We are grateful to seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, the Cornell-PSU Fall 2013 meeting, McGill University, the International Macroeconomics Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the University of Pittsburgh, the Riksbank and the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University for helpful comments and questions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. Both markets are fragile: excessively responsive to fundamentals and prone to strategic uncertainty. This interaction, termed a diabolic loop, is driven by government willingness to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks not to self-insure through equity buffers. We provide conditions such that the diabolic loop is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government arising from instability in debt markets.
Abstract

This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. Both markets are fragile: excessively responsive to fundamentals and prone to strategic uncertainty. This interaction, termed a ‘diabolic loop’, is driven by government willingness to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks not to self-insure through equity buffers. We provide conditions such that the ‘diabolic loop’ is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government arising from instability in debt markets.

1 Introduction

The following quote is from a 2012 speech by IMF Director Christine Lagarde:

We must also break the vicious cycle of banks hurting sovereigns and sovereigns hurting banks. This works both ways. Making banks stronger, including by restoring adequate capital levels, stops banks from hurting sovereigns through higher debt or contingent liabilities. And restoring confidence in sovereign debt helps banks, which are important...
holders of such debt and typically benefit from explicit or implicit guarantees from sovereigns[1].

Following the Greek sovereign debt write-down in 2011, the four largest Greek banks made losses of more than 28 billion euros (or 13% of GDP)[2]. This was enough to wipe out almost all of their combined equity capital. In 2010, the Irish government ran an unprecedented peace-time deficit, reaching 32% of GDP as it bailed out its banking system. Under the weight of nationalized banks’ losses, Ireland was forced to seek financial support from the IMF and the EU in November 2010.

These are two recent examples of a ‘diabolic loop’ between banks and sovereigns. In the case of Greece, banks that were otherwise solvent, were made insolvent by the default of their sovereign whose debt they were holding[3]. In the case of Ireland, a government which had previously had one of the lowest levels of debt to GDP in Europe, suffered a withdrawal of funding as markets became concerned about the contingent liabilities involved in bailing out its large, insolvent banking system. Throughout the rest of southern Europe, this ‘diabolic loop’ has operated in a less dramatic fashion but has nevertheless contributed to ongoing strains in sovereign and bank debt markets.

This paper models the channels that transmit fragility in the valuation of government debt onto the banking system. The framework combines the canonical model of sovereign debt fragility (Calvo (1988)) with the canonical model of banking instability (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). Put differently, the framework studies the interaction of strategic complementarities in debt and financial markets.

Sovereign debt fragility arises due to a strategic complementarity between the buyers of government bonds and the government default decision, as in Calvo (1988). Since the government’s ability to repay debt depends inversely on the real interest rate it has to pay, this opens up the possibility of self-fulfilling pessimistic equilibria in which the high interest rate needed to compensate bond holders for high expected default risk weakens the government’s solvency and validates the pessimistic default expectations.

Banks are fragile due to liquidity and solvency risks as they provide liquidity insurance to their depositors while holding risky assets such as government debt. The collapse of the intermediation process leads to large output and welfare costs to the real economy.

Motivated from the European experience, we consider two channels whose interactions complete the ‘diabolic loop’. The first is the strong tendency by banks to hold (their own) government debt

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[3]The term ‘diabolic loop’ was evidently coined by Markus Brunnermeier in a presentation on the Euro Crisis at the July 2012 NBER Summer Institute.
both as a long-term investment and as a source of liquidity. Table 1 shows data on European banks’ government debt holdings which was released as part of the EBA stress test conducted in 2011. The table focuses on the so-called ‘peripheral Eurozone countries’ whose debt had come under pressure during the sovereign debt crisis which began in 2010.

Two points are immediately apparent from the table. First, the exposure of southern European banks to EEA sovereign debt is very high. The average GIIPS, (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), bank holds 15.8% of risk-weighted assets in EEA government securities. The second fact highlighted in the table is that banks are heavily invested in the debt of their own government. This lack of diversification is critical for the ‘diabolic loop’.

Table 1: European Holding of Sovereign Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All GIIPS</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EEA30 government debt</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which domestic government debt</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

European banks’ holdings of EEA and domestic government debt as a percentage of total risk weighted assets. Source: 2011 EBA Stress Test.

The second channel arises due to the explicit (via deposit insurance) or implicit guarantees that governments provide to their banking systems. One of the contributions of the paper is to provide conditions for governments to provide guarantees.

Our model economy highlights fragility in debt markets arising from multiple self-fulfilling valuations of government debt, building on the interaction of domestically held debt and government guarantees. In this setting, if the government debt market switches to a pessimistic (high interest rate, high default risk) equilibrium, government bond prices fall and the banks holding the bonds suffer losses. At this point (due to the high output costs of bank defaults), governments are forced to intervene and bail their banks out, further increasing government debt at precisely the point when high interest rates are making repayment difficult. The result is a further decline in government debt prices, leaving a deeper hole in bank balance sheets and requiring a larger bailout. This is the ‘diabolic loop’ between government debt and the banking system.

There is ample evidence for the interaction we study in the paper. Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) and Hannoun (2011) show that European sovereign and bank CDS prices exhibit positive co-movement over the crisis period while showing little correlation pre-crisis. When government and bank balance sheets become closely intertwined, their default probabilities become

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4European Banking Authority.
5European Economic Area. This includes the 27 EU countries as well as Norway and Switzerland.
highly correlated too. Our focus on bailouts as an important linkage between banks and sovereigns is supported by Pagano (2014) who provides evidence that European governments have shown a greater willingness to provide assistance to financial institutions compared to the US and UK. 

In this paper we study the policy options of the crisis-prone country in isolation of other members of a currency or economic union. We consider two ways in which policymakers and private agents can (in Christine Lagarde’s words) ‘break the vicious cycle of banks hurting sovereigns and sovereigns hurting banks’.

On the banking side, equity cushions can break the adverse feedbacks between banks and sovereigns. Banks that hold adequate capital against potential sovereign risks become completely insulated from developments in debt markets, severing a key channel of crisis transmission from governments to the banking system. However, when banks expect bailout assistance to be provided \textit{ex post}, the incentive for them to self-insure by building up equity buffers against losses disappears. Worse than this, banks overinvest in risky government debt, putting further contingent liabilities on an already fragile sovereign. Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli (2014) provide compelling evidence for this behaviour. They show that European banks increased their holdings of domestic sovereign debt in response to an increase in country-specific risk - a finding they attribute to moral hazard.

On the sovereign side, we examine a key policy which affects the ‘diabolic loop’ - the \textit{ex post} choice of whether to provide bailout assistance to the banking system during a crisis. We argue that if the collapse of the financial system is very costly for the real economy, then governments always provide a bailout \textit{ex post}, thus removing the need for banks to self-insure \textit{ex ante} by issuing equity. However, a sovereign with the power to commit \textit{ex ante} would choose not to do so, leaving it to the banks to protect depositors through equity buffers. This highlights a key part of the analysis: a necessary ingredient for the ‘diabolic loop’ is limited commitment by the government.

The interaction between sovereign and bank balance sheets has been the subject of a growing literature since the start of the European debt crisis. Similar to our work, Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) also model the balance sheet linkages between banks and sovereigns but do not consider how anticipated bailouts affect banks’ incentives to hold government bonds and/or issue equity to guard against sovereign exposures. Uhlig (2013) appeals to moral hazard in order to explain banks’ tendency to hold large quantities of government debt. In Uhlig (2013), inadequate collateral haircuts imposed by the central bank in a monetary union allow weak country banks

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\textsuperscript{6}Pagano (2014) examines the difference in banks’ ‘standalone’ credit ratings with the ratings they receive when potential government support is taken into account. He shows that government support reduces banks’ funding costs by 60 bps in the EU as compared to 10-20 bps for the US and UK.

\textsuperscript{7}Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2013) show that banks’ domestic debt exposures can serve as a government commitment device against strategic sovereign default. They do not consider the role of bank bailouts. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) also consider international spillovers through cross-country sovereign debt holdings.
to profitably default on the central bank when economic fundamentals deteriorate. Farhi and Tirole (2014) examine the effects of fundamental shocks in creating feedback effects between banks and sovereigns. Leonello (2014) analyses strategic complementarities between bank depositors and sovereign debt holders and uses a ‘global games’ framework to endogenise the crisis probability. Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014) show that banks’ holdings of government debt can also add to the weakness of the real economy by crowding out lending for productive purposes.\(^8\)

One important factor that has received little attention in the literature is banks’ equity issuance decision. In contrast, our paper places a strong emphasis on the importance of banks’ equity buffers for the severity of the ‘diabolic loop’. As we show subsequently, significant investments in government bonds are not a problem \textit{per se} as long as banks hold significant capital buffers against sovereign exposures. In this respect our paper is also related to the work of Admati and Hellwig (2013) which stresses the importance of adequate equity buffers in order to make banking safe without resorting to bailouts.

Though the paper is not intended to provide policy guidance, it does lend support to regulatory interventions which strengthen capital requirements. Further, policies that provide incentives for bank holding of domestic debt, such as the Basel III regime, only strengthen the ‘diabolic loop’. Interventions to increase capital requirements and reduce bank reliance on domestic debt holdings would weaken the ‘diabolic loop’, consistent with the policy goals of IMF Director Christine Lagarde.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the baseline model. The multiplicity of valuations of government debt is highlighted in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the Nash equilibria of the interactions between the banks and the government. Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Framework

Time lasts for three periods: 0, 1 and 2. The model has two principal components. The first is a banking relationship between intermediaries and depositors, following Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The second component is the pricing of government debt, following Calvo (1988) and others.\(^9\)

The intermediation process and pricing of government debt are linked in a couple of ways. First, the value of the government debt held by the banks affects their solvency. Second, the potential and realized needs to bailout the financial sector influences the value of government debt. Third, banking problems affect the real economy and impact on the size of the tax base, thus

\(^8\)Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014) provide empirical evidence of such effects in the European sovereign debt crisis.

\(^9\)There are now a number of papers building on Calvo (1988), including Cole and Kehoe (2000) and, more recently, Corsetti and Dedola (2012), Roch and Uhlig (2012), Cooper (2012) and many others.
adding a further valuation effect on government debt. These interactions can be activated by either fundamental shocks or self-fulfilling expectations influencing the value of government debt.

There are four types of agents: households, banks, investors and the government. We discuss the choices and objectives of these agents and then characterize the equilibria.

Ultimately the uncertainty in the model will come from self-fulfilling variations in investors beliefs about government debt repayment. That is, we will study debt fragility as part of a sunspot equilibrium. In framing the choice problems for agents, let \( s \) denote the state of the economy. The state is linked to investor beliefs in the characterization of a sunspot equilibrium in section 4.

2.1 Households

Households are of size 1. They have an endowment of goods \( d \) at \( t = 0 \) with preferences

\[
V_0^H = \pi u (c_1 + \beta c_2) + (1 - \pi) u (\beta c_1 + c_2).
\]

Here \( \beta \) is close to 0. With probability \( \pi \) they are early consumers who prefer consuming at \( t = 1 \) and with probability \( 1 - \pi \) they are late consumers who prefer consuming at \( t = 2 \). The shares of early consumers at the aggregate level is fixed at \( \pi \). We assume \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and \( u(0) \) is finite.

2.2 Banks

Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), consumers can share liquidity risk through the banking system. Banks construct a portfolio for households which provides the needed liquidity while still taking advantage of longer term investment opportunities. In addition to providing liquidity, the bank provides insurance to households, both against their individual taste shock and government default risk. As is well understood, it is this interaction of liquidity needs and illiquid investment that can lead to fragility in the banking system. In our framework, by holding government debt as a means of meeting the liquidity needs of households, the bank is exposed to fluctuations in the value of government debt.

Banks are competitive. Ex ante banks offer contracts to consumers. The contract specifies the levels of early, denoted \( c^E(s) \), and late consumption, denoted \( c^L(s, 1_G) \), dependent on the sunspot state \( s \), realized in period 1, as well as the period 2 government repayment decision, where \( 1_G = 1 \) if the government defaults on its debt and \( 1_G = 0 \) if there is repayment. They raise deposits \( d \) from households in period 0. Investors also supply equity, denoted \( x_0 \), to the bank.

