

Why did the Democrats Lose the South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate

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Abstract

Did Southern whites leave the Democratic Party over Civil Rights or because economic development and other secular changes in the region made the party's platform increasingly unattractive to them? Answering this central question in American political economy has been hampered by lack of micro-data on racial attitudes from both *before* and after the Civil Rights era. Our contribution is to uncover and employ such measures, drawn from Gallup surveys dating back to 1958. From 1958 to 1961, conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic identification among Southern whites, a correlation that disappears after Democrats introduce sweeping Civil Rights legislation in 1963. Gallup's monthly presidential approval surveys allow us to more finely link variation in white support for Kennedy (and Eisenhower before him) to episodes where newspapers linked his name to Civil Rights initiatives (and allows us to eliminate other policy initiatives and current events as drivers of white Southern dealignment from the Democrats). We conclude that the entire 17 percentage-point decline in relative white Southern Democratic identification between 1958 and 1980, and 75% of the 20 percentage-point decline from 1958 to 2000, is explained by racial attitudes, with little if any role for income growth or other observable secular changes.

Keywords: Party identification; Civil Rights movement

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1 Introduction

After nearly a century of loyalty and despite the general stability of Americans' party identification in adulthood, Southern whites left the Democratic party *en masse* in the second half of the twentieth century.¹ As illustrated in Figure 1, at mid-century white Southerners (defined throughout as residents of the eleven states of the former Confederacy) were 25 percentage points more likely to identify as Democrats than were other whites, a gap that disappeared by the mid 1980s and has since flipped in sign.² Despite the massive, concurrent enfranchisement of Southern blacks, who overwhelmingly favored the Democrats from 1964 onward, the resulting shifts in aggregate Southern political outcomes were stark: to take but one example, in 1960, *all* U.S. senators from the South were Democrats, whereas today all but three (of 22) are Republican.

Did Southern whites leave the Democratic Party over Civil Rights or because economic development and other secular changes in the South made the party's platform increasingly unattractive to them? This central question of American political economy remains unresolved. On one side of the argument are researchers who rely on more qualitative sources (interviews, party platforms, correspondence and other historical sources) who conclude that the Democratic Party's liberal Civil Rights platform was the trigger for the exodus. On the other side are scholars whose more quantitative methods (correlations using repeated cross-sectional data, most typically cumulative file of the ANES, the American National Election Surveys) point to other factors, chiefly economic development.

Indeed, the *a priori* case for factors besides Civil Rights is compelling. Southern dealignment, though much accelerated during the 1960s, was (and perhaps still is) a slow moving trend.³ As we detail in Section 4, voters viewed Civil Rights as the most important issue facing the country for a fleeting two to three year period, undermining the case that it could

¹Political scientists have found partisanship, like religion or ethnicity, to be a stable part of an adult's identity. The canonical reference is Campbell *et al.* (1966), with a more quantitative treatment by Green *et al.* (2004).

²Authors' calculation using Gallup micro data (more information on this data source is provided in Section 3). The eleven states of the former Confederacy are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

³We use the term "dealignment" instead of "realignment" in this paper as we focus on Southerners *leaving* the Democratic party—whether to join the Republicans, adopt independent status, or support third-party candidates such as Strom Thurmond or George Wallace. We therefore focus on the activities of the Democratic Party that repelled Southern voters rather than on efforts of the Republican Party to this population.

be the underlying cause of a fifty-year trend. Moreover, dealignment coincides with massive economic catch-up in the region—from 1940 to 1980, per capita income in the South rose from 60 to 89 percent of the U.S. average—which would predict a movement away from the more redistributive party.⁴ Beyond economic catch-up, demographic change (driven by both Northern Republican migrants and younger voters coming into the age of majority post-Jim Crow) and the liberalization of the Democratic party on other issues such as abortion and welfare may have pushed whites in the region out of the party.⁵

That such disagreement could remain on such a central question may seem surprising, but data limitations have severely hampered research on this question. Until recently, survey questions asked in a consistent manner from before and after the major Civil Rights victories of the 1960s have not been widely available. For example, as we review in the next section, those authors using the cumulative ANES to address the role of racial views on party alignment typically begin their analysis in the 1970s, well after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

In this paper, we uncover and employ the missing measure of racial attitudes from both *before* and after the Civil Rights movement, by turning to micro-data from Gallup surveys. Beginning in 1958, Gallup asks respondents “Between now and ..[election]... there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates. If your party nominated a well-qualified man for president, would you vote for him if he happened to be a Negro?” Fortunately for our purposes, the wording has remained consistent and the question has been asked repeatedly since that date.⁶ We refer to those who do not answer in the affirmative to this question as having conservative racial views (“conservative” as in “believing in the value of established and traditional practices in politics and society,” Merriam-Webster). To our knowledge, these data represent the longest running time series on Americans’ attitudes toward racial equality.

Having identified our measure of racial attitudes, we then define the pre- and post-periods by determining the moment at which the Democratic Party is first seen as actively pursuing a liberal Civil Rights agenda. Conventional wisdom of the race-as-cause view states that President Johnson famously “lost the south” with his signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, marshaling contemporaneous sources, survey questions on issue importance and views on political parties’ agendas as well as textual analysis of daily newspapers, we

⁴Authors’ calculation, *Statistical Abstracts*, various years.

⁵We detail each of these arguments in the next Section.

⁶Changes are very minor and are discussed in detail in Section 3.

identify the critical moment as Spring of 1963, during John F. Kennedy's administration. In Spring of 1963, Civil Rights is, for the first time, an issue of great importance to the majority of Americans and an issue clearly associated with the Democratic Party.

The first part of our exploration on the role of racial views in explaining white Southern dealignment focuses on a triple-difference analysis: how much of the post-period decrease in Democratic party identification among Southern versus other whites is explained by the differential decline among those Southerners with conservative racial attitudes? We find that racial attitudes have little if any explanatory power for Northern whites' party identification in either period. In the South, conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic identification in the pre-period, but this correlation is wiped out between August 1961 and August 1963 (the last poll of the pre- and the first poll of the post-period, respectively). Most important to the question at hand, the entire 17 percentage-point decline in Democratic party identification between 1958 and 1980 is explained by the 19 percentage point decline among Southern whites with conservative racial views. Extending the post-period through 2000, 77% of the 20 percentage-point drop is explained by the differential drop among Southern whites with conservative racial views. This pattern of results is robust to controlling flexibly for socioeconomic status measures included in the Gallup data and is highly evident in event-time graphical analysis as well.

The second part of our exploration exploits higher-frequency variation provided again in the Gallup micro data. Whereas Gallup only asks the black president question every one to two years, it asks its signature "Presidential approval" question roughly once a month during our sample period. We can thus perform a high-frequency analysis surrounding our key moment of Spring of 1963 by correlating presidential approval (for John F. Kennedy) in the South versus the non-South, with the daily count of newspaper articles that include the President's name along with terms related to Civil Rights. The most striking result is the 35 percentage point drop in his support among whites in the South (compared to no change in the North and a rise among blacks) between the April 6th and June 23rd 1963 Gallup polls (which corresponded to a surge of articles related to his support of protesters during Martin Luther King's Birmingham campaign in May and the president's televised announcement of the Civil Rights Bill on June 11th). This drop in support for Kennedy is reflected in both survey data on his approval and on preferences in a hypothetical matchup between Kennedy and Goldwater in anticipation of the following year's presidential election. Smaller Civil Rights moments (e.g., the integration of Ole Miss in September 1962) also

match up to significant dips in Kennedy’s relative approval among Southern whites.

In regression analysis, we find that relative white Southern approval of Kennedy is inversely related to the frequency with which the media mentions his name alongside Civil Rights, but bears little relation to mentions of his name alongside other key issues of the day (e.g., Cuba, tax policy), suggesting that our main results are unlikely driven by similarly timed alternative policies or events. Moreover, a simple regression of approval on state fixed effects and Civil Rights article counts explain over half the decline in relative white Southern approval of Kennedy during his administration, whereas no other issue (taxes, the Soviet Union) explains more than 20%. Regressing the Republican Eisenhower’s approval on Civil Rights-related article counts, we show that his smaller gestures toward Civil Rights cost him among Southern whites as well.

Our work speaks to the large literature on whether political and policy preferences in the US are motivated by class versus racial or ethnic identification. We find that, consistent with work that argues that racial fractionalization helps explain “American exceptionalism” in terms of limited redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, Lee and Roemer, 2006, Luttmer, 2001), that during these key years racial attitudes explain the entire white Southern shift away from the Democrats.

Our findings further shed light on redistributive patterns within the US. First, race-based dealignment offers an explanation for why the poorest part of the country now serves as the base for the anti-redistributive political party.⁷ Second, our findings provide an explanation for why—in stark contrast to the median voter model’s prediction (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)—redistribution in the US has receded since the 1970s, even as income inequality has risen. We show that a large voting bloc left the more redistributive political party over largely non-economic issues, reducing political support for redistributive policies just when theory would predict that they should begin to become more popular.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the debate between the more qualitative race-as-cause and more quantitative secular-trends-as-cause sides of the literature. In Section 3, we introduce the Gallup micro data, and in particular our key question on racial attitudes. In Section 4, we justify our use of the Spring of 1963 as the key moment that separates the “pre-” and “post-periods.” In Section 5, we present results both from the triple-differences analysis as well as the high-frequency analysis on Kennedy’s approval.

⁷A recent policy manifestation of this pattern is the refusal of almost all Southern states to expand Medicaid coverage to poor adults under the Affordable Care Act, despite the fact that the South remains the poorest region of the country (even when considering only whites).

In Section 6, we more directly address the remaining arguments of the research arguing for causes besides Civil Rights. In Section 7 we offer some concluding thoughts and ideas for future work.

2 Debate Over the Role of Race in Southern Dealignment

The literature on the role of race in Southern politics is vast, and our attempts to summarize it here cannot do it proper justice. Almost all reviews start with V.O Key’s *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Key memorably wrote, “[w]hatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro” (Key Jr, 1949). Drawing on hundreds of interviews with Southern politicians and journalists, the book provides a state-by-state analysis of how race influenced Southern politics, but given its 1949 publication cannot directly speak to the coming dealignment. Carmines and Stimson (1989) is a modern update on this seminal work, using historical material (e.g., interviews, party platforms, and speech transcripts) as well as some tabulations from the ANES to argue that race was the motivating factor in the dealignment, as “racially conservative white southerners felt betrayed” when President Lyndon Johnson, a Texan, navigated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA).⁸

Those who argue against race as the cause of dealignment emphasize the lack of quantitative backing for the race claim. Shafer and Johnston (2009) are quite emphatic in this regard: “Yet if these propositions [our quantitative approach] appear almost elementary as an analytic strategy, they bump up against an established literature of Southern politics—charming and richly contextualized, but also unsystematic and deeply inbred.” But even on the more quantitative side of the debate, few if any authors perform formal econometric decompositions of the share of dealignment that can be explained by racial attitudes versus other factors. The authors more typically employ the cumulative file of the ANES (and to a somewhat lesser extent on the General Social Survey) to offer indirect evidence (often cross tabulations) relating to the question.

⁸While this literature is primarily ethnographic, at times aggregate data are employed in a descriptive manner. For example, Carmines and Stimson point to the fact all five Deep South states voted majority Republican in 1964 (when Barry Goldwater, a staunch opponent of Civil Rights legislation, was the candidate), four of which had not done so in 92 years. Authors exploring the “racial threat” hypothesis—the idea that whites fled the Democratic Party because of the threat posed by the inclusion of new black voters—support their argument with county-level negative correlations between the black population or black voter registration and white Democratic Party registration (see, for example, Kohfeld, 1989).

While some papers in the quantitative literature argue for the primacy of racial attitudes in explaining dealignment, the majority argue that the role of Civil Rights and race has been vastly overstated.⁹ We group these arguments into four main categories.

Economic growth in the South. Shafer and Johnston (2009) argue that income growth in the South was the key driver of dealignment (and in fact contend that Civil Rights, by introducing a strongly Democratic black voting bloc to the South, on net *slowed* the natural process of dealignment). They show via cross tabulations that, relative to the 1950s, in more recent decades it is *economically conservative* Southern whites who identify as Republican (they generally do not compare this trend to that among non-Southern whites).¹⁰

Also using the ANES cumulative file, Brewer and Stonecash (2001) run a regression “horserace” between racial issues and income in predicting party identification and presidential and House support, again focusing on Southern whites in isolation. They find a larger coefficient on income, though given limited ANES questions on race, their regression analysis starts in the 1970s.¹¹

Interestingly, economists who have studied the role of economic development in explaining Southern dealignment have reached the opposite conclusion. Wright (2013) argues in fact for a reverse causal chain. Using BEA annual data, he shows that while the South grew rapidly during World War II, its growth stalled from 1945 until the late 1960s. He credits the Civil Rights Act with the late-1960s economic surge in the South, meaning major exodus of Southern whites from the Democratic party *preceded* the South’s real catch-up growth.¹² Using IPUMS data, we find that the relative Southern catch-up is limited to 1960-1980,

⁹Quantitative papers that conclude that racial views are key to dealignment include Valentino and Sears (2005), who use the GSS and cumulative ANES to show that, in the South relative to elsewhere, whites report more racially conservative views and that racial views have greater predictive power for whites’ party identification. McVeigh *et al.* (2014) use county-level data to show that the presence of a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) chapter in 1960 predicts higher vote shares for Goldwater (in 1964), George Wallace (in 1968), and more generally for Republicans in the elections since.

¹⁰In a wide-ranging critique of Shafer and Johnston, Kousser (2010) argues that growing social desirability of progressive racial views may mean that in more recent years racially conservative whites merely adapt the language of economic conservatism.

¹¹Note that they are not decomposing what share of the change is explained by income versus racial views, but instead estimating which factor has greater explanatory power, separately by decade.

