

The Output Cost of Inheritance

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Motivation: Inheritance Is Big

- ▶ Economic importance of intergenerational wealth transfers
 - More than half of private wealth in Western Europe and the US ([Alvaredo et al., 2017](#))
 - Annual bequest flows \approx 10-15% of GDP in advanced economies
 - Main worldwide source of new billionaires ([UBS, 2024](#))
- ▶ Implications for equity and efficiency
 - Distributional consequences have been widely studied ([Nishiyama, 2002](#); [De Nardi, 2004](#); [Benhabib et al., 2011](#); [Boserup et al., 2016](#); [Nekoei and Seim, 2023](#); [Black et al., 2024](#))
 - Less developed literature on **labor supply effects to inheritance**

Labor Supply Effects to Wealth Shocks

- ▶ Prior evidence comes from *sudden, unanticipated* wealth shocks ([Imbens et al. 2001](#), [Cesarini et al. 2017](#), [Golosov et al. 2024](#))
 - Inheritances are (at least partly) anticipated
 - ⇒ may induce behavioral responses in *advance* of receipt as well as on *impact*
 - ⇒ equivalence of inheritance and lottery wins is a “strong assumption” ([Kopczuk, 2013](#))
- ▶ Macroeconomic impact
 - ⇒ lottery represents a smaller flow compared to inheritance
- ▶ Implies positive fiscal externality of inheritance tax ([Kopczuk, 2013](#); [Kindermann et al., 2020](#))

Research Questions

- ▶ How do recipients adjust their labor supply after receiving an inheritance?
- ▶ How do these responses vary over the life cycle?
- ▶ How do responses to inheritance differ from those to lottery wins?
- ▶ What are the aggregate consequences for GDP?

Our Paper in a Nutshell (1)

Empirical estimation

- ▶ Swiss tax data matching earnings with
 - 5,000 lottery wins
 - 135,000 inheritances
- ▶ Reduced-form results (DiD, event studies)
 - Earnings responses are negative and long-lasting
 - Stronger responses for older workers, partly through early retirement
 - Women's labor supply is more elastic than men's
 - Weaker responses to inheritance than to lottery wins

Our Paper in a Nutshell (2)

Model

- ▶ Life-cycle model with endogenous labor supply (De Nardi, 2004)
 - Labor supply response varies by age and on whether the shock is expected
 - When unexpected, stronger *impact* but smaller *lifetime* response than when anticipated

Counterfactual policy experiments

- i. What if inheritance were taxed away (and dissipated)?
 - ⇒ Removing inheritance would increase GDP by 1.1% (**output cost of inheritance**)
- ii. What if the age distribution of bequests were shifted?
 - ⇒ projected \uparrow life expectancy lowers the output cost by 0.2 p.p.

Overview

Introduction

Empirical Estimation

Data

Identification

Results

Life-Cycle Model

Counterfactual Policy Experiments

Shutting off inheritance

Shifting the timing of inheritance

Conclusion

Data

- ▶ Tax data from canton of Bern ($\approx 12\%$ of Swiss population), 2002-2019
 - Inheritances ($N=135,150$); avg size = CHF 129,038
 - Lottery wins ($N=5,430$); avg size = CHF 123,261
 - Present-value adjustment
- ▶ Individual panel dataset
 - Income by source; (household) wealth; basic demographics
 - Labor earnings: employment income plus two-thirds of self-employment income
- ▶ Sample selection:
 - Wealth shock of at least CHF 10,000 ($\approx 10,000$ USD)
 - Multiple shocks (16%) \Rightarrow pick the largest shock if $\geq 2 \times$ 2nd-largest shock
 - Check: lottery player heirs ($\approx 13\%$ of heirs)


Identification Strategy

- Leverage variation in the size of the shock W_i^{pv} , conditional on receipt year and age cohort

$$\log(y_{i,t}) = \sum_{k \neq -1; k = -3}^5 \beta_k \cdot \mathbf{1}(K_{i,t} = k) \cdot \log(\mathcal{W}_i^{pv}) + \delta_i + \gamma_{a(i),t} + u_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

- δ_i : individual FE; $\gamma_{a(i),t}$: calendar year-by-age cohort FE
- β_k : labor supply elasticity
- Identifying assumption: $cov(\log(\mathcal{W}_i^{pv}), u_{i,t} | \delta_i, \gamma_{a(i),t}) = 0$
 - ⇒ Parallel trend assumption: $\beta_k = 0$ for $k < 0$
 - ⇒ Anticipation may still affect levels, but pre-shock *changes* are unrelated to $\log(\mathcal{W}_i^{pv})$