Banks invest in two types of assets in period 0. They can buy government bonds \( b_0 \) at price \( q_0 \). These bonds do not pay a coupon at the middle date but can be traded in the secondary market.
Second, banks can make long term investments \( i_0 \) that return \( R > 1 \). These investments have a liquidation value at the middle date of \( 0 \leq \varepsilon \leq 1 \). Banks can adjust their portfolios in the middle period, after \( s \) is realized.

The optimal contract between the banks and the households solves:

\[
\max_{i_0, b_0, x_0, c^E(s), c^L(s, 1_G), l_1(s), b_1(s), L_1(s)} \quad E[\pi u (c^E(s)) + (1 - \pi) u (c^L(s, 1_G))] 
\]

such that

\[
i_0 + q_0 b_0 \leq d + x_0
\]

\[
\pi c^E(s) \leq q_1(s) (b_0 - b_1(s)) + \varepsilon l_1(s) + L_1(s) \forall s
\]

\[
(1 - \pi) c^L(s, 1_G) \leq (1 - 1_G) b_1(s) + R (i_0 - l_1(s)) - \delta_2(s, 1_G) - r^b L_1(s) \forall s
\]

\[
E \delta_2(s, 1_G) \geq Rx_0.
\]

In this problem, the expectation is taken over the distribution of the sunspot variable, \( s \), and the over the distribution of government default.

From (2), the total funding of the bank, \( d + x_0 \), is invested in illiquid investment, \( i_0 \) and government bonds, \( b_0 \), at a price \( q_0 \). The funding for the payment to the early households comes from three sources, as indicated by (3). First, the bank can sell some of the government debt it acquired in period 0 to the investors to obtain goods for early consumers. These sales occur at a state contingent price \( q_1(s) \). Second, the bank could liquidate some of the illiquid investment, denoted \( l_1(s) \) in (3). The liquidation of the illiquid technology is equivalent to having access to a storage technology with a return of \( \varepsilon \) between period 0 and 1. Finally, the bank could borrow from investors or other banks, denoted \( L_1(s) \) in (3), at a rate \( r^b \). We refer to this as a loan in the interbank market. This provides a second way for the bank to finance \( c^E(s) \).

From (4), the state contingent consumption of late households is financed by the bonds held until the last period as well as the return on the illiquid investment that was not liquidated in the middle period. Further, the bank has the returns to investor loans made at the middle date.

The final constraint, (5) ensures that the expected return on equity is not less than the outside option of investing \( x_0 \) in the illiquid technology. Here \( \delta(s, 1_G) \) is the state contingent payout of dividends to equity holders.

The potential risks to depositors should be clear from this optimization problem. First, there is uncertainty over the period 1 value of government debt. Second, there is sovereign default risk. The optimal contract will optimally allocate this risk between households and investors as well as provide liquidity to early households.

The first-order conditions for this problem are analyzed in Section 6.1. These conditions are used to characterize equilibria in Section 4 in the Appendix.
In the construction of equilibria, it will be necessary to describe the outcome of the banking arrangement when banks anticipate government support but, off the equilibrium path, it chooses not to provide it. This discussion of a ‘resolution mechanism’ is delayed until the characterization of equilibria.

### 2.3 Investors

Investors are risk neutral agents (of size 1) with endowments in periods \( t \) of \( A_t \) for \( t = 0, 1, 2 \). They consume in periods 1 and 2 with preferences given by \( c_1 + \frac{c_2}{R} \). The assumption that investors discount at \( \frac{1}{R} \) will determine the asset returns in equilibrium.

In the first period, investors allocate their endowment to the purchase of government debt (\( b_0^I \)), bank equity (\( x_0 \)) and illiquid investments (\( i_0^I \)). Their budget constraint is:

\[
A_0 = q_0 b_0^I + x_0 + i_0^I.
\]

Their budget constraint in period 1 is:

\[
c_1^I(s) = A_1 + q_1(s)(b_0^I - b_1^I(s)) - L_1^I(s)
\]

as the investor can purchase government debt of \( b_1^I(s) - b_0^I \) and lend to banks, \( L_1^I(s) \). The budget constraint in period 2 is:

\[
c_2^I(s, 1_G) = (1 - \tau(1_G)) A_2(1_G, 1_B) + b_1^I(1_G) + R_t^I_0 + \delta_2(s, 1_G) + r^b L_1^I(s)
\]

where \( \tau \) is the tax rate on investor’s endowment. In period 2, the endowment of the investor is augmented by the returns to bond holdings and the long term investments plus the repayments on bank loans. The government default decision influences investor consumption through the tax rate, the investors endowment (explained below) and the return on bonds.

The investors’ endowment at the final date, \( A_2 \), serves as the tax base for debt service. Its value depends on the operations of the intermediation process as well as the default choice of the government.

The dependence of \( A_2 \) on the intermediation process captures the disruptive effects of a breakdown in the financial system. For one specific model of this, see Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2013). In our model, the disruption has the effect of reducing the endowment of the investors and hence the tax base. The output loss is parameterized by \( \psi \) in (9) where \( 1_B = 1 \) if the intermediation process breaks down.

In addition, following Eaton and Gersowitz (1981), government default leads to output costs. This is reflected in the reduction in the \( (1 - \gamma 1_G) \) term in the investors’ endowment where \( 1_G = 1 \) if the government defaults.
Specifically, the investor’s endowment in the last period is given by:

\[ A_2 = \bar{A}(1 - \psi 1_B)(1 - \gamma 1_G). \]  

(9)

As made clear by the propositions in section 4, these two parameters \((\psi, \gamma)\) are key determinants of the government’s choice on supporting banks. Importantly, they have very different effects on the bailout decision and hence on the diabolic loop.

A large value of \(\psi\) implies that disruptions in the intermediation process are socially costly. This captures, in a tractable manner, the effects of a financial crisis on output and productivity. Clearly, a large value of this cost will motivate a bailout.

One of the main costs of a debt-financed bailout is the prospect of future default. The costs of default, such as exclusion from future trades and the attempt of creditors to seize assets, are captured by \(\gamma\). When default costs are high, bailout becomes socially costly and thus less likely to occur.

2.4 The Government

The government issues debt \(B_0\) at price \(q_0\) in period 0 to fund government expenditure \(G_0\). This is two-period debt with repayment due in period 2. At the middle date, it issues additional debt to finance period 1 government expenditure \(G_1\) and, if it chooses, make transfers to support the banking system. At the end of period 1, the debt outstanding is \(B_1(q_1)\).

We assume that the size of time 0 government spending is smaller than the deposits of households in the bank. This makes it feasible for banks to buy the government debt stock which is convenient in the construction of the pessimistic equilibrium with government intervention.

Assumption 1. \(d > G_0\).

2.4.1 The Dependence of \(B_1\) on \(q_1\)

The dependence of the debt issuance in the middle period on \(q_1\) is a key element of the analysis. In fact, \(B_1(q_1)\) is a decreasing function of \(q_1\).

A leading reason for \(B_1(q_1)\) to be contingent on \(q_1\) comes from government spending. Suppose the government is committed to spending \(G_1 > 0\) in period 1. It must sell new debt of \(\frac{G_1}{q_1}\) to finance this level of real spending.

A second reason for \(B_1(q_1)\) depend on \(q_1\) comes from government support of the banking system through debt repurchases\(^{10}\) As we shall argue below, this support of the banking system is\(^{10}\) Equivalently, the support could be in the form of deposit insurance.

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inversely related to the value of government debt in period 1. A reduction in \( q_1 \) can lead to the deterioration of bank balance sheets, bank failures and thus the provision of financial support for these intermediaries. By assumption, the government sells additional debt to finance these transfers.

Let \( T(q_1) \) be the transfers to the banking system when the current price of debt is \( q_1 \). Though not explicit, the transfer will also depend on the debt buyback price of the government. Then the debt outstanding at the end of period 1 is

\[
B_1(q_1) = B_0 + \frac{G_1 + T(q_1)}{q_1}. \tag{10}
\]

The analysis will generally use both of these channels that link debt issuance in the middle period to the state of the economy. In the construction of an equilibrium, the value of government debt in the middle period will be linked to the state \( s \). Finally, we will allow the government to decide whether or not to support the financial system, thus making the dependence of \( B_1 \) on \( q_1 \) through this channel endogenous.

### 2.4.2 Taxation and Default

The government taxes investors’ endowments \( A_2 \) at the final date. The tax rate required to meet the total obligations of the government is equal to

\[
\tau = \frac{B_1(q_1)}{A_2}.
\]

By taxing investors’ endowments, the government taxation does not directly impact the intermediation process. Any frictions that impinge on the deposit contract, such as sequential service, are irrelevant for the government’s ability to collect taxes. However, the tax base does depend on the functioning of the intermediation process, as in (9).

To introduce the possibility of default into the analysis, assume the government’s capacity to tax the endowment of the investors is random and drawn from a known probability distribution \( F(\tau) \) with associated density \( f(\tau) \). The uncertainty about tax capacity, denoted \( \tau \), is realized at the final date. This naturally leads to the possibility of default due to bad fundamentals (as opposed to strategic default): a low realization of \( \tau \) could trigger government insolvency despite a large tax base \( (A_2) \).

If \( \tau < \frac{B_1(q_1)}{A_2} \), the government must default on its obligations where \( A_2 = \bar{A}(1 - \psi I_B) \). The probability of default is therefore equal to \( F \left( \frac{B_1(q_1)}{A_2} \right) \) while the probability of repayment is given

\[11\] The discussion of government intervention below includes more detail on this policy.

\[12\] Alternatively, \( A_2 \) could be random.
by $1 - F\left(\frac{B_1(q_1)}{A_2}\right)$. Once the government is forced to default, it defaults fully. But, if $\tau > \frac{B_1(q_1)}{A_2}$, the government repays its debt obligation. No additional taxes are collected.

# 3 Debt Fragility

This section characterizes debt fragility in the economy. In particular, there can exist multiple valuations of government debt in period 1. This multiplicity will be used to construct sunspot equilibria.

In period 1, the debt is priced by risk neutral investors who discount the future at rate $\frac{1}{R}$. To avoid arbitrage, the price $q_1$ must satisfy

$$1 - F\left(\frac{B_1(q_1)}{A(1-\psi_1 B)}\right) = q_1$$

(11)

where $B_1(q_1)$ is given by (10). As argued earlier, $B_1(q_1)$ is decreasing in $q_1$ so the left side is increasing in $q_1$. As $q_1$ increases, the amount of debt outstanding decreases and the probability of repayment increases with $q_1$.

Some of the analysis will study the pricing of debt in the absence of bank bailout. In this case, the arbitrage condition simplifies to:

$$1 - F\left(\frac{B_0+(G_1/q_1)}{A(1-\psi_1 B)}\right) = q_1.$$  

(12)

Even without bailouts, the dependence of $B_1$ on $q_1$ through the financing of $G_1$ can generate multiple solutions to this pricing equation. The key to the multiplicity is that both sides of (12) are increasing in $q_1$.

**Assumption 2.** There are multiple solutions to (12), including $q_1 = \frac{1}{R}$ and a locally stable solution with $q_1 < \frac{1}{R}$.

Once $B_1(q_1)$ is decreasing in $q_1$, it is straightforward to construct multiple solutions of (12) since there is flexibility in the choice of the distribution of tax capacity. Implicitly this assumption is a restriction on $F(\cdot)$.

Our study of debt fragility is based upon (12). Without this multiplicity, there would be no strategic uncertainty in debt markets and thus no spillovers to financial markets.

Assumption 2 also imposes a default free solution to the debt pricing equation. This establishes a useful benchmark but is not restrictive. The existence of a solution without default only simplifies the analysis: multiple solutions could exist even if there is no default free solution.
Figure 1 illustrate solutions to (12). The function \[1 - F\left(\frac{B_0 + (G_1/q_1)}{A(1-\psi B)}\right)\] is the ‘debt valuation equation’ because it determines the price of government debt (as a function of itself). It is depicted as the black dashed curve. The points of intersection of this curve and the 45-degree line are solutions to (11).