¹²He argues that, before Civil Rights, Southern firms were in a bad equilibrium: they would have preferred to sell to (hire from) both black and white clients (workers), but any one firm moving away from the pre-1964 equilibrium might legitimately fear that its white clients (workers) could abandon it for another firm.

consistent with this story (Appendix Figure A.1). Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that the sharp rise of mechanization in the cotton industry during the 1960s actually made Southern elites more open to social insurance programs (and thus should have pushed them toward the Democrats).¹³ Neither of these arguments would seem to imply that Southern economic growth could have caused the mid-1960s nosedive in Democratic identification.¹⁴

Changing selection into the South. The South experienced net in-migration after 1960. Given the large Democratic advantage in the South during much of the 20th century, in-migrants from the non-South would tend to be more Republican (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2001 and Trende, 2012). However, Stanley (1988) uses ANES data to show that the vast majority of the overall decline is accounted for by *native* Southern whites, as the migrant population is simply too small to drive the effect. Age has also been considered as a dimension of dealignment that weakens the race case: Wattenberg (1991) argues that Southern whites who came of age since Jim Crow have in fact driven the dealignment, though Osborne *et al.* (2011) finds that the shift has taken place among all cohorts.

Issues other than Civil Rights. Did Southern whites leave the Democratic Party, or did the Democratic Party leave Southern whites, by taking more liberal positions on free speech, abortion and issues other than Civil Rights? Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) lend support for the latter view using the ANES to demonstrate that in the post-Civil Rights period ideology (how liberal or conservative the respondent is), as well as views on social welfare and security, are better predictors than racial views of Southern white partisanship.

Secular trend versus one-time decline. As we show in Section 4, Civil Rights was a dominant issue for at most a few years in the mid-1960s. Trende (2012) argues that the secular nature of Southern dealignment undermines the argument that Civil Rights was the prime mover, driving home the point by highlighting the slow evolution of the relative Southern Democratic vote share in presidential elections (which can be seen in Appendix Figure A.2). He concludes that “the gradual realignment of the South had been going for nearly forty years by 1964 and continued at a glacial pace after that.” He points to the 1960 election as a key piece of evidence for secular causes: “That [Republican Richard] Nixon could do so well in the South while part of an administration that had finished desegregating Washington,

¹³They argue that pre-mechanization, planter elites required a large, unskilled labor force, which they secured in part by providing informal social insurance (including physical protection from other, more violent whites). They would lose the ability to uniquely provide this employment benefit were the government to universally guarantee it.

¹⁴Less quantitative work on the role of Southern economic development include Rorabaugh (2005) and Lassiter (2013).

argued that segregation was unconstitutional before the Supreme Court ... implemented [desegregation] with a show of force in Little Rock, and pushed through the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 seems astonishing, until you realize that economics, rather than race, was primarily driving the development of Southern politics at the time.” We discuss this time series in detail in Section 6.1.

Although both large and contentious, the literature on the cause of dealignment has a clear gap: Due to the limitations of standard data sets, existing quantitative work is unable to examine racial attitudes before Civil Rights was a key political issue (and often several years after that). Even Shafer and Johnston, the authors perhaps most associated with the argument that economic development triggered dealignment, write: “Introducing racial attitudes into the story of legal desegregation and a politics of race will prove more difficult overall than introducing welfare attitudes into the story of economic development and a politics of class, because there is less substantive consistency in the opinion items asked by the [A]NES in the realm of race policy for the full postwar period.” Due to this limitation, a standard econometric decomposition of the share of dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views has not been possible.

As we describe in the following section, we have identified a consistent measure of racial attitudes dating back to 1958 by turning to a data source little used by social scientists.

3 Data

An ideal research design would employ panel data on white voters to compare the extent to which holding conservative racial views in the pre-period (before the Democratic party is associated with Civil Rights) predicts leaving the Party in the post-period, in the South versus the rest of the country. To the best of our knowledge, such panel data do not exist. We instead use repeated cross-sectional surveys from Gallup (and later the restricted-access version of the GSS) that each have the following key variables: a consistently worded measure of racial attitudes, party identification, state of residence and race.

3.1 Gallup Surveys

Gallup, Harris and other commercial, academic and media surveys have been recently cataloged and in many cases made available for download on the website of the non-profit Roper

Center at the University of Connecticut.¹⁵ The 20,000 surveys deposited at Roper date as far back as 1935 and cover topics such as foreign relations, health, economics, politics, and—most relevant for our purposes—social issues including racial attitudes. It is our hope that one contribution of this work will be to increase awareness and usage of Roper’s resources.

As noted in the introduction, beginning in 1958 Gallup repeatedly asks respondents whether they would vote for a qualified man (“person,” in more recent years) who happened to be Negro (“black”). While there are some small variations year to year, they are relatively minor (e.g., sometimes specifying the “qualifications” in terms of age and education), especially compared to other surveys during this time (we detail the deficiencies of the ANES in this regard in Appendix C). Appendix Table B.1 documents the exact wording of this item separately by survey date, as well as the wording of the question preceding it (often asking about willingness to vote for members of other demographic groups). For ease of exposition, we refer to this survey item as the “black president question.”

In addition to consistency, a second advantage of the survey item is that Gallup fielded it quite frequently during our key sample period. The question is asked in nine separate surveys between 1958 and 1972. While the question is asked less frequently after 1972, we are fortunate that beginning in 1974 we can use the GSS (see Appendix Table B.2 for exact wording and preceding question in the GSS) to help fill gaps. As such, between 1958 and 1980 (2000), the black president item (as well as the other variables we need for the analysis) was collected by either Gallup or GSS on 14 (29) separate occasions.¹⁶

A final strength of the black president item is its specificity: it refers to a single, hypothetical (at least during our key sample period) concept. For example, the GSS has, since 1972, asked whether the government should “help” blacks, which is not only vague but also might be interpreted differently in 1972 than in 2000. Similarly, Gallup also queries white respondents—much less frequently—about whether they would move if blacks came to reside next door or in their neighborhoods in great numbers.¹⁷ But responses to these questions

¹⁵See <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/>. Access is free to affiliates of institutional subscribers.

¹⁶The GSS fields this question in 1972 as well, but only in 1974 are state identifiers available (and even then only in the restricted-use version of the data). In addition to the 1983 black president survey that we employ, the Roper catalog lists two additional surveys from 1983 that include the question. In one case the survey is not available for download. In the second case the codebook shows that the question is not actually included in the survey.

¹⁷Gallup also poses, again less frequently than the black president question, questions on school integration, but unfortunately only directs these questions to parents of school-aged children, which greatly reduces sample sizes.

will vary not only by feelings about racial equality but also by the actual integration of one’s present neighborhood, not to mention housing density (“next door” is a different concept in an apartment building versus a farm). The black president question suffers from no such contextual bias: it should be interpreted similarly for Southerners and non-Southerners, rich and poor, urban and rural. Nonetheless, as we demonstrate in Appendix Table A.4 black president is highly correlated with other GSS measures of racial attitudes, including questions on interracial socializing, school integration, government aid to blacks, and agreeing with the sentiment that blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted.

While we believe the Gallup data has allowed us to make an important step forward in answering the question at hand, these data are not without their limitations. The most important given our context is limited control variables for income and place of birth (given the arguments that Southern income growth and Northern migrants played key roles in dealignment). Only six of ten of our Gallup surveys from 1958-1980 have income information; none records state of birth. To rule out income and migration as alternative hypotheses we turn to alternative data sources, most frequently the ANES. Begun in 1948, ANES is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey of the political and social opinions of voting age Americans conducted in the fall of both midterm and presidential election years.¹⁸

As the Gallup data are not familiar to most researchers, Appendix Table A.1 compare its summary statistics to the IPUMS, splitting the sample by region and decade. Comfortingly, demographics for each of these subsamples are quite similar across surveys.

3.2 Summary statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for our basic Gallup analysis sample (whites age 21 and above who live in the continental US and have non-missing state data) from 1958 to 1980 (our standard sample period, though we demonstrate robustness to various endpoints), by pre-and post-period.¹⁹ We once again see the large decline in southern Democratic Party

¹⁸The survey was fielded in presidential election years only from 1948-1952. State identifiers are missing in 1948, so 1952 is the first year we can include in regression analysis.

¹⁹Both Gallup and GSS claim to be nationally representative surveys of adult Americans. We use the provided survey weights—the GSS for all years and Gallup for 1968 forward—to adjust for sampling error. We are indebted to Jeff Jones at Gallup for his instructions on weighting older Gallup surveys. The age and residency restrictions used in our analysis sample allow us to focus on a demographic group that is consistently eligible to vote for President throughout our time period (as those between 18 and 20 as well as Alaskans and Hawaiians are ineligible in early years). The

affiliation across the two time periods. Not surprisingly, we also see a concurrent increase in education and urbanicity in both regions. The ANES columns of the table demonstrate similar demographic shifts in our analysis sample drawn from that dataset.

In Appendix Figure A.3 we graph the responses to the black president over time in the combined GSS and Gallup samples, denoting the data set from which each point is drawn. Note that this figure includes non-whites, whereas most of the analysis that follows does not. In years where we have both GSS and Gallup data, the shares willing to vote for a black president are nearly identical, suggesting that both surveys are collecting data from very similar (presumably representative) universes. The series as a whole depicts a marked increase in stated views on racial equality, at least as measured by this question. In 1958 fewer than 40% say they would be willing to vote for an equally qualified black candidate, where by 1974 that share has nearly doubled.²⁰

While Appendix Figure A.3 is interesting in demonstrating the rapid change that occurred in attitudes toward race relations nationally, Figure 2 introduces the views of our analysis sample, separately for the South and non-South.²¹ While only about ten percent of white Southerners are willing to vote for a black person at the series' beginning (versus just under forty percent elsewhere), whites in both regions increase at the same (rapid) rate through about 1970, after which point there is more (though never complete) Southern catch-up.²²

For completeness, in Appendix Figure A.4 and A.5 we graph for all available years the other two Gallup survey questions on racial attitudes: the questions that ask whether the respondent would move if a black person moved next door or if blacks moved into the neighborhood in great numbers. The same pattern of substantial (but incomplete) Southern convergence holds.

state variable is necessary to identify residents of the former Confederacy, our definition of the South.

²⁰The percentage willing to vote for a black person continues to increase but never hits 100 even in the present day, though it is difficult to determine whether this result is due to racial attitudes or measurement error.

²¹In this focal sample we have roughly 2,000 observations per survey in the Gallup data and 1,200 observations per survey in the GSS data.

²²The small percentage of respondents who answer don't know are grouped with those unwilling to vote for a black president throughout the paper. Results are robust to grouping them with those willing to vote yes or dropping them entirely.

4 Methodological Approach

4.1 Defining pre- and post-periods

A necessary first step in gauging the role of racial attitudes in Southern dealignment is to determine the point at which the Democratic Party became associated with meaningful pro-Civil Rights initiatives. From our twenty-first century vantage point, it is easy to view the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the inevitable culmination of a decades-long process including the integration of the armed services in the 1940s, the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56, the integration of Little Rock High School in 1957 and the Freedom Rides of 1961. In fact, these events were interspersed with many setbacks for the movement. Not only was there no sense of the inevitability of Civil Rights victories, by the early 1960s voters did not connect the movement, such as it was, to the Democratic Party. As late as April 1960, the plurality of voters (28%) said the Republican Party was “doing the most for Negroes,” 25% said the Democrats, with 19% saying there was no difference and the remainder saying they had no opinion.²³ Nor did most Americans view Civil Rights as a pressing issue: for example, in all four presidential debates of 1960, only a single question on the issue was asked.

Thus rather than choose the transition date based on events that from our modern day viewpoint seem important, we analyze contemporaneous media and polling sources.

4.1.1 Evidence from the ANES: The shift occurs between 1960 and 1964

To pin down the transition date we would ideally employ a consistent repeated survey question that asks respondents which party they believe will do more to promote equality between whites and blacks. Unfortunately we were unable to find such a question. We come close, however. Using the individual-year files of the ANES, we can compare a 1960 item asking “which party is more likely to stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same schools” with 1964 and 1968 items asking which party is more likely to “see to it that white and negro children go to the same schools.” Figure 3 shows that in 1960, only 13% of Southern whites see the Democrats as the party pushing for school integration, 22% say Republicans, and the rest see no difference. Non-Southern whites see essentially no difference between the parties on this issue in 1960.

²³Summary statistics from Gallup survey fielded March 30 to April 4, 1960, accessed online via ipoll. Dataset ID: 1960-0626.

A dramatic shift occurs sometime between 1960 and 1964. By 1964, 45% of Southern whites now see the Democrats as more aggressive on this issue, whereas the share seeing Republicans as more aggressive has fallen to 16%. Non-Southerners' assessment shifts similarly. The large gap in voters' perception of the parties on school integration that emerges in 1964 holds steady in 1968.²⁴ In Appendix Figure A.6 we show that the same shift occurs on the question of which party most supports "fair" treatment for negroes in obtaining jobs (and, in 1964, "jobs and housing"). The addition of "housing" in 1964 as well as the worry that "fair" is interpreted differently in the South and elsewhere makes us prefer the school integration question, but the result is robust to using this survey item.²⁵

4.1.2 Evidence from newspapers: The shift occurs in Spring of 1963

The ANES, in asking views about parties' positions on integration and racial equality, asks almost the ideal question for helping us define the moment when the Democrats become the Civil Rights party in voters' eyes. But unfortunately the question is asked so infrequently that it only allows us to narrow down that critical date to somewhere between 1960 and 1964. To further pinpoint that moment, we use higher-frequency data, but these data admittedly provide somewhat less direct evidence.

The leader of the Democratic party during most of the 1960 to 1964 period was President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was not a consistent supporter of Civil Rights throughout his presidency. Just as the Republican, Eisenhower, who preceded Kennedy, sent federal troops to forcibly integrate Little Rock High School, Kennedy intervened to end both the violence against the freedom riders in 1961 and attempts to bar James Meredith from integrating the University of Mississippi in 1962. But Kennedy also disappointed movement leaders with his inaction, including a January 1962 press conference pledging not to move ahead of public opinion on Civil Rights and his appointment of segregationist federal judges in the South. Thus it is not clear that voters could have predicted his June 1963 proposal of sweeping Civil Rights legislation, even a few months before that date.²⁶

²⁴This result of a sharp mid-1960s change in the view of the Democratic Party's position on Civil Rights lends support to the Kousser (2010) criticism that by grouping data by decade Shafer and Johnston (2009) create a false image of continuity over a period in which there was actual a trend break.

²⁵While there is an ANES fielded in 1962, it does not ask either of these questions.

²⁶Space constraints prevent us from detailing the relationship of President Kennedy (as well as that of his brother Robert, the attorney general) to the Civil Rights movement. We direct readers to Branch (2007) and Perlstein (2009).

