Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation:  
Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries*

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Abstract

Firm dynamics in poor countries show striking differences to those of rich countries. While some firms indeed experience growth as they age, many firms are simply stagnant in that they neither exit nor expand. We interpret this fact as a lack of selection, whereby producers with little growth potential survive because innovating firms do not expand enough to force them out of the market. To explain these differences we develop a theory, whereby contractual frictions limit firms’ acquisition of managerial time. If managerial effort provision is non-contractible, entrepreneurs will benefit little from delegating decision power to outside managers, as they spend most of their time monitoring their managerial personnel. As the return to managerial time is higher in big firms, improvements in the degree of contract enforcement will raise the returns of growing large and thereby increase the degree of creative destruction. To discipline the quantitative importance of this mechanism, we incorporate such incomplete managerial contracts into an endogenous growth model and calibrate it to firm level data from India. Improvements in the efficacy of managerial delegation can explain a sizable fraction of the difference between plants’ life-cycle in the US and India.

Keywords: Development, growth, selection, competition, firm dynamics, contracts, management, entrepreneurship.

JEL classification: O31, O38, O40

STILL PRELIMINARY!!!

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1 Introduction

A recent macroeconomic literature on firm dynamics has documented striking differences across countries. While firms in rich countries experience rapid growth conditional on survival, firms in poor countries remain small and do not grow as they age. Hsieh and Klenow (2014) for example show that the average firm in the US has grown by a factor of five by the time it is 30 years old. In contrast, firms in India see very little growth during their life-cycle, making 30 year old firms barely bigger than new entrants. To explain this pattern, we want to take seriously a growing microeconomic, empirical literature, which argues that lack of managerial delegation might be important to understand such differences of performance of firms in poor countries. Bloom, Eifert, McKenzie, Mahajan, and Roberts (2013) for example argue that textile firms in India are severely constrained in their managerial resources, which prevents them from expanding. In particular, they show that the delegation of decision-rights hardly extends to managers outside the family as the imperfect contractual environment makes it difficult for firms to incentivize external managers. In fact, they show that the number of male family members is the dominant predictor of firm size. In this paper we embed these distinct branches of the literature in a macroeconomic model and ask whether such limits to delegation are quantitatively important to explain the observed differences in plants’ life-cycle growth across countries.

To analyze the effect of managerial delegation on the process of firm dynamics, we construct a novel theory of endogenous growth building on the work of Klette and Kortum (2004). In this model, firm dynamics are the outcome of creative destruction, whereby firms expand into new markets through productivity-enhancing activities, thereby replacing other producers. Hence, life-cycle growth is a byproduct of selection, whereby successful firms grow at the expense of their competitors. To focus on the importance of this selection margin, we explicitly allow for firm heterogeneity in their innovation potential. While high-type firms have the potential to grow by investing in technological improvements, low-type firms are endowed with an inefficient innovation technology, which makes them remain small. Hence, we do not expect all firms in the economy to grow - even in the absence of any frictions. In fact, as shown by Hurst and Pugsley (2012) there are also many firms in the US that do not expand. The important difference between poor and rich countries however, is their aggregate importance. While such firms in the US account for relatively little aggregate employment and shrink in importance as they age, in poor countries essentially the entirety of employment is allocated toward these producers and their aggregate importance remains stubbornly high. As an example of such lack of selection, consider Figure 1, which reports the share of Indian manufacturing plants with at most two workers by age. The striking result is that this share is almost constant, i.e. there is no weeding out of small-scale producers as they age. The problem in developing countries therefore seems not to be a failure of most firms to grow. The problem is rather that firms that do have innovative potential do not grow quickly enough to push stagnant producers out of the market.

The reason why innovation incentives are low for firms with growth potential is directly linked to the supply of managerial time, a firm can acquire. As the firm owner’s time endowment is limited, growing firms will run less and less profitably as the owner’s attention has to be spread over a larger workforce. Hence, owner-run firms run into span of control problems in the spirit of Lucas (1978), which ultimately reduce the returns of growing large. To overcome such decreasing returns, the firms can augment the owner’s time endowment by delegating managerial decisions to outside managers. As stressed by the empirical literature described above however, this interaction is subject to contractual frictions. If managerial effort provision is non-contractible, outside managers have to be monitored by the entrepreneur, which itself requires valuable time. The net return to
delegation therefore depends both on the countries legal environment and the human capital of the outside manager.

The model predicts a threshold firm size, below which firms are only run by their owners. Furthermore, this threshold depends on the country-specific institutional and technological parameters. As long as firms do not delegate decision rights, firm profits have decreasing returns as the entrepreneur’s time is a fixed factor in production. This dictates that growth incentives are declining. Once, the marginal value of delegation is sufficiently high, firms start to hire outside managers to overcome the decreasing returns. In fact, the model predicts that the firm’s value function becomes linear, the slope of which is determined by the net benefit of delegation and shapes the dynamic incentives to firm growth. In particular, improvements in the contractual environment will increase firms’ incentives to grow by raising the net benefit of delegation. Intuitively, functioning court systems can substitute for owners’ monitoring requirements. Outside managers will therefore bring more net managerial resources into firms. This will make the problems of span of control less severe, hence increase the returns to innovation for firms with innovation potential and finally strengthen the degree of selection in the aggregate economy. In the micro data, this increase in aggregate creative destruction will manifest itself in a steep life-cycle profile as profitable firms can expand quickly at the expense of their less innovative competitors.

We then analyze the quantitative importance of this mechanism. In a first step we calibrate the parameters of the model to micro data from Indian manufacturing plants. A neat result of the theoretical model is that the net benefit to delegation is summarized by a single parameter, which we can directly calibrate to the data. Hence, for the calibration exercise, we do not have to take stand on a particular microfoundation of the contractual game between managers and entrepreneurs. Next, keeping all other parameters at the Indian levels, we recalibrate this single parameter to match the share of managers in the US economy. This exercise shows us that if Indian firms were able to obtain the US-level benefits of delegation, the gap in lifecycle growth between India and the US was reduced by 50%. This quantitatively large impact stems from the fact that high-type firms see their returns to expansion increase and that stagnant firms are replaced faster
so that the share of small, old firms drops substantially. We then dig deeper into the fundamental
determinants of the delegation benefits. Using cross-country data on the quality of legal institutions
and on human capital by managerial personnel, we show that while 70% of the higher delegation
benefits in the US stem from a more efficient court system, human capital differences between US
and Indian managers cannot account for these differences in the efficiency of delegation.

Related Literature  The idea that managerial inputs are crucial for the process of firm dynamics
has a long tradition in development economics. Of particular importance is the seminal work of
Penrose (1959), who argues not only that managerial resources “create a fundamental and
inescapable limit to the amount of expansion a firm can undertake at any time” but also that it
is precisely this scarcity of managerial inputs that prevents the weeding out of small firms as “the
bigger firms have not got around to mopping them up” (Penrose (1959, p. 221)). Recently, a series
of papers by Bloom and Van Reenen have provided empirical support for this view. First, they show
that managerial practices differ across countries (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010)). Second,
as described earlier, they suggest that it is not merely differences in managerial technology (or
human capital) that determine managerial efficiency, but that contractual imperfections are likely
to be at the heart of why firms in poor countries might be “management constrained.” Bloom,
Eifert, Heller, Jensen, and Mahajan (2009) argues that if an Indian firm owner caught an outside
manager stealing or shirking, she would have very little formal recourse as court cases take very
long and often require additional bribes. Managerial decision rights therefore largely remain within
the family, so that managerial resources are akin to a "fixed" factor for many firms. Relatedly,
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) also find that in countries with better legal institutions,
firms are larger and more decentralized in that more managerial tasks are delegated to outsiders.