From Assumption 2 there is a point labeled ‘optimism’ in Figure 1 where the default probability is zero so that \(q_1 = \frac{1}{R}\). That is, \(F\left(\frac{B_0 + (G_1/q_1)}{A_2}\right) = 0\). This corresponds to the valuation of government debt in the optimistic equilibrium without default.

The slope of the debt valuation equation is given by \(-f\left(\frac{B_1 A_1}{A_2}\right)\frac{B_1'(q_1)}{A_2}\) where \(f(\cdot)\) is the density associated with the distribution function \(F(\cdot)\). This expression is zero at high levels of \(q_1\) when government debt is very far from the default point. This is the case when the density of the tax capacity random variable \(f\left(\frac{B_1}{A_2}\right) = 0\).

The curve crosses the x-axis at the point at which the price of government debt becomes so low that the government is insolvent with probability 1. The location of this intersection point depends on the support of the distribution of the tax capacity shock.

At the ‘pessimism’ point, the debt valuation curve is assumed to have a slope less than unity implying that the pessimistic equilibrium would be stable under a dynamic adjustment of private beliefs.

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13 The slope of the debt valuation equation is given by \(-f\left(\frac{B_1 A_1}{A_2}\right)\frac{B_1'(q_1)}{A_2}\) where \(f(\cdot)\) is the density associated with the distribution function \(F(\cdot)\). This expression is zero at high levels of \(q_1\) when government debt is very far from the default point. This is the case when the density of the tax capacity random variable \(f\left(\frac{B_1}{A_2}\right) = 0\).

The curve crosses the x-axis at the point at which the price of government debt becomes so low that the government is insolvent with probability 1. The location of this intersection point depends on the support of the distribution of the tax capacity shock.

At the ‘pessimism’ point, the debt valuation curve is assumed to have a slope less than unity implying that the pessimistic equilibrium would be stable under a dynamic adjustment of private beliefs.
In addition, there are other equilibria in which the value of debt, $q_1$, is lower. These are labeled ‘pessimism’ and ‘collapse’ in the figure. The resulting higher debt obligation in period 2 generates a positive probability of default and thus lower values of $q_1$. By Assumption 2, there will exist a locally stable pessimistic solution.

The inclusion of bailouts, $T(q_1) > 0$, provides a powerful amplification mechanism of the effects of strategic uncertainty in the government debt market by adding a further negative dependence of bond issuance on the debt price. By bailing out banks, the resulting increase in amount of debt outstanding reduces the value of the debt and hence makes banks even more precarious. This is precisely the ‘diabolic loop’ in our model.

The interaction through bailouts is illustrated in Figure 2. The solid curve assumes no bailouts while the dashed one allows bailouts. For illustration, the dashed curve is drawn for a case where the structure of the set of equilibria is not affected by the government buyback policy. By continuity, this will be the case for sufficiently small buyback programs. The following assumption on $T(q_1)$ focuses on this case. The analysis will study buyback policies that satisfy this assumption and those that do not.

**Assumption 3.** For every locally stable solution to (11) with $T(q_1) \equiv 0$, there exists a locally stable solution to (11) with debt buyback, $T(q_1) \neq 0$.

By Assumption 2, there are multiple crossings of the solid curve and the 45 degree line. As $T(q_1) > 0$, the dashed curve is below the solid curve for all $q_1$. By Assumption 3, debt prices in the locally stable pessimistic equilibria are shown as $\hat{q}_1$ and $\tilde{q}_1$. Due to local stability, the pessimistic debt price without a bailout is higher than that with one.

To summarize, this section constructs multiple solutions to the valuation of government debt, (11), in period 1. The multiplicity relies upon an inverse relationship between the amount of debt issued in period 1 and the value of government debt. The analysis provides two mechanisms for this inverse relationship: (i) financing of government spending and (ii) support of the banking system.

### 4 The ‘Diabiotic Loop’ as a Nash Equilibrium

This section characterizes sub-game perfect Nash Equilibria for our economy. The players are the banks, the households and the government. The banks simultaneously and independently move first, setting contracts with households and deciding on their portfolio, including the amount of equity financing. These contracts are set in period 0, recognizing the possibility of strategic uncertainty influencing the valuation of government debt in period 1 as well as any government support.

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14 In other words, the locally stable pessimistic equilibrium still exists under bailouts.
We construct sunspot equilibria as a randomization between two solutions to (11). One is the no default solution labeled ‘optimism’ in Figure 1. The other solution is labeled ‘pessimism’ in Figure 1 for the case in which there are no bailouts. If there are bailouts, the outcome with pessimism is a locally stable solution to (11) with a valuation of debt less than $\frac{1}{R}$. An example of this is shown in Figure 2 as the point associated with the debt price of $\tilde{q}_1$. This crossing exists if Assumption 3 holds. In the analysis, we study situations in which this assumption holds and when it fails.

Given the choices of the banks, after the sunspot is realized, the government will, in period 1, either support the banks or not. This decision is a key part of the analysis. Along the equilibrium path, the expectations underlying the choices of the investors, depositors and the banking contract are fulfilled.

**Definition 1.** A *Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium* (SPNE) is a set of bank equity issuance and debt purchase strategies, a set of government bailout provision strategies and a set of realizations
of government debt prices as a function of the debt sunspot realizations such that: (i) Individual banks solve (1) given the government’s bank bailout strategy, the exogenous probabilities of government debt sunspot shock realizations and the prices of government debt at these sunspot realizations, (ii) the government chooses whether or not to bailout the banks in order to maximize social welfare taking bank government debt exposures as given, and (iii) the government debt markets clear at each sunspot realization.

The SPNE will depend on the government’s ability to commit to a bank bailout policy. Our approach is to study two cases. At one extreme, a committed government chooses ex ante, i.e. in period 0, whether to bailout the banks. At the other extreme, a weak government is incapable of any kind of commitment and decides whether or not to bailout a financial institution in period 1 to maximize ex post social welfare.

We study whether the diabolic loop exists in all these cases. If the government lacks commitment and the cost of default (particularly the disruption of the intermediation process) is large enough, then the government will be led to support the banking system. Anticipating this, banks will issue no equity and are vulnerable to the strategic uncertainty emanating from the debt market.

But, if the government is able to commit not to provide financial support, then the banking system is immune from debt fragility. Anticipating no government support, the banks are led to issue enough equity to shield depositors from variations in the price of government debt.

4.1 Optimistic Equilibrium

Before exploring equilibria with variations in debt prices due to strategic uncertainty, we establish a benchmark equilibrium in which sunspots do not matter. This equilibrium is interesting in its own right because debt markets can function perfectly well in our economic environment. We will also use this equilibrium as a basis for welfare comparisons. The analysis that follows builds upon the optimistic equilibrium by introducing the strategic uncertainty.

This analysis uses Assumption 2 to construct a risk free equilibrium with $q_0 = q_1(s) = \frac{1}{R}$ for all $s$. Markets clear at these prices, given the solution of the bank contracting problem.

4.1.1 Optimal Contract

Given debt prices $q_0 = q_1 = \frac{1}{R}$, the optimal contract between the households and the banks solves (1) subject to the constraints as described in section 2.2. This problem generates a demand for

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15Here the government is limited to choosing bailout or no bailout, including the imposition of a tax on investors to finance these flows. We do not consider other ex ante tools for redistribution.

16As we are constructing an equilibrium without sunspots, the notation $s$ is eliminated.
government debt by the banking system. In an optimistic equilibrium, neither the banks nor the depositors anticipate variations in the price of government debt as sunspots, by construction, do not matter.

The banks hold a portfolio of government debt and long-term illiquid investment. They provide for the consumption of early households by selling government debt to investors in period 1. When the liquidation value of the illiquid investment, $\varepsilon$, is less than one, trading government debt strictly dominates liquidating the long-term investment. At $\varepsilon = 1$, the bank is indifferent between liquidation and the selling of government debt and we assume there is no liquidation in this case either.

**Proposition 1.** In the optimal banking contract with no default risk and $q_0 = q_1 = \frac{1}{R}$: (i) $c^L > c^E$ and (ii) $l_1 = 0$.

**Proof.** See Appendix, Section 6.2.1.

In the subsequent discussion, let $(c^E, c^L)$ denote the optimal contract characterized in Proposition 1. We will refer to this as the first best contract. The property that $c^L > c^E$ implies that depositors have an incentive to reveal their true taste types.

From (1), there are other elements of the bank’s problem to determine. To implement the optimal contract, it is sufficient that debt holdings of the bank satisfy: $(b_0 = \frac{pe^E}{q_1}, i_0 = \frac{(1-\varepsilon)c^L}{R})$. Further, $(b_1 = L_1 = 0)$ as trades in period 1 are not needed in the case of optimism. In an optimistic equilibrium, bank equity, $x_0$ is irrelevant to the allocation of the households. Thus for convenience, we set $x_0 = 0$ in the construction of an optimistic equilibrium. Equity will play a more important role in the sunspot equilibrium later on in the paper.

### 4.1.2 Equilibrium

Given the banking contract, the last step in constructing an equilibrium is to guarantee market clearing. There are three markets to consider: (i) the period 0 market for government debt, (ii) the period 1 market for government debt and (iii) the interbank loan market. Let $(q_0^*, q_1^*)$ denote the values of the debt prices in an optimistic equilibrium.

**Proposition 2.** There exists an optimistic rational expectations equilibrium with $q_0^* = q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$, $r^b = R$ and the banking contract given by $(c^E, c^L)$.

**Proof.** See Appendix, Section 6.2.2.

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16 As is well understood, there may also exist a bank runs equilibrium in this environment. That is not the focus of this analysis and is left aside to focus on crises emanating from uncertainty over government debt repayment.
We refer to the allocation characterized by Proposition 2 as the first best allocation. In this equilibrium, risks are shared efficiently between the risk averse household and investors through the banking system. Further, there are no resources lost due to default and/or disruptions of the intermediation process. In this way, this allocation will serve as a benchmark for \textit{ex ante} comparisons of other allocations.

We assume that at this allocation, a government with the ability to redistribute the endowments of households and investors in period 0 would have no incentive to do so. This implicitly defines a welfare weight for investors in period 0, $\omega$, such that $u'(c^{E}) = \omega$.\footnote{This comes from a planner’s problem allocating the deposit of households between illiquid investment and government bonds that yield, as in an optimistic equilibrium, a return of unity between period 0 and period 1.}

This is a benchmark equilibrium for this economy in which there is no strategic uncertainty and no default. The existence of an equilibrium without default requires Assumption 2 which we maintain throughout this discussion.

Default could arise in equilibrium because of fundamentals. That is, if Assumption 2 did not hold, then an equilibrium without default would not exist. Instead, even in the absence of strategic uncertainty, low realizations of the tax capacity would trigger a default.

An alternative way to understand default is through the power of investors’ beliefs. Under Assumption 2 there may be other solutions to the debt valuation equation. We now consider sunspot equilibria arising from debt fragility.

\subsection{Discretionary Government}

Under pessimism, the banks could be insolvent and the government will decide whether to support them or not. A discretionary government is unable to commit not to bailout the banks. Instead, \textit{ex post} it decides whether to engage in a debt buyback program or not. Here we consider a scheme in which the government buys back debt from banks at the optimistic price. Therefore

$$T(q_{1}; q_{1}^{T}, B_{0}^{B}) = B_{0}^{B}(q_{1}^{T} - q_{1})$$

where $q_{1}^{T}$ is the buyback (target) price of debt and $q_{1}$ is the prevailing price of debt under pessimism.\footnote{With this notation, we make explicitly the dependence of the transfer on the support price for debt, the second argument, and the level of debt held by the banks, the third argument.} Here $B_{0}^{B}$ is the total amount of debt held by the banking system at the start of period 1. In the equilibria we construct, banks hold all the government debt and receive the bailout.

Since the government lacks commitment, it is necessary to specify what happens in the event it chooses, off the equilibrium path, not to engage in a debt buyback scheme. As banks anticipated
this bailout, if it is not provided they are insolvent: i.e. their liabilities to depositors exceed their assets.

