

The Costs of Housing Regulation: Evidence from Generative Regulatory Measurement

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Abstract

We introduce “generative regulatory measurement,” using Large Language Models to interpret administrative documents with 96% accuracy in binary classification and 0.87 correlation for continuous questions. Our analysis of U.S. zoning regulations reveals four facts: (1) Housing regulations are multidimensional with two main principal components. (2) The first principal component represents *value capture* in high housing demand areas. (3) The second principal component associates with *exclusionary zoning*, increasing housing costs and socioeconomic exclusion. (4) Zoning follows a monocentric pattern with regional variations and is especially strict in Northeast suburbs. We develop a model of municipal regulatory choice consistent with these facts.

JEL-Classification: R52, R31, H73, D78, C55, C81

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1 Introduction

Housing regulations govern the built environment of American cities, dictating the form and extent of residential development and housing affordability (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018; Gyourko et al., 2008). The influence of zoning laws and land use policies extends far beyond the real estate market, with implications for segregation, economic mobility, the environment, urban agglomeration, and construction sector productivity (Gyourko and Molloy, 2015; Kahn, 2000; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019; D’Amico et al., 2023). Despite their importance, accurately measuring housing regulations remains a challenge due to the complexity and variety of municipal ordinances. These measurement gaps hinder our ability to understand housing regulation’s drivers and impacts.

Our paper argues that advances in Large language Models (LLMs) enable scalable and accurate classification of regulatory documents, a task that we refer to as *generative regulatory measurement*. We obtain municipal codes for 63% of the population covered by municipal zoning ordinances, and develop an LLM-powered algorithm to estimate housing regulation using these documents. Our approach builds on the Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) architecture, adding prompt-engineering, prompt chaining, and detailed background information on zoning. We apply this methodology to a set of regulatory questions initially developed by the Pioneer Institute for Massachusetts (Glaeser and Ward, 2009), and benchmark our LLM-generated regulatory categorizations against human-coded measurements from this same study.

Our results indicate that LLMs have achieved near-human rates of precision in classifying regulation, with an accuracy rate of 96% for binary questions and a correlation of 0.87 with the correct answer for continuous questions. We manually verify a subset of housing regulations in California to ensure that our results are not geographically biased. We also expand the original Pioneer classification by incorporating additional questions on housing process regulations, and verify high accuracy on this new set of measures. We use the resulting dataset on national housing regulations to establish four key facts about housing regulation.

First, housing regulation is multidimensional, and the variation is not well summarized by a single dimension measuring regulatory stringency. This contrasts with prior analysis which has largely focused on a unidimensional distinction between regions with stricter or less strict land use regulation (Gyourko et al., 2021). Using

a variety of statistical tests, we find that the first two principal components of our regulatory questions explain the bulk of the systematic variation across regulations, with the remainder due to a long tail of idiosyncratic factors.

Second, we argue that the first principal component can be interpreted as capturing the extent to which the municipality is engaging in value capture. This component is associated with high prices and high construction, suggesting regulations that allow development but exact value in high-demand environments. Consistent with this interpretation, this component loads heavily on regulations that allow local governments to extract and redistribute housing surplus, such as inclusionary zoning mandates that require developers to include affordable units. These regulations are typically found in densely populated, centrally located cities that tend to support Democratic political candidates. These regulations are higher in areas with higher amenities—as measured in terms of consumption (retail establishments), natural amenities (such as good weather or proximity to bodies of water), and productive spillovers (patents per capita and job density). The strong correlation with diverse amenity measures suggests these regulations emerge precisely in locations with the most valuable land and highest development potential. Rather than completely blocking all development, these regulations impose implicit taxes on new construction for the purposes of redistribution and funding local public goods.

Third, we connect the second principal component to exclusionary zoning practices aimed at limiting density and affordable housing options. This component associates with high prices but low construction, indicating regulations that restrict housing supply. This dimension loads heavily on bulk regulations, such as minimum lot size requirements, as well as procedural barriers to development. Among single-family zoned areas in municipalities across the country, 66% have town-wide minimum lot size requirements above 5,000 square feet, 17% of requirements are above 10,000 square feet, and 7% have requirements exceeding half an acre. These tools are particularly prevalent in affluent, predominantly white suburban areas that tend to lean Republican relative to other areas in their metropolitan area. We find a strong association between these regulatory measures and indicators of local school performance and social mobility, suggesting a role for educational sorting. Unlike value capture regulations that allow for development with conditions, these exclusionary practices directly left-truncate the housing distribution through regulations that effectively require households to consume a minimum quantity of housing. These regulations

intensify economic and racial segregation by effectively pricing out lower-income and minority households from neighborhoods with desirable public goods, particularly high-performing schools.

Fourth and finally, we find that housing regulation varies within metropolitan areas in ways that are broadly consistent with a monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1971). As standard monocentric city models predict, denser building is generally allowed in city centers, with stricter bulk regulations and lower density requirements found in inner-ring suburbs. However, we also observe substantial sorting of high-income households into expensive suburbs with higher minimum size requirements. This is in contrast to the most basic models in which all households, regardless of income, are assumed to prefer central locations to minimize commuting costs. Our findings suggest a more complicated spatial pattern, with some peripheral suburban locations able to maintain high prices and a high share of affluent households through stricter zoning. This pattern is particularly pronounced in the Northeast, which has substantially more onerous bulk regulation requirements than other regions of the country. This pattern is driven by the fact that low-density areas around historic industrial centers in the Northeast (and to a lesser extent the Midwest) adopted disproportionately strict bulk regulations. We suggest possible drivers for this result, such as regulatory mitigations against pollutants and social exclusionary factors against workers in industrial hubs.

We develop a model of inter-municipal competition to interpret these facts. In the model, local governments strategically and non-cooperatively select between two sets of housing regulations: one associated with value capture and the other with exclusionary zoning through the imposition of minimum housing requirements. Our framework builds on a literature examining Tiebout sorting and local goods provision (Tiebout, 1956; Epple and Zelenitz, 1981), as well as theories of zoning focused on housing sorting across public goods regimes (Fischel, 1987; Brueckner, 1995; Hamilton, 1975), but generates distinct predictions about regulatory behavior that are consistent with our empirical results.

The model predicts that metropolitan cores with high amenities will implement value capture regulations. These regulations act as implicit taxes on housing development (similar to rent-seeking behavior in other municipal contexts as in Diamond (2017)), with the seized housing surplus redistributed to residents in the form of public goods provisioning. In contrast, the model predicts that suburban areas will adopt

exclusionary regulations to generate more tax revenue from a concentrated pool of affluent households. Exclusionary zoning is less attractive to municipalities that are too large to be filled primarily with the most affluent households. This leads to a spatial equilibrium in which suburbs are home to higher-income residents, while poorer households concentrate in urban areas.

Our paper makes four primary contributions to the literature. First, our key methodological contribution lies in developing a general-purpose approach to measure the content of regulatory documents and quantify the accuracy and reliability of the resulting classifications. A long-standing literature has used text analysis to extract measures of sentiment from firm or policymaker communications (Romer and Romer, 2004; Tetlock, 2007; Hassan et al., 2019; Lopez-Lira and Tang, 2023). More recently, researchers have begun to use LLMs to collect more detailed data from literary, financial, regulatory, and legal documents (Dell, 2025; Giesecke, 2023; Lagakos et al., 2025; Jha et al., 2023; Yang, 2023; Bybee, 2023; Hansen and Kazinnik, 2023; Hoffman and Arbel, 2023). However, existing research on AI models emphasizes both their promise in analyzing textual data (Zhao et al., 2023), as well as challenges with undesirable AI features such as “hallucination” and manufactured model output (Azamfirei et al., 2023). We show that when coupled with careful text selection, prompting, and background information, LLMs can be used to parse complicated regulatory documents with high fidelity.

In addition to high accuracy rates, our approach offers several other advantages. It provides unprecedented scalability at low cost: we successfully apply our regulatory classification measure across thousands of municipalities, a task that would be expensive and time-consuming for human analysts. Our approach also ensures verifiability and auditability by prompting the LLM to provide specific supporting text from the regulatory documents, enabling independent verification of classifications. Finally, our approach is highly adaptable, allowing researchers to easily incorporate changes in regulatory interpretations or advancements in AI models, facilitating replication and refinement of measurements over time. The broad applicability of our approach extends to various domains where textual analysis is crucial, including building codes, tax regulations, legal cases, financial reports, newspapers, and other uses. This versatility is particularly valuable as the volume and complexity of regulations continue to increase (Singla, 2023).

Our second contribution is the production of a novel dataset on housing regulation

across the United States. Survey-based approaches to measuring zoning regulations nationally, such as the Wharton Regulatory Index (Gyourko et al., 2008, 2021; Huang and Tang, 2012), offer broad coverage on housing regulations, but are limited by low and potentially biased response rates, fixed questionnaires, and inaccuracy by respondents (Lewis and Marantz (2019)). Another approach imputes zoning regulations using wedge-based approaches that measure the expected spatial macroeconomic distortions resulting from zoning (see Turner et al. (2014), Hsieh and Moretti (2019), Glaeser et al. (2005), Herkenhoff et al. (2018), Babalievsky et al. (2021), and Durranton and Puga (2019)), references to zoning regulations in court cases (Ganong and Shoag (2017)), or newspaper articles (Stacy et al. (2023)). These imputation approaches provide insights on the general importance of zoning regulations, but are more limited in determining which regulations matter or bind. Another branch of the literature conducts more detailed analysis of regulations at the local level, sacrificing generalizability for more granularity (see e.g. Quigley and Raphael (2005), Ihlanfeldt (2007), Glaeser and Ward (2009), Jackson (2016), Shanks (2021)).

Existing research therefore leaves significant gaps in our understanding of their measurement and impacts. Our approach provides detailed measures of zoning regulations for over 5,800 municipalities, more than twice as many municipalities as previous national studies such as the Wharton Regulatory Index, while providing as much granularity as local studies such as the Pioneer Institute study.¹

Third, our key economic contribution is to exploit these rich data to provide a more nuanced portrait of zoning regulations than was previously possible, showing that zoning regulations are not well-summarized by one dimensional indices of stringency and that municipalities enact disparate regulatory regimes that vary dramatically across space depending on municipal circumstances. Previous research has often either focused on analysis of individual regulations (Gyourko and McCulloch, 2023; Cui, 2024) or has focused on uni-dimensional indices of regulatory stringency (Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2007; Gyourko et al., 2008; Glaeser and Ward, 2009; Jackson, 2016).² Rather than relying on aggregate indices or indirect measures, we

¹Mleczko and Desmond (2023) use a non-LLM natural language processing (NLP) approach to measure a set of zoning regulations for municipalities covered by the Wharton Regulatory Index (Gyourko et al., 2008), about 2600 in total, less than half the size of our sample. Their approach requires more manual input than ours, reducing its scalability, and the accuracy level is unclear because they do not compare their measures to a test dataset not used in training.

²One notable exception is Mayer and Somerville (2000) which classifies regulations based on whether they add costs, delays, or uncertainty and measure the extent to which these three indices

directly measure specific provisions, allowing us to distinguish between value capture tools in urban cores (like inclusionary zoning mandates) and exclusionary practices in suburbs (like minimum lot size requirements). The size and coverage of our data allow us to explore how these distinct regulatory approaches vary within metropolitan areas: high demand urban areas use value extraction regulations to extract some of the surplus generated by high amenities, while suburban regulations maintain exclusivity through density restrictions.

Fourth, our theory contribution is to develop a model of non-cooperative regulation choice by local governments who have access to multiple zoning instruments to explain the zoning patterns we observed in our data. This model shows that large, high amenity municipalities will be more likely to choose extractive zoning regulations, while small, outlying municipalities, with lower amenities will be more likely to choose exclusionary regulations. These predictions help unite disparate aspects of the theoretical literature on zoning, which has discussed how zoning regulations can be used to create efficient public goods provision and sorting (Tiebout, 1956; Fischel, 1987; Hamilton, 1975, 1976), lead to segregation (Rothstein, 2017; Cui, 2024), and function as distortionary taxes (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986).

2 Construction of National Database

In this section, we describe the institutional background and data sources on municipal zoning codes, describe our approach to generative regulatory measurement in classifying these codes at scale, provide evidence on the accuracy of our approach, and discuss the scalability and replicability of our method.

2.1 Institutional Background and Data

In the United States, local governments are “creatures of the state” subordinate to state control. Municipal corporations, which include cities, towns, villages, and other local government units, are authorized by state law to organize and function as local governing bodies. This concept largely overlaps with the Census definition of “incorporated place”, which we use to organize our analysis.³ In most states, one of

of regulation have affected new construction using a panel dataset for 44 metro areas.

³In several states the “township” form of government also has jurisdiction in zoning which aligns with the Census County Subdivision definition.

the powers granted to municipalities by the state government is control over local zoning decisions; indeed, the desire to control local zoning is a primary motive for incorporation.

Zoning, broadly, consists of two key sets of regulations: land use regulations, which partition local land into distinct use classes, and bulk regulations, which regulate the physical dimensions and density of buildings in different land use classes. Examples of bulk regulations include: minimum lot sizes (specifying the smallest allowed area for a buildable lot), lot coverage requirements, front and side setbacks (mandating minimum distances buildings must be from property lines), height restrictions, and floor area ratio caps (regulating total floor area relative to lot size). Zoning codes also specify the process through which development is approved, such as whether development can be done by right and which governing bodies must approve developments. These regulations combine to regulate how densely areas can be developed, the size and spacing of buildings, the overall built form of neighborhoods, and the process through which construction is approved. Other mandates and requirements, such as parking minimums, further constrain both commercial and residential development.⁴

Municipalities enforce laws by issuing municipal codes which outline local regulation in different domains. Some regulations apply to all land within a jurisdiction; other regulations (such as minimum lot sizes) typically vary depending on the specific use class and district (i.e., single-family zoning, commonly referred to as R-1, or commercial or industrial). These ordinances are updated over time to reflect changes in local regulations and often aggregated by different companies online.

We source the text of municipal codes from a variety of municipal aggregators, including American Legal Publishing, Municode, and [Ordinance.com](https://www.ordinance.com). These municipal aggregators post municipal codes and other information on local governments, often at the behest of the local government to fulfill public posting requirements. Table 1 illustrates the breadth of our sample coverage. In total, we cover 25% of all municipalities in the U.S. and 6% of all townships. This coverage is skewed to larger cities; of the 76% of the population in the U.S. that live in either a municipality or a township, we have relevant municipal documents for 63% of the population. Panel B shows our underlying sources for the ordinances in our sample. American Legal Publishing provides significant numbers of records in the Northeast and Mid-

⁴States and municipalities also enact building codes, which govern the building and safety standards that new construction needs to adhere to.

west, Municode provides especially good coverage in the South and the Midwest, and [Ordinance.com](#) provides substantial coverage of the West and Northeast.⁵

We combine data on these municipal ordinances with a variety of municipal level demographic, housing, and economic information such as building permits data from the Census Building Permits Survey, rent and home price data from the American Community Survey (ACS), and other sources. We describe the data sources we use in greater detail in Table A1.

2.2 Processing Municipal Codes Using LLMs

In this subsection, we outline the general process we use to generate our housing regulatory dataset, a process we refer to as generative regulatory measurement. Figure 1 also illustrates the overall approach.

The first step of our process is to download the sources of municipal codes listed in Table 1. We collected these ordinances throughout Fall 2023, providing us a snapshot of zoning ordinances at that time. The lengths of many ordinances exceed the context windows usable by current LLMs⁶ (see Appendix Figure A2 for a histogram of token length across our entire sample compared with the maximum token length for various LLMs). As a result, it is either impossible or cost-prohibitive to simply upload the entirety of municipal code documents into standard LLM services and ask our questions directly. Moreover, LLM performance significantly declines with context length (Modarressi et al., 2025).

