

Better Lucky Than Rich? Welfare Analysis of Automobile License Allocations in Beijing and Shanghai*

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Abstract

Economists often favor market-based mechanisms over non-market based mechanisms to allocate scarce public resources on grounds of economic efficiency and revenue generation. When the usage of the resources in question generates type-dependent negative externalities, the welfare comparison can become ambiguous. Both types of allocation mechanisms are being implemented in China's major cities to distribute limited vehicle licenses as a measure to combat worsening traffic congestion and urban pollution. While Beijing employs non-transferable lotteries, Shanghai uses an auction system. This study empirically quantifies the welfare consequences of the two allocation mechanisms by estimating a random coefficients discrete choice model of vehicle demand to recover consumers' willingness to pay for a license. Rather than relying on the maintained exogeneity assumption on product attributes in the literature, we employ a novel strategy by taking advantage of a control group as well as information from household surveys to identify structural parameters. Our analysis finds that although Beijing's lottery system has a large advantage in reducing automobile externalities over auction, the advantage is offset by the significant allocative cost from misallocation. The lottery system foregone nearly 36 billion Yuan (\$6 billion) in social welfare in 2012 and a uniform price auction would have generated 21 billion Yuan to Beijing municipal government, more than covering all the subsidies to the local public transit system.

Keywords: Air Pollution, Auction, Lottery, Vehicle Demand, Traffic Congestion

JEL classification: Q58, R48

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1 Introduction

Market-based mechanisms (e.g., auction) have often been advocated for allocating scarce public resources on grounds of economic efficiency and revenue generation, as opposed to non-market based mechanisms (e.g., lottery). Both have been used widely in practice, often for different types of resources. For example, auctions are routinely used to sell mineral rights, timber, and radio spectrum while lotteries are employed in distributing hunting licenses, charter school admissions, and jury duty.¹ Market-based mechanisms have the potential to achieve efficiency by using price signals to distribute the scarce resource to those with the highest willingness to pay (WTP), whereas lotteries with no-transferability can lead to misallocation and unrealized welfare gain. However, when the usage of the resources generates negative externalities that are increasing in WTP, the welfare comparison between the two mechanisms can become ambiguous. In this case, the social benefit (consumer welfare net of externalities), the basis for measuring social welfare, diverges from and may even be decreasing with WTP, the basis for resource allocation under the market-based mechanisms.

The resource in question here is a license or permit to register a vehicle. Major cities in China have been experiencing the world's worst traffic congestion and air pollution as a result of rapid economic growth as well as vehicle ownership outpacing transport infrastructure and environmental regulation.² Beijing, the second largest city in China, has been routinely ranked as one of the cities with worst traffic conditions in the world, with the average traffic speed during peak hours below 15 miles per hour. The daily concentration of PM2.5, a key measure of air quality, frequently reaches over 10 times of the daily health limit recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). To ease gridlock and improve air quality, Beijing municipal government introduced a quota system for vehicle licenses in 2011 in order to limit the growth of vehicle ownership. About 20,000 new licenses are distributed each month through non-transferable lotteries. Winning the lottery has become increasingly difficult: the odds decreased from 1:10 in January 2011 to 1:100 by the end of 2013.

Shanghai, the largest city in China, also has a vehicle license quota system but its license allocation is through an auction system instead of lotteries. In fact, an auction system has

¹The Federal Communications Commission used both administrative process and lotteries to allocate radio spectrum in the early years, both of which led to wide discontent due to long delays. The FCC finally adopted auctions in 1994 after many decades of persistent arguments by economists. The first auction yielded ten times of revenue predicted by the Congressional Budget Office (Cramton 2002).

²New automobile sales in China grew from 2.4 million units in 2001 to 19.30 million in 2012, surpassing the U.S. to become the largest market in 2009. Zheng and Kahn (2013) offer a comprehensive review on China's urban pollution challenges and government policies to deal with them.

been in place since 1986 but the goal of reducing vehicle ownership did not emerge until much recently. The current form of multi-unit, discriminatory and dynamic auction started in 2008 and auctions are held monthly online to distribute about 10,000 licenses. In 2012, the auction system generated over 6.7 billion Yuan (about \$1 billion) to Shanghai municipal government. The average bid for a license reached over 92,000 Yuan in March 2013, higher than the price of many entry-level vehicle models.

The main objective of this study is to empirically quantify the welfare consequences of the two allocation mechanisms in distributing vehicle licenses taking into account both allocation efficiency and externalities associated with vehicle usage. This is an important question for at least two reasons. First, traffic congestion and air pollution impose major costs to the society, especially in emerging markets (Parry et al. 2007). Creutzig and He (2008) estimate that the external costs from automobile usage in Beijing amount to over 7.5% of its GDP. Under the endorsement of China's Ministry of Environmental Protection, many large cities in China are adopting license quota systems and some version of allocation mechanisms.³ However, the impacts and welfare consequences of these policies are unknown.

Second, there is theoretical ambiguity *a priori* in welfare comparison between the two mechanisms because the usage of license (registering and ultimately driving a vehicle) is associated with negative externalities such as congestion and pollution. These type-dependent externalities are likely to be increasing in consumers' WTP for a license in that consumers with high WTP tend to have high income, buy less fuel-efficient vehicles and drive more. Whether the lottery or the auction system leads to higher social welfare depends critically on the level of consumer heterogeneity in WTP and its relationship with automobile externalities. Therefore, the efficiency comparison and the magnitude of welfare impacts are ultimately empirical questions.

Since licenses are allocated through lotteries and trade is not allowed in Beijing, we do not observe consumers' WTP. In Shanghai, licenses are auctioned in a non-standard format where the bids may not reflect value and the equilibrium bidding function is difficult to characterize as shown in an experimental study by Liao and Holt (2013). To recover consumers' WTP for a license, we estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model of vehicle demand that takes into account consumer preference heterogeneity and unobserved product attributes developed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (henceforth BLP). Similar to Petrin (2002), our estimation strategy employs both aggregate market-level data

³Cities of Guiyang and Guangzhou adopted license lotteries in July 2011 and August 2012, respectively. Tianjin and Hangzhou started to implement a hybrid system in January and March 2014.

and information from household surveys to form moment conditions. From household surveys on new vehicle buyers, we obtain the share of buyers among different income groups. We used them to form (micro-) moment conditions and they are critical in identifying consumer preference heterogeneity.

An important departure in our identification strategy from the literature is that we do not rely on the maintained exogeneity assumption that unobserved product attributes are uncorrelated with observed product attributes. Rather, we explicitly employ the common trend assumption in the difference-in-differences (DID) framework to aid identification. Our market-level data include data for four cities: Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Nanjing and Tianjin are two large cities next to Shanghai and Tianjin, respectively. They did not have the license quota system during the data period and as we show through graphs and regressions, the automobile markets in these two cities exhibit similar trends to Beijing and Shanghai in the absence of the policies.

Several important findings emerge from our analysis. First, both policies in Beijing and Shanghai significantly limited new vehicles sales: the lottery system in Beijing reduced new vehicle sales by over one million in 2011 and 2012 while the Shanghai auction reduced sales by about 1.4 million from 2008 to 2012. These reductions are substantial and a reflection of the stringency of the quota system. Second, while Beijing's lottery system has a non-trivial advantage (7 billion Yuan) over an auction system in reducing automobile externalities, its allocative cost due to misallocation is nearly 43 billion Yuan in 2012, implying a welfare loss of nearly 36 billion Yuan. The significant allocative cost from the lottery system is driven by the large consumer heterogeneity in WTP for licenses. Third, a uniform price auction would have generated 21 billion revenue to Beijing municipal government in 2012, more than enough to cover all its subsidies to the local public transit system. Fourth, based on a range of plausible assumptions, the optimal level of quota in Beijing is lower than the existing level and further reducing the quota would increase net social welfare.

This study contributes to the literature in the following four aspects. First, although theoretical literature on allocation mechanisms are abundant, there are very few empirical studies on quantifying welfare outcomes of different mechanisms. Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) study housing market rationing under the rent control in New York city and provide evidence of significant misallocation of houses, without explicitly estimating the allocative cost. Davis and Kilian (2011) find significant allocative costs from misallocation under the price ceiling in the U.S. residential market for natural gas. In the context of a quantity regulation, this paper empirically examine allocative outcomes by exploring a rare opportunity where both

market-based and non-market mechanisms are used for the same type of resources.⁴

Second, as we discussed above, in the presence of type-dependent externalities that is increasing in WTP, the efficiency comparison between the lottery and auction systems could be ambiguous due to the fact that externalities introduce a wedge between net social benefit, the basis for measuring social welfare, and the private benefit, the basis of resource allocation under auction. The implication of type-dependent externalities on optimal allocation mechanisms has been examined in several theoretical studies in the context of firm competition.⁵ Our analysis empirically highlights type-dependent externalities in the context of consumer goods and showcases the advantage of the lottery system in reducing externalities.

Third, our analysis adds to the emerging literature on China’s environmental and energy policies. China is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, accounting for nearly 30 percent of world emissions in 2012. It is the largest energy consumer and is also the top importer of crude oil in the world. China’s domestic policies could have global impacts but our understanding on the impacts of these policies is very limited.⁶

Fourth, our study offers a novel identification strategy in structural demand estimation by employing the common trend assumption used in DID analysis. This alleviates the need to rely on the maintained assumption in the literature which is often deemed strong since vehicles attributes are likely to be jointly determined in the design process. Our empirical strategy to recover consumers’ WTP for licenses combines both the structural demand model and the DID method. The structural demand model allows consumer heterogeneity that is critical for the welfare analysis while the DID framework provides us an alternative method to identify structural parameters while at the same time offering a benchmark for examining the validity of the predictions from the structural model.

Before we proceed, it is perhaps helpful to further clarify the scope of our welfare analysis.

⁴An emerging literature on the efficient targeting of public programs in the development context compares allocation outcomes of different mechanisms and finds that properly designed auctions can reduce program costs by better targeting on private information relative to lottery (see for example Jack (2013)).

⁵Brocas (2013) analyzes optimal auction design with type-dependent negative externalities in the context of multiple firms competing for the acquisition of a technology license or a procurement contract. The winner induces a negative externality on the loser since the winner will have a competitive advantage over the loser in downstream competition. Similarly, the usage of licenses by firms may have implications on market power. This has been discussed in the context of airport slot allocations and spectrum auctions where different collection of winners may subsequently lead to different market structure (Borenstein 1988; Cramton 2002; Hazlett and Munoz 2009) .

⁶Various federal and local policies are being adopted in China to address urban congestion and air pollution including fuel economy standards, emission standards, gasoline tax, and driving restrictions. Chen et al. (2011) study the environmental impacts of measures such as driving restriction and plant closure by the Beijing government to clear up the air before the 2008 Olympic Games. Xiao and Heng (2013) evaluate and compare the effects of favorable consumption tax treatment for small vehicles and the gasoline tax.

First, our analysis focuses on the welfare consequences of different allocation mechanisms within the policy framework of a quota system. Automobile usage generates multiple types of externalities including congestion, air pollution, traffic accidents and noise. A vehicle license quota system in theory is not the first-best instrument to internalize these externalities since it does not directly address the source of externalities, i.e., driving.⁷ Second, our analysis focuses on welfare impacts in the short run. The allocation of vehicle licenses are likely to have impacts on household location, job decision and schooling choices, all of which could have important welfare implications in the long term. Although part of these welfare impacts such as the desire to live in a large apartment outside of the city center and hence the need to have a vehicle are captured by the WTP that we estimate, we are not investigating the policy impacts in these dimensions. The broader welfare comparisons between the quota system with other potentially more efficient policy instruments such as congestion pricing and fuel taxes as well as long-run analysis will necessitate additional information and modeling efforts. We leave them for future research.

2 Allocation Mechanisms and Externalities

The purpose of this section is to offer an illustration on the welfare comparison between lottery and auction systems in the presence of type-dependent negative externalities. In allocating scarce public resources, governments or resource managers have relied on both market-based mechanisms and non-market based mechanisms often for different types of goods. Market-based mechanisms such as a well-designed auction can allocate the resource to those with the highest value and hence achieve efficiency while non-market based mechanisms such as an administration process or lottery do not. It is argued that non-market based mechanisms such as a lottery are chosen often out of concern of fairness or for political convenience (Taylor et al. 2003).