We consider a particular resolution mechanism. If the government does not bailout a bank, then the insolvent bank is liquidated allowing assets, including the liquidated long-term investments, to be used to pay off depositors in an optimal way. This involves no government help or sovereign debt issuance and is simply a reallocation of existing bank assets and liabilities. This process is described in more detail in the proof of Proposition 3.

The following proposition provides conditions such that a government will choose, \emph{ex post}, to support the banking system through a full debt buy back, i.e. \( q^T_1 = q^*_1 = \frac{1}{R} \).

**Proposition 3.** Suppose Assumption 3 holds and the government lacks commitment. If

1. either (i) the default cost, \( \gamma \), is sufficiently small or (ii) the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, \( \psi \), is sufficiently large, there will exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of \( q^T_1 = \frac{1}{R} \) in the pessimistic sunspot state. The first best banking contract is offered to households.

2. the default cost, \( \gamma \), is sufficiently large and the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, \( \psi \), is sufficiently small, there will not exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of \( q^T_1 = \frac{1}{R} \) in the pessimistic sunspot state.

**Proof.** See Appendix, Section 6.2.3.

Absent commitment, the government will choose in period 1 whether to bailout the banks or not. There are three factors influencing the bailout decision which are made explicit in the proof. First, relative to an allocation without a bailout, there are gains to redistribution from investors to depositors. This motivates a bailout. Second, if \( \psi \) is high, then there are gains to bailout from protecting the banking sector. Third, as the bailout is debt financed, it may increase the probability of default. The magnitude of this cost depends on the size of \( \gamma \) as well as the sensitivity of the probability of debt to changes in the amount of debt outstanding. In our model, this last effect will depend on the shape of \( F(\cdot) \) in the neighborhood of a pessimistic equilibrium.

The sufficient conditions for bailout, given in the first part of the proposition, reflect these tradeoffs. If \( \gamma \) is low, then bailout is provided because redistribution through government support is desired and saving the financial sector is important. Even if there are costs of default, as long as \( \psi \) is large enough, bailout will be desired.

From the proposition, banks anticipate the bailout and thus choose not to self-insure through equity buffers. In actual fact, banks become the natural holders of risky government debt, buying
the entire stock. This creates further contingent liabilities for the sovereign, thus activating the diabolic loop.

The second part of the proposition provides sufficient conditions for a full bailout not to occur. Given the tradeoff between the default cost and the gains from saving the banking system, if the default cost is large enough relative to the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, then the bailout equilibrium will not exist.

Assumption 3 is used in Proposition 3 to guarantee that a pessimistic equilibrium exists under a full debt buyback scheme. For a sufficiently small transfer to the banking system, Assumption 2 along with continuity implies a pessimistic solution to (11). Assumption 3 is not needed. But for a large enough transfer to the banks, the continuity argument fails.

Without Assumption 3, there is no SPNE with full bailout as there is no pessimistic equilibrium under the debt buyback scheme specified in (13). The government is simply not able to borrow enough to finance the transfers to the banks which are needed for a full debt buyback.

There is a maximal level of debt the government could incur while maintaining a positive probability of repayment. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Thus if a partial bailout, defined by lower buyback price, $q_T < \frac{1}{R}$ was feasible, it might be provided even if a full bailout was not possible.

To evaluate the choice of the government, it is necessary to be clear on the solution to the contracting problem of the bank in the presence of risky government debt. Given the risk aversion of depositors and the risk neutrality of investors, in the face of fiscal risk the investors insure depositors through the intermediary. Formally,

**Proposition 4.** When government debt is risky, the bank can fully insure its depositors by issuing equity. The first best banking contract is offered to depositors.

**Proof.** See Appendix, Section 6.2.4.

Proposition 4 demonstrates that the bank has the options at its disposal in order to implement the first best contract even when the government does not offer full bailout assistance. However, we will see in subsequent analysis that the bank will minimize the amount of self-insurance it does when it anticipates government help. As we saw in Proposition 3, the bank will issue no equity at all, knowing that the government will come to the rescue. At most, as Proposition 5 below demonstrates, the bank will engage in partial equity issuance in order to insure itself from risks when the government is unable to offer full insurance ex post.

**Proposition 5.** Suppose Assumption 3 does not hold and the government lacks commitment. If

1. either (i) the default cost, $\gamma$, is sufficiently small or (ii) the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, $\psi$, is sufficiently large, there will exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback
at a price of $q_1^{\text{max}} < \frac{1}{R}$ in the pessimistic sunspot state, where $q_1^{\text{max}}$ is the maximum buyback price such that a pessimistic equilibrium exists. The first best banking contract is offered to households, partially supported by investor equity.

2. the default cost, $\gamma$, is sufficiently large and the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, $\psi$, is sufficiently small, there will not exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of $q_1^{\text{max}}$ in the pessimistic sunspot state.

Proof. See Appendix, Section 6.2.5

Throughout this discussion, an insolvent bank was assumed to be reorganized without any direct support from the government. Though off the equilibrium path, the nature of the resolution is clearly relevant to the outcome. As an alternative, suppose a government deciding not to provide a full bailout, may nonetheless provide a partial bailout by purchasing bank assets at a price less
This partial bailout will involve the issuance of new debt in order to finance these buybacks. This case is considered in the Appendix, section 6.3. There we argue that, once again, if $\psi$ is large enough, full (partial) bailout will arise along the equilibrium path since the cost of deviation is the disruption of the intermediation process.

4.3 Commitment

Without commitment, if the default cost ($\gamma$) is small, and the intermediation sector is crucial for economic activity ($\psi$ is large), the government will be induced to support the banking system. In this case, sunspot driven fluctuations in the value of government debt are ultimately absorbed by the investors who provide the taxes to support the banks.

This form of risk sharing through the government is costly. Insofar as a bailout is financed by the issuance of new government debt, the higher debt burden increases the likelihood of sovereign default.

There is another, more efficient, way to share the risk associated with debt fragility: through bank equity. Suppose that the government is able to commit in period 0 to a bailout policy. It does so understanding that the banks will respond to the government’s choice in the design of the banking contract.

As we demonstrate, the government will choose to commit not to bailout the banks. In response, the banks will issue enough equity to insure households against fluctuations in the value of government debt. As a result, if the government is able to commit to its bailout policy, the banking system is immune to strategic uncertainty: there is no diabolic loop.

**Proposition 6.** A committed government will choose not to bailout the banks. In the SPNE, banks self-insure through equity issuance and provide the first best contract to households.

**Proof.** See Appendix, Section 6.2.6.

Proposition 6 shows that government discretion is a necessary ingredient for the existence of the ‘diabolic loop’. A committed government that withholds bailouts ex post will induce banks to self-insure in a way that obviates the need for government assistance. In this case, when Assumption 2 holds, strategic uncertainty remains in the government debt market but it does not spill over to the banking system.

The resulting allocation is not identical to the optimistic equilibrium (first best allocation) characterized in Proposition 2. Households indeed receive the same consumption allocations under the two equilibria because banks always offer the first best banking contract. However, the optimistic equilibrium has no default while the equilibrium in Proposition 6 entails a positive probability of
default in pessimistic sunspot states. Thus there is an expected loss in investors’ consumption from default when $\gamma > 0$.

Propositions 3 and 6 demonstrate how bank risk taking in the sovereign debt market grows and the joint fragility of banks and sovereigns worsens with diminished commitment. If governments can commit not to bail out, bank and sovereign balances sheets become disconnected and there is no sovereign-banking loop. When no commitment is possible, we get full moral hazard: banks over-invest in government debt and issue no equity. The probability of government default in the pessimistic equilibrium is higher under discretion than in the case of the government with commitment.

In both of these equilibria the households suffer no losses from the onset of pessimism in the debt market. But this happens in very different ways. In the equilibrium with commitment, the banks self insure through equity. So when there are variations in the value of government debt, the banks have a buffer.

In the equilibrium without commitment, there is no equity. The banks are insolvent following a pessimistic sunspot. The government steps in to protect depositors: this is a banking crisis, but not one that entails depositor losses. Because of the bailout, government debt is higher, thus increasing the chance of a costly default (when $\gamma > 0$). This is the source of the welfare loss without commitment.

Absent the ability to commit, the government may take actions \textit{ex ante} to make more credible a pledge of “no bailouts” \textit{ex post}. As suggested by Proposition 3, \textit{ex ante} actions to increase the costs of default along with measures to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to disruptions in the intermediation process, will reduce incentives for \textit{ex post} bailout. Recent efforts to limit the importance of banks who otherwise might be “too big to fail” would be one example.

5 Conclusions

This paper builds a model of the feedback loops between banks and sovereigns in Europe. From Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Calvo (1988), banks as well as sovereign debt markets are individually subject to powerful sources of strategic uncertainty, which can lead to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Our paper characterizes a ‘diabolic loop’ that links these markets and thus propagates and amplifies the impact of strategic uncertainty emanating from debt markets.

Bank solvency is affected by sovereign bond market turmoil because the financial system holds a large amount of (largely domestic) government debt. In turn, government solvency is affected due to the implicit or explicit guarantees extended by governments to their banking systems. These interactions amplify the impact of pessimism in the government debt market. The initial decline in
government debt prices reduces bank solvency and causes the implicit government promises to its banks to turn into explicit debt issuance at precisely the time when the government is least able to issue debt on favorable conditions. The higher debt issuance then pushes government debt prices even lower, completing the diabolic loop which has been rocking a number of European economies since 2010. The impact of these feedbacks is to make sovereign-banking crises much more severe than they otherwise would have been.

While we study the effects of strategic uncertainty in debt markets as the initial shock, the model is general enough to accommodate other sources and types of uncertainty. As is well understood, the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model often has a bank run equilibrium which itself could influence debt valuation through the cost of a government fulfilling obligations to banks. In fact, even if the bank run could be avoided through government intervention, the costs of those actions through debt valuation would be an important part of the calculus concerning the ex post provision of deposit insurance. Moreover, fundamental shocks to either the banking system or the government fiscal situation would be magnified and propagated through the mechanisms identified in our model.

Having built a model of the crisis, we study a number of simple remedies for cutting the diabolic loop. One often suggested policy is just to let the banking system fail, imposing losses on depositors. Such a policy, if credible, would have multiple benefits. First, it would reduce the need for bailout assistance to add to government debt during a sovereign crisis. This, taken in isolation, would diminish the crisis amplification mechanisms we study in our paper. Second, when banks know they will not be bailed out, they will issue equity which will absorb losses from sovereign bond holdings without needing government assistance. Hence, bank solvency becomes completely decoupled from government solvency, severing a key linkage that has amplified the financial crisis in a number of EU countries.

The problem with such a commitment to let the banking system fail is that it is not credible. Governments, acting with discretion after a crisis, prefer (under some plausible conditions) to bailout the banking system rather than incur the output losses associated with a breakdown of the intermediation process.

In turn, banks, anticipating that government assistance will be provided, have little incentive to issue equity. To the benefit of depositors, they take advantage of the ‘heads-I-win, tails-you-lose’ nature of the financial safety net. If the economy finds itself in an optimistic equilibrium, banks profit from high ex post bond returns. When the economy finds itself in the pessimistic equilibrium, the bank expects the government to bail it out in order to protect household deposits. This strategy extracts a transfer from taxpayers to bank depositors which makes the latter better off. As a result, banks rationally prefer to remain exposed to a sovereign debt crisis.

This moral hazard by banks might be corrected by regulatory interventions which impose capital
requirements on banks’ sovereign debt holdings until they become insulated from shocks in the debt market. In the light of this finding, it is puzzling that the new Basel III regime continues to favor domestic government debt over other assets by assigning it a zero capital weight. Moreover, domestic government debt continues to be exempt from large exposure limits creating exactly the kinds of incentives for banks to become overexposed to it described in our paper. While beyond the scope of this paper, adding an explicit analysis of government capital regulation seems to us like a interesting avenue for future research.

Future work will analyze the international dimension of the European twin crisis. Financial stability policy in Europe is undergoing major reform with the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and with the use of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank. We intend to embed our single country model into a multi-country setting and consider the union-wide policies which can limit the economic damage done by the ‘diabolic loop’.