On the theoretical side, this paper provides a new theory of firm dynamics in developing coun-
tries.1 While many recent papers have aimed to measure and explain the static differences in
allocative efficiency across firms,2 there has been little theoretical work explaining why firm dy-
namics differ so much across countries. A notable exception is the work by Cole, Greenwood,
and Sanchez (2012), who argue that cross-country differences in the financial system will affect the type
of technologies that can be implemented. Like them, we let the productivity process take center
stage. However, we turn to the recent generation of micro-founded models of growth, in particular
Klette and Kortum (2004). While such models have been built to study firm dynamics in develop-
ed economies (Lentz and Mortensen (2005, 2008), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), Acemoglu, Akcigit,
Bloom, and Kerr (2013)), this is not the case for developing countries.3 We believe endogenous
technical change models are a natural environment for studying this question, as they focus on
firms’ productivity-enhancing investment decisions. We believe that models of endogenous growth
have been under-utilized in the development literature, partly because of a lack of data to discipline
these models, and partly because early models of endogenous growth have been mainly constructed
to model innovation decisions of firms in developed countries.4 Hence, these early models have

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1 An overview of some regularities of the firm size distribution in India, Indonesia and Mexico is contained in Hsieh
and Olken (2014).

2 The seminal papers for the recent literature on misallocation are Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). As far as theories are concerned, there is now a sizable literature on credit market frictions (Buera,
Kaboski, and Shin, 2011; Moll, 2010; Midrigan and Xu, 2010), size-dependent policies Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008),
monopolistic market power (Peters, 2013) and adjustment costs (Collard-Wexler, Asker, and De Loecker, 2011). A
synthesis of the literature is also contained in Hopenhayn (2012) and Jones (2013).

3 An exception is Peters (2013), who applies a dynamic Schumpeterian model to firm-level data in Indonesia.

4 A major impediment to bringing the first-generation models of endogenous growth to the data is that these were
aggregate models, which do not have direct implications at the firm level (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
been harmonized with terminologies such as innovation, R&D, patent protection, and innovation policy, which do not seem to properly capture the reality of firms in developing countries. For the remainder of this paper, we therefore refer to innovation in a broad sense, capturing not only the implementation of new ideas but also a variety of costly productivity-enhancing activities, encompassing also training, reorganization or the acquisition of high-quality complementary factors.

We focus on inefficiencies in the interaction between managers and owners of firms to explain the differences in firms’ demand for expansion. Hence, particularly relevant contributions are Caselli and Gennaioli (2012) and Powell (2012). Caselli and Gennaioli (2012) also stress the negative consequences of inefficient management. Their focus is on the efficiency of the “market for control”, i.e., the market where (untalented) firm owners are able to sell their firms to (talented) outsiders. With imperfect financial markets, such transactions might not take place as outsiders might be unable to secure the required funds.

Our economy does not have any exogenous heterogeneity in productivity so that there is no notion of static misallocation. In contrast, we argue that managerial frictions within the firm reduce growth incentives and hence prevent competition from taking place sufficiently quickly on product markets. Such within-firm considerations are also central in Powell (2012), who studies an economy where firms (“owners”) need to hire managers as inputs to production but contractual frictions prevent owners from committing to pay the promised managerial compensation after managerial effort has been exerted. He studies the properties of the optimal long-term relational contract in a stationary equilibrium, whereby owners are disciplined to keep their promises through reputational concerns. There are two important differences from our paper. First, Powell (2012) studies an economy where firm productivity is constant, i.e., there is no interaction between contractual frictions in the market for managers and firms’ innovation incentives. Second, while he studies the implications of owners not being able to write contracts on their wage promises, we focus on managers not being able to contractually commit themselves to their choice of effort. This difference is important in that it determines the distribution of costs of imperfect legal systems. While in our model, contractual frictions will especially hurt large firms, for which hold-up is costly, Michael Powell’s model implies that small producers will be particularly affected, as they have little reputational capital to pledge.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the theoretical model, where we explicitly derive the link between firms’ delegation decisions under contractual frictions and their innovation incentives. In Section 3 we take the model to the data. We first calibrate the model to the Indian micro data and then use the cross-country data on the aggregate importance of managerial employees, their human capital and quality of legal institutions to assess the quantitative importance of our mechanism. Section 4 concludes.

2 The Model

We consider a firm-based model of endogenous technical change in the spirit of Klette and Kortum (2004). We augment this framework with three ingredients:

1. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their innovation potential.

2. Both managerial time and labor time are inputs for production and individuals can either work as production workers or managers.

Grossman and Helpman, 1991.)

Another reason for untalented owners to not sell their firm is that individual wealth can substitute for managerial incompetence if financial markets are imperfect. Hence, financial frictions will also reduce the supply of firms and not only the demand from credit-constrained outsiders.
3. Firm owners are endowed with a fixed amount of managerial time and owners can choose to delegate managerial tasks to outside managers. This interaction, however, is subject to contractual frictions.

The first two items allow us to meaningfully speak about a process of selection. It is the last ingredient that will determine how quickly this process will take place. To sustain innovation incentives, entrepreneurs have to delegate eventually to not run out of managerial time, which they can provide on their own behalf. We will be thinking of the degree of contractual frictions as our main source of variation across countries. However, we will also allow for differences in human capital and will use the cross-country data to distinguish between these different margins.

More precisely, we think of an economy that is populated by two types of agents: workers and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are endowed with production possibilities ("firms") and have the capacity to grow their firms through innovation. Entrepreneurs come in two types, which differ in their innovation costs: while high types can perform innovation activities and hence generate sustained productivity growth through creative destruction, low types are not capable of starting a thriving business in that they have no talent for innovation. Hence, our model is a heterogeneous firm model, where firms do not differ in their exogenous TFP (as in Lucas (1978)), but where firms differ in the efficiency of innovation. The process of creative destruction, which is ignited by the high types, determines how long low types can remain in business. Hence, at the heart of our selection process is the demand for growth of high types.

Entrepreneurs combine their technology with two inputs of production: workers and managerial effort. By increasing the amount of managerial effort, firms can increase the efficiency of their physical production factors. Hence, well-managed firms have high “x-efficiency” in that they combine their technology and their production workers more effectively. While workers are simply hired in a frictionless spot market, the provision of managerial effort is more involved. In particular, managerial services can either be provided solely by the entrepreneur himself or can be acquired on the market by delegating decision power to specialized manager. Specialized managers are useful in that they can add to the supply of managerial resources within the firm. However, the interaction between entrepreneurs and managers is subject to contractual frictions, which will taint the efficiency with which managers can be employed. This has important dynamic ramifications: because large firms will - endogenously - be more likely to delegate, the incentives to grow large are low when contracts are hard to enforce. Hence, the demand for creative destruction will - endogenously - be low and the economy will be sclerotic for two reasons. First, low types, i.e., firms without any growth potential, will survive for a long time conditional on entry. Second, contractual frictions reduce the demand for outside managers, both by reducing managerial demand of firms of a given size and by changing the stationary distribution of firm size toward smaller firms.

For simplicity we assume that both managers and entrepreneurs are short-lived. More precisely entrepreneurs live for one period and then hand over the firm to their offspring, who also live for one period. This is isomorphic to an environment where entrepreneurs are infinitely lived but have a planning horizon of only one period. This is useful for analytical tractability and captures all the economic intuition.