However, when the usage of resources generates market failures such as externalities, market-based mechanisms such as an auction may not yield efficient allocation because the private value and the social benefit diverge. We illustrate this point within the context of allocating vehicle licenses using lotteries and auctions. Consider the following environment: (1) there are Q licenses to be allocated; (2) there are $N(N > Q)$ agents, each demanding

⁷In the first-best world, multiple instruments should be used to correct for these externalities. For example, real-time congestion pricing is the first-best instrument to deal with congestion externality while fuel taxes is the first-best instrument to internalize the externality from CO₂ emissions and other pollutants that are proportional to fuel use. Nevertheless, these policy instruments would require different administrative costs. The quota system has become a popular policy option among local policy makers perhaps for its lower administrative costs or due to inertia from traditional command-and-control regulatory approach.

at most one license; (3) each agent i has a private value (or WTP) V_i and the value is drawn from a known i.i.d. distribution with a support of $[0, \bar{V}]$; (4) the usage of the license imposes an external cost of E_i , which is increasing in V_i . The fourth assumption of type-dependent externalities is a key departure from a standard model of resource allocation. As we document below, consumers with high WTP for a license tend to have higher income. On average, they drive larger and less fuel-efficient vehicles and they drive more relative to those with a low WTP. So the usage of licenses by those with a higher WTP is likely to generate larger external costs. Our estimates below show that neither the magnitude of external costs nor the difference in external costs across households is trivial. That is, the discussion below does have empirical relevance in our context.

We compare two allocation mechanisms: a non-transferable lottery where all agents can participate and have an equal chance of winning (random allocation); and a uniform price auction where the \underline{Q} highest bidders each gets one license and pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid. Harris and Raviv (1981) show that each agent bids her value in this auction and therefore the licenses will be allocated to the \underline{Q} agents with the highest value. We use the uniform price auction for exposition and the point is not lost with other types of auctions such as discriminatory auctions that can achieve the same allocation outcome.

We start with a simple case of allocation mechanisms with constant external costs from the usage of the license and ultimately automobiles as depicted in the top panel of Figure 1. To ease exposition, we focus on a linear WTP schedule. Line $Q(p)$ is the (smoothed) WTP schedule. Line EC is the external cost for the agents with the corresponding WTP and it is constant in this case. Assuming the quota \underline{Q} is lower than the optimal cap Q^* , the area BCD is the conventional deadweight loss (DWL) from quantity constraint. Total consumer surplus from the auction system is given by the area $AB\underline{Q}O$ but the lottery system can only realize \underline{Q}/Q_1 of these surplus from the random allocation, which is given by $A\underline{Q}O$. Therefore, the allocative cost, i.e., welfare loss from misallocation, of the lottery system is $AB\underline{Q}$, which could even be larger than the DWL from quantity constraint. The empirical importance of allocative cost from random allocation is highlighted in Davis and Kilian (2011) in the context of price ceiling in the U.S. residential natural gas market.

The middle panel in Figure 1 shows a case where the external costs are positively correlated with WTP. As in the top panel, BCD is the DWL from quantity constraint and $AB\underline{Q}$ is the allocative cost from the lottery system. However, the presence of type-dependent external costs implies that the lottery system leads to a reduction in external costs depicted by EDF , offsetting part of the allocative cost. The net welfare loss from lottery (versus auction)

is given by the area $AB\underline{Q}$ - EDF, which is positive in this case. The advantage in reducing externalities from the lottery system is dominated by the welfare loss from misallocation, implying that the auction system still produces a better welfare outcome.

The welfare comparison between the two systems is reversed in the bottom panel where the external costs are “strongly” increasing in WTP. To ease exposition, we assume that the quota \underline{Q} is at the intersection of the WTP schedule and the corresponding external cost curve. In this case, the reduction in external costs from the lottery given by $EB\underline{Q}O$ dominates the allocative cost given by $AB\underline{Q}$. Since agents with the highest private value generates the smallest social value, the auction will allocate the licenses to the wrong hands from the efficiency perspective. This result is driven by the fact that the wedge introduced by the external costs between the private value and the social value leads to a negative correlation between the two. Note that the external cost line does not have to surpass the WTP schedule as shown in the graph to make the point. The result could still hold if the EC line is below the WTP schedule but is steeper.

Which of the two scenarios is playing out in reality depends on the WTP schedule as well as its relationship with the external cost curve. Although one can get a good sense on the external costs from driving from different households based on household survey data, the WTP schedule is not readily available. The empirical goal is to develop a method to estimate the WTP schedule and conduct welfare comparison taking into account the external costs.

3 Policy and Data Description

In this section, we first describe the background for the quota systems. We then discuss the lottery and auction policies in Beijing and Shanghai and present our data thereafter.

3.1 Background

During the past three decades, China has embarked on an extraordinary journey of economic growth with its GDP growing at about 10 percent a year. As household income grows, luxury good consumption such as automobiles started to pick up dramatically at the turn of the century. Annual sales of new passenger vehicles increased from 2.4 million units in 2001 to nearly 22 million in 2013 as shown in Appendix Figure 1. China surpassed the U.S. to become the largest auto market in 2009 and in 2013, it accounted for 26 percent of world’s total new auto sales. Large cities in China are ahead of the curve in both economic growth and vehicle ownership. Beijing with about seven million households has gone from a city on bikes to a city on cars during this period: the stock of passenger vehicles increased from 1.6

million units to nearly 5 million units as shown in Appendix Figure 1.⁸

The rapid growth in vehicle ownership leads to serious traffic congestion, despite significant efforts in expanding roads and public transit systems and a whole range of other traffic management policies such as driving restrictions and reducing public transit fares. The city is now often ranked routinely as one of the worst cities in traffic conditions. The traffic speed on arterial roads within the 5th ring road during morning peak hours (7:00-9:00) on work days averaged 14.7 miles/hour (MPH) in 2011, reduced from 22.8 MPH in 2005. The average speed was 13.4 MPH during afternoon peak hours (17:00-19:00) in 2011, compared with 20.2MPH in 2005. During the same period, air quality has worsened dramatically, and the air quality index is frequently above the level above which the U.S. EPA recommends that everyone should avoid all outdoor physical activities.⁹

Shanghai, with 8.5 million households, has slightly better traffic conditions, on par with those in Los Angeles. The traffic speed on arterial roads averages 21.2MPH and 22.3MPH during morning and evening peak. As shown in the bottom panel of Appendix Figure 1, the total number of vehicles in Shanghai is less than half of that in Beijing, despite having more households and higher household income. This is largely due to vehicle purchase restrictions put in place before vehicle ownership took off as we discuss below. The air quality in Beijing is consistently worse than Shanghai due to more vehicles, worse traffic, and winter heating coupled with unfavorable topography. In a ranking of air quality among 28 major cities on the east coast, Beijing ranked at the bottom with an annual average PM10 concentration of 121 micrograms per cubic meter while Shanghai ranked at 8th with an average PM10 concentration of 79 in 2010, still significantly higher than the WHO's health limit.

3.2 Policy Description

To address traffic congestion and air pollution, Beijing municipal government announced the policy of capping new vehicle licenses which are necessary to register a vehicle, on December 23, 2010. Since January 2011, lotteries have been used to allocate about 20,000 licenses each month. A license is needed for first-time buyers, and those who purchase an old vehicle, accept a gifted vehicle, or transfer out-of-state registration to Beijing. Vehicle owners who

⁸Among the 5 million vehicles, about 4 million are owned by households. The household vehicle ownership rate is 0.58 in Beijing, comparing to 0.46 in New York city and 1.16 in the U.S. from 2010 U.S. Census.

⁹The average daily concentration of PM2.5 frequently reaches over 250 micrograms per cube meter, compared to the recommended daily level of 20 by WHO. According to Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau, automobiles are the largest source of PM2.5, accounting for 22 percent in the whole city and about one third in the urban core. The second largest source of PM2.5 is coal burning (17 percent) followed by construction site dusts (16 percent) in 2012.

scrap the used vehicle can transfer the old license to the new vehicle and do not need a new license. The eligible participants include Beijing residents and non-residents who have been paying income tax for at least five years in Beijing. The licenses are assigned to winners through random drawings. The winners can then use the license to register their vehicles.

Transferring a license from a winner to other people is prohibited. Although there are anecdotal evidence that some transferring occurred by having vehicle registered under the winner but paid and used by another person, this is unlikely to be widespread because the legal owner (the winner) not only has the liabilities in paying annual registration fee, traffic fines and emission inspections, but also is liable for damages and injuries in accidents. In addition, barriers are in place to prevent Beijing residents from registering vehicles in neighboring provinces. First, a temporary driving permit is need to be able to drive an out-of-state vehicle in Beijing. More importantly, these vehicles are banned from entering the 5th ring road (within which the vast majority of business and population are located) during rush hours. So this avoidance behavior is also not likely to be widespread.

Among all the licenses allocated, about 88% (or 17,600 each month) are for private vehicles and the rest are for institutions. The winners are determined in two different pools for these two categories. While the private licenses are allocated monthly, the institutional licenses are done bi-monthly. The first lottery was held on January 26th, 2011 and 17,600 private licenses were allocated among 187,420 participants. By the end of 2013, the winning odds reduced to 1:100 due to the cumulation of pent-up demand over time as well as future buyers entering into the lottery pool.¹⁰ The top panel of Appendix Figure 2 shows monthly licenses allocated and new vehicle sales. The dramatic decrease in vehicles sales since the start of the policy reflects the stringency of the policy relative to the demand for new vehicles. The difference between vehicle sales and the number of licenses allocated is due to the sales that do not need a license (vehicle replacement after scrappage). The winners have six months to register a new vehicle before they become expired. Once expired, the license recycles back for distribution in future lotteries. The winners who allow their licenses to expire will not be permitted to participate in the lottery within the next three years.

Shanghai is the first city to implement a vehicle license quota system in China and it auctioned its first license in 1986. Although the market for private vehicles was very small at that time, traffic congestion was a big problem due to insufficient road infrastructure.

¹⁰With the shrinking odds of winning, there is increasing discontent with the system. According to a survey of 800 residents in 2013 by Beijing Statistical Bureau, nearly 70 percent of the participants agree that the system needs to be improved. Among them, 42.2 percent would like to abolish the system and 41.5 percent prefer a hybrid system of lottery and auction. 7.7 percent would like to switch to auctions.

In fact, Shanghai experimented with vehicle driving restrictions even before 1995. The auction system has evolved over time. Initially, it was a sealed-bid auction where reservation prices and quota levels varied across vehicles produced in Shanghai, non-Shanghai produced vehicles, and imports.¹¹ In 2003, a unified auction system without a reservation price was put in place for domestic vehicles and imports.

The current online system started in 2008 and the auction format can be characterized as a multi-unit, discriminatory (pay as you bid), and dynamic auction (Liao and Holt 2013). The auction is held monthly during a 90-minute period and bidders observe the current lowest accepted bid prior to submitting a bid. In the first hour, bidders can submit a single initial bid and in the last 30 minutes, each bidder can revise their bids up to two times. The revised bid however has to be within a window of 300 Yuan below and above the current lowest accepted bid. The purpose of the bid revision period and the restriction on bid revisions is to reduce price volatility. The bottom panel in Appendix Figure 2 shows the average and lowest accepted bid in each month from 2008 to 2012. The average bid price increased from 23,370 to 69,346 Yuan during this period. The plot shows that the average and the lowest winning bids are very close: the difference is usually less than 500 Yuan or one to two percent of the average bid.¹² The winners are required to purchase a new vehicle within three months before the license expires. The vehicle and the license cannot be transferred within the first year of registration. Similar to Beijing, vehicles registered outside of Shanghai are not allowed to use the major roads during rush hours. Although there is anecdotal evidence that some households choose to register their vehicles in neighboring provinces due to high license prices, this phenomenon is not believed to be widespread.

3.3 Data Description

Our analysis focuses on policies in Beijing and Shanghai and we bring two nearby cities, Nanjing and Tianjin into analysis to facilitate identification. Nanjing is about 300km away from Shanghai and is the capital city of Jiangsu province that shares boarder with Shanghai. Tianjin is about 150km from Beijing. The characteristics of these four cities are shown in Appendix Table 1. Shanghai and Beijing are the two largest cities in China in population.