While we unfortunately do not have polling data that directly speaks to the evolution of voters' perception of Kennedy's commitment to the issue, we turn to the *NYT* to track any evolution he exhibited on the issue. In Figure 4 we tally daily counts of articles in which (1) "President" and "Kennedy" and "civil rights" appear or (2) "President" and "Kennedy" and *any* of the following terms: "civil rights," "integrat*", "segregat*," where the asterisk is a "wildcard."²⁷ While the former search hones in on the focal issue, it may miss articles related to the civil rights that fail to use the stylized term. The expansiveness of the second search is both its advantage and disadvantage, because of the increasing likelihood of false positives. The two series tell similar stories. Outside of two short-lived spikes—when the administration intervenes on behalf of the freedom riders (Spring 1961) and James Meredith (fall 1962)—the first two years of Kennedy's administration see few mentions of his name alongside civil rights terms.

It is not until May 1963—when Martin Luther King's Birmingham campaign captured the nation's attention—that the number of articles begins a steep increase that hits a pinnacle around the time of his televised proposal of Civil Rights legislation that June. And while the number of articles drops slightly from that mid-June high it remains elevated above pre-May 1963 levels throughout the remainder of the presidency. Thus the *NYT* evidence points to spring 1963 as the moment when Kennedy became linked with Civil Rights. The dramatic change in voters' views of his party's position on Civil Rights in the ANES data suggests that voters saw Kennedy's evolution as reflecting that of the Democratic party more broadly.

4.1.3 Further corroborating evidence

The *NYT* data may reflect the views of a narrow, elite group of East Coast editors and may not reach, much less reflect, average voters. In fact, Civil Rights coverage explodes in the Spring of 1963 for the two largest *Southern* papers for which we can do a textual analysis: the *Dallas Morning News* and the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*. In Appendix Figures A.7 we tally the number of articles with the term "civil rights" for these papers. Within the year 1963, monthly searches of "civil rights" and "President Kennedy" demonstrate the robustness of spring (in particular June) of that year as the time at which the number of the articles linking the president to the issue skyrockets.²⁸

²⁷We searched for words "President" and "Kennedy" to exclude articles that *only* mention Robert Kennedy, though in practice there is little difference.

²⁸We performed this search in the summer of 2014 using Library of Congress state newspapers as well as Yale University subscriptions to ProQuest Historical Newspapers and 20th Century

A related concern is that newspapers, regardless of their regional focus, reflect the decisions of editors, not the sentiment of the general public. We thus complement our newspaper analysis with polling data. In the years 1950-1980, Gallup asks over 100 times “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?” The responses are open ended. This item has at least four limitations for our purposes. First, it is not asked on a regular schedule. The question is fielded six times in 1962 but only once in the key year of 1963. Second, we are unable to produce analysis by race and region. In order to retain as many data points as possible, we graph the frequencies using the website Gallup Brain rather than reading in the data ourselves, which would mean losing those surveys without usable data on ipoll. Third, in some surveys Gallup allows individuals to provide more than one response to the most important problem question, which adds noise to our analysis. Finally, Gallup does not code the responses consistently from survey to survey. In some surveys the frequency responding “civil rights” is reported alone. In other surveys “civil rights” responses are grouped with, for example, “racial problems, discrimination and states rights,” in other surveys with “integration,” and in still others with “demonstrations.” For each survey, we graph the frequency responding to the category that includes “civil rights,” so inconsistencies arise year-to-year.

Those caveats notwithstanding, Figure 5 points once again to the great importance of civil rights as an issue in the mid 1960s. Few respondents cite civil rights as important in the early fifties. That number increases to as much as 20 and 30 percent in some surveys in the late fifties. But it is in 1963 when the frequency reporting civil rights crosses the 50 percent threshold for the first time. Given the data limitations mentioned above, we cannot replicate the analysis for all surveys by race and region, but in Appendix Table A.3 we do so for four key surveys: two from the low-importance early 1960s and two from the high-importance mid-1960s. The levels differ in the expected manner—Southern whites and all blacks care more about the issue than do non-Southern whites—and the issue takes on heightened importance in the mid-1960s for all subgroups.

In summary, the ANES data show that views on the parties’ racial policies shift dramatically between 1960 and 1964. Such a shift is unlikely to occur without important events that generate media and public interest. Indeed, we show that in the Spring of 1963, the media begins to link the Democratic president with Civil Rights in a heightened and sustained manner unequalled before in his presidency. Moreover, media coverage of the issue as well as

American Newspapers.

public interest in Civil Rights explodes in 1963, suggesting that the shift in the positions of the parties on this issue would be hard for voters to miss.

4.2 Estimating equations

Having defined a pre- and post-period, the empirical strategy for our main set of results is straightforward. We first estimate the total amount of white dealignment specific to the South in the following regression:

$$D_{ist} = \beta_1 South_s \times Aft_t + \gamma X_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}, \quad (1)$$

where D_{ist} is an indicator for person i identifying as a Democrat, $South_s$ is an indicator for residency in a Southern state, Aft_t is an indicator for being observed after April 1963, X_{ist} includes controls (which we will vary in robustness checks), and λ_s and μ_t are state and year fixed effects, respectively.²⁹

We then estimate a companion regression:

$$D_{ist} = \tilde{\beta}_1 South_s \times Aft_t + \tilde{\beta}_2 South_s \times Aft_t \times NoBlackPresz_i + \tilde{\gamma} \tilde{X}_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}. \quad (2)$$

In equation (2), the $South_s \times Aft_t$ interaction is now interacted with $NoBlackPresz_i$, an indicator variable for being unwilling to vote for a black president.³⁰ The vector \tilde{X} now includes all lower-order terms of this triple interaction and the remaining notation follows that in (1). The estimate of $\tilde{\beta}_2$ reflects the dealignment coming from those with conservative racial views, and comparing the estimate of β_1 in (1) with that of $\tilde{\beta}_1$ in (2) allows us to measure the share of dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views.

5 Results

We first present the main results from estimating equations (1) and (2) and then provide corroborating higher-frequency analysis using Gallup’s Presidential approval data.

²⁹As we are interested in dealignment from the Democratic Party, we code Democrats as 1 and Republicans, independents and other responses to party identification as 0.

³⁰In practice we code both “no” and “don’t know” as 1 for this measure. In no year do more than ten percent of respondents answer “don’t know.”

5.1 Results using the “black president” question

5.1.1 Regression results

Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. For completeness and to provide a baseline, col. (1) replaces state fixed effects with a South dummy and uses only Gallup (as opposed to GSS) data from 1958 to 1980. Whereas Democrats had a 23 percentage point advantage among whites in the South relative to the rest of the country, that advantage fell by 65% in the post-period. In col. (2), we show that the $South \times Aft$ coefficient falls by 99% once the triple interaction term is added, which is itself highly significant and negative, indicating that essentially all the decline in Democratic Party alignment among white Southerners comes from those with conservative racial views. The lower-order terms are of interest in their own right. While not significant, whites outside the South who hold conservative racial views move slightly away from the Democrat party, though neither in the pre- or post-period are racial views highly predictive of white partisanship outside the South. The significant, positive coefficient on $South \times No\ Black\ Prez$ highlights the strongly conservative racial views that characterized the Southern Democratic party in the pre-period.

In the remainder of Table 2 we explore the robustness of this result. Gallup does not consistently sample all states in all years, thus in cols. (3) and (4) as well as all remaining columns we add state fixed effects to adjust for this variation. The comparison of $South \times After$ across specifications is even more striking: In col (3) the coefficient is larger in magnitude than in col(1). Yet the inclusion of $NoBlackPrez$ and its interactions in the state fixed effect model actually makes the $South \times After$ coefficient flip signs (though its magnitude is tiny). We take these results as our “preferred specifications” and the resulting point estimates suggest that the 18.6 point decline among Southerners with conservative racial views (very) slightly *overpredicts* the full 16.7 point relative decline among white Southerners. In Cols. (5) and (6) we add basic controls (age, city-size fixed effects, and educational attainment fixed effects) to this specification, which barely moves the coefficients of interest.

Col. (7) adds interactions of $South \times Aft$ with, respectively, age, a high school completion dummy, and a city size (categorical) variable (as well as all lower-order terms). While the $South \times Aft$ interaction no longer has any meaningful interpretation, this specification tests whether the strong, negative coefficient on $South \times Aft \times NoBlackPrez$ is merely picking up differential trends along these other dimensions. For example, perhaps rural Southerners have more conservative racial views but differentially turn against the Democrats in the

post-period for reasons independent of Civil Rights (but for whatever reason do not outside the South). In fact, even after allowing these covariates to have different effects in the South, different effects in the post-period, and different effects in the South in the post-period, the coefficient of interest again barely moves.

In the remaining columns, we add the GSS data (as control variables are not consistent across the two datasets, we do not include them). Comparing cols. (8) and (9) to cols. (3) and (4) shows that the results are nearly identical in this larger dataset. The final two columns we keep the GSS data and extend the series to 2000. The point estimates suggest that the decline among those with conservative racial views explains three-fourths of the 19.5 point relative decline in the South over this longer period.³¹

5.1.2 Graphical results

Figure 6 shows our regression results in an event-time figure. Specifically, for each survey date, we present the coefficient from regressing Democratic party ID on *NoBlackPrez*, separately for the South versus others. The figure echoes the regression results (conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic party identification in the South in the pre-period, an association that is wiped out in the post-period) but unlike those results can show the shift is better described as a one-time decline—occurring sometime between the 1961 and 1963 survey dates—and not a secular trend. Throughout the sample period, racial views have limited predictive power over party identification among whites outside the South.

5.1.3 Robustness checks

Perhaps the key concern about our approach so far is that while the black president question is worded consistently over time, the *true attitudes* of those who respond “yes” may change because of the decreasing social desirability of conservative racial views over the sample period.³² If socially desirable responses are increasing similarly in both the South and non-

³¹We conclude our analysis period in 2000. After Illinois State Senator Barack Obama’s 2004 Democratic convention speech, heightened talk of his Presidential bid may have transformed the black president item from a hypothetical question to a referendum on a particular individual.

³²This concern is not merely hypothetical. For example, Kuklinski *et al.* (1997) use a clever between-subject approach whereby the racial views of any one individual cannot be detected but the racial views of large groups can be. They show that these “unobtrusive” measures of racial attitudes show white Southerners to have significantly more conservative racial views than other whites (at least in the mid-1990s), whereas standard survey questions (subject to social desirability bias) show much smaller differences.

South, then state fixed effects address this concern. But to the extent that our measure of conservative racial views is increasingly poor in one region over the other, our results will be biased.

We address this concern in two ways in Table 3. First, Figure 2 shows that from 1958 to about 1970, the South non-South gap on this question remains relatively stable, suggesting that social desirability bias may work similarly by region during these earlier years (and it seems fair to assume this bias was simply *smaller* during earlier years and thus less concerning). Cols. (1) and (2) demonstrate that our main result barely changes when we restrict observations to this shorter period, not surprising given the patterns presented in Figure 6.

Second, we use pre-1963 data to *predict* conservative racial views and then substitute this predicted black president response for the actual response. The predicted conservative racial views analysis of Cols (3) and (4) suggests an even larger role for racial views, suggesting, perhaps, that social desirability adds noise to the actual black president question and thus attenuates the results of the first two columns. The analysis suggests that Southerners without (predicted) conservative racial views in fact increased their allegiance to the Democratic party. Note that using the predicted instead of actual answer to the black president question means we can expand the sample to the (many more) surveys that have the regressors used in the prediction equation but do not have the black president question itself. In cols. (5) and (6) we show that adding controls for predicted attitudes erases the negative coefficient on $South \times After$ in this larger sample as well.

As final checks, in Appendix Table A.4 we demonstrate robustness of our preferred specification (cols. 3 and 4 of Table 2) to using a probit specification, breaking the non-South control group into separate Census regions, and substituting “Republican ID” for the outcome variable. In Appendix Table A.5 we show that results are qualitatively similar across age (under and over 40) and gender.

5.2 Higher-frequency results from Gallup

The results of Figure 6 point to a sharp decline in the association of conservative racial attitudes and white Southern identification with the Democratic Party between the summers of 1961 and 1963, the time of the last pre-period and first post-period surveys that include the black president question, respectively. Gallup does not ask the black president question at a sufficiently high frequency that we can pin the key shift to the Spring of 1963, the moment

when, we earlier argued, voters first connect the Democrats to Civil Rights. We now turn to alternative Gallup questions and a modified empirical strategy to more finely pinpoint the transition moment of white Southern Democratic allegiance. We lose the ability to stratify the analysis by racial attitudes, but we gain higher-frequency measures of Americans' responses to political news.

5.2.1 Presidential approval

During the 1960s, Gallup asked the following question roughly every month: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President _____ is handling his job as President?"³³ We find 25 usable surveys that ask Kennedy approval, a question we use to examine how Southern white approval (relative to non-Southern white approval) responds to presidential Civil Rights news.³⁴

Figure 7 tracks Kennedy's approval among whites, separately for the South and non-South. The most striking element of the figure is the more than 35 percentage point drop in Southern approval around our critical period, the Spring of 1963, a period during which non-Southern white approval is flat and black approval (Appendix Figure A.8) is increasing.³⁵ More than half of this decrease occurs between the two polls (May 25 and June 23) that surround Kennedy's televised June 11 Civil Rights address. Thus this high frequency data provides evidence to pinpoint spring 1963 as the critical date for dealignment.

In addition to allowing us to focus in on particular moments, these high frequency data, along with our *NYT* searches on the mentions of Kennedy and Civil Rights allow us to expand our focus beyond Spring 1963 and ask how presidential approval correlates more generally with Civil Rights mentions. In Figure 8 we plot the difference in presidential approval by region (South minus non-South) against the frequency of articles mentioning President Kennedy and Civil Rights terms.³⁶ We see of course that the large spike in articles in the spring of 1963 is accompanied by a large decline in relative approval. However it is notable

³³In most surveys the possible valid responses are only approve or disapprove.

³⁴According to the Roper catalog, Gallup asks about Kennedy (Eisenhower) approval 39 (119) times, all of which are downloadable. However only 25 (52) were originally entered in ASCII format. We eliminate files that were originally entered in binary format as Roper's binary to ASCII conversion resulted in several strange characters in variable fields such that we cannot match our frequencies to that in the codebook.

