The Far-Right Donation Gap*

Julia Cagé[†1], Moritz Hengel[2], and Yuchen Huang[3]

[1]Sciences Po Paris and CEPR

[2,3]Sciences Po Paris

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Abstract

We document a widespread decline in the share of donors to charities in Western countries over the past decade, and show that this can be in part explained by the growing electoral importance of the far right, using several novel datasets and empirical strategies. First, we conduct a large-scale survey in France in 2022 and show that far-right voters are significantly less likely to report a charitable donation than the rest of the population. Second, we provide similar evidence using administrative tax data between 2013 and 2019 combined with electoral results for the universe of French municipalities, relaxing social desirability bias concerns. Using unique geo-localized charity-level records between 2012 and 2024, we next find that, while the negative relationship between far-right voting and charitable giving is stronger for charities with a global reach than for more local ones, far-right voters do not compensate less universalistic preferences by more local donations; they simply give less overall. Exploiting novel administrative tax data from the public funding of NPOs in Italy, we show that the lower altruistic preferences of far-right voters do not result from the lack of supply of communal charities. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence of a negative causal impact of far-right voting on the propensity to give, driven by the increasing salience of far-right criticism of the charitable sector.

Keywords: altruism, charitable giving, philanthropy, political donations, far-right, social norms, universalistic preferences, populism.

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[†]Corresponding author: julia [dot] cage [at] sciencespo [dot] fr.

1 Introduction

Although the 21st century is often presented as the "age of philanthropy"[1] with an unprecedented increase in the amount of charitable giving, the *share* of the population donating to charities is declining in many Western democracies (see Figure 1[2]). This drop poses a threat to the charitable business, as giving increasingly relies on a small number of individuals who enjoy a favorable tax treatment (Auten et al., 2002; Karlan and List, 2007; Duquette, 2016). In this paper, above and beyond the evolution of income, inequality and other demographic determinants of charitable giving, we relate the drop in the propensity to give to the electoral rise of far-right parties. Specifically, drawing on insights from rich survey data, novel geo-localized administrative tax data, and unique charity records, we show a significant and persistent donation gap among individuals who vote for far-right parties, both in France and in Italy. We investigate whether this gap may lead to a further reduction in the charities' donor base in the years to come.

To document what we call the "far-right donation gap" – the fact that far-right voters are significantly less likely to donate to charities than other citizens, even relative to people who abstain – we proceed in three steps. First, we run a large-scale pre-registered survey ($N = 12,600$) one week before the 2022 presidential elections in France, where we ask respondents about their past and future donations. According to our findings, Marine Le Pen's (far-right) voters are 4 to 5 percentage points less likely to make a charitable donation than citizens who abstain. This negative relationship – which we only observe among far-right voters – is robust to controlling for a large number of demographic observables, such as the age of the surveyed individuals, their gender, marital status, income, religion, life satisfaction, trust, pessimism, as well as the size of the city where they live. It is also robust to using the surveyed individuals' self-placement on a left-right scale, furthermore showing that the negative relationship between far-right voting and donations is specific to right-wing extremism and not to political extremism in general. More importantly, the size of the far-right effect does not vary when we control for additional observables, suggesting that the far-right donation gap is structural. We also show that the lower propensity of far-right voters to contribute to charities does not come from the fact that they tend to contribute time (e.g. volunteer) rather than money. Similarly, we show that it is specific to charitable giving; we do not observe a similar pattern for political donations.

Survey data may suffer from a number of concerns, in particular regarding social desirability bias in reporting. To address these concerns, we next leverage detailed administrative data on tax-deducted charitable contributions for $33,037$ French municipalities[3] between 2013 and 2019, and compare them with the vote shares obtained by each of the candidates in these municipalities in the first round of the presidential elections, controlling for a large set of time-varying city-level socio-demographic variables. We find that a 10% increase in the vote share obtained by Le Pen in a municipality compared to abstention

[1] See e.g. "A million dollars a minute: the rise and rise of philanthropy," Mark Rice-Oxley, *The Guardian*, June 18, 2021.

[2] The share of donors to charities varies strongly from one country to another in Figure 1. This is driven both by actual differences in the propensity to give, and by the use of different data sources. E.g. self-reported donations are always higher than donations reported in tax data.

[3] This represents nearly the universe of French municipalities ($\simeq 36,000$), except the very small ones due to statistical secrecy.



