade costs, the stock of ideas in the deviant economy slowly converges to that of the $n - 1$ open countries. On impact real income jumps as it would in a static model. Furthermore, over time, it continues to increase as the stock of knowledge improves. The speed of

²⁵We set $\beta = 0.5$. The rest of the parameters follow the calibration in footnote 20.

this process depends on the sources of insights, as discussed above. Notice that for this example, the long-run effect on per-capita income is substantially larger than the effect on impact, and that the transition is very protracted. These examples suggest that our model provides a promising theory of growth miracles fueled by openness, and underscores the importance of investigating the particular mechanism for the diffusion of ideas.

4 Research

This section endogenizes the arrival rate of ideas, broadly following [Rivera-Batiz and Romer \(1991\)](#) and [Eaton and Kortum \(2001\)](#). Labor can engage in two types of activities, production and research. The production sector is described by [Section 2](#). In the research sector, entrepreneurs generate ideas by hiring labor. The labor resource constraint in country i at t is thus

$$L_{it}^P + L_{it}^R = L_{it}$$

where L_{it}^P is the labor used in production and L_{it}^R is the labor used in research. We will show that on a balanced growth path, the fraction of labor engaged in research is independent of trade barriers.

We assume that there is a mass of managers and each manager is, in principle, capable of producing all varieties $s \in [0, 1]$. Each manager is characterized by a profile of productivities $q(s)$ with which she can produce the various goods. We assume that if an individual manager employs l units of labor in research, then ideas arrive independently for each variety at rate $\tilde{\alpha} \frac{l}{L_{it}^R} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon$, with $\Upsilon \in [0, 1]$. Thus the arrival of goods is uniform across goods; research effort is not directed at particular goods.²⁶ Υ summarizes the aggregate intra-temporal returns to scale of research; if $\Upsilon = 1$ then there is constant returns to scale in research.²⁷

Suppose also that the entrepreneurs behave as if there is a tax T_i on profit. This may be an actual tax, or it may stand in for other distortions (as in [Parente and Prescott \(1994\)](#)). Let V_{it} is

²⁶We could just as easily have assumed that each manager is capable of producing a subset of the goods with positive measure, and call this subset an industry. The part of the assumption that is crucial is that the research effort is uniform across varieties.

²⁷More generally, we could specify the arrival rate of ideas so that individual managers face decreasing returns to research, e.g., $\tilde{\alpha} l^{\Upsilon_1} (L_{it}^R)^{\Upsilon_2}$. On a balanced growth path, the arrival rate of ideas would be proportional to $L_{it}^{\Upsilon_1 + \Upsilon_2}$. The main difference from the equilibrium described in the main text would be that the present value of research would be greater than the cost, as we have not modeled free entry into becoming a manager.

the expected pretax value of a single idea generated in i at t . Each manager chooses a research intensity l to maximize $\tilde{\alpha} \frac{l}{L_{it}^R} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon (1 - T_i) V_{it} - w_{it} l$. For research to be interior, it must be that

$$\tilde{\alpha} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon V_{it} = w_{it} L_{it}^R$$

We next compute the expected pretax value of an idea, V_{it} . In [Appendix E](#) we prove the following intermediate step: if $\Pi_{i\tau}$ is total flow of profit earned by entrepreneurs in i at time τ , then the flow of profit earned in i at time τ from ideas generated between t and t' (with $t < t' < \tau$) is $\frac{\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \Pi_{i\tau}$. The basic idea is that, among ideas on the frontier at time τ , knowing the time at which the idea was generated does not provide any additional information about the quality of the idea.²⁸

Taking the limit as $t' \rightarrow t$ implies that the flow of profit at τ from ideas generated at the instant t is $\frac{\dot{\lambda}_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \Pi_{i\tau}$. As a consequence, the present value of revenue from ideas generated in i at instant t is

$$\int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i\tau}} \frac{\dot{\lambda}_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \Pi_{i\tau} d\tau$$

where $e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i\tau}}$ is the real discount factor between t and τ . The cumulative arrival of ideas at t is $\tilde{\alpha} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon$, so that the total pretax value of the ideas generated at t is $\tilde{\alpha} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon V_{it}$. We thus have

$$\tilde{\alpha} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon V_{it} = \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i\tau}} \frac{\dot{\lambda}_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \Pi_{i\tau} d\tau$$

The optimal choice of research intensity implies $\tilde{\alpha} (L_{it}^R)^\Upsilon (1 - T_i) V_{it} = w_{it} L_{it}^R$. In addition, [Section 2](#) showed that profit among all entrepreneurs is proportional to the wage bill in production, $\Pi_{i\tau} = \frac{w_{i\tau} L_{i\tau}^P}{\theta}$. Together these imply that the optimal research intensity satisfies

$$w_{it} L_{it}^R = (1 - T_i) \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i\tau}} \frac{\dot{\lambda}_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \frac{w_{i\tau} L_{i\tau}^P}{\theta} d\tau$$

²⁸Both the arrival rate of ideas and the source distribution at time t affect the probability that the idea is on the frontier at $\tau \geq t$ and the unconditional distribution of the idea's productivity, these have no impact on the conditional distribution of productivity conditioning on being on the frontier. This is a useful and well known property of extreme value distributions, see [Eaton and Kortum \(1999\)](#).

Letting $r_{it} = \frac{L_{it}^R}{L_{it}}$ be the fraction of labor engaged in research, this can be rearranged as

$$r_{it} = \frac{1 - T_i}{\theta} \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} \frac{P_{it}}{P_{i\tau}} \frac{\dot{\lambda}_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \frac{(1 - r_{i\tau}) w_{i\tau} L_{i\tau}}{w_{it} L_{it}} d\tau$$

Finally, using $w_{it}/P_{it} \propto (\lambda_{it}/\pi_{iit})^{1/\theta}$, this can be written as

$$r_{it} = \frac{1 - T_i}{\theta} \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} (1 - r_{i\tau}) \frac{\dot{\lambda}_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \frac{(\lambda_{i\tau}/\pi_{iit})^{1/\theta} L_{i\tau}}{(\lambda_{it}/\pi_{iit})^{1/\theta} L_{it}} d\tau$$

If labor grows at rate γ so that $L_{i\tau} = L_{it} e^{\gamma(\tau-t)}$, then there is balanced growth path with $r_{it} = r_i$, $\lambda_{it} = e^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}t} \lambda_i$, $\pi_{iit} = \pi_{ii}$. Plugging these in gives

$$r_i = \frac{1 - T_i}{\theta} \int_t^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} (1 - r_i) \frac{e^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}t}}{e^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}(\tau-t)}} \left(e^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}(\tau-t)} \right)^{1/\theta} e^{\gamma(\tau-t)} d\tau$$

Integrating and rearranging gives a simple characterization of the fraction of the labor force engaged in research:

$$\frac{r_i}{1 - r_i} = \frac{1 - T_i}{\theta \left[(1 - \beta) \frac{\rho}{\gamma} + \beta \right] - 1} \quad (15)$$

Equation 15 implies that on a balanced growth path, the fraction of labor engaged in research is independent of both trade barriers and the cross-country distribution of knowledge. The only thing that alters research effort are distortions on the payoff to innovation. This aligns with results of [Eaton and Kortum \(2001\)](#), [Atkeson and Burstein \(2010\)](#), and the knowledge specification of [Rivera-Batiz and Romer \(1991\)](#) with flows of only goods, all of which imply that integration has little impact on R&D effort.

It is important to keep in mind that, in this context, integration still has an impact on a country's stock of knowledge. Even if a country's R&D effort does not change, integration could lead to larger increases in a country's stock of knowledge if new ideas are based on better insights.²⁹

Finally, we define

$$\alpha_{it} = \frac{\tilde{\alpha}}{m} (r_{it} L_{it})^\Upsilon$$

where r_{it} is defined in [equation \(15\)](#) and depends on country-specific distortion to R&D effort.

²⁹See also [Rivera-Batiz and Romer \(1991\)](#) and [Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud \(2008\)](#).

5 Quantitative Exploration

We now explore the ability of the theory to account for the evolution of the distribution of productivity (TFP) across countries in the post-war period. With this in mind, we extend the simple trade model introduced in Section 2 to incorporate intermediate inputs, non-traded goods, and a broader notion of labor which we refer to as equipped labor.

In particular, we assume that in each country i a producer of good s with productivity q has access to a constant returns to scale technology combining intermediate input aggregate (x) and equipped labor (l)

$$y_i(s) = \frac{1}{\eta^\eta(1-\eta)^{1-\eta}} q x_i(s)^\eta l_i(s)^{1-\eta}$$

All goods use the intermediate good aggregate, or equivalently, the same bundle of intermediate inputs. The intermediate input aggregate is produced using the same Constant Elasticity of Substitution technology as the consumption aggregate, so that the market clearing condition for intermediate inputs for i is

$$\int x_i(s) ds = \left[\int \chi_i(s)^{1-1/\varepsilon} ds \right]^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}.$$

where $\chi_i(s)$ denotes the amount of good s used in the production of the intermediate input aggregate. Equipped labor L is produced with an aggregate Cobb-Douglas technology requiring capital and efficiency units of labor

$$L_i = \int l_i(s) ds = K_i^\zeta (h_i \tilde{L}_i)^{1-\zeta}.$$

In our quantitative exercises we take an exogenous path of aggregate physical and human capital, K_i and h_i , from the data, therefore, we abstract from modeling the accumulation of these factors.³⁰

In addition to the iceberg transportation costs κ_{ij} , we assume that a fraction μ of the goods

³⁰Implicitly, we are assuming that individual technologies are

$$y(s) = \frac{1}{\eta^\eta(1-\eta)^{1-\eta} \zeta^{(1-\eta)\zeta} (1-\zeta)^{(1-\eta)(1-\zeta)}} q x(s)^\eta [k(s)^\zeta (h_i l(s))^{1-\zeta}]^{1-\eta}$$

and that investment can be produced with the same Constant Elasticity of Substitution technology as the consumption and intermediate input aggregates.

are non-tradable, i.e., this subset of the goods face infinite transportation costs. The main effect of introducing non-traded goods is that in the extended model the value of the elasticity of substitution ε affects equilibrium allocations. In [Appendix F](#) we present the expressions for price indices, trade share and evolution of the stock of ideas of this version of the model.

5.1 Calibration

We need to calibrate six common parameters, $(\theta, \eta, \zeta, \mu, \gamma, \varepsilon)$, and two sets of parameters that are (potentially) country and time specific, the matrix of transportation costs $\mathbf{K}_t = [\kappa_{int}]$ and the vector of arrival rates $\alpha_t = (\alpha_{1t}, \dots, \alpha_{nt})$. In addition, we need to assign a value to the diffusion parameter β . Instead of calibrating it, we present results for alternative values of $\beta \in [0, 1)$.

We set $\theta = 5$. This value is in the range consistent with estimates of trade elasticities. See [Simonovska and Waugh \(2014\)](#), and the references therein. We let $\eta = 0.5$ and $\zeta = 1/3$ to match the intermediate share in gross production and the labor share of value added. We consider a share of non-trade goods $\mu = 0.5$. Given values for θ and β , we choose γ to match an average growth rate of TFP in the US of 1 percent. We set $\varepsilon = 1$ to guarantee that the constants B^S and B^P are finite, but note that alternative values that satisfy this restriction do not affect the results significantly.

Following the strategy in [Waugh \(2010\)](#), we show in [Appendix F](#) that given values for θ , μ , and ε as well as data on bilateral trade shares over time, the iceberg cost of shipping a good to country i from country j at time t is

$$\kappa_{ij} = \frac{p_i}{p_j} \left(\frac{1 - \pi_{ii}}{\pi_{ij}} \frac{Z_i}{1 - Z_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left[\frac{(1 - \mu) + \mu Z_i^{-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}}{(1 - \mu) + \mu Z_j^{-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

where Z_i solves

$$\pi_{ii} = \frac{(1 - \mu) + \mu Z_i^{1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}}{(1 - \mu) + \mu Z_i^{-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}}.$$

To operationalize this equation, we use bilateral trade data for 1962-2000 from [Feenstra et al. \(2005\)](#) and data on real GDP and the price index from PWT 8.0. ³¹

³¹In particular, we measure real GDP using real GDP at constant national prices (rgdpna). We scale the real GDP series for each country so that its value in 1962 coincides with the real GDP measure given by the output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (rgdpo). We measure the price index using the price level of cgdpo (pl.gdpo), where cgdpo is the output-side real GDP at current PPPs.

To assign values to the vector of arrival rates $\hat{\alpha}_t = (\hat{\alpha}_{1t}, \dots, \hat{\alpha}_{nt})$ we follow two alternative strategies. First, motivated by [Section 4](#), we consider the case in which each country’s arrival rate of ideas depends only on its equipped labor $\hat{\alpha}_{it} = \hat{\alpha} L_{it}^{\Upsilon}$. Υ is a measure of scale effects and will be calibrated to match the cross sectional relationship between TFP and equipped labor: $TFP \propto L^{0.003}$. Given that we can always normalize one element of the vector $\hat{\alpha}$, we set the common arrival rate of ideas to $\hat{\alpha} = 1$. The second strategy consists of assuming that countries are on a balanced growth path in 1962, and choosing the vector $\hat{\alpha}$ to exactly match the relative TFP across countries in 1962. We will discuss each in more detail below. We measure TFP in the data as a standard Solow residual using real GDP, physical capital (K), employment (emp) and average human capital (h) from the PWT 8.0, i.e., $TFP = \text{real GDP} / [K^{1/3} \cdot (\text{emp} \cdot h)^{2/3}]$.