³⁵This drop occurs between the April 5 and June 23 polls.

³⁶The figure shows the hits for the expanded definition of Civil Rights (including segregation, integration and their variants). Results, available upon request, are similar for the more narrow search.

that even smaller events in the Civil Rights timeline lead to wobbles in Kennedy’s popularity among whites in the South relative to elsewhere.

We formalize the analysis of Figure 8 in the regression analysis of Table 5. We regress approval on the number of articles per day linking the president and Civil Rights during the week of the survey.³⁷ We begin with the more narrow, “Civil Rights” classification. The negative coefficient on articles mentioning “Civil Rights” in col. (1) indicates that Kennedy’s approval falls in both regions the more his name is mentioned alongside the issue. However, the interaction term indicates that the decrease is nearly four times larger amongst Southerners. The point estimates suggest that, if a week were to average an additional article per day that mentions JFK and civil rights than some baseline period, we should expect non-Southern white approval to fall by 1.53 percentage points and white Southern approval to fall by 7.13 percentage points relative to the baseline.

In col. (2) we add date fixed effects, controls for the number of articles mentioning Kennedy alongside “placebo” issues, along with their interactions with South, so as to test whether the association between Civil Rights coverage and differential Southern approval is merely picking up coincident events or policy initiatives (the main effects of these placebo issues are absorbed by the survey-date fixed effects). Consistent with divergent regional interests, Southerners not only differentially react to Civil Rights but also mentions of the USSR and agricultural policy (consistent with the region’s large share of rural residents and its reputation for hawkish foreign policy views). However, adding these controls only increases the magnitude of the association between Civil Rights mentions and relatively lower approval among Southerners. In col. (3) we repeat the col. (2) analysis using the more expanded “Civil Rights terms” search. The interaction term remains negative and significant, though is about one-fourth smaller.

False positives, especially for the expanded “Civil Rights terms” search, could attenuate results. We thus had two RAs ascertain whether each article actually suggests that Kennedy was on the side of Civil Rights. In fact, they classify roughly two-thirds of the “expanded” search as false hits.³⁸ Col. (4) suggests that, relative to baseline, an additional article per

³⁷The modal survey is in the field for six days. However, we do not know on which day each respondent is interviewed. We match the midpoint of the survey date to the number of hits during the period four days before through two days after the midpoint.

³⁸In practice, we sum by day each article *either* RA denotes as pro Civil Rights, and then divide by two to keep coefficients comparable. See Appendix D for the instructions we gave to the RAs. Neither knew that we hypothesized Spring of 1963 as the turning point. The most common false hit was “integration” referring to European integration, NATO, etc.

day placing Kennedy on the side of Civil Rights reduces his relative support among white Southerners by over eleven percentage points, consistent with substantial attenuation bias in col. (3). Finally, in another attempt to address false positives but without relying on labor-intensive and potentially subjective hand coding, in col. (5) we show that our col. (3) specification is robust to using the search term “Negro” instead of Civil Rights terms. In Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 we show that our results are robust to normalizing the number of hits by total number of articles and to including a *South* linear time trend.³⁹

We provide a final piece of evidence against alternative issues as drivers of Southern dealignment by quantifying the share of the variation over JFK’s administration in the South-versus-elsewhere difference in presidential approval that can be explained by Civil Rights relative to placebo issues. Separately for each issue (each of the placebos as well as civil rights) we use our micro data to regress whites’ approval on state fixed effects, the number of hits for the expanded “Civil Rights” Kennedy search (from col. 3, without RA coding), and the interaction of this variable with *South*. We then predict approval and collapse both the predicted and actual approval to *South* \times survey date cells. Figure 9 shows the actual South-versus-elsewhere approval differences (already depicted in Figures 7 and 8) as well as our predicted differences, generated from the parsimonious regression described above. The series line up quite well and in fact our predicted series explains 51% of the total variation in the actual South-nonSouth difference over time.⁴⁰ The best performing placebo category (social security and safety net issues) explains only twenty percent (see Appendix Figure A.9) and completely misses the huge decline in relative approval in the Spring of 1963. In fact seven of nine placebo issues explain under five percent of the South-nonSouth variation over time. Consistent with the results in Table 5, when we use the RA-coded version of the broad search in the same prediction exercise, the relationship appears even tighter (the third series of 9) and now explains 56 percent of the variation. The overwhelming predictive power of Civil Rights in explaining regional differences in approval for JFK undercuts the argument that other issues were triggering dealignment during this period.

³⁹We have also explored robustness of these results to varying the search window. When we increase the window to allow articles to impact approval with a lag of as much as 30 days, the coefficient on *South* \times *Articlecount* and its significance increase to a lag of about two weeks before precision starts to fall. When we include additional lags of search terms, the association of hits and approval is smaller in magnitude in lagged weeks.

⁴⁰When we instead use the more narrow “Civil Rights” search in our prediction exercise, it also explains 51%. The “negro” search explains 54%.

5.2.2 Hypothetical presidential match-ups

Another familiar Gallup question asks voters whom they would prefer in hypothetical election match-ups. We examine how Kennedy fairs in these match-ups against Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate most identified with Civil Rights opposition. Gallup asks this question roughly monthly beginning in February 1963, with the final poll less than two weeks before Kennedy’s assassination.

Figure 10 shows Goldwater’s support among white Southerners at around 30% through the first week of March. Goldwater then enjoys a steady increase in support through the Spring of 1963, reaching a plateau of around 60% in July. During our key period of the Spring of 1963, JFK goes from having a healthy, thirty percentage point lead over Goldwater to being thirty points behind him. White non-Southerners remain rather aloof toward Goldwater. Over the same February to July period when JFK’s support plummets in the South, in the non-South it falls modestly from 65 to 60%, while support for Goldwater shows a similarly small gain from 28 to 33%.

The result from the presidential match-ups suggests that JFK’s decline in approval documented in the previous subsection did not reflect mere short term annoyance. Within months of Kennedy’s association with Civil Rights, half of his Southern white supporters shifted their backing to a candidate who was from a party they had shunned for a century but who was not believed to support Civil Rights. As noted in the introduction, those arguing for Civil Rights as the trigger for dealignment typically point to Johnson as the catalyst—our results suggest that JFK has been given too little credit (or blame?) for losing the South for his party.

6 Addressing alternative hypotheses

We think of the previous section as our “positive case” for Civil Rights as the prime mover of Southern whites out of the Democratic Party. In this section, we more directly address the most commonly raised alternative hypotheses.

6.1 Is dealignment “too smooth” to be explained by Civil Rights?

Was the South moving toward the Republicans long before Civil Rights, in particular from 1952 to 1960, when the party had a similar if not more liberal position on Civil Rights than did the Democrats? As noted, Trende (2012) points out that the decline in the advantage

Democrats enjoyed in the South during Presidential elections was not a one-time decline after 1963, but more slow-moving (a pattern we indeed confirm using election returns data, see Appendix Figure A.2). Of course, composition effects plague this type of analysis: Southern black registration rose from essentially zero to roughly 20% between 1940 and 1960 (when they leaned Republican) and then shot up to 65% after the Voting Rights Act (when they essentially voted as a Democratic bloc).⁴¹

As the dealignment hypothesis concerns only whites, in Appendix Figure A.10 we replicate this figure using individual-level data from ANES, excluding non-whites. The ANES limits us to a start date of 1952, after the precipitous drop in the Southern Democratic vote share in 1948. This lack of coverage for the 1940s is not a threat to our conclusion as race as cause as historians link this drop to the Democrats taking their first cautious steps toward a more liberal Civil Rights position.⁴² Indeed, Strom Thurmond left the Democrats and created the splinter Dixiecrat party explicitly over this issue; he went on to win four of the five states of the Deep South in the 1948 election. That some white Southerners gave the Republicans another look after 1948 does not contradict the primacy of Civil Rights as the key driver of dealignment.

However, Appendix Figure A.10 does suggest a threat to our hypothesis. The shorter time-series points to a key break in relative white Southern Democratic Party support *in the 1960 election*, not 1964 as our definition of the post-period would predict. This decline in 1960 has led to two key arguments among scholars arguing against Civil Rights as the trigger for dealignment: 1) The Democratic party's liberal Civil Rights agenda could not be the cause of dealignment as it *post*-dated this key, 1960 drop. 2) Southern whites were approving or at least not disapproving of Eisenhower's Civil Rights initiatives as evidenced by the increased attraction to the Republican Party in the first presidential election following the events in Little Rock. We address each in turn.

Kennedy's Catholicism was a key factor in the election, especially in the South, to the point that he felt compelled to give a speech to Southern ministers reaffirming his commitment to secular government. Indeed, Gallup asked in 1958 whether respondents would vote for a well-qualified candidate if he happened to be Catholic. In the South, 48 percent of whites explicitly say no, compared to only 22 percent of whites elsewhere.

On the other hand, Catholic voters (94% of whom lived outside the South) mobilized

⁴¹Registration statistics can be found in Stanley (1987).

⁴²See Black (1987). They point to Truman's liberalization of the armed services and the introduction of a Civil Rights plank of the party's platform in 1948.

in support of Kennedy.⁴³ Appendix Figure A.11 shows what an extreme outlier 1960 was in terms of white Catholic support for the Democratic presidential nominee. While in the other presidential elections from 1952 to 2000, white Catholics, relative to other whites, favor Democrats by roughly eleven percentage points, the advantage in 1960 was over 45 percentage points. While the ANES does not ask about anti-Catholic sentiment and thus we cannot account for the votes Kennedy lost in the South to anti-Catholic sentiment, we can account for the votes he gained among Catholics (disproportionately outside the South) by excluding all Catholics in the ANES. Figure 11 shows that, among non-Catholic whites, the clear break in Southern white relative support of Democratic candidates occurs between 1960 and 1964, consistent with Civil Rights events of 1963 as the cause. That nearly half of Southern whites openly admit to being unwilling to vote for a Catholic suggests that if Kennedy's religion had not been an issue, the drop between 1960 and 1964 would have been even more dramatic.

We address the question of Southern support of Eisenhower's Civil Rights initiatives by conducting an analysis of Eisenhower's approval in the style of our earlier Kennedy analysis. While historians have debated the ultimate importance of Civil Rights initiatives under Eisenhower (e.g., the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts famously had no federal enforcement provisions), we put that debate to the side and instead focus on the contemporaneous reaction to these episodes amongst white Southerners relative to other whites.

Figure 12 is the Eisenhower analogue to Figure 8. The red line shows the difference (South minus non-South) in presidential approval by region. Consistent with our claim that Civil Rights is not salient for most Americans until the 1960s, the overall article counts are much lower than in the analogous Kennedy graph. There is a clear increase in Eisenhower's connection to Civil Rights issues in two periods: the fall of 1956 during his reelection campaign and the summer and fall of 1957 when the 1957 Civil Rights Bill was making its way through Congress and to the president's desk that September, the same month in which Eisenhower sent federal troops to escort the Little Rock Nine. Only the latter of the two events is concurrent with a large drop in relative approval. Most notably there is a 25-point drop between the polls of September 21 and October 12, a period which encompasses the forcible integration of Little Rock Central High School. The relationship between Civil Rights and Eisenhower approval more generally is quantified in the regression analysis shown in Appendix Table A.8. And just like for Kennedy, we see that Eisenhower paid an approval penalty in the

⁴³State residence of Catholic voters is based on authors' calculation from the 1960 ANES.

South when the news made mention of him alongside Civil Rights (regardless of the search terms we use to identify articles).

Finally, in a more general test of the secular trend hypothesis, we return to the Gallup data to examine whether 1963 is actually a break or a continuation of a longer trend. (We note that the graphical evidence of Figure 6 demonstrating an abrupt halt to the conservative-racial-attitude-Democratic-identification connection between 1961 and 1963 already suggests against 1963 as merely a part of a more general trend.) In col. (1) of Appendix Table A.9 we replicate our baseline specification from equation (1). Because we do not need racial attitudes for this analysis, in col. (2) we augment the black president sample to include all Gallup surveys in the sample period and find the same, 17 percentage point relative decline in Democratic identification among Southern whites. Finally, we add a linear *South* trend to the specification. Its negative and significant coefficient suggests a longer run trend of Southern whites turning away from the Democratic Party. Nonetheless the coefficient on *South* \times *Aft* remains large and significant: 1963 does reflect a trend break with Southern whites fleeing the Democratic Party in larger numbers than previously. Although it is harder to separately identify a linear time trend alongside a one-time decline over a shorter time period, the 1963 trend break result remains significant as we shrink the post-period window in the remaining columns of Appendix Table A.9.

6.2 Can economic development or changing demographics explain dealignment?

Income is a strong, negative predictor of Democratic party identification. During our study period, the South and non-South exhibited differential economic growth rates. While our main results were robust to flexibly controlling for education, age and urbanicity, it is possible that they are confounded by insufficient controls for income. Therefore we explore the alternative hypothesis of income as the cause of dealignment in this section.

As noted, only six of the ten Gallup surveys from 1958 through 1980 include an income control, and in fact only one of the six is from the pre-period. Given the limitations of income measures in Gallup, our main approach to addressing this concern is to return to the ANES, the dataset authors tend to use in support of the income argument.⁴⁴ From 1952 onward,

⁴⁴When we perform our standard analysis on the subsample of Gallup surveys that include the income variable, the coefficient of interest on our triple interaction term is not affected by whether income is included as a control.

the ANES has the needed state identifiers as well as a consistent income measure: grouping households by where they fall in the U.S. income distribution (bottom 16 percent, between the 17 and 33 percentiles, the middle third, between the 67th and 95th percentiles, or the top five percent).

As noted in Section 2, most of the work that finds evidence of income as a driver actually uses cross tabulations and does not, in a regression sense, partial out what share of the total dealignment is explained by the South’s economically catching up with the rest of the country. We perform this exercise in Table 6, again defining the post-period as years after 1963 (1964 being the first post-period year in the ANES) and otherwise following the specification in equation (1).