To address this challenge, our second step is to use a standard framework in computer science known as “retrieval-augmented generation” (RAG) (Lewis et al., 2020). The basic objective of this approach is to combine a large pre-trained language model with external information retrieval, in order to give the LLM the ability to “look up” information from a vast corpus of text during the generation process. We describe in subsection 2.5 the accuracy and cost implications of this choice.

In order to implement RAG, we first partition each ordinance into small chunks of text taking into account the hierarchical section structure of the ordinance.⁷ Next,

⁵When a municipality hosts its ordinance on multiple aggregators, we prioritize Ordinance.com, and then Municode over American Legal Publishing.

⁶Several large cities exceed the maximum commercial model limit of 2 million tokens: for example, New York City (17.1 million), Detroit (4.3 million), and Atlanta (3.6 million).

⁷We further split or combine sibling sections so that their length ranges between 50 and 1,000 tokens of text. One token is roughly 3/4 of a word.

we map each chunk of text into a vector representation called an embedding. Embeddings are vector representations of text trained to minimize the distance between semantically similar content, allowing efficient comparison of text meaning (Reimers and Gurevych, 2019). We vectorize each subsection of the ordinance document using the OpenAI ‘text-embedding-3-large’ algorithm.

The third step in our process is to prepare a set of questions that we want to ask of our sample. We begin with the question base already used by the Pioneer Institute (i.e., “Is multifamily zoning allowed in this area as-of-right?”). We add to these questions four additional questions about the process determining construction permitting and approvals. In the initial step of our process, we simply use the text of the questions verbatim as first posed by the Pioneer Institute (or the first draft of the additional process question). The text of the questions is also run through an embedding process to generate its own vector representation.

The fourth step of our process is to identify the most likely relevant information from the ordinance to show the LLM. We use cosine similarity, a standard measure of vector distance, to rank each text chunk by proximity to the question. We next rerank using a cross-encoder on the top 50 chunks of text, which is a more powerful model for calculating the similarity between two pieces of text (Anthropic, 2024).⁸ We then select the top 4,000 tokens (~3,000 words) worth of text chunks, since LLM performance significantly degrades beyond this length (Modarressi et al., 2025).

The fifth step in the process is to send the LLM the query, which consists of the zoning question, the 4,000 tokens worth of text chunks, and a system prompt. The system prompt guides the LLM to provide an open-ended argument followed by a parsable answer (i.e., “Yes” or “No”). The open-ended answer allows for humans to audit the reasoning path of the LLM and has been shown to increase performance by providing space for the LLM to think out loud (Zhang et al., 2022).

These five initial steps are sufficient to produce an answer to each regulatory question sourced from municipal documents. However, they are not necessarily very accurate. As a result, we followed a data-driven process to iterate and improve the accuracy of our approach. We used three distinct strategies which we describe in more detail below: prompt chaining, prompt engineering, and providing detailed question background information. To avoid overfitting, we conducted all such training on a

⁸We use the Cohere reranking model for this step. For some questions, when double-checking the answer we instead use keyword inclusion to rerank.

distinct subsample of the Pioneer data, and then performed our final validity checks only once on a leave-out sample of the Pioneer data.

The first strategy is prompt chaining, which breaks down LLM queries into multiple steps (prompts) where the output from one prompt is used as input in the next.⁹ For instance, when asking about the largest frontage requirement for all single-family residential districts, we first ask the LLM to name all districts which allow single-family housing. We do this as a separate step because the relevant text defining allowable uses in a district and the text defining frontage requirements for districts are typically in different sections of the ordinance with distant embedding vectors. Additionally, LLM performance is enhanced when it is only required to answer a direct single step question in each call (Khot et al., 2023). Another use of prompt chaining is through the post-processing of certain questions, which functions to double-check answers. For instance, the answer “Yes” to a question about whether townhouses/attached housing is allowed typically means the LLM has found affirmative evidence that such housing typologies are allowed, while an answer of “No” signifies either a lack of approval, or a lack of sufficient context for the LLM to answer the question. In such cases where an answer could indicate lack of information, we reprompt the LLM and directly use keywords like “townhouse” or “attached” to refine and rerank our search (instead of the reranking algorithm).

A second strategy of model improvement is to generate additional background information to provide to the LLM. The background information and model assumptions were initialized based on the Pioneer study (their “Issue Overview” and “Research Coding” sections for each question) when possible and were LLM generated otherwise. We manually refined this background information to address areas of misinterpretation by investigating cases in which regulations were misclassified. Appendix C contains an example of an original Pioneer question, our rephrased question, as well as the additional background information and assumptions provided for that question.

The third dimension of improvements comes from prompt engineering. In the “system prompt” we instruct the LLM to think “step by step” to induce chain of thought reasoning (Zhang et al., 2022)¹⁰. Additionally, we rephrase the questions from the original wording provided by the Pioneer Institute in order to produce a

⁹See [Anthropic Prompt Chaining Guide](#) for further details on prompt chaining, as well as [Wu et al. \(2022\)](#).

¹⁰See Appendix Section C for exact system prompts for each type of question.

more simplified version which is easier for the LLM to parse. This primarily consists of breaking down compound questions.

2.3 Simple Example to Illustrate Approach

To illustrate our process more concretely, we go through our procedure for one question in our sample in Arlington, Massachusetts on the presence of inclusionary zoning mandates or incentives. In this case, the question used by the Pioneer Institute was sufficiently concise and clear that we did not need to modify it. This question reads:

Question: Does the zoning bylaw/ordinance include any mandates or incentives for development of affordable units?

Figure 2 visualizes the context retrieval process. Each dot represents one chunk of text and is colored by its broader article in the ordinance. Reassuringly, in Panel A we find that chunks within the same article cluster together, which suggests that embeddings are picking up on the underlying meaning of the text. The black star in the upper right quadrant represents the embedding for the question itself. RAG selects the chunks of text closest to the question in embedding space to provide to the cross-encoder reranker. In Panel B, we confirm that the most relevant sections on affordable housing are indeed selected.

We provide these chunks of text, our system prompt described above, along with the question shown above, and additional pieces of background information and assumptions to whichever LLM model that we’re using. In this case, the background information and assumptions given to the model are as follows:

Background Information: Inclusionary zoning requires or encourages developers to include affordable dwelling units within new developments of market rate homes. Some municipalities call it “incentive zoning” ...

Assumptions: Do not include provisions for entirely affordable, subsidized housing development by public or non-profit corporations. Also do

not include provisions under “rate of development” headings that exempt affordable units from project phasing and growth caps.

By providing relevant text and guidance to the LLM, we receive a final classification along with references for the source of this information:

GPT-4 Turbo Output: The zoning bylaw/ordinance provided does indeed include mandates and incentives for the development of affordable units. Here’s a breakdown of the evidence supporting this conclusion:

1. ****Mandates for Affordable Housing Development**:** The ordinance mandates that 15% of the residential units in new projects be affordable units (Section 11.08, Part_1, d. REQUIREMENTS, 1.). This requirement applies to all new residential projects, including phased or segmented developments, with six or more units subject to Environmental Design Review (Section 11.08, Part_1, b. APPLICATION). The affordable units must conform to specific affordability criteria, ensuring they are accessible to households earning no more than 60% of the median income for rental units and no more than 70% of the median income for homeownership units (Section 11.08, Part_1, c. DEFINITIONS)...*(rest of answer omitted for brevity)*

In this case, the model’s output matches the Pioneer Institute classification of inclusionary zoning in Arlington, MA.

2.4 Model Validation with Pioneer Data

A critical step in assessing the performance of LLM-based approaches lies in comparing model-generated classifications against a ground truth benchmark. The Pioneer dataset serves as an excellent starting point for our purposes, as previously mentioned, due to the expert classification of a large number of municipalities. The main drawback in using this dataset is the staleness of responses—with responses categorized as of 2004. Additionally, the Pioneer Institute relied on some outside information (i.e., directly contacting local regulatory bodies) in addition to municipal ordinance text.

To address these issues, we construct a hold-out testing dataset based on 30 randomly chosen municipalities from the Pioneer Institute dataset. We also recode these municipalities to 1) exclude question responses which relied on outside context, and 2) hand-correct inaccuracies in the original classification.¹¹

Table 2 shows the performance results of our baseline GPT-4 Turbo model against the testing sample in Massachusetts. Among continuous questions (Panel A), our generated answers have an average correlation of 0.87 with the ground truth of expert classifications, after winsorization of our results at the 1% level. These results suggest we are able to reach high model performance when matching against continuous numerical outcomes. We also find high model accuracy when measuring binary questions (i.e., those with a yes or no answer like whether “multi-family housing is allowed” which we measure perfectly across all municipalities). As shown in Panel B of Table 2, we observe a model accuracy of 96% across all binary questions. Because the raw accuracy measure may be biased depending on the base rate of answers, we also provide a Relative Squared Error (RSE) that compares each model result to a naive model which guesses the sample mode. We observe quite small RSEs as well.

2.5 Sources of Model Improvements

In this section, we provide a detailed decomposition of how each training step contributes to accuracy. We do so to provide intuition, identify the most crucial training steps, and to show robustness. We run each model five times to calculate the mean and standard deviation of accuracy for each specification. The results of this investigation are shown in Table 3. The first two columns report the mean and standard deviation of our accuracy measures, while the third and fourth columns report the mean and standard deviation of the “I don’t know” rate.

The first choice we face is whether to use RAG models at all or not. Because the municipalities that make up our core validation sample in Massachusetts are shorter on average, we are able to compare the accuracy of specifications with and without RAG in Table 3. Here, we use Gemini Flash 1.5, a long context window model.¹²

¹¹Due to the time-intensive nature of the expert correction step, we only check responses in which our LLM approach disagrees with the Pioneer Institute classification.

¹²Gemini Flash 1.5 has a context window of one million tokens, or roughly 750k words. The primary model we use in our analysis, GPT-4 Turbo only has a context window of 128k tokens or 96k words, which is too short even for many of the relatively shorter Massachusetts codes we use for validation.

We test three specifications: Full RAG, Basic RAG, and No-RAG. Full RAG follows our main specification, while basic RAG uses a smaller, less powerful, embedding model¹³ and does not use reranking. No-RAG provides the entire ordinance to the LLM as context. For each specification we only provide the question and ordinance text to the LLM, omitting any of our refinements like prompt chaining or background information.

Ex-ante it is unclear whether using RAG will improve performance. Because RAG only provides a subset of the overall ordinance to the LLM, it may omit some critical information. On the other hand, without RAG the LLM may struggle to interpret the critical sections of text correctly as performance degrades with input size (Modarressi et al., 2025). In our environment, we find that RAG approaches demonstrate improved overall performance for both continuous questions (Table 3 Panel A) and binary questions (Panel B). For continuous questions, we observe a dramatic reduction in “I don’t know” responses when implementing RAG (dropping from 38.7% with No-RAG to 12.9% with full RAG, with particularly strong improvements from basic to full RAG). Continuous questions typically involve information that is localized to specific sections of the ordinance, such as in tables. In our setting, therefore, we conclude that refinements to RAG, such as re-ranking and the size of the embedding model, meaningfully improve retrieval (Anthropic, 2024); and that the benefits from smaller context windows outweigh the costs of possible information omission. These findings, combined with RAG’s feasibility benefits and cost advantages, justify our choice to use RAG for the remainder of the paper.

Next, we examine the impact of iteratively layering the prompting strategies discussed in subsection 2.2. For this analysis, we switch to our primary model, GPT-4 Turbo, and use full RAG throughout. We start with a “no prompting” specification that simply feeds the questions as originally phrased by the Pioneer Institute along with the context, achieving a correlation of 0.72 for continuous questions and an accuracy rate of 83.5% for binary questions. We then layer in additional prompting strategies: first adding prompt engineering, then incorporating background information, and finally implementing prompt chaining. For binary questions, incorporating background information yields the largest improvement (from 86.0% to 93.9%), while for continuous questions, prompt chaining provides the biggest boost (increasing correlation from 0.73 to 0.87). Our main specification, which uses prompt chaining,

¹³Specifically, we use `multi-qa-mpnet-base-dot-v1`.

reaches 0.87 correlation for continuous questions and 96.7% accuracy for binary questions.

In Table A2, we disaggregate these results to examine how different prompting strategies affect each question. The impact varies substantially across questions. Some questions, like those about flexible zoning, achieve high accuracy even without prompting. Others show marked improvements from specific strategies—wetland restrictions in lot size calculations sees substantial gains from prompt engineering alone, while questions about affordable housing incentives benefit from both rephrasing and background information. For questions like longest frontage requirements, where relevant information often appears in semantically distant parts of the ordinance, prompt chaining yields the largest improvements (correlation increasing from 0.46 to 0.70).

The key takeaway from our approach towards generative regulatory parsing is that, at least with models available at the time of writing, model accuracy improves substantially above simple “zero shot learning” examples given additional human input. We provide substantial human input in the areas of prompt engineering and providing background information, which helps to direct the LLM on the relevant focus of the text. Additionally, we design a multi-step reasoning chain for each question to simplify the tasks required by the LLM in each sub-step. Such additional human processing is likely necessary in other contexts as well, at least until further advances in LLMs are made.

2.6 Understanding Model Errors

To better diagnose reasons for model error in our baseline approach, in Figure A4 we provide a complete decomposition of all of the reasons for disagreement between GPT-4 Turbo and the original Pioneer Study on binary questions in our testing sample. We categorize disagreements into whether the Pioneer study was itself outdated or inaccurate, the LLM was incorrect, or the answer is ambiguous. While ideally municipal regulations would identify a clear and unambiguous answer, we observe differences even among legal experts hired for the task of hand-classifying regulations. Finally, we further divide cases where the LLM was incorrect into those which it missed the relevant text chunks and those which it misinterpreted the context.

Largely, answers from the Pioneer Institute that our model did not match were due to changes in the underlying ordinance since the Pioneer Institute study roughly

20 years ago. LLMs missed the relevant text chunks in two cases, while in four cases the answer itself was ambiguous. The most important category for our purposes is cases in which the LLM misinterpreted the context—this happens in nine cases, most often with respect to whether townhouses are allowed and with permit caps or phrasing. Six questions do not exhibit this type of error at all. When considered over a large sample, these results appear promising in suggesting that errors are typically quite rare.

Importantly, the errors also appear balanced across false positives and false negatives. Appendix Table A3 provides a confusion matrix comparing our baseline GPT-4 Turbo model against the Pioneer classifications, separating true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives. Our errors are equally represented among false positives and false negatives, suggesting no obvious bias in our classification.

2.7 Additional Validation Checks Beyond the Pioneer Sample

Additional Hand Validation: To assess accuracy outside the Pioneer study Massachusetts sample, we conducted additional manual validation. First, we reviewed four process questions on a nationwide random sample of 30 municipalities (Panel A of Table A4). This component also enables us to augment the initial Pioneer set of questions to incorporate additional regulatory questions related to housing process. After removing ambiguous cases, the model achieved accuracy rates ranging from 89% to 100% across these questions. Second, we assessed accuracy on bulk zoning regulations by randomly selecting 30 municipalities in California (Panel B of Table A4). After dropping ambiguous cases—such as zoning rules that varied between interior and corner lots—the model achieved 89% accuracy for both measures. These results suggest that the model generalizes well beyond the Massachusetts-based training data, performing reliably across diverse regulatory contexts.