We should emphasize that we are not providing any causal evidence about the relationship between openness and productivity. Many of the potential omitted variables that have been discussed in the empirical literature relating trade and growth are not present in this analysis. Rather than taking a strong stand on the value of the diffusion parameter β , we will simply explore how well the model can quantitatively account for cross-country income differences and the evolution of countries’ productivity over time for alternative values of the diffusion parameter β .

5.2 Sample Selection

The sample of countries in our quantitative analysis consist of a balance panel of countries that is obtained by merging the PWT 8.0 with the NBER-UN dataset on bilateral trade flows from 1962 to 2000. We further restrict this sample to those countries with a population above 1 million in 1962 and oil rents that are smaller than 20 % of GDP in 2000. We exclude Hong Kong, Panama and Singapore, as these are countries where re-exports play a very large role. The final sample consist of 65 countries.³²

³²Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg (we consider the sum of the two countries, as the UN-NBER trade data is reported only for the sum), Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Zambia.

5.3 Explaining the Distribution of TFP

We first explore the ability of the theory to account for the initial distribution of TFP. Given the arrival rate of ideas in a country, the theory predicts that the main drivers of a country's TFP are its openness and the TFP of their trading partners. We begin with some motivating patterns. The first panel of Figure 5 shows that countries that are less open (high π_{ii}) tend to have lower TFP, although this relationship is not significant. The second panel shows the relationship between the TFP of a country's trading partners and its own TFP. In particular, for each country we compute an import weighted average of a country's trading partners' TFP: $\frac{\sum_{j \neq i} \pi_{ij} TFP_j}{1 - \pi_{ii}}$. The figure shows that countries with more productive trading partners tend to be (statistically significantly) more productive.




Figure 5: Cross-sectional TFP differences in 1962. The first panel shows the cross-sectional relationship between (lack of) openness, as measured by countries' expenditure shares on domestic goods, and TFP. The right panel shows the cross-sectional relationship between the each country's TFP and its exposure to other high trading partners, as measured by a import-weighted average of trading partners' TFP. In each panel we report the slope of the regression line and its standard error in parenthesis.

Given these correlations, we now quantify how much of cross-country TFP differences could be attributed to openness. Of course, TFP can vary for a variety of reasons other than openness, so we do not expect the model to explain all of cross-country income differences.

To this end, we make the extreme assumption that the arrival rate of ideas in each country is a constant log-linear function of equipped labor, $\hat{a}_{it} = \hat{a} \times L_{it}^{\gamma}$. Given the calibrated trade costs and a value of β , we solve for the balanced growth path of the model.




Figure 6: Openness and the Distribution of TFP in 1962. Each panel plots countries actual TFP in the 1962 against the predicted TFP of the model under the assumption that the arrival rate of ideas is uniform across countries. The first panel assumes that $\beta = 0$. The second and third panels assume $\beta = 0.5$ and study alternative sources of insights, learning from sellers or producers. In addition, each figure plots a dashed 45-degree line and a red regression line.

Figure 6 compares the implied distribution of TFP in the balance growth path of the model with the observed distribution of TFP in 1962, the first year in our sample. Each dot represents a country. If the model perfectly predicted each country's TFP, each dot would be on the (dashed) 45 degree line. The first panel shows the the case when $\beta = 0$, so that there is no cross-country diffusion of ideas and differences in countries' TFP represent only the static Ricardian gains from trade. As the panel shows, differences in openness generate only a small amount of cross-country differences in productivity.

The second and third panels assume that $\beta = 0.5$ so that the cross-country TFP differences represent both the static and dynamic gains from trade. The second panel studies the case in which insights come from sellers to the country while the third panel studies the case where insights come from domestic producers. In each case the model generates more variation in TFP across countries. The red regression line in each panel provides a simple measure of the average ability of the theory to account for the initial cross country differences in TFP. The positive slope implies a positive correlation between the model's predictions and the data.

We next assess more systematically how the strength of diffusion affects the ability of the model

to account for cross-country TFP differences in [Figure 7](#). For each model, we compute the mean squared error of predicted TFP for each country in 1962 and divide by standard deviation of TFP in the cross-section. Thus a value of one implies that the model does not account for any of the variation in TFP, whereas a value of zero implies that the model perfectly predicts countries' TFP. The solid blue line shows the fit of the learning from sellers specification for various values of β , while the solid red line shows the learning from producers specification.

When $\beta = 0$ so that there is no diffusion of ideas, the model accounts for roughly 2% of the variation, consistent with the first panel of [Figure 6](#). For each specification of learning, when the strength of diffusion is larger, the model accounts for more of the variation in TFP. Interestingly, while the ability of the model to account for the initial differences in TFP initially rises with the strength of diffusion, it is greatest for cases with intermediate values of the diffusion parameter, β . As highlighted when discussing [Figure 2](#), for β close to 1 a country's stock of ideas depends much more heavily on insights from the most productive producers, so that even countries close to autarky have accrued most of the dynamic gains from trade. Consequently when β is close to 1, the model does not predict much dispersion in TFP among countries that are moderately open. For a large range of values of β , however, (the lack of) openness accounts on average for a significant fraction of TFP differences.

The dashed line shows an alternative calculation. In the learning from sellers specification, country i 's stock of knowledge depends on all of its trading partners' stocks of knowledge, $\lambda_i \propto \sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \lambda_j^\beta$.³³ As a consequence, to the extent that the model is correctly specified, any errors in predicting the trading partners' stocks of knowledge will be compounded and impact the prediction of i 's stock of knowledge. We now ask: if i 's trading partners' stocks of knowledge were more accurate, would this improve the prediction of i 's TFP?

To answer this, for each country we compute the stock of knowledge necessary to match the country's TFP perfectly and call this λ_j^{data} . We then solve the model exactly as before, except we replace the equation that specifies each country's stock of knowledge with $\lambda_i \propto \pi_{ii}^{1-\beta} \lambda_i^\beta + \sum_{j \neq i} \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} (\lambda_j^{\text{data}})^\beta$. The dashed line shows that more accurately specifying each country's trading partners' stocks of knowledge improves the ability of the model to account for TFP differences.

³³This is the expression for the case without non-traded goods, $\mu = 1$. See [Appendix F](#) for the general specification.




Figure 7: Mean squared error of predicted TFP. This figure reports the mean squared error of the predicted log TFP in 1962 divided by the standard deviation of TFP in 1962 for various versions of the model. The blue and red lines reflect the two alternative sources of insights, learning from sellers and learning from producers respectively, respectively. The blue dashed is a version of the model in which insights are drawn from sellers, except that the law of motion for each country’s stock of knowledge uses trading partners’ stocks of knowledge that are calibrated from data rather than trading partners’ stocks of knowledge generated by the model.

5.4 Explaining the Dynamics of TFP

This section studies the ability of the model to account for the evolution of productivity over time. As with cross-sectional TFP differences, there are many reasons why countries’ TFP might change over time that are unrelated to changes in trade costs. Nevertheless, we are interested in quantifying how much of changes in TFP might be attributable to changes in trade costs.

Among the many factors that would alter a country’s productivity, the model emphasizes changes in openness, changing exposure to trading partners, and changes in trading partners’ productivity. To motivate the analysis, Figure 8 shows some simple reduced form patterns in the data.

The first panel shows the relationship between changes in openness and changes in TFP. Consistent with the model, countries that increased expenditures on imports tended to have (statistically significantly) larger increases in TFP.

The second panel shows the association between the change in countries composition of expenditures and TFP growth. For each country, we compute the changes in exposure to trading




Figure 8: Openness and Changes in TFP, 1962-2000. The first panel shows the cross-sectional relationship between changes in countries' TFP and changes in (lack of) openness, as measured by the change in expenditure share on domestic goods. The second panel shows the cross-sectional relationship between changes in countries' TFP and changes in countries exposure to trading partners who had high TFP in 1962, where exposure is an expenditure-weighted average. The third panel shows the cross-sectional relationship between changes in countries' TFP and changes in trading partners' TFPs, weighted by expenditure shares in 1962. In each panel we report the slope of the regression line and its standard error in parenthesis.

partners with high initial TFP. Specifically, for country i we compute $\sum_j (\pi_{ij}^{2000} - \pi_{ij}^{1962}) TFP_j^{1962}$. Consistent with the theory, there is a clear pattern that countries that increased import exposure to trading partners with high initial productivity saw (statistically significantly) larger increases in TFP.

The third panel shows that countries whose trading partners became more productive tended to see increases in TFP. While this relationship is consistent with the model, it is fairly weak and statistically insignificant.

Given these reduced form patterns, we begin our quantitative analysis by comparing the static and dynamic gains from changes in trade costs. We again use expenditure shares to back out the evolution of bilateral iceberg trade costs over time. We make the stark assumption that, given trade costs, each country was on its balanced growth path in 1962. Under this assumption, we can find the set of country-specific arrival rates $\{\alpha_i\}$ that match the cross-section of productivity perfectly. Finally, we ask: if the arrival rates of ideas had remained constant over time and only trade costs changed, what would each country's TFP be in 2000?




Figure 9: Trade and the TFP Dynamics, 1962-2000. Each panel plots countries’ actual changes in TFP against the predicted change in TFP of the model under the assumptions that the arrival rates are heterogenous across countries, that each country was on its balanced growth path in 1962, and that arrival rates have remained constant since 1962. The first panel assumes that $\beta = 0$. The second and third panels assume $\beta = 0.5$ and study alternative sources of insights, learning from sellers or producers. In addition, each figure plots a dashed 45-degree line and a red regression line.

Figure 9 compares the predicted change in TFP from the model to that of the data for various specifications of the model. Each point represents a country, and each panel contains a regression line through the observations and a dashed 45-degree line. The first panel shows the predicted changes in TFP when $\beta = 0$ so that there are no dynamic gains from trade. The model predicts only small changes in TFP, consistent with small static gains from trade. In the second and third panels, insights are drawn respectively from sellers and from domestic producers, and β is set to 0.5. For each of these specifications, the regression line is a bit more upward sloping, indicating a stronger relationship between the predicted and actual changes in TFP.

Figure 10 shows a more systematic assessment of how the strength of diffusion alters the explanatory power of trade in the model. For each β , we plot the mean squared error of the predicted changes in TFP given the calibrated changes in trade costs and divide this by the standard deviation of TFP changes. Again, a value of one indicates that the model does not account for any of the changes in TFP, whereas a value of zero indicates that the model perfectly predicts changes in TFP. When $\beta = 0$, changes in trade costs account for roughly five percent of changes in TFP. For larger values of β in which diffusion is more important, the model accounts for more of the variation in TFP changes. As with the cross-sectional TFP differences, the ability of the model to account for TFP changes is greatest for intermediate values of the diffusion parameter, β . In




Figure 10: Mean squared error of TFP. This figure reports the mean squared error of predicted change in log TFP divided by the standard deviation of log changes in TFP for various versions of the model. The blue and red lines reflect the two alternative sources of insights, learning from sellers and learning from producers respectively, respectively. The blue dashed is a version of the model in which insights are drawn from sellers, except that the law of motion for each country’s stock of knowledge uses trading partners’ stocks of knowledge that are calibrated from data rather than trading partners’ stocks of knowledge generated by the model.

addition, the specification with learning from sellers accounts from more of the variation in TFP changes when $\beta > 0.3$.

Figure 10 also contains a blue dashed line in which we modify the learning equation so that when each country’s stock of knowledge grows, the stock of knowledge of its trading partners reflects actual productivity rather than predicted productivity. Again, for each country we compute the stock of knowledge necessary to match TFP perfectly and call this λ_j^{data} . We then solve the model exactly as before, except we replace the equation that specifies the change in each country’s stock of knowledge with $\dot{\lambda}_i \propto \pi_{ii}^{1-\beta} \lambda_i^\beta + \sum_{j \neq i} \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} (\lambda_j^{\text{data}})^\beta$. The dashed line shows that more accurately specifying each country’s trading partners’ stocks of knowledge is not quantitatively important. Consistent with the second and third panels of Figure 8, changes in TFP are more closely related to the initial level of trading partners’ TFP than to the changes in trading partners’ TFP.

Finally, to get a sense of what is driving the model’s predictions, we can decompose the predicted TFP changes into various components. Each panel in Figure 11 displays the changes in countries’ TFP on the x-axis and some measure of the model’s predicted changes in TFP when $\beta = 0.5$

and insights are drawn from sellers on the y-axis. The top-left panel contains predicted TFP of the model. In the model, each country's TFP is a function of its stock of knowledge and its expenditure on domestic goods, $TFP(\lambda_i, \pi_{ii})$. Each country's stock of knowledge is a function of others' stocks of knowledge and import shares, $\lambda(\{\lambda_{jt}\}_{j \neq i, t \geq 0}, \{\Pi_t\}_{t \geq 0})$, where $\Pi = \{\pi_{ij}\}_{i, j=1, \dots, N}$ is the matrix of trade shares. The top right panel shows the static effects of changes in trade costs, $d \ln TFP(\lambda_{it}(\lambda_{-i0}, \Pi_0), \pi_{iit}) = \ln TFP(\lambda_{i0}, \pi_{iit}) - \ln TFP(\lambda_{i0}, \pi_{i00})$, where each country's stock of knowledge is held fixed at its initial level. Countries that saw an increase in the trade share tended to increase TFP more. The two lower panels show the contribution of the two drivers of dynamic gains from trade. The lower left panel holds fixed trading partner's stocks of knowledge, but allows the dynamic gains from trade through changing exposure to different trading partners. The lower right panel holds fixed trade shares but allows the dynamic gains from trade through changes in trading partners' productivities. Consistent with [Figure 8](#), changes in exposure to trading partners plays an important role, but changes in trading partners productivities plays almost no role.