To establish a baseline, col. (1) shows the results with no controls except year and state fixed effects, and we find a 14 percentage-point relative decline in Southern Democratic identification (similar, as we would expect, to the analogous results from Gallup, col. 3 of Table 2).⁴⁵ Col. (2) shows that this estimate barely changes after adding fixed effects for each of the ANES income categories. Those arguing for economic development as the prime mover often refer not only to income growth *per se*, but also the decline in the rural share of the Southern population. Col. (3) adds fixed effects for the three urbanicity categories in the ANES, and again the coefficient on *South* \times *Aft* barely changes. Finally, Col. (4) allows urbanicity and income to have different effects in the South and in the post-period (i.e., fully interacting dummies for each of the urbanicity and income categories with both *South* and *After*). The magnitude of the coefficient on *South* \times *After* in fact increases. In short, we find no role for economic development in explaining the differential decline in Democratic allegiance among Southern whites after 1963.

As detailed in Section 2, other authors argue that Northern migrants and younger cohorts—two groups which should have little loyalty to Jim Crow—drive dealignment. In col. (5) we introduce a “restricted sample”: we drop all respondents (in the South and non-South) born after 1941 as well as all respondents living in the South at the time of the survey but born elsewhere. Relative to the baseline in col. (1), our restrictive sample shows a post-period drop in Southern Democratic attachment that is 91% of the size of the drop in the full sample. The estimated dealignment in fact grows in size when in col. (6) we add the flexible controls for income and urbanicity included in col. (4).

⁴⁵All results in Table 6 are robust to using “voted for the Democratic nominee in most recent presidential election” as the outcome instead of Democratic identification. Results available upon request.

A final exercise we perform in Table 6 is to ask whether richer and less rural Southerners—i.e., the so-called “New South”—were more likely to leave the party in the post-period.⁴⁶ In col. (7) we define *Rich* as being in the top third of the U.S. income distribution. Besides its main effect (strongly negative, as expected) the interactions with *Rich* have very little explanatory power and while rich Southerners appear somewhat more likely to leave the party in the post-period, this effect is very small and insignificant. There is similarly no differential decline in Democratic identification among non-rural Southerners (col. 8).

7 Conclusion

The exodus of Southern whites from the Democratic party is one of the most transformative, and controversial, political developments in twentieth century U.S. history. While the qualitative literature pointed to the Democratic Party’s 1960s Civil Rights initiatives as the cause, quantitative analysts have challenged this conclusion. Gallup microdata on racial attitudes dating back to the 1950s have allowed us to make progress on resolving the question of why this exodus occurred. Using their consistent, frequent and cross-contextually relevant question on whether the respondent would vote for a qualified black candidate for president, we find that 100% (75%) of dealignment from 1958 to 1980 (2000) can be explained, in a regression sense, by the movement of racially conservative whites away from the Democratic Party, after it became the party of Civil Rights in 1963. Gallup’s higher frequency presidential approval data allow us to more finely pinpoint the large drop in Southern support for President Kennedy to the timing of his proposal of Civil Rights legislation. More generally, for both Kennedy and Eisenhower, we find a negative correlation between Southern white approval and the mention of the president alongside Civil Rights initiatives in the media, a correlation that survives even after allowing white Southerners to have differential reactions to other key events in these administrations.

While we have focused on the effects of the most salient Civil Rights period on partisanship, quantifying the impact of race on political and policy preferences in other contexts is an interesting direction for future research. In concurrent work, we are examining the reactions of white voters to school busing initiatives, which were most prominent outside of the South in the 1970s. A greater challenge given the current social desirability bias against admitting conservative racial views (see Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014, Mas and Moretti, 2009

⁴⁶This exercise is of course different than asking whether economic development can *explain* dealignment, which col. (1) through (4) suggests it cannot.


and Greenwald *et al.*, 2009 on whether racism cost Barack Obama votes in his presidential elections), is to measure the extent to which racial views continue to shape our political outcomes today.

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
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Figure 1: Share of Democrats among Whites in Confederate and non-Confederate States




Source: Individual-level data from Gallup polls (accessed via ipoll), 1944-2004. South is defined throughout as the eleven states of the former Confederacy.

Figure 2: Share of whites willing to vote for a black president, by region




Source: Gallup polls 1958-2003 and GSS 1974-2010. “Don’t know” is counted as unwilling.

Figure 3: Whites' views of which party will ensure school integration, by year and region




Source: ANES 1960, 1964, and 1968 individual year files. “No difference between the two parties” is not plotted, but can be derived by subtracting the sum of the Republican and Democratic shares from one. We have dropped missing observations, so $Dem + Rep + No\ difference$ sum to 100%.

Figure 4: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “Kennedy” and Civil Rights terms in *The New York Times*, 1961-1963




Source: *New York Times* and Gallup Polls

Figure 5: Share of Respondents Identifying Civil Rights as the Most Important Problem




Source: Gallup polls 1950-1979

Figure 6: Coefficient from regressing *Dem* on *NoBlackPres*, by region and year (whites in Gallup and GSS)




Notes: Source: Gallup and GSS polls 1958-1984. Circles denote that the coefficient comes from a *Gallup* survey and triangles denote a *GSS* survey.

Figure 7: White approval of President Kennedy by region, 1961-1963



Source: Gallup polls 1961-1963


Figure 8: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “President Kennedy” with Civil Rights terms and relative Presidential approval (whites in South versus non-South)



Notes: “Civil Rights terms” include the term “civil rights” and any form of the word “integration” and “segregation.” In the approval data, “approve” is coded as one, and disapprove or no opinion is coded as zero.


Source: *New York Times* and *Gallup Polls*.

Figure 9: Predicted and actual regional approval differences for JFK among whites




Data come from Gallup polls 1961-1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. “Predicted” approval comes from regressing Gallup micro data (for whites) on state fixed effects, the average number of Civil-rights related articles in the *NYT* in which President Kennedy’s name appears, and this variable interacted with a *South* dummy. Predictions are collapsed to *South* \times *surveydate* cells and we subtract the non-South from the South cells to generate the “predicted” series for each date. “Predicted, RA coding” uses the same procedure, but Civil-rights related articles are broken down into those that argue Kennedy is pro-Civil Rights and those that argue he is against Civil Rights (the rest are dropped). See text for further detail.

Figure 10: Hypothetical match-up between JFK and Goldwater, by survey and region (whites only)




Data come from Gallup polls, 1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. We count “lean toward” a candidate as supporting that candidate.

Figure 11: Share of Democratic votes in Presidential Election among White non-Catholics in South versus non-South



Source: ANES 1952-2008

Figure 12: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “President Eisenhower” with Civil Rights terms and relative Presidential approval (whites in South versus non-South)



Source: New York Times and Gallup Polls

Table 1: Comparison of Summary Statistics for Whites by Time Period and Region (Gallup—ANES)

	1958-1962		1963-1980	
	Gallup	ANES	Gallup	ANES
Non Confederate States				
Completed high school	.479	.541	.546	.686
Democrat	.436	.430	.412	.364
Female	.516	.526	.526	.561
Resident in urban area	.672	.590	.731	.659
Observations	10148	2622	32027	10369
Confederate States				
Completed high school	.362	.533	.452	.602
Democrat	.641	.622	.490	.467
Female	.513	.568	.523	.552
Resident in urban area	.449	.329	.592	.379
Observations	2384	8030	9885	3185

Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using survey weights. Urban areas are defined as areas with populations of at least 2,500, although the variable varies in construction from survey to survey in the ANES.

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup and ANES data. “Urban area” in Gallup refers to areas with a population greater than 2,500. “Urban area” in ANES refers to “central cities” and “suburban areas” as defined in the original ANES variable VCF 0111. These definitions have changed over time. In general, what we code as an “urban area” designates a Census-defined Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). A full account of how the original ANES variable is coded can be found in the ANES Cumulative Data File (ICPSR 8475) codebook.

Table 2: Democratic Party identification among whites as a function of region and racial views

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Confederate	0.230*** [0.0485]	0.0835 [0.0684]									
Conf x Aft	-0.149** [0.0657]	-0.00130 [0.0688]	-0.165** [0.0658]	0.00264 [0.0595]	-0.164** [0.0629]	-0.0151 [0.0612]	-0.153 [0.145]	-0.167*** [0.0624]	-0.00492 [0.0585]	-0.195*** [0.0519]	-0.0436 [0.0618]
No Bl prez		0.0201 [0.0177]		0.00671 [0.0158]		-0.00612 [0.0154]	0.0104 [0.0157]		0.00798 [0.0158]		0.00930 [0.0158]
Conf x No Bl prez		0.159** [0.0652]		0.187*** [0.0570]		0.172*** [0.0563]	0.158** [0.0744]		0.192*** [0.0570]		0.183*** [0.0605]
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.0216 [0.0244]		-0.0124 [0.0242]		-0.0164 [0.0224]	-0.0287 [0.0223]		-0.00668 [0.0226]		-0.0171 [0.0200]
Conf x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.161* [0.0809]		-0.186** [0.0745]		-0.171** [0.0764]	-0.158* [0.0923]		-0.174** [0.0718]		-0.147** [0.0716]
Mean, dep. var.	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.451	0.451	0.451	0.435	0.435	0.391	0.391
State FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Interactions?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Max year	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	2000	2000
GSS?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20192	20192	20192	20192	19787	19787	19787	25235	25235	41588	41588

Notes: Year fixed effects included in all regressions, and state fixed effects in column (3) and beyond. *After* is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “No Bl prez” is an indicator variable for reporting unwillingness to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate (“don’t know” and “no” are both coded as one). “Controls” indicate that age (in ten-year intervals), gender, education categories and city-size categories have been added. “Interactions” includes these controls as well as their interactions with *Confederate* and *After*. “Max year” indicates the end point of the sample period (in all cases, the first year of the sample period is 1958) and “GSS” indicates where GSS data have been added to the regression. Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Testing for composition bias in main regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conf x Aft	-0.161** (0.0690)	0.00485 (0.0644)	-0.162** (0.0723)	0.394*** (0.0985)	-0.138*** (0.0398)	0.0461 (0.101)
No Bl prez		0.00661 (0.0158)				
Conf x No Bl prez		0.178*** (0.0578)				
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.00912 (0.0279)				
Conf x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.188** (0.0758)				
No Bl prez (pr.)				0.404*** (0.0843)		0.463*** (0.0484)
Conf x No Bl prez (pr.)				0.373 (0.231)		0.134 (0.156)
No Bl prez (pr.) x Aft				-0.0985 (0.112)		-0.0635 (0.0616)
Conf x No Bl prez (pr.) x Aft				-0.731*** (0.198)		-0.232 (0.171)
Observations	17642	17642	17322	17322	47246	47246
Dataset	Gallup	Gallup	Gallup	Gallup	Gallup all	Gallup all
Mean	0.458	0.458	0.457	0.457	0.448	0.448

Notes: Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. *After* is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “No Bl prez” is an indicator variable for reporting unwillingness to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate (“don’t know” and “no” are both coded as one). “No Bl prez (pr.)” refers to the predicted values from a regression of “No Bl prez” on state and occupation fixed effects, gender, city-size categories, and age (in ten-year intervals) interacted with education categories. The “Gallup” dataset refers to Gallup surveys in which the black president survey question is asked, and the “Gallup all” dataset refers to all Gallup surveys for which there was sufficient data to estimate “No Bl prez (pr.)”, including survey years in which the black president question was not asked. The sample period is 1958-1969. Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Predicting approval of JFK among whites by region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Rights	-0.0153** (0.00693)					
Conf x Civil Rights	-0.0560*** (0.00743)	-0.0591*** (0.00441)				
Civil Rights Terms			-0.00999** (0.00451)			
Conf x Civil Rights Terms			-0.0359*** (0.0125)	-0.0465*** (0.00484)		
Negro					-0.0197*** (0.00702)	
Conf x Negro					-0.0556*** (0.0139)	-0.0587*** (0.00743)
Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0101 (0.00832)		0.0197** (0.00816)		0.0162 (0.0121)
Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		-0.00720 (0.0272)		-0.0147 (0.0354)		-0.0136 (0.0249)
Conf x Placebo: USSR		0.0208*** (0.00677)		0.0323*** (0.00751)		0.0194** (0.00901)
Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.0147 (0.00941)		-0.00849 (0.00957)		-0.00657 (0.0100)
Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00353 (0.00683)		-0.0125* (0.00662)		-0.00583 (0.0129)
Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.0136 (0.00894)		0.0183** (0.00870)		0.0147 (0.0122)
Conf x Placebo: Employment		0.00288 (0.0120)		-0.0220 (0.0151)		-0.0172 (0.0144)
Conf x Placebo: Social Security		-0.00576 (0.0132)		0.00706 (0.0124)		0.00685 (0.0227)
Conf x Placebo: Agriculture		0.0178** (0.00721)		0.0191** (0.00731)		0.0182* (0.00964)
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365
Survey Date FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673

Notes: State fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” denotes frequency NYT of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights.” “Civil Rights Terms” denotes frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights” *or* any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval question between January 1961 and November 1963. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: White approval of JFK as function of Civil Rights coverage (*NYT*)

Search terms employed: “President Kennedy” and...					
	“Civil rights”		Civil rights terms		“Negro”
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Article count	-0.0153**				
	[0.00693]				
Article count x South	-0.0560***	-0.0591***	-0.0465***	-0.114***	-0.0587***
	[0.00743]	[0.00441]	[0.00484]	[0.00863]	[0.00743]
Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0101	0.0197**	0.00623	0.0162
		[0.00832]	[0.00816]	[0.00914]	[0.0121]
Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		-0.00720	-0.0147	0.0172	-0.0136
		[0.0272]	[0.0354]	[0.0270]	[0.0249]
Conf x Placebo: USSR		0.0208***	0.0323***	0.0157**	0.0194**
		[0.00677]	[0.00751]	[0.00646]	[0.00901]
Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.0147	-0.00849	0.00676	-0.00657
		[0.00941]	[0.00957]	[0.0102]	[0.0100]
Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00353	-0.0125*	-0.0142	-0.00583
		[0.00683]	[0.00662]	[0.00961]	[0.0129]
Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.0136	0.0183**	-0.0125	0.0147
		[0.00894]	[0.00870]	[0.0107]	[0.0122]
Conf x Placebo: Employment		0.00288	-0.0220	0.0134	-0.0172
		[0.0120]	[0.0151]	[0.0126]	[0.0144]
Conf x Placebo: Social Security		-0.00576	0.00706	0.0341*	0.00685
		[0.0132]	[0.0124]	[0.0166]	[0.0227]
Conf x Placebo: Agriculture		0.0178**	0.0191**	0.0177**	0.0182*
		[0.00721]	[0.00731]	[0.00785]	[0.00964]
Mean, dept. var.	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673
Survey date FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RA coding?	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365

Notes: State fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” denotes frequency *NYT* of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights.” “Civil Rights Terms” denotes frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights” *or* any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval question between January 1961 and November 1963. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Table 6: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity on Democratic identification (ANES, 1952-1980)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conf x Aft	-0.140*** (0.0428)	-0.139*** (0.0410)	-0.148*** (0.0436)	-0.149*** (0.0373)	-0.127** (0.0521)	-0.156*** (0.0477)	-0.135** (0.0503)	-0.146*** (0.0528)
Rich							-0.0591*** (0.0200)	
Conf x Rich							0.000898 (0.0448)	
Rich x Aft							-0.00684 (0.0189)	
Conf x Rich x Aft							-0.0226 (0.0483)	
Non Rural								0.0602 (0.0380)
Conf x Non Rural								-0.0966 (0.0594)
Non Rural x Aft								-0.0243 (0.0247)
Conf x Non Rural x Aft								0.0153 (0.0826)
Observations	19158	19158	19158	19158	15240	15240	19158	19158
Sample	All	All	All	All	Restricted	Restricted	All	All
Income FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
City Type FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Interactions	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Mean	0.418	0.418	0.418	0.418	0.441	0.441	0.418	0.418

Notes: Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. *After* is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “Rich” is an indicator variable for being in the 68th to 100th percentile of family income. “Non Rural” is an indicator variable for being a resident of “central cities” or “suburban areas” as defined in the ANES. The “Restricted” sample used in columns 5 and 6 excludes those aged below 21 in 1963 and migrants to the Confederate states. Income category and city-type fixed effects are included where specified in the table footer. Where “Interactions” are included, income category and city-type fixed effects have each been interacted with *Conf* and (separately) with *Aft*. The sample period is 1952-1980. Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Appendix A. Supplementary figures and tables noted in the text

Appendix Figure A.1: Mean Personal Income by Race in Confederate and non Confederate States




Source: Census IPUMS files 1950-1990. Absolute differences (in 2013 dollars) are plotted on the left-hand side and the ratio on the right-hand side.