¹¹In 1998, Shanghai government set the reservation price of 20,000 Yuan for vehicles produced in Shanghai while the reservation price was set at 100,000 Yuan for vehicles produced elsewhere. In protest, Hubei province which has a large automobile industry initiated an additional charge of 70,000 Yuan for those who purchase brands produced in Shanghai. The trade war ended in 2000 when Shanghai removed the reservation price in auctions for domestically produced vehicles.

¹²During the first month of the new auction system in January 2008, the lowest price was 8,100 Yuan compared with the average price of 23,370 Yuan. This anomaly was due to a computer glitch. The abrupt change in price in December 2010 was due to the speculation that the policy was about to be phased out.

Tianjin is the sixth and Nanjing is the 11th.¹³ Shanghai has the highest average household income while Tianjin has the lowest. Appendix Table 1 shows that Beijing has the smallest increase in average nominal income of 42% during the 5-year period while Shanghai has the largest increase of 57%, with the inflation being 13.7% during this period.

We rely on four main data sets together with a variety of auxiliary data for our analysis. The first main data set contains monthly vehicle sales by model (vintage-nameplate) in each city from 2008 to 2012. There are 21,228 observations with 1,769 distinct models. Figure 2 plots monthly sales (in log) in each city and displays two important features. First, sales in all four cities grew over time and tracked each other well before 2011 and the trend is more consistent across Beijing, Nanjing and Tianjin, reflecting the fact that Shanghai has an auction policy in place throughout the data period. Second, there was strong seasonality which is largely driven by holidays. The sales in December 2010 went up dramatically in all cities but then dropped significantly in February 2011. This is due to the fact that Chinese New Year was in February 3rd in 2011.¹⁴ Third, the sales increase in December 2011 appeared to be stronger in Beijing than in other cities. This is due to the anticipation and more importantly the fact that the quota policy was announced in December 23, 2010. Very little if any discussion on the policy was made public before the announcement. However, once the policy was announced, many who planned to buy a vehicle in the next few months moved their purchase forward into the last week of December. In the main specification of our analysis, we remove the last two months in 2010 and the first two months in 2011 in Beijing to deal with the anticipation and more importantly announcement effects.

The second data set contains vehicle characteristics of each model in the sales data. These characteristics include price, fuel economy (liters/100km), vehicle size, engine size, vehicle type, and vehicle segment. The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Vehicle prices are computed based on the Manufacturer Suggested Retail Prices (MSRPs) and the sales tax. MSRPs are set by manufacturers and are generally constant across locations and within a model year. There could be potential pitfalls in using MSRPs when they are different from the transaction prices due to promotions. Different from the promotion-heavy environment in the U.S., China's auto market has infrequent promotions from manufactures or dealers and retail prices are often very close to or the same as MSRPs, a phenomenon commonly seen for luxury products in China. Our analysis uses MSRPs with the implicit assumption

¹³Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin are three of the four province-level cities. They are at the same level of administrative subdivision as provinces and are right below the central government.

¹⁴During the holiday season that starts from at least one week before the Chinese New Year and ends two weeks after, people are occupied with visiting families and friends. Big-item purchases such as buying a car tend to occur before the holiday season.

that the allocation mechanisms in Shanghai and Beijing are not likely to affect firms price-setting behavior or local dealer incentives. This assumption should not be a driving factor in our results given the small market shares of these two cities and the marketing environment for automobiles in China.¹⁵ The sales tax is normally set at 10% but was reduced to 5 and 7.5 percent for vehicles with engine displacement no more than 1.6 liter in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The average price of a vehicle is over 300,000 Yuan and the median price is over 190,000, both significantly higher than the average household income in these cities.

The third data set is income distributions by city by year. Income is arguably the most important determinant in vehicle purchase decisions. China's National Bureau of Statistics conducts a census every 10 years but the income data at the household level are not publicly available. Instead, we obtain the average income by income quantiles in each city in each year from the statistical yearbooks of each city. We construct household income distribution based on these aggregate information together with Chinese Household Income Survey (2002), a national representative survey, conducted by researchers at the University of Michigan. We adjust the income in the household survey (14,971 observations) proportionally and separately for each of the quantiles so that the interpolated income distributions in a given year are consistent with the annual income statistics from the yearbooks.

The fourth set of data contains aggregate information from an annual national representative household survey among new vehicle buyers from Ford Motor Company. We were provided household shares by four income groups among new vehicles buyers in each city in each year. Appendix Table 2 presents these shares along with the shares of different income group among all households, which are constructed based on the income distributions from each city. The table shows that high income groups account for a disproportionately large share of vehicle buyers. While the highest income group (annual household income over 144,000) accounts for 3.85% of all households in 2012 in Beijing, this group accounts for more than 20% of new vehicle buyers. These information will be used to form additional moment conditions that are crucial to identify consumer preference parameters.

4 Empirical Model of Vehicle Demand

In order to conduct welfare analysis, we need to recover consumers' WTP schedule for vehicle licenses. As shown in Section 2, the efficiency outcomes under different allocation

¹⁵Li et al. (2013) offer a detailed discussion on the industry and examine various factors underlying price changes over time. MSRPs already include two types of taxes: consumption tax ranging from 1% for vehicles with small engines to 40% for large engines, and value-added tax of 17% of before-tax price. These high taxes partly contribute to the high vehicle prices in China relative to those in the United States.

mechanisms hinges on the heterogeneity of the WTP. We do not observe license prices in Beijing since the licenses are allocated through lottery for free. In Shanghai, although we observe average bids, they are unlikely to represent consumers' WTP and the equilibrium bidding function is difficult to characterize due to the non-standard auction format. Liao and Holt (2013) use experiments to study the relationship between bid and WTP under the Shanghai auction and compare it with other formats such as the first price auction. They show that initial bids in the first stage of the auction tend to be much lower than those in the first price auction which themselves are lower than WTP. Bids are revised up in the second stage but they are still much lower than WTP and the difference is larger among high WTP bidders. In addition, the auction design suppresses heterogeneity in bids, which will be a key factor in our welfare comparison.

Our strategy to recover consumers' WTP for a license is to estimate consumer surplus from buying a new vehicle. We set up and estimate a demand system that is obtained by aggregating over the discrete choices of individual buyers. In this section, we first specify the utility function, the basis of individual choices. We then discuss the aggregation process to obtain the market demand. We focus on the mechanism of the model in this section and leave the discussion on model estimation and identification to the next section.

4.1 Utility Function Specification

Let $m = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ denote a market (i.e., Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin) and a year-month by t from 2008 to 2012. Let i denote a household and $j \in \mathcal{J}$ denote a model (i.e., vintage-nameplate) where \mathcal{J} is the choice set. Household i 's utility from product j is a function of household demographics and product characteristics. A household chooses one product from a total of J models and an outside alternative in a given month. The outside alternative captures the decision of not purchasing any new vehicle in the current month. The indirect utility of household i from product j in market m at time t is defined as

$$u_{mtij} = \bar{u}(p_j, b_{mti}, X_j, \xi_{mtj}, y_{mti}, Z_{mti}) + \epsilon_{mtij}, \quad (1)$$

where the first term on the right, $\bar{u}(\cdot)$, denotes the deterministic component of the utility as a function of vehicle attributes and consumer characteristics. p_j is the tax-inclusive price of product j and it does not vary across markets and months within a year as we discussed in the data section. In Shanghai, for consumers who need to obtain a license through auction, b_{mti} is the price paid (i.e., the bid); and it is zero for consumers who do not need a new license (e.g., after scraping a used vehicle). In other cities, b_{mti} is always zero for everyone. The importance of variation in b_{mti} for identification is discussed in Section 5.2. As shown

above, the winning bids in the discriminatory multi-unit auction in Shanghai have very small spread. Given that we do not observe the distribution of the bids, we use the average bid as the price paid by all the winners. The effect of this measurement error on our results should be small since the difference between the average winning bid and the lowest winning bid is generally less than two percent of the average bid.

X_j is a vector of observed product attributes (other than price) including a constant term, vehicle size, engine size and fuel cost. ξ_{mtj} includes unobserved product attributes such as product quality and unobserved demand shocks to be specified below. y_{mti} is the income of household i and Z_{mti} is a vector of (unobserved) household demographics. ϵ_{mtij} is an i.i.d. random taste shock and is assumed to follow the type I extreme value distribution. The utility from the outside good is defined as $u_{mti0} = \epsilon_{mti0}$, where ϵ_{mti0} also follows the type I extreme value distribution. Following the literature, we specify the first part of u_{mtij} , the deterministic utility to be:

$$\bar{u}_{mtij} = \alpha_{mti} \ln(p_j + b_{mti}) + \sum_{k=1}^K X_{mtjk} \hat{\beta}_{mtik} + \xi_j. \quad (2)$$

α_i measures consumer i 's preference or distaste for price and it is defined as:

$$\alpha_{mti} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln y_{mti} + \sigma \nu_{mti},$$

where α_i will be negatively related to income if α_1 is negative. One would expect high income households to be less sensitive to price due to diminishing marginal utility of income. α_i is also affected by unobserved household attributes captured by ν_{mti} . We assume that ν_{mti} has a standard normal distribution in the benchmark specification and σ is the standard deviation of a normal distribution.

A note on the functional form of consumer preference on price is in order. The literature on vehicle demand has used different specifications for the price and income interactions. BLP and Petrin (2002) use $\ln(y_i - p_j)$ and the term has a natural explanation as the utility from the composite good. As discussed above, the median vehicle price in China are higher than the average income of most households, hence this specification does not lend itself well to our context. One might argue that we should use the current payment on the vehicle rather than the price in the utility function. In China, most buyers make full cash payment on their purchases. Goldberg (1995) specifies the price and income interactions as $\alpha_i(y_i - p_j)$ where α_i varies across income categories. She argues that one can view the price and income variables to be proxies for vehicle capital cost and the lifetime wealth of the household, respectively. Berry et al. (1999) specify $\alpha_i p_j$ where α_i is inversely related to income. In our

context, both of these specifications do not lead to the intuitive pattern of price elasticity where more expensive products have less elastic demand. In order to generate that pattern, these specifications require that the increase in household income among the buyers have to be faster than the price increase if we compare two products with different prices.

We choose the current specification to allow income to affect consumer preference on price in a more flexible manner. The price and income variables should be viewed as relative to the outside good (which has a price of one). Therefore, our utility specification is homogenous of degree zero in prices and income. In obtaining consumer surplus and welfare analysis, we rely on the price variable rather than the income variable because of the difficulty in directly interpreting the income variable in our context.¹⁶

X_{mtjk} is the k th attribute of product j . $\tilde{\beta}_{ik}$ is the random taste parameter of household i over product attribute k . It is a function of unobserved household demographics captured by ν_{ik} , which is assume to have a standard normal distribution.

$$\tilde{\beta}_{mtik} = \bar{\beta}_k + \sigma_k^u \nu_{mtik}. \quad (3)$$

The preference parameters defined above underscore consumer heterogeneity that our model tries to capture. The heterogeneity will translate into heterogeneity in consumers' WTP for a new vehicle, which is crucial for our welfare analysis. With all the components defined above, the utility function can be fully written out as the following:

$$u_{mtij} = (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln y_{mti} + \sigma \nu_{mti}) \ln(p_j + b_{mti}) + \sum_{k=1}^K X_{mtjk} (\bar{\beta}_k + \sigma_k^u \nu_{mtik}) + \xi_{mtj} + \epsilon_{mtij}. \quad (4)$$

4.2 Choice Probabilities and Aggregate Demand

Based on the i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution of ϵ_{mtij} and ϵ_{mti0} , the choice probability of household i for product j without any quantity constraint is

$$\Pr_{mtij}(p_j, b_{mti}, X_j, \xi_{mtj}, y_{mti}, Z_{mti}) = \frac{\exp(\bar{u}_{mtij})}{1 + \sum_h [\exp(\bar{u}_{mtih})]}, \quad (5)$$

where $b_{mti}=0$. This equation can be used directly to generate aggregate sales in the market when there is no quantity constraint such as in Nanjing and Tianjin as well as in pre-policy

¹⁶Household income can be a rather imprecise proxy of wealth in these cities where housing value can account for the majority of the wealth. Housing values have increased several folds during the past 10 years in these cities. Many residents inherited housing from their parents and many others especially those who work at government agencies were given subsidized housing. These people do not necessarily have as high income as those who purchase their houses from the market. Alternatively, one can treat the income variable as another variable (such as education) that does not have a monetary unit.