(a) France (tax-deducted donations)

(b) Canada (tax-deducted donations)

(c) Germany & US (household expenditure surveys)

(d) Netherlands, Sweden, UK (self-reported donations)

Notes: The figure plots the evolution of the share of households making a donation to charities. Sub-figure 1a reports this share for France using administrative tax data from Cagé and Guillot (2022) on the share of donors declaring a charitable donation on their tax return. Sub-figure 1b reports this share for Canada using the share of tax filers declaring a donation from Statistics Canada. Sub-figure 1c reports this share for Germany and the US using respectively the Deutscher Spendenrat and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. Sub-figure 1d reports this share using household survey data for Netherlands (GINPS), Sweden (Giva Sveriges), and the UK (GSS).

Figure 1: An overall decline in the share of donors to charities

is associated with a 1.5% decrease in the share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax return. Importantly, the magnitude of the estimated effect is consistent with the one we obtain when using the survey data; furthermore, we show that this effect happens both at the intensive and the extensive margin, and that it is robust to the use of different empirical specifications.

Third, we investigate the heterogeneity of the effects depending on the purpose of the charities. To do so, we obtain unique detailed information on donations received (with the precise date of the donation and the location of the donor) by several large charities with different purposes between 2012 and 2024, including the fight against global poverty, for migrants, for human rights, for global health and education, for the environment, as well as for the (local) prevention or relief or poverty, animal protection, and the conservation of cultural heritage. Overall, these charities account for more than 8% of the total amount of individual donations made each year in France.[4] To the extent of our knowledge, the use of such detailed

[4]These charity-level data also allow us to overcome a potential limitation of the administrative data. While most individuals declare their donations on their tax form to benefit from tax deductions, not all of them do so. The charity records are instead fully exhaustive, and so cannot suffer from an under-reporting bias. The charities included are listed and described in details in the online Appendix Section A.

information on the actual amount received by large charities capturing the diversity of the philanthropic sector is unprecedented.

Using these data – which we similarly merge with the electoral results at the local level – we find that a one standard-deviation increase in Le Pen's vote share in a municipality is associated with a 0.06 to 0.21 standard-deviation decrease in the share of households donating to the charities fighting against global poverty, helping migrants, and fighting for global health or against global warming. The magnitude of the drop is consistent with the one obtained using the tax data.

On the contrary, the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to give does not hold for the more local 30 Millions d'Amis charity working in the field of animal protection, nor for the charity safeguarding the local French heritage. This is consistent with the work of Enke (2020) who highlights the positive correlation between "communal morality" – i.e. the preference for giving only to people like oneself – and voting for Trump in the US context, and points to the fact that the decrease in the probability of giving is mostly driven by a decrease in donations to universalistic charities, reflecting a decline in universalistic values by far-right supporters. In the end, however, far-right voters do not compensate less universalistic preferences by more local donations; they simply give a lot less overall. Hence, our results suggest that the rise of nationalist-right political movements is accompanied by a general decline of altruism and solidarity, rather than a refocusing of altruism.

We then show that the far-right donation gap does not result from the lack of supply of "communal" charities – supporting local good causes – nor is it specific to France. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to give hold both in cities with at least one local charity and in French cities with none. Second, we use novel non-publicly available tax data on the public funding of the third sector in Italy, where every year taxpayers can devote five thousandths of their total income tax to nonprofit organizations, including the social activities in their municipality of residence (the so-called "cinque per mille" system).[5] Using annual city-level information merged with general election results, we find that Fratelli d'Italia voters are less likely than other taxpayers to express a preference as part of the cinque per mille system. This is consistent with a general decline in altruism. However, pointing towards more local preferences, conditional on expressing a preference, they contribute more to their commune of residence.

Despite the fact that we control for many time-varying covariates that could be associated both with far-right voting and the propensity of giving (including measure of demographics, education, wealth, income, employment, share of foreigners, as well as life satisfaction and trust when using survey data), the

[5] As described in Section 2.2.2 below, in Italy citizens can devote five-thousandths of their total income tax to third sector entities and non-profit organizations, including the social activities in their commune of residence. To do so, all they have to do is fill in the sheet specifying the destination of the 5 per thousand at the end of their tax return. Specifically, a taxpayer can decide either (i) to express a preference toward a given organization, (ii) to express a preference toward a category of organizations, (iii) to express a preference toward the "social activities in the commune of residence," or (iv) not to express any preference. In the last case, the equivalent of 5 per thousand of the taxpayer's income taxes is simply transferred to the general budget. While the 5 per thousand mechanism has already been used in the literature as a measure of social capital (see e.g. Buonanno et al., 2024), we are, to the extent of our knowledge, the very first to exploit the (non publicly-available) tax data on the choices made by taxpayers within each municipality.