Comparison Against WRLURI: We next compare our analysis to another commonly used dataset of national housing regulation: the WRLURI from Gyourko et al. (2021); we describe this contrast in more detail in Appendix D. The key takeaways from this investigation are that our approach improves on WRLURI in both coverage and accuracy. Additionally, our indices consist of only hard regulations, while WRLURI also incorporates housing market outcomes.

2.8 Scalability and Replicability of LLM Regulatory Analysis

While LLMs hold promise for regulatory analysis based on accuracy, their key advantage lies in scalability and cost-effectiveness. Appendix Figure A3 reports the cost comparison between human analysis and two LLM-based approaches: one using RAG and another without RAG. The RAG-based approach becomes more cost-effective than the human-based analysis at larger scales, while the No-RAG approach exhibits a cost structure more similar to human analysis. Human-based analysis shows a linear cost increase as the number of municipalities grows. The RAG approach has a higher setup cost, but better scalability. The cost curves for RAG and human analysis intersect at approximately 300 municipalities, beyond which the RAG method becomes increasingly more cost-effective. While both LLM-based approaches require similar setup costs, the No-RAG method’s heavy token usage results in steeper cost scaling, making it less advantageous for large-scale analysis compared to the RAG approach.

Another consideration in adopting LLM-based approaches for regulatory analysis is the replicability of results. We explore techniques to reduce the stochasticity of LLM responses including setting a random seed, lowering the temperature (a measure of LLM randomness), and ensembling (aggregating responses from multiple LLM responses). In short, we find that no strategy provides full replicability and conclude that using a low temperature single-shot (no ensembling) approach is optimal to create an easily interpretable dataset that retains high levels of replicability. See Appendix Section B for complete details on the replicability of our approach.

3 Characterizing Housing Regulations

In this section, we summarize our housing regulations dataset and examine regulatory patterns within metropolitan areas and across municipalities. This analysis reveals insights into both the drivers and impacts of different zoning approaches.

3.1 Principal Component Analysis

Our nationwide dataset consists of 20 questions and covers nearly 6,000 local governments. To provide context for our analysis of regulatory dimensions, Table 4 presents the key descriptive statistics for our nationwide housing regulation dataset. The continuous measures in Panel A reveal substantial variation in regulatory scope and

complexity across municipalities. The average municipality has 14 zoning districts, showing considerable regulatory sophistication. Bulk regulations are frequently stringent, with lowest minimum lot sizes averaging 10 thousand square feet and longest frontage requirements averaging 92 feet—well above typical urban lot dimensions. Process regulations typically involve extended review periods, with maximum potential waiting times averaging around 7 months. Appendix Figure A1 shows that housing process regulations vary substantially across different regions, with particularly onerous requirements in the American West and California in terms of waiting times, public hearings, and mandatory approval steps.

Panel B of Table 4 highlights the prevalence of binary regulatory controls. A notable feature of housing regulations across municipalities is restrictions on housing density: multifamily housing is prohibited in 5% of jurisdictions (rising to 10% in high-income areas), and 86% of municipalities restrict conversions to multifamily units. About 37% ban mixed-use developments combining residential and commercial uses.

We next assess the correlation structure between variables in Appendix Figure A12. The average absolute value correlation between regulations is only 0.08 with near zero correlation between many regulations. For example, minimum lot size requirements have a correlation of 0.01 with flexible zoning policies. Still, there are many regulations that are strongly correlated, especially similar types of regulation (i.e., comparing different bulk regulations). Some correlations have interesting signs; for example, allowing accessory dwelling units (i.e., a less restrictive regulatory environment) is actually positively correlated with the lowest minimum lot size as well as permit caps (which both correspond to a more restrictive regulatory environment). These complicated covariance patterns reflect the diversity of zoning codes created by local governments, and the wide variety of objectives these governments pursue.

To summarize the correlation structure between regulations, we turn to a PCA analysis. We start by assessing how many components capture systematic variation using a variety of statistical tests as outlined in [Peres-Neto et al. \(2005\)](#). First, we compare the eigenvalues¹⁴ for each principal component to those expected under a null hypothesis of no correlation between regulations. Panel A of Figure 3 visualizes this comparison and shows that the first two principal components explain substantially more variation than would occur under the no correlation null hypothesis, with a

¹⁴Each eigenvalue reflects the amount of variation explained by a principal component; dividing it by the sum of all eigenvalues gives the share of total variation explained.

sharp decline in explanatory power for subsequent components. Next, we apply an alternative statistical test, Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial test (Velicer et al., 2000), which suggests selecting the number of principal components that minimize the average residual pairwise correlations. Panel B of Figure 3 shows that two principal components minimize the average squared pairwise correlations and fourth-power correlations. These statistical tests suggest that housing regulations are not well-summarized by a simple unidimensional level of stringency. Rather, two underlying factors capture the bulk of the systematic variation, with the remainder likely driven by a long tail of idiosyncratic factors.

To better understand the economic interpretations behind the two main principal components, and to disentangle the relative roles of demand and supply in housing production, we show in Figure 4 the associations between housing construction (building permits), housing cost (median house prices), and our two key principal components. We interpret the association of these two principal components with housing construction and cost in light of a simple framework of supply and demand for housing. In places with rising demand for housing and inelastic supply, home prices will be high and construction low (the lower-right quadrants of Panels A and B of Figure 4). In areas with rising demand for housing and elastic supply, there will be high house prices and high construction (i.e., the upper right quadrant). In places with falling housing demand, there will be both low construction and prices. In places with elastic housing supplies and constant or moderately rising demand, there will be low home prices and high construction.

Panel A of Figure 4 highlights that areas with a high value for the first principal component generally have high house prices as well as construction, while areas low in this dimension typically have both low prices and construction. This association suggests that the first principal component generally coincides with high housing demand environments. This interpretation is supported by the main regulatory loadings on this principal component (Table 5), which loads heavily on measures that are typically associated with more developed, high-demand housing markets. For instance, affordable housing and age restricted provisions are policy tools that are more likely to be implemented in areas with significant housing pressure and the administrative capacity to manage complex policies. Other associates of the first principal component relate to additional layers of local government: maximum review wait times and public hearing requirements. However, areas heavy in this component are

much less likely to have bans or limits on multifamily housing, townhouses, accessory apartments (ADUs), or flexible zoning.

By contrast, the second principal component (Panel B, Table 5) associates highly with areas that have high house prices but low construction, while being negatively associated with areas that have low prices and high construction. This suggests that while the second principal component is also associated with higher costs, these higher costs appear to be more related to housing supply factors rather than higher housing demand (as appears to be the case with the first principal component).

Figure A5 provides a visual scatterplot representation of the relationship between these two principal components across U.S. municipalities. Suburban areas around high-demand metropolitan areas (such as Darien, CT or Billerica, MA) rank highly on both PCs. High-demand urban areas (like Santa Ana, CA) score low in PC2, but are relatively high in PC1. Low-demand urban areas (like Cleveland, OH) rank low on both PCs. Finally, exclusionary suburbs of low-demand areas (like Novi, MI) rank high in PC2 but low in PC1. Figure A6 maps the first two principal components across the nation.

We summarize the multidimensional nature of zoning codes as our first fact:

Fact 1. *Zoning codes are multidimensional and can be clustered into two main principal components.*

3.2 Value Capture and Housing Markets

We next focus on the economic interpretation of these two principal components. We argue the first principal component can be interpreted as value capture. Value capture in the housing context refers to mechanisms by which local governments extract a portion of the increased land value or housing surplus that arises from high market demand. This typically occurs through regulatory tools that allow municipalities to convert some of the economic gains from private development into public benefits or revenue. As discussed in the previous section, factor loadings reveal that this component associates most strongly with regulatory tools like inclusionary zoning mandates (where developers must include affordable units), affordable housing incentives, and age-related provisions, which are tools that directly extract concessions from developers. Housing process regulations, such as public hearing requirements and waiting times, also reflect additional wedges or distortions which are more feasible in higher

demand environments.

We further support this interpretation by linking this regulatory dimension to its economic associates in Table 6, focusing first on the relationships with county-level amenities. These measures include: an index of retail establishments per capita across industries (constructed by taking the first PC of industry-level establishment counts), a natural amenity index (capturing features like temperature and sunlight hours), patents per capita (measuring productivity), and employment density (job access benefits). We find that the first PC has a large and statistically significant positive relationship with all four measures, while the second PC has either small or statistically insignificant relationships with each. We construct a combined amenity index by taking the first principal component across these four measures and find an even stronger relationship between the combined amenity index and the first PC. These results support a housing demand interpretation of this regulatory regime: areas with higher amenities feature higher housing demand, which generates a surplus that can be captured through regulation.

We explore a more granular comparison across different types of retail establishments in Appendix Figure A7. Counties scoring high on the first PC have higher concentrations of consumer retail outlets (like apparel stores and restaurants) and professional services (including educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and cleaning services) per capita, while having fewer establishments typically associated with negative externalities, such as gas stations, utility services, and truck transportation businesses per capita. This pattern suggests these areas are high-demand locations where businesses can command premium rents (also see Couture et al. (2024)). Appendix Figure A9 shows that the first PC exhibits a high degree of spatial autocorrelation, as captured by Moran’s I. This supports the notion that the first PC captures factors that vary smoothly across space, such as quality-of-life amenities, which naturally exhibit spatial dependence. In contrast, the second PC has very low spatial autocorrelation, suggesting that it is less influenced by spatially clustered amenities and more likely driven by other economic forces.

We then examine associations of this first PC on other variables, controlling in column 2 for metro fixed effects. Consistent with a demand interpretation of this principal component, we find areas that are high on this dimension have a high college share, more young households, have lower poverty rates, and have substantially higher shares of Democrats. However, they have higher density on some measures

(especially multifamily structures), and are also generally larger areas in land units, with more municipalities as neighbors, and closer to the city center. These associations together suggest that areas high in PC1 are high-demand areas which may be prone to extraction of value by local governments (Diamond, 2017).

To be sure, such regulations may also affect housing supply. We explore this variable in more detail in columns 1–2 of Appendix Table A5, adding additional topographical and land availability controls such as the fraction of land developed in 2001, the squared fraction of land developed in 2001, and the fraction of land with a flat topography. The first principal component is associated with lower housing elasticities, though the significance becomes marginal once metro fixed effects are included. This suggests that, despite the raw association of this PC with higher construction, the regulations associated with the PC impose an implicit tax on new construction, which weakly associates with lower housing supply elasticity. We summarize these patterns as our second fact:

Fact 2. *The first principal component corresponds to value capture in high-demand locations. This component loads heavily on regulations that allow municipalities to extract and redistribute housing value, such as inclusionary zoning mandates that require developers to include affordable units. These regulations enable local governments to convert market-rate housing demand into public benefits, and are most prevalent in densely populated cities with high consumption and production amenities.*

3.3 The Role of Exclusionary Zoning

Exclusionary zoning refers to land use regulations that limit housing density and types, often with the effect of excluding lower-income residents from certain areas. The role of exclusionary zoning in shaping socioeconomic patterns has been a subject of significant research and debate in urban economics and policy circles, but accurately defining these practices has been a challenge.

The second principal component of housing regulations identified in this study correlates strongly with intuitive measures of exclusionary zoning, particularly minimum lot sizes and other bulk regulations that limit density, the loadings for which we show in Table 5. In fact, the highest loading for this principal component is the smallest residential minimum lot size, a commonly used proxy for exclusionary practices in general. This regulation sets a lower bound on how small a piece of land

can be for a single housing unit, impacting the potential density of an area. Larger minimum lot sizes result in fewer, more spread-out homes, while smaller minimums allow for denser development. They have been frequently estimated in prior research through bunching methods (Cui, 2024; Song, 2021) as important drivers of housing regulations; the contribution of our approach is to measure these regulations directly from municipal documents, rather than indirectly through their effects on observed housing development. Figure A8 demonstrates the high frequency of these minimum lot size regulations specifically; two-thirds of local governments prohibit residential lots smaller than 5,000 square feet across the entire town (Panel A), and nearly half enforce minimum lot sizes of at least half an acre in some part of their jurisdiction (Panel B). This mandated minimum amount of housing consumption effectively truncates the left tail of the housing value distribution by preventing the construction of houses on small lots of land or apartments.

We validate our economic interpretation of the second PC by investigating its relationship with housing affordability. We show municipalities high in the second principal component have fewer housing units affordable to the state median income household (Panel A of Figure 5). We focus on three key mechanisms driving this relationship. First, exclusionary zoning shifts the entire housing price distribution rightward, with significantly higher median home values in high second PC municipalities compared to low second PC areas (Panel B). Second, exclusionary zoning shifts mass away from the left tail and towards the median of the housing price distribution; i.e., a left-truncation of the house price distribution corresponding to missing units made unviable through the presence of minimum housing requirements. In Panel C, we compare the distribution of home values across granular home value bins for low and high second PC areas. High second PC areas have relatively more housing units at or right below the median home price and less well below the median, suggesting a leaner left tail. We further show in Appendix Figure A10 that this left truncation is more pronounced in higher median home values areas, and that areas higher in the second PC have smaller shares of low-income and younger households. The third dimension by which exclusionary zoning practices limit affordability is on the rental margin. Panel D reveals that high second PC areas limit the degree of rental housing with a strong correlation of 0.40 between the second PC and the share of owner-occupied housing. For rental housing, the second PC is more strongly associated with overall rents than with rent conditional on housing characteristics (i.e.,

number of bedrooms, as shown in Appendix Figure A11), suggesting that it further raises rental prices by shifting the composition of available units. The resulting lack of affordable housing options results in a negative correlation between the second PC and the share of low-income families (-0.26) and young households under 35 (-0.39).

We further validate that density restrictions impact observed density in Appendix Table A6. We examine associations between our measured regulations and building permits as well as affordability of local housing units using three approaches: bivariate regressions, LASSO, and XGBoost. Density restrictions (multifamily bans, minimum lot sizes, frontage requirements) associate with less affordable housing. This rules out the competing hypothesis that lower construction in these areas is associated with lower demand. Building permits are best predicted by affordable housing mandates.

We explore the resulting distributional consequences of these quantity-based housing restrictions in Table 6. We find that PC2 corresponds to a higher proportion of white, medium-to-high income, and college-educated residents. This suggests racial, ethnic, and income segregation effects of these policies. This is consistent with prior analyses of zoning as a tool for maintaining racial homogeneity in the absence of racial covenants (Rothwell, 2011; Cui, 2024). Areas higher in the second PC also have a relatively higher Republican share of the population, relative to their metro.

Areas characterized by more exclusionary zoning practices also show higher average math test scores. This pattern suggests that exclusionary zoning effectively creates enclaves of educational privilege, where resources and positive peer effects are concentrated. Consistent with a public goods motive, we also observe higher local revenue per student. These results are consistent with classic theories of fiscal zoning which emphasize the role of zoning and property taxes in conjunction with support of local public goods (Fischel, 1987; Hamilton, 1975, 1976). These areas also tend to have lower property tax rates, suggesting that by limiting the share of cheaper housing, they can maintain a lower tax burden while still sustaining high-quality and well-funded public education (Table A7). Areas higher in the second PC also show higher causal measures of economic opportunity (drawn from Chetty et al. (2014)). The presence of such public goods may help to explain the sorting of higher-income residents in these areas. However, they also point to the socioeconomic costs of excluding lower-income residents from access to areas with such public goods. We summarize these associations as our third fact:

Fact 3. *The second principal component captures exclusionary zoning practices aimed*

at restricting housing density and affordability through bulk regulations. This dimension loads heavily on minimum lot size requirements and procedural barriers to development, which are concentrated in affluent suburban areas. These regulations associate with a truncation of the left tail of house prices, lower construction, and strong sorting on education and income.