Earnings Response to Inheritance: Event Study




Earnings Responses to Inheritance and to Lottery Wins

	Inheritance (1)	Lottery win (2)
Earnings elasticity	-0.046*** (0.005)	-0.082*** (0.031)
Obs.	1,219,122	47,308
N of recipients	135,150	5,340
Average earnings (CHF)	43,500	44,029
Wealth (CHF, p.v. adj.)	349,703	352,662
Wealth (CHF, nominal)	129,038	123,261
On impact MPE (1,000 CHF)	-6 CHF	-10 CHF
Remaining worklife MPE (1,000 CHF)	-43 CHF	-148 CHF



Age Profile of Earnings Responses



Early Retirement











Gender



Heterogeneity by children

Heterogeneity by pre-shock income/wealth

Robustness

- ▶ Additional controls: 
- ▶ Balanced sample: 
- ▶ Scale treatment by pre-shock income: 
- ▶ Sensitivity to CHF 10,000 threshold: 
- ▶ Discrete treatment: 
- ▶ Comparing heirs with lottery winners: 
- ▶ By type of asset: 
- ▶ Household-level estimates: 

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Life-cycle Model with Labor Supply

- ▶ Life-cycle model with endogenous labor supply in partial equilibrium
 - Age specific incomes and survival risk (De Nardi, 2004)
 - Closed-form solution for consumption and work hours in each period
- ▶ Calibration
 - Match life-cycle income (Bern data); survival prob (WHO)
 - Set r (3%), κ for Frisch ≈ 0.3 (Chetty et al., 2011)
- ▶ Wealth shocks arrive at different ages and can be of two types:
 1. **Unexpected** (lottery-like): no anticipation; only response *on impact*
 2. **Expected** (inheritance-like): earnings adjust also *before* receipt

Elasticities: Structural and Empirical

Structural elasticity

$$\xi_a^{struct} = \frac{\log \mathcal{Y}_{i,a} - \log \mathcal{Y}_{i,a}^{ns}}{\log \mathcal{W}_{i,a}}$$


- Compares earnings w/ wealth shock to a counterfactual w/o wealth shock

Elasticity upon impact

$$\xi_a^{impact} = \frac{(\log \mathcal{Y}_{i,a} - \log \mathcal{Y}_{i,a-1}) - (\log \mathcal{Y}_{i,a}^{ns} - \log \mathcal{Y}_{i,a-1}^{ns})}{\log \mathcal{W}_{i,a}}$$


- Measures change in earnings *growth* due to shock
- What we measured empirically
- Anticipation of $\mathcal{W} \Rightarrow \xi_a^{impact} \neq \xi_a^{struct}$

Unexpected Shock at Different Ages




Expected vs. Unexpected Wealth Shocks

Example: shock at 50




Expected vs. Unexpected Wealth Shocks

Example: shock at 50




Earnings elasticity




Expected vs. Unexpected Wealth Shocks


Example: shock at 50



Earnings elasticity



Lifetime elasticity



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
Counterfactual Policy Experiments

Shutting off inheritance

Shifting the timing of inheritance


Conclusion

Shutting Off Inheritance



- Complete confiscation
 - \Rightarrow \uparrow labor supply by 1–1.7%
 - \Rightarrow \uparrow steady-state GDP by 1.1%
- Positive fiscal externality
 - \$0.05 income tax for \$1 of inheritance tax

Shifting the Timing of Inheritance



- ▶ Encouraging inter-vivos gifts
⇒ lower aggregate work incentive
- ▶ Projected life expectancy \uparrow ([Vollset et al. 2024](#))
⇒ labor supply increase by 0.2%
⇒ output cost falls from 1.1% to 0.9%

Summary

- ▶ Positive wealth shocks discourage labor supply
- ▶ Whether shock is expected or not matters (inheritance vs. lottery)
- ▶ When the shock hits matter (duration effect > on impact effect)
- ▶ An inheritance tax pushes heirs to work more (even before inheriting)
 - ⇒ Eliminating inheritance could raise labor earnings by 1.7%
 - ⇒ GDP effect of 1.1% (**output cost of inheritance**)
- ▶ Limitations:
 - Partial equilibrium analysis
 - Margin of adjustments: hours vs. wage
 - Inter-vivos gifts

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Existing Estimates of the “Carnegie Elasticity”

Effect on subsequent annual earnings of a one-dollar **lottery win**:

- ▶ Imbens et al. (2001): **-0.011** (Massachusetts)
- ▶ Picchio et al. (2018): **-0.046** (Netherlands)
- ▶ Cesarini et al. (2017): **-0.016** (Sweden)
- ▶ Golosov et al. (2024): **-0.024** (United States)