2.1 Preferences and Technology

The final good is a composite of a continuum of intermediate goods, and produced with the Cobb-Douglas technology under perfect competition:

\[ \ln Y_t = \int_0^1 \ln y_{jt} dj, \]
where \( y_{jt} \) is the amount of product \( j \) produced at time \( t \). To save notation, the time subscript \( t \) will be dropped henceforth when it causes no confusion.

Production of intermediate goods takes place by heterogeneous firms and uses both production workers and managers. In particular, the production function for good \( j \) at time \( t \) is given by

\[
y_{jf} = q_{jf} \mu (e_{jf}) l_{jf},
\]

(1)

where \( q_{jf} \) is the firm-product specific production technology, \( \mu (e_{jf}) \) is the functional form that translates managerial effort \( e_j \) supplied by firm \( f \) in product line \( j \) into managerial efficiency units for production, and \( l_{jf} \) is the number of workers employed for producing intermediate good \( j \).

Each intermediate good \( j \) is produced by a firm that has the highest productivity in line \( j \), and that firm also acts as a monopolist. One of the new ingredients of the current model, which is also the main focus of our analysis, is the provision of the managerial effort in production. In order to keep the focus on the determination of the managerial effort, here we skip the lengthy details of the market structure. It can be shown that the profit in each product line \( j \) is a concave function of the managerial effort \( e_j \)

\[
\pi_{jt} = e_j^\sigma Y_t
\]

(2)

i.e. profits are a simple power-function of managerial effort parametrized by the elasticity \( \sigma \) (which is a property of the function \( \mu \) in (1)). Section 5.1 in the Appendix provides the necessary details that endogenously leads to the exact expression of (2).

There is measure 1 of individuals who can work as production workers or managers. Let us denote the number of production workers and managers hired in line \( j \) by \( l_j \) and \( m_j \), respectively. Then the labor market clearing condition will be

\[
1 = \int_0^1 (l_j + m_j) \, dj.
\]
2.2 Delegation

An owner can also delegate some of the managerial task to outside managers by paying a wage rate of \( w \) to each. The cost of hiring an outside manager is the wage rate \( w \) that will be paid to the manager. The benefit is that outside managers will add to the firm’s endowment of available managerial time and hence generate managerial effort \( e \). Contractual imperfections however require the owner to spend some of her time to monitor the manager. We denote the net benefit of delegation per manager by \( \xi \) which is in terms of managerial effort units \( e \). In other words, an owner that has \( n \) product lines over which she distributes her time equally, and hires \( m_j \) managers per each line \( j \) has a total managerial effort in line \( j \) equal to \( e_j = T/n + m\xi \) per line. Recall that \( \xi \) is net of the time the owner needs to spend to ensure that the manager adheres to the arrangements. In return, the owner has to pay \( m_j w \).

The net benefit of delegation \( \xi \) can depend on various country-specific characteristics, such as the strength of rule of law, human capital, or the quality of the monitoring technologies. In the following subsection, we provide a micro-founded game to illustrate how the level of \( \xi \) might depend on those country characteristics. Readers, who are not interested in the particular micro-foundation can take \( \xi \) as given and skip to Section 2.2.2, where we solve for firms’ optimal delegation strategies.

2.2.1 Delegation with contractual frictions

As it was described in the Introduction, delegation of tasks to outside managers has both monetary and monitoring time costs. A major concern for business owners (especially in India) is the fact that outside managers can misbehave and the weak legal system prevents the owner to seek their rights to punish managers who do not deliver on their promises. Therefore, the owners themselves need to invest time to monitor their outside managers. To capture these considerations, we consider the following scenario: Both managers and owners each have one unit of time at their disposal. While owners can provide \( T \) units of effort during that time interval, managers can provide \( \eta \) units of effort. One can also think of \( \eta \) to be the human capital of outside managers.

Managerial effort provision, however, is subject to contractual frictions. For simplicity, we assume that the manager can decide to either provide effort, in which case his contribution to the firms’ time endowment is \( \eta \), or shirk, in which case he adds no human capital to the firm:

\[
e^\text{manager}_j = \begin{cases} \eta & \text{if work}, \\ 0 & \text{if shirk}. \end{cases}
\]

Crucially, the managers’ effort choice is not perfectly contractible but the entrepreneur has to
monitor the manager and has to rely on the legal system in case she catches the manager shirking. We assume that if the owner spends $s$ units of effort in monitoring a manager, she will catch a shirking manager with probability $\phi s$. Here $\phi$ simply captures the quality of the monitoring technology. Whenever the manager shirks and the owner catches her, the owner can go to court and sue the manager for the managerial wage $w$. To model differences in the efficiency of the legal system, we assume that in such case, the court (rightly) decides in the owner’s favor with probability $\kappa \in [0, 1]$. Hence one can think of $\kappa$ as the proxy for the rule of law in the country. Finally, the demand for shirking arises because shirking carries a private benefit $b w$, where $b < 1$.\(^6\)

Now we are ready to solve for the equilibrium of this simple game. If the entrepreneur spends $s$ units of time monitoring the manager, the manager does not shirk if and only if

$$w \geq b w + w (1 - \kappa \phi s),$$

where $(1 - \kappa \phi s)$ is the probability that the manager is not required to return his remuneration despite having shirked. This incentive constraint implies that the manager puts effort as long as $s \geq \frac{b}{\kappa \phi}$. Clearly the owner will never employ a manager without inducing effort. Hence, the owner will spend

$$s = \frac{b}{\kappa \phi}$$

units of time monitoring the manager. Note that the expression (4) has two major implications:

1. Improvements in the contractual system will reduce the time necessary to monitor as $\frac{\partial s}{\partial \kappa} < 0$. Hence, monitoring and the strength of the legal system are substitutes.

2. Improvements in the efficiency of monitoring $\phi$, will also substitute for the time required to provide sufficient incentives.

Given the equilibrium of this game, the net benefit of delegation in terms of managerial effort is simply the manager’s effort $\eta$ minus the effort cost of monitoring $s$ in (4) such that the overall managerial effort in a line $j$ is

$$e_j = \frac{T}{n} - m_j \frac{b}{\phi \kappa} + m_j \eta.$$

This expression implies that by hiring $m_j$ managers for line $j$, the owners brings $m_j \eta$ units of managerial effort, yet she also has spend $m_j b/(\phi \kappa)$ units of effort from her own time to monitor those managers. Hence, the overall net benefit of delegation per manager can be summarized by

$$\xi (\kappa, \eta, \phi) \equiv \eta - \frac{b}{\phi \kappa}$$

Note that the benefit of delegation is increasing in rule of law $\kappa$, human capital $\eta$, and the monitoring technology $\phi$. As the whole purpose of delegation is to increase the firms’ managerial resources, firms will never hire a manager if $\xi (\kappa, \eta, \phi) < 0$. Hence, whenever the quality of legal system is sufficiently low (in particular $\kappa < \frac{b}{\phi \eta}$), there will not be any managerial demand as the net benefits of delegation are negative: Owners need to spend more of their human capital to prevent opportunistic behavior of managers than they gain in return. For the following we will assume that $\xi > 0$ to make the analysis interesting.