3.4 Monocentric City Model and Zoning Gradients

We next interpret municipal regulations in the context of the monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1971). In these models, there is a central location in each city where production is concentrated and rents decay as one moves away from this productive center, with the rate of decay governed by transportation costs. These dynamics may also affect the benefits and costs of zoning regulations at different distances from the city center. Housing regulations, in turn, may then affect the rent gradient as one moves away from the city center.

We show various regulatory variables along the dimension of distance to city center in Figure 6. Affordable housing mandates are decreasing in distance from the center of the city, illustrating that these regulations are most commonly found at the centers of cities. Minimum lot size requirements show a different pattern, and vary markedly across regions. While minimum lot size requirements are higher in suburban areas on average, this relationship is particularly driven by the Northeast and Midwest regions.

In Table A10, we explore the relationship between distance from the city center and regulatory stringency for all housing regulations that we measure and both the first and second principal components. The first four columns show these relationships between regulations and distance from city center by region, while the final column shows the relationship for the U.S. as a whole. Across all regions, we observe that the number of zoning districts decreases with distance from the city center, suggesting simpler zoning structures in more peripheral areas. This pattern is particularly pronounced in the Midwest and South. Some components of allowable density decrease with distance from the center, especially the permission of townhouses and mixed-use development. The allowance of multifamily housing shows a positive correlation with distance in the West and South, contrary to the general expectation of decreasing density with distance.

The Northeast stands out with several distinct patterns. Unlike other regions,

it shows sharply increasing restrictiveness with distance for several measures. For instance, the longest frontage requirement and highest residential minimum lot size both increase with distance from the city center in the Northeast, while these measures show weak relationships in other regions. These results are especially surprising in the context of well-developed public transit and highway links in this area, which should, all else equal, facilitate greater development and density outside of city centers.

Several factors may help to explain this regional variation. The Northeast was the first region of the U.S. to urbanize and industrialize, allowing for greater development before the advent of zoning. Many of its suburbs were established earlier than in other regions, often as affluent enclaves seeking to preserve their character against urban expansion (Fischel, 2015). In addition, the region has a highly fragmented system of local governments, with many small, independent municipalities. This structure facilitates more localized and potentially more restrictive zoning policies. The Northeast's early experience with industrial pollution and urban congestion may have fostered a culture of environmental protection that manifests itself in stricter land use controls, particularly for suburban lot size requirements, which were commonly justified on the basis of preserving natural land. Finally, the region has had particularly strong fights over access to local schools (i.e., school busing (Angrist et al., 2022)) that can increase the use of exclusionary zoning practices to maintain local school districts by limiting access to lower-income and minority households.

In contrast, California, which also has high house prices and where housing regulation is commonly thought to be tight, appears surprisingly to have more nationally typical bulk regulations. We show a map representation of these regulations in Figure A6, which highlights the high minimum residential lot size requirements in the Northeast relative to California. Instead, California's housing market is heavily influenced by state-level regulations, such as environmental reviews, and an onerous permitting process. We find evidence of this in Appendix Figure A1, which shows that California has the highest potential waiting time for review of a typical new multi-family building (see Mayer and Somerville (2000) for a link between regulatory uncertainty and reduced construction) and highest prevalence of public hearing requirements for multi-family buildings. These results therefore suggest that while the Northeast and California have high housing costs, they are the result of very different factors that may call for different policy responses. Furthermore, California's housing market faces significant constraints due to its challenging topography (Saiz, 2010),

which limits developable land, and the high demand for natural amenities and local jobs. These factors can create a situation in which even relatively less restrictive local bulk regulations can result in binding constraints on housing supply, especially in combination with a challenging permitting process.

To explore the drivers of exclusionary zoning practices in the Northeast further, we follow (Glaeser and Ward, 2009) who connected minimum lot sizes drawn from the Pioneer Institute survey in the Boston metropolitan area to historical variables: particularly historical density and industrial production. The key conclusion from that analysis is the gradient between minimum lot sizes and distance to city center (in Boston) was largely explained by the fact that low density areas historically (in 1940) were able to adopt minimum lot size requirements, and thereby stay low density. We expand the scope of this analysis to municipalities across the nation.

In Table A11, we show the key object of interest—regional gradients of minimum lot size against distance to city center—across a range of controls. Our initial specification reveals that the Northeast and (to a lesser extent) the Midwest feature substantially higher minimum lot sizes as distance to city center increases, a relationship which strengthens after controlling for a fixed effect for the nearest metropolitan area. However, we are able to partially account for these gradients by controlling for historical variables, drawn from 1940, which capture density, manufacturing output, and demographic variables in that period. Our preferred specification, in column (7), controls for an interaction of historical municipal-level density with county-level industrial production. This specification reduces the regional gradient by 40%. We are able to explain an even larger fraction of the raw gradient in a final specification which controls for a large battery of historical variables.

There are several potential factors which could explain this result. Less dense areas in the vicinity of industrial centers in the Northeast and Midwest could be averse to industrial pollutants; they may have been motivated by social exclusionary factors against industrial workers (who were disproportionately immigrant and non-white, see Cui (2024)); and the spread of industrial production through automobile traffic may have made such areas adopt stricter zoning to thwart direct industrial spillovers, as suggested by Fischel (2015). This finding is consistent with several plausible channels connecting industrial spillovers and exclusionary motives, and we formally consider this channel in the context of our model in Section 4.

Our findings on spatial patterns of zoning have important implications for urban

economic models. Traditional models predict that all households prefer central locations to minimize commuting costs, with wealthier residents outbidding others for scarce urban land. While the general relationship between regulatory intensity and distance from city centers is consistent with standard monocentric city models (i.e., [Rossi-Hansberg \(2004\)](#)), the strong sorting of high-income households into expensive, strictly regulated suburbs is a recognized challenge for these frameworks ([Glaeser et al., 2008](#)). This spatial pattern is more pronounced in the United States compared to other countries, where it is more typical for wealthy residents to reside in the city center, and appears particularly pronounced in the Northeast. Our results suggest that this sorting is accompanied by regulatory restrictions on the minimum allowable housing size, which truncates the housing size distribution to the left, and results in sorting of higher-income residents to distant suburbs against the typical pattern expected in the monocentric city model. We summarize these patterns as our fourth and final fact:

Fact 4. *Zoning regulations generally follow a monocentric pattern, with value capture tools predominant in city centers and exclusionary zoning practices intensifying with distance from urban cores, a pattern most pronounced in the Northeast where suburban areas employ particularly strict density restrictions.*

4 Discussion and Framework

4.1 Model Framework

We next interpret these empirical findings through a model of inter-municipal competition in which local governments strategically select housing regulations. A more complete version of the model is discussed in [Appendix E](#). The model features households sorting across locations with two different regulatory regimes intended to proxy for our first two principal components. The key elements include:

Agents and Locations: The economy contains two types of households differentiated by productivity: high-wage (H) and low-wage (L), earning $w^H > w^L$. Households choose between two zones: city centers (c) and suburbs (s). Each zone offers amenities (α_c, α_s) and implements different regulations. Housing supply in each zone is somewhat inelastic, such that local rents r_i are increasing in housing demand.

Government Policies: Local governments in each zone $i \in \{c, s\}$ impose two types of taxes: a uniform wage tax τ and zone-specific housing taxes t_i , which are intended to proxy for value capture regulations. These correspond to our first principal component of housing regulations, and the interpretation is that regulations such as mandatory inclusionary zoning can be seen as an implicit tax. In principle the proceeds could be either redistributed to other residents (as in the case of affordable housing units), captured as private benefits by local policymakers, or extracted by the government for the purpose of public goods. We assume these benefits can be extracted without penalty to produce government revenue. With these revenues, they provide public services s_i using labor inputs G_i (compensated at the low-productivity wage), while maximizing net revenue. Additionally, governments can impose minimum housing requirements \underline{h}_i , which proxy for exclusionary zoning requirements.

For a household of type j in zone i , utility is given by:

$$U_i^j = \max_{c, h} \gamma \log c + (1 - \gamma) \log h + \alpha_i - \log(N_i) + \log(s_i).$$

This optimization is subject to the budget constraint:

$$c + h \cdot r_i = (1 - \tau) \cdot w^j$$

Local governments maximize revenue:

$$\max_{G_i, t_i, \underline{h}_i} [\tau + (1 - \gamma) \cdot t_i] \cdot (w^L \cdot N_i^L + w^H \cdot N_i^H) - w^L \cdot \log(G_i)$$

subject to the minimum housing constraint ($h_i^j \geq \underline{h}_i$) and a positive earnings condition for local governments. Production opportunities are equally accessible from both zones, so there are no reasons to sort for increasing wage income.

In spatial equilibrium, households sort across zones until indifferent, yielding:

$$[\alpha_c - \alpha_s] + \log \frac{s_c}{s_s} = (1 - \gamma) \left[\log \frac{r_c}{r_s} + \log \frac{1 + t_c}{1 + t_s} \right] + \log \frac{N_c}{N_s} \quad (1)$$

i.e., that the benefits of locating in one zone (based on local amenities and government services) equal the costs of rents, housing taxes, and congestion disamenities.

4.2 Optimal Policy Conditions

Exclusionary Zoning: Minimum housing requirements (h_i) become binding when they increase revenue by attracting high-productivity households:

$$\Delta h_i \left(\Delta \eta_i N_i \cdot \left[t_i \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial \eta_i} + \tau \frac{\partial \tilde{w}}{\partial \eta_i} \right] + \Delta N_i \cdot \left[t_i r_i + \tau \tilde{w}_i + N_i t_i \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial N_i} \right] \right) \geq 0.$$

For $\tilde{N}_i = w_i^L \cdot N_i^L + w_i^H \cdot N_i^H$ as the “effective” population, and similarly $\tilde{w}_i = w_i^H \cdot \eta_i + w_i^L \cdot (1 - \eta_i)$ as the effective wage, and $\eta_i = \frac{N_i^H}{N_i^H + N_i^L}$ as the high-income share of total population.

Exclusionary zoning affects local government revenues through two channels. The first term shows that local governments gain from attracting a higher share of high-income workers. These workers are attracted to areas with minimum lot size requirements because they are subject to lower congestion disamenities. However, this loss in population also reduces local government revenue in the second term.

Value Capture: Housing taxes (t_i) become optimal when tax revenue gains outweigh population losses:

$$(1 - \gamma) \cdot \tilde{N}_i + \frac{\partial \tilde{N}_i}{\partial t_i} [\tau + (1 - \gamma) \cdot t_i] \geq 0.$$

Proposition 1. *Urban Value Capture: City cores c prioritize revenue extraction (t_c).*

In the model, city cores choose a positive housing tax requirement t_c to maximize local revenues, and pick no exclusionary housing requirement. The intuition is that city cores have a sufficiently high population of low-income workers, so the income losses from an exclusionary housing requirement, and the resulting loss of the low-income population, would exceed gains from gaining high-income population share. However, if city cores have sufficiently high amenities relative to suburban areas ($\alpha_c - \alpha_s$), from indifference equation (1) we see this amenity differential can offset higher housing costs, taxes, and congestion disamenities in the city core. This gives urban centers leverage to extract value without depopulating the area.

Proposition 2. *Urban zones with higher amenities have more revenue extraction.*

This proposition follows a similar argument as the previous one. The core intuition is that higher amenities increase residents’ willingness to pay for housing, generating

economic rents which governments can profitably tap into. Again from equation 1 we see that households accept higher housing costs (both due to rent and value capture taxes) because these are offset by higher amenities. Therefore, the optimal t_i rises with α_i : urban centers with higher amenities can impose even higher taxes without losing residents, because leaving entails losing access to valuable local benefits.

Proposition 3. *Suburban Exclusion: Suburbs s adopt stricter bulk regulations \underline{h}_s .*

The key difference between urban cores and suburban areas lies in population composition: when suburban areas have a substantially smaller population relative to urban cores, they are able to shift to a concentrated tax base consisting only of high-income workers through exclusionary zoning. The trade-off is that such strict bulk regulations limit the total number of households (N_s), which lowers income-based tax revenue. However, this loss in quantity can be offset fiscally by an increase in per-household tax contribution, and also results in lower congestion costs, which results in an additional motive for high-income workers to move to suburban areas.

Proposition 4. *Suburban areas with fewer amenities have weakly stricter bulk regulations.*

In the model, local amenities and exclusionary zoning can work as substitutes. This situation is not relevant if the local government is already at a corner solution and has implemented a minimum house size requirement to exclude all low-income residents. But if a suburban area is indifferent between imposing such a restriction or not, lowering the presence of amenities will encourage the municipality to implement such policies. The intuition is that a low α_s raises the marginal benefit of exclusion (i.e., attracting rich households), because the suburb can offset low taxation in quantities by improving the quality of the tax base.

4.3 Connecting Model Predictions to Empirical Findings

We now discuss how the predictions of our model relate to our empirical findings. Our first and third propositions predict where value capture and exclusionary zoning will be most prevalent spatially. The first proposition predicts that value capture will be higher in cities, where demand for living is highest and so the ability for local governments to extract value is correspondingly higher as well. Consistent with this result in the model, we find empirically that areas high in the first principal

component are substantially larger, and also appear to be somewhat more centrally located. By contrast, proposition three predicts that suburban areas will impose more restrictive bulk regulations. We find that bulk regulations and the second principal component are commonly found in suburban areas in the peripheries of those cities across the United States, but are particularly pronounced in the Northeast.

These spatial regulatory patterns contribute to the sorting of Americans by age and income. Cities are home to poorer residents that need access to smaller housing, wealthy residents, as well as younger working households. By contrast, suburban areas with exclusionary zoning requirements are typically home to richer households, despite high commuting costs. Our results help to connect classic previous theories of zoning. (Fischel, 1987) and (Hamilton, 1975, 1976) argue that housing regulation and property taxes can create efficient public goods provision in the context of (Tiebout, 1956) sorting. By contrast, (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) argue instead that local taxes are distortionary and function like excise taxes, while more recent scholarship has emphasized the segregation motives of zoning, especially exclusionary zoning (Rothstein, 2017; Cui, 2024). Our two types of municipal zoning regulations span this prior literature, and helps to explain the circumstances under which housing regulation can appear extractive, and the conditions under which they sustain local public goods investment under exclusionary environments.

Our model also makes additional sets of predictions on the intensive margin of such regulations, which align with our empirical findings. Proposition 2 predicts that greater amenities should predict higher value capture, which is a strong pattern in our data as well across amenities measured through different methods (natural amenities, consumption amenities, and productive/job amenities). This close alignment between empirical and model results further justifies our interpretation of the first principal component as reflecting value extraction in high demand environments.

The model also helps us interpret our fourth fact concerning the regional nature of exclusionary zoning patterns. In the model, exclusionary zoning can emerge in suburban environments exposed to negative amenities. Our empirical results suggest that the strongest patterns of exclusionary zoning emerged historically among Northeastern (and to some extent Midwestern) municipalities exposed to local manufacturing. While we cannot separate the specific role of industrial pollutants and direct spillovers versus exclusionary motives around the presence of manufacturing workers (many of whom were immigrants or non-white); all plausible mechanisms entail such early in-

dustrialization exposing smaller suburbs to some set of negative disamenities. Our model helps therefore reconcile the motives for why such municipalities may pick exclusionary zoning as a response to this disamenity shock.

5 Conclusion

Our paper introduces a new methodology we refer to as generative regulatory measurement, which leverages LLMs to systematically interpret municipal zoning regulations at scale. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can achieve near-human levels of accuracy in classifying zoning rules from textual documents, with accuracy levels of 96% for binary questions and correlations of 0.87 on average relative to existing hand-classifications. This approach enables the creation of a comprehensive nationwide dataset of municipal zoning regulations. Our methodology opens up new avenues for analyzing vast amounts of previously untapped regulatory documents across multiple domains. With further development, this generative regulatory measurement framework can be extended to other categories of housing regulation, regulations in other domains, and even regulatory systems across different countries and languages.