Appendix Figure A.2: Democratic share of votes in Presidential Elections




Source: U.S. election returns data as tabulated by David Leip voting, 1900-2012. Data available for purchase here: <http://uselectionatlas.org/>.

Appendix Figure A.3: Would Vote for a black president, full sample (including non-white respondents)




Source: Gallup polls 1958-2003 and GSS surveys 1974-2010

Appendix Figure A.4: Share of whites who would not move if black family moved next door




Source: Gallup polls 1958-1978

Appendix Figure A.5: Share of whites who would not move if neighborhood became half black




Source: Gallup polls 1958-1978

Appendix Figure A.6: Whites' views of which party will ensure blacks get fair treatment in obtaining jobs, by year and region




Source: ANES 1960, 1964, and 1968 individual year files. “No difference between the two parties” is not plotted, but can be derived by subtracting the sum of the Republican and Democratic shares from one. We have dropped missing observations, so $Dem + Rep + No\ difference$ sum to 100%. In 1960, the question actually refers to “jobs and housing,” whereas in 1964 and 1968 only jobs are mentioned.


Appendix Figure A.7: Frequency of articles mentioning “Civil Rights” in 1963, Southern newspapers



Appendix Figure A.8: Approval of JFK among black Gallup respondents, 1961-1963




Appendix Figure A.9: Predicted and actual regional approval differences for JFK among whites (Social Security and safety net issues)




Notes: Data come from Gallup polls 1961-1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. “Predicted” approval comes from regressing Gallup micro data (for whites) on state fixed effects, the average number of Social Security and safety net articles in the *NYT* in which President Kennedy’s name appears, and this variable interacted with a *South* dummy. Predictions are collapsed to *South* × *survey date* cells and we subtract the non-South from the South cells to generate the “predicted” series for each date. See text for further detail.

Appendix Figure A.10: Democratic share of white votes in presidential elections in Confederate and non Confederate States



Source: ANES 1952-2008

Appendix Figure A.11: White Catholic support for Democratic presidential candidates relative to other whites



Source: ANES 1952-2008

Appendix Table A.1: Comparison of Summary Statistics for Whites by Time Period and Region (Gallup—IPUMS)

	1960		1970		1980	
	Gallup	IPUMS	Gallup	IPUMS	Gallup	IPUMS
Non Confederate States						
Completed high school	.479	.458	.570	.586	.655	.715
Female	.516	.517	.523	.527	.529	.526
Resident in urban area	.671	.718	.732	.737	.726	.749
Observations	10263	772823	6374	848060	1956	974156
Confederate States						
Completed high school	.362	.418	.478	.516	.552	.650
Female	.514	.516	.526	.524	.523	.523
Resident in urban area	.448	.603	.581	.652	.704	.672
Observations	2416	199391	1962	244145	5820	327401

Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using survey weights. Years reported are census years. For each census year, Gallup statistics are drawn from surveys in the 5-year period around the census year. E.g. for census year 1960, Gallup surveys 1958-1962 are used.

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup data. The years reported in the table refer to census years. For each census year, Gallup statistics are drawn from surveys in the 5-year period around the census year. E.g. for census year 1960, Gallup surveys 1958-1962 are used. “Urban area” in Gallup refers to areas with a population greater than 2,500. The definition of “Urban area” in IPUMS has changed over time. A full account of how the variable has been defined can be found in the IPUMS documentation (<https://usa.ipums.org/usa/>). Summary statistics are weighted using survey weights.

Appendix Table A.2: Whites' opinions on race-related questions, by response to black president question (GSS, 1972-1980)

	Would vote for a a black president	Would not vote for a black president
Strongly agree that blacks shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted	.3671737 [N=2827]	.6797642 [N=1018]
Agree that government does too much to improve condition of blacks	.2325276 [N=3806]	.4933712 [N=1056]
Against busing of black and white school children from one district to another	.8347466 [N=4835]	.9147287 [N=1548]
Agree that white and black children should go to separate schools	.0562566 [N=1902]	.3559557 [N=722]
Object to sending children to a school where a few of the children are black?	.0278278 [N=4995]	.1737747 [N=1571]
Favors laws against marriages between blacks and whites	.2575914 [N=3886]	.640031 [N=1289]
Would object to family member bringing black friend for dinner	.1835052 [N=2910]	.561245 [N=996]

Appendix Table A.3: Share of Gallup respondents naming "Civil Rights" the country's "most important problem," by race and region

	Pre-period		Post-period	
	February 1961	June-July 1962	April 1964	June 1964
Whites, Confederate States	.095	.140	.400	.510
Blacks, Confederate States	.310	.270	.640	.730
Whites, Non-Confederate States	.036	.058	.380	.420
Blacks, Non-Confederate States	.170	.230	.650	.670

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup data. "Pre" and "Post" indicate before and after April 1963, respectively. Surveys used are restricted to the survey dates indicated.

Appendix Table A.4: Robustness of main triple-interaction results to estimating model, control group and outcome variable

	Democrat										Republican	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Conf x Aft	-0.432** (0.179)	0.00673 (0.153)	-0.178** (0.0697)	-0.00260 (0.0735)	-0.152** (0.0680)	-0.0146 (0.0614)	-0.162** (0.0687)	0.00166 (0.0632)	-0.148* (0.0727)	0.0690 (0.0796)	0.0774** (0.0311)	0.00668 (0.0729)
No Bl prez		0.0173 (0.0414)		-0.0235 (0.0344)		0.0450 (0.0398)		0.0164 (0.0220)		-0.0757 (0.0696)		0.0479*** (0.0151)
Conf x No Bl prez		0.494*** (0.153)		0.210*** (0.0690)		0.137* (0.0745)		0.180*** (0.0595)		0.250** (0.0909)		-0.130** (0.0572)
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.0326 (0.0630)		0.0198 (0.0690)		-0.0523 (0.0324)		-0.0319 (0.0199)		0.0862* (0.0442)		0.0121 (0.0237)
Conf x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.492** (0.198)		-0.210* (0.107)		-0.132 (0.0808)		-0.177** (0.0718)		-0.262*** (0.0884)		0.0606 (0.0784)
Observations	20192	20192	9660	9660	7651	7651	10639	10639	5511	5511	20192	20192
Control Group	All	All	Northeast	Northeast	West	West	Midwest	Midwest	Other South	Other South	All	All
Model	Probit	Probit	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Mean	0.452	0.452	0.478	0.478	0.504	0.504	0.459	0.459	0.565	0.565	0.296	0.296

Notes: These specifications replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 2. Year and State FE are included; the sample period used starts in 1956, with 1963 as the first year of the ‘after’ period and continues through 1980. Probit specifications report marginal effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.5: Robustness of main triple-interaction results in samples restricted by age and gender

	Age				Gender			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conf x Aft	-0.159* (0.0865)	0.000311 (0.0633)	-0.167** (0.0637)	-0.00629 (0.107)	-0.183** (0.0712)	0.00483 (0.0757)	-0.149** (0.0643)	0.0117 (0.0604)
No Bl prez		0.0244 (0.0199)		0.00154 (0.0239)		0.0112 (0.0172)		0.00126 (0.0219)
Conf x No Bl prez		0.164*** (0.0514)		0.166* (0.0921)		0.199*** (0.0558)		0.186** (0.0864)
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.0249 (0.0304)		-0.0104 (0.0297)		0.0245 (0.0313)		-0.0402 (0.0323)
Conf x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.188** (0.0705)		-0.178 (0.116)		-0.223** (0.0876)		-0.169** (0.0818)
Observations	7789	7789	12403	12403	9685	9685	10507	10507
Age	40 and under	40 and under	Over 40	Over 40	–	–	–	–
Gender	–	–	–	–	Male	Male	Female	Female
Mean	0.441	0.441	0.459	0.459	0.437	0.437	0.465	0.465

Notes: These specifications replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 2. Year and State FE are included; the sample period used starts in 1958, with 1963 as the first year of the ‘after’ period and continues through 1980. Standard errors clustered by state in parenthesis.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.8: Predicting approval of Eisenhower among whites by region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Rights	-0.0167 (0.0128)					
Conf x Civil Rights	-0.0225 (0.0142)	-0.0369** (0.0145)				
Civil Rights Terms			-0.0186*** (0.00668)			
Conf x Civil Rights Terms			-0.0282** (0.0113)	-0.0290*** (0.00789)		
Negro					-0.0145 (0.0129)	
Conf x Negro					-0.0585** (0.0232)	-0.0527*** (0.0149)
Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0172*** (0.00570)		0.0167*** (0.00484)		0.0130*** (0.00453)
Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		0.0505 (0.0385)		0.0410 (0.0312)		0.0316 (0.0325)
Conf x Placebo: USSR		-0.0315*** (0.00868)		-0.0276*** (0.00724)		-0.0222*** (0.00583)
Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.00386 (0.00726)		-0.00959 (0.00763)		-0.00745 (0.00571)
Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00841 (0.00943)		-0.00460 (0.00792)		-0.00430 (0.00689)
Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.00122 (0.00702)		-0.00370 (0.00760)		-0.00719 (0.00634)
Conf x Placebo: Employment		-0.00345 (0.0101)		0.00226 (0.0106)		-0.00846 (0.0100)
Conf x Placebo: Social Security		0.00659 (0.0137)		0.00231 (0.0125)		0.00660 (0.0118)
Conf x Placebo: Agriculture		0.000470 (0.0105)		0.00314 (0.00987)		0.00168 (0.00900)
Conf x Placebo: Korea		0.0112 (0.00948)		0.00784 (0.00842)		0.0181** (0.00783)
Conf x Placebo: Highways		0.0798* (0.0435)		0.0686* (0.0377)		0.0832** (0.0341)
Observations	82508	82508	82508	82508	82508	82508
Survey Date FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651

Notes: State fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Eisenhower” that employ the terms “civil rights” in the New York Times. “Civil Rights Terms” is an expanded version of this search that refers to frequency of articles containing “President Eisenhower” that employ the terms “civil rights” *or* any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Eisenhower” that employ the term “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Eisenhower” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels, interacted with *Conf*. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data. The sample period is Eisenhower’s presidential term, January 1953 – January 1961. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.6: Predicting approval of Kennedy among whites by region – Regress on Articles as Fraction of Total Daily Article Count

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conf x Share of Civil Rights	-21.66*** (3.050)		
Conf x Share of Civil Rights Terms		-15.51*** (3.571)	
Conf x Share of Negro			-21.09*** (5.234)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Foreign Policy, War	0.637 (4.887)	1.656 (4.663)	0.280 (5.323)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Crime, Drugs	17.71 (13.37)	24.98 (15.03)	16.01 (14.19)
Conf x Share of Placebo: USSR	-0.596 (2.412)	0.0608 (2.767)	-1.960 (2.786)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Cuba, Castro	-4.706 (4.517)	-2.353 (4.518)	-1.858 (4.782)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Communism, Socialism	5.468 (4.208)	5.641 (5.223)	5.998 (6.177)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Taxes, Budget	-2.149 (3.018)	-4.374 (2.939)	-2.953 (2.975)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Employment	2.484 (5.377)	-1.473 (5.810)	1.022 (6.048)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Social Security	6.919 (8.607)	14.39 (8.634)	9.777 (10.06)
Conf x Share of Placebo: Agriculture	2.760 (4.557)	3.487 (4.833)	3.373 (5.296)
Observations	81365	81365	81365
Mean	0.673	0.673	0.673

Notes: State and survey date fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” in the New York Times. “Civil Rights Terms” is an expanded version of this search that refers to frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” *or* any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the term “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels, interacted with *Conf*. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data. The sample period is Kennedy’s presidential term, January 1953 – January 1961. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.7: Predicting approval of Kennedy among whites by region, controlling for *South* linear time trend