Beijing. Denote N_{mt} as the number of potential buyers in the market (i.e., the market size) and the market share of project j in market m in time t is

$$S_{mtj} = \frac{1}{N_{mt}} \sum_i \Pr_{mtij}. \quad (6)$$

In the case of quantity constraint, the aggregation needs to take into account the allocation mechanisms. There are two types of households: those who need to acquire a new license to register a vehicle and those who do not. Under both lottery and auction policies, households who scrap a used vehicle can use the old license to register a new vehicle. We do not have household level data and therefore do not observe the type of households in this regard. Instead, we explicitly model the type probabilities as a function of vehicle ownership rate in Beijing and Shanghai. Denote L_{mt} as the probability that a household in city m and time t would need to obtain a new license to register a vehicle. We parameterize L_{mt} as a logistic function of observed vehicle ownership rate across markets and over time, o_{mt} :

$$L_{mt} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\gamma_0 + o_{mt} * \gamma_1)}. \quad (7)$$

A positive coefficient γ_1 would imply that as vehicle ownership rate rises, the probability of a household needing a new license will decrease.¹⁷

In Beijing, the households who need a new license must obtain the license through the lottery system. Denote the odds of winning a lottery in Beijing in a given month among all potential buyers from January 2011 ($t > 36$) as ρ . Denote c_{mti} as a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of L_{mt} being 1. The market share of product j in Beijing ($m=1$) is:

$$S_{1tj[t>36]} = \frac{1}{N_{mt}} \sum_i [\Pr_{1tij} * \mathbb{1}(c_i = 1) * \rho + \Pr_{1tij} * \mathbb{1}(c_i = 0)], \quad (8)$$

where $\mathbb{1}(\cdot)$ is the indicator function. \Pr_{1tij} is defined by equation (5) and $b_{mti}=0$. The market share of product j in Shanghai ($m=3$) is defined as:

$$S_{3tj} = \frac{1}{N_{mt}} \sum_i [\Pr_{3tij}(b_{mti} > 0) * \mathbb{1}(c_i = 1) + \Pr_{3tij}(b_{mti} = 0) * \mathbb{1}(c_i = 0)]. \quad (9)$$

We define the market size N_{mt} to be half of the number of households in the city in a given year in the benchmark specification. To check the sensitivity of the result to this definition, we estimate a model where the market size is the total number of households as

¹⁷Assuming L_{mt} to be constant during our data period in a robustness check does not significantly change our welfare analysis.

has been traditionally done in the literature for the U.S. market.¹⁸ The results do not differ in any significant way as we will show below.

Furthermore, we make the conceptual distinction between the market size and the lottery pool. The market is composed of all potential buyers who first make lottery participation decisions. Those who decide to participate form the lottery pool and the winners then make vehicle purchase decisions. Our specification and aggregation method lump these two decisions together. The parameter ρ in equation (8) captures both participation decisions and the winning odds of the lottery. Therefore, it should not be compared against the observed odds in the data. That is, our specification does not explicitly model the increase of the lottery pool due to the cumulation of unmet demand as well as strategic participation behaviors, which explains the drop of the winning odds over time. As one of the robustness checks, we estimate the model without using the post-policy data in Beijing (2011-2012) and equation (8). The analysis shows that this simplified modeling choice does not have qualitative impacts on the welfare outcomes.

5 Identification and Estimation

5.1 Constructing Moment Conditions

Our goal is to recover the preference parameters in equation (4) in order to estimate consumers' WTP for a license. The identification challenge comes from the fact that there are unobserved product attributes as well as demand shocks ξ_{mtj} in the utility function. The unobserved product attributes such as product quality are likely to be correlated with prices. Previous studies show that ignoring these unobserved product attributes biases the price coefficient toward zero and leads to wrong welfare calculations. This challenge in fact motivated the methodology in BLP. An additional issue in our context is that unobserved demand shocks in Shanghai are likely to be correlated with average bids and hence render them endogenous. Ignoring this can also bias the price coefficient toward zero.

To facilitate the discussion on identification and estimation below, notice that the utility function in equation (4) contains terms that vary by households as well as terms that do not. We separate these two categories and rewrite the utility function as the following:

$$u_{mtij} = \delta_{mtj} + \mu_{mtij} + \epsilon_{mtij}, \quad (10)$$

¹⁸In the U.S., about 13 percent of households purchased a new vehicle each year before the economic downturn in 2008. In China, the number was about 5 percent in 2012.

where δ_{mtj} is the household-invariant utility or the mean utility of product j in market m at time t . Based on equation (4), it is specified as follows

$$\begin{aligned}\delta_{mtj}(\theta_1) &= X_j\bar{\beta} + \xi_{mtj} \\ &= X_j\bar{\beta} + \xi_j + \eta_t + \mathbf{1}(m=3)\eta'_t + \zeta_{ms} + \kappa_m yr_t + e_{mtj} \\ &= \delta_j + \eta_t + \mathbf{1}(m=3)\eta'_t + \zeta_{ms} + \kappa_m yr_t + e_{mtj},\end{aligned}\tag{11}$$

where we write ξ_{mtj} into several terms in the second line. ξ_j is unobserved product attributes such as quality and safety features that do not vary over time and across markets. η_t captures time (year-month) fixed effects that control for common demand shocks and seasonalities across cities. $\mathbf{1}(m=3)\eta'_t$ captures Shanghai-specific time effects. ζ_{ms} is city-specific preferences for different vehicle segments where s is an index for segments. yr_t is year (1 to 5) and $\kappa_m yr_t$ captures city-specific time trend. e_{mtj} is time-varying and city-specific demand shocks. The last line combines $X_j\bar{\beta} + \xi_j$ into product dummies δ_j , absorbing the utility that is constant for all households across the markets. The parameters in the mean utility function is denoted as $\theta_1 = \{\delta_j, \eta_t, \eta'_t, \zeta_{ms}, \kappa_m\}$. The second part in equation (10), μ_{mtij} , is household-specific utility defined as:

$$\mu_{mtij}(\theta_2) = [\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln y_{mti} + \sigma \nu_{mti}] \ln(p_{mtj} + b_{mti}) + \sum_k x_{mjk} \nu_{mtik} \sigma_k^u.\tag{12}$$

The parameters in the household-specific utility are denoted as $\theta_2 = \{\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \sigma, \sigma^u\}$. With this specification, we can rewrite the choice probabilities in equation (5) as following:

$$\Pr_{mtij}(p_j, b_{mti}, X_j, \xi_{mtj}, y_{mti}, Z_{mti}) = \frac{\exp[\delta_{mtj}(\theta_1) + \mu_{mtij}(\theta_2)]}{1 + \sum_h \{\exp[\delta_{mth}(\theta_1) + \mu_{mtih}(\theta_2)]\}}.\tag{13}$$

The market shares can be written as $S_{mtj}(\delta_{mtj}, \theta_2, \theta_3)$, where $\theta_3 = \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \rho\}$ which characterizes the license allocation processes described above.

In the choice probabilities, unobserved product attributes and demand shocks are absorbed in δ_{mtj} while the price and bid variables are in μ_{mtij} . If we could include market-time-product fixed effects subsuming δ_{mtj} , we can control for unobserved product attributes and demand shocks. However, this is impractical in this nonlinear model. BLP develop a methodology to back out δ_{mtj} . Under mild regularity conditions, for given vectors of θ_2 and θ_3 , a unique vector of δ_{mt} for each market that equalizes the predicted market shares with observed market shares can be recovered through a contraction mapping algorithm:

$$\delta_{mt}^{n+1} = \delta_{mt}^n + \ln(S_{mt}^o) - \ln[\hat{S}(\delta_{mt}^n, \theta_2, \theta_3)],\tag{14}$$

where n is the number of iteration. S^o is a vector of observed market shares while $\hat{S}()$ is

predicted market shares. With the recovered δ_{mt} for given vectors of θ_2 and θ_3 , θ_1 can be estimated using a linear framework following equation (11).

To estimate the model, we follow BLP by using simulated GMM with the nested contraction mapping. The GMM is based on three sets of moment conditions. The first set is formed based on the city-year specific demand shocks in equation (11). The identification assumption is that these demand shocks are mean independent of city-year dummy variables, i.e., having zero mean at the city-year level:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[e_{mtj}(\theta_2, \theta_3)|d_{mt}\right] = 0, \quad (15)$$

where d_{mt} are city-year dummies. This assumption amounts to that time-varying demand shocks have a common trend across cities and the common trend is controlled by time fixed effects. What is left from the time trend e_{mtj} is not systemically different across cities. Note that we have also included city-segment fixed effects and these control for difference in levels in demand shocks. Since Beijing implemented the lottery in 2011 and 2012, this assumption implies that the lottery policy is exogenous to the time-varying demand-shocks in Beijing.

This common trend assumption (in the absence of the policy) is motivated by the graphical evidence in Figure 2 and it is a key assumption needed in the DID analysis for policy evaluation. Although one cannot test this assumption directly given that we do not observe the counterfactual of no policy for the treatment group (Beijing in our case), we have three years of data before the policy and we can examine if the pre-policy time trends are the same across the cities in a reduced-form framework. If they are the same before the policy, we would be more comfortable with the assumption (Heckman and Hotz 1989).

Since Shanghai implements an auction system throughout our data period, we do not have a pre-policy period for comparison. To allow for the possibility of different time trend between Shanghai and other cities, we include Shanghai-specific time effects in equation (11) in the benchmark specification as a conservative measure. Recall we have city-segment dummies (which swaps city fixed effects) and time fixed effects in the equation. This leaves us eight exclusion restrictions in the first set including city-year dummy variables for Beijing and Nanjing from 2009 to 2012 (Tianjin is the base group and year 2008 is the base year). In one alternative specification, we do not include Shanghai-specific time effects and assume common trend in all four cities (leaving us 12 exclusion restrictions) and we obtain very similar results.

The second set of moment conditions is constructed based on the aggregate information from the household survey presented in the right panel of Appendix Table 2. We match

the predicted shares of households by income group by city among new vehicle buyers to those in the table. We use the fourth group as the base group and this gives us 12 moment conditions (four cities each with three income groups):

$$E_t \left[\tilde{S}_{mgt|buyers}(\theta_2, \theta_3) - S_{mgt|buyers} \right] = 0, \quad (16)$$

where g is a income group and $\tilde{S}_{mgt|buyers}$ is the predicted share of income group g among vehicle buyers while $S_{mgt|buyers}$ is the observed counterpart. The former is calculated as:

$$\tilde{S}_{mgt|buyers}(\theta_2, \theta_3) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{mt}} d(y_{mti} \in INC_g) \sum_{j=1}^J Pr_{mtij}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{mt}} \sum_{j=1}^J Pr_{mtij}} \quad (17)$$

where $d(\cdot)$ is an indicator function being 1 for household i whose income (y_{mti}) falls into the income range of group g , INC_g . These moment conditions turn out to be crucial in recovering the curvature of the WTP schedule (i.e. heterogeneity in WTP).

The third set of moment conditions matches the predicted quantity of licenses to the observed quota in each month.

$$E_t[\tilde{Q}_{mt}(\theta_2, \theta_3) - Q_{mt}] = 0, \quad (18)$$

where \tilde{Q}_{mt} is predicted quantity of licenses and it is calculated for Beijing ($m=1$ and $t > 36$) and Shanghai ($m=3$) as the following

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{Q}_{1t} &= \sum_i \sum_{j=1}^J [Pr_{1tij} * \mathbf{1}(c_i = 1) * \rho], \\ \tilde{Q}_{3t} &= \sum_i \sum_{j=1}^J [Pr_{3tij}(b_{mti} > 0) * \mathbf{1}(c_i = 1)], \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

where $\mathbf{1}(\cdot)$ is the indicator function and the definitions of c_i are random draws from a Bernoulli distribution as discussed in Section 4.2. There could be a time gap between winning a license and purchasing a vehicle. In Beijing, winners have six months to purchase a new vehicle while in Shanghai, winners have three months before the license expires. Many consumers indeed take their time to purchase their vehicles. In the estimation, Q_{mt} is not the quota observed in that particular month; rather it is the average of the last six months and three months for Beijing and Shanghai, respectively.