By combining this measurement with a theoretical framework, we establish four facts about housing regulation. Municipal zoning regulations are not well-summarized by single dimensional measures of strictness, reflecting the myriad ways municipalities have designed their zoning codes. Rather, two factors capture the bulk of the systematic variation and represent value capture and exclusionary zoning. Urban cores, especially those with high amenities, implement value capture regulations to extract housing surplus to provide public goods. Conversely, suburban municipalities adopt exclusionary zoning and strict bulk regulations, especially in the Northeast and Midwest, a pattern which we connect to historical exposure to industrial production.

Our findings highlight the broader consequences of housing regulations on socio-economic sorting and affordable housing. Suburban practices of exclusionary zoning truncate the left part of the housing price distribution, which effectively prices out lower-income and minority households from areas with high-quality public services. Such households sort instead to urban cores, which also feature elevated housing costs due to extractive housing regulations. Our findings therefore underscore the importance of zoning regulations as tools used by municipalities to manage growth, capture value from residential demand, and impact demographic composition.

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Tables

Table 1: Sample Coverage

Panel A: Sample and Local Government Coverage Metrics					
	National	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Coverage Metrics:					
Total Munis	19,488	2,101	8,481	6,587	2,319
% of Munis in Sample	25	32	19	22	48
Total Townships	16,213	4,111	12,102	0	0
% of Townships in Sample	6	23	0	-	-
Total Pop. (Millions)	331	57	69	127	77
% of Pop. Under Local Gov.	76	100	95	55	78

Panel B: % of Pop. Under Local Gov. Covered By Sample					
	National	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Ordinance Aggregator:					
American Legal Publishing	11	15	15	6	8
Municode	23	1	19	54	12
Ordinance.com	30	52	12	1	60
Total	63	68	46	61	80

Notes: This table highlights our sample coverage across region and data source. For local governments available in multiple datasets, we prioritize using Ordinance.com and then Municode and reflect that in the population count. We also adjust for geographical overlap between townships and municipalities in tallying population by using census block level population data and corresponding shape files. We use population estimates from the 2022 Census of Governments for municipality population, and 2022 State-Level Census Population Data for census region and national population.

Links to data sources are [American Legal Publishing](#), [Municode](#), and [Ordinance.com](#).

Table 2: Performance Validation for LLM-Generated Zoning Classifications

Panel A: Continuous Questions		
Question	RSE	Correlation
Zoning District Count	0.06	0.98
Longest Frontage	1.16	0.70
Lowest Res Min Lot Size	0.16	0.92
Cumulative Average	0.46	0.87
Cumulative Median	0.31	0.90
Panel B: Binary Questions		
Question	RSE	% Accuracy
Multifamily Allowed	0.00	100%
Mixed-Use Buildings	0.07	96%
Conversion To Multifamily	0.08	96%
Townhouses Allowed	0.30	90%
Age-Restricted Provisions	0.14	96%
ADUs Allowed	0.09	96%
Flexible Zoning By Right	0.00	100%
Flexible Zoning By Permit	0.00	100%
Affordable Incentive	0.00	100%
Permit Cap Or Phasing	0.33	90%
Wetlands Restrictions	0.14	96%
Cumulative Average	0.11	96%
Cumulative Median	0.09	96%

Notes: This table calculates accuracy against a hand-classification by the Pioneer Institute on a hold-out sample of 30 municipalities. In Panel A, we use Relative Squared Error (RSE) which compares the model’s results to a naive model that guesses the sample mean. The correlation column is the correlation between the model answer and the Pioneer Institute answer. We calculate performance metrics and sample means (for RSE) only on the set of question municipality pairs that GPT-4 Turbo does not say “I don’t know.” We winsorize data from our models at the 1% level. The Cumulative Average and Cumulative Median are calculated across questions. In Panel B, for Relative Squared Error (RSE) we compare each model’s results to the naive model that guesses the sample mode. The accuracy column is calculated as the percent of municipalities where the model matches the Pioneer Institute answer. We drop any errors where the answer is considered ambiguous. For details on adjustments to the Pioneer data, see Figure A4. For full questions see Appendix Table A8.

Table 3: Decomposition of Model Accuracy

Panel A: Continuous Questions

Model	Specification	Correlation		I Don't Know Rate	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
RAG Strategies (+ No Prompting)					
Gemini Flash	No RAG	0.74	0.01	38.7%	2.3
Gemini Flash	+ Basic RAG	0.66	0.03	32.7%	1.7
Gemini Flash	+ Full RAG	0.84	0.02	12.9%	0.6
Prompting Strategies (+ Full RAG)					
GPT-4 Turbo	No Prompting	0.72	0.05	2.7%	0.6
GPT-4 Turbo	+ Prompt Engineering	0.78	0.05	2.9%	1.3
GPT-4 Turbo	+ Background Info	0.73	0.11	2.2%	1.4
GPT-4 Turbo	+ Prompt Chaining	0.87	-	4.4%	-

Panel B: Binary Questions

Model	Specification	Accuracy		I Don't Know Rate	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
RAG Strategies (+ No Prompting)					
Gemini Flash	No RAG	81.0%	1.24	21.1%	1.0
Gemini Flash	+ Basic RAG	84.5%	1.18	22.0%	1.7
Gemini Flash	+ Full RAG	86.2%	0.87	18.6%	0.8
Prompting Strategies (+ Full RAG)					
GPT-4 Turbo	No Prompting	83.5%	1.4	14.2%	5.3
GPT-4 Turbo	+ Prompt Engineering	86.0%	0.8	10.7%	1.4
GPT-4 Turbo	+ Background Info	93.9%	1.0	1.1%	0.2
GPT-4 Turbo	+ Prompt Chaining	96.7%	-	0.0%	-

Notes: This Table reports the accuracy of LLM-generated regulatory classifications against hand-classified data for 30 municipalities from the Pioneer Institute. To quantify accuracy, we calculate the mean and standard deviation across five runs of each specification. See Appendix Section B for more details on sources of variation across runs. We manually verified disagreements between our headline specification (GPT-4 Turbo Full RAG + Full Prompting) and the Pioneer dataset, so we only run this specification once. See Figure A4 for more details on error adjustments. All accuracy statistics are calculated on the disagreement adjusted testing sample. Gemini Flash refers to Gemini Flash 1.5.

Table 4: National Sample Question Means

Panel A: Continuous Questions			
Question	Mean	Weight	Count
Zoning District Count	14	19	5,471
Longest Frontage	92	69	5,213
Highest Res Min Lot Size*	52	45	5,424
Lowest Res Min Lot Size*	10	6	5,440
Mandatory Approval Steps	4.5	4.3	5,791
Distinct Approval Bodies	3.1	3.0	5,759
Max Review Waiting Time	218	211	5,109

Panel B: Binary Questions			
Question	Mean	Weight	Count
Multifamily Allowed	95	99	5,703
Mixed-Use Buildings	63	71	5,717
Conversion To Multifamily	14	20	5,766
Townhouses Allowed	80	89	5,795
Age-Restricted Provisions	45	60	5,129
ADUs Allowed	33	39	5,781
Flexible Zoning By Right	9	10	5,797
Flexible Zoning By Permit	80	80	5,679
Affordable Incentive	24	50	5,540
Permit Cap Or Phasing	17	18	5,803
Wetlands Restrictions	10	7	4,617
Affordable Mandate	7	10	5,784
Public Hearing Requirements	30	32	5,709

Notes: This table reports the averages of sample questions from our generated national regulatory dataset across a range of demographic associates. We define the count (sample size) as the number of municipalities where the model does not say “I don’t know” as the answer. The “Weight” column weights each municipality by its population in the 2022 census of governments. For continuous questions we upper winsorize at the 1% level for frontage, minimum lot sizes, and maximum potential review waiting time. *Min lot size variables expressed in thousands of square feet.

Table 5: Loadings on Principal Components

	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Affordable Incentive	0.42	0.10	0.38	0.08	-0.03
Affordable Mandate	0.32	0.11	0.46	0.15	-0.05
Age-Restricted Provisions	0.31	0.00	0.20	-0.11	-0.04
Zoning District Count	0.30	-0.20	0.00	-0.15	0.04
Wetlands Restrictions	0.23	0.20	-0.10	-0.24	-0.06
Permit Cap Or Phasing	0.22	0.03	-0.06	0.19	0.26
Highest Res Min Lot Size	0.19	0.37	-0.23	-0.15	0.02
Longest Frontage	0.17	0.40	-0.22	-0.15	-0.08
Public Hearing Requirements	0.15	0.11	0.18	0.34	-0.01
Max Review Waiting Time	0.12	0.03	-0.06	0.40	-0.21
Lowest Res Min Lot Size	0.05	0.47	-0.19	-0.05	0.03
Distinct Approval Bodies	0.02	0.02	-0.37	0.36	-0.10
Mandatory Approval Steps	0.01	0.10	-0.15	0.56	-0.26
No Conversion to Multifamily	-0.09	0.00	0.13	0.24	0.68
No Flexible Zoning By Right	-0.13	0.04	0.26	-0.06	-0.49
Multifamily Not Allowed	-0.14	0.35	0.08	0.07	0.21
No Mixed-Use Buildings	-0.21	0.29	0.22	0.05	0.11
Townhouses Not Allowed	-0.23	0.33	0.12	-0.03	0.00
ADUs Banned	-0.30	-0.02	0.07	0.10	-0.12
No Flexible Zoning By Permit	-0.31	0.20	0.32	-0.04	-0.12

Notes: This table reports loadings between the first five principal components of our regulatory dataset and specific regulatory questions. We upper winsorize at the 1% level the values for highest residential minimum lot size, lowest residential minimum lot size, longest frontage requirement, and maximum review waiting time. We transform the highest residential min lot size variable into a dummy for whether it is above one acre. Missing data, where the model output “I don’t know,” were imputed with k-nearest neighbors. Prior to performing principal component analysis, all variables were normalized into z-scores. Additionally, each variable was expressed in terms of its expected univariate association with stricter zoning policies, such that more positive values indicate a greater degree of restrictiveness. For example, the variable representing the allowance of multi-family housing was inverted, so that a more positive value indicates that multi-family housing is not permitted, while a more negative value suggests that it is not.


Table 6: Economic and Social Correlates of Housing Regulatory Dimensions

	First PC		Second PC	
	No FE	Metro FE	No FE	Metro FE
Fundamental Amenities (County Level)				
Index	0.52 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)	
– Natural Amenities	0.27 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)	
– Retail Establishments	0.46 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.02)	
– Log Patents Per Capita	0.37 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)	
Socioeconomic Characteristics (Local Government Level)				
Index	0.21 (0.01)	0.09 (0.03)	0.37 (0.01)	0.26 (0.03)
– % Mid to High Income	0.20 (0.01)	0.12 (0.03)	0.24 (0.01)	0.18 (0.03)
– White Share	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.22 (0.01)	0.22 (0.03)
– % Households Over 35	0.06 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.03)	0.38 (0.01)	0.26 (0.03)
– College Degree Share	0.27 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)	0.27 (0.01)	0.13 (0.03)
Government Services (Local Government Level)				
Index	0.24 (0.02)	0.12 (0.04)	0.36 (0.02)	0.16 (0.03)
– Math Test Scores	0.23 (0.01)	0.16 (0.03)	0.29 (0.01)	0.16 (0.02)
– Local Rev. Per Student	0.14 (0.03)	0.01 (0.07)	0.32 (0.06)	0.17 (0.06)
– Total Rev. Per Capita	0.11 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)
Housing Density (Local Government Level)				
Index	0.05 (0.01)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.37 (0.02)	-0.36 (0.04)
– Housing Unit Density	0.01 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.03)	-0.24 (0.06)
– % Structures \geq 2 Units	0.13 (0.01)	0.10 (0.04)	-0.32 (0.01)	-0.35 (0.03)
– Share Rental Units	-0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.41 (0.01)	-0.33 (0.03)
Geographic Attributes (Local Government Level)				
Index	-0.29 (0.01)	-0.28 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.01)	0.12 (0.02)
– Log Land Area	0.47 (0.01)	0.47 (0.03)	0.07 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.05)
– Log Near Neighbors	0.17 (0.01)	0.29 (0.06)	0.21 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.03)
– Log Miles Metro Center	-0.14 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.01)	0.10 (0.03)
Political Characteristics (Local Government Level)				
Percent Democrat	0.27 (0.01)	0.17 (0.04)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.22 (0.04)

Notes: All variables are normalized. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at metro/state level when including fixed effects. County regressions use population weights to aggregate. Category indices are first PCs of their listed components. See Appendix Table A7 for more components and Appendix Table A1 for variable definitions.

Figures


Figure 1: Model Overview




Notes: We chunk ordinances by most granular organization (usually subsection) and ensure each chunk is between 50 to 1000 tokens by splitting and joining adjacent sections when needed. We embed each chunk using “text-embedding-3-large” ([link](#)). We use [Amazon Texttract](#) to transcribe tables when necessary. We elicit an open-ended response to each question first and then use [function calling](#) to parse out a structured answer. Ordinances from digital aggregators are either entirely about zoning, partially about zoning (i.e., have one or more sections about zoning), or not about zoning at all. We filter out ordinances not at all about zoning by searching for key phrases, table headers, and zoning district names (i.e., R-1 for the first residential zoning district).

Figure 2: Embeddings of Municipal Code Sections

Panel A: Full Embedding Space




Panel B: Zoomed View of Similar Sections




Notes: This Figure shows the two-dimensional UMAP projection of embeddings from sections of municipal codes for Arlington, Massachusetts.

Figure 3: Statistical Tests For Number of Principal Components

Panel A: Scree Plot



Panel B: Velicer's Minimum Average Partial Test




Panel A: We simulate eigenvalues following the RnD-Lambda method [Peres-Neto et al. \(2005\)](#). Specifically, we shuffle each column (regulation) in the dataset $n = 999$ times and calculate the eigenvalues for each simulated dataset. These estimates represent eigenvalues if the variables (regulation) were uncorrelated. We plot the 95th percentile of these eigenvalues across simulations. "Actual" plots the eigenvalues for each principal component in the original data along with the percent variation explained by each (as seen in [Table 5](#)).


Panel B: We use Velicer's MAP test as specified in [Velicer et al. \(2000\)](#). The number of principal components that minimizes the average squared and fourth power pairwise correlation between regulations after we partial out principal components is two.

Figure 4: Regulatory Dimensions and Housing Market Dynamics

Panel A: First Principal Component (Value Capture)




Panel B: Second Principal Component (Exclusionary Zoning)




Notes: This Figure illustrates the relationship between two principal components of housing regulation and key housing market outcomes. Panel A shows the first principal component, associated with value capture. Panel B displays the second principal component, which corresponds to exclusionary zoning practices. The x-axis in both panels represents the percentile of median housing value, drawn from the 2022 ACS, while the y-axis measures the percentile of units permitted per capita (averaged from 2019–2023) from the Building Permits Survey. Darker colors illustrate a larger correlation in the heatmap between each regulatory principal component and each coordinate of prices and building. The right figures show the overall correlation between each quadrant of the space of housing prices and quantities and the regulatory outcome.