5.5 Growth Miracles

To illustrate the fit of the model more concretely, we show how the model predicts changes in TFP during several growth miracles. We begin by comparing the implied evolution of TFP in South Korea and the US. South Korea is a particularly interesting example as it is one of the most successful growth miracles in the post-war period, and a country that became most integrated with the rest of the world, as inferred from the behavior of trade flows. The U.S. economy provides a natural benchmark developed economy.

[Figure 12](#) explores the implied dynamics of TFP under various assumptions. As in [Section 5.4](#), we continue under the assumptions that arrival rates of ideas are heterogenous, that, given trade costs, each country was on its balanced growth path in 1962, and that arrival rates have remained constant since 1962. [Figure 12](#) shows the evolution of TFP for South Korea (top panels) and the US (bottom panels) for this case. The left and right panels show the implied dynamics of TFP for specifications in which producers learn from sellers and from other domestic producers, respectively. The solid line shows the evolution of TFP in the data, de-trended by the average growth of TFP in the U.S. The other lines correspond to simulations using alternative values of the diffusion parameters β . The case of $\beta = 0$ (dotted line) gives the dynamics of TFP implied by




Figure 11: Decomposition of Changes in TFP, 1962-2000. The top left panel plots changes in TFP against predicted changes in TFP under the assumption that learning is from sellers and $\beta = 0.5$. The remaining three panels plot actual changes in TFP against the various components of predicted changes in TFP. The top right panel hold fixed all countries stocks of knowledge. The bottom panels allow each country’s stock of knowledge to evolve, but hold fixed initial trade shares in computing TFP. In the bottom left panel, learning is such that each country’s trading partners’ stocks of knowledge are held fixed at their initial levels, but trade shares evolve. In the bottom right panel, learning is such that trading partners’ stocks of knowledge evolve but initial trade shares are held fixed at their initial levels.

a standard Ricardian trade model, e.g., the dynamics quantified by [Connolly and Yi \(2009\)](#). The other three lines illustrate the dynamic gains from trade implied by the model.

Two clear messages stem from this figure. First, for a wide range of values of the diffusion parameter the dynamic model accounts for a substantial fraction of the TFP dynamics of South Korea. This is particularly true when considering intermediate values of the diffusion parameters β . Recall from [Figure 2](#) that for an economy that is moderately open, dynamic gains from trade are non-monotonic in β .³⁴ Second, the bottom panels show that changes in the dynamic gains

³⁴For the case of learning from domestic producers, there are large negative scale effects for β close to 1. Since the relative amount of equipped labor increase in South Korea, when β is closed to 1 the model with learning from producers accounts for a negative part of TFP growth. The negative scale effects are not present if we let α scale




Figure 12: Openness and the Evolution of TFP: South Korea and the US. This figure plots the changes in TFP for South Korea (top panels) and the US (bottom panels) under the specification of learning insights from sellers (left panels) and learning from producers (right panels). In each panel, we plot the actual change in TFP and changes in TFP generated by the model for various values of β . In all cases, TFP is detrended by the average growth rate of TFP in the US.

from trade identified by the model are less relevant for understanding the growth experience of a developed country close to its balanced growth path.

Figure 13 shows the evolution of TFP for a larger set of Asian countries that experienced high growth in the post-war period. For each country, the solid line is the data, while the dotted line is the model with $\beta = 0$. The dashed and dashed-dotted lines shows the evolution of TFP for the case with an intermediate value of the diffusion parameter, $\beta = 0.5$, for the case where domestic producers learn from sellers and producers, respectively. For some countries such as South Korea and China, the diffusion of ideas due to trade explains a substantial fraction of TFP growth. For others, such as Thailand changes in trade costs account for a smaller, but significant, fraction of TFP growth.

with equipped labor as done in Section 5.3, $\hat{\alpha}_{it} = \hat{\alpha} L_{it}^{\chi}$.




Figure 13: Growth Miracles, $\beta = 0.5$. In all cases, TFP is detrended by the average growth rate of TFP in the US.

6 Trade and Multinational Production

The set of producers in a country may be influenced by multinationals' decisions of where to locate production. Some countries have policies to encourage FDI, and this might be related to positive spillovers to local producers. In this section we extend the basic model to allow for multinational production, and insights drawn from foreign technologies used domestically.

We follow [Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare \(2013\)](#) in modeling a multinational as a producer that can manufacture a single variety with productivity that varies with the location of production. For variety s , a multinational is characterized by a vector of productivities $\mathbf{q}(s) = \{q_j(s)\}_j$, where $q_j(s)$ is the best productivity available to the multinationals when producing variety s in country j .

Producing abroad is further subject to iceberg costs. Suppose a producer of variety s based in i can produce in j with productivity q . That producer's marginal cost will be $\frac{w_j \delta_{ji}}{q_{ji}(s)}$. We assume $\delta_{ji} \geq 1$ and $\delta_{ii} = 1$.

We first study learning from a general source distribution. Among all varieties, let $M_{it}(\{q_1, \dots, q_n\})$

be the joint distribution of productivities across locations among multinationals based in i , so that $\tilde{F}_{it}(\{q_1, \dots, q_n\})^m$ represents the frontier of knowledge. Suppose an individual production manager draws an insight from a source distribution, $\tilde{G}_{it}(q)$. Upon drawing insight from an idea with productivity \tilde{q} , the manager is provided with a vector of ideas with productivities $\{z_j \tilde{q}^\beta\}_j$ across locations. The idiosyncratic portion of the productivities, $\{z_j\}$, are drawn from a multivariate distribution with joint CDF $H(\{z_1, \dots, z_n\})$.

Extending the analysis in [Section 1](#), the distribution of productivity of technologies based on country i

$$\frac{d}{dt} \ln \tilde{F}_{it}(\{q_1, \dots, q_n\}) = -\alpha_t m \int_0^\infty \left[1 - H\left(\left\{\frac{q_1}{\tilde{q}^\beta}, \dots, \frac{q_n}{\tilde{q}^\beta}\right\}\right) \right] d\tilde{G}_{it}(\tilde{q})$$

We assume that the idiosyncratic components of new ideas are drawn from a joint distribution with right tails that are jointly regularly varying.

Assumption 5

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - H(\mathbf{xz})}{x^{-\theta}} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n z_i^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho}$$

with $\rho \in [0, 1]$. Each marginal distribution has a Pareto right tail with tail index θ . Using the same logic as the baseline analysis, we can define a $F(\mathbf{q}) \equiv \tilde{F}\left(m^{\frac{1}{\theta(1-\beta)}} \mathbf{q}\right)$ and $G(\mathbf{q}) \equiv \tilde{G}\left(m^{\frac{1}{\theta(1-\beta)}} \mathbf{q}\right)$ to be the frontier distribution and the source distribution scaled by the number of multinationals. The law of motion for the frontier is

$$\frac{d}{dt} \ln F_{it}(\{q_1, \dots, q_n\}) = -\alpha_t \left(\sum_j q_j^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho} \int_0^\infty \tilde{q}^{\beta\theta} dG_{it}(\tilde{q})$$

Asymptotically, the frontier converges to a Frechet distribution

$$F_{it}(\{q_1, \dots, q_n\}) = e^{-\lambda_{it} \left(\sum_j q_j^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho}}$$

with

$$\dot{\lambda}_{it} = \alpha_t \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_{it}(x)$$

The frontier of knowledge thus takes the form of a multivariate Frechet.³⁵

³⁵It is given this name because each marginal distribution is Frechet.

We now describe the equilibrium, leaving the derivation of the equations to Appendix G. Define π_{ijk} to be the share of i 's expenditure on goods produced in j by by multinationals based in k . Similarly, let $r_{ijk} \equiv \frac{\pi_{ijk} X_i}{\sum_{\tilde{i}k} \pi_{\tilde{i}k} X_{\tilde{i}}}$ be the share of j 's revenue from sales to i of goods produced by multinationals based in k . Thus $1 = \sum_j \pi_{ij} = \sum_j \sum_k \pi_{ijk}$ and $1 = \sum_i r_{ij} = \sum_i \sum_k r_{ijk}$. Given wages, the trade shares and the price level are

$$\pi_{ijk} = \frac{\lambda_k \left(\sum_l [w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}]^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{-\rho} [w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}]^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}}}{\sum_{\tilde{k}} \lambda_{\tilde{k}} \left(\sum_l [w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}]^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho}}$$

and

$$P_i = B \left(\sum_k \lambda_k \left(\sum_j [w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}]^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}.$$

where B is defined in Section 2. The set of wages that clear each country's labor market solve the set of equations

$$w_j L_j = \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \sum_i \sum_k \pi_{ijk} X_i = \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \sum_i \pi_{ij} X_i.$$

If individuals learn from sellers, the evolution of country i 's stock of knowledge can be summarized by the following differential equation:

$$\dot{\lambda}_i = B^S \alpha \sum_j \sum_k \pi_{ijk} \left(\frac{\lambda_k}{\pi_{ijk}^{1-\rho} [\sum_l \pi_{ilk}]^\rho} \right)^\beta$$

whereas if individuals learn from domestic producers, country i 's stock of knowledge evolves as

$$\dot{\lambda}_i = B^P \alpha \sum_j \sum_k r_{jik} \left(\frac{\lambda_k}{\pi_{jik}^{1-\rho} [\sum_l \pi_{jlk}]^\rho} \right)^\beta$$

where B^S and B^P are defined in Section 2.

There are a number of ways that production managers in i can get insights from production managers in k . When learning from sellers is important, a manager in i can draw insight from multinationals based in k from goods produced in any location. When learning from producers is important, a manager in i can learn from multinationals based in k that produce goods in i to

export to j .

When a multinational's productivities are uncorrelated across production locations ($\rho = 0$), the logic of selection of ideas is exactly the same as the case without FDI: holding fixed k 's stock of knowledge, for each combination of multinational's home and production location, the smaller i 's expenditure, the more likely it is that insights are drawn from higher productivity goods. When a multinational's ideas are correlated across locations ($\rho > 0$), the logic is similar.

Whether trade and FDI are complements or substitutes in learning and production depends on the correlation of multinationals' productivities across locations. This can be seen most easily in the case of symmetric economies. Let $y(\kappa, \delta)$ be real income when trade costs between any pair of countries is κ and FDI costs between any pair of countries is δ . In this setting, real income relative to costless trade can be summarized concisely for two polar cases:

$$\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{y(\kappa, \delta)}{y(1, 1)} = \left[\left(\frac{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{n} \right) \left(\frac{1 + (n-1)\delta^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{n} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta(1-\beta)}}$$

and

$$\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 1} \frac{y(\kappa, \delta)}{y(1, 1)} = \max \left\{ \left(\frac{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{n} \right), \left(\frac{1 + (n-1)\delta^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{n} \right) \right\}^{\frac{1}{\theta(1-\beta)}}$$

When multinationals' productivities are uncorrelated across locations ($\rho \rightarrow 0$), lower worldwide trade costs and lower worldwide FDI costs are complementary. In contrast, when each multinational has the same productivity in every location, trade and FDI are perfect substitutes. Consider a multinational that has the highest productivity for its variety. If trade costs are lower than FDI costs, it will produce in its home country and export. If FDI costs are lower than trade costs, it will produce in each destination country.

For the case of a symmetric world, the gains from openness (trade and FDI) as measured by the per-capita income on the balanced growth path with costless trade and FDI relative to autarky

can be characterized for an arbitrary correlation of multinationals' productivities across locations:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y^O}{y^{AUT}} &= n^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(\frac{\lambda^{FT}}{\lambda^{AUT}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \\ &= \underbrace{n^{\frac{2-\rho}{\theta}}}_{static} \underbrace{n^{\frac{(2-\rho)\beta}{(1-\beta)\theta}}}_{dynamic} \end{aligned}$$

Notice that both, the static and dynamic, gains from openness are larger than those in (14), provided $\rho < 1$.

6.1 Opening to Trade and FDI

Economic miracles are characterized by protracted growth in productivity and per-capita income, and are associated with increases in trade and FDI flows. Our theory features novel mechanisms through which trade and FDI liberalization could result in protracted growth in productivity and per-capita income. In this section we explore quantitatively the dynamic implications of our theory following trade and FDI liberalization. We also assess the relative importance of these flows for the diffusion of technologies.