We form the objective function by stacking these three sets of moment conditions. The procedure involves iteratively updating θ_2 and θ_3 and then δ_{mj} from the inner loop of contraction mapping to minimize the objective function. The estimation starts with an initial weighted matrix to obtain consistent initial estimates of the parameters and optimal weight-

ing matrix. The model is then re-estimated using the new weighting matrix.

5.2 Identification Sources and Strategy

Although our model follows closely the BLP literature, our identification strategy represents an important departure. The maintained identification assumption in the literature is that unobserved product attributes are mean independent of those observed ones and the exclusion restrictions are given by the product attributes of other products within the firm and outside the firm. This assumption could be violated if firms choose product attributes (observed and unobserved) jointly (Klier and Linn 2012). We do not rely on this assumption. Instead, our first set of moment conditions (or macro-moments) are based on the assumption that unobserved demand shocks have a common trend across the cities, a critical assumption in DID analysis. We are able to offer some evidence to support this assumption.

It is worth mentioning that our identification strategy is also made possible by the fact that different households are paying different effective prices (price plus bid) for the same vehicle in Shanghai depending on whether they need a new license or not. This allows us to have all the price variables in the household-specific utility and be isolated from unobserved product and demand shocks. To understand this, imagine if we do not have data for Shanghai, we would have $\alpha_0 \ln(p_j)$ entering the mean-utility term. We would then need to estimate α_0 for welfare analysis. Since the price variable and the unobserved product attributes would both appear in the mean utility, one would need to evoke some type of exogeneity assumption such as the one on unobserved product attributes maintained in the literature to deal with price endogeneity. Alternatively, one can assume away $\alpha_0 \ln(p_j)$ from the utility specification so that the price variable is always interacted with household demographics such as income and hence appear in the household specific utility alone as in Berry et al. (1999) and Beresteanu and Li (2011). This could be a restrictive functional form and our estimation results do not support this form in our context.

As we will discuss further below in the next two sections, the identification of the WTP schedule critically hinges on the coefficients on the price and income variables in equation (4). Intuitively, the discontinuity in purchase costs (prices plus bids) between Shanghai and other cities due to the auction policy helps identify the price coefficient. Higher purchase costs for buyers who need a new license in Shanghai lead to lower vehicle sales than in other cities, due to consumer disutility from high prices. The magnitude in sales reduction regulates the magnitude of the price coefficient. The variation in auction prices over time, the logarithm function form, and rich price variation across vehicle models all facilitate identification.

The micro-moments on the share of different income groups among new vehicle buyers help identify heterogeneity in consumer price sensitivity and WTP. These micro-moments in Appendix Table 2 show that high income groups accounts for disproportionately larger shares among new vehicle buyers, suggesting that households with higher income are less price sensitive. The disproportionality is more salient in Shanghai. This can be explained by the fact that higher purchase costs in Shanghai make new vehicle purchase more out of reach for low income households. These micro-moments help pin down the coefficient on the income variable and hence the curvature of the WTP schedule.

Another source of heterogeneity in consumer WTP is captured by the random coefficient on the price variable and the coefficient estimate turns out to be small in magnitude, suggesting that the heterogeneity in WTP is largely driven by income. Our sensitivity analysis below shows that the large heterogeneity in the WTP schedule is not driven by the infinite support of the normal distribution used to characterize the unobserved heterogeneity.

5.3 Further Discussions on Computation

Before concluding this section, we offer some additional details for estimation. First, the estimation starts from generating a set of households in each year-month and in each market. Each of the households is defined by a vector of household demographics including income from the income distribution and unobserved household attributes from the standard normal. When generating the random draws, we use randomized Halton sequences to improve efficiency. Our results below are all based on 150 households in each year-month and market. Using the benchmark specification, we tried 200 random draws but that made very little difference.¹⁹

Second, we speed up the estimation process through a combination of two techniques. The first technique is to parallelize the computation across the four markets. The time savings from the parallel process more than offset the additional overhead time. The second technique is to modify equation (14) for the contraction mapping by employing Newton's method where the update is based on the derivate of the market share with respect to the mean utility δ_{mt} :

$$\delta_{mt}^{n+1} = \delta_{mt}^n + \left[\frac{\partial \ln[\hat{S}(\delta_{mt}^n, \theta_2, \theta_3)]}{\partial \delta_{mt}^n} \right]^{-1} \left\{ \ln(S_{mt}^o) - \ln[\hat{S}(\delta_{mt}^n, \theta_2, \theta_3)] \right\}. \quad (20)$$

Although additional time is needed to calculate the derivatives, there is still considerable

¹⁹The convergence criterion for the simulated GMM (outer loop) is 10e-8 while that for the contraction mapping (inner loop) is set to 10e-14 to minimize the approximation error.

savings from fewer iterations due to the quadratic convergence rate of Newton’s method.

6 Estimation Results

In this section, we first present evidence from the reduced-form regressions on the common trend assumption and the sales impact of the lottery policy in Beijing. Then we discuss the parameter estimates from the random coefficients discrete choice model.

6.1 Evidence from Reduce-form Regressions

To examine the validity of the common trend assumption across the cities, we estimate the following regression based on data from 2008 to 2010 (pre-policy period).

$$\ln(S_{mtj}) = \delta_j + \lambda_{mt} + \eta_t + \mathbf{1}(m = 3)\eta'_t + \zeta_{ms} + e_{mtj},$$

where the dependent variable is the log market shares. δ_j is model (vintage-nameplate) dummies. λ_{mt} is city-year fixed effects to capture city-specific and time-varying demand shocks. The common trend assumption assumes that these shocks are the same across cities in a given year. The other terms are defined the same as in equation (11): we include time (year-month) fixed effects, Shanghai-specific time effects and city-segment fixed effects.

Table 2 presents the regression results for three specifications. The first two use all observations while the third one drops the data in the last two months of 2010 in Beijing to remove the anticipation effect and more importantly the announcement effect in December 2010. In all specifications, the base group is Tianjin and the base year is 2008. The first specification does not include Shanghai-specific time fixed effects but include Shanghai-year fixed effects. The coefficient estimate on $\ln(\text{price}+\text{bid})$ suggests a price elasticity of -4.846, which is a plausible magnitude. All the city-year interactions are small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero, suggesting a similar time trend across the four cities.

The second specification include Shanghai-specific time fixed effects to control for monthly demand shocks in Shanghai that are different from the base group and could be correlated with the average bid. The price coefficient reduces to -5.089, consistent with the conjecture that unobserved demand shocks that are correlated with the average bid can bias the price coefficient toward zero. Nevertheless, the difference in the price coefficient estimates is quite small. The city-year interactions again have small and insignificant coefficient estimates. The third specification produces very similar results to the second one, suggesting that the anticipation and announcement effects are not large enough perhaps due to the short notice. The evidence from Figure 2 and these results support the common trend assumption, the

basis of our first set of moment conditions in the structural estimation.

We next use a DID framework to examine the sales impact of the lottery policy. These results will be compared with those from the structural demand model. The equation for DID is very similar to equation except replacing city-year fixed effects with lottery policy dummies for Beijing in 2011 and 2012. The results are presented in Appendix Table 3. The first specification uses all observations while the other two drop observations in the last two months in 2010 and the first two months in 2011 in Beijing. While the first two specifications include city-specific time trend (up to second-order polynomials), the third one does not.

Using the full data set, the lottery policy is estimated to have reduced sales by 60.6% in 2011 and 50.7% in 2012. This implies that without the policy, the sales would have been 847,000 units in 2011 and 1.05 million units in 2012, compared with a pre-policy sales of 804,000 in 2010. The second specification produces slightly smaller sales impacts: 54.1% and 40.4% in 2011 and 2012, respectively. This is intuitive since we drop the last two months in 2010 where the increase in sales was partly due to the fact that people moved their purchase forward from the future. So without the policy, the sales would have been smaller in 2010. The sales impacts of the policy would have been smaller in 2011 and 2012 to be consistent with growth in other cities. These estimates imply that the sales would have been about 728,000 and 873,000 in the absence of the policy in 2011 and 2012. The third specification leads to slightly larger sales impacts than those from the specification two. We will come back to these estimates for comparison once we obtain estimates from the structural model.

6.2 Parameter Estimates from the Demand System

Table 3 shows parameter estimates from the GMM estimation for six specifications. The first panel represent parameters in θ_2 which appear in the household-specific utility function in equation (12). The three parameters in the second panel are the auxiliary parameters θ_3 that are needed to incorporate the policies into the calculation of market shares as shown in equations (8) and (9). We do not present parameter estimates for θ_1 since they are not needed to perform our policy simulations and welfare analysis: θ_2 , θ_3 , and δ_{mtj} , the mean utilities from equation (20) suffice.

The first specification is the benchmark model and our preferred specification. Below we discuss the coefficient estimates and compare results across different specifications. We note however, that the magnitude of the preference parameters by themselves are hard to interpret and we defer much of the discussion on the comparison across specifications in the next two sections where we simulate sales and conduct welfare analysis using these parameters.

In the benchmark specification, the coefficient estimate on $\ln(\text{price}+\text{bid})$ is negative while that on the interaction between this price variable and $\ln(\text{income})$ is positive. This suggests that households with a higher income are less price sensitive. Given the range of $\ln(\text{income})$ from 0.55 to 6.72, the first two coefficient estimates suggest that all households dislike high prices. The variable $\ln(\text{income})$ in the specification is to capture the fact that the utility difference between a new vehicle and the outside good varies by income. The second and third coefficient estimates imply the partial effect of $\ln(\text{income})$ is positive for about 95% of the vehicle models, suggesting that the utility difference increases with income.

The next five coefficients are random coefficients, representing the standard deviation estimates of the normal distribution for preferences on each vehicle characteristics. The random coefficient on constant captures the variation (due to unobserved household demographics) in the utility difference between a new vehicle and the outside good. Three out of five random coefficients are statistically significant, adding consumer heterogeneity to what is implied by income heterogeneity.

To get a sense of the magnitude of coefficient estimates on price variables, we calculate price elasticities based on model estimates. The average own price elasticity is -10.51 with a range of -8.70 to -15.97. Models with a higher price tend to have a smaller elasticity in magnitude, consistent with the intuition. The average elasticity is somewhat larger in magnitude than the estimates obtained for the U.S. market which range from -3 to -8.4 (BLP, Goldberg 1995, Petrin 2002, and Beresteanu and Li 2011).²⁰

However, we believe our estimates are reasonable. In addition to the fact that we have a different identification strategy as discussed in Section 5, the difference could be attributed to at least the following two reasons. First, the income level in these four cities in China is less than one half of the U.S. income level during the data period of 1981 to 1993 used in Petrin (2002). To the extent that higher income would reduce price sensitivity, the differences in income could lead to the differences in price elasticities. Second, vehicle prices in our data are much higher than MSPRs in the U.S. for the same brand.²¹ For example, a Hyundai Sonata GLS Sedan with 2.4 Liter engine with base options had a MSRP of \$19,695 in the U.S., and a similar model produced in China had an MSPR of 178,800 Yuan (over \$28,000). That is, one needs to adjust our price elasticities downward (in magnitude) in order to compare them

²⁰Petrin (2002) based on data from 1981 to 1993 in the U.S. market and Beresteanu and Li (2011) based on data from 1999 to 2006 both use micro-moments for estimation, yielding an average price elasticity of -6 and -8.4, respectively.

²¹Imports account for less than 3% of the auto market in China. Most brands sold in U.S. are available in China but they are produced there by joint ventures between foreign and domestic auto makers. Please see Li et al. (2013) for a discussion on China's auto industry.

with the elasticities in the U.S. market.²²

The first auxiliary parameter ρ is the ratio of total license allocated over the number of potential vehicle buyers (without the quota constraint) that would need a new license (e.g., fist-time buyers) under the quota system. It measures the stringency of the quota system: the smaller it is, the more stringent the quota is. It is a very important parameter in estimating the counterfactual sales under the policy. The parameter is estimated to be 0.202 in the benchmark specification, implying that only one out of five potential buyers that need a license are able to obtain a license through the lottery. As discussed above, this should not be compared with the observed odds because the observed lottery pool includes not only those who enter the market for a new vehicle in the current month but also unmet demand in the past months and future buyers. Our empirical model lumps lottery participation decision and vehicle choices together. Nevertheless, as we show below, the estimate of 0.202 (together with other parameters) leads to reasonable counterfactual sales without the policy.