\(^6\)The necessity to the the private benefit being proportional to the wage (or any other variable that grows in proportion to the aggregate productivity) arises in order to make the contract stationary.
2.2.2 Value of a firm with Delegation

Given the net benefit of delegation $\xi$, we can now solve the owner’s problem. Consider a firm with $n$ products and let us denote the set of firm $f$’s product lines by $J_f$ such that $|J_f| = n$. Given (2), the owner maximizes the total profits of the firm by choosing the optimal number of outside managers

$$V(n) = \sum_{j \in J_f} m_j \geq 0 \left\{ \left( \frac{T}{n} + \xi m_j \right)^\sigma Y_t - w_t m_j \right\}$$

This expression is intuitive. The owner allocates $T/n$ units of her time on each product line. In addition, by hiring $m$ outside managers, she can obtain an overall managerial efficiency of $T/n + m_j \xi$ but has to pay $mw$ overall to managers.\footnote{Note that in this maximization problem we already imposed the optimality condition that the owner is going to allocate the same amount of time in each line ($T/n$).}

The solution to this maximization problem is provided in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1** Consider the maximization problem in (7) and let us define the normalized wage rate as $\omega \equiv w_t/Y_t$. Firms below a certain size cut-off $n < n^*$ do not hire outside managers and run only by their owners such that

$$m_j = 0 \text{ if } n < n^* \equiv \left\lceil T \left( \frac{\omega}{\sigma \xi} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \right\rceil.$$  \hfill (8)

Conditional on being above the threshold $n \geq n^*$, firms hiring decision is equal to

$$m_j = \left[ \frac{\sigma}{\omega} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \left( \frac{\xi}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} - \frac{T}{\xi n} \text{ if } n \geq n^*.$$ \hfill (9)

**Proof.** This follows trivially from the first order condition of (7). \qed

The intuition for these results are provided in Figures 4 and 5.

If the owner runs a small firm ($n = 1$ in Figure 4), then the owner can invest her entire managerial time in the firm which then lowers the marginal return from hiring an outside manager. This can be seen from the fact that the slope at $m = 0$ is lower than wage rate, hence a small firm does not hire an outside manager. A large firm with $n > n^*$, on the other hand, hires outside managers until the marginal return from the last manager is equal to the market wage rate. That determines the equilibrium number of managers hired by an $n$–product firm.

The result in (8) implies that small firms do not hire outside managers. The threshold size for hiring is increasing in owner’s time $T$ and the monetary cost of hiring a manager $\omega$ and it is decreasing in the net benefit of delegation $\xi$. Similar comparative statics hold for the intensive margin as well. Hence the following predictions follow.

**Prediction 1** Small firms do not hire managers. Conditional on hiring managers, the number of outside managers increases in firm size.

**Prediction 2** Controlling for firm size $n$, in countries with higher $\xi$ (due to stronger rule of law, for instance) firms hire more outside managers.

**Prediction 3** Controlling for firm size $n$, owners with larger time endowments $T$ will hire less outside managers, both at the extensive and intensive margins.
Next we turn to the resulting value function which will determine the innovation incentives of firms. The following proposition specifies its exact functional form.

**Proposition 2** Consider the above economy. Under the optimal delegation decisions of (8) and (9), the equilibrium normalized value \( \tilde{V} = \frac{V}{Y} \) of an \( n \)-product firm is:

\[
\tilde{V}(n) = \begin{cases} 
\tilde{V}_{\text{self}}(n) & \text{for } n < n^* \\
\tilde{V}_{\text{manager}}(n) & \text{for } n \geq n^*
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \tilde{V}_{\text{self}}(n) \) is the value of owner-run \( n \)-product firm,

\[
\tilde{V}_{\text{self}}(n) = T^n n^{1-\sigma}
\]

and \( \tilde{V}_{\text{manager}}(n) \) is the value of a delegating \( n \)-product firm,

\[
\tilde{V}_{\text{manager}}(n) = \frac{\omega T}{\xi} + n (1 - \sigma) \left( \frac{\xi \sigma}{\omega} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}}. \tag{10}
\]

**Proof.** Directly follows from substituting (8) and (9) into (7). \( \square \)

Note that the interesting result here is the fact the value function is linear in firm size \( n \). This is an important implication that suggests that the owner can fight against diminishing returns by delegating to outside managers. Not surprisingly, the slope of this value function, i.e., the incremental gain from firm growth, directly depends on the net benefit of delegation \( \xi \). On the other hand, the incremental gain from firm growth is decreasing in the wage bill of the manager \( \omega \).

**Theorem 1** An owner-run firm’s value function features diminishing returns, whereas delegation results in a constant returns value function.

Figure 6 illustrates this result. When a firm is run only by the owner, the firm runs into diminishing returns in size \( n \), as in Lucas (1978). Delegation, on the other hand, has a constant...
return. Therefore the owner decides to delegate once the firm size hits a certain size threshold \( n^* \). The value function becomes linear as in Klette and Kortum (2004) after \( n^* \), letting the owner overcome the diminishing returns in size.

Clearly the slope of the linear portion is important and determines when delegation will take place. In countries where the net benefit of delegation is larger (i.e., \( \xi \) is larger), the return to delegation is bigger and the slope of the linear portion of the value function is steeper. Hence, owners decide to delegate earlier as illustrated in Figure 7. For instance, stronger rule of law or higher human capital by managers will imply higher value of \( \xi \) which then results in more delegation of managerial tasks.

![Figure 6: Value Function upon Delegation](image1)

![Figure 7: Value Function with Increased \( \xi \)](image2)

2.3 Dynamics

In this model, growth stems from two margins: entry and innovation by incumbent firms. We describe these processes next.

**Entry** In order to focus on the process of selection (or lack thereof), we assume that a measure \( N \) of entrepreneurs entering the economy at each point in time. This can be thought of as an exogenous flow of business ideas to outsiders, who enter the economy as new entrepreneurs. Importantly, entrants are heterogeneous and are either of high or low types as discussed above. Formally, upon entry, each new entrant draws a firm type \( \theta \in \{ \theta_H, \theta_L \} \) from a Bernoulli distribution, where

\[
\theta = \begin{cases} 
\theta_H & \text{with probability } \alpha \\
\theta_L & \text{with probability } 1 - \alpha.
\end{cases}
\]

**Incumbent Innovation** The type of the firm determines its innovation productivity or growth potential. In particular, each firm is endowed with an innovation technology. If a firm of type \( \theta \) with \( n \) products in its portfolio invests \( R \) units of the final good in R&D, it generates a flow rate of innovation of

\[
X (R; \theta, n) = \theta \left( \frac{R}{Q} \right)^\xi n^{1-\xi}. \quad (11)
\]

Hence, \( \theta \) parameterizes the efficiency of innovation resources. For simplicity we assume that \( \theta_L = 0 \), i.e. low types will never be able to grow and we can focus on the high types’ decisions. The other
terms in the innovation technology are the usual scaling variables in many models of growth. Because we denote innovation costs in terms of the final good, the scalar \( Q(t) \) is required to keep the model stationary and the presence of \( n \) implies that the costs of innovation do not scale in firm size.