above findings can be driven either by other (unobserved) correlated factors or by the fact that moving to the far right has a causal impact on the probability of giving. We finally provide suggestive evidence of the latter. First, using the panel dimension of our administrative tax data, we introduce city fixed effects and investigate the impact of the change in the vote for the far right between 2012 and 2017 on the change in the propensity to make a charitable donation. We show that both the level of support for the far right and the change matter. We obtain similar results when considering the charity data covering three presidential elections (2012, 2017 and 2022): the negative relationship between far right voting and the propensity of giving to global charities is robust to controlling for city fixed effects, pointing toward a negative causal impact of an increase in the support for the far-right on giving.[6] Second, we take advantage of the fact that, for some of the charities that provided us with their records, we have donation data going back to 1990. We show that, if anything, the places that voted more for the far right in the 2002 presidential elections – which were marked by Le Pen's first electoral breakthrough – were characterized by a *higher* share of donors historically. Third, using our survey data, we study whether the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to give is driven by loyal far-right voters or by new voters. We show that the propensity to give is lower among Le Pen faithfuls – individuals who voted for Le Pen both in 2017 and in 2022 – than among Le Pen converters, but that converters also change their behavior when convinced by Le Pen. Ultimately, we perform media content analysis to better understand the intensification of far-right voters' preferences against charities, and document in particular the increasing salience of far-right criticism of the charitable sector.

Our findings have implications for the nonprofit sector and inform ongoing debates about the challenges facing it, including financial issues. In particular, our analysis highlights that future electoral gains by the far right – whatever their causes – may lead to a further drop in the share of individuals willing to donate to charities.

Literature review This paper contributes to the literature investigating the determinants of charitable donations (among others Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni et al., 2017; Dawood, 2015). While a number of important factors have been studied – pure altruism versus warm-glow effect (Andreoni, 1990), reputation concerns (Tirole and Bénabou, 2006), price of giving (Randolph, 1995; Karlan and List, 2007; Rondeau and List, 2008; Fack and Landais, 2010, 2016) – we still know little about the relationship between charitable giving and political preferences. Existing evidence points toward a higher propensity of Conservative/Republican voters to give compared to Labour/Democrat supporters (see Alzuabi et al. (2022) on the UK, and Yen and Zampelli (2014) and Margolis and Sances (2017) on the US). But empirical studies do not achieve general consensus (Paarlberg et al., 2019; Yang and Liu, 2021). We are, to the extent of our knowledge, the first to provide evidence – using novel survey data, administrative tax data, and charity records – on the decrease in the share of charitable donors and its relationship to the electoral rise of the far right. This is particularly relevant given that a shrinking donor base echoed by a rise of the far right might

[6]Furthermore, in the spirit of a Granger causality test, we show that past far-right voting contains unique information to forecast the future share of donors.

undermine public support for subsidies granted to charities, often in the form of favorable tax treatment that benefit donors.

Our results showing that far-right voters are particularly less likely to support global charities echo the findings of Enke (2020) and Enke et al. (2022) who emphasize the difference between universalist and communal moral values (see also Ziblatt et al., 2023, on parochial altruism). However, we go one step further by showing that far-right voters do not fully compensate their hostility toward global charities by contributing more to more local ones. They simply give less overall, even in the Italian context where they could contribute to the social activities of their commune of residence at no direct cost. Further, exploiting the French multi-party electoral system allows us to show that the donation gap is specific to the far right as opposed to the right or to extreme parties in general. Besides, we make an important methodological contribution by highlighting the need to combine survey data with administrative and charity-level data to cross-validate results and overcome various measurement errors related to social desirability and reporting. Moreover, we leverage the panel dimension of our data to compare the co-evolution of donation behavior and political preferences over time.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on social capital and civic engagement. Our results show that the far-right donation gap is not driven by the factors that have traditionally been associated with far-right voting, such as pessimism, unhappiness, and (a lack of) trust at the individual level (see e.g. Algan et al., 2017, 2019; Giuliano and Wacziarg, 2020; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). They suggest that the rise of the far right may be seen as a source of deteriorating social capital, and that this surge affects not only the social acceptability of charitable behaviors (Ali and Bénabou, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2020) but also the underlying preferences toward donations. Our results are also linked to the literature on the preferences toward redistribution; Alesina and Glaeser (2004) show that people partly support redistribution out of altruistic concerns, but that altruism is parochial. Our findings point toward the fact that far-right voters might have a more restricted view of who the in-group members are, excluding not only migrants or individuals abroad, but also members who could be considered "in-group" in many aspects, yet are perceived as different, in particular because they live on handouts.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 below, we present the novel databases we build for this study and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents our main findings on the negative relationship between far-right voting and charitable donations, and we show in Section 4 that the decrease in the probability of giving is mostly driven by a decrease in donations to universalistic charities. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms at play, and provides suggestive evidence of a causal impact of far-right voting on the probability of giving. Section 6 concludes.