Figure 5: Second Principal Component and Housing Affordability


Panel A: Share Units Affordable




Panel B: Median Home Value



Panel C: Difference in Probability For Left Tail of Home Value




Panel D: Owner-Occupied Share and Low-Income Family Share by Second PC



Notes: In Panel A, rental units are affordable if monthly rent is $\leq 30\%$ of state median monthly income; owner-occupied units if value is $\leq 3 \times$ state median annual income. In Panel C, we compare home value distributions for municipalities in the top and bottom 25% of the second principal component (PC) for owner-occupied units, focusing on those with median values \$200k–\$500k (where overlap in Panel B is greatest). Within four ACS value ranges in this band, we compute the difference in probability mass for each ACS home value bin between high- and low-PC municipalities, collapsing all values $< \$100k$ to a \$50k midpoint bin. The x -axis measures the percent difference between the bucket’s midpoint and each ACS bin midpoint; the y -axis is the probability mass difference. Panel D shows correlations between the second PC and owner-occupied share (0.41) and low-income family share (-0.24). All data is sourced from the 2022 American Community Survey.


Figure 6: Spatial Variation of Zoning Regulations Relative to Metropolitan Centers



Notes: We plot regulatory variables at the local government level based on the distance from the center of the respective metro, defined as city hall. We show whether a city has an affordable housing incentive or mandate; the minimum lot size; the first principal component of housing regulation (value capture), and the second principal component of housing regulations (exclusionary zoning).


A Appendix: Additional Graphs and Tables

Figure A1: Measuring Housing Process Variation




Notes: This Figure plots population weighted averages of four LLM-generated process regulations at the census region level.

Figure A2: Distribution of Ordinance Lengths




Notes: This figure shows the token count distribution for ordinances in our sample. Vertical dashed lines mark maximum context lengths (in tokens) for popular LLMs. Counts use the GPT-4 Turbo tokenizer (c1100k_base).

Figure A3: Comparison of Human vs. LLM Cost




Notes: This figure compares costs of human vs. LLM zoning analysis. Assumptions: (1) Lawyers: 5 min per question–municipality at \$50/hr; (2) RAG: 4,000 input + 500 output tokens/call at \$5 per million input tokens and \$15 per million output tokens; (3) Prep: \$390/question (lawyer time for 60 municipalities, 10 hr at \$140 to train model); (4) Scraping/cleaning/embedding: \$2.80/municipality; (5) No-RAG: 330,000 input tokens/question–municipality.

Figure A4: Sources of Discrepancy Between LLM and Human Classifications of Zoning Regulations



Notes: This Figure reports reasons for disagreement between our generated model data from GPT-4 Turbo and the original version of the Pioneer Institute data for binary questions. We first ran GPT-4 Turbo on the testing sample of 30 randomly selected municipalities that were included in the Pioneer Institute’s study but were not used to train our model. We then identified the binary questions where the model responses disagreed with the Pioneer study. A law student reviewed each of these disagreements individually to determine the reason for the discrepancy, classifying them into the categories shown in the chart. When measuring the performance of the model we adjust for disagreements where the Pioneer study was outdated/incorrect and also drop ambiguous cases.

Figure A5: Relationship between First and Second Principal Components





Notes: This scatter plot illustrates the relationship between the first two principal components of our zoning regulation analysis across U.S. municipalities. The x-axis represents the first principal component (PC1), which we interpret as a measure of value capture. The y-axis shows the second principal component (PC2), which corresponds to exclusionary zoning practices. Each point represents a municipality. Municipalities in the upper right quadrant tend to have both value capture and more exclusionary practices, while those in the lower left capture less value and exclude less.

Figure A6: Nationwide Maps of Population-Weighted Averages



Panel A: First PC

Panel B: Second PC




Panel C: Affordable Incentives/Mandates

Panel D: Lowest Residential Minimum Lot Size



Notes: This Figure plots regulatory variables by state, weighted by local municipality population. We use the 2022 ACS Population as the population weight. Hawaii is grey because only one municipality (Honolulu) is in the dataset.


Figure A7: Granular County Amenities Correlations with Principal Components




Notes: This Figure shows the correlation of the first principal component of regulatory variables against a range of amenities. Retail establishment data are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) 2022 dataset. Correlations are calculated at the county level, with the number of establishments for each industry normalized to per capita measures using county population estimates. Principal Component indices are population-weighted averages of municipality level data, aggregated to the county level. Industries are classified using 2017 NAICS codes. Natural amenity data comes from USDA county natural amenities dataset.

Figure A8: Minimum Lot Size Distribution

Panel A: Lowest Residential Minimum Lot Size




Panel B: Highest Residential Minimum Lot Size



Notes: This histogram shows the distribution of minimum lot size requirements across local governments. The x-axis represents lot size in square feet, with key thresholds labeled. The y-axis shows the percentage of local governments falling into each lot size category. Vertical lines mark important thresholds: 5,000 sq ft (common suburban lot size), 10,000 sq ft (quarter-acre), and 21,780 sq ft (half-acre). We measure minimum lot sizes across all residential districts, and show the lowest such requirement within a municipality in Panel A, and the highest such requirement in Panel B. The x-axis in Panel B stops at 100 thousand square feet, though 12% of local governments have highest residential minimum lot sizes above this level.

Figure A9: Spatial Autocorrelation of Zoning Regulations and Indices




Notes: This figure displays Moran's I spatial autocorrelation statistics for various zoning regulations and indices. Moran's I measures the degree to which similar values cluster spatially, with values closer to 1 indicating stronger positive spatial autocorrelation.

Figure A10: Extra Second Principal Component Correlations


Panel A: Low-Income Housing and Ownership



Panel B: Housing and Ownership Among Younger Households




Panel C: Correlation of Second PC with Home Value Dispersion




Notes: Panel C presents correlations between the second PC and measures of home value dispersion across different median home value bins. The correlation with the 25th percentile home value reflects the absolute percent difference from the median, so a negative correlation indicates that higher-second PC municipalities have a leaner left tail, with the 25th percentile closer to the median. Similarly, a negative correlation with the 75th percentile means that the right tail is also compressed. The interquartile range correlation captures the combined effect of these shifts, with negative values indicating an overall tighter home value distribution in higher-second PC municipalities.

Figure A11: Second PC and Rent by Number of Bedrooms



Notes: This Figure plots the correlation between various rent measures and the second principal component of our housing regulatory dataset both with raw values (blue) and demeaned at the MSA level. Rent measures come from the 2022 ACS. “Overall” is the median gross rent value (B25064_001E), while other categories are median gross rents conditioned on number of bedrooms in the housing unit (i.e. B25031_003E for median gross rent for one-bedroom apartments).

Figure A12: Pairwise Correlations Between Zoning Questions



Notes: This heatmap illustrates the pairwise correlations between various zoning regulations across U.S. municipalities. Each cell represents the correlation coefficient between two zoning measures, with color intensity indicating the strength and direction of the relationship. Darker red indicates stronger positive correlations, while darker blue represents stronger negative correlations. White or light-colored cells suggest weak or no correlation. See Appendix Table A8 for full question names. See Table 4 footnote for details on sample construction.

Table A1: Variable Definitions

Variable	Source	Definition
Housing Unit Density	2022 ACS	Number of housing units divided by area from shape files.
Share Families Low Income	2022 ACS	Share of families with income below 80% of the state median income.
Share Population 65 and Over	2022 ACS	The percentage of the population aged 65 and over.
Share Units Affordable	2022 ACS	% of units affordable at state median income (rent \leq 30% of monthly income; value \leq 3x annual income).
Local Revenue Per Student	2022 Annual Survey of School System Finances	Local revenue for a school district divided by the enrollment of that school district spatially merged to local gov. borders.
Log Land Area	2022 Census Shapefiles	The area in acres of a local government with a log transform.
Miles Metro Center	2022 Census Shapefiles	Number of miles from the town centroid to the center of metropolitan area.
Log Near Neighbors	2022 Census of Governments	The number of other local govts within 25 miles of a local govts border.
Units Permitted Per Capita	BPS	The number of housing units permitted per capita averaged over 2019-2023.
1940 Foreign Born Share	NHGIS	Share foreign born
1940 Manufacturing Workforce Share	NHGIS	Ratio of the number of annual average wage earner in manufacturing to all those employed.
1940 Owner Occupied Share	NHGIS	Share of all housing units owner occupied.
Log Patents Per Capita	USPTO	Domestic patents granted between 2000–2015, normalized by population.

Variable	Source	Definition
Percent Democrat	(Bryan, 2022)	Share Democrat votes in 2020.
Year of Incorporation	(Goodman, 2023)	The year a municipality was incorporated. Not available for townships.
Property Tax Rate	(Pierson et al., 2015)	Total property tax revenue in 2017 divided by the aggregate home value in 2017 ACS.
Total Revenue Per Capita	(Pierson et al., 2015)	Total local government revenue normalized by population.
Math Test Scores	(Reardon et al., 2024)	The average math test score pooled across grades (3rd-8th) and years (2008-2019).
Natural Amenities Index	(Service, 2019)	First principal component of various climate, topography, and water area features.
Opportunity Index	(Chetty et al., 2025)	Kid family rank merged from census tracts to local governments using Geocorr.
1940 Housing Unit Density	(Markley et al., 2022)	1940 housing units per square mile in 2010 tract borders merged to local governments with geocorr.
Retail Establishments	County Business Patterns Survey	First principal component of number of retail establishments of each type per capita.

Notes: The following variables are from the 2022 American Community Survey (ACS): households over 35, % structures ≥ 2 units, commute 30 minutes or longer, college degree share, foreign born share, median gross rent, median home value, owner occupied, share mid to high income, share population under 18, share rental units, vacancy rate, and White share. USPTO refers to the United States Patent and Trademark Office; NHGIS is the National Historical Geographic Information System; CBP is the County Business Patterns dataset; BPS is the Building Permits Survey dataset; and 2022 ACS refers to the 2022 American Community Survey dataset.

Table A2: Question Level Accuracy Contributions From Prompting

Panel A: Binary Questions				
Question	Accuracy (%)			
	No Prompting	Prompt Eng.	Background Info	Prompt Chaining
ADUs Allowed	86.1%	99.0%	96.7%	96.7%
	(3.9)	(2.1)	(0.0)	(-)
Flexible Zoning By Right	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(-)
Flexible Zoning By Permit	96.0%	94.8%	95.8%	100.0%
	(0.3)	(3.4)	(2.9)	(-)
Affordable Incentive	81.4%	86.6%	99.3%	100.0%
	(2.5)	(1.9)	(1.5)	(-)
Permit Cap Or Phasing	83.3%	67.1%	91.3%	90.0%
	(0.0)	(5.2)	(1.8)	(-)
Wetlands Restrictions	76.0%	90.6%	92.7%	96.7%
	(1.5)	(5.6)	(1.5)	(-)
Multifamily Allowed	93.0%	94.7%	95.3%	100.0%
	(2.3)	(1.8)	(3.0)	(-)
Mixed-Use Buildings	79.7%	91.4%	92.6%	96.7%
	(7.5)	(2.9)	(1.5)	(-)
Conversion To Multifamily	59.5%	60.8%	88.0%	96.7%
	(1.3)	(4.1)	(3.8)	(-)
Townhouses Allowed	73.6%	68.1%	82.6%	90.0%
	(6.2)	(1.5)	(2.8)	(-)
Age-Restricted Provisions	89.5%	93.4%	98.6%	96.7%
	(5.1)	(2.9)	(1.9)	(-)
Panel B: Continuous Questions				
Question	Correlation			
	No Prompting	Prompt Engineering	Background Info	Prompt Chaining
Zoning District Count	0.88	0.95	0.94	0.98
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(-)
Longest Frontage	0.50	0.53	0.46	0.70
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(-)
Lowest Res Min Lot Size	0.80	0.87	0.79	0.92
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.29)	(-)

Notes: See Table 3 for more details.

Table A3: Confusion Matrix For Binary Performance Results

Question	True Positive	False Positive	True Negative	False Negative	True Positive Rate	False Positive Rate	Precision
Multifamily Allowed	28	0	2	0	1.00	0.00	1.00
Mixed-Use Buildings	15	0	14	1	0.94	0.00	1.00
Conversion to Multifamily	12	1	17	0	1.00	0.06	0.92
Townhouses Allowed	18	1	9	2	0.90	0.10	0.95
Age-Restricted Provisions	22	0	7	1	0.96	0.00	1.00
Accessory Apartments Allowed	18	0	11	1	0.95	0.00	1.00
Flexible Zoning by Right	1	1	27	0	1.00	0.04	0.50
Flexible Zoning by Permit	26	0	3	0	1.00	0.00	1.00
Affordable Housing	22	0	7	0	1.00	0.00	1.00
Permit Cap or Phasing	8	2	19	1	0.89	0.10	0.80
Wetlands Restricted in Lot-Size Calc	23	1	6	0	1.00	0.14	0.96
Total	193	6	122	6	0.97	0.05	0.97

Notes: This table shows a confusion matrix of model accuracy for binary variables. True Positive refers to an outcome where the model correctly predicts the positive class. False Positive is an outcome where the model incorrectly predicts the positive class. True Negative denotes an outcome where the model correctly predicts the negative class. False Negative represents an outcome where the model incorrectly predicts the negative class. The true positive rate (also known as sensitivity or recall) is the proportion of actual positive cases correctly identified by the model. The false positive rate (also known as the false alarm rate or fall-out) is the proportion of actual negative cases incorrectly identified as positive by the model. Precision (also known as positive predictive value) is the proportion of positive identifications that are actually correct. See Panel B footnote of Table 2 for details about the sample.

Table A4: Further Manual Validation

Panel A: Process Questions on Nationwide Random Sample of 30 Municipalities

Question Description	Correct	Ambiguous	Incorrect	Correct (Non-Ambiguous %)
Public Hearing Requirements	80%	10%	10%	89%
Max Review Waiting Time	87%	13%	0%	100%
Mandatory Approval Steps	93%	7%	0%	100%
Distinct Approval Bodies	80%	13%	7%	92%

Panel B: Bulk Questions on Random Sample of 30 California Municipalities

Question Description	Correct	Ambiguous	Incorrect	Correct (Non-Ambiguous %)
Lowest of Residential Min Lot Sizes	83%	6%	10%	89%
Longest Frontage Requirement	80%	10%	10%	89%

Notes: In Panel A we randomly drew 30 municipalities from our national dataset and had a law student review each answer. For Panel B, we drew a random sample of 30 municipalities from California and had a law student review each answer. Answers that are ambiguous include situations where the bulk regulations depend on whether a lot is interior or corner and the model chose one of the cases that could be correct. The column “Correct (Non-Ambiguous %)” calculates the percentage of correct responses among non-ambiguous cases. See Table A8 for full detailed versions of questions.

Table A5: Housing Regulation and Housing Supply Elasticity

Dependent Variable:	First Principal Component		Second Principal Component	
New Housing Unit Elasticity	-0.43 (0.05)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.74 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.10)
Share Land Developed (2001)	-0.87 (0.11)	-0.28 (0.23)	-2.23 (0.12)	-0.90 (0.23)
Squared Share Land Developed (2001)	0.38 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.15)	1.26 (0.08)	0.41 (0.15)
Share Land Flat Plains	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)	0.19 (0.03)	0.12 (0.07)
Log Miles to Metro Center	-0.10 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.03)
Intercept	0.14 (0.02)	-0.49 (0.07)	0.06 (0.02)	1.45 (0.06)
R-squared	0.06	0.20	0.17	0.40
N	3890	3890	3890	3890
Metro Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This specification has as the dependent variable the first regulatory principal component (value capture, first two columns) and the second regulatory principal component (exclusionary zoning, second two columns). We regress these variables against a range of variables relating to new housing production and land availability. All variables are normalized to z-scores for the regression. Housing elasticity controls follow [Baum-Snow and Han \(2024\)](#) and include fraction of land developed in 2001, squared fraction of land developed in 2001, and the fraction of land with a flat topography. Metro fixed effects include state fixed effects for municipalities not within 100 miles of a metro center. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the metro level when using metro fixed effects and are robust otherwise.