We consider a world economy that starts with $n - 1$ (relatively) open economies and one deviant economy that are on a balanced growth path. We calibrate the trade costs of the $n - 1$ open economies so that their trade shares equal 0.50, $\kappa_1 = 2.15$. We set the FDI cost to be 40% higher than the trade costs, $\delta_1 = 3$, to be consistent with the estimates in [Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare \(2013\)](#). Trade to and from, and operation in, the deviant economy face large trade and FDI costs, $\kappa_n = \delta_n = 100$. We trace the evolution of the stock of ideas and per-capita income as trade and FDI costs are eliminated, $\kappa_n = \delta_n = 100 \rightarrow \kappa'_n = \delta'_n = 1$. We also consider the cases in which only one of the costs are eliminated. In all these examples, we set $\beta = 0.5$ and $\rho = 0.5$.³⁶

[Figure 14](#) shows the dynamics of the stock of ideas (top panels) and per-capita income (bottom panels) following the reduction of trade and/or FDI cost with the deviant economy. The y-axis measures the variables relative to their values on a balanced growth path where all countries have the same, low trade and FDI costs, $\kappa_1 = \kappa_n = 2.15$ and $\delta_1 = \delta_n = 3$. The solid line shows the dynamics after trade and FDI costs with the deviant country are reduced, while the dashed and

³⁶The rest of the parameters are calibrated as discussed in footnote 20.




Figure 14: Dynamics after Opening to Trade and/or FDI.

dotted lines correspond to the cases where only trade or FDI costs are reduced, respectively.

Following the opening to trade and FDI, the stock of ideas in the (formerly) deviant country undergoes a sustained period of growth, converging to that of the $n - 1$ open economies. For learning from producers, this process is substantially slower when only trade costs are reduced. If only trade costs are reduced, most of the improvements in the quality of insights come from the selection of better domestic producers, which are themselves relatively unproductive to start with. On the contrary, when FDI costs are reduced, the initial growth of the stock of knowledge is much faster, as more productive foreign multinational start producing in the (formerly) deviant country, resulting in a better distribution of insights. In the long run, since trade costs are reduced by more than FDI costs, the gains associated with a reduction in the former is larger, albeit these gains materialize at a slower pace.

7 Conclusion

To be written.

A Technology Diffusion

Lemma 5 Under *Assumption 1*, there is a $K < \infty$ such that for all z , $\frac{1-H(z)}{z^{-\theta}} \leq K$

Proof. Choose $\delta > 0$ arbitrarily. Since $\lim_{z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1-H(z)}{z^{-\theta}} = 1$, there is a z^* such that $z > z^*$ implies $\frac{1-H(z)}{z^{-\theta}} < 1 + \delta$. For $z < z^*$, we have that $z^\theta [1 - H(z)] \leq (z^*)^\theta [1 - H(z)] \leq (z^*)^\theta$. Thus for any z , $\frac{1-H(z)}{z^{-\theta}} \leq K \equiv \max \{1 + \delta, (z^*)^\theta\}$ ■

Claim 6 Suppose that *Assumption 1* and *Assumption 3* hold. Then in the limit as $m \rightarrow \infty$, the frontier of knowledge evolves as:

$$\frac{d \ln F_t(q)}{dt} = -\alpha_t q^{-\theta} \int_0^\infty x^{\beta\theta} dG_t(x)$$

Proof. Evaluating the law of motion at $m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q$ and using the change of variables $w = m^{-\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} x$ we get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \ln \tilde{F}_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q \right) &= -m\alpha_t \int_0^\infty \left[1 - H \left(\frac{m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q}{x^\beta} \right) \right] d\tilde{G}_t(x) \\ &= -m\alpha_t \int_0^\infty \left[1 - H \left(\frac{m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q}{\left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} w \right)^\beta} \right) \right] d\tilde{G}_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} w \right) \end{aligned}$$

From above, we have that $F_t(q) \equiv \tilde{F}_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q \right)$, and $G_t \equiv \tilde{G}_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q \right)$ which have the following derivatives

$$\begin{aligned} G'_t(q) &= m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} \tilde{G}'_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q \right) \\ F'_t(q) &= m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} \tilde{F}'_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q \right) \\ \frac{\partial F_t(q)}{\partial t} &= \frac{\partial \tilde{F}_t \left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q \right)}{\partial t} \end{aligned}$$

The equation becomes

$$\frac{\partial \ln F_t(q)}{\partial t} = -m\alpha_t \int_0^\infty \left[1 - H \left(\frac{m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} q}{\left(m^{\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} w \right)^\beta} \right) \right] dG_t(w)$$

This can be rearranged as

$$\frac{\partial \ln F_t(q)}{\partial t} = -\alpha_t q^{-\theta} \int_0^\infty \left[\frac{1 - H(m^{1/\theta} q w^{-\beta})}{[m^{1/\theta} q w^{-\beta}]^{-\theta}} \right] w^{\beta\theta} dG_t(w)$$

We want to take a limit as $m \rightarrow \infty$. To do this, we must show that we can take the limit inside the integral. By [Lemma 5](#), there is a $K < \infty$ such that for any z , $\frac{1-H(z)}{z^{-\theta}} \leq K$. Further, given the assumptions on the tail of G_t , the integral $\int_0^\infty K w^{\beta\theta} d\tilde{G}_t(w)$ is finite. Thus we can take the limit inside the integral using the dominated convergence theorem to get

$$\frac{\partial \ln F_t(q)}{\partial t} = -\alpha_t q^{-\theta} \int_0^\infty w^{\beta\theta} dG_t(w)$$

■

B Trade

B.1 Equilibrium

This section derives expressions for price indices, trade shares, and market clearing conditions that determine equilibrium wages. The total expenditure in i is X_i . Throughout this section, we maintain that $F_i^{12}(q_1, q_2) = [1 + \lambda_i q_1^{-\theta} - \lambda_i q_2^{-\theta}] e^{-\lambda_i q^{-\theta}}$.

For a variety $s \in S_{ij}$ (produced in j and exported to i) that is produced with productivity q , the equilibrium price in i is $p_i(s) = \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q}$, the expenditure on consumption in i is $\left(\frac{p_i(s)}{P_i}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} X_i$, consumption is $\frac{1}{p_i(s)} \left(\frac{p_i(s)}{P_i}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} X_i$, and the labor used in j to produce variety s for i is $\frac{\kappa_{ij}/q_{j1}(s)}{p_i(s)} \left(\frac{p_i(s)}{P_i}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} X_i$

Define $\pi_{ij} \equiv \frac{\lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta}}$. We will eventually show this is the share of i 's total expenditure that is spent on goods from j .

We begin with a lemma which will be useful in deriving a number of results.

Lemma 7 *Suppose τ_1 and τ_2 satisfy $\tau_1 < 1$ and $\tau_1 + \tau_2 < 1$. Then*

$$\int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{\tau_1 \theta} p_i(s)^{-\tau_2 \theta} ds = \tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\tau_2} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{\tau_1}$$

where $\tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2) \equiv \left\{ 1 - \frac{\tau_2}{1-\tau_1} + \frac{\tau_2}{1-\tau_1} \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta(1-\tau_1)} \right\} \Gamma(1 - \tau_1 - \tau_2)$

Proof. We begin by defining the measure \mathcal{F}_{ij} to satisfy

$$\mathcal{F}_{ij}(q_1, q_2) = \int_0^{q_2} \prod_{k \neq j} F_k^{12} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} x}{w_j \kappa_{ij}}, \frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} x}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right) F_j^{12}(dx, x) + \int_{q_2}^{q_1} \prod_{k \neq j} F_k^{12} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} q_2}{w_j \kappa_{ij}}, \frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} q_2}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right) F_j^{12}(dx, q_2) \quad (16)$$

$\mathcal{F}_{ij}(q_1, q_2)$ is the fraction of varieties that i purchases from j with productivity no greater than q_1 and second best provider of the good to i has marginal cost no smaller than $\frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_2}$. There are two terms in the sum. The first term integrates over goods where j 's lowest-cost producer has productivity no greater than q_2 , and the second over goods where j 's lowest cost producer has productivity between q_1 and q_2 . The corresponding density $\frac{\partial^2}{\partial q_1 \partial q_2} \mathcal{F}_{ij}(q_1, q_2)$ will be useful because it is the measure of firms in j with productivity q that are the lowest cost providers to i and for which the next-lowest-cost provider has marginal cost $w_j \kappa_{ij} / q_2$.

We first show that

$$\mathcal{F}_{ij}(q_1, q_2) = \left[\pi_{ij} + \lambda_j \left(q_2^{-\theta} - q_1^{-\theta} \right) \right] e^{-\frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \lambda_j q_2^{-\theta}}$$

The first term of [equation \(16\)](#) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^{q_2} \prod_{k \neq j} F_k^{12} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} x}{w_j \kappa_{ij}}, \frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} x}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right) F_j^{12}(dx, x) &= \int_0^{q_2} e^{-\sum_{k \neq j} \lambda_k \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right)^{-\theta} x^{-\theta}} \theta \lambda_j x^{-\theta-1} e^{-\lambda_j x^{-\theta}} dx \\ &= \frac{\lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta}} e^{-\sum_k \lambda_k \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right)^{-\theta} q_2^{-\theta}} \\ &= \pi_{ij} e^{-\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} q_2^{-\theta}} \end{aligned}$$

The second term is

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{q_2}^{q_1} \prod_{k \neq i} F_k^{12} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} q_2}{w_j \kappa_{ij}}, \frac{w_k \kappa_{ik} q_2}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right) F_j^{12}(dx, q_2) &= e^{-\sum_{k \neq j} \lambda_k \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right)^{-\theta} q_2^{-\theta}} \int_{q_2}^{q_1} \theta \lambda_j x^{-\theta-1} e^{-\lambda_j q_2^{-\theta}} dx \\ &= e^{-\sum_k \lambda_k \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{w_j \kappa_{ij}} \right)^{-\theta} q_2^{-\theta}} \lambda_j \left[q_2^{-\theta} - q_1^{-\theta} \right] \\ &= e^{-\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} q_2^{-\theta}} \lambda_j \left[q_2^{-\theta} - q_1^{-\theta} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Together, these give the expression for \mathcal{F}_{ij} , so the joint density is

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial q_1 \partial q_2} \mathcal{F}_{ij}(q_1, q_2) = \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \left(\theta \lambda_j q_1^{-\theta-1} \right) \left(\theta \lambda_j q_2^{-\theta-1} \right) e^{-\frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \lambda_j q_2^{-\theta}}$$

We next turn to the integral $\int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{\theta\tau_1} p_i(s)^{-\theta\tau_2} ds$. Since the price of good s is set at either a markup of $\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}$ over marginal cost or at the cost of the next lowest cost provider, this integral equals

$$\begin{aligned} & \int_0^\infty \int_{q_2}^\infty q_1^{\theta\tau_1} \min \left\{ \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_2}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_1} \right\}^{-\theta\tau_2} \frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{F}_{ij}(q_1, q_2)}{\partial q_1 \partial q_2} dq_1 dq_2 \\ &= \int_0^\infty \int_{q_2}^\infty q_1^{\theta\tau_1} \min \left\{ \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_2}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_1} \right\}^{-\theta\tau_2} \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \left(\theta \lambda_j q_1^{-\theta-1} \right) \left(\theta \lambda_j q_2^{-\theta-1} \right) e^{-\frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \lambda_j q_2^{-\theta}} dq_1 dq_2 \end{aligned}$$

Using the change of variables $x_1 = \frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} q_1^{-\theta}$ and $x_2 = \frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} q_2^{-\theta}$, this becomes

$$(w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta\tau_2} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{\tau_1 + \tau_2} \int_0^\infty \int_0^{x_2} x_1^{-\tau_1} \min \left\{ x_2, \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^\theta x_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_1 dx_2$$

Define $\tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2) \equiv \int_0^\infty \int_0^{x_2} x_1^{-\tau_1} \min \left\{ x_2, \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^\theta x_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_1 dx_2$, so that the integral is

$$\int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{\theta\tau_1} p_i(s)^{-\theta\tau_2} ds = B(\tau_1, \tau_2) (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta\tau_2} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{\tau_1 + \tau_2}$$

Using $\pi_{ij} = \frac{\lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta}}$, we have $(w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta\tau_2} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{\tau_2} = \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\tau_2}$. Finally we com-

plete the proof by providing an expression for $\tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2)$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2) &= \int_0^\infty \int_0^{x_2} x_1^{-\tau_1} \min \left\{ x_2, \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^\theta x_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_1 dx_2 \\
&= \int_0^\infty \int_{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}\right)^{-\theta} x_2}^{x_2} x_1^{-\tau_1} x_2^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_1 dx_2 + \int_0^\infty \int_0^{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}\right)^{-\theta} x_2} x_1^{-\tau_1} \left\{ \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^\theta x_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_1 dx_2 \\
&= \int_0^\infty \frac{x_2^{1-\tau_1} - \left(\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta} x_2 \right)^{1-\tau_1}}{1-\tau_1} x_2^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_2 + \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta \tau_2} \int_0^\infty \frac{\left(\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta} x_2 \right)^{1-\tau_1-\tau_2}}{1-\tau_1-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_2 \\
&= \frac{1 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta(1-\tau_1)}}{1-\tau_1} \int_0^\infty x_2^{1-\tau_1-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_2 + \frac{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta(1-\tau_1)}}{1-\tau_1-\tau_2} \int_0^\infty x_2^{1-\tau_1-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_2 \\
&= \left\{ \frac{1 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta(1-\tau_1)}}{1-\tau_1} + \frac{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta(1-\tau_1)}}{1-\tau_1-\tau_2} \right\} \Gamma(2-\tau_1-\tau_2) \\
&= \left\{ 1 - \frac{\tau_2}{1-\tau_1} + \frac{\tau_2}{1-\tau_1} \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta(1-\tau_1)} \right\} \Gamma(1-\tau_1-\tau_2)
\end{aligned}$$

where the final equality uses the fact that for any x , $\Gamma(x+1) = x\Gamma(x)$. ■

We first use this lemma to provide expressions for the price index in i and the share of i 's expenditure on goods from j .