The second and third auxiliary parameters define the probability of a buyer needing a new license given by equation (7). The positive coefficient γ_1 suggests that as vehicle ownership goes up, the share of potential buyers who need a new license decreases. This is intuitive since as vehicle ownership increases, more and more households would need to replace their old vehicles with new vehicles and hence do not need a new license. These two parameter estimates imply that about 72% of potential buyers in Shanghai and 69% in Beijing in 2012 would need a license should they decide to buy a vehicle.

To examine the importance of the first set of moment conditions based on the common trend assumption, we estimate the model without these moment conditions under alternative one. The coefficient estimates on $\ln(\text{price}+\text{bid})$ and its interaction with income are both larger in magnitude. The average own price elasticity is -13.55 with a range from -20.48 to -11.07. These are about 30% larger than those from the benchmark specification in magnitude. Another key difference is that the estimate of ρ is almost twice as large as that from the benchmark model. This estimate implies that the quota is much less stringent and as we show below, the model estimates from this specification predict unreasonably small sales under the counterfactual scenario of no policy and under-estimate consumers WTP for licenses as discussed below in more detail.

Alternative specification two in Table 3 does not utilize the second set of moment conditions (i.e., micro-moments) that are based on shares of new vehicle purchases by income

²²High vehicle prices in China are in part due to the fact that they include three types of taxes on top of the prices that dealers get: value-added tax, consumption tax, and sales tax. For an average vehicle, these three amount to about one third of the vehicle price.

group. These moment conditions are important in recovering the heterogeneity in WTP for a new car and price sensitivity across income groups. Without these micro-moment conditions, the parameter estimate on the price and income interaction term has a negative sign. This implies that high income groups are more price sensitive, running against our intuition as well as the results from the benchmark model. As a result, price elasticity estimates are larger in magnitude for more expensive vehicles, opposite to the results from the first two specifications. It is interesting to note that the auxiliary parameters are very close to those from the benchmark model, suggesting that these parameters are largely identified through the first and third sets of moment conditions.

These two alternative specifications show the crucial roles of the first two set of moment conditions in identifying price coefficients and WTP schedule. Table 3 also presents results from three additional specifications as further robustness checks. Alternative three examines the sensitivity of the results to the definition of market size. In the benchmark model, we assume half of the households in a city participate in the market for new vehicles, implying the market size of a month is the number of households divided by 24. Alternative three assumes the market size to be the number of all households as is often done in the studies on the U.S. market. The coefficients by and large are very similar to those in the benchmark specification. This implies that the mean utilities must be smaller in this specification in order to generate the same number of new vehicle sales as in the benchmark specification.

Alternative four assumes that 85% of the lottery winners use the license to purchase new vehicles instead of used vehicles in Beijing and the number in Shanghai is 95%. As specified by the policy, buyers of used vehicles need a license if they do not already have one (i.e., from scrapping an old vehicle). We do not have detailed statistics on the ultimate usage of the licenses and we use these two numbers as the upper bound. We choose a lower number for Shanghai because the buyers there tend to have higher income than in Beijing.²³

In all the first five specifications, random draws for random coefficients are drawn from standard normal distributions which are unbounded. To remove the impacts of extreme values, the last specification uses random draws from truncated normal distributions by removing the draws below 2.5 percentile and above 97.5 percentile. The coefficient estimates are very close to those from the benchmark specification and so are the simulation results and welfare analysis shown below.

²³In May 2011, about 1600 licenses from the lottery were used for used vehicle purchases in Beijing according to information from used vehicle dealers: <http://auto.sina.com.cn/news/2011-06-21/0752790152.shtml>. In June and July 2011, the ratio was 11.7% and 14%, respectively: <http://auto.sohu.com/20110816/n316431063.shtml>.

6.3 Impacts on Vehicle Sales

Table 4 presents the simulated sales under the counterfactual of no policy for various specifications. Under the benchmark specification, the counterfactual sales in Beijing are 779,272 and 1,142,064 in 2011 and 2012, relative to observed sales of 334, 308 and 520,442 under the policy. This suggests that the lottery policy reduced sales by 57 and 54 percent, respectively in 2011 and 2012. The estimated sales impact in 2011 is very close to those from the DID analysis in Appendix Table 3. The sales impact in 2012 from the structural model is somewhat larger than those from the DID analysis.

The model estimates predict the sales would have increased by 46.5% from 2011 to 2012 in Beijing without the quota system. This is quite a bit larger than what was observed in Tianjin and Nanjing (13% and 5%), our control groups. This larger uptake in sales, relative to other cities, could be due to the combination of the following two reasons. First, the number of households in Beijing increased by 2.8% from 2011 to 2012, compared to 0.6% in Nanjing, 1.4% in Shanghai, and 4.3% in Tianjin. Second, the average income of the top quantile increased from 158,233 to 189,213 from 2011 to 2012 in Beijing, a 19.6% growth. This is much larger than the other three cities: 6.5%, 10.9% and 7.9% in Nanjing, Shanghai and Tianjin, respectively. Given that the high-income group contributes disproportionately more to new vehicle purchases as shown in Appendix Table 2, the larger income growth in this group could lead to a larger increase in vehicle sales.

Under alternative specification one without the first set of moment conditions, the counterfactual sales in Beijing without the policy are 591,789 and 884,541 in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The 25% drop in sales from 2010 to 2011 without the policy is hard to explain given that the sales decrease during the same period in Nanjing and Tianjin was 6.6% and 0.02%. Since the common trend assumption is not enforced, this specification wrongly attributes part of the large sales drop from 2010 to 2011 due to the quota system to a negative demand shock in 2011 in Beijing relative to other cities. This then leads to a larger estimate on ρ (i.e., less stringent quota) and predicts a large decrease in sales without the policy

It is interesting to note that although alternative specification two (without micro-moments) does not provide sensible pattern of price elasticities, the simulated sales impacts are close to those from the benchmark model. This is because the policy impacts are mainly identified through the first set of moment conditions that utilize common trend assumption, just as in a DID analysis. The micro-moment conditions, on the other hand, are very important for identifying consumer WTP and subsequent welfare comparisons.

The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the counterfactual sales without the auction policy from 2008 to 2012 in Shanghai. The results from the benchmark specification suggest that the policy reduced the sales by about 52% during this period. Interestingly, all three specifications including alternative one produce very similar results. This is because the identification of the policy impacts in Shanghai is through the changes in treatment intensity (i.e., average bids) over time. That is, the estimation of the policy impacts in Shanghai is largely based on the parameter estimates on the price variables.

The last three columns of Table 4 presents the sales impacts from the three robustness checks based on different assumptions on the market size, license usage for used cars, and distribution of random draws. As we have discussed in the above section, the parameter estimates from these specifications are very similar to those in the benchmark specification. Consistent with that, this table shows that the sales impacts are by and large similar to the estimates from the benchmark specification.

7 Welfare Analysis

The purpose of this section is to compare welfare consequences under the lottery and auction systems and we focus on 2012 for illustration. The comparison is performed on both allocative efficiency and the external costs associated with automobile usage.

7.1 WTP Schedules

We first derive consumer WTP schedule for a license in Beijing and Shanghai in 2012 based on parameter estimates from the benchmark specification in Table 3. The WTP for a license by household i is given by the expected consumer surplus (CS) from the most preferred vehicle:

$$E(\text{CS}_i) = E_\epsilon \left[\max_{j=1, \dots, J} \frac{\bar{u}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}}{\text{MU}_{ij}} \right] = \frac{1}{\text{MU}} \ln \left[\sum_{j=1, \dots, J} \exp(\bar{u}_{ij}) \right] \text{ if } \text{MU}_{ij} \text{ is constant,} \quad (21)$$

where MU_{ij} is marginal utility of money. The last equality holds only if the marginal utility of money is constant. However, because our utility specification is nonlinear in price, we cannot use the closed-form expression in the last equality to estimate consumer surplus. Instead, we follow the simulation method developed by Herriges and Kling (1999) to estimate the expected CS from the most preferred vehicle.²⁴

²⁴Independent of the estimation, we separately generate 1000 households for each market for each month in 2012. Each household is characterized by a vector of income and random draws of unobserved household attributes. For each household, we draw 200 vectors of ϵ_i to achieve better precision.

Figure 3 depicts the WTP schedule or the demand curve for licenses in Beijing (top panel) and Shanghai (bottom panel) in 2012. The WTP schedules can be viewed as populated by households with different WTP since each household demands no more than one vehicle in a period. The red vertical line denotes the level of quota: 259,800 in Beijing and 108,100 in Shanghai. The WTP schedules exhibit two salient features. First, there is considerable heterogeneity with some households willing to pay more than 200,000 Yuan for a license in both markets.²⁵ Among those with positive WTP in Beijing, the average WTP is about 53,200 Yuan with a standard deviation of about 83,500 Yuan. The average WTP in Shanghai is 32,000 Yuan with a standard deviation of 52,400 Yuan. Our random coefficients utility framework is well suited to capture consumer heterogeneity, which is critical for welfare comparison under different allocation mechanisms as we will show below.

The second feature is that the WTP schedule in Beijing is higher than that in Shanghai, implying that households in Beijing on average are willing to pay a higher price for a license. This is a reflection that consumers in Shanghai have better access to the public transit and hence have less strong demand for a new vehicle.²⁶ This is also consistent with the simulated sales under the counterfactual scenario of no quota systems in Table 4: the counterfactual sales in Beijing and Shanghai in 2012 would have been 1,142,064 and 712,215, respectively. Although Shanghai has more households and a higher average income than Beijing, the sales are lower, reflecting a lower WTP for a new vehicle. As discussed above, Shanghai has been carrying out the auctions to distribute licenses for nearly three decades and the auction revenue has been used to build road infrastructure and improve public transit.

The intersection between the vertical lines and the WTP schedules in Figure 3 gives the market clearing prices under a uniform price auction, the highest rejected bid in such a auction. The clearing price would have been 82,210 Yuan in Beijing and 53,020 Yuan in Shanghai based on simulations. This simulated clearing price in Shanghai is nearly identical to the observed lowest bid of 52,800 from the auction data in 2012. This fact provides another favorable validity check for our empirical analysis. Since our estimation does not have any explicit constraints on WTP and clearing prices, this adds confidence for us to take the estimates to perform the welfare analysis below.

²⁵Anecdotal evidence from the internet suggests that the price of a vehicle license in the black market in Beijing was about 200,000 Yuan in 2012 even though there is a large legal risk in such transactions. Truncating the maximum WTP to 200,000 Yuan do not qualitatively affect the conclusion on welfare comparison in Section 7.3.

²⁶For example, the total length of Beijing's city rail system is 465km with 277 stations while that in Shanghai is 538km with 329 stations by the end of 2013.

7.2 Consumer Surplus and Externalities

We now compare consumer surplus from license allocations and externalities associated with automobile usage under the two mechanisms. As discussed in Section 2, although auctions can achieve more efficient allocations than lottery in general, this may not be true when the resources being allocated generate negative externalities that increase with WTP. Vehicle usage generates multiple externalities including congestion, air pollution, and accidents (Parry et al. 2007). These externalities could impose a huge burden on the society especially in rapidly developing countries where they are not adequately controlled for.

There are good reasons to believe that the externalities are positively correlated with consumer WTP for a vehicle license. First, households with a high WTP tend to be those with high household income. They tend to drive larger and more luxurious vehicles that have lower fuel economy and hence burn more gasoline for the same travel distance.²⁷ Second, households with high income tend to drive more. Small and Van Dender (2007) estimate the elasticity of annual vehicle miles traveled (VMT) with respect to income to be 0.11 using the U.S. state-level data. The relationship holds among households in Beijing according to 2010 Beijing Household Travel Survey, a representative household survey in Beijing conducted by Beijing Transportation Research Center. Among the seven income groups in the survey, the average annual household VMT ranges from 15,300 to 25,100 km from the lowest income group (less than 50,000 Yuan in annual income) to the highest income group (more than 300,000 Yuan). The average VMT is 16,100 km among all 133,14 households in the data.