Table A6: Predicting Housing Market Outcomes With Zoning Regulation

	Residential Permits per Capita			Share Housing Units Affordable		
	XGBoost	LASSO	Bivariate	XGBoost	LASSO	Bivariate
Affordable Mandate	100		-0.00 (0.02)	51	-0.02	-0.05 (0.01)
Lowest Res Min Lot Size	22		0.01 (0.02)	100	-0.11	-0.18 (0.01)
Highest Res Min Lot Size	9		0.02 (0.02)	85	-0.06	-0.15 (0.01)
Multifamily Not Allowed	10		0.00 (0.02)	80	-0.09	-0.13 (0.01)
Affordable Incentive	32		0.02 (0.02)	52	-0.01	-0.06 (0.01)
Age-Restricted Provisions	17		0.00 (0.02)	62		-0.02 (0.01)
Wetlands Restrictions	22		0.01 (0.02)	55	-0.05	-0.10 (0.01)
Max Review Waiting Time	25		0.02 (0.01)	45		-0.02 (0.01)
No Mixed-Use Buildings	18		-0.02 (0.02)	52	-0.00	-0.03 (0.01)
Longest Frontage	26		0.01 (0.02)	40	-0.04	-0.12 (0.01)
Zoning District Count	11	0.00	0.06 (0.01)	53	-0.03	-0.05 (0.01)
Townhouses Not Allowed	9		-0.03 (0.02)	55		-0.00 (0.01)
No Conversion to Multifamily	16		0.02 (0.02)	43		-0.03 (0.01)
Mandatory Approval Steps	13		0.03 (0.02)	42	-0.00	-0.04 (0.01)
Permit Cap Or Phasing	14		0.03 (0.02)	40	-0.00	-0.04 (0.01)
Public Hearing Requirements	8		0.04 (0.02)	46		0.01 (0.01)
Distinct Approval Bodies	12		0.01 (0.02)	41		-0.02 (0.01)
ADUs Banned	18		-0.05 (0.02)	33	0.08	0.12 (0.01)
No Flexible Zoning By Right	14		0.00 (0.02)	32	0.02	0.06 (0.01)
No Flexible Zoning By Permit	9		-0.05 (0.02)	31	0.02	0.06 (0.01)

Notes: Residential permits are averaged over 2019–2023. Rental units are affordable if monthly rent is $\leq 30\%$ of state median monthly income; owner-occupied units if value is $\leq 3\times$ state median annual income. XGBoost scores are the “gain” importance, normalized so the most important feature has a score of 100. All variables are demeaned at the metro or state level. We use imputed regulations when missing for LASSO and Bivariate, see footnote of Table 5, and allow XGBoost to both impute and predict. Standard errors are in parentheses for bivariate.

Table A7: Other Associates of Principal Components

	First PC		Second PC	
	No FE	Metro FE	No FE	Metro FE
Year of Incorporation	0.01 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.02)	0.10 (0.01)	0.13 (0.02)
Property Tax Rate	0.06 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	-0.12 (0.02)
Vacancy Rate	-0.15 (0.01)	-0.15 (0.03)	0.04 (0.01)	0.06 (0.02)
% with Commute Over 30 Minutes	0.13 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.24 (0.01)	0.12 (0.03)
Share Population Under 18	-0.07 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.11 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Share Population 65 and Over	-0.07 (0.01)	-0.10 (0.02)	0.16 (0.01)	0.14 (0.02)
Median Home Value	0.18 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.28 (0.02)	0.27 (0.03)
Median Gross Rent	0.29 (0.02)	0.13 (0.05)	0.22 (0.01)	0.15 (0.03)
Foreign Born Share	0.16 (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.01)	-0.17 (0.03)
Units Permitted Per Capita	0.09 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
% Structures Built Before 1970	-0.19 (0.01)	-0.28 (0.04)	0.06 (0.01)	-0.09 (0.03)
Share Units Affordable	-0.32 (0.01)	-0.16 (0.03)	-0.29 (0.01)	-0.20 (0.04)
Opportunity Index	0.08 (0.01)	0.00 (0.03)	0.24 (0.01)	0.16 (0.03)

Notes: All right-hand side variables are measured as Z-scores. Fixed effects are for metros with State FE for municipalities not within 100 miles of a metro center.

Standard errors are shown in parentheses. We cluster standard errors at the metro/state level when including metro fixed effects and use robust standard errors otherwise. Results for other covariates can be found in Table 6.

Table A8: Mapping of Full Binary Questions to Short Names

Full Question	Short Question	ID
Is multi-family housing allowed, either by right or special permit (including through overlays or cluster zoning)?	Multifamily Allowed	4
Are apartments above commercial (mixed use) allowed in any district?	Mixed-Use Buildings	5
Is multi-family housing listed as allowed through conversion (of either single family homes or non residential buildings)?	Conversion To Multifamily	6
Are attached single family houses (townhouses, 3+ units) listed as an allowed use (by right or special permit)?	Townhouses Allowed	8
Does zoning include any provisions for housing that is restricted by age?	Age-Restricted Provisions	9
Are accessory or in-law apartments allowed (by right or special permit) in any district?	ADUs Allowed	11
Is cluster development, planned unit development, open space residential design, or another type of flexible zoning allowed by right?	Flexible Zoning By Right	13
Is cluster development, planned unit development, open space residential design, or another type of flexible zoning allowed by special permit?	Flexible Zoning By Permit	14
Does the zoning bylaw/ordinance include any mandates or incentives for development of affordable units?	Affordable Incentive	17
Is there a town-wide annual or biannual cap on residential permits issued, and/or is project phasing required?	Permit Cap Or Phasing	20
Are there restrictions on counting wetlands, sloped land or easements in lot size calculations?	Wetlands Restrictions	21
Do developers have to comply with the requirement to include affordable housing, however defined, in their projects?	Affordable Mandate	18
Are there townwide requirements for public hearings on any type of multi-family residential projects?	Public Hearing Requirements	32

Notes: See Appendix Table [A9](#) for mapping of continuous questions.

Table A9: Mapping of Full Continuous Questions to Short Names

Full Question	Short Question	ID
What is the lowest residential minimum lot size?	Lowest Res Min Lot Size	28Min
What is the highest residential minimum lot size?	Highest Res Min Lot Size	28Max
How many zoning districts, including overlays, are in the municipality?	Zoning District Count	2
What is the longest frontage requirement for single family residential development in any district?	Longest Frontage	22
How many mandatory steps are involved in the approval process for a typical new multi-family building?	Mandatory Approval Steps	30
For a typical new multi-family building project in this jurisdiction, how many distinct governing bodies or agencies must give mandatory approval before construction can begin?	Distinct Approval Bodies	31
What is the maximum potential waiting time (in days) for government review of a typical new multi-family building?	Max Review Waiting Time	34

Table A10: Housing Regulation Intensity and Distance from Metropolitan Centers

Variable	US Census Region				All
	West	Northeast	Midwest	South	
First PC	-0.10 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.23 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)
Second PC	0.06 (0.08)	0.22 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.10 (0.03)
Reg 11	-0.11 (0.07)	0.13 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Reg 13	-0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
Reg 14	0.01 (0.04)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
Reg 17	-0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.21 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.03)
Reg 18	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)
Reg 2	-0.18 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.24 (0.08)	-0.22 (0.05)	-0.17 (0.04)
Reg 20	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Reg 21	-0.03 (0.07)	0.14 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.03)
Reg 22	0.03 (0.06)	0.18 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)
Reg 28Max	0.00 (0.05)	0.19 (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)
Reg 28Min	0.04 (0.04)	0.20 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.09 (0.04)
Reg 30	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Reg 31	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Reg 32	0.00 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Reg 34	-0.09 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)
Reg 4	0.13 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Reg 5	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.12 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.02)
Reg 6	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.08 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)
Reg 8	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.02)
Reg 9	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.03)

Notes: This Table shows a regression of distance to city center against a variety of regulatory measures. We subset to within 100 miles of the center of a metropolitan area which accounts for 3,605 observations in our sample. The dependent variable is log distance to metro center. A positive coefficient indicates that the variable increases with log distance from the metro center and a negative coefficient means that the variable decreases with log distance from the metro center. See Appendix Table A8 for full definitions of zoning questions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. We cluster standard errors at the metro level and include metro fixed effects.

Table A11: Historical Determinants of Minimum Lot Size Gradients

Regional Slopes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Midwest	85.19 (24.01)	79.37 (23.05)	28.19 (21.97)	93.13 (31.32)	72.31 (27.86)	83.45 (24.79)	12.90 (23.24)	82.36 (33.02)
Northeast	345.2 (44.42)	358.7 (42.69)	205.6 (44.12)	321.8 (47.35)	330.6 (43.67)	351.1 (45.39)	220.9 (42.63)	154.5 (51.48)
South	6.283 (26.41)	2.912 (26.14)	-7.213 (27.52)	-1.022 (34.01)	10.15 (29.14)	19.91 (30.93)	-11.41 (25.97)	2.300 (40.64)
West	-5.160 (10.45)	-1.264 (12.95)	-10.50 (12.07)	9.998 (13.44)	5.697 (14.46)	0.226 (12.82)	-31.51 (14.07)	7.588 (15.30)
Controls								
Nearest Metro		✓						✓
Density × Nearest Metro			✓					✓
Foreign Born × Nearest Metro				✓				✓
Owner-occupied × Nearest Metro					✓			✓
Manufacturing × Nearest Metro						✓		✓
Manufacturing × Density							✓	✓
N	3,353	3,344	3,344	3,344	3,344	3,344	3,344	3,344
R-squared	0.136	0.248	0.329	0.263	0.267	0.266	0.288	0.371

Notes: This table shows regional variation in minimum lot size gradients by distance from metropolitan centers, using municipalities within 50 miles of a metro. The dependent variable is the lowest residential minimum lot size requirement (sq. ft.). Column (1) reports baseline regional slopes; subsequent columns add controls: nearest metro FE (2), metro FE × 1940 density (3), metro FE × 1940 foreign-born share (4), metro FE × 1940 manufacturing share of county employment (6), 1940 manufacturing share × 1940 density (7), and all controls (8). Results are robust to using log distance.

B Appendix: LLM Replicability

LLMs responses are not fully deterministic and so the results of this study cannot be completely replicated for several reasons. First, LLMs sample tokens from a probability distribution leading to variation in responses to the same query across iterations. Second, the GPT-4 class of models that we use in this study follow a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture (see [here](#) and [here](#) for further details). This means that the specific expert that an LLM query gets routed to varies across API calls depending on supply/demand of experts. In turn, this implies that the underlying probability distribution that tokens are sampled from may change from one query call to the next, depending on the availability of experts. Moreover, OpenAI’s models are closed source so there may exist other sources of randomness across API calls that we cannot explain.

One potential way to increase replicability is to request multiple responses from the LLM and then aggregate the answers by majority rule, an ensemble approach. Previous research has also found that ensemble methods can greatly improve LLM performance ([Li et al., 2024](#)).

With the OpenAI API there are two ways to ensemble API calls. The first way is to request multiple chat completions for a given query (by setting the API parameter $n > 1$). This effectively samples the distribution of tokens several times. This method is also cost effective because OpenAI only charges the user once for the input tokens regardless of how many iterations of output tokens are requested. However, this approach fails to sample from the distribution of potential experts or other potential sources of variation, for example the hardware of the server in which the LLM was run. A more costly approach is to separately query the LLM for each of the ensemble queries paying for both the input and output tokens used in each call. This second approach more broadly samples from the various sources of randomness for an LLM response.

We measure replicability with two measures in this analysis. Both measures average pairwise matching rates. We compare the final structured answer from a given LLM query across multiple API calls for all pairs (n choose 2), and take the ratio of the number of pairs that match to the total number of pairs. We call this ratio a consistency score. We measure both internal consistency, scores from requesting multiple chat completions for a given query, and external consistency, scores from

comparing separate API calls.

We confirm that lower temperatures create more deterministic responses, even after ensembling. In Table B1, we compare temperatures of 0, 0.5, and 1 (lower temperatures should mean more deterministic responses). We use a random sample of 30 municipalities from our national sample and use two questions, a binary one (whether there are permits caps or project phasing) and a continuous one (how many districts there are). For each specification we run the model five times, each time requesting 10 chat completions. We find that lower temperature models are more internally consistent, especially for the continuous question, and have a lower variance of internal consistency. After aggregating responses, we find that external consistency scores are fairly similar for the binary question, but still higher for the continuous one and with lower variance. We also do not find evidence that including a random seed makes responses more deterministic.

We next show in Figure B1 that external consistency grows with ensemble size, especially for the continuous question. This suggests that answers begin to stabilize at larger ensemble sizes, though not fully. We still find that at least five percent of pairwise comparisons do not match even with ensemble sizes of 10 and a temperature of 0. We also find that the zero temperature specification already begins at a fairly high level of external consistency even with an ensemble size of 1.


We separately found that internal consistency was more predictive of external consistency for higher-temperature models than for lower-temperature ones. Larger ensemble sizes did not improve accuracy, and internal consistency was only weakly related to accuracy, mainly for the higher-temperature model.

We suggest researchers consider one of two specifications. First, a low temperature single shot approach. This approach is cost effective by only requesting one chat completion, has a high degree of external consistency, and is straightforward to explain. If a researcher wants to use an ensemble approach then we suggest using a high temperature model with an ensemble size of at least five. High temperature ensemble models have a high degree of external consistency and have informative internal consistency scores for both predicting external consistency and accuracy. We choose to use the first approach in this paper for the higher external consistency, cost savings, and for simplicity.

Table B1: Internal and External Consistency Varying Temperature and Seed

Question	Temperature Seed		External Consistency		Internal Consistency	
			Mean	Variance	Mean	Variance
Continuous: Number of Districts	0	No	0.91	0.05	0.9	0.05
		Yes	0.89	0.04	0.9	0.04
	0.5	No	0.83	0.09	0.68	0.1
		Yes	0.8	0.11	0.67	0.1
	1	No	0.75	0.11	0.61	0.1
		Yes	0.78	0.11	0.64	0.1
Binary: Whether Permit Caps or Phasing	0	No	0.93	0.03	0.96	0.02
		Yes	0.92	0.03	0.95	0.02
	0.5	No	0.93	0.03	0.88	0.04
		Yes	0.9	0.05	0.89	0.04
	1	No	0.91	0.04	0.88	0.04
		Yes	0.92	0.04	0.86	0.04

Figure B1: External Consistency vs. Ensemble Size



C Appendix: Question Details

This appendix provides detailed information about each question used in the study. Each question is presented with its original phrasing by the Pioneer Institute, the text that we embed for the question, background information and assumptions, question type, and the rephrased question that the language model sees. For some questions, we also include a value that triggers double-checking if the model’s answer does not match it, along with the rephrased question used for double-checking and the keywords used to build context during the double-checking process. Additionally, certain questions involve subtasks, which are described in detail.

System Prompts for Each Question Type

We use a system prompt to guide the LLM in how to respond. Part of the system prompt includes details on how to structure the response, so we vary the exact system prompt by question type.