Claim 8 *The price index for i satisfies*

$$P_i = \tilde{B} \left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon-1}} \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

where $B \equiv \left\{ \left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right) \left(1 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta} \right) + \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{-\theta} \right\} \Gamma \left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right)$. $\pi_{ij} = \frac{\lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta}}$ is the share of i 's expenditure on goods from j .

Proof. The price aggregate of goods provided to i by j is $\int_{s \in S_{ij}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds$. Using [Lemma 7](#), this equals

$$\int_{s \in S_{ij}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds = \tilde{B} \left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}} \pi_{ij}$$

The price index for i therefore satisfies

$$P_i^{1-\varepsilon} = \sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds = \tilde{B} \left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}$$

and i 's expenditure share on goods from j is

$$\frac{\int_{s \in S_{ij}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} = \pi_{ij}$$

■

We next turn to the market clearing conditions.

Claim 9 *Country j 's expenditure on labor is $\frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \sum_i \pi_{ij} X_i$.*

Proof. i 's consumption of good s is $p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}}$. If j is the lowest-cost provider to i , then j 's expenditure on labor per unit delivered is $w_j \frac{\kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)}$. The total expenditure on labor in j to produce goods for i is then $\int_{s \in S_{ij}} \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds$. Using [Lemma 7](#), the total expenditure on labor in j is thus

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_i \int_{s \in S_{ij}} \frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds &= \sum_i w_j \kappa_{ij} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{-1} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} ds \\ &= \tilde{B} \left(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta} \right) \sum_i w_j \kappa_{ij} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \end{aligned}$$

The result follows from $\tilde{B} \left(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta} \right) = \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \tilde{B} \left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right)$ and $\frac{w_j \kappa_{ij}}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} = \tilde{B} \left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta} \right)^{-1}$.

■

C Source Distributions

This appendix derives expressions for the source distributions under various specifications. We begin by describing learning from sellers.

C.1 Learning from Sellers

Here we characterize the learning process when insights are drawn from sellers in proportion to the expenditure on each seller's good. Consider a variety that can be produced in j at productivity q . Since the share of i 's expenditure on good s is $(p_i(s)/P_i)^{1-\varepsilon}$, the source distribution is

$$G_i(q) = \sum_j \int_{\{s \in S_{ij} | q_{j1}(s) \leq q\}} (p_i(s)/P_i)^{1-\varepsilon} ds$$

The change in i 's stock of knowledge depends on

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) = \sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{\beta\theta} (p_i(s)/P_i)^{1-\varepsilon} ds$$

Using [Lemma 7](#), this is

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) &= \sum_j \frac{1}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \tilde{B}\left(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}}\right)^\beta \\ &= \frac{\tilde{B}\left(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)}{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)} \sum_j \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}}\right)^\beta \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

C.1.1 Alternative Weights of Sellers

Here we explore two alternative processes by which individuals can learn from sellers. In the first case, individuals are equally likely to learn from all active sellers, independently of how much of the seller's variety they consume. In the second case, insights are drawn from sellers in proportion to consumption of each sellers' goods. In each case, the speed of learning is the same as our baseline ([equation \(17\)](#)) up to a constant.

Learning from All Active Sellers Equally

If producers are equally likely to learn from all active sellers, the source distribution is

$$G_i(q) = \frac{\sum_j \int_{\{s \in S_{ij} | q_{j1}(s) \leq q\}} ds}{\sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} ds}$$

The change in i 's stock of knowledge depends on $\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) = \frac{\sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{\beta\theta} ds}{\sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} ds}$. Using [Lemma 7](#),

this is

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) = \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta, 0)}{\tilde{B}(0, 0)} \sum_j \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^\beta = \Gamma(1 - \beta) \sum_j \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^\beta$$

Learning from Sellers in Proportion to Consumption

i 's consumption of goods s is $c_i(s) = p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}}$. If producers learn in proportion to consumption, then the source distribution is

$$G_i(q) = \frac{\sum_j \int_{\{s \in S_{ij} | q_{j1}(s) \leq q\}} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds}{\sum_j \int_{\{s \in S_{ij}\}} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds}$$

The change in i 's stock of knowledge depends on

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) = \frac{\sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} q_{j1}(s)^{\beta\theta} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} ds}{\sum_j \int_{s \in S_{ij}} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} ds}$$

Using [Lemma 7](#), this is

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) &= \frac{\sum_j \tilde{B}(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^\beta}{\sum_j \tilde{B}(0, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}} \pi_{ij}} \\ &= \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})}{\tilde{B}(0, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})} \sum_j \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^\beta \end{aligned}$$

C.2 Learning from Producers

Here we characterize the learning process when insights are drawn from domestic producers in proportion to labor used in production. For each $s \in S_{ij}$, the fraction of j 's labor used to produce the good is $\frac{1}{L_j} \frac{\kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} c_i(s)$ with $c_i(s) = p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}}$. Summing over all destinations, the source distribution would then be

$$G_j(q) = \sum_i \int_{s \in S_{ij} | q_{j1}(s) \leq q} \frac{1}{L_j} \frac{\kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds$$

The change in j 's stock of knowledge depends on

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_j(q) = \sum_i \int_{s \in S_{ij}} q^{\beta\theta} \frac{1}{L_j} \frac{\kappa_{ij}}{q_{j1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds$$

Using [Lemma 7](#), this is

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_j(q) = \sum_j \frac{\kappa_{ij}}{L_j} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \tilde{B}\left(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}\right) \left[\sum_k \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^{\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}}$$

Using the expressions for P_i and π_{ij} from above, this becomes

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_j(q) = \frac{\tilde{B}\left(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}\right)}{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)} \frac{1}{w_j L_j} \sum_j \pi_{ij} X_i \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^\beta$$

C.2.1 Alternative Weights of Producers

Here we briefly describe the alternative learning process in which insights are equally likely to be dawn from all active domestic producers. We consider only the case in which trade costs satisfy the triangle inequality $\kappa_{jk} < \kappa_{ji}\kappa_{ik}, \forall i, j, k$ such that $i \neq j \neq k \neq i$. We will show that, in this case, all producers that export also sell domestically. This greatly simplifies characterizing the learning process.

Towards a contradiction, suppose there is a variety s such that i exports to j and k exports to i . This means that $\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{q_i(s)} \leq \frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{q_k(s)}$ and $\frac{w_k \kappa_{ik}}{q_k(s)} \leq \frac{w_i \kappa_{ii}}{q_i(s)}$. Since $\kappa_{ii} = 1$, these imply that $\kappa_{ji}\kappa_{ik} \leq \kappa_{jk}$, a violation of the triangle inequality and thus a contradiction.

In this case, the source distribution is $G_i(q) = \frac{\int_{s \in S_{ii} | q_{i1} \leq q} ds}{\int_{s \in S_{ii}} ds}$. The change in i 's stock of knowledge depends on

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) = \frac{\int_{s \in S_{ii}} q^{\beta\theta} ds}{\int_{s \in S_{ii}} ds}$$

Using [Lemma 7](#), this is

$$\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i(q) = \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta, 0) \pi_{ii} \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\pi_{ii}} \right)^\beta}{\tilde{B}(0, 0) \pi_{ii}} = \Gamma(1 - \beta) \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\pi_{ii}} \right)^\beta$$

D Simple Examples

D.1 Symmetric Countries

If countries are symmetric, there are two possible values of π_{ij} :

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{ii} &= \frac{1}{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta}} \\ \pi_{ij} &= \frac{\kappa^{-\theta}}{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta}}, \quad i \neq j\end{aligned}$$

Normalizing the wage to unity, the price level is

$$P = B\lambda^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

The de-trended scale parameter on a balance growth path is

$$\hat{\lambda}(\kappa) = \left[(1-\beta) \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} \frac{\Gamma(1-\beta-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta})}{\Gamma(1-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta})} \frac{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta})^{1-\beta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}$$

Using this expression, per-capita income, $y_i = w_i/P_i$, is

$$\begin{aligned}y(\kappa) &= \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \lambda^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \\ &= \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \left[(1-\beta) \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} \frac{\Gamma(1-\beta-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta})}{\Gamma(1-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta})} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta(1-\beta)}} \left(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta(1-\beta)}}\end{aligned}$$

The de-trended stock of knowledge and per-capita income relative to costless trade are

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\hat{\lambda}(\kappa)}{\hat{\lambda}(1)} &= \left[\frac{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta(1-\beta)}}{(1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta})^{1-\beta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} n^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \\ \frac{y(\kappa)}{y(1)} &= \left(\frac{1 + (n-1)\kappa^{-\theta}}{n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(\frac{\lambda(\kappa)}{\lambda(1)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}\end{aligned}$$

In particular, per-capita income in autarky relative to the case with costless trade

$$\frac{y(\infty)}{y(1)} = \underbrace{n^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}}_{static} \underbrace{n^{-\frac{\beta}{\theta(1-\beta)}}}_{dynamic}$$

D.2 A Small Open Economy

Consider a small open economy. The economy is small in the sense that actions in the economy have no impact on other countries' expenditures, price levels, wages, or stocks of knowledge.

D.2.1 Steady State Gains from Trade

D.2.2 Speed of Convergence

We use the notation \tilde{x} to denote log-deviation from of x from its steady state (or BGP) value. To derive the speed of convergence, we want expressions for how the trade shares and wages change over time. The trade shares and market clearing condition for i are

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{ij} &= \frac{\lambda_j (w_j \kappa_{ij})^{-\theta}}{\sum_{k=1}^n \lambda_k (w_k \kappa_{ik})^{-\theta}} \\ r_{ji} &= \frac{X_j \pi_{ji}}{w_j L_j} \\ w_i L_i &= \sum_j X_j \pi_{ji}\end{aligned}$$

For a small open economy, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\pi}_{ii} &= (1 - \pi_{ii}) [\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i] \\ j \neq i &: \tilde{\pi}_{ij} = -\pi_{ii} [\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i] \\ i \neq j &: \tilde{\pi}_{ji} = \tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i \\ j \neq i &: \tilde{r}_{ji} = \tilde{\pi}_{ji} - \tilde{w}_i = [\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i] - \tilde{w}_i\end{aligned}$$

The change in the wage can be found from linearizing the labor market clearing condition:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{w}_i &= r_{ii} [\tilde{w}_i + (1 - \pi_{ii}) (\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i)] + \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} [\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i] \\ \tilde{w}_i &= \pi_{ii} [\tilde{w}_i - \pi_{ii} (\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i)] + [\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i] \\ (1 - \pi_{ii}) \tilde{w}_i &= (1 - \pi_{ii})^2 (\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i) \\ \tilde{w}_i &= (1 + \pi_{ii}) (\tilde{\lambda}_i - \theta \tilde{w}_i)\end{aligned}$$

This last equation can be expressed in two ways:

$$\check{\lambda}_i - \theta \check{w}_i = \frac{\check{\lambda}_i}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})}$$

$$\check{w}_i = \frac{(1 + \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i$$

Plugging these back into the shares, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \check{\pi}_{ii} &= \frac{(1 - \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i \\ j \neq i &: \check{\pi}_{ij} = -\frac{\pi_{ii}}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i \\ i \neq j &: \check{\pi}_{ji} = \frac{1}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i \\ j \neq i &: \check{r}_{ji} = \check{\pi}_{ji} - \check{w}_i = \frac{1}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} - \frac{(1 + \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i = \frac{-\pi_{ii}}{1 + \theta(1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i \end{aligned}$$

We now proceed to characterizing transition dynamics for the stock of knowledge, $\check{\lambda}_i$.