Negative average earnings effects also found with respect to:

- ▶ Inheritances (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Brown et al., 2010; Elinder et al., 2012; Bø et al., 2019)
- ▶ Asset price appreciations (Poterba, 2000; Andersen et al., 2024)
- ▶ Social security benefit increases (Gelber et al., 2017)

Present-Value Adjustment

- ▶ Standardize amounts to properly compare amounts received at different ages
 - Recipients earn interest over varying durations
- ▶ Adjust nominal wealth shocks \mathcal{W}_i based on the time available for it to grow
 - Fixed end age = 90
 - $r = 3\%$

$$\mathcal{W}_i^{pv} = \mathcal{W}_i(1 + 0.03)^{[90 - a(i)]} \quad (3)$$

Note: shocks are net of tax ([inheritance tax](#) anyway negligible)

Linking Structural and Empirical Elasticities

$$\xi_a^{struct} \approx \xi_a^{impact} - \frac{\kappa \lambda_i \mathcal{W}_{i,a}}{\Gamma_{a-1}(1+r) \mathcal{Y}_{i,a-1}^{ns} \log \mathcal{W}_{i,a}}$$

► Quantifies role of anticipation


► Depends on:

- Preference for leisure: κ
- Marginal utility of wealth: λ_i
- Discounting: Γ_{a-1}
- Interest rate: r
- Size of wealth shock


Summary Statistics

	Heirs		Lottery winners	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Wealth shock (CHF, p.v. adj.)	349,703	2,335,501	352,662	3,256,443
Wealth shock (CHF, nominal)	129,038	699,576	123,261	1,128,965
Age	57.6	11.5	50.8	12.1
Female	0.53	0.50	0.46	0.50
Married	0.70	0.45	0.57	0.48
Single	0.30	0.45	0.43	0.48
Has kids <18	0.27	0.42	0.30	0.44
Average earnings (CHF)	43,500	43,121	44,029	35,959
Taxable income (CHF)	38,596	70,201	33,556	42,179
Net wealth (CHF)	303,852	2,662,145	93,886	297,036
<i>N of recipients</i>	135,150		5,340	


Frequency of Wealth Transfers




Age Distribution Inheritances and Lottery Wins



Inheritance Tax Rates on Direct Descendants, Canton of Bern



Long-run



Average Earnings Response to a Wealth Shock: Binned Scatter Plot



International Comparison




Illustration and elasticity definition taken from [Nekoei and Seim \(2023\)](#).

Age-specific earnings responses to wealth shocks: All shocks

	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	≥70
Earnings elasticity	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.029* (0.016)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.061*** (0.010)	-0.092*** (0.011)	-0.083*** (0.017)	0.014 (0.021)	-0.026** (0.013)
Obs.	40,306	58,261	84,552	126,285	177,522	223,659	219,347	159,215	208,536
Individuals	4,726	6,705	9,346	13,821	19,506	24,827	24,178	17,461	23,781
Pr(recipient)	0.078	0.102	0.134	0.191	0.269	0.359	0.389	0.323	0.205
Avg. earnings (CHF)	47,230	51,910	55,020	57,470	58,751	57,099	48,735	25,077	4,058
Avg. \mathcal{W}_i^{pv} (CHF)	542,693	527,034	477,772	461,895	397,109	364,231	304,498	262,818	191,458
Avg. \mathcal{W}_i (CHF)	99,248	110,091	115,925	130,680	130,174	137,763	132,871	131,979	133,936
On impact MPE (1k CHF)	-1	-3	-2	-2	-9	-14	-13	1	-1
Lifetime MPE (1k CHF)	-20	-79	-39	-43	-115	-114	-41	-	-

Age-specific earnings responses to wealth shocks: Inheritance


	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	≥70
Earnings elasticity	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.026 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.063*** (0.010)	-0.089*** (0.011)	-0.077*** (0.017)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.026** (0.013)
Obs.	35,765	52,901	77,955	119,721	170,892	217,461	214,094	155,878	205,665
Individuals	4,198	6,087	8,598	13,084	18,772	24,134	23,586	17,095	23,541
Pr(recipient)	0.069	0.092	0.123	0.181	0.259	0.349	0.380	0.316	0.203
Avg. earnings (CHF)	47,398	51,957	55,366	57,683	58,932	57,289	48,866	25,117	4,064
Avg. \mathcal{W}_i^{pv} (CHF)	585,634	560,842	473,805	464,215	400,107	361,970	304,728	254,623	191,983
Avg. \mathcal{W}_i (CHF)	107,165	117,148	115,196	131,238	131,217	136,825	133,025	127,875	134,365
On impact MPE (1k CHF)	-1	-2	-2	-3	-9	-14	-12	2	-1
Lifetime MPE (1k CHF)	-23	-66	-40	-45	-119	-112	-38	-	-