6 Appendix

6.1 Banking Problem

The bank solves:

$$\max_{i_0, B_0^E, x_0, c^E(s), c^L(s, 1_G), l_1(s), B_0^L(s), L_1(s)} \mathbb{E}[\pi u(c^E(s)) + (1 - \pi) u(c^L(s, 1_G)) | (A.1)$$

such that

$$i_0 + q_0 B_0^E \leq d + x_0$$

$$\pi c^E(s) \leq q_1(s)(B_0^B - B_1^B(s)) + \epsilon l_1(s) - L_1(s), \forall s$$

$$(1 - \pi) c^L(s, 1_G) \leq (1 - 1_G) b_1(s) + R (i_0 - l_1(s)) - \delta_2(s, 1_G) - r^b L_1(s), \forall s$$

$$E \delta_2(s, 1_G) \geq R x_0$$

The first order conditions to the contracting problem in (A.1) with respect to $(c^E(s), c^L(s, 1_G), B_0^B, i_0, x_0, 1_G, l_1(s), B_1^B(s), L_1(s))$ are:

$$\nu(s) u' \left(c^E(s)\right) - \lambda^E(s) = 0$$

$$p(s) \nu(s) u' \left(c^L(s, 1_G = 0)\right) - \lambda^L(s, 1_G = 0) = 0$$

$$(1 - p(s)) \nu(s) u' \left(c^L(s, 1_G = 1)\right) - \lambda^L(s, 1_G = 1) = 0$$

$$q_0 \phi = \sum_s q_1(s) \lambda^E(s)$$

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\[ \phi = R \sum_{s, 1_G} \lambda^L(s, 1_G) \]  
(A.10)

\[ (\phi - R\chi) x_0 = 0 \]  
(A.11)

\[ (p(s)\nu(s)\chi - \lambda^L(s, 1_G = 0)) \delta_2(s, 1_G = 0) = 0 \]  
(A.12)

\[ ((1 - p(s))\nu(s)\chi - \lambda^L(s, 1_G = 1)) \delta_2(s, 1_G = 1) = 0 \]  
(A.13)

\[ (\varepsilon \lambda^E(s) - R \sum_{1_G} \lambda^L(s, 1_G)) l_1(s) = 0. \]  
(A.14)

\[ (\lambda^E(s)q_1(s) - \lambda^L(s, 1_G)) B^B_1(s) = 0. \]  
(A.15)

\[ (\lambda^E(s) - r^b \sum_{1_G} \lambda^L(s, 1_G)) L_1(s) = 0 \]  
(A.16)

where \( \nu(s) \) is the probability of state \( s \), \( \phi \) is the multiplier on \( (A.2) \), \( \lambda^E(s) \) is the multiplier on \( (A.3) \), \( \lambda^L(s, 1_G) \) is the multiplier on \( (A.4) \), for all \( s \) and default choices, and \( \chi \) is the multiplier on \( (A.5) \). Here, \( p(s) \) is the probability of sovereign debt repayment in period 2 when the sunspot state in period 1 was \( s \). These necessary conditions will be used in the subsequent proofs.

### 6.2 Proofs

#### 6.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1

**Proposition 1.** In the optimal banking contract with no default risk and \( q_0 = q_1 = \frac{1}{R} \): (i) \( c^L > c^E \) and (ii) \( l_1 = 0 \).

**Proof.** With \( q_1(s) = \frac{1}{R} \), no sunspots and no default, the first-order conditions for the optimal contract become:

\[ u'(c^E) - \lambda^E = 0 \]  
(A.17)

\[ u'(c^L) - \lambda^L = 0 \]  
(A.18)

\[ q_0\phi = \frac{\lambda^E}{R} \]  
(A.19)

\[ \phi = R\lambda^L \]  
(A.20)

\[ (\varepsilon \lambda^E - R\lambda^L) l_1 = 0. \]  
(A.21)
Using $q_0 = \frac{1}{R}$, combining (A.19) and (A.20) implies $\phi = \lambda^E = R\lambda^L$. Substituting this into (A.17) and (A.18) implies

$$u'(c^E) = Ru'(c^L).$$

(A.22)

This condition implies property (i): $c^L > c^E$ for all $R > 1$ as $u(\cdot)$ is strictly concave. Using (A.21), $l_1$ is zero, and strictly so if $\varepsilon < 1$, as $\lambda^E = R\lambda^L$.  

6.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2

**Proposition 2.** There exists an optimistic rational expectations equilibrium with $q_0^* = q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$, $r^b = R$ and the banking contract given by $(c^E, c^L)$.

**Proof.** The equilibrium conditions are driven by the investors. We assume that the aggregate endowment of the investors is larger than the stock of government debt in period 0. The investors can either put their endowment directly in the illiquid technology and obtain $R$ or purchase two period government debt. They are indifferent between these options if $q_0 = \frac{1}{R}$. If this condition holds, they are willing to purchase any of the government debt not held by the banking system. Since investors have linear utility of $c_1 + \frac{1}{R}c_2$, they are indifferent between consuming their period 1 endowment and buying one period government debt if $q_1 = \frac{1}{R}$. Assuming that investors’ period 1 endowment is sufficiently large, if $q_1 = \frac{1}{R}$, the investors will purchase the debt sold by the banks in period 1 and the new debt issued by the government in period 1.

Thus, at these prices, all markets clear. The excess supply of government debt in period 0 is purchased by the investors. The stock of government debt held by bank is sold to the investors along with any new debt in period 1. The market for government debt clears in both periods. Given that $q_0^* = q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$, the probability of government default is zero.

Further, at $r^b = R$, investors are indifferent both with respect to the timing of their consumption and the composition of their portfolio. This indifference guarantees market clearing in the interbank market at zero trade.

The result that the first best contract is provided in equilibrium comes from Proposition 1. In equilibrium, banks will hold enough debt to finance their payment to early consumers at the anticipated period 1 price: $b_0 q_1 = \pi c^E$. The debt is sold to the investors for goods and those goods are transferred to the early consumers. There are no liquidations in an optimistic equilibrium.  

6.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3

**Proposition 3.** Suppose Assumption 3 holds and the government lacks commitment. If
1. either (i) the default cost, $\gamma$, is sufficiently small or (ii) the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, $\psi$, is sufficiently large, there will exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of $q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$ in the pessimistic sunspot state. The first best banking contract is offered to households.

2. the default cost, $\gamma$, is sufficiently large and the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, $\psi$, is sufficiently small, there will not exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of $q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$ in the pessimistic sunspot state.

Proof. The proof has three steps: (i) characterizing the optimal banking contract, (ii) determining the government’s bailout choice and (iii) checking market clearing.

**Step 1: Optimal Contract**

To construct an equilibrium, suppose the banks anticipate a bailout by the government in the event of pessimism. The banking contract with expected bailouts solves (A.1) with the resource constraint for early consumers in the **pessimistic state** modified to reflect the government debt buyback program:

\[
\pi c_E(s^p) \leq \frac{1}{R} (B_0^B - B_1^B(s^p)) + \varepsilon I_1(s^p) - L_1(s^p)
\]  

(A.23)

Here the government buys government bonds from the banks at the optimistic price of $q_1(s^p) = \frac{1}{R}$, making the return on government bonds independent of the sunspot. This is the form of anticipated government support in the pessimistic sunspot state.

The government debt support at $\frac{1}{R}$ implies that the contract between the bank and the households is immune from the sunspot. With $q_0 = \frac{1}{R}$, verified below, the bank problem is identical to that solved in the optimistic equilibrium, characterized in Proposition 1. Hence the banking contract is the first best one: $(c^*_E, c^*_L)$.

Given that the households are insured through the government buyback, there is no gain to supplying equity to the bank. Hence $x_0 = 0$.

**Step 2: Government’s Choice**

The government will choose between a buyback, denoted $BB$, and no bailout, denoted $NB$.

Under a buyback scheme, the government will buy as much debt as banks supply at a price denoted $q_1^{BB} = \frac{1}{R}$. Throughout, let $(1_G = 0)$ denote the states in which the government repays its debt and let $(1_G = 1)$ denote default states. Given that the government debt market is in a state of pessimism, the analysis characterizes the payoffs in periods 1 and 2 to households and investors with and without a debt buyback.

**Welfare under Full Bailout**
First, suppose that the government supports the banks by purchasing debt at a price $q_{1\text{BB}}$. This transfer is financed through the issuance of new debt.

**Investors**

If a debt buyback is provided, at the middle date investors consume the difference between their endowment, the bonds they buy from banks $B_0^B$ and the amount they lend to banks $L_1$:

$$c_{1,\text{BB}} = A_1 - q_{1\text{BB}} (B_0^B + (G_1 + T (q_{1\text{BB}})) / q_{1\text{BB}}) - L_1.$$  

At the final date, investors consume all their net worth. Their consumption depends on the default decision of the government.

If the government repays its debt, consumption is given by:

$$c_{2,\text{BB}} (1_G = 0) = \bar{A} + B_1 + R_i^I + RL_1 - \tau \bar{A}. \quad \text{(A.24)}$$

where the second equality follows from the fact that the banking system sells its entire holding of government debt in the pessimistic equilibrium. Hence investors own all debt and pay the taxes to pay the debt obligation. The two cancel out ($B_1 = \tau \bar{A}$).

If the government defaults, investors’ final period consumption is given by:

$$c_{2,\text{BB}} (1_G = 1) = \bar{A} (1 - \gamma) + R_i^I + RL_1. \quad \text{(A.25)}$$

Investors’ welfare is affected by the default decision, in part, due to the output costs of default assumed in our specification of the final date endowment. Investors’ expected welfare is:

$$W_{I,\text{BB}} = c_{1,\text{BB}} + \mathbb{E} [ c_{2,\text{BB}} (1_G) ]$$

where the expectation is over the government default decision in period 2.

**Depositors**

The utility of depositors when the government buys back debt is independent of its decision to default and is given by the utility delivered by the standard banking contract

$$W^{H,\text{BB}} = \pi u (c^E) + (1 - \pi) u (c^L)$$

---

20In the pessimistic equilibrium, banks sell their entire holdings of government debt ($B_0^B$) to investors in the middle period.
Social welfare when a buyback is provided is:

\[ W^{BB} = \pi u(c^E) + (1 - \pi) u(c^L) \]

\[ + \omega \left[ A_1 - q_1^{BB} \left( B_0^B + (G_1 + T(q_1^{BB})) / q_1^{BB} \right) \right] + \frac{\omega}{R} (\bar{A} + R\iota_0) - \frac{\omega}{R} (1 - p^{BB}) \gamma \bar{A}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.26)

With a buyback price of \( \frac{1}{\pi} \), \( T(q_1^{BB}) = B_0^B(\frac{1}{\pi} - q^{BB}) \). Thus \( q_1^{BB} \left( B_0^B + (G_1 + T(q_1^{BB})) / q_1^{BB} \right) = G_1 + B_0^B \) so that investor consumption in period 1 is simply \( A_1 - G_1 - \frac{B_0^B}{\pi} \).

In (A.26), \( p^{BB} \) is the probability that the government repays at the final date conditional upon a buyback being provided:

\[ p^{BB} = 1 - F \left( \frac{B_0 + (G_1 + T(q_1^{BB})) / q_1^{BB}}{A} \right). \] \hspace{1cm} (A.27)

In (A.26), \( q_1^{BB} \) denotes the price of government debt in the middle period if there is pessimism and a bailout is provided. This is determined from the investor’s arbitrage condition of \( \frac{B_0^B}{q_1^{BB}} = R \) and (A.27). Finding the \( (p^{BB}, q_1^{BB}) \) that solves these two conditions is the same as finding a solution to (11), other than the optimistic equilibrium. By assumption, the economy is in a pessimistic solution to (11).

**Welfare without a Bailout**

Now assume that the government does not bailout the banks. This is off the equilibrium path as the banks had anticipated a bailout. As a consequence, the banks are insolvent. The banking system is shut down and investors’ endowments are reduced by a fraction \( \psi \). At this point, the banks re-optimize given their existing assets and liabilities without government involvement\(^{21}\).