2 Data and Descriptive statistics

In this section, we briefly introduce the different data sources we use in this paper. Additional summary statistics and a more detailed description of the data are provided in the online Appendix.

2.1 Survey data

We ran a pre-registered survey between April 2 and April 4, 2022, as a part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey (*"L'Enquête Electorale Française"*), a monthly panel run from September 2021 to June 2022 jointly by the survey company Ipsos, the newspaper *Le Monde* and the CEVIPOF at Sciences Po Paris.[7]

The data contains 12,600 individuals representative of the French voting-age population, for which we have detailed socio-demographic characteristics (including gender, age, education, location, profession, religion, and income; see online Appendix Table C.1 for descriptive statistics). Respondents are also asked about their political preferences, such as their projected vote in the 2022 presidential elections and their self-reported vote in the 2017 presidential elections (see online Appendix Table C.2 for summary statistics). As part of this research project, we added to this survey a novel module on past and future charitable and political donations. Specifically, we introduce the following questions:[8]

- Of the following organizations, have you made a donation in the last 12 month to *[a non-profit organization/a foundation/the Téléthon/A political party or movement/An electoral campaign]*?
- If yes, what was the overall amount of your donations?
- If yes, did you report this donation on your income tax return?
- Do you plan to make a donation in the next 12 months to *[a non-profit organization/a foundation/the Téléthon/A political party or movement/An electoral campaign]*?
- If yes, how much do you plan to donate?

Table 1 reports summary statistics on these variables. 43% of the surveyed individuals report a charitable donation in the past 12 months, while about 5% of the individuals report a political donation. Among those who report a donation, the average amount donated (combining both charitable and political donations[9]) is €249. 63% of the surveyed respondents in our sample also report having declared this donation on their income tax return.

Our data may suffer from a reporting bias that has been well-documented in the existing literature; because of social desirability, surveyed individuals tend to over-report donations (see e.g. Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). Indeed, only about 10 to 12% of French households on average report a donation every year on their income tax return as observed in the fiscal data (Cagé and Guillot, 2022), while 28% of the individuals surveyed report to have made and declared a charitable donation. Note however that part of the

[7]The survey was pre-registered at the AER RCT Registry: AEARCTR-0009023. The first part of the survey is about the reported donations (past and future) of the surveyed individuals and is at the core of this research paper. The second part is an experiment aimed at understanding the role played by tax deductions and belongs to a different research project.

[8]In the questionnaire, we distinguish non-profit organizations (in French, *"associations"*) from foundations (in French, *"fondations"*) given that they are formally two different legal forms of non-profits, which may create confusion (e.g. citizens may think that they make a donation to a "fondation" that formally is an "association" and vice versa; the main differences between the two come from the bylaws as well as from different tax deductions – in particular with respect to the wealth tax). We ask specifically about the Téléthon (a charity event organized since 1987 by the French Muscular Dystrophy Association), given that it is the most famous French non-profit organization.

[9]Unfortunately, given the strong space (and monetary) constraints associated with the fact of adding a new module to the existing *"Enquête électorale"* (with $12,600$ surveyed individuals), we were not able to ask individuals separately for the amount of their charitable donations vs. the amount of their political donations. If we only consider the subset of individuals who declare a charitable donation but no political donation ($5,312$ individuals out of the $5,890$ who declare a charitable donation), the average amount reported is €241.