Numerical Questions: *"You are a municipal zoning ordinance expert. Use the following context which follows 'Context: ' from a municipal ordinance about zoning laws to answer the question which follows 'Question: '. You think step by step and justify each step with explanations and evidence from the context. At the end of your argument, you explicitly state your answer in the format of 'ANSWER: ' followed by a number or 'I DON'T KNOW'."*

Binary Questions: *"You are a municipal zoning ordinance expert. You use the following context which follows 'Context: ' from a municipal ordinance to answer the question which follows 'Question: '. You first review the background information on the question following 'Background Information on Question:' and treat it as additional instructions. You assume that the context includes all of the relevant legal information for the question. You review the context thoroughly for evidence to answer the question. When you cannot find any relevant information in the context, you realize that the town does not have relevant laws for the question and you reference the question background for how to handle this situation. You think step by step and justify each step with explanations and evidence from the context. At the end of your argument, you review what the answer should be and then explicitly state your answer in the format of 'ANSWER: ' and then one of 'YES', 'NO', or 'I DON'T KNOW'."*

Lot Size Questions: *"You are a municipal zoning ordinance expert. Use the follow-*

ing context which follows 'Context: ' from a municipal ordinance about zoning laws to answer the question which follows 'Question: '. Refer to the question background section for detailed instructions on how to answer the question. You think step by step and justify each step with explanations and evidence from the context. At the end of your answer, you say 'ANSWER:' and then reply with a CSV format with a column for 'District Name', 'Minimum Lot Size', 'Unit', and perhaps more depending on the question background. Ensure that you only include one row per district."

Example Question Details

Question Phrased by Pioneer: Are apartments above commercial (mixed use) allowed in any district?

Question Text That We Embed: Are apartments above commercial (mixed use) allowed in any district?

Question Background and Assumptions: Zoning bylaws and ordinances in various municipalities often contain provisions for combining residential dwellings with commercial uses such as retail or office spaces, creating mixed-use developments. While some zoning regulations explicitly allow multi-family housing and retail to co-exist within the same district, they may not clarify whether these uses can share the same building, leaving this to be determined in practice. Certain municipalities explicitly permit "combined dwelling/retail" configurations in their use regulation tables, sometimes noting that any uses allowed within the same district can occupy the same building. Additionally, detailed provisions for mixed-use are facilitated through special zoning arrangements like overlay districts (e.g., mixed use district, downtown overlay, or planned unit development) or conversion projects, such as transforming former mills to accommodate both retail and housing. However, it's important to note that some references to "mixed use" may actually pertain to commercial and industrial combinations, excluding residential components. If you cannot find any reference to residential and commercial uses in the same building within the context then you assume that the answer is 'NO'.

Question Type: Binary

Rephrased Question the LLM Sees: Is a combination of commercial and residential uses in the same building or structure allowed in any zoning district?

D Appendix: Comparison With Wharton Study

The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) is a survey-based measure of local housing market regulations. In this section we compare our study to the 2018 version of the index (Gyourko et al., 2021). The survey was administered through the International City Managers Association (ICMA) to its 10,949 member municipalities at the time, receiving 2,825 responses for a response rate of 25.8%. In Table D1, we compare our each datasets coverage. Our analysis reveals superior coverage across the distribution of various demographic and housing characteristic variables. We especially have greater coverage for low population, low white share, high college share, and high median home value local governments.

In Panel A of Table D2, we compare question level responses for two questions which overlap studies: affordable housing mandates and minimum lot sizes. Our measure of affordable housing shows a substantial correlation of 0.38 with the Wharton measure. For minimum lot size requirements, we find smaller but meaningful correlations ranging from 0.18 to 0.37 across different size categories. We next compare the accuracy of each study for the highest minimum lot size by benchmarking responses against independently sourced geographic data from Massachusetts GIS in Panel B. Our approach achieves an average accuracy rate of 77%, substantially higher than Wharton’s 50% accuracy rate when compared against the same ground-truth data.

In Table D3, we examine correlations between our principal components and the Wharton index. We find positive but somewhat low correlations ranging from 0.11 to 0.33. Besides differences in question-level accuracy, our study exclusively measures regulation, while WRLURI takes a broader approach. Of its 71 sub-questions, only 56.3% directly measure zoning regulations. The remaining questions cover important aspects of the housing production process, such as approval processes and timelines in practice (22.5%), but also questions less relevant to a strictly regulatory index, like housing market outcomes and market conditions (i.e., whether single-family housing supply meets demand). This broader scope is reflected in the PCA weights in the Wharton index. The highest weights are assigned to process-based measures, such as court involvement, state political involvement, and local political pressure indices, while direct regulatory measures such as supply restrictions and density restrictions indices receive the smallest loadings.¹⁵

¹⁵The factor loadings from the principal component analysis used to construct the WRLURI2018 are: Court Involvement Index (0.42), State Political Involvement Index (0.41), Local Political Pres-

Table D1: Sample Coverage Comparison With Wharton Index

Variable	Variable Distribution Percentiles					
	0-5th	5-25th	25-50th	50-75th	75-95th	95-100th
Population						
Wharton Sample (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	25.1	31.6
Our Sample (%)	0.3	0.7	3.8	13.7	40.5	65.3
Difference (p.p.)	0.3	0.7	3.8	8.7	15.4	33.7
Owner-Occupied Share						
Wharton Sample (%)	12.2	13.8	8.8	6.1	3.2	0.1
Our Sample (%)	30.9	29.2	17.7	10.8	5.9	0.2
Difference (p.p.)	18.8	15.5	8.9	4.7	2.7	0.1
65+ Population Share						
Wharton Sample (%)	2.7	9.8	10.5	8.6	4.8	1.4
Our Sample (%)	7.7	21.8	20.5	15.3	10.1	6.0
Difference (p.p.)	5.0	11.9	10.0	6.7	5.3	4.6
Under 18 Share						
Wharton Sample (%)	0.4	5.8	10.3	10.5	7.4	1.2
Our Sample (%)	2.6	12.1	19.2	21.3	15.4	4.5
Difference (p.p.)	2.2	6.3	9.0	10.9	8.0	3.3
White Share						
Wharton Sample (%)	11.2	15.1	9.8	6.0	1.5	0.0
Our Sample (%)	34.5	35.8	18.7	8.0	1.7	0.4
Difference (p.p.)	23.3	20.7	8.9	2.1	0.2	0.3
College Share						
Wharton Sample (%)	0.2	2.3	6.0	8.9	14.3	16.9
Our Sample (%)	1.4	6.9	11.6	15.6	27.0	46.8
Difference (p.p.)	1.1	4.6	5.6	6.8	12.7	30.0
Median Home Value						
Wharton Sample (%)	0.5	3.0	6.5	9.1	13.8	23.3
Our Sample (%)	1.7	6.7	12.1	14.1	27.9	71.4
Difference (p.p.)	1.1	3.7	5.5	5.1	14.1	48.1

sure Index (0.40), Environmental Index (0.28), Approval Delay Index (0.28), Local Project Approval Index (0.29), Local Zoning Approval Index (0.27), Open Space Index (0.24), Affordable Housing Index (0.27), Local Assembly Index (0.17), Supply Restrictions Index (0.12), and Density Restrictions Index (0.09).

Table D2: Correlation With Wharton Index

Panel A: Averages and Correlation For Wharton Questions

Question	Wharton Average	Our Average	Correlation
Affordable Housing	0.20	0.06	0.38
Minimum Lot Size	< 1/2 acre	0.50	0.49
	1/2 - 1 acre	0.17	0.13
	1 - 2 acres	0.12	0.17
	≥ 2 acres	0.22	0.16

Panel B: Comparison to Massachusetts GIS Minimum Lot Sizes

	Massachusetts GIS Data	< 1/2 acre	1/2 - 1 acre	1 - 2 acres	≥ 2 acres	Average Accuracy
Our Model	< 1/2 acre	6	2	0	1	
	1/2 - 1 acre	1	12	1	1	
	1 - 2 acres	0	1	23	2	
	≥ 2 acres	1	0	4	8	
	Percent Correct	75%	80%	82%	67%	77%
Wharton	< 1/2 acre	3	3	1	0	
	1/2 - 1 acre	4	6	7	0	
	1 - 2 acres	0	4	13	2	
	≥ 2 acres	1	2	7	10	
	Percent Correct	38%	40%	46%	83%	50%

Notes: The sample overlap is 1,171 municipalities. We drop municipalities without minimum lot size requirements. Affordable housing refers only to mandates, not incentives, and the minimum lot size questions refers only to residential districts. Massachusetts GIS data comes from MassGIS. To find the highest residential min lot size from MassGIS we first drop districts with missing/no min lot size info and then drop districts not flagged as single family zoned.

Table D3: Index Level Wharton Correlations

	Wharton Index	PC 1	PC 2	Overall Index
Wharton Index	1.00	0.33	0.11	0.22
PC 1	0.33	1.00	0.07	0.36
PC 2	0.11	0.07	1.00	0.74
Overall Index	0.22	0.36	0.74	1.00

The Overall Index sums the z-scores of all zoning questions.

E Appendix: Economic Model of Housing Regulation and Municipal Zoning

This appendix provides a detailed exposition of a model used to analyze municipal zoning regulations, household location choices, and government policy. The model combines a spatial equilibrium framework with non-cooperative local government optimization to explain the key facts around housing production, choice of regulations, and socio-economic sorting which we observe in our key facts.

E1 Model Setup

Agents and Locations: To capture the key socio-economic differences among agents, we define households as of two types: low productivity (L) and high productivity (H), earning wages w^L and w^H , respectively). These agents decide to live in one of two zones, reflecting the key spatial differences within urban areas as either a city core c and a suburb s , which are differentiated by distinct amenities (α_c, α_s) and regulatory environments. $\eta_i = \frac{N_i^H}{N_i}$ is therefore the share of high productivity workers in each zone. Denote $\tilde{w}_i = w_i^H \cdot \eta_i + w_i^L \cdot (1 - \eta_i)$ as the effective wage, and $\tilde{N}_i = w_i^L \cdot N_i^L + w_i^H \cdot N_i^H$ as the effective population.

Government Structure: Local governments within each zone $i \in \{c, s\}$ levy a homogeneous wage tax τ and differentiated housing tax t_i . Governments produce public services s_i using labor G_i , paid for by low productivity workers, and maximize net revenue.

Housing Market: The housing market clears through spatial sorting of workers. Housing rents r_i in each region are upward sloping and depend on local population density:

$$r_i = \bar{r}_i + \beta_i \cdot \log(N_i^L \cdot h_i^L + N_i^H \cdot h_i^H)$$

where \bar{r}_i is the baseline rent fixed in each region, $\beta_i > 0$ governs the supply elasticity, and N_i^j is the population of type j in zone i .

E2 Household Problem

Households maximize utility by choosing consumption (c), housing (h), and location (choice of i). The utility function for a household of type j in zone i is:

$$U_i^j = \max_{c,h} \gamma \log c + (1 - \gamma) \log h + \alpha_i - \log(N_i) + \log(s_i)$$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$c + h \cdot r_i = (1 - \tau) \cdot w^j.$$

Utility in this framework is decreasing in local population (N_i) due to congestion, and increasing in public services s_i . Housing demand in this framework satisfies:

$$h_i = \frac{(1 - \gamma)(1 - \tau)w_j}{r_i}.$$

E3 Government Problem

Local governments maximize net revenue:

$$\max_{G_i, t_i, \underline{h}_i} [\tau + (1 - \gamma) \cdot t_i] \cdot (w^L \cdot N_i^L + w^H \cdot N_i^H) - w^L \cdot \log(G_i),$$

subject to a production function on public services:

$$s_i = \gamma_i \exp(G_i),$$

a requirement on minimum housing consumption, which corresponds to exclusionary zoning:

$$h_i^j \geq \underline{h}_i,$$

a population constraint:

$$N_i^L + N_i^H = N_i$$

and a balanced budget requirement:

$$N_i \cdot [t_i \cdot r_i + \tau \cdot \tilde{w}_i(\eta_i)] \geq w^L \cdot \log(G_i).$$

The two key government regulatory policies are the choice of housing taxes t_i , which corresponds to value capture or the first principal component, and \underline{h}_i , a minimum housing requirement, which corresponds to exclusionary zoning and the second principal component. Governments in both zones choose regulations in a non-cooperative way independent of the other jurisdiction.

E4 Equilibrium and Sorting

The key condition for market clearing is that total population satisfies

$$N_c + N_s = N$$

for each household type.

In spatial equilibrium, households sort across zones until they are indifferent, resulting in the following condition:

$$[\alpha_c - \alpha_s] + \log \frac{s_c}{s_s} = (1 - \gamma) \left[\log \frac{r_c}{r_s} + \log \frac{1 + t_c}{1 + t_s} \right] + \log \frac{N_c}{N_s}. \quad (2)$$

In other words, the relative benefit of being in one zone instead of the other (based on local baseline amenity and government services) is equal to the additional costs (taxes and congestion costs). We can also substitute in the government production function and rewrite this as:

$$[\alpha_c - \alpha_s] + [\log \gamma_c - \log \gamma_s] + [G_c - G_s] = (1 - \gamma) \left[\log \frac{r_c}{r_s} + \log \frac{1 + t_c}{1 + t_s} \right] + \log \frac{N_c}{N_s}.$$

Exclusionary Zoning (\underline{h}_i) This regulatory choice is binding when raising \underline{h}_i raises revenue via the sorting of high productivity households:

$$\Delta \underline{h}_i \left(\Delta \eta_i N_i \cdot \left[t_i \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial \eta_i} + \tau \frac{\partial \tilde{w}}{\partial \eta_i} \right] + \Delta N_i \cdot \left[t_i r_i + \tau \tilde{w}_i + N_i t_i \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial N_i} \right] \right) \geq 0.$$

Value Capture (t_i) This regulatory choice is optimal when increased tax revenue offsets population loss:

$$(1 - \gamma) \cdot \tilde{N}_i + \frac{\partial \tilde{N}_i}{\partial t_i} [\tau + (1 - \gamma) \cdot t_i] \geq 0.$$

E5 Existence and Uniqueness of Solution

Solution for Value Capture To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we start from the assumption that the government’s objective function is non-negative, as governments always have the alternative of providing no public services, thereby incurring no cost. Hence, the optimal government service provision (G_i) must satisfy the first-order conditions rather than merely binding the budget constraint.

Under symmetric conditions, spatial equilibrium in equation (2) requires that the ratio of government services between the city core and the suburb ($\log(s_c^*/s_s^*)$) equals the ratio of their productivity parameters ($\log(\gamma_c/\gamma_s)$). This reduces equilibrium determination to solving the household indifference condition for population distribution (N_c^*), given that the left-hand side of equation (2) is constant and the right-hand side increases strictly with city core population (N_c). This yields a unique solution for N_c^* , implying unique equilibrium allocations for government services G_c^* and G_s^* .

Specifically, the unique equilibrium holds under the condition $d(RHS)/dN_c \cdot N_c^* \geq 1$ and $d(RHS)/dN_c \cdot N_s^* \geq 1$. If this condition fails, the equilibrium does not exist. However, because $d(RHS)/dN_c$ consistently exceeds $1/N_c + 1/N_s$, a unique equilibrium generally exists.

Solution for Exclusionary Zoning When examining existence under exclusionary zoning conditions, the equilibrium structure changes. Exclusionary zoning mandates imply all low-type households leave the zone that enforces such regulations. The household indifference condition thus applies solely to high-type households, as low-type households always prefer the non-exclusionary zone. Being constrained by exclusionary regulations imposes utility costs on low-type households, effectively excluding them from suburbs. In this scenario, equilibrium again depends on solving the household indifference condition (equation (2)) specifically for high-type households, confirming the existence of at most one internal equilibrium solution for the share of high-type households (η^*). If such an internal equilibrium does not exist—meaning the maximum utility difference between zones remains insufficient to attract high-type households—the outcome defaults to a corner solution: the city core is fully populated by low-type workers, and the suburb exclusively by high-type workers.