The bank solves the following problem:

\[
\max_{c^E, c^L, (1_G), B_0^B \geq 0, L_1} \pi u(c^E) + (1 - \pi) \left[ p^{NB} u(c^L(1_G = 0)) + (1 - p^{NB}) u(c^L(1_G = 1)) \right] \\
+ \lambda^E \left( q_1^{NB} \left( B_0^B - B_1^B \right) + L_1 - \pi c^E \right) \\
+ \lambda^L \left( 1_G = 0 \right) \left( R(i_0 - L_1) + B_1^B - (1 - \pi) c^L(1_G = 0) \right) \\
+ \lambda^L \left( 1_G = 1 \right) \left( R(i_0 - L_1) - (1 - \pi) c^L(1_G = 1) \right) \] \hspace{1cm} (A.28)

In these expressions, \( 1_G = 0 \) is a state of debt repayment by the government and \( 1_G = 1 \) denotes default. The probability of repayment is \( p^{NB} \). Here the bank chooses the consumption levels of the two types of households, with the consumption of late households contingent on the government default decision in the next period. The bank can sell debt to finance the consumption of early households, \( (B_0^B - B_1^B) \), as well as borrow from investors in period 1, \( L_1 \). While the bank could also liquidate the illiquid investment, this is dominated by borrowing from investors at an interest

\(^{21}\)This part of the analysis is similar to that of orderly liquidation explored in Cooper and Kempf (2013).
rate of $R$, the marginal rate of substitution for investors, and is not considered. We establish later that this is the equilibrium rate in the interbank market i.e. $r^b = R$.

For this problem, the price of debt, $q_1^{NB}$ is taken as given as individual banks are small. Further, there is no fiscal operation associated with the bank resolution. The first order conditions are:

$$u'(c^E) - \lambda^E = 0 \tag{A.29}$$

$$p^{NB}u'(c^L(1_G = 0)) - \lambda^L(1_G = 0) = 0 \tag{A.30}$$

$$(1 - p^{NB})u'(c^L(1_G = 1)) - \lambda^L(1_G = 1) = 0 \tag{A.31}$$

$$(-q_1^{NB}\lambda^E + \lambda^L(1_G = 0))B_1^B = 0 \tag{A.32}$$

$$\lambda^E - R\sum_{1_G}^{}\lambda^L(1_G) = 0 \tag{A.33}$$

Let $\hat{c}^E$ and $\hat{c}^L(1_G)$ denote the optimal consumption allocations when the bank gets ‘resolved’ in this manner. Substituting (A.33) into (A.32), implies:

$$\left(\lambda^L(1_G = 0)(1 - Rq_1^{NB}) - Rq_1^{NB}\lambda^L(1_G = 1)\right)B_1^B = 0. \tag{A.34}$$

Since $q_1^{NB} = p^{NB}/R$, this implies that:

$$\left(\lambda^L(1_G = 0)(1 - p^{NB}) - p^{NB}\lambda^L(1_G = 1)\right)B_1^B = 0. \tag{A.35}$$

Using (A.30) and (A.31), we get:

$$\left(u'(c^L(1_G = 0)) - u'(c^L(1_G = 1))\right)B_1^B = 0. \tag{A.36}$$

As long as $B_1^B > 0$, households suffer losses when the government defaults and $u'(c^L(1_G = 0)) - u'(c^L(1_G = 1)) < 0$. Thus for (A.34) to hold, $B_1^B = 0$.

When $B_1^B = 0$, the resources to finance late consumption are independent of government default, $\hat{c}^L(1_G = 0) = \hat{c}^L(1_G = 1)$. From the first three first-order conditions and (A.33), $u'(c^E) = Ru'(\hat{c}^L)$.

Thus the marginal rate of substitution is the same without bailout as it is with bailout. But the solution to the problem without bailout must generate lower welfare to depositors than the optimistic outcome since $q_1^{NB} < \frac{1}{R}$.

**Welfare if no buyback is provided**

Social welfare when no buyback is provided is:

$$W^{NB} = \pi u\left(\hat{c}^E\right) + (1 - \pi) u\left(\hat{c}^L\right) \tag{A.37}$$

$$+ \omega \left[A_1 - q_1^{NB} \left(B_0^B + G_1/q_1^{NB}\right)\right] + \frac{\omega}{R} \left(\bar{A}(1 - \psi) + Ri_0^U\right) - \frac{\omega}{R} (1 - p^{NB}) \gamma \bar{A}. $$

30
In these expressions, the loans to banks made by the investors in period 1 cancel with the proceeds from those loans at the interbank loan rate of \( r_b = R \).

Here \( p^{NB} \) is the probability that the government repays at the final date conditional upon no buyback being provided:

\[
p^{NB} = 1 - F \left( \frac{B_0 + G_1/q_1^{NB}}{A} \right). \tag{A.38}
\]

Finding the \((p^{NB}, q_1^{NB})\) that solves \((A.38)\) and the arbitrage condition is the same as finding a solution to \((12)\), other than the optimistic equilibrium. By assumption, there exists a pessimistic solution to \((12)\).

**The Bailout Decision**

The difference in the value of the social welfare function between bailout and no bailout is:

\[
\Delta \equiv W^{BB} - W^{NB} \tag{A.39}
\]

\[
= \pi \left[ u(c^*E) - u(\hat{c}E) \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ u(c^*L) - u(\hat{c}L) \right] - \omega \left( \frac{1}{R} - q_1^{NB} \right) B_0^B
\]

\[
+ \frac{\omega}{R} \left[ (p^{BB} - p^{NB}) \gamma + \psi \right] \bar{A}.
\]

where \( p^{NB} \) is given by \((A.38)\) and \( p^{BB} \) is given by \((A.27)\).

From the constraints of the banking problems,

\[
\pi[c^*E - \hat{c}E] + (1 - \pi)[c^*L - \hat{c}L] = (\frac{1}{R} - q_1^{NB}) B_0^B. \tag{A.40}
\]

Using \( \omega = u'(c^*E) = Ru'(c^*L) \), the first term in \((A.39)\) becomes

\[
\pi \left[ u(c^*E) - u(\hat{c}E) \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ u(c^*L) - u(\hat{c}L) \right] - u' E \left( \pi [c^*E - \hat{c}E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{c^*L - \hat{c}L}{R} \right] \right). \tag{A.41}
\]

By the strictly concavity of \( u(\cdot) \) this term is positive. This represents the gain to redistribution through a debt buyback.

The second term in \((A.39)\) is proportional to:

\[
(p^{BB} - p^{NB}) \gamma + \psi. \tag{A.42}
\]

The first part, \((p^{BB} - p^{NB}) \gamma\), is the difference in the expected output costs of default due to the provision of a bailout relative to no bailout. If \( \psi = 0 \), \( p^{NB} > p^{BB} \) since the buyback increases the debt and there are no costs from a breakdown of the intermediation process. As \( \psi \) rises \( p^{NB} \) falls monotonically. Hence there exists \( \psi^* \) such that \((A.42)\) equals zero.
If $\gamma = 0$ and $\psi \geq 0$, both of these components of (A.39) are positive so that $\Delta > 0$ and a bailout is provided. By continuity this result holds for sufficiently small $\gamma$. This is the first sufficient condition in the proposition. Further if $\psi > \psi^*$, then $\Delta > 0$ for any $\gamma$. This is the second sufficient condition in the proposition.

If, as in the second part of the proposition, $\gamma$ is sufficiently large and $\psi$ is sufficiently small, then, using $p^{NB} > p^{BB}$ for $\psi = 0$, $(p^{BB} - p^{NB}) \gamma + \psi < 0$. In this case, the costs of the bailout can offset the redistribution gains so that a full bailout will not occur, i.e. $\Delta < 0$.

If markets clear at the presumed prices, then these are two sufficient conditions for $\Delta > 0$ and a sufficient condition for $\Delta < 0$. Step 3 of the proof shows that markets clear at the conjectured prices.

**Step 3: Market Clearing**

We construct prices such that markets clear. All government debt is held by banks as they receive the benefits of the debt buyback. From Assumption 1, this is feasible because bank deposits are larger than the government debt stock at the initial date.

At $q_0 = \frac{1}{R}$, as assumed in the construction of the equilibrium, banks are indifferent between illiquid investment and the holding of government debt to finance the consumption of late households. The banks are the marginal holders of the government debt in period 0. Along the equilibrium path, banks sell all the risk debt to investors at date 1, i.e. $B^B_1 = 0$.

Period 1 prices are $q_1(s^o) = \frac{1}{R}$ and $q_1(s^p) = \frac{p^{BB}}{R}$ where $p^{BB} < 1$ is the probability of repayment under bailout given by (A.27).

From the preferences of the investors, they are willing to lend as much as demanded in the interbank market if $r^b = R$. Thus this market will clear at that price with and without government debt buyback.

**6.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4**

**Proposition 4.** When government debt is risky, the bank can fully insure its depositors by issuing equity. The first best banking contract is offered to depositors.

**Proof.** Let $q_1(s^o)$ be the price of government debt under optimism and $q_1(s^p)$ be the price of government debt under pessimism, with $q_1(s^o) > q_1(s^p)$. Using Assumption 2 the outcome under optimism is the no default solution to the debt pricing equation. So $q_1(s^o) = q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$, $q_1(s^p) = \frac{p}{R}$ where $p < 1$ is the probability of government repayment in the pessimistic equilibrium. Let $\nu$ denote the probability of optimism.

The proof argues that there exists equity infusion $x_0$ such that (i) the contract with equity fully insulates depositors from risks and supports the first best allocation despite stochastic government
debt prices and (ii) investors receive their required rate of return from the equity investment. We first determine the level of equity investment needed to support the first best contract, \((c^*E, c^*L)\). We then argue that the return on this equity equals the outside option of the investors.

Let \(x_0\) denote the period 0 investment of equity holders into the bank and let \(e_0\) denote its market value. Because the first best contract delivers state-uncontingent allocations to consumers, we drop the dependence of consumption on the sunspot state or the government’s default decision. In the first best contract, the expected net present value of promises to depositors equals the amount they deposit at the initial date:

\[
\pi c^*E + \frac{(1 - \pi) c^*L}{R} = d. \tag{A.43}
\]

To support the first best contract, the bank must have sufficient resources to meet the contractual commitment to early consumers regardless of the realized government debt price:

\[
\pi c^*E = q_1(s^p)B_0^B \tag{A.44}
\]

where \(q_1(s^p)\) is the period 1 price of government debt under pessimism. In this state, the bank sells its entire bond holding in order to pay off early consumers. Promises to late consumers are met through the illiquid investment:

\[
(1 - \pi) c^*L = R_i_0. \tag{A.45}
\]

The cash flow for dividend payments to shareholders is only generated in the optimistic state. The bank rolls over its bond not needed to fund the early consumers:

\[
\pi c^*E = q_1(s^o) \left( B_0^B - B_1^B(s^o) \right). \tag{A.46}
\]

The rolled over bond holding is then used to pay dividends to shareholders at the final date:

\[
\delta_2(s^o) = B_1^B(s^o).
\]

Since there is no default under optimism, the payment to equity holders is not indexed by the government default decision. The value of the equity to the shareholder is the discounted expected value of this dividend:

\[
e_0 = \frac{\nu B_1^B(s^o)}{R}. \tag{A.47}
\]

For the equity investment to be undertaken in equilibrium it must be the case that this expected value equals the equity put into the bank by the investor, i.e. \(x_0 = e_0\). Substituting (A.43), (A.44) and (A.45) into (A.2) yields \(x_0 = q_0B_0^B - \pi c^*E\). From this and from the definition of \(q_1(s^o)\) and \(q_1(s^p)\) the equity investment needed is:

\[
x_0 = \nu \frac{(1 - p)}{p} \pi c^*E. \tag{A.48}
\]
Combining (A.44) with (A.46) we get:

\[ B_1^B(s^o) = R \frac{(1 - p)}{p} \pi c^*E. \]

Hence

\[ e_0 = \nu \frac{(1 - p)}{p} \pi c^*E = x_0. \]

There is a strict incentive for banks to issue equity to insure depositors against the strategic uncertainty created by \( G_1 > 0 \). This implements the first best contract. A bank offering any other contract would either not attract customers or would be unprofitable.

\[ \blacksquare \]

6.2.5 Proof of Proposition 5

**Proposition 5.** Suppose Assumption 3 does not hold and the government lacks commitment. If

1. either (i) the default cost, \( \gamma \), is sufficiently small or (ii) the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, \( \psi \), is sufficiently large, there will exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of \( q_{1\text{max}} < \frac{1}{R} \) in the pessimistic sunspot state, where \( q_{1\text{max}} \) is the maximum buyback price such that a pessimistic equilibrium exists. The first best banking contract is offered to households, partially supported by investor equity.