After entry decisions have taken place, firms can try to innovate. Letting \( V_i(n,t) \) be the value of having a firm of type \( i \) with \( n \) products, the value of an incumbent of type \( i \) with \( n \) products prior to the innovation stage is given by

\[
X^*_n = \arg \max_{X_n} \left\{ V_i(n,t) + X_n [V_i(n+1,t) - V_i(n,t)] - Q \left[ \frac{X_n}{\theta n^{1-\xi}} \right]^{\frac{\xi}{1-\xi}} \right\},
\]

where the last term is simply the cost function of innovation that is implied directly by the production function in (11). Hence the profit-maximizing innovation rate per product line, \( x_n = X_n/n \) is given by

\[
x^*_n = \Delta_n^{\frac{1-\xi}{\xi}} \theta^{\frac{1}{1+\xi}} \xi^{\frac{\xi}{1+\xi}},
\]

where \( \Delta_n \) denotes the marginal return to innovation as

\[
\Delta_n \equiv \frac{V(n+1) - V(n)}{Q}.
\]

Equations (13) and (14) are crucial equations in that they link firms’ innovation incentives to the slope of the value function \( V_n \) in Figures 6 and 7. Hence, in the absence of delegation, diminishing returns will lower the incentives to expand as firm size increases. The fact that owners start to delegate beyond a certain size increases the incentives to expand relative to no delegation case. However, how much owners gain from delegation, i.e. the level of \( \xi \), effects how much delegating firms will be willing to expand. This implies that in countries where the rule of law of stronger, firms will be willing to expand more due to higher returns to expansion. Another important implication is about the firm growth and firm size relationship. Innovation incentives are declining more in firm size in lower \( \xi \) countries than the ones with high \( \xi \), which implies that the average firm growth will decline faster in size when \( \xi \) is lower.

**Prediction 4** Firm growth decreases in firm size, more so in countries with lower \( \xi \).

### 2.4 Flow Equations and the Stationary Distribution

The key force that pushes firms out of the market is creative destruction: Firms lose products if they are replaced by either new entrants or successful incumbents. To study the aggregate consequences of selection, we need to keep track of the share of product lines belonging to high and low types respectively. Let us denote the share of the product lines that belong to \( n \)-product high type firms by \( \Psi^H_n \) and the share of the product lines that belong to all low type firms by \( \Psi^L \). Then

\[
\Psi^L + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \Psi^H_n = 1.
\]

Let us denote the aggregate creative destruction, i.e., the rate at which the producer of a given product is replaced, by \( \tau \). Creative destruction can happen by new entry at the rate \( N \) or by an \( n \)-product incumbent at the rate \( x_n \) per line. Therefore,

\[
\tau \equiv \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} x_n \Psi^H_n + N.
\]
In order to pin down the steady-state values of each product line share $\Psi^L$ and $\Psi^H_n$, we now express the flow equations that equate the outflows from to inflows into each state:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{STATE: } & \quad \text{OUTFLOW} = \text{INFLOW} \\
\Psi^L & : \quad \Psi^L = (1-\alpha) \frac{1}{N} \Psi^L \tau \\
\Psi^H_1 & : \quad \Psi^H_1 = \alpha N \Psi^H_1 \tau \\
\Psi^H_{n \geq 1} & : \quad \Psi^H_n [\tau + x_n] = \Psi^H_{n-1} [n-1] + \Psi^H_{n+1} \tau [n+1] \tag{17}
\end{align*}
\]

In the first line, the left-hand side denotes the total number of low-type products that exit the economy which happens at the rate $\tau$, and the right-hand side shows the number of products that enter the economy as products of low type firms. Similarly, the amount of entry into the economy by high types must be equal to the amount of exit from the economy of high-type producers which is described in the second line.

Finally the third line specifies the outflows and inflows for all high-type product lines with $n \geq 1$. The outflow from each product line can happen in two ways: Either the owner of the product line will lose one of its $n$ product lines at the total rate of $n \tau$, or the owner will come up with a new innovation at the rate $X_n = nx_n$ in which case the product line will now belong to an $(n+1)$-product firm. Likewise, the inflow can occur in two ways: Either firms with $n-1$ lines grow to being an $n$-line firm which happens at the rate $(n-1)x_{n-1}$ or the $(n+1)$ firms lose one product against another competitor at the rate $(n+1) \tau$.

For given innovation schedules $\{x_n\}$ and entry rate $N$, (15)-(17) fully characterize the stationary distribution of the economy. As $x_n$ is only dependent on $\Delta_n$ (see (13)), (15)-(17) are also sufficient to solve for the dynamic evolution of the economy given a schedule of marginal returns $\{\Delta_n\}_n$. It is precisely this marginal return schedule that we will construct from the decision of owners to delegate some tasks to outside managers.

Now we can also express the evolution of the size of any given high-type firm with $n$-products. After a small time interval $dt$ the number of products will evolve as follows:

\[
n(t + dt) = \begin{cases} 
  n(t) + 1 & \text{with probability } X_n dt, \\
  n(t) - 1 & \text{with probability } n \tau dt, \\
  n(t) & \text{with probability } 1 - X_n dt - n \tau dt.
\end{cases}
\]

### 3 Quantitative exercise

We now take the model to the data to gauge the quantitative importance of this mechanism. Our strategy is as follows. We first calibrate the model to the Indian microdata. In particular, we target different moments of the process of firm-dynamics of the Indian manufacturing sector so that the model matches the Indian life-cycle by construction. As stressed in the theory, the crucial parameter for firms’ demand for delegation is the management multiplier $\xi$, which we discipline by forcing the model to match the managerial employment share in India. We think of this multiplier as a reduced form parameters at the country level, which depends on various country-characteristics - in our particular micro-foundation it depends on the strength of the legal system $\kappa$, the level of managerial human capital $\eta$ and the efficiency of the monitoring technology $\phi$. Hence, from the micro-variation within a country, we cannot identify these individual components but only $\xi$ itself. To quantify the explanatory power of this delegation margin, we hence proceed in two steps. First, we study the implications of $\xi$ for the life-cycle of manufacturing plants. To discipline the exercise, we treat $\xi$ as a country-fixed effect and calibrate it the cross-sectional distribution of managerial employment shares, i.e. for each country we calibrate $\xi$ to perfectly match the particular countries.
share of managerial personnel. The resulting change in the implied firm-dynamics is - through the lens of the model - the causal effect of changes in delegation benefits and hence answers the question what fraction of the observed difference in firm performance our mechanism can explain, once it is disciplined to be consistent with the managerial employment shares across countries. This exercise, is deliberately silent on the underlying source of variation in these benefits of delegation and is hence not a policy parameter with well-defined counterfactual experiments.

To make progress in that dimension, we than decompose such delegation benefits into various components. In line with our micro-foundation, we focus on the variation induced by differences in the legal system and by managerial human capital. Exploiting the variation in these two fundamentals and the calibrated delegation benefits, we can then further decompose the explanatory power of the legal system on firms’ life-cycle through its effect on delegation benefits and also consider counterfactual exercises, like improving India’s legal system holding human capital constant.

3.1 Data

**Indian Micro Data** We are using two major sources of data about Indian manufacturing establishments. The first source is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and the second is the National Sample Survey (NSS). The ASI is an annual survey of manufacturing enterprises. It covers all plants employing ten or more workers using electric power and employing twenty or more workers without electric power. For our analysis we use only the cross-sectional data in 1995 to make it comparable to our sample of the NSS. For an economy like India, the ASI covers only a tiny fraction of producers, as most plants employ far fewer than twenty employees. To overcome this oversampling of large producers in the ASI, we complement the ASI data with data from the NSS. The National Sample Survey is a survey covering different aspects of socio-economic life in India. Every five years, however, Schedule 2.2 of the NSS surveys a random sample of the population of manufacturing establishments without the minimum size requirement of the ASI. While these producers are (by construction) very small, they still account for roughly 30% of aggregate output in the manufacturing sector. We use the NSS data for the year 1994/95 and merge it with the ASI using the sampling weights provided in the data. For a more detailed description and some descriptive statics, we refer to Hsieh and Olken (2014). In terms of the data we use, we mostly focus on the employment side. In particular, we draw on the information on age and employment to study the cross-sectional age-size relationship. Additionally, we use the information on managerial personnel and family size to provide some direct evidence on friction in managerial hiring. To compare the implications of our theory with data from the US, we also complement these data sets using the summary statistics on the US economy from Hsieh and Klenow (2014).