We first examine allocative efficiency in Beijing from lottery and auction mechanisms under the observed quota level of 259,800 units in 2012. We use a uniform price auction rather than the Shanghai auction format as the basis for comparison. As shown in Liao and Holt (2013), the Shanghai auction is non-standard and may not yield the efficient outcome. Table 5 presents the simulation results for two different scenarios regarding the time-span for the external cost analysis to be discussed below, bearing in mind that consumer surplus does not vary between the two scenarios.

Under a uniform price auction, the clearing price would have been 82,210 Yuan in Beijing in 2012. The total consumer surplus given by the area to the left of the vertical line in Figure 3 would have been 48.35 billion, but only 11 percent of it (or 5.39 billion) is realized under the lottery system, resulting in a welfare loss of nearly 43 billion. This striking result is

²⁷Larger and heavier vehicles also impose larger accident externalities as shown in (Anderson and Auffhammer 2013; Jacobsen 2013). However, accident externalities in general are found to be small relative to congestion and air pollution in the slow-moving urban traffic.

due to: (1) there is a great deal of heterogeneity in WTP, and (2) the lottery allocates the license randomly. The significant welfare loss is robust to the three assumptions (market size, license usage for used vehicles, and extreme random draws) examined under the last three specifications in Table 3: it is 41.1, 38.4 and 39.8 billion Yuan, respectively.

We now turn to differences in total external costs under the two mechanisms. The average fuel economy of new vehicles sold under the lottery is 8.92 liters/100km compared to 9.19 under the auction. This is consistent with our discussion above: the auction system will lead to a market with more high income households than the lottery system. In calculating VMT, we assign annual VMT to each household according to the seven income groups in 2010 Beijing Household Travel survey. By doing so, the average annual VMT of 17,760km under the lottery is also smaller than that from the auction, 19,800km. To quantify automobile externalities under the two mechanisms, we need to make two additional assumptions.

The first is with regard to the time horizon over which the external costs accrue. Although a license can theoretically stay with the households over multiple vehicle lifetimes, it is probably not very meaningful to take such a long-term view in calculating external costs. In response to the fast-changing environment, policies in China tend to change frequently. How long the quota system will last and how binding it will be is uncertain. We carry out our analysis based on two scenarios: 15 years, the maximum legal age of usage, and 10 years, which bound the average vehicle lifetime. These should be plausible time horizons to consider from the policy perspective. In addition, our demand analysis assumes that a consumer's WTP for a license is the consumer surplus for the most preferred vehicle during the vehicle lifetime. The WTP estimates obtained under this assumption are quite sensible as discussed above. Lastly, we note that reasonable variations of time horizons would change our welfare estimates but would not affect the qualitative comparison of the two mechanisms.

The second assumption is on the external costs associated with gasoline consumption. The literature has generally translated externalities on a per-unit of gasoline basis in the discussion on the optimal gasoline tax as a (second-best) policy instrument.²⁸ We take the results from Creutzig and He (2008) that estimate the externalities from automobile usage in Beijing. The most plausible estimate from their study is 0.85 Yuan/km (in 2012 terms) and congestion and air pollution account for about 80%. This translates to 9.7 Yuan per liter of gasoline consumed at the average level of fuel economy, implying an external cost

²⁸Congestion is directly related to travel distance while CO₂ emissions is proportional to gasoline consumption. Air pollution is more complicated as it relates to engine running time even for the same distance. In addition, it also has to do with vehicle age as old vehicles pollute disproportionately more (Kahn 1996).

of \$6.02 per gallon of gasoline.²⁹ Parry and Timilsina (2009) estimate the external costs from automobile usage to be about \$6.05 (in 2005 \$) per gallon of gasoline in Mexico city.³⁰ Mexico city probably offers a reasonable comparison to Beijing in that both have very severe congestion and air pollution. In addition, the average household income in these two cities is roughly the same, about one fourth of that in the US. We note that although reasonable variations on the unit external cost affect the magnitude of welfare estimates, they do not qualitatively affect the efficiency comparison between the two mechanisms.

Figure 4 plots the external cost curve (the dashed downward sloping curves) for the 15-year time horizon in the top panel and 10-year time-horizon in the bottom panel. The external cost curves depict the total external costs from the automobile usage during a given time horizon for the corresponding households on the WTP curve. The estimates are obtained based on a five percent annual discount rate. Since the external costs increase with WTP, the auction system leads to larger externalities than the lottery system. As shown in Table 5, the total external costs during a 15-year time horizon is estimated to be 33.02 billion Yuan under the lottery system and 40.21 under the auction system, implying a non-trivial difference of nearly 7 billion Yuan. With a 10-year time horizon, the estimates are 24.57 billion Yuan and 29.92 billion Yuan, respectively.

7.3 Social Welfare and Comparison

Does the advantage of externality reduction from the lottery system change the efficiency ranking of the two mechanisms? The answer is no in our context because this advantage is dominated by the allocative cost from the lottery. The net social welfare (total surplus minus total external costs) from the lottery system is estimated to be -27.63 billion, compared with 8.13 billion from the auction. The net social welfare from the lottery system being negative is due to: (1) the external costs are larger than consumer surplus for a larger number of households with relatively low WTP as shown in Figure 4; and (2) the level of quota is set too high relative to the optimal level as we discuss below.

The difference in net social welfare implies that by using the lottery system instead of a uniform price auction, Beijing municipal government left nearly 36 billion Yuan on the table. If we use a 10-year time horizon to calculate total external costs, the difference in net social

²⁹For final calculation of external costs, we recognize that China currently imposes a gasoline tax of 1Yuan per liter to deal with the externalities from automobile usage. So we take 8.7 Yuan/km as the (un-internalized) external costs.

³⁰Parry and Small (2005) estimate the external costs of one gallon of gasoline consumption to be around \$0.83 and \$1.23 (in 2000 \$) in the US and UK, respectively.

welfare is about 38 billion. These findings suggest that under the model estimates and a set of reasonable assumptions, the lottery system performs poorly in efficiency relative to a uniform price auction. In terms of government revenue, a uniform price auction would have generated over 21 billion Yuan for Beijing government in 2012. If the revenue were to be used for additional support to the public transit as Shanghai does, it would have more than doubled the existing subsidy level of 17 billion.

The last exercise we conduct is to examine the optimal level of quota in Beijing. Our analysis is not meant to devise the optimal policy for dealing with congestion and air pollution. In fact, real-time congestion pricing and gasoline taxes should be more effective policies than the quota system since they directly target the source of externalities: driving and gasoline consumption. Nevertheless, we investigate another margin of improvement within the framework of the quota system. The optimal level of quota is determined by the intersection of the WTP and external cost curves as shown in Figure 4. Under the 15-year time horizon, the optimal level of quota is 125,612, about half of the quota used in 2012.³¹ The clearing price from a uniform price auction would be 157,500 Yuan, nearly twice as high as it would be with the existing quota. As shown in the second panel of Table 5, consumer surplus would be 34.87 billion, less than 48.35 billion under the existing quota. However, the total external costs would be 20.87 billion with the smaller quota, about half of those from the existing quota. As a result, the net social welfare would be 14.12 billion, compared with 8.13 billion under the existing quota. Government revenue would be 19.78 billion, only slightly smaller. If we use a 10-year time horizon, the optimal quota would be higher since the unit external costs would be smaller. The net social welfare would increase to 20.79 billion Yuan.

8 Conclusion

Air pollution and traffic congestion are arguably two of the most pressing issues for China's urban residents. To combat worsening traffic congestion and air pollution, transit authorities in many large cities in China are implementing license quota systems to curb the growth in vehicle ownership. How should they distribute the limited number of vehicle licenses? One might be quick to point out that market-based mechanisms that distribute the resources to those with the highest value would be more efficient. However, if the usage of the resources generates negative externalities that are positively correlated with the willingness to pay, the efficiency advantage of market-based mechanisms may disappear because the usage of the

³¹Interestingly, the annual quota in Beijing is reduced to 150,000 in 2014 from about 250,000 in previous years. This new quota includes 20,000 licenses designated for electric vehicles.

resources by those with highest private benefit could lead to smaller social benefit.

Although there is a large and distinguished theoretical literature on resource allocation mechanisms since Coase (1959), with the exception of the auction literature, empirical studies that quantify resource misallocation and its welfare impacts are sparse. This study offers the first empirical analysis on the welfare outcomes of the lottery and auction systems used in Beijing and Shanghai to distribute vehicle licenses. The analysis builds upon the random coefficients discrete choice model and develops a novel empirical strategy that combines the common trend assumption between treatment and control groups in impact evaluation literature with the micro-moment conditions as in Petrin (2002) to identify structural parameters, without relying on the maintained exogeneity assumption between observed and unobserved product attributes in the literature.

Our analysis shows that lotteries offer a large advantage over auctions in reducing automobile externalities under a quota system. Nevertheless, this advantage is offset by the allocative cost from misallocation. The estimated welfare loss from Beijing's lottery system is 36 billion Yuan (or \$6 billion) in 2012. This underscores the importance of allocation efficiency in the presence of large consumer heterogeneity. This large loss is especially concerning given that Beijing is often a leader in setting state policies. Four other major cities have recently adopted vehicle license quota systems: two are using lotteries to allocate licenses while the other two using a hybrid system. Although the rationale for choosing lotteries has not been made public, one can postulate that the decision reflects concerns for equality. Our analysis shows that a uniform price auction could have generated 21 billion Yuan revenue to Beijing municipal government, which could then be used to double its subsidies to local public transit system or for other measures to address the distributional concern.

The vehicle license quota system being adopted by urban transit authorities in China is a blunt instrument that does not directly attack the source of externalities. Economists have long been advocating market-based mechanisms such as Pigouvian policies to correct for externalities. Among real-world implementations, congestion pricing schemes have been adopted in London, Singapore and Stockholm and have been found effective in reducing congestion (Anas and Lindsey 2011). Fuel taxes offer a second-best and administratively simple policy to deal with multiple automobile externalities (Parry et al. 2007). In this paper, we focus on the welfare consequences of the two allocation mechanisms within the framework of a license quota system. The comparison between the quota system itself with road pricing and gasoline taxes is worthy of future research.

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Figure 1: Welfare Comparison of Lottery and Auction with Externalities






Figure 2: New Vehicle Monthly Sales (in logarithm) in the Four Cities






Figure 3: WTP Schedules for Licenses in Beijing and Shanghai



Notes: The top panel depicts the demand curve or the WTP schedule for licenses in Beijing in 2012 while the graph in the bottom panel is for Shanghai in 2012. The vertical lines are the quotas, 259,800 and 108,100 in Beijing and Shanghai, respectively.

Figure 4: WTP Schedules and External Costs



Notes: The external costs depicted in the top panel (the downward sloping dashed line) are calculated over a 15-year time span of using the license while those in the bottom panel are based on a 10-year time span. The solid vertical lines denote the observed quota level of 259,800. The dashed vertical lines are the optimal levels of quota of 125,612, and 183,796 for the top and bottom, respectively.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Vehicle Sales and Characteristics

Variable	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min	Max
Price (in 2012 Yuan)	315.22	197.79	276.58	36.49	1148.38
Monthly sales by model in Beijing	125.93	31.00	240.66	1.00	3464.00
Monthly sales by model in Nanjing	34.71	9.00	65.36	1.00	964.00
Monthly sales by model in Shanghai	57.01	11.00	131.23	1.00	3036.00
Monthly sales by model in Tianjin	57.33	12.00	125.75	1.00	2295.00
Vehicle size (m ²)	8.01	8.09	1.01	4.20	10.97
Displacement (liter)	2.09	1.87	0.77	0.90	5.70
Liters per 100 kilometers	9.10	8.80	2.09	2.90	17.20
Yuan per 100 kilometers	66.17	63.62	16.10	20.61	129.95
Passenger car dummy	0.63	1.00	0.48	0.00	1.00
SUV dummy	0.22	0.00	0.41	0.00	1.00
Minivan dummy	0.15	0.00	0.36	0.00	1.00
Large dummy	0.14	0.00	0.35	0.00	1.00
Luxury dummy	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.00	1.00
Medium dummy	0.35	0.00	0.48	0.00	1.00
Mini dummy	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.00	1.00
Small dummy	0.21	0.00	0.41	0.00	1.00
Upper medium dummy	0.24	0.00	0.43	0.00	1.00

Notes: The observation is at the vehicle model-year-month level. Prices include vehicle sales tax which is 10 percent in 2008, 2011 and 2012. The tax varied across vehicles with different engine size in 2009 and 2010. There are 21,228 observations from 2008 to 2012 with 1,769 models (vintage-nameplate) in the data set.