Learning from Sellers Let $\Omega_{ij}^S \equiv \frac{\pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_j^\beta}{\sum_k \pi_{ik}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_k^\beta}$. The change in the the deviation of i 's stock of knowledge from the BGP is

$$\frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} = \frac{1}{\hat{\lambda}_i} \frac{\partial \hat{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} = \frac{B^S \hat{\alpha}_i}{\hat{\lambda}_i} \sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_j^\beta - \frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}$$

Log-linearizing around the steady state gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &\approx \frac{B^S \hat{\alpha}_i}{\hat{\lambda}_i} \sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_j^\beta [(1-\beta) \check{\pi}_{ij} + \beta \check{\lambda}_j - \check{\lambda}_i] \\ &= \frac{\gamma}{1-\beta} \frac{\sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_j^\beta [(1-\beta) \check{\pi}_{ij} + \beta \check{\lambda}_j - \check{\lambda}_i]}{\sum_j \pi_{ij}^{1-\beta} \hat{\lambda}_j^\beta} \\ &= \frac{\gamma}{1-\beta} \sum_j \Omega_{ij}^S [(1-\beta) \check{\pi}_{ij} + \beta \check{\lambda}_j - \check{\lambda}_i] \\ \frac{1-\beta}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &= \sum_j \Omega_{ij}^S [(1-\beta) \check{\pi}_{ij} + \beta \check{\lambda}_j] - \check{\lambda}_i \end{aligned}$$

For a small open economy, we have $\check{\lambda}_j = 0$, $\check{\pi}_{ii} = \frac{(1-\pi_{ii})\check{\lambda}_i}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})}$, and $\check{\pi}_{ij} = \frac{-\pi_{ij}\check{\lambda}_i}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})}$ for $j \neq i$. The law of motion can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1-\beta}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &= \Omega_{ii}^S [(1-\beta)\check{\pi}_{ii} + \beta\check{\lambda}_i] + (1-\beta) \sum_{j \neq i} \Omega_{ij}^S \check{\pi}_{ij} - \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= \Omega_{ii}^S \left[(1-\beta) \frac{(1-\pi_{ii})\check{\lambda}_i}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} + \beta\check{\lambda}_i \right] + (1-\beta) \sum_{j \neq i} \Omega_{ij}^S \frac{-\pi_{ij}\check{\lambda}_i}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} - \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= \left\{ \Omega_{ii}^S \left[(1-\beta) \frac{(1-\pi_{ii})}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} + \beta \right] + (1-\beta) (1 - \Omega_{ii}^S) \frac{-\pi_{ii}}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} - 1 \right\} \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= - \left\{ 1 - (1-\beta) \frac{\Omega_{ii}^S - \pi_{ii}}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} - \beta \Omega_{ii}^S \right\} \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= - \left\{ (1-\beta) - (1-\beta) \frac{\Omega_{ii}^S - \pi_{ii}}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} + \beta (1 - \Omega_{ii}^S) \right\} \check{\lambda}_i \\
\frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &= -\gamma \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Omega_{ii}^S - \pi_{ii}}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} (1 - \Omega_{ii}^S) \right\} \check{\lambda}_i
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, we can use this to get at the speed of convergence for real income:

$$\begin{aligned}
\check{w}_i - \check{P}_i &= \frac{1}{\theta} [\check{\lambda}_i - \check{\pi}_{ii}] = \frac{1}{\theta} \left[1 - \frac{(1-\pi_{ii})}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} \right] \check{\lambda}_i = A \check{\lambda}_i \\
\frac{d}{dt} [\check{w}_i - \check{P}_i] &= A \frac{d\check{\lambda}_i}{dt} = -\gamma \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Omega_{ii}^S - \pi_{ii}}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} (1 - \Omega_{ii}^S) \right\} A \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= -\gamma \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Omega_{ii}^S - \pi_{ii}}{1+\theta(1+\pi_{ii})} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} (1 - \Omega_{ii}^S) \right\} [\check{w}_i - \check{P}_i]
\end{aligned}$$

Learning from Producers Let $\Omega_{ij}^P \equiv \frac{r_{ji}(\hat{\lambda}_i/\pi_{ji})^\beta}{\sum_k r_{ki}(\hat{\lambda}_i/\pi_{ki})^\beta}$. The change in the the deviation of i 's stock of knowledge from the BGP is

$$\frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} = \frac{1}{\hat{\lambda}_i} \frac{\partial \hat{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} = \frac{B^P \hat{\alpha}_i}{\hat{\lambda}_i} \sum_j r_{ji} \left(\hat{\lambda}_i / \pi_{ji} \right)^\beta - \frac{\gamma}{1-\beta}$$

Log-linearizing around the steady state gives

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &\approx \frac{B^P \hat{\alpha}_i}{\hat{\lambda}_i} \sum_j r_{ji} \left(\hat{\lambda}_i / \pi_{ji} \right)^\beta [\check{r}_{ji} - \beta \check{\pi}_{ij} - (1 - \beta) \check{\lambda}_i] \\
&= \frac{\gamma}{1 - \beta} \sum_j \Omega_{ij}^P [\check{r}_{ji} - \beta \check{\pi}_{ij} - (1 - \beta) \check{\lambda}_i] \\
\frac{1 - \beta}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &= \sum_j \Omega_{ij}^P [\check{r}_{ji} - \beta \check{\pi}_{ij}] - (1 - \beta) \check{\lambda}_i
\end{aligned}$$

Using the expressions for $\check{\pi}_{ii}$, $\check{\pi}_{ji}$ and \check{r}_{ji} , along with $\pi_{ii} = r_{ii}$, the law of motion can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1 - \beta}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &= \Omega_{ii}^P [\check{r}_{ii} - \beta \check{\pi}_{ii}] + \sum_{j \neq i} \Omega_{ij}^P [\check{r}_{ji} - \beta \check{\pi}_{ij}] - (1 - \beta) \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= \Omega_{ii}^P (1 - \beta) \frac{(1 - \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \Omega_{ij}^P \left[\frac{-\pi_{ii}}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i - \beta \frac{1}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} \check{\lambda}_i \right] - (1 - \beta) \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= \left\{ \frac{\Omega_{ii}^P (1 - \beta) (1 - \pi_{ii}) + (1 - \Omega_{ii}^P) (-\pi_{ii} - \beta)}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} - (1 - \beta) \right\} \check{\lambda}_i \\
&= \left\{ \frac{\Omega_{ii}^P (1 - \beta) (1 - \pi_{ii}) - \pi_{ii} (1 - \Omega_{ii}^P) (1 - \beta) - \beta (1 - \Omega_{ii}^P) (1 + \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} - (1 - \beta) \right\} \check{\lambda}_i \\
\frac{\partial \check{\lambda}_i}{\partial t} &= -\gamma \left\{ 1 - \frac{\Omega_{ii}^P - \pi_{ii}}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{(1 - \Omega_{ii}^P) (1 + \pi_{ii})}{1 + \theta (1 + \pi_{ii})} \right\} \check{\lambda}_i
\end{aligned}$$

E Research

This section proves the following claim:

Claim 10 *If $\Pi_{i\tau}$ is total flow of profit earned by entrepreneurs in i at time τ , then the flow of profit earned in i at time τ from ideas generated between t and t' (with $t < t' < \tau$) is:*

$$\frac{\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \Pi_{i\tau}$$

Proof. For $v_1 \leq v_2$, let $\check{\mathcal{V}}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t']}(v_1, v_2)$ be the probability that at time τ , the lowest cost technique to provide a variety to j was discovered by a manager in i between times t and t' , that the marginal cost of that lowest-cost technique is no lower than v_1 , and that marginal cost of the next-lowest-cost supplier is not lower than v_2 . Just as in [Appendix B](#), we will define $\mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t']}(v_1, v_2) = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \check{\mathcal{V}}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t']}\left(m^{-\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} v_1, m^{-\frac{1}{(1-\beta)\theta}} v_2\right)$.

Let $\Pi_{i\tau}^{(t,t')}$ be profit from all techniques drawn in i between t and t' . Thus total profit in i at τ is $\Pi_{i\tau}^{(-\infty,\tau]}$. Defining $p(v_1, v_2) \equiv \min\left\{v_2, \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}v_1\right\}^{-\varepsilon}$, we can compute each of these by summing over profit from sales to each destination j :

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_{i\tau}^{(t,t')} &= \sum_j \int_0^\infty \int_{v_1}^\infty [p(v_1, v_2) - v_1] p(v_1, v_2)^{-\varepsilon} P_j^{\varepsilon-1} X_j \mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t')} (dv_1, dv_2) \\ \Pi_{i\tau}^{(-\infty,\tau]} &= \sum_j \int_0^\infty \int_{v_1}^\infty [p(v_1, v_2) - v_1] p(v_1, v_2)^{-\varepsilon} P_j^{\varepsilon-1} X_j \mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(-\infty,\tau]} (dv_1, dv_2)\end{aligned}$$

We will show below that $\mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t')} (v_1, v_2) = \frac{\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(-\infty,\tau]} (v_1, v_2)$. It will follow immediately that

$$\Pi_{i\tau}^{(t,t')} = \frac{\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \Pi_{i\tau}^{(-\infty,\tau]}$$

We now compute $\mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t')} (v_1, v_2)$. For each of the m managers in i , let $M_i^{(t,t')}(q)$ be the probability that the no technique drawn between t and t' delivers productivity better than q . Similarly, define $\tilde{F}_i^{(t,t')}(q) \equiv M_i^{(t,t')}(q)^m$ be the probability that none of the m managers drew a technique with productivity better than q between t and t' . Finally, let $F_i^{(t,t')}(q) = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \tilde{F}_i^{(t,t')}\left(m^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \frac{1}{\theta} q\right)$.

We have

$$\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t')} (v_1, v_2) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} m \int_{v_2}^\infty \left[\prod_{k \neq i} \tilde{F}_k^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{x} \right) \right] M_i^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)^{m-1} M_i^{(-\infty,t]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right) \\ \quad M_i^{(t',\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right) dM_i^{(t,t')} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right) \\ + m \int_{v_1}^{v_2} \left[\prod_{k \neq i} \tilde{F}_k^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{v_2} \right) \right] M_i^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{v_2} \right)^{m-1} M_i^{(-\infty,t]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right) \\ \quad M_i^{(t',\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right) dM_i^{(t,t')} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right) \end{array} \right\}$$

The expression for $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t')} (v_1, v_2)$ contains two terms. The first represents the probability that the best technique to serve j delivers marginal cost greater than v_2 and was drawn by a manager in i between t and t' . For each of the m managers in i , $dM_i^{(t,t')}\left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x}\right)$ measures the likelihood that the managers best draw between t and t' delivered marginal cost $x \in [v_2, \infty]$, $M_i^{(-\infty,t]}\left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x}\right) M_i^{(t',\tau]}\left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x}\right)$ is the probability that the manager had no better draws, and $\left[\prod_{k \neq i} \tilde{F}_k^{(-\infty,\tau]}\left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{x}\right)\right] M_i^{(-\infty,\tau]}\left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x}\right)^{m-1}$ is the probability that no other manager from any destination would be able to provide the good at marginal cost lower than x . The second terms represents the probability that the best technique to serve j delivers marginal cost between v_1 and

v_2 and was drawn by a manager in i between t and t' , and that no other manager can deliver the variety with marginal cost lower than v_2 .

Using $M_i^{(-\infty,t]}(q) M_i^{(t',\tau]}(q) M_i^{(t,t']}(q) = \tilde{F}_i^{(-\infty,\tau]}(q)$, $\tilde{F}_i^{(-\infty,\tau]}(q) = M_i^{(-\infty,\tau]}(q)^m$ and $\tilde{F}_i^{(t,t']}(q) = M_i^{(t,t']}(q)^m$, this can be written as

$$\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t']}(v_1, v_2) = \left\{ \begin{aligned} & \int_{v_2}^{\infty} \left[\prod_k \tilde{F}_k^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{x} \right) \right] \frac{d\tilde{F}_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{\tilde{F}_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)} \\ & + \int_{v_1}^{v_2} \left[\prod_k \tilde{F}_k^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{v_2} \right) \right] \left(\frac{\tilde{F}_i^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{\tilde{F}_i^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{v_2} \right)} \right)^{\frac{1}{m}} \frac{d\tilde{F}_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{\tilde{F}_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)} \end{aligned} \right\}$$

Evaluating this at $m^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}\frac{1}{\theta}} v_1$ and $m^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}\frac{1}{\theta}} v_2$ and taking a limit as $m \rightarrow \infty$ gives

$$\mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t']}(v_1, v_2) = \left\{ \begin{aligned} & \int_{v_2}^{\infty} \left[\prod_k F_k^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{x} \right) \right] \frac{dF_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{F_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)} \\ & + \int_{v_1}^{v_2} \left[\prod_k F_k^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_k \kappa_{jk}}{v_2} \right) \right] \frac{dF_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{F_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)} \end{aligned} \right\}$$

Finally, following the logic of [Section 1](#), we have $F_i^{(t,t']}(q) = e^{-(\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it})q^{-\theta}}$, so that

$$\frac{dF_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{F_i^{(t,t']} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)} = \frac{\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \frac{dF_i^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}{F_i^{(-\infty,\tau]} \left(\frac{w_i \kappa_{ji}}{x} \right)}$$

We thus have

$$\mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(t,t']}(v_1, v_2) = \frac{\lambda_{it'} - \lambda_{it}}{\lambda_{i\tau}} \mathcal{V}_{ji\tau}^{(-\infty,\tau]}(v_1, v_2)$$

which completes the proof. ■

F Quantitative Model

This appendix presents expressions for the price index, expenditure shares and the law of motion of the stock of ideas for the extension of the model discussed in [Section 5](#), incorporating non-tradable

goods, intermediate inputs and equipped labor. The price index

$$p_i^{1-\varepsilon} = \alpha (1 - \mu) \left[\left(p_i^\eta w_i^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_i \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}} + \mu \left[\sum_{j=1}^n \left(p_j^\eta w_j^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ij} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_j \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}}.$$