Table 1: Summary statistics: Survey data, Past and future (self-reported) donations

	Mean	St.Dev
Have you made a donation in the past 12 months to		
A non-profit organization	0.31	0.46
A foundation	0.15	0.36
The Téléthon	0.10	0.30
A charitable donation (overall)	0.43	0.49
A political party	0.04	0.21
An electoral campaign	0.02	0.14
=1 if declared the donation(s)	0.63	0.48
I have not made any donation	0.55	0.50
Amount		
Amount of donations (including the 0s)	113	422
Amount of donations (cond. on giving)	249	600
Have you declared a donation in the past 12 months to		
A non-profit organization	0.22	0.41
A foundation	0.10	0.30
The Téléthon	0.07	0.25
A charitable donation (overall)	0.28	0.45
A political party	0.03	0.17
An electoral campaign	0.01	0.11
Do you plan to make a donation in the next 12 months to		
A non-profit organization	0.31	0.46
A foundation	0.15	0.36
The Téléthon	0.10	0.30
A political party	0.03	0.18
An electoral campaign	0.01	0.11
Total amount I plan to give	228	501
I don't plan to make a donation	0.57	0.50
Observations	12,600	

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

gap between the fiscal data and the reported donations in the survey may also come from the fact that most households (as encompassed in the tax data) include several individuals, while the survey data is at the individual level. To address the bias that may come from social desirability, we nonetheless complement our survey data with administrative tax data and charitable-level donation information.

2.2 Administrative tax data

2.2.1 France

We use administrative tax data from Cagé and Guillot (2022), which include the total amount of charitable donations declared by households aggregated at the municipality/year level in France between 2013 and 2019. The data encompass $33,037$ municipalities, which represents nearly the universe of French municipalities ($\simeq 36,000$), except the very small ones due to statistical secrecy. Specifically, the data include all charitable donations that benefit from a 66% tax deduction. These administrative tax data also include municipality/year information on the number of tax households.

2.2.2 Italy

In Italy, citizens can devote five-thousandths (0.5 percent) of their total income tax (IRPEF) to third sector entities and non-profit organizations, including the social activities in their municipality of residence.[10] To do so, they just need to fill in the sheet specifying the destination of the 5 per thousand at the end of their tax return.[11] Specifically, a taxpayer can decide either (i) to express a preference toward a *given organization* (identifying it with the fiscal code of the association), (ii) to express a preference toward a *category of organizations*, e.g. scientific research or health research[12], (iii) to express a preference toward the "social activities in the municipality of residence" (in this case, taxpayers can only contribute to the municipality they live in), or (iv) not to express any preference. In the last case, the equivalent of 5 per thousand of the taxpayer's income taxes is simply transferred to the general budget (just like the rest of the taxes). See online Appendix Figure E.4 for an illustration.

In the first three cases, the State has to devote 5 per thousand of their taxpayer's income taxes to the chosen sector or organization. We obtain from the Italian tax administration non-publicly available annual data covering the years 2018 to 2022, with information at the city level on the number of choices and amount contributed to (i) third sector entities and non-profit organizations ("enti del terzo settore e onlus"), (ii) scientific research ("ricerca scientifica"), (iii) health research ("ricerca sanitaria"), (iv) cultural and landscape heritage ("beni culturali e paesaggistici"), (v) amateur sports associations ("associazioni sportive dilettantistiche"), (vi) management bodies of protected areas ("enti gestori delle aree protette"),

[10] The 5 per mille system was introduced experimentally in 2006 and then generalized in 2010. See online Appendix Section E.2 for more details on this mechanism.

[11] They can also devote respectively two-thousandths (0.2 percent) and eight-thousandths (0.8 percent) of their IRPEF to the political party of their choice and to the religion of their choice (see e.g. Cagé, 2018).

[12] The amount collected through the preferences expressed for the entire category are then redistributed among the different entities registered in the category.

as well as to (vii) the social activities in the commune of residence ("attivita' svolte dai comuni"). On average, during our time period, 40% of the taxpayers express a choice as part of the 5 per mille. Online Appendix Figure E.5 plots the allocation of these choices.