Age-specific earnings responses to wealth shocks: Lottery


	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	≥70
Earnings elasticity	0.020 (0.114)	-0.098 (0.062)	-0.011 (0.047)	0.007 (0.072)	0.022 (0.060)	-0.168** (0.076)	-0.346*** (0.129)	-0.065 (0.158)	0.018 (0.126)
Obs.	4,541	5,360	6,597	6,564	6,630	6,198	5,253	3,337	2,871
Individuals	528	618	748	737	734	693	592	366	330
Pr(recipient)	0.009	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.007	0.002
Avg. earnings (CHF)	45,636	51,371	50,110	52,851	53,290	49,225	42,323	23,041	3,671
Avg. \mathcal{W}_i^{pv} (CHF)	133,364	136,176	533,950	411,632	306,656	457,909	293,200	688,998	157,063
Avg. \mathcal{W}_i (CHF)	23,783	28,508	126,253	118,591	98,688	176,643	125,301	345,375	105,808
On impact MPE (1k CHF)	7	-37	-1	1	4	-18	-50	-2	1
Lifetime MPE (1k CHF)	220	-1032	-24	17	50	-146	-156	-	-

Presence / Absence of Children

Men




Women




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Pre-Shock Income / Wealth Distribution

Pre-shock income




Pre-shock wealth




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Balanced Sample




Event Study with Discrete Treatment




Note: Treatment = 5 * avg wealth shock; control = below avg wealth shock.

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
Treatment Scaled by Pre-Shock Income




Response to Lotteries vs. Inheritance by Age




Are Lottery Players Different?




Event-study Results by Age Group: 30-34




Event-study Results by Age Group: 35-39




Event-study Results by Age Group: 40-44




Event-study Results by Age Group: 45-49




Event-study Results by Age Group: 50-54




Event-study Results by Age Group: 55-59



Event-study Results by Age Group: 60-64




Event-study Results by Age Group: 65-69




Event-study Results by Age Group: 70+




Early Retirement by Gender




Intensive vs. Extensive Responses




Intensive vs. Extensive Responses




Sensitivity to Additional Controls



Sensitivity to Additional Controls




Do liquidity and attachment effects attenuate responses?



Notes: The sample is split into (i) heirs for whom at least 50% of the inheritance value consists of housing wealth ("mostly housing"), and (ii) heirs for whom at least 50% of the inheritance value consists of non-housing wealth ("mostly cash").

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Age profile of earnings responses: household-level estimates



Calibration

Annual interest rate: $r = 3\%$ (data)





Weight of leisure: $\kappa = 0.35$ (LS elast. of 0.3)

Discount factor ρ : adj. to match life-cycle wealth

Table 1: Calibration

Age	Surv. prob. (s_a)	Income (data)	Hourly wage (inferred)
30 – 34	1	2.51	28.65
35 – 39	1	2.78	31.69
40 – 44	1	3.10	35.35
45 – 49	1	3.31	37.75
50 – 54	1	3.38	39.47
55 – 59	1	3.29	39.41
60 – 64	0.97	3.02	37.88
65 – 69	0.96	2.64	-
70 – 74	0.93	2.41	-
75 – 79	0.89	2.33	-
80 – 84	0.79	2.31	-
85 – 89	0.65	2.38	-

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Earnings response to expected wealth shocks

$$\frac{y_{i,a}^w - y_{i,a}^{w,ns}}{y_{i,a}^{w,ns}} = -\mathbb{E}_a \left[\frac{\kappa \lambda_i}{\Gamma_a (1+r)^s} \frac{W_{i,a+s}}{y_{i,a}^{w,ns}} \right] \leq 0$$

Determinants

- ▶ *Shock size*: Larger wealth shocks $W_{i,a+s}$ (relative to income/permanent income) imply bigger percentage drops in current earnings.
- ▶ *Preferences for leisure*: A higher weight on leisure (κ) amplifies the wealth effect on labor supply.
- ▶ *Marginal utility of wealth*: A higher λ_i (shadow value of wealth) increases the response.
- ▶ *Lifetime discount factor*: A lower Γ_a (which falls with age) raises the response; older individuals react more.
- ▶ *Timing and interest rate*: Greater horizon to the expected shock (s) and a higher r attenuate today's response via $(1+r)^s$.

Comparison with Empirical Estimates