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conf x Civil Rights	-0.0434*** (0.00756)		
Conf x Civil Rights Terms		-0.0340*** (0.00716)	
Conf x Negro			-0.0391** (0.0144)
Conf x Linear Date	-0.000189*** (0.0000640)	-0.000185** (0.0000674)	-0.000185* (0.000105)
Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War	-0.00862 (0.0101)	-0.00137 (0.0118)	-0.00468 (0.0174)
Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs	0.00521 (0.0260)	-0.000764 (0.0299)	-0.00251 (0.0243)
Conf x Placebo: USSR	0.0202*** (0.00604)	0.0287*** (0.00669)	0.0196** (0.00878)
Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro	-0.00303 (0.00806)	0.00139 (0.00917)	0.00271 (0.0101)
Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism	-0.00875 (0.00584)	-0.0152** (0.00706)	-0.00973 (0.0126)
Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget	0.0163** (0.00736)	0.0199** (0.00757)	0.0183 (0.0117)
Conf x Placebo: Employment	0.00405 (0.0101)	-0.0144 (0.0136)	-0.0111 (0.0141)
Conf x Placebo: Social Security	-0.00270 (0.0131)	0.00676 (0.0139)	0.00696 (0.0232)
Conf x Placebo: Agriculture	0.0219*** (0.00704)	0.0228*** (0.00768)	0.0225** (0.0102)
Observations	81365	81365	81365
Mean	0.673	0.673	0.673

Notes: State and survey date fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” in the New York Times. “Civil Rights Terms” is an expanded version of this search that refers to frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” *or* any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the term “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels, interacted with *Conf*. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data. The sample period is Kennedy’s presidential term, January 1953 – January 1961. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.9: Regressing Democrat on $Conf \times After$ with and without *Confederate* time trend

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Conf x Aft	-0.154** (0.0677)	-0.180*** (0.0282)	-0.0522* (0.0300)	-0.154** (0.0677)	-0.175*** (0.0269)	-0.100*** (0.0334)	-0.165** (0.0658)	-0.173*** (0.0254)	-0.133*** (0.0347)
Conf x Year			-0.0107*** (0.00126)			-0.00529*** (0.00167)			-0.00247* (0.00140)
Observations	18921	521874	521874	18921	632494	632494	20192	755560	755560
Max Year	1972	1972	1972	1976	1976	1976	1980	1980	1980
Dataset	Gallup	Gallup all	Gallup all	Gallup	Gallup all	Gallup all	Gallup	Gallup all	Gallup all
Mean	0.453	0.432	0.432	0.453	0.425	0.425	0.452	0.427	0.427

Notes: Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. *After* is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. A time trend is included in the regression wherever the variable $Conf \times Year$, an interaction between *Confed* and survey year, is specified. The “Gallup all” includes survey years in which the “black president” question was not asked. The “Gallup” dataset restricts the sample to only survey years in which the “black president” question was asked, in line with the main results tables. “Max year” indicates the end point of the sample period (in all cases, the first year of the sample period is 1958). Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B. Details on “black president” questions from Gallup and GSS

Appendix Table B.1: Details on the Gallup “black president question”

Mon/Year	Black President Question Wording	Question Preceding Black President Question	Notes
7-8/1958	If he happened to be a Negro.	If he happened to be a Jew.	The main black president question reads as follows: "Between now and 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates....if your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president, would you vote for him—" Each of the response options follows the main question.
9/1958	Between now and 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race and the like..... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.	Questions 53A and 53B to be coded together. If "yes" to part A, edit answers into part B. Q.53A. Do you, yourself, plan to vote in the election this November or not. F. If "yes", ask: Q.53B. How certain are you that you will vote - absolutely certain, fairly certain, or not certain.	
12/1959	Between now and the time of the conventions in 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race, and the like...if your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.	Do you think Jesus Christ will ever return to earth. F. If "yes" to Q.66C, ask: Q.66D. When do you think this will happen.	
8/1961	Between now and 1964 there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race, and the like.... Q.31A. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.	Suppose there were only two major parties in the United States, one for liberals and one for conservatives, which one would you be most likely to prefer.	
8/1963	If he happened to be a Negro.	If he happened to be a Catholic.	The main black president question reads as follows: "There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like...If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be divorced, would you vote for him." Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Catholic, Negro, etc.) would replace "divorced."

Appendix Table B.1: Details on the Gallup “black president question” (continued)

Mon/Year	Black President Question Wording	Question Preceding Black President Question	Notes
7/1965	If he happened to be a Negro.	If he happened to be a Catholic.	The main black president question reads as follows: "There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be divorced, would you vote for him." Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Catholic, Negro, etc.) would replace "divorced."
4/1967	-- a Negro.	-- a Jew.	The main black president question reads as follows: "There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like...If your party nominated a generally well qualified man for president and he happened to be divorced, would you vote for him." Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Jew, Negro, etc.) would replace "divorced."
3/1969	If he happened to be a Negro.	If he happened to be a Catholic.	The main black president question reads as follows: "There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like...If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Jew, would you vote for him." Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Catholic, Negro, etc.) would replace "Jew."
10/1971	There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.	Is there any man not on this list whom you would like to see as the Republican candidate for vice president in 1972.	

Appendix Table B.1: Details on the Gallup “black president question” (continued)

Mon/Year	Black President Question Wording	Question Preceding Black President Question	Notes
7/1978	Between now and the time of the convention in 1980 there will be more discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates -- their education, age, religion, race, and the like... Q8a. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a black, would you vote for him?	Which political party do you think would be more likely to keep the United States out of World War III -- the Republican party or the Democratic party?	
3/1983	If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be black, would you vote for him?	Now, which of the persons on the list would be UNACCEPTABLE to you as the Democratic candidate for president in 1984.	
7/1984	This year there has been much discussion about the qualifications of Presidential candidates---their education, age, religion, race, and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, would you vote for him if he happened to be black?	Some people have very traditional values about such matters as sex, morality, family life and religion. If 1 represents someone who has VERY TRADITIONAL, OLD-FASHIONED values and 7 represents someone who has very LIBERAL, MODERN values about these matters, where on this 1 to 7 scale would you place yourself?	
7/1987	If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and if he happened to be black would you vote for him?	If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and if he happened to be an atheist would you vote for him?	
2/1999	Between now and the 2000 political conventions, there will be discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates -- their education, age, religion, race, and so on. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for president who happened to be [INSERT A-H], would you vote for that person?	Would you generally favor or oppose each of the following proposals as part of this year’s federal budget package?	Note that for the main black president question, "An atheist" precedes "Black" in the list of response options A-H.
5-6/2003	Between now and the 2004 political conventions, there will be discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates -- their education, age, religion, race, and so on. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for president who happened to be [INSERT A-D], would you vote for that person?	In the next few years, do you think the United States’ efforts against terrorism will – or will not – require the U.S. to put military troops in combat situations in other countries as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan?	Note that for the main black president question, "Jewish" precedes "Black" in the list of response options A-D.

Appendix Table B.2: Details on the GSS “black president question”

Mon/Year	Black President Question Wording	Question Preceding Black President Question
2/1972	If your party nominated a Negro for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	A. Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are Negroes? No (ASK B) Don't know (ASK B) B. IF NO OR DK TO A: Where half of the children are Negroes? No (ASK C). Don't know (ASK C) C. IF NO OR DK TO B: Where more than half of the children are Negroes?
3/1974	If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is -- far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average? (PROBE: Just your best guess.)
3/1975	If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Are there any (Negroes/Blacks) living in this neighborhood now? Yes... (ASK A-C). A. Are there any (Negro/Black) families living close to you? B. How many blocks (or miles) away do they (the [Negro/Black] families who live closest to you) live? C. Do you think this neighborhood will become all (Negro/Black) in the next few years, or will it remain integrated?
2/1977	If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements A. You can expect special problems with marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites. B. You can expect special problems with (Negro/Black) supervisors getting along with workers that are mostly white. C. A school board should not hire a person to teach if that person belongs to an organization that opposes school integration.
2-3/1978	If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on: (READ CATEGORIES A & B) Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Whites. B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Neither. Don't know.
2/1982	If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	A. In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school district to another? B. Now, thinking about ten years ago, that is in 1972, did you then favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school district to another?
2/1983	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on: (READ CATEGORIES A & B) Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Whites. B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. NEITHER. DON'T KNOW.
1/1985	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Black/Negro) and White school children from one school district to another?
12/1985 (1986 GSS)	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on: (READ CATEGORIES A & B) Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to whites. B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. NEITHER. DON'T KNOW.

Appendix Table B.2: Details on the GSS “black president question” (continued)

Mon/Year	Black President Question Wording	Question Preceding Black President Question
1/1988	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	May vary
1/1989	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	May vary
1/1990	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	May vary
1/1991	If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President. would you vote for him if he were qualified far the job?	May vary
1993 GSS	If your party nominated a/an (Black/African-American) for President. would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	May vary
1994 GSS	If your party nominated a/an (Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	May vary
Spring 1996 (1996 GSS)	If your party nominated a/an (Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	May vary

Appendix C. ANES analysis

In this section, we detail the questions that the ANES includes on racial equality during the Civil Rights era and explore how viable they are to use in an analysis similar to that in the main text of the paper.

C.1. Questions on school integration

As noted earlier, the ANES cumulative file includes questions from its individual year files *if those questions are deemed reasonably comparable and were repeated with sufficient frequency*. The only question related to civil rights that spans our pre- and post-periods that the ANES deems comparable over time is on school integration. It covers only a single pre-period year (1962) and is then asked most years from 1964 through 2000. Appendix Table C.1 gives the exact wording of the question each year it is asked (ignore 1956–1960 for the moment). Even though the ANES deems the question comparable from 1962 onward, non-trivial differences arise year to year. For example, in 1962 supporting integration but “not by force” is an option (and coded as support), whereas in 1964 that option is not offered. In 1964, the justification of it not being the “government’s business” is introduced, but this wording is not included in 1962.

These caveats aside, in Appendix Table C.2 we replicate our main analysis, using opposition to school integration in the same manner we used refusal to vote for a black president (those who answer “don’t know” or “unsure” are coded as being against integration). Again, we use only data from the ANES cumulative file. Col. (1) shows that the decline in Southern white support for the Democrats relative to other whites is smaller when we use this very abbreviated pre-period. As noted in Section 6, Catholics (almost all of whom lived outside the South) reacted to JFK’s administration with unprecedented support, whereas nearly half of white Southerners told Gallup they would never vote for a Catholic. As such, the small coefficient on *South* × *After* is likely an artifact of our single pre-period year being 1962 (the middle of JFK’s administration).

Nonetheless, while the small sample size reduces precision, the sign and magnitude of the triple interaction term reported in col. (2) supports the Gallup analysis. Relative to 1962, white Southerners against integration are nine percentage points less likely to identify as Democrats in 1964–1980, compared to their non-Southern counterparts. Whereas the Gallup analysis showed non-Southern whites with conservative racial views only slightly moving away from the party, the effect in the ANES is larger and achieves significance. These patterns of coefficients hold in when we extend the post-period to 2000 (cols. 3 and 4) or end it in 1970 (cols. 5 and 6).

The key drawback to restricting ourselves to the cumulative file is that its one question on racial attitudes that spans our two periods provides only a single pre-period year. We thus explore the viability of adding additional data from the *individual* year files, even though ANES did not deem these questions sufficiently comparable. The closest candidate is a question asked in 1956, 1958 and 1960. As detailed in Appendix Table C.1, the question asks for respondents’ agreement with the statement: “The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school” and unlike the version in the cumulative file offers respondents five possible answers based on the

strength of their opinion.

Given evidence that framing significantly affects survey answers, flipping the default between 1960 and 1962 is certainly not ideal (agreement with the pre-1962 statement would generally signal opposition to integration, whereas agreement with the 1962 and later versions would signal support of integration). Moreover, especially in 1956, it is not clear whether the government in Washington “staying out” of the question would signal opposition or support of school integration. In reaction to *Brown*, U.S. Senators and Representatives from the South drafted the Southern Manifesto in March of 1956, calling on all possible legal action to circumvent *Brown*.⁴⁷ It is thus quite possible that Southerners especially could interpret Washington “staying out” as in fact allowing *Brown* to progress.

These caveats notwithstanding, we attempt to combine these additional years, coding any degree of agreement that the government should “stay out” as opposition to integration. Appendix Figure C.1 plots the share of whites against integration by year and region. Overall, those outside the South are uniformly more in support of integration throughout the sample period. In 1956, the difference between regions is unusually small, consistent with some Southerners assuming federal intervention might be on the side of school segregation. There is a very large decline in support for segregation among non-Southerners in 1962, perhaps due to the change in the way the question is asked.

Cols. (7) through (12) of Appendix Table C.2 replicate the analysis in the first six columns, but include the three additional pre-period years from the individual year data files. Adding these additional years adds power as well as makes the *South* \times *After* coefficient larger in magnitude. Essentially, the results look very similar to the main Gallup analysis.

However, examining coefficients year-by-year paints a noisier picture (Appendix Figure C.2). Perhaps because of the Southern Manifesto, 1956 appears to be an extreme outlier, where white Southerners who wanted the government to involve themselves in school integration were also staunchly Democratic. Nor do we see a sharp drop in the Southern coefficient estimate between 1962 and 1964. Overall, however, we continue to see that in the pre-period, opposition to integration positively predicts Democratic identification in the South relative to elsewhere, and that this difference for the most part disappears in the post-period.

Given that the ANES cautions against longitudinal analysis with variables they do not include in the cumulative file, we show these results mostly for the sake of completeness and emphasize that we prefer the Gallup given the serious issues of question consistency highlighted above.

C.2. Questions on jobs and housing

The ANES cumulative file contains two questions on fair treatment of blacks in the areas of employment *and* housing (pre 1964) and employment alone (1964 and beyond), and thus in isolation we cannot use them to replicate the Gallup analysis. As Appendix Table C.3 shows, besides the inconsistent inclusion of housing, there are other non-trivial differences between these two series, likely the reason why ANES does not combine them into a single question in the cumulative file. First, whereas before 1964 it is left unclear as to which level (federal,

⁴⁷Richard Russell (D-GA) was its main author.

state or local) “the government” refers, the “the federal government” is specified in 1964 and later. Second, as with the school integration question, more flexibility on the degree of one’s agreement or disagreement are offered in the earlier years. Third, though not a fault of the question, the way that one answers is likely very different before and after the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, which in principle would have addressed many of these issues.


A final issue with this question unrelated to its consistency across time is that “fair treatment” is vague. If one believes that blacks are innately inferior or that the races should not mix, then limiting blacks to low-status jobs and segregated housing could be viewed as “fair.” Indeed, in 1958, the ANES specifically asks respondents to *explain* their views about school integration. Among those whose views were classified by ANES as “anti-Negro,” still only 32% percent disagreed that government should ensure “fair treatment” for blacks in the area of jobs and housing.⁴⁸ This cross-tabulation suggests the notion of fairness in the jobs/housing question may be so vague as to be meaningless.