**Cross Country Data** To discipline the benefits of delegation across countries and identify the underlying fundamental determinants we draw on the information of official census disseminated by IPUMS-International. This data provides us with consistent measures of occupational categories, sectors of employment and educational attainment for millions of workers around the world. We aggregate this micro-data at the country level and focus on the cross-country variation in 2001 (which is the year, where we have the largest cross-section). Hence, we can calculate the share of managers, their human capital and the share of self-employed for around 70 countries of the world. We try to conform with our measure of managers to our theory. Our main source of information relies on the harmonized occupational titles according to ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations). We identify managers as members of the occupation “Legislators, senior officials and managers”. As our theory stresses frictions in delegation between entrepreneurs and
outside managers, we then use more detailed occupational data to reclassify all self-employed as non-managers. Additionally, we also drop all government officials. To calculate human capital, we adopt the usual approach to translate observed years of schooling into human capital unit using Mincerian returns.\(^8\) Hence, we get a measure of human capital at the individual level so that we can calculate human capital stocks by narrowly defined occupational group. In particular we are going to use the human capital by managerial workers as the empirical counterpart of the theories parameter \(\eta\). We further augment this data with data on the rule of law by the World Bank and match it to the Penn World Tables to exploit additional controls at the country level.

### 3.2 Calibrating the Model to the Indian Microdata

In the model, we have eight parameters to calibrate. On the production side, we require the delegation benefits \(\xi\), the elasticity of profits with respect to managerial effort \(\sigma\), the human capital (“time”) of entrepreneurs \(T\) and the level \(\theta\) and convexity \(\zeta\) of the innovation technology. The process of entry is parameterized by the constant entry flow rate \(z\) and the share of high types in the economy \(\alpha\). Finally, we also need to parametrize the step-size of innovations \(\gamma\). We calibrate these parameters using the Indian microdata. While all parameters are calibrated jointly, we intuitively identify these parameters from the following moments.\(^9\) The delegation benefits \(\xi\), our main parameter of interest, is mostly identified from the aggregate employment share of managers in the population, as \(\xi\) directly affects the demand for managerial personnel. The three parameters \(\sigma\), \(\alpha\) and \(\theta\) are mostly identified from three dynamic moments, namely the plants life-cycle (i.e. average employment of firms 26-30 years old), the aggregate importance of old firms (i.e. the employment share of 26-30 year old firms) and the aggregate growth rate. While the \(\sigma\) and \(\theta\) directly determine innovation incentives for high-type firms and hence are important for firm’s life-cycle and the aggregate growth rate, \(\alpha\) measures the importance of stagnant producers at the time of entry and therefore affects mainly the aggregate share employment share of old firms. The entrepreneurial time endowment \(T\) is mostly informed by the importance of firms who do not delegate, which we proxy by the employment share of self-employed firms, i.e. firms with one employee. In the model, this moment is essentially driven by the delegation cutoff \(n^*\), which is proportional to \(T\) (see Proposition 2). To calibrate the innovation step-size \(\gamma\), we target firms’ profitability (or average mark-ups) as \(\gamma\) measures the degree to which producing firms are subject to limit pricing.\(^{10}\) Finally, we calibrate the flow rate of entry \(z\) to match the entry rate in the data. The one parameter, where we do not feel to have enough information for is the convexity of the innovation technology \(\zeta\), which would be identified from innovation spending relative to firm output. Following a long-standing micro R&D literature, we take the curvature of the innovation production function to be \(\zeta = 0.5\), which implies a quadratic cost function. The resulting parameters and moments are reported in Tables 1 and 2.

As seen in Table 1, the model does a relatively good job to match salient features of the data. The model generates slightly too much economic dynamism, in that both mean employment of old firms is somewhat too high and the employment share of self-employed firms is slightly too low. Overall, however, Table 1 shows that the model replicates our moments of interest relatively well. This is also seen in Figure 8, where we compare the entire implied life-cycle profile with the one observed in the data. The model essentially matches the observed flat life-cycle - in fact the

\(^8\)See Appendix for details.

\(^9\)A more detailed description of our calibration is contained in the Appendix.

\(^{10}\)Again we refer to the Appendix for the details of the equilibrium pricing game between incumbent firms and the competitive fringe.
Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean employment for 26-30 year old firms</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment share of 26-30 year old firms</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment share of self-employed firms</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of managers in workforce</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entry rate</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregate growth rate</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profitability</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Moments Targeted for Indian Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>benefit of delegation</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>curvature of efficiency</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T$</td>
<td>entrepreneur’s managerial time</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z$</td>
<td>entry flow rate</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>innovation step size</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>innovativeness</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>share of high type</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Parameter Calibration for Indian Firms

non-calibrated age bins are matched even better than our calibrated number for the 26-30 year old firms in Table 1.

We can now use the model, to understand better the importance of selection or the lack thereof. The theory stresses that the life-cycle profile in Figure 8 masks the heterogeneity across firms, whereby some producers do grow - but not sufficiently to affect the aggregate life-cycle profile. To see this mechanism in the calibrated model, consider Figure 9, which shows both the average life-cycle profile from Figure 8 and the life-cycle profile of high types, i.e. firms with growth potential.\(^{11}\) While the overall life-cycle profile of firms is completely flat as seen in the data, there is a subgroup of firms that have a positively sloped profiles and see their employment increase by a factor of 3.

The main argument of this paper is that it is this slope, which is too low in that these firms are hampered by an unfavorable managerial environment as captured by low managerial benefits $\xi$. As seen in Figures 6 and 7, improvements in the efficiency of delegation will keep innovation incentives high and hence prevent firms from running into decreasing returns quickly. Hence, increases in $\xi$ will make innovative firms grow faster, which in turn will induce a steeper slope of the life-cycle profile. Additionally, growing firms force other firms to exit earlier, which in turn will increase the degree of selection and hence decrease the share of small firms as a cohort ages. In the calibrated model, this relationship is seen in Figure 10, where we show the relative size of firms at age 30 as a function of the delegation benefits $\xi$. Hence, qualitatively, the model predicts that plants' life-cycle in the US should be much steeper if the US is indeed characterized by better delegation benefits. Whether this mechanism is also powerful quantitatively depends of course on the discipline we impose on the variation in $\xi$. This is the subject of the next section.

\(^{11}\)The life-cycle of low types is of course entirely flat, as they - by construction - do not see any growth at all.
3.3 Comparison to the US

How much of the difference in firms’ life-cycle between India and US is due to a more seamless mode of delegation in the US? More specifically, what would the life-cycle look like if were to move from the delegation benefits in India ($\xi_{\text{IND}}$) to the ones in the US ($\xi_{\text{US}}$) holding all other parameters constant. Our empirical strategy is as follows. Our main source of identification for $\xi$ stems from the aggregate importance of managerial workers. Using the occupational identifiers in the international census data, we can measure this managerial employment share for a broad cross-section of countries. In Figure 11 we show the cross-sectional variation in the importance of managerial personnel across countries. In particular, managerial employment is much more common in more developed economies. It is systematic variation in the importance of managers, which we are going to use to discipline our quantitative analysis.