2. the default cost, \( \gamma \), is sufficiently large and the cost of disrupting the intermediation process, \( \psi \), is sufficiently small, there will not exist a SPNE with a government debt buyback at a price of \( q_{1\text{max}} \) in the pessimistic sunspot state.

**Proof.** The proof has three steps: (i) characterizing the optimal banking contract, (ii) determining the government’s bailout choice and (iii) checking market clearing.

**Step 1: Optimal Contract**

To construct an equilibrium when Assumption 3 does not hold, suppose the banks anticipate the maximum feasible bailout by the government in the event of pessimism. Let \( q_{1\text{max}} < q_1^* \) denote the maximum buyback price at which the government is able to repurchase the sovereign bonds in the event of pessimism. This maximum buyback price is given by the tangency point of the debt valuation condition to the 45 degree line in Figure 3. A higher bailout price is not consistent with the existence of a pessimistic equilibrium.

The banking contract with expected bailouts solves (A.1) with the resource constraint for early consumers in the pessimistic state modified to reflect the government debt buyback program:
\[ \pi c^E(s^p) \leq q_1^{\text{max}} \left( B_0^B - B_1^B(s^p) \right) + \varepsilon l_1(s^p) - L_1(s^p) \] 

(A.49)

Unlike in Proposition 3, here the government does not fully insulate the bank from the risk in government bonds.

This leaves the bank with a choice of whether to expose depositors to risk or whether to insure them fully by issuing equity. From Proposition 4 we know that equity issuance implements the first best banking contract. This contract gives the highest utility to a depositor bringing \( d \) units of deposits to the bank and, since it is feasible, the bank issues equity and offers this allocation to households.

The bank issues equity \( x_0 \) such that it is just solvent under pessimism provided that the government does buy back the debt at price \( q_1^{\text{max}} \). For the bank to be solvent in the pessimistic state, the net present value of liabilities \( (c^*E, c^*L) \) must be equal to the value of bank assets when a debt buyback is provided:

\[
i_0 = \pi c^E + \frac{(1 - \pi) c^*L}{R} - q_1^{\text{max}} B_0
\]

Hence, using the period 0 budget constraint:

\[
x_0(q_1^{\text{max}}) = q_0 B_0 + i_0 - d
= (q_0 - q_1^{\text{max}}) B_0 + \pi c^E + \frac{(1 - \pi) c^*L}{R} - d
= (q_0 - q_1^{\text{max}}) B_0
\]

where the third equality follows from the fact that depositors receive claims whose net present value equals the funds they deposit in the bank. Equity is issued to protect the bank from potential losses on sovereign bond holdings. The lower the buyback price \( q_1^{\text{max}} \) relative to \( q_0 \) the more equity needs to be issued by the banks in order to protect their depositors from fluctuations in government bond values.

The bank has no incentive to issue more equity than this amount because it is insured by the government’s buyback policy anyway. It will not want to issue less because, by the definition of \( q_1^{\text{max}} \) the government is unable (because Assumption 3 does not hold) to offer a larger bailout.

**Step 2: Government’s Choice**

The proof proceeds in a parallel fashion to the proof of Proposition 3. The government will choose between the partial buyback, denoted \( PB \), and no bailout, denoted \( NB \). Under a buyback scheme, the government will buy as much debt as banks supply at a price of \( q_1^{\text{max}} \). Throughout, let \( (1_G = 0) \) denote the states in which the government repays its debt and let \( (1_G = 1) \) denote default states. Given that the government debt market is in a state of pessimism, the analysis characterizes the payoffs in periods 1 and 2 to households and investors with and without a debt buyback.
Welfare under the Partial Bailout

First, we examine the case when the government acts as expected by purchasing debt at a price \( q_1^{\text{max}} \). This transfer is financed through the issuance of new debt. Following similar derivations as in Proposition 5 social welfare when a buyback is provided is:

\[
W^{PB} = \pi u(c^E) + (1 - \pi) u(c^L)
\]

\[+ \omega \left[ A_1 - G_1 - q_1^{\text{max}} B_0^B \right] + \frac{\bar{\omega}}{R} (\bar{A} + R i_0^I) - \frac{\bar{\omega}}{R} (1 - p^{PB}) \gamma \bar{A}.
\]

In (A.50), \( p^{PB} \) is the probability that the government repays at the final date conditional upon a buyback at price \( q_1^{\text{max}} \) being provided:

\[
p^{PB} = 1 - F \left( \frac{B_0 + (G_1 + T(q_1^{PB})/q_1^{PB})}{A} \right).
\]

In (A.51), \( q_1^{PB} \) denotes the market price of government debt in the middle period if there is pessimism and a bailout is provided. This is determined from the investor’s arbitrage condition of \( \frac{p^{PB}}{q_1^{PB}} = R \) and (A.51). Finding the \((p^{PB}, q_1^{PB})\) that solves these two conditions is the same as finding a solution to (11), other than the optimistic equilibrium. By assumption, the economy is in a pessimistic solution to (11).

Welfare without a Bailout

When the government does not bailout the banks (as expected on the equilibrium path), they are insolvent. The banking system is shut down and investors’ endowments are reduced by a fraction \( \psi \). At this point, the banks re-optimize given their existing assets and liabilities without government involvement.

As shown in the proof to Proposition 3, the bank solves (A.28) with a solution which delivers \( \hat{c}^E < c^E \) and \( \hat{c}^L < c^L \) to depositors such that \( u'\left(\hat{c}^E\right) = R u'\left(\hat{c}^L\right) \). The bank sells all its bonds to investors \((B_1^B = 0)\) thus making the allocation to late investors independent of the sunspot shock. However all depositors receive a smaller allocation compared to the first best reflecting the decline in bank asset values as a result of the sunspot. The consumption allocation is increasing in the amount of equity issued by the bank at the initial date.

Welfare if no buyback is provided

Social welfare when no buyback is provided is:

\[
W^{NB} = \pi u(c^E) + (1 - \pi) u(c^L)
\]

\[+ \omega \left[ A_1 - q_1^{NB} B_0^B + G_1 \right] + \frac{\bar{\omega}}{R} (\bar{A}(1 - \psi) + R i_0^I) - \frac{\bar{\omega}}{R} (1 - p^{NB}) \gamma \bar{A}.
\]

In these expressions, the loans to banks made by the investors in period 1 cancel with the proceeds from those loans at the interbank loan rate of \( r = R \).
Here \( p^{NB} \) is the probability that the government repays at the final date conditional upon no buyback being provided:

\[
p^{NB} = 1 - F \left( \frac{B_0 + G_1/q_1^{NB}}{A(1 - \psi)} \right). \tag{A.53}
\]

Finding the \( (p^{NB}, q_1^{NB}) \) that solves \( \text{(A.53)} \) and the arbitrage condition is the same as finding a solution to \( \text{(12)} \), other than the optimistic equilibrium. By assumption, there exists a pessimistic solution to \( \text{(12)} \).

The Bailout Decision

The difference in the value of the social welfare function between buyback and not is:

\[
\Delta \equiv W^{PB} - W^{NB} \tag{A.54}
\]

\[
= \pi \left[ u(c^*) - u(\hat{c}^E) \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ u(c^*) - u(\hat{c}^L) \right] - \omega (q_1^{\text{max}} - q_1^{NB}) B_0^B + \frac{\omega}{R} ((p^{PB} - p^{NB}) \gamma + \psi) \bar{A}.
\]

where \( p^{NB} \) is given by \( \text{(A.53)} \) and \( p^{PB} \) is given by \( \text{(A.51)} \).

From the constraints of the banking problems,

\[
\pi [c^* - \hat{c}^E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ c^* - \frac{\hat{c}^L}{R} \right] = (q_1^{\text{max}} - q_1^{NB}) B_0^B. \tag{A.55}
\]

Using \( \omega = u'(c^*) = Ru'(c^*) \), the first term in \( \text{(A.55)} \) becomes

\[
\pi \left[ u(c^*) - u(\hat{c}^E) \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ u(c^*) - u(\hat{c}^L) \right] - u'(c^*) \left( \pi \left[ c^* - \frac{\hat{c}^E}{R} \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ c^* - \frac{\hat{c}^L}{R} \right] \right)
\]

By the strictly concavity of \( u(\cdot) \) this term is positive although it is smaller compared to \( \text{(A.41)} \) because the fact that the bank had issued some equity makes the consumption allocations under no bailout better compared to the one in Proposition 3. This represents the gain to redistribution through a debt buyback that restores the bank to solvency.

The second term in \( \text{(A.54)} \) is proportional to:

\[
(p^{PB} - p^{NB}) \gamma + \psi. \tag{A.57}
\]

Through the same arguments as in the proof to Proposition 3, if \( \gamma = 0 \) and \( \psi \geq 0 \), both of these components of \( \text{(A.54)} \) are positive so that \( \Delta > 0 \) and a bailout is provided. By continuity this result holds for sufficiently small \( \gamma \). This is the first sufficient condition in the proposition. Further if \( \psi > \psi^* \), then \( \Delta > 0 \) for any \( \gamma \). This is the second sufficient condition in the proposition.
If, as in the second part of the proposition, $\gamma$ is sufficiently large and $\psi$ is sufficiently small, then, using $p^{NB} > p^{PB}$ for $\psi = 0$, $(p^{PB} - p^{NB}) \gamma + \psi < 0$. In this case, the costs of bailout can be made to offset the redistribution gains so that a full bailout will not occur, i.e. $\Delta < 0$.

If markets clear at the presumed prices, then these are two sufficient conditions for $\Delta > 0$ and a sufficient condition for $\Delta < 0$. Step 3 of the proof shows that markets clear at the conjectured prices.

**Step 3: Market Clearing**

We construct prices such that markets clear. All government debt is held by banks as they receive the benefits of the debt buyback. From Assumption 1, this is feasible because bank deposits are larger than the government debt stock at the initial date.

When the bank knows it will receive a buyback price of $q_{1}^{\text{max}}$ in the event of pessimism at the middle date and when it knows that the consumption allocations of depositors are independent of the sunspot (due to the combination of equity issuance and government bailout assistance), the bank is risk-neutral in its pricing of the bond. Let $\nu$ denote the probability of optimism. Hence at

$$q_0 = \nu \frac{1}{R} + (1 - \nu) q_{1}^{\text{max}},$$

as assumed in the construction of the equilibrium, banks are indifferent between illiquid investment and the holding of government debt to finance the consumption of late households. Since $q_{1}^{\text{max}} > q_{1}^{BB}$ (above market price buybacks), the price (A.58) is above what investors are prepared to pay for government debt. Hence banks hold the entire stock of government debt in period 0 and investors hold all the debt after period 1 trades.

Period 1 government debt prices are $q_{1}(s^{o}) = \frac{1}{R}$ and $q_{1}(s^{p}) = \frac{p^{PB}}{R}$ where $p^{PB} < 1$ is the probability of repayment under bailout given by (A.51).

From the preferences of the investors, they are willing to lend as much as demanded in the interbank market if $r^{b} = R$. Thus this market will clear at that price with and without government debt buyback.

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**6.2.6 Proof of Proposition 6**

Proposition 6. A **committed government** will choose not to bailout the banks. In the SPNE, banks self-insure through equity issuance and provide the first best contract to households.

Proof. The proof has three steps: (i) characterizing the optimal banking contract, (ii) determining the government’s bailout choice and (iii) checking market clearing.

**Step 1: Optimal Contract**
Under Assumption 2, sunspot equilibria exist even when the government does not bail out the banks and sovereign debt remains risky. Let $q_1(s^o)$ be the price of government debt under optimism and $q_1(s^p)$ be the price of government debt under pessimism, with $q_1(s^o) > q_1(s^p)$. Using Assumption 2, the outcome under optimism is the no default solution to the debt pricing equation. So $q_1(s^o) = q_1^* = \frac{1}{R}$. $q_1(s^p) = \frac{p}{R}$ where $p < 1$ is the probability of government repayment in the pessimistic equilibrium.