Indeed, Appendix Figure C.3 is consistent with many of these concerns. First, regional differences on this question are very small relative to those for school integration. A sizable majority of Southerners agree that the government should guarantee “fair” treatment in jobs and housing, suggesting the notion is vague enough for most people to support. Unlike the black president question, whites in both regions become *less* supportive of the idea of time, perhaps because of a presumption CRA64 took care of the problem or because the understanding of “fair treatment” became broader over time. In any case, whether it is the addition of “federal government” to the wording of the question, the change in the number of options given as potential answers, or the passage of the CRA that summer, the new version of the question beginning in 1964 elicits significantly less support among whites than did the older question.

Despite these serious reservations and ANES classifying them as incomparable questions, for the sake of completeness we replicate our standard analysis by combining these two jobs/housing questions in Appendix Table C.4. Not surprising given that the question changes just at the point when our post-period begins, we do not find that including our triple interaction decreases the coefficient on *South* \times *After* nor is the triple interaction term itself significant.


⁴⁸Authors’ calculation from 1958 ANES individual year file.

Appendix Figure C.1: Share against school integration, by region and year




Source: ANES (cumulative file for 1964 and later, individual year files for 1956, 1958 and 1960).

Appendix Figure C.2: Coefficient from regressing *Dem* on *Against school integration* by region and year (whites in ANES)



Source: ANES (cumulative file for 1964 and later, individual year files for 1956, 1958 and 1960).

Appendix Figure C.3: Share against government guaranteeing “fair” treatment of blacks for jobs/housing



Source: ANES cumulative file. For 1956-1960, the question asks about jobs and housing. For 1964 onward, the question asks only about jobs. See details in Appendix Table C.3.

Appendix Table C.1: ANES school integration questions

Year	Question	Codes/Frequency	ANES cum. var name
1956	Q. 12P. 'THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOL.'	615 1. AGREE STRONGLY 144 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 110 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 163 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 518 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 22 8. DK 10 9. NA 180 0. NO OPINION	Not in cumulative file
1958	Q. 18A. "THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOL." DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION ON THIS OR NOT. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO THIS.	646 1. AGREE STRONGLY 149 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 94 3. NOT SURE. IT DEPENDS 124 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 612 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 154 7. NO OPINION 28 8. DK 15 9. NA	Not in cumulative file
1960	Q. 25A. 'THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOL.'	629 1. AGREE STRONGLY 118 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 129 3. NOT SURE. IT DEPENDS 155 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 641 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 51 8. DK 31 9. NA 200 0. NO OPINION	Not in cumulative file
1962	Q. 47A. (IF HAS OPINION ON FEDERALLY ENFORCED SCHOOL INTEGRATION) DO YOU AGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO THIS OR DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT DO IT. ["THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS."]	596 1. YES 33 2. YES, QUALIFIED 27 3. YES, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO FORCE. MODERATE. GRADUAL 13 4. NO, QUALIFIED 404 5. NO 9 8. DK 32 9. NA 183 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8, OR 9 IN REF.NO. 61	VCF0816
1964	Q. 23. "SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO (COLORED) CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. OTHERS CLAIM THAT THIS IS NOT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS." HAVE YOU BEEN CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER. Q. 23A. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD:	647 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO (COLORED) CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 113 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED 602 5. (YES) STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NONE OF ITS BUSINESS 52 8. DK 7 9. NA 150 0. NO INTEREST	VCF0816

Appendix Table C.1: ANES school integration questions (cont'd)

Year	Question	Codes/Frequency	ANES cum. var name
1966	A3. "SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. OTHERS CLAIM THAT THIS IS NOT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS". HAVE YOU BEEN CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER? A3A. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD:	594 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 96 3. (YES) PRO-CON, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED, OTHER 434 5. (YES) STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS 32 8. DK 9 9. NA 126 0. NO INTEREST ("NO" ANSWER TO Q.A3)	VCF0816
1968	Q. 24, 24A. "SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. OTHERS CLAIM THIS IS NOT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS." HAVE YOU BEEN CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER? (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD --	593 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 103 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED IN Q. 24A 681 5. (YES) STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NONE OF ITS BUSINESS 24 8. DK 10 9. NA 146 0. NO INTEREST ('NO' BOX CHECKED IN Q. 24)	VCF0816
1970	**TYPE 2 QUESTION** (IF 'YES' TO Q.10) Q.10A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD: SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS?	399 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 295 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS 86 7. OTHER; DEPENDS; BOTH BOXES CHECKED 12 8. DON'T KNOW 2 9. NA 98 0. INAP, CODED 1 IN REF. NO. 3, CODED 5, 8, OR 9 IN Q.10	VCF0816
1972	**FORMS 1 AND 2** PRE-ELECTION QUESTION --IF RESPONDENT IS CODED 1 IN Q.D2-- D2A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS?	995 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 1200 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS 182 7. OTHER; DEPENDS 38 8. DK 5 9. NA 285 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.D2	VCF0816

Appendix Table C.1: ANES school integration questions (cont'd)

Year	Question	Codes/Frequency	ANES cum. var name
1976	--IF RESPONDENT IS CODED 1 IN Q.E3-- Q.E3A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS <THE GOVERNMENT'S> BUSINESS?	690 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 1125 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS <THE GOVERNMENT'S> BUSINESS 237 7. OTHER; DEPENDS; ANTI-BUSING COMMENT QUALIFIED WITH STATEMENT THAT R IS NOT AGAINST INTEGRATION OR OPPORTUNITY 37 8. DK 4 9. NA 778 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.E3	VCF0816
1978	-- IF RESPONSE TO Q.F2 WAS "YES" -- Q.F2A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS (THE GOVERNMENT'S) BUSINESS?	616 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 924 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS (THE GOVERNMENT'S) BUSINESS 237 7. OTHER; DEPENDS 22 8. DK 6 9. NA 499 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.F2	VCF0816

Appendix Table C.2: Regressing Democrat identification on views on school integration, by time and region

	Cumulative File Only						Cumulative File + Indiv. Year Files					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Conf x Aft	-0.0143 (0.0495)	0.0788 (0.0824)	-0.0566 (0.0554)	0.0430 (0.0810)	0.0113 (0.0618)	0.0938 (0.0578)	-0.105** (0.0502)	-0.00696 (0.0524)	-0.142** (0.0575)	-0.0420 (0.0676)	-0.0704 (0.0575)	0.00650 (0.0665)
No school integ		0.0289 (0.0280)		0.0288 (0.0281)		0.0316 (0.0281)		-0.00348 (0.0140)		-0.00430 (0.0140)		-0.00348 (0.0135)
Conf x No school integ		0.108 (0.0943)		0.112 (0.0990)		0.105 (0.0971)		0.135*** (0.0419)		0.132*** (0.0425)		0.131*** (0.0424)
No school integ x Aft		-0.0654* (0.0358)		-0.0914*** (0.0335)		-0.0779* (0.0421)		-0.0330 (0.0203)		-0.0579*** (0.0174)		-0.0444* (0.0248)
Conf x No school integ x Aft		-0.0896 (0.118)		-0.0952 (0.109)		-0.0693 (0.101)		-0.114*** (0.0358)		-0.115*** (0.0350)		-0.0805* (0.0472)
Observations	11396	11396	17190	17190	5583	5583	15255	15255	21049	21049	9442	9442
Max Year	1980	1980	2000	2000	1970	1970	1980	1980	2000	2000	1970	1970
Mean	0.404	0.404	0.374	0.374	0.449	0.449	0.422	0.422	0.394	0.394	0.457	0.457

Notes: Year and State FE are included in all columns. “After” is 1963 and later (so, in ANES, first post-period year is 1964).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table C.3: ANES fair jobs/housing questions

Year	Question	Codes/Frequency	ANES cum. var. name
1956	Q. 12F. 'IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO.'	750 1. AGREE STRONGLY 320 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 114 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 114 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 224 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 30 8. DK; 7 9. NA ; 203 0. NO OPINION	VCF0818
1958	Q. 16A. "IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO." DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION ON THIS OR NOT. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO THIS.	860 1. AGREE STRONGLY 293 2. AGREE, BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 107 3. NOT SURE. IT DEPENDS 100 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 230 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 205 7. NO OPINION; 15 8. DK; 12 9. NA	VCF0818
1960	Q. 22A. 'IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO.'	889 1. AGREE STRONGLY 338 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 141 3. NOT SURE. IT DEPENDS 91 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 258 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 31 8. DK 34 9. NA 172 0. NO OPINION	VCF0818
1964	Q. 22. "SOME PEOPLE FEEL THAT IF NEGROES (COLORED PEOPLE) ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON OUGHT TO SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO. OTHERS FEEL THAT THIS IS NOT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS." HAVE YOU HAD ENOUGH INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER. Q. 22A. (IF YES) HOW DO YOU FEEL. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON:	611 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT NEGROES (COLORED PEOPLE) GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS 115 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED 626 5. (YES) LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 53 8. DK 6 9. NA 160 0. NO INTEREST	VCF9037
1968	Q. 23, 23A. "SOME PEOPLE FEEL THAT IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO. OTHERS FEEL THAT THIS IS NOT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS." HAVE YOU HAD ENOUGH INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER? (IF YES) HOW DO YOU FEEL? SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON --	593 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT NEGROES GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS 99 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED IN Q. 23A 663 5. (YES) LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 30 8. DK 9 9. NA 163 0. NO INTEREST ('NO' BOX CHECKED IN Q. 23)	VCF9037

Appendix Table C.3: ANES fair jobs/housing questions (cont'd)

Year	Question	Codes/Frequency	ANES cum. var. name
1972	<p>**FORMS 1 AND 2** PRE-ELECTION QUESTION --IF RESPONDENT IS CODED 1 IN Q.D1-- D1A. HOW DO YOU FEEL? SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SEE TO IT THAT BLACK PEOPLE GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS OR LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES?</p>	<p>1122 1. SEE TO IT THAT BLACK PEOPLE GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS 952 5. LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 161 7. OTHER; DEPENDS 25 8. DK 7 9. NA 438 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.D1</p>	VCF9037

Appendix Table C.4: Regressing Democrat on views on jobs/housing, by time and region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conf x Aft	-0.114** (0.0534)	-0.110** (0.0511)	-0.173** (0.0649)	-0.151* (0.0801)	-0.0880 (0.0666)	-0.116 (0.0891)
No fair jobs		-0.0391 (0.0278)		-0.0425 (0.0276)		-0.0377 (0.0278)
Conf x No fair jobs		0.118** (0.0553)		0.113* (0.0573)		0.120** (0.0562)
No fair jobs x Aft		-0.0252 (0.0313)		-0.0454 (0.0308)		-0.0611* (0.0328)
Conf x No fair jobs x Aft		-0.0436 (0.0559)		-0.0653 (0.0625)		0.00403 (0.0835)
Observations	7561	7561	11669	11669	5745	5745
Max Year	1980	1980	2000	2000	1970	1970
Mean	0.439	0.439	0.397	0.397	0.458	0.458

Notes: Year and State FE are included in all columns. “After” is 1963 and later (so, in ANES, first post-period year is 1964). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D. Details on media searches

D.1. NYT searches

The full code (in R) used to generate the article counts is available upon request. The table below provides the exact search terms used for each of the Civil Rights searches as well as the searches for “placebo issues.” Searches were performed for each date of Kennedy’s administration.

Appendix Table D.1: Details on *NYT* article searches

Category	Search terms
“Civil Rights” (narrow)	“Civil Rights”
Civil Rights terms (broad)	“civil rights,” “segregation,” “segregate,” “segregated,” “integration,” “integrate,” “integrated”
Negro	“Negro”
Foreign Policy, War	“war”, “peace”, “atomic”, “security”, “defense”, “foreign policy”, “international relations”, “international tensions”
Crime, Drugs	“crime”, “juvenile delinquency”, “narcotics”
USSR	“russia”, “soviet”, “soviets”, “russian”, “ussr”
Cuba, Castro	“cuban”, “cuba”, “castro”
Communism, Socialism	“communism”, “socialism”, “communist”, “socialist”
Taxes, Budget	“tax”, “taxes”, “budget”
Employment	“Employment”, “recession”, “unemployment”, “cost of living”, “wages”, “inflation”
Social Security	“Social security”, “social services”, “welfare”, “old age”
Agriculture	“farm”, “agriculture”, “agricultural”

For each search, “President” and “Kennedy” was also appended. Full code available upon request. Searches are not case-sensitive.

D.2. Research assistant article coding

Each RA received a spreadsheet that included the title of the article and its link (which they read via the *NYT* TimesMachine option).

The instructions were given via email as follows (note that, sadly, typos indeed appear in the original):

Please skim each article. We are interested in your assessment of the article after reading the headline, first few paragraphs, and skimming the rest.

Please categorize each article into one of the following four categories:

1. False hit (main subject of article is NOT civil rights).
2. Pro civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats more generally are pushing toward greater racial equality, that Southerners are unhappy about JFK/Dem stance on this issue, that Southerners worry that JFK/Dems are about to push forward on this issue, etc.)
3. Anti civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats are holding the status quo on the issue of racial equality, that Southerners are NOT worried or are even pleased about JFK/Dems on this issue relative to Republicans, etc.)
4. Mixed (article suggests that JFK/Dem efforts on issue of racial equality are mixed or unclear)

Note that there many articles will probably offer at east some “on the one hand....on the other” analysis, but when possible try to decide if it is general more “pro” or “anti” (though certainly if you feel it is truly mixed, you should categorize it as such).

Excel instructions:

1. For “false hit” enter “F”
2. For “pro civil rights” enter “P”
3. For “anti civil rights” enter “A”
4. For “mixed” enter “M”

Thank you!

A basic summary of the RAs’ coding outcomes is presented below. Further details available upon request.

Appendix Table D.2: RA coding statistics

	sum	mean
All	2230	2.154589
Pro (Averaged across RAs)	714	.6898551
Pro (RA1)	614	.5932367
Pro (RA2)	814	.7864734
Observations	1035	

Notes: RA1 was not aware of our hypothesis that the Spring of 1963 represented a major turning point in Kennedy’s association with Civil Rights but knew about the overall project. RA2 did not know anything about the project at the time she coded the articles (but was informed ex post).