As a baseline, we are going to impose the identification assumption that the entirety of the cross-sectional dispersion in managerial employment is driven by underlying differences in delegation benefits $\xi$.\footnote{We will come back to this assumption in Section 3.5 below and explicitly allow other margins of the model to also differ across countries.} Under this assumption we can identify $\xi$ for each country given the data on managerial employment shares shown in Figure 11.\footnote{Conceptually, this exercise is very similar to the quantitative strategy adopted by Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011).} For the particular case of the US, the result of this exercise
Our calibration result depicts a significant difference in the managerial environment between the two countries: the benefit of delegation for US firms is more than twice as much that for Indian firms (Table 3).

The case of the US is an interesting one, because we can contrast the model’s implication for the life-cycle with the actual data reported in Hsieh and Klenow (2014). Figure 12 shows the implication of these differences for the resulting life cycle profile for US firms and the actual data. While firms in the US grow by a factor of around four, the model predicts an increase of around 2.5. Hence, variation in the benefits of delegation can - when disciplined by the variation in managerial employment shares between the US and India - explain roughly $\frac{5.5 - 1}{4 - 1} = 50\%$ of the observed in employment in the US economy by age 31-35.

Two important channels through which higher benefit of delegation in US result in a steeper life cycle profile for the overall economy are worth to emphasize. First, by comparing Figure 9 and 13, our calibration implies that high-type firms in US grows faster on average compared to the high-type Indian firms. This is simply due to the fact that US firms with the growth potential have a higher incentive to expand thanks to a better managerial environment. This directly contributes to have a steeper life cycle for the overall economy. Second, faster growing high-type firms create a strong selection mechanism: with faster growing high-type firms, it is less likely for low-type firms to survive. In other words, better managerial environment creates a composition effect in favor of growing firms, reducing the share of non-growing firms in the economy and making the life cycle profile even steeper. To see clearly how the selection differs between India and the US through the lens of the model, Figure 14 plots the share of low type firms within a cohort as it ages. The starker

in the context of a model with credit market frictions. There, the sole variation across countries is assumed to lie in the quality of the financial system. To discipline the variation in financial systems across countries, Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) target the cross-country variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is an endogenous outcome of the model. In our case, we envision the source of variation stemming from delegation benefits and identify $\xi$ from the cross-country variation in managerial employment shares, which is also an endogenous outcome of the model.
decline in the US is a sign of the stronger selection, as opposed to the weak selection margin in the Indian economy.

Figure 15 extends this analysis to the entire world. In particular, we show the model’s implication for cross-country relationship between the managerial employment share and implied “steepness” of the life-cycle profile, i.e. the size of 30 year old firms relative to new entrants. Recall that the slope of this locus is identified through the mapping between the observable managerial share and the benefits of delegation, which are identified from the firm-level data in India. As seen clearly in the Figure: given the variation of the importance of managerial personnel across countries, the model is able to deliver sizable differences in the life-cycle across firms. We unfortunately have only little firm-level data to confront this quantitative implication with reality. However, Hsieh and Klenow (2014) report this particular moment for some additional economies and we highlight these observations in the Figure.

3.4 Decomposing the Benefits to Delegation into Fundaments

Given the inferred value of delegation benefits $\xi_c$, we will now explicitly decompose this “country fixed effect” into the different components using the structure of the theory. Using our particular micro-foundation, delegation benefits primarily depends on two things: the level of managerial human capital ($\eta$) and the contractual system or the state of the legal system ($\kappa$). Instead of using
Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries

Figure 15: Management and Life-cycle Growth

the particular functional form as implied by the theory, we adopt a reduced form approach, where we simply run the cross-country regression

$$\xi_c = \alpha + \varphi \times HC^M_c + \beta \times ROL_c + u_c. \quad (18)$$

where $ROL_c$ proxies the legal system by the World Bank’s rule of law measure and $HC^M_c$ is the measured managerial human capital, which we take directly from the census microdata. In Table 4 we present the results of the regression contained in (18). These results show that the cross-sectional variation across countries is to an overwhelming degree driven by the variation in legal institutions. In fact, the variation in managerial human capital is essentially orthogonal to the inferred delegation benefits. Furthermore, legal institutions as measured by the role of law predict 45% of the variation in delegation benefits across countries.

This decomposition might seem surprising. One might have expected that the rule of law and the stock of human capital are highly correlated. This however is not the case. The key to understand why is to remember that we focus on managerial human capital. And while the average level of human capital is indeed very highly correlated with income per capita (and hence a country’s legal system), the human capital within managerial occupations is not. This is clearly seen in Figure below, where we depict the correlation between income per capita and human capital - both for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. Variable</th>
<th>Delegation Benefits $\xi$</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.172***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial Human Capital</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Parameter Calibration for US
the economy as a whole and for the subpopulation of managers. Not only are managers a selected group in all countries, this selection becomes much stronger in poor countries - in fact so strong that there is little systematic variation in managerial human capital across countries. Managerial human capital has therefore little scope to explain the variation in delegation benefits, because the latter is entirely driven by managerial employment shares, which show ample systematic variation across countries (as seen in Figure 11). These results therefore suggest the interpretation that delegation benefits are low in poor countries not so much because managerial human capital is low but because the legal system prevents an efficient use of managerial supplies.\footnote{The main caveat to this interpretation is that it presumes that the marginal non-managerial worker is of a similar skill level than the average manager. We know that this cannot be the case “globally” (as we know that the average level of human capital is lower in poor countries). Hence, we implicitly assume that there are some non-managerial workers with a similar skill level, which could be hired as managers if there was sufficient demand.}

Given the estimated parameters $\hat{\phi}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ we can use (18) to decompose the variation in inferred delegation benefits $\xi_c$ into its different components. For concreteness we focus on the US and we report these decompositions in Figure 17. The grey and red line shows the data for India and the US respectively - more precisely, it shows a plants lifecycle given the inferred delegation benefits $\xi_{\text{IND}}$ and $\xi_{\text{US}}$. While this matches the life-cycle perfectly for India, it explains roughly half of the actual life-cycle pattern in the US (see Figure 12 above). The two remaining blue lines refer to two decompositions of the life-cycle. The light blue line, shows the hypothetical life-cycle of a country with the delegation benefits $\hat{\xi}_{\text{US}}$, i.e. the predicted delegation benefits for the US given its legal institutions and its level of human capital. If one where to assume that the regression error $u_c$ in (18) was orthogonal to the regressors, these counterfactual life-cycle profiles had a structural interpretation. The light blue line was the life-cycle profile of India if it had both the US level of human capital and legal system. The dark blue line would correspond to India with the US level of human capital, holding legal systems the same. According to Figures 12 and 17, we conclude that the delegation margin as such can explain 50\% of the life-cycle difference between the US and India, 70\% of which can be explained by the empirical variation in legal systems. The human capital margin in contrast is not important - precisely because in the data managerial human capital is uncorrelated with managerial employment shares and hence the inferred delegation benefits.
3.5 Role of Different Margins of the Model

Up to now we only allowed for a single source of heterogeneity across countries. In this section, we will analyze the role of different mechanisms on the implied firms dynamics in more detail. For this, we will examine the partial effects of various channels of the model. This will turn out to be a useful exercise to see which ingredients are quantitatively important for the model’s implications.

**Entry** We first start with the entry intensity $z$, which could presumably vary across countries. Figure 18 plots the employment share of firms 31-35 years old against various values of the entry rate, keeping all other parameters at their Indian values. A seen in Figure 18 more entry implies more competition and hence lowers firm size. This is because incumbent firms are losing their product lines at a faster rate to new entrants. Hence, for the entry rate to explain the differences in life cycle growth between Indian and US firms, it had to be the case that entry in the US was markedly. Not only do we not know of any evidence for this to be true, but Figure 18 also shows that the quantitative effect of a higher entry rate is relative minor. Differences in the rate of entry are therefore unlikely to play a major role - at least within a model like ours.