The fraction of income that country i spends in goods from country $j \neq i$

$$\pi_{ij} = \frac{\mu \left(p_j^\eta w_j^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ij} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_j \left[\sum_{k=1}^n \left(p_k^\eta w_k^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ik} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_k \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta} - 1}}{(1 - \mu) \left[\left(p_i^\eta w_i^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_i \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}} + \mu \left[\sum_k \left(p_k^\eta w_k^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ik} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_k \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}}}.$$

The fraction of income that country i spends in its own goods is given by the sum of the non tradable and tradable shares

$$\pi_{ii} = \pi_i^{NT} + \pi_i^T$$

where the non tradable share

$$\pi_i^{NT} = \frac{(1 - \mu) \left[\left(p_i^\eta w_i^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_i \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}}}{(1 - \mu) \left[\left(p_i^\eta w_i^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_i \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}} + \mu \left[\sum_k \left(p_k^\eta w_k^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ik} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_k \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}}}$$

and the tradable (own) share

$$\pi_i^T = \frac{\mu \left(p_i^\eta w_i^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_i \left[\sum_k \left(p_k^\eta w_k^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ik} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_k \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta} - 1}}{(1 - \mu) \left[\left(p_i^\eta w_i^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_i \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}} + \mu \left[\sum_k \left(p_k^\eta w_k^{1-\eta} \kappa_{ik} \right)^{-\theta} \lambda_k \right]^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}}}.$$

The evolution of the stock of ideas when learning is from sellers

$$\dot{\lambda}_i \propto \pi_i^{NT} \lambda_i^\beta + \pi_i^T \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\frac{\pi_i^T}{\pi_i^T + \sum_{k \neq i} \pi_{ik}}} \right)^\beta + \sum_{j \neq i} \pi_{ij} \left(\frac{\lambda_j}{\frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_i^T + \sum_{k \neq i} \pi_{ik}}} \right)^\beta.$$

The evolution of the stock of ideas when learning is from domestic producers

$$\dot{\lambda}_i \propto \pi_i^{NT} \lambda_i^\beta + \pi_i^T \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\frac{\pi_i^T}{\pi_i^T + \sum_{k \neq i} \pi_{ik}}} \right)^\beta + \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{L_j w_j \pi_{ji}}{L_i w_i} \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\frac{\pi_{ji}}{\pi_j^T + \sum_{k \neq j} \pi_{jk}}} \right)^\beta.$$

The market clearing conditions are the same as in the baseline model once labor is reinterpreted as equipped labor.

G Multinationals

This section derives expressions for price indices, trade shares, and market clearing conditions. Across multinationals, let $v_{i1}(s)$ and $v_2(s)$ be the lowest and second lowest marginal costs of supplying good s to i . Then the price of good s in i is

$$p_i(s) = \min \left\{ \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} v_{i1}(s), v_{i2}(s) \right\}$$

Define

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi_i &= \sum_{\tilde{k}} \lambda_{\tilde{k}} \left(\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho} \\ \pi_{ijk} &= \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho} \frac{(w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]}}{\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]}} \end{aligned}$$

As with, [Lemma 7](#), we begin with a lemma which will be useful intermediate step.

Lemma 11 *Suppose τ_1 and τ_2 satisfy $\tau_1 < 1$ and $\tau_1 + \tau_2 < 1$. Then*

$$\int_{s \in S_{ijk}} q_{jk1}(s)^{\tau_1 \theta} p_i(s)^{-\tau_2 \theta} ds = \tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2) \pi_{ijk} \varphi_i^{\tau_1 + \tau_2} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{\tau_1 \theta}$$

where $\tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is defined as in [Lemma 7](#).

Proof. For $v_1 \leq v_2$, define $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2)$ to be the fraction of goods for which the lowest cost source for i is a multinational based in k producing in j , and for which that multinational is unable to

supply the good at cost lower than v_1 , and for which no other multinational can supply the good at cost lower than v_2 . We can then express $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2)$ using \tilde{F}_{kj} and M_{kj} to represent the derivatives of \tilde{F}_k and M_k with respect to the j th argument:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2) &= m \int_{v_2}^{\infty} \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} M_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right) M_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)^{m-1} \prod_{\tilde{k} \neq k} \tilde{F}_{\tilde{k}} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{x} \right\}_l \right) dx \\ &\quad + m \int_{v_1}^{v_2} \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} M_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right) M_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{v_2} \right\}_l \right)^{m-1} \prod_{\tilde{k} \neq k} \tilde{F}_{\tilde{k}} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{v_2} \right\}_l \right) dx\end{aligned}$$

The two terms divide $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2)$ into instances where the lowest cost provider has cost less than v_2 and between v_1 and v_2 respectively. To interpret the first term, note that for each of the m multinationals based in k , the term $\frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} M_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)$ is the probability that that particular multinational can provide the good to i by producing in j at cost $x (> v_2)$ and cannot provide the good at a lower cost by producing elsewhere, while $M_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)^{m-1} \prod_{\tilde{k} \neq k} \tilde{F}_{\tilde{k}} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{x} \right\}_l \right)$ is the probability that none of the other multinationals (the other $m - 1$ based in k or any based in another country) can provide the good to i at cost lower than x . The second term is similar, except since $x \in [v_1, v_2]$, it uses the probability that none of the other multinationals can provide the good to i at cost lower than v_2 . This can be written more concisely as

$$\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2) = m \int_{v_1}^{\infty} \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} M_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right) M_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right\}_l \right)^{m-1} \prod_{\tilde{k} \neq k} \tilde{F}_{\tilde{k}} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right\}_l \right) dx$$

Note that since $\tilde{F}_k(\mathbf{q})^{\frac{1}{m}} = M_k(\mathbf{q})$, we can differentiate each with respect to the j th argument to get $M_{kj}(\mathbf{q}) = \frac{1}{m} \frac{\tilde{F}_{kj}(\mathbf{q})}{\tilde{F}_k(\mathbf{q})^{\frac{m-1}{m}}}$. We can therefore express $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}$ as

$$\tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2) = \int_{v_1}^{\infty} \frac{\frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} \tilde{F}_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right) \prod_{\tilde{k}} \tilde{F}_{\tilde{k}} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right\}_l \right)}{\tilde{F}_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)^{1-1/m} \tilde{F}_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right\}_l \right)^{1/m}} dx$$

Define $\mathcal{V}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2) \equiv \tilde{\mathcal{V}}_{ijk} \left(m^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}} v_1, m^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}} v_2 \right)$. As m grows large, this becomes

$$\mathcal{V}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2) = \int_{v_1}^{\infty} \frac{\frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} F_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)}{F_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)} \prod_k F_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right\}_l \right) dx$$

With functional forms, $F_k(\mathbf{q}) = e^{-\lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^n q_l^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho}}$, the second term in the integrand can be expressed as

$$\prod_{\tilde{k}} F_{\tilde{k}} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right\}_l \right) = \prod_{\tilde{k}} e^{-\lambda_{\tilde{k}} \left(\sum_{l=1}^n \left(\frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{l\tilde{k}}}{\max\{x, v_2\}} \right)^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho}} = e^{-\varphi_i \max\{x, v_2\}^\theta}$$

We also have $\frac{F_{kj}(\mathbf{q})}{F_k(\mathbf{q})} = \lambda_k \theta \left(\sum_{l=1}^n q_l^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho} q_j^{-\theta/[1-\rho]-1}$, so that the first term of the integrand is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} F_{kj} \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)}{F_k \left(\left\{ \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right\}_l \right)} &= \frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x^2} \lambda_k \theta \left(\sum_{l=1}^n \left(\frac{w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk}}{x} \right)^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho-1} \left(\frac{w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}}{x} \right)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}-1} \\ &= \theta x^{\theta-1} \lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho-1} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \\ &= \varphi_i \pi_{ijk} \theta x^{\theta-1} \end{aligned}$$

The measure \mathcal{V}_{ijk} can therefore be expressed as

$$\mathcal{V}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2) = \int_{v_1}^{\infty} e^{-\varphi_i \max\{x, v_2\}^\theta} \varphi_i \pi_{ijk} \theta x^{\theta-1} dx$$

with density

$$\frac{d^2 \mathcal{V}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2)}{dv_1 dv_2} = \pi_{ijk} \varphi_i \theta v_1^{\theta-1} \varphi \theta v_2^{\theta-1} e^{-\varphi_i v_2^\theta}$$

With this density, we can derive the desired expression for the integral.

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{s \in S_{ijk}} q_{jk1}(s)^{\tau_1 \theta} p_i(s)^{-\tau_2 \theta} ds &= \int_0^\infty \int_0^{v_2} \left(\frac{w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}}{v_1} \right)^{\tau_1 \theta} \min \left\{ v_2, \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} v_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2 \theta} \frac{d^2 \mathcal{V}_{ijk}(v_1, v_2)}{dv_1 dv_2} dv_1 dv_2 \\ &= \int_0^\infty \int_0^{v_2} \left(\frac{w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}}{v_1} \right)^{\tau_1 \theta} \min \left\{ v_2, \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} v_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2 \theta} \\ &\quad \pi_{ijk} \varphi_i \theta v_1^{\theta-1} \varphi \theta v_2^{\theta-1} e^{-\varphi_i v_2^\theta} dv_1 dv_2 \end{aligned}$$

Using the change of variables $x_2 = \varphi_i v_2^\theta$ and $x_1 = \varphi_i v_1^\theta$

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{s \in S_{ijk}} q_{jk1}(s)^{\tau_1 \theta} p_i(s)^{-\tau_2 \theta} ds &= \pi_{ijk} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{\tau_1 \theta} \varphi_i^{\tau_1 + \tau_2} \int_0^\infty \int_0^{x_2} x_1^{-\tau_1} \min \left\{ x_2, \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \right)^\theta x_1 \right\}^{-\tau_2} e^{-x_2} dx_1 dx_2 \\ &= \tilde{B}(\tau_1, \tau_2) \pi_{ijk} \varphi_i^{\tau_1 + \tau_2} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{\tau_1 \theta} \end{aligned}$$

■

With this lemma in hand we can derive expressions for the trade share and price index. The share of i 's expenditure on goods produced in j by multinationals based in k is

$$\frac{\int_{S_{ijk}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds}{\sum_{\tilde{j}, \tilde{k}} \int_{S_{i\tilde{j}\tilde{k}}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds} = \frac{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \pi_{ijk} \varphi_i^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}}{\sum_{\tilde{j}, \tilde{k}} \tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \pi_{i\tilde{j}\tilde{k}} \varphi_i^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}} = \pi_{ijk}$$

and the price level satisfies

$$P_i^{1-\varepsilon} = \sum_{\tilde{j}, \tilde{k}} \int_{S_{i\tilde{j}\tilde{k}}} p_i(s)^{1-\varepsilon} ds = \sum_{\tilde{j}, \tilde{k}} \tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \pi_{i\tilde{j}\tilde{k}} \varphi_i^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}} = \tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \varphi_i^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}$$

The labor market clearing condition is

$$\begin{aligned} L_j &= \sum_{i,k} \int_{s \in S_{ijk}} \frac{\kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}}{q_{jk1}(s)} c_i(s) ds = \frac{1}{w_j} \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} \int_{s \in S_{ijk}} \frac{1}{q_{jk1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds \\ w_j L_j &= \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \int_{s \in S_{ijk}} \frac{1}{q_{jk1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} ds \end{aligned}$$

Using [Lemma 11](#), this is

$$\begin{aligned} w_j L_j &= \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} X_i \frac{\tilde{B}\left(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}\right) \pi_{ijk} \varphi_i^{-\frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{-1}}{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \varphi_i^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}}} \\ &= \frac{\tilde{B}\left(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}\right)}{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)} \sum_{i,k} X_i \pi_{ijk} \\ &= \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \sum_{i,k} X_i \pi_{ijk} \end{aligned}$$

Source Distributions Finally, we derive expressions for the source distributions. Before doing that, it is useful to note the following relationship

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{ijk}^{1-\rho} \left(\sum_l \pi_{ilk} \right)^\rho &= \left[\frac{1}{\varphi_i} \lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho} \frac{(w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]}}{\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]}} \right]^{1-\rho} \\ &\quad \times \left[\frac{1}{\varphi_i} \lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^n (w_l \kappa_{il} \delta_{lk})^{-\theta/[1-\rho]} \right)^{1-\rho} \right]^\rho \\ &= \frac{\lambda_k (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{-\theta}}{\varphi_i} \end{aligned}$$

We first study learning from sellers, where learning is in proportion to expenditure. The source distribution is $G_i^S(q) = \sum_{j,k} \int_{\{s \in S_{ijk} | q_{jk1} < q\}} \left[\frac{p_i(s)}{P_i} \right]^{1-\varepsilon} ds$, so the important term in the learning equations is

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_i^S(q) &= \sum_{j,k} \int_{\{s \in S_{ijk} | q_{jk1} < q\}} q_{jk1}^{\beta\theta}(s) \left[\frac{p_i(s)}{P_i} \right]^{1-\varepsilon} ds \\ &= \frac{\sum_{j,k} \tilde{B}\left(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right) \frac{\pi_{ijk}}{\varphi_i^{-(\beta-\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta})}} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{\beta\theta}}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \\ &= \frac{\tilde{B}\left(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)}{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)} \sum_{j,k} \frac{\pi_{ijk}}{\varphi_i^{-\beta}} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{\beta\theta} \\ &= \frac{\tilde{B}\left(\beta, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)}{\tilde{B}\left(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}\right)} \sum_{j,k} \pi_{ijk} \left[\frac{\lambda_k}{\pi_{ijk}^{1-\rho} (\sum_l \pi_{ilk})^\rho} \right]^\beta \end{aligned}$$