From Proposition 4 we know that, when the bank issues sufficient equity, depositors are fully insured against the uncertainty in the government debt market and the first best banking contract can be offered.

**Step 2: Government’s Choice**

If the government commits to no bailout, then the first-best contract is provided by the banks and households bear no risk from variability of debt prices. The intermediation process is never interrupted so that the welfare loss from $\psi > 0$ is avoided. There remains a positive probability of default given by:

$$p^{NB} = 1 - F\left(\frac{B_0 + G_1/q_1(s^p)}{A}\right).$$  \hfill (A.59)

With $p^{NB} > 0$, the default cost of $\gamma$ is borne with positive probability in the last period, conditional on a pessimistic sunspot in the middle period.

If, instead, the government commits to a bailout, it cannot improve upon the first-best allocation. The banks, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, will continue to offer the first-best contract.

But the first-best allocation will not obtain. Under bailout, the government issues more debt. This will increase the probability of default directly and thus depress the valuation of government debt. Under pessimism, as seen in Figure 2, the outcome will be a lower value of government debt. The reduction in the value of debt implies the government must raise even more debt to finance $G_1$ as well as any bailouts.

The probability of default under a bailout becomes

$$p^{BB} = 1 - F\left(\frac{B_0 + (G_1 + T(\hat{q}_1))/\hat{q}_1}{A}\right).$$  \hfill (A.60)

where $\hat{q}_1$ denotes the value of government debt under a bailout in the pessimistic sunspot state, as in Figure 2.

Comparing from (A.60) and (A.59), $p^{NB} > p^{BB}$ for two reasons. First, under bailout, the government issues more debt as $T(\hat{q}_1) \geq 0$. Second, $\hat{q}_1 < q_1(s^p)$, as seen in Figure 2. Hence the expected default cost, due to $\gamma > 0$, is higher under a bailout.

**Step 3: Market Clearing**
The construction of equilibrium prices such that markets clear parallels that in the proof of Proposition 2. In period 1, \( q_1(s^0) = \frac{1}{R} \) as in an optimistic sunspot state, default probabilities are zero. Hence at this price, investors are indifferent between consumption in period 1 and purchasing government debt to finance consumption in period 2. This indifference along with the large endowment of investor is sufficient for them to purchase debt from banks and newly issued government debt at this price.

If there is pessimism in period 1, then \( q_1(s^p) = \frac{p^{NB}}{R} \) where \( p^{NB} \) is the probability of debt repayment given in (A.59). At this price, investors are again willing to hold the excess supply of government debt.

In period 0, investors can either put their endowment directly in the illiquid technology and obtain \( R \) or purchase two period government debt. They are indifferent between these options if \( q_0 = \frac{\nu + (1-\nu)p^{NB}}{R} \), where \( \nu \) is the probability of optimism in period 1. If this condition holds, they are willing to purchase any of the government debt not held by the banking system. Thus, at these prices, all markets clear. The stock of government debt held by bank is sold to the investors along with any new debt in period 1. The market for government debt clears in both periods, in all states.

Further, at \( r^b = R \), investors are indifferent both with respect to the timing of their consumption and the composition of their portfolio. This indifference guarantees market clearing in the interbank market at zero trades.

6.3 Partial Bailout

In the proofs to Propositions 3 and 5 we assumed that the government’s ‘off-the-equilibrium-path’ alternative is to deliver no bailout to the bank in effect leaving it to be resolved optimally but with no government intervention. In this section we consider the possibility that the government could get involved in the resolution of the bank by providing some bailout assistance which moderates the haircuts suffered by depositors in the event of bank resolution. We do this in order to show that our results are robust to the nature of the resolution mechanism.

To simplify the analysis we assume that Assumption 3 holds so that a full bailout is feasible. Consequently, on the equilibrium path, the banks offers a full bailout to the banks and they issue no equity.

First we consider the case when the government takes an off-the-equilibrium-path action and does not fully bail out the banks instead offering them a partial bailout within the bank restructuring process. The government solves the following problem:
where $\tilde{q}_{PB}^1$ is the price at which the government buys debt from the bank within the bank resolution mechanism while $q_{PB}^1$ is the market price at which the government sells debt to investors in order to finance the bailout. The main difference between (A.28) and (A.61) is the fact that the buyback price $\tilde{q}_{PB}^1$ is optimally chosen during the restructuring process and the probability of government default $p_{PB}$ is different because of the different fiscal cost of bailout and because the tax base is negatively affected by the collapse of intermediation when $\psi > 0$. Note that the government solves the bank’s resolution problem only the pessimistic equilibrium and consequently we can simplify our notation by dropping the dependence on the sunspot state.

It is easy to see that as long as the bank sells all its bonds to investors ($B_{PB}^1 = 0$) it can make the allocation to late investors independent of whether the government defaults or not ($\hat{c}_{L}(1_G) = \hat{c}_{L}$). Since consumers are risk-averse, this would be beneficial. It is also feasible because the government can borrow and lend with investors via its choice of $L_1$ in order to choose optimally the allocations to the early and late consumers conditional upon its pessimism asset value. The first order condition with respect to $L_1$ delivers an allocation $\hat{c}_{E} < c_{E}$ and $\hat{c}_{L} < c_{L}$ to depositors such that $u'(\hat{c}_{E}) = Ru'(\hat{c}_{L})$. The consumers receive less than promised under optimism because the value of the bank’s bonds are below $q_{PB}^1 = 1/R$. However depositors are shielded from the risk of government default and hence, in what follows we drop the dependence of the government’s default, $1_G$.

The first order condition with respect to the buyback price delivers an intuitive first order condition which places limits on the size of the partial bailout depending on its impact on the probability of costly government default:

$$u'(\hat{c}_{E}) - \omega \left(1 - \frac{\overline{A}\gamma}{RB_{PB}^0} \frac{\partial p_{PB}}{\partial \tilde{q}_{PB}^1} \right) = 0$$

This implies that

$$u'(\hat{c}_{E}) - u'(c^E) \left(1 - \frac{\overline{A}\gamma}{RB_{PB}^0} \frac{\partial p_{PB}}{\partial \tilde{q}_{PB}^1} \right) = 0$$

(A.62)

and since $\frac{\partial p_{PB}}{\partial \tilde{q}_{PB}^1} < 0$, $\hat{c}_{E} < c_{E}$. This is intuitive - the government uses bailout policy to provide insurance to households. However, it provides only partial insurance because insurance is costly
in terms of a higher probability of sovereign default when $\gamma > 0$. The special case when $\gamma = 0$ is interesting because it follows from equation (A.62) that the government fully insures the depositor households. Then full and partial bailout coincide.

Welfare when the government provides some bailout funds inside the bank resolution mechanism is given by:

$$W_{PB} = \pi u(\hat{c}^E) + (1 - \pi) u(\hat{c}^L)$$

$$+ \omega \left[A_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB} B_0^B + G_i \right] + \frac{\omega}{R} (\bar{A}(1 - \psi) + Ri_0) - \frac{\omega}{R} (1 - p^{PB}) \gamma \bar{A}.$$  

(A.63)

Then the difference between full and partial bailout is given by:

$$\Delta \equiv W_{BB} - W_{PB}$$

$$= \pi [u(c^*E) - u(\hat{c}^E)] + (1 - \pi) [u(c^*L) - u(\hat{c}^L)] - \omega (\tilde{q}_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB}) B_0^B$$

$$+ \frac{\omega}{R} [(p^{BB} - p^{PB}) \gamma + \psi] \bar{A}.$$  

(A.64)

(A.64) looks very similar to the expressions found in Proposition 3, as does the bank’s resource constraint which links consumption allocations to the value of the bank’s sovereign debt holdings:

$$\pi [c^*E - \hat{c}^E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{c^*L - \hat{c}^L}{R} \right] = (\tilde{q}_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB}) B_0^B.$$  

(A.65)

Using $\omega = u'(c^*E) = Ru'(c^*L)$, the first term in (A.65) becomes

$$\pi [u(c^*E) - u(\hat{c}^E)] + (1 - \pi) [u(c^*L) - u(\hat{c}^L)] - u'(c^*E) \left( \pi [c^*E - \hat{c}^E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{c^*L - \hat{c}^L}{R} \right] \right)$$

By the strictly concavity of $u(\cdot)$ this term is positive although it is smaller compared to (A.41) because the provision of some bailout assistance from the government makes the consumption allocations under bank insolvency and resolution better compared to the one in Proposition 3.

The second term in (A.64) is proportional to:

$$(p^{BB} - p^{PB}) \gamma + \psi.$$  

(A.67)

The $p^{BB} - p^{PB}$ term is larger compared to $p^{BB} - p^{NB}$. This is because the provision of bailouts in the bank resolution mechanism implies that $p^{PB} < p^{NB}$.

It is worth re-writing (A.64) further so as to clarify the key terms in the government’s bailout
decision. First of all we can use (A.65) to substitute out the \((\tilde{q}_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB})B_0^B\) term.

\[
\Delta \equiv W^{BB} - W^{PB}
\]

\[= \pi \left[ \frac{u(c^E) - u(\hat{c}E)}{c^E - \hat{c}E} - u'(c^E) \right] [c^E - \hat{c}E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{u(c^L) - u(\hat{c}L)}{c^L - \hat{c}L} - u'(c^L) \right] [c^L - \hat{c}L] + u'(c^E) \frac{(p^{BB} - p^{PB}) \gamma \bar{A}}{(\tilde{q}_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB})RB_0^B} \left[ \pi[c^E - \hat{c}E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{c^L - \hat{c}L}{R} \right] \right] + u'(c^E) \frac{\psi \bar{A}}{R}.
\]

Secondly we can re-arrange the expression above as follows:

\[
\Delta \equiv W^{BB} - W^{PB}
\]

\[= \pi \left[ \frac{u(c^E) - u(\hat{c}E)}{c^E - \hat{c}E} - u'(c^E) \left( 1 - \left( \frac{p^{BB} - p^{PB}}{(\tilde{q}_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB})RB_0^B} \right) \right) \right] [c^E - \hat{c}E] + (1 - \pi) \left[ \frac{u(c^L) - u(\hat{c}L)}{c^L - \hat{c}L} - u'(c^L) \left( 1 - \left( \frac{p^{BB} - p^{PB}}{(\tilde{q}_1 - \tilde{q}_1^{PB})RB_0^B} \right) \right) \right] [c^L - \hat{c}L] + u'(c^E) \frac{\psi \bar{A}}{R}.
\]

The advantage of doing this is to demonstrate clearly that the decision whether to offer a full bailout or not is one that trades off losses deviating from the optimal partial bailout with the resolution mechanism against the gains from protecting financial intermediation. The terms in the square brackets (on the second and third lines of (A.69) above) represent the welfare losses due to deviating from the first order condition (A.62) when the government provides full bailout thus ensuring that households get \((c^E, c^L)\) instead of the lower allocation \((\hat{c}E, \hat{c}L)\). Offsetting these losses are the welfare gains from protecting investors’ endowment from the damage caused by the collapse of intermediation (this is the \(u'(c^E)\frac{\psi \bar{A}}{R}\) term). From (A.62) when \(\gamma = 0\), \(\hat{c}E = c^E\) and a full bailout is always provided.

As \(\gamma\) rises above zero, the second and third lines of (A.69) become negative. Then a full bailout is provided only when \(\gamma\) is small so that the losses from deviating from (A.62) are small and when \(\psi\) is large so that the gains from saving the banking system are significant.

The ability to provide partial bailout assistance inside the bank resolution mechanism (weakly) increases the value of not bailing out the banks. Consequently, a bailout will be provided at a lower value of \(\gamma\) and a higher value of \(\psi\) compared to Proposition 3. In other words, the ability to provide partial assistance within the bank resolution mechanism does not alter the qualitative nature of the government choice of whether to save the banks or not. It is still governed by the magnitudes of sovereign default costs and the lost output due to the collapse of financial intermediation.
References