**Entrepreneurial Talent** We next turn to $\alpha$, the probability of being a high type entrepreneur. Maybe the low life-cycle growth profile among Indian plants stems simply from the fact that there are too few entrepreneurs with high innovation potential. In Figure 19 we keep all other parameters at their Indian values and vary only $\alpha$. Initially, this indeed contributes to a higher employment share of older firms. However, this positive effect fades away quickly, so that the life-cycle growth is essentially non-responsive to changes in the share of innovative firms. In fact, for large values of $\alpha$, the average employment of large firms even start to decrease. This is due to the general equilibrium nature of the model. In our model growth is driven by selection, whereby successful firms managed to innovate and thereby steal market share from their less fortunate competitors. A higher share of innovative types therefore implies more competition among high type incumbents, so that firms also lose products quickly. To generate a steeply increasing life-cycle profile there cannot be too many innovative firms - there have to be sufficiently many
marginal firms in the economy, which can be replaced easily. While this margin is likely to be more important then the entry rate analyzed above, average employment does not increase sufficiently to make it the sole candidate for explaining the differences between Indian and US firms. Simply having more talented entrepreneurs does not contribute much to the dynamism of economy unless the managerial environment allows for seamless delegation and thereby sustained incentives to grow large.

4 Conclusion

This paper studies the reasons behind the stark differences in firm dynamics across countries, as documented in Hsieh and Klenow (2014). We focus on manufacturing firms in India and analyze the stagnant firm behavior. We show that the poor life-cycle behavior in India could be explained by the lack of firm selection, wherein firms with little growth potential survive because innovative firms do not expand sufficiently quickly to replace them. Our theory stresses the role of of imperfect managerial contracts as the main cause for the insufficient expansion by the high type firms. We show that if the provision of managerial effort is non-contractible, the benefits of delegation are low and firms will run quickly into decreasing returns. This in turn will reduce the returns to innovation. Improvements in the degree of contract enforcement will therefore raise the returns to growth and
increase the degree of creative destruction. This argument is in line with the empirical findings of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010). Quantitatively, such limits to delegation can explain up to 50% of the difference in life-cycle growth between the US and India. While the cross-country variation in legal system can account for 70% of this explained part, variation in managerial human capital is unlikely to have a large impact.
References


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5 Appendix

5.1 Proofs and Derivations

Derivation of Profit $\pi_j$

On the demand side, we have a representative household with standard preferences

$$U_0 = \int_0^\infty \exp(-\rho t) \ln C_t dt,$$

(19)

where $\rho > 0$ is the discount factor. Given the unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the Euler equation along the balanced growth path is simply given by $g = r - \rho$, where $g$ is the growth rate of the economy and $r$ is the interest rate.

5.2 Static Equilibrium

Now consider the equilibrium in the product market. At each point in time, each product line $j$ is populated by a set of firms that can produce this good with productivity $[q_f^j]$, where $f$ identifies the firm. We will make sufficient assumptions on $m(.)$, that the most productive firm (which we will sometimes refer to as the (quality) leader) will be the sole producer of product $j$. Intuitively, while managerial slack can and will be a drag on efficiency, it can never reverse comparative advantage based on physical efficiency $q$. This assumption will make the structure of the optimal contract between entrepreneurs and managers slightly easier but it is not essential for our results. As the demand functions stemming from (2.1) will have unitary elasticity, the optimal mark-up was infinite if there was no entry threat. Hence, we assume that there is a competitive fringe of firms, which can produce the product with efficiency $q_{jt}$ for some $\gamma > 1$. For simplicity, we assume that fringe firms do not provide any managerial effort.

Hence, the leader will always be forced to engage in limit pricing. Given this assumption, the equilibrium price for product $j$ is given by

$$p_{ij} = \gamma w_t q_{jt},$$

(20)

as $\frac{\gamma w_t}{q_{jt}}$ are exactly the competitive fringe’s marginal costs of producing product $j$. Equation (2.1) then implies that the demand for product $j$ is given by

$$y_{jt} = \frac{Y_t}{p_{ij}} = \frac{q_{jt} Y_t}{\gamma w_t},$$

(21)

so that total sales are simply $S_{jt} = p_{jt}y_{jt} = Y_t$, i.e., equalized per product. This, of course, does not imply that the distribution of sales is also equalized across firms; as some firms will (endogenously) have more products than other firms, the distribution of sales is fully driven by the distribution of products. This tight link between firm-level sales and firms’ product portfolios is not only analytically attractive but also conceptually useful in that it clarifies that our model attributes firm dynamics to a single mechanism: why countries differ in the speed at which firms accumulate (and lose) products along their life-cycle.

Similarly, the allocation of labor demand is simply

$$l_{jft} = \frac{y_{jft}}{q_{jft} m(e_{jt})} = \frac{Y_t}{m(e_{jft}) \gamma w_t},$$

(22)
i.e., the allocation of labor across products depends on firms’ managerial choices. In particular, managerial efficiency is labor-saving. Intuitively, an increase in managerial effort increases profitability as it increases the firms’ sustainable mark-up. To see this, note that equilibrium mark-ups are given by

\[ \zeta_{jft} = \frac{p_{jft}}{MC_{jft}} = \frac{\gamma m}{q_{ft} m(e_{jft})} = \gamma m(e_{jft}), \]  

\[ (23) \]

i.e., well-managed firms can keep their competitors at bay, sustain high prices and hence move up on their product demand curve. The resulting profit (before paying the managers) for producer \( f \) of variety \( j \) is then simply

\[ \tilde{\pi}_{jft} = \left[ \gamma w_t - \frac{w_t}{q_{ft} m(e_{jft})} \right] q_{ft} Y_t = \frac{\gamma m(e_{jft}) - 1}{m(e_{jft})} Y_t, \]

\[ (24) \]

i.e., profits depend only on how well the respective firm can incentivize their managers. In particular, \( \tilde{\pi}_{jft} \) is increasing in \( e_{jft} \): better managerial practices increase mark-ups and hence profits per product. Equation (24) contains the main intuition about the interaction between contractual frictions and innovation incentives: As contractual frictions will be detrimental to the provision of managerial effort, firms will be unable to sustain high mark-ups as they grow. The marginal product will therefore be less profitable than the average product and incentives to break into new products will be low.

Substituting (21) into (2.1) we get that equilibrium wages are given by

\[ w_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} Q_t, \]

\[ (25) \]

where \( Q_t \) is the Cobb-Douglas composite of individual efficiencies

\[ \ln Q_t \equiv \int_0^1 \ln q_{jt} dj. \]

Using (22), we get that \( l_{jft} = \frac{1}{Q(t) m(e_{jft})} Y_t \), so that total output is given by

\[ Y_t = Q_t M_t L_t^P, \]

\[ (26) \]

where

\[ M_t = \left[ \int_0^1 m(e_{jft})^{-1} dj \right]^{-1}. \]

\[ (27) \]

Here, \( M_t \) is the endogenous TFP term based on managerial effort. In particular, increases in x-efficiency, i.e., managerial effort, will increase aggregate TFP.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15}In this paper, we will mostly be concerned with the process of firm-dynamics and less with the stationary properties of managerial effort determining the distribution of mark-ups and hence \( M_t \). See Peters (2013) for a related model that focuses explicitly on the heterogeneity of mark-ups as source of misallocation across firms.