Table 2: Pre-policy Trend Analysis

Variables	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 3	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Ln(price+bid)	-4.846	0.352	-5.089	0.367	-5.095	0.368
Beijing*2009	-0.033	0.085	-0.033	0.085	-0.032	0.085
Beijing*2010	0.021	0.080	0.021	0.080	-0.026	0.082
Nanjing*2009	0.056	0.071	0.056	0.071	0.056	0.071
Nanjing*2010	0.081	0.069	0.081	0.069	0.081	0.069
Shanghai*2009	-0.054	0.094	No		No	
Shanghai*2010	-0.071	0.088	No		No	
Vintage-model fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
City-segment fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year-month fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Shanghai year-month fixed effects	No		Yes		Yes	

Notes: The dependent variable is ln(market shares). Specifications 1 and 2 use all the 47,232 observations from 2008 to 2010. Specification 3 drops observations in Nov. and Dec. of 2010 in Beijing to remove anticipation effect and has 46,462 observations. Tianjin is the base group and 2008 is the base year. The standard errors are clustered at the model level.

Table 3: Parameter Estimates from GMM

Variables	Benchmark		Alternative 1		Alternative 2		Alternative 3		Alternative 4		Alternative 5	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Parameters in the household-specific utility (θ_2)												
Ln(price+bid)	-17.519	1.927	-23.687	2.041	-8.132	2.425	-21.315	4.133	-17.127	2.184	-16.222	1.852
Ln(income)*ln(p+bid)	1.558	0.193	2.141	0.256	-1.215	0.403	1.561	0.316	1.519	0.234	1.384	0.201
Ln(income)	-6.442	0.897	-7.108	1.170	5.850	1.926	-6.470	1.383	-6.387	1.140	-5.648	0.985
σ for ln(price+bid)	0.095	0.044	0.195	0.059	0.248	0.106	0.215	0.084	0.080	0.063	0.091	0.056
σ for constant	0.907	0.261	0.011	0.133	1.164	0.543	1.512	0.311	0.922	0.290	0.897	0.283
σ for fuel costs/100km	0.000	0.094	0.000	0.060	0.299	0.208	0.002	0.119	0.003	0.120	0.001	0.114
σ for vehicle size	0.022	0.326	0.020	0.155	0.385	0.254	0.065	0.193	0.137	0.498	0.065	0.517
σ for engine displacement	1.835	0.493	2.954	0.337	2.990	0.981	3.726	1.023	1.360	0.555	1.520	0.561
Auxiliary parameters for allocation mechanism (θ_3)												
ρ	0.202	0.037	0.395	0.030	0.205	0.041	0.283	0.036	0.182	0.033	0.186	0.041
γ_0	-1.001	0.018	-0.925	0.042	-1.002	0.038	-0.986	0.343	-1.002	0.408	-1.004	0.065
γ_1	0.252	0.005	0.136	0.006	0.248	0.007	0.225	0.078	0.253	0.103	0.255	0.017

Notes: The benchmark model is the preferred model. Alternative specification 1 does not include the first set of moment conditions (common-trend moments). Alternative 2 does not include the second set of moment conditions (micro-moments). Alternative 3 assumes all the households as the potential buyers in a year so the market size in each month is the total number of households divided by 12. Alternative 4 assumes a certain percentage of licenses are used to buy used vehicles: 15 percent in Beijing and 5 percent in Shanghai. Alternative 5 takes the random draws for unobserved household attributes from a standard normal distribution removing draws below 2.5 and above 97.5 percentiles

Table 4: Policy Impacts on Sales in Beijing and Shanghai

Year	Observed Sales	Counterfactual Sales					
		Benchmark	Alternative 1	Alternative 2	Alternative 3	Alternative 4	Alternative 5
Beijing							
2008	411,936	411,936	411,936	411,936	411,936	411,936	411,936
2009	602,219	602,219	602,219	602,219	602,219	602,219	602,219
2010	804,355	804,355	804,355	804,355	804,355	804,355	804,355
2011	334,308	779,273	591,789	774,600	691,476	800,655	797,041
2012	520,442	1,142,064	884,541	1,114,074	1,004,969	1,177,813	1,170,655
Shanghai							
2008	165,298	344,955	322,379	340,356	377,179	346,277	340,970
2009	208,570	414,994	417,469	399,754	453,940	418,868	412,830
2010	264,232	577,542	538,468	567,164	651,788	575,782	568,714
2011	277,119	599,425	603,846	597,196	603,463	609,972	599,961
2012	295,047	712,215	681,951	688,113	779,833	723,197	712,205

Notes: The six counterfactual outcomes correspond to the six specifications in Table 3.

Table 5: Welfare Comparison Between Lottery and Auction in Beijing


	15-year Horizon		10-year Horizon	
	Lottery	Auction	Lottery	Auction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Observed Quota Level				
Quota in 2012	259,800	259,800	259,800	259,800
Clearing price (in 1000 Yuan)	0.00	82.21	0.00	82.21
Realized consumer surplus (in billion)	5.39	48.35	5.39	48.35
Unrealized consumer surplus (in billion)	42.96	0.00	42.96	0.00
Average fuel economy (liters per 100km)	8.92	9.19	8.92	9.19
Annual VMT (1000 kms)	17.76	19.80	17.76	19.80
Total external costs (in billion)	33.02	40.21	24.57	29.92
Government revenue (in billion)	0.00	21.36	0.00	21.36
Net social welfare (in billion)	-27.63	8.13	-19.18	18.43
Optimal Quota Level				
Optimal quota		125,612		183,796
Clearing price (in 1000)		157.50		112.50
Consumer surplus (in billion)		34.87		42.60
Total external costs (in billion)		20.75		21.82
Government revenue (in billion)		19.78		20.68
Net social welfare (in billion)		14.12		20.79

Notes: All monetary variables are in Yuan (\$1 for about 6.1 Yuan). The top panel presents welfare comparison between a lottery system and a uniform price auction for Beijing in 2012. The bottom panel shows welfare outcomes with the optimal levels of quota. The optimal quotas are defined by the intersections between the vertical dashed line and the downward sloping dashed line in the two panels of Figure 4. Net social welfare is equal to realized consumer surplus minus total external costs. Columns (1) and (2) use a 15-year time span for calculating total external costs, i.e., total discounted external costs during 15 years with a discount rate of 5%. Columns (3) and (4) are results based on a 10-year time span for external costs.

Appendices

NOT FOR PUBLICATION: ONLINE MATERIALS

Figure 1: New Vehicle Sales in China and Vehicle Stocks in Beijing and Shanghai



Notes: The top panel depicts annual sales of new passenger vehicles in China and the U.S. from 2001 to 2013. The bottom panel shows the vehicle stock of passenger vehicles in Beijing and Shanghai from 2003 to 2013.

Figure 2: Monthly Vehicle Sales and Number of licenses in Beijing and Shanghai




Table 1: City Characteristics in Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin

Year	City	No. of Households (mil.)	Average Household Income (in Yuan)	New vehicle Sales	National Vehicle Sales(mil.)	% in nation
2008	Beijing	605.99	69,230	419,703	6.76	6.21
2009	Beijing	636.29	74,866	610,076	10.33	5.91
2010	Beijing	668.10	81,404	815,211	13.76	5.93
2011	Beijing	687.86	88,838	346,207	14.47	2.39
2012	Beijing	704.89	98,466	536,216	15.50	3.46
2008	Nanjing	224.68	62,431	83,459	6.76	1.24
2009	Nanjing	230.84	68,861	131,316	10.33	1.27
2010	Nanjing	237.00	76,442	177,105	13.76	1.29
2011	Nanjing	240.08	86,940	166,770	14.47	1.15
2012	Nanjing	241.62	98,069	187,194	15.50	1.21
2008	Shanghai	774.12	79,225	169,678	6.76	2.51
2009	Shanghai	799.21	84,495	212,139	10.33	2.05
2010	Shanghai	825.10	92,330	268,507	13.76	1.95
2011	Shanghai	841.23	105,067	284,693	14.47	1.97
2012	Shanghai	853.06	116,545	303,095	15.50	1.96
2008	Tianjin	347.88	56,131	160,221	6.76	2.37
2009	Tianjin	356.92	61,737	223,774	10.33	2.17
2010	Tianjin	366.20	69,477	276,716	13.76	2.01
2011	Tianjin	383.35	76,455	278,336	14.47	1.92
2012	Tianjin	399.92	84,138	292,442	15.50	1.89

Notes: The sales data are from R.L. Polk & CO. and other variables are from various issues of Annual Social and Economic Development Report by each of the cities. The average income is nominal. New vehicle sales include passenger cars and light trucks.

Table 2: The Share of Households by Income among Vehicle Buyers and All Households

City	Annual Household Income (in Yuan)				New Vehicle buyers				All Households						
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Beijing	Under 48k	14.24	18.93	14.92	11.8	7.89	26.69	18.24	12.35	9.34	6.7				
Beijing	48k to 96k	34.71	30.73	31.11	26.15	23.67	59.82	63.3	62.68	61.67	60.03				
Beijing	96k to 144k	30.73	32.71	32.82	34.47	36.51	9.63	13.64	19.41	20.15	18.93				
Beijing	Over 144k	20.3	17.63	21.16	27.59	31.92	3.86	4.82	5.56	8.84	14.34				
Nanjing	Under 48k	15.72	10.16	5.87	6.92	1.4	40.6	37.07	30.56	12.96	7.83				
Nanjing	48k to 96k	36.75	36.57	26.08	34.15	14.16	46.39	44.55	45.26	55.32	48.46				
Nanjing	96k to 144k	28.21	36.59	40.05	33.25	49.76	9.27	13.18	17.11	22.87	31.98				
Nanjing	Over 144k	19.33	16.68	27.99	25.68	34.66	3.74	5.21	7.07	8.84	11.73				
Shanghai	Under 48k	2.03	4.56	1.54	1.11	0.91	23.96	13.42	9.53	6.69	5				
Shanghai	48k to 96k	7.86	11.82	8.79	8.94	5.9	51.67	60.21	59.02	47.93	42.42				
Shanghai	96k to 144k	43.78	40.44	33.84	34.11	18.76	16.58	17.16	19.88	29	29.33				
Shanghai	Over 144k	46.34	43.19	55.83	55.83	74.44	7.79	9.22	11.57	16.38	23.26				
Tianjin	Under 48k	15.88	21.69	20.37	10.35	4.81	49.25	36.09	28.08	17.42	10.04				
Tianjin	48k to 96k	41.78	42.35	39.45	37.55	22.87	42.49	54.31	57.9	60.95	60.51				
Tianjin	96k to 144k	27.62	25.45	30.43	36.45	52.13	6.11	7.01	10.04	16.6	23.02				
Tianjin	Over 144k	14.74	10.51	9.74	15.64	20.17	2.14	2.6	3.97	5.03	6.42				

Notes: The income data for vehicle buyers come from national representative surveys on new vehicle buyers by Ford Motor Company. The data on all households are from Annual Statistical Yearbook for each city by Bureau of Statistics.

Table 3: Sales Impacts of the Lottery Policy in Beijing

Variables	Specification 1		Specification 2		Specification 3	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Ln(price+bid)	-3.213	0.174	-3.229	0.1744	-3.229	0.175
Lottery in 2011	-0.938	0.116	-0.787	0.122	-0.803	0.046
Lottery in 2012	-0.730	0.213	-0.543	0.2216	-0.547	0.046
Vintage-model fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year-month fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Shanghai * year-month effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
City-segment fixed effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
City trend (quadratic)	Yes		Yes		No	

Notes: The dependent variable is ln(market shares). Specifications 1 use all the 84,912 observations from 2008 to 2012. Specifications 2 and 3 drop the last two months in 2010 and first two months of 2011 for Beijing to remove anticipation effect. The standard errors are clustered at the model level.