With learning from producers, the source distribution is

$$\begin{aligned} G_j^P(q) &= \sum_{i,k} \int_{\{s \in S_{ijk} | q_{jk1} < q\}} \frac{1}{L_j} \frac{\kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk}}{q_{jk1}(s)} c_i(s) ds = \frac{1}{w_j L_j} \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} \int_{\{s \in S_{ijk} | q_{jk1} < q\}} \frac{1}{q_{jk1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} ds \\ &= \frac{1}{w_j L_j} \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \int_{\{s \in S_{ijk} | q_{jk1} < q\}} \frac{1}{q_{jk1}(s)} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} ds \end{aligned}$$

The important term in the learning equation is then

$$\begin{aligned}
\int_0^\infty q^{\beta\theta} dG_j^P(q) &= \frac{1}{w_j L_j} \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} \frac{X_i}{P_i^{1-\varepsilon}} \int_0^\infty q_{jk1}(s)^{\beta\theta-1} p_i(s)^{-\varepsilon} ds \\
&= \frac{1}{w_j L_j} \sum_{i,k} w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk} X_i \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}) \frac{\pi_{ijk}}{\varphi_i^{-(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta} + \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})}} (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^{\beta\theta-1}}{\tilde{B}(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}) \varphi_i^{-\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\theta}}} \\
&= \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})}{\tilde{B}(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta})} \frac{1}{w_j L_j} \sum_{i,k} X_i \pi_{ijk} \left[\varphi_i (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^\theta \right]^\beta \\
&= \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})}{\tilde{B}(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})} \sum_{i,k} r_{ijk} \left[\varphi_i (w_j \kappa_{ij} \delta_{jk})^\theta \right]^\beta \\
&= \frac{\tilde{B}(\beta - \frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})}{\tilde{B}(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta})} \sum_{i,k} r_{ijk} \left[\frac{\lambda_k}{\pi_{ijk}^{1-\rho} (\sum_l \pi_{ilk})^\rho} \right]^\beta
\end{aligned}$$

where $r_{ijk} = \frac{\frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \pi_{ijk} X_i}{w_i L_i} = \frac{\tilde{B}(-\frac{1}{\theta}, \frac{\varepsilon}{\theta}) \pi_{ijk} X_i}{\tilde{B}(0, \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\theta}) w_i L_i}$

G.1 Symmetric Countries

For symmetric countries with symmetric trade cost κ and FDI cost δ , the trade FDI shares can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{iii} &= \frac{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{-\rho}}{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho} + (n-1)(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho}} \\
\pi_{iik} &= \frac{(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{-\rho} \delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}}}{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho} + (n-1)(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho}}, & i \neq k \\
\pi_{ijk} &= \frac{(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{-\rho} (\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}}}{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho} + (n-1)(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho}}, & i \neq j \neq k \neq i \\
\pi_{jjj} &= \frac{(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{-\rho} \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}}}{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho} + (n-1)(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho}}, & i \neq j \\
\pi_{iji} &= \frac{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{-\rho} (\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}}}{(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho} + (n-1)(\delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}})^{1-\rho}}, & i \neq j
\end{aligned}$$

The price index is

$$P = \Gamma \left(1 - \frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \lambda^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(\left(1 + (n-1)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho} + (n-1) \left(\kappa^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + \delta^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} + (n-2)(\kappa\delta)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

References

- ALVAREZ, F., F. BUERA, AND R. LUCAS JR (2008): “Models of Idea Flows,” *NBER Working Paper 14135*.
- (2013): “Idea Flows, Economic Growth, and Trade,” *NBER Working Paper 19667*.
- ALVAREZ, F. AND R. J. LUCAS (2007): “General equilibrium analysis of the Eaton-Kortum model of international trade,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 54, 1726–1768.
- ARKOLAKIS, C., A. COSTINOT, AND A. RODRÍGUEZ-CLARE (2012): “New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?” *American Economic Review*, 102, 94–130.
- ATKESON, A. AND A. T. BURSTEIN (2010): “Innovation, Firm Dynamics, and International Trade,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 118, 433–484.
- BALDWIN, R. E. AND F. ROBERT-NICOUD (2008): “Trade and growth with heterogeneous firms,” *Journal of International Economics*, 74, 21–34.
- BERNARD, A., J. EATON, J. JENSEN, AND S. KORTUM (2003): “Plants and Productivity in International Trade,” *The American Economic Review*, 93, 1268–1290.
- CONNOLLY, M. AND K.-M. YI (2009): “How much of South Korea’s growth miracle can be explained by trade policy?” Tech. rep.
- EATON, J. AND S. KORTUM (1999): “International Technology Diffusion: Theory and Measurement,” *International Economic Review*, 40, 537–70.
- (2001): “Technology, trade, and growth: A unified framework,” *European economic review*, 45, 742–755.
- (2002): “Technology, geography, and trade,” *Econometrica*, 70, 1741–1779.
- FEENSTRA, R. C., R. E. LIPSEY, H. DENG, A. C. MA, AND H. MO (2005): “World Trade Flows: 1962-2000,” NBER Working Papers 11040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- FEYRER, J. (2009a): “Distance, Trade, and Income The 1967 to 1975 Closing of the Suez Canal as a Natural Experiment,” Working Paper 15557, National Bureau of Economic Research.

- (2009b): “Trade and Income – Exploiting Time Series in Geography,” Working Paper 14910, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- GROSSMAN, G. AND E. HELPMAN (1991): “Trade, Knowledge Spillovers, and Growth,” *European Economic Review*, 35, 517–526.
- JOVANOVIC, B. AND G. M. MACDONALD (1994): “Competitive Diffusion,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 102, 24–52.
- JOVANOVIC, B. AND R. ROB (1989): “The Growth and Diffusion of Knowledge,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 56, 569–82.
- KORTUM, S. (1997): “Research, patenting, and technological change,” *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 65, 1389–1419.
- LUCAS, R. E. (2009a): “Ideas and Growth,” *Economica*, 76, 1–19.
- (2009b): “Trade and the Diffusion of the Industrial Revolution,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1, 1–25.
- LUCAS, R. E. AND B. MOLL (2014): “Knowledge Growth and the Allocation of Time,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 122, pp. 1–51.
- LUTTMER, E. (2012): “Eventually, Noise and Imitation Implies Balanced Growth,” Working Papers 699, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- OBERFIELD, E. (2013): “Business Networks, Production Chains, and Productivity: A Theory of Input-Output Architecture,” Tech. rep.
- PARENTE, S. L. AND E. C. PRESCOTT (1994): “Barriers to technology adoption and development,” *Journal of political Economy*, 298–321.
- PERLA, J. AND C. TONETTI (2014): “Equilibrium Imitation and Growth,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 122, 52 – 76.
- PERLA, J., C. TONETTI, AND M. WAUGH (2013): “Equilibrium Technology Diffusion, Trade, and Growth,” Tech. rep.

- RAMONDO, N. AND A. RODRIGUEZ-CLARE (2013): “Trade, Multinational Production, and the Gains from Openness,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 121, 273 – 322.
- RIVERA-BATIZ, L. A. AND P. M. ROMER (1991): “Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106, 531–555.
- SAMPSON, T. (2014): “Dynamic Selection: An Idea Flows Theory of Entry, Trade and Growth,” .
- SIMONOVSKA, I. AND M. E. WAUGH (2014): “The elasticity of trade: Estimates and evidence,” *Journal of International Economics*, 92, 34–50.
- WAUGH, M. E. (2010): “International Trade and Income Differences,” *American Economic Review*, 100, 2093–2124.

Table 1: TFP Growth by Country, 1962-2000. Data vs. Models with $\beta = 0.5$.

	Data	Learning from Sellers			Learning
	Total Effect	Static Effect ^a	Trade Exposure ^b	from Producers	
China	0.767	0.313	0.037	0.268	0.261
Thailand	0.745	0.204	0.090	0.107	0.249
Japan	0.465	0.008	0.001	0.002	-0.006
Taiwan	0.455	0.187	0.074	0.107	0.061
Ireland	0.453	0.164	0.117	0.043	0.292
South Korea	0.446	0.184	0.038	0.140	0.231
Israel	0.322	0.051	0.014	0.033	0.098
Greece	0.316	0.079	0.021	0.053	0.088
Sri Lanka	0.306	0.063	0.019	0.038	0.229
Egypt	0.280	0.126	0.001	0.119	0.202
Finland	0.238	0.094	0.028	0.062	0.104
Pakistan	0.208	0.022	-0.007	0.024	0.084
Tunisia	0.163	0.115	0.036	0.074	0.144
Belgium+Lux.	0.157	0.168	0.126	0.038	0.201
Norway	0.146	0.006	-0.002	0.004	0.031
Italy	0.114	0.047	0.020	0.024	0.053
UK	0.076	0.048	0.020	0.024	0.076
Malaysia	0.062	0.206	0.155	0.045	0.119
India	0.039	0.056	-0.007	0.058	0.067
Mozambique	0.029	0.183	0.035	0.140	0.416
Denmark	0.024	-0.002	0.004	-0.010	-0.001
Australia	0.022	0.051	0.014	0.033	0.027
Turkey	0.022	0.054	0.019	0.032	0.014
Portugal	0.021	0.100	0.041	0.056	0.078
Austria	0.020	0.090	0.034	0.053	0.078
Indonesia	0.002	0.112	0.017	0.089	0.074
USA	0.000	0.057	0.019	0.035	0.038
Netherlands	-0.024	0.033	0.023	0.006	-0.016
Sweden	-0.026	0.043	0.024	0.015	0.084
France	-0.035	0.071	0.030	0.038	0.074
Mali	-0.085	-0.053	-0.025	-0.033	0.127
Spain	-0.112	0.066	0.031	0.032	0.040
New Zealand	-0.136	0.087	0.022	0.062	0.087

^aThe static effect is given by the change in TFP caused by the change in the own trade share, i.e., $\Delta \log TFP(\lambda_0, \pi_{iit})$.

^bThe effect of the trade exposure is given by the change in TFP caused by the change in the trade exposure, holding fixed the stock of ideas of all the other countries, i.e., $\Delta \log TFP(\lambda_t(\lambda_{-i}^0, \Pi^t), \pi_{iit})$.

TFP Growth by Country, 1962-2000. Data vs. Models with $\beta = 0.5$ (cont'd).

	Data	Learning from Sellers			Learning from Producers
		Total Effect	Static Effect ^a	Trade Exposure ^b	
Germany	-0.170	0.052	0.025	0.023	0.045
Ecuador	-0.180	0.041	0.014	0.024	-0.015
Canada	-0.189	0.073	0.045	0.025	0.065
Brazil	-0.197	0.007	0.001	0.002	-0.026
Tanzania	-0.203	0.128	-0.002	0.124	-0.025
Chile	-0.206	0.067	0.025	0.039	0.155
Switzerland	-0.258	0.003	0.009	-0.009	-0.017
Argentina	-0.259	0.009	0.002	0.003	0.024
Dom. Rep.	-0.262	0.034	-0.002	0.033	-0.012
Syria	-0.265	0.013	-0.004	0.013	-0.023
Guatemala	-0.271	0.049	0.004	0.042	0.078
Costa Rica	-0.288	0.027	-0.004	0.028	0.061
Morocco	-0.297	0.061	0.017	0.040	0.066
Cote d'Ivoire	-0.298	0.015	-0.013	0.024	-0.017
Uruguay	-0.302	0.041	0.014	0.025	0.285
Colombia	-0.337	0.019	0.004	0.012	0.054
Mexico	-0.400	0.066	0.043	0.021	0.055
Senegal	-0.400	0.034	0.002	0.027	-0.020
Kenya	-0.419	0.015	-0.015	0.025	-0.073
Cameroon	-0.499	0.002	-0.009	0.006	-0.020
Uganda	-0.532	0.122	-0.005	0.124	0.123
Paraguay	-0.549	0.045	0.020	0.021	-0.039
Ghana	-0.550	-0.007	0.003	-0.014	0.053
Philippines	-0.555	0.085	0.042	0.037	0.065
Jamaica	-0.565	-0.002	-0.014	0.008	0.053
Bolivia	-0.604	-0.008	-0.006	-0.005	0.087
South Africa	-0.632	0.019	-0.001	0.017	-0.024
Zambia	-0.634	-0.155	-0.080	-0.078	-0.127
Peru	-0.639	-0.082	-0.026	-0.060	-0.153
Honduras	-0.644	0.075	-0.002	0.072	0.122
Niger	-0.911	0.064	0.004	0.056	0.164
Jordan	-1.089	0.000	-0.026	0.023	0.069

^aThe static effect is given by the change in TFP caused by the change in the own trade share, i.e., $\Delta \log TFP(\lambda_0, \pi_{iit})$.

^bThe effect of the trade exposure is given by the change in TFP caused by the change in the trade exposure, holding fixed the stock of ideas of all the other countries, i.e., $\Delta \log TFP(\lambda_t(\lambda_{-i}^0, \Pi^t), \pi_{iit})$.