2.3 Charity-level data

We obtained access to detailed data on the donations received from 2012 to 2024 by several large charities with different purposes: two charities that fight global poverty and world hunger (Action Contre la Faim and Oxfam), one charity that provides humanitarian and developmental aid to children worldwide (UNICEF), one charity that provides humanitarian medical care (Médecins sans Frontières), one charity for the rescue of migrants at sea (SOS Méditerranée), one charity that gives assistance and support to foreigners (La Cimade), one charity that defends human rights (LDH), one charity that works in the field of wilderness preservation and the reduction of human impact on the environment (WWF), one charity that works to preserve the marine environment and species and to increase social benefits in the fishing sector (Bloom), one charity whose objective is to combat animal suffering (30 Millions d'Amis, focusing in particular on animal refuges and abandoned pets), one charity dedicated to social solidarity and evangelism (La Cause, a Protestant foundation), one charity committed to relieving isolation and loneliness among the elderly (Les Petits Frères des Pauvres), one charity dedicated to biomedical research (Institut Pasteur), and one charity whose mission is to safeguard and promote local French heritage (Fondation du Patrimoine). Overall, these charities account for more than 8% of the total amount of individual donations made each year in France; hence, while they obviously do not provide us with a fully exhaustive view of the nonprofit sector in France, the evidence we draw from them is more than anecdotal. Further, it allows us to get a better sense of what is driving the drop in the share of donors – the charity sector is indeed heterogeneous. We describe them in detail and provide descriptive statistics in the online Appendix Section A.

These data allow us to compute for each year and each city the total amount received by each of these charities, the number of donors and the average donation (conditional on giving). Just as we did for the administrative tax data, we merge these charity-level data with city/year-level covariates and in particular the presidential election results, and compute the amount of donations made per tax household.

2.4 Additional data

2.4.1 National Directory of Associations

To gain additional insights into the supply side of charities, we rely on the French national directory of associations (*"Répertoire National des Associations,"* RNA), the repository of all the non-profit organizations (see e.g. Urvoy, 2025). By law, all French non-profit organizations are included in this dataset, which contains a unique identifier for each of them, as well as their stated purpose. About $80,000$ charities are included in this dataset, with their statement of purpose. Using this statement, we classify them as local or global (see online Appendix Section E.3 for details on the data construction).

2.4.2 Electoral data

France For each commune, we obtain the election results for the first round of the 2012, 2017 and 2022 presidential elections from the French Ministry of the Interior's website. We focus on presidential elections for the sake of comparison between cities (in contrast with other elections, the same candidates run in all the cities during presidential elections).

Italy Contrarily to France, there is no direct election of the president of Italy (the president is elected by a joint assembly composed of the Parliament and regional representatives). We thus rely on data for the Italian general elections that took place in 2018 and in 2022, which we collect from the Italian Ministry of the Interior's website.

2.4.3 City-level controls

France Finally, we obtain city-level socio-demographic information for France from Cagé and Piketty (2023). The set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2 below.

Italy For Italy, we rely on the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) decennial censuses that were conducted in 2001, 2011, and 2021, as well as from the "continuous" (combining administrative data and sample statistics) census run since 2016. The specific set of controls included is described in Section 5.2.2.

3 Empirical estimation: The far-right donation gap

In this section, we document a negative relationship between support for the far right and donations to charities, using both survey data and administrative tax data.

3.1 Evidence from survey data

To estimate the relationship between electoral support for the far right and the propensity to donate to charities, we first rely on the individual-level survey data described in Section 2.1. We estimate the following model:

$$Donor_i = \pi_0 + \boldsymbol{Vote_i'}\pi_1 + \boldsymbol{X_i'}\pi_2 + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where i indexes the surveyed individuals, and $Donor_i$ is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise.

$\boldsymbol{Vote_i'}$ is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections.[13] The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote. $\boldsymbol{X_i'}$

[13] Twelve candidates ran in the first round of the elections.

is a vector of controls including demographics (gender, age, marital status, unemployment status, socio-economic status), the respondent's income bracket, her religion, life satisfaction, 'political trust' (i.e. trust in the president, the MPs, the city mayor, the media and the political parties), 'social trust' (i.e. trust in family members, in people she personally knows, and in strangers), and the size of the city where she lives (see Section 2.1 above and Appendix Table C.1).

Figure 2 reports the results of the estimation (see online Appendix Table C.3 for the associated regression table). We first report the raw relationship between far-right support and the propensity to donate (blue dots) and then progressively introduce the controls. We find that respondents who intend to vote for Le Pen report on average a 4 to 5% lower probability of having made a donation than people who abstained. This result is significant at the 5% level. Zemmour's voters also tend to give less than abstainers – and than supporters of other candidates (except Le Pen) – but to a lower extent. Thus, while voting is generally associated with a higher propensity to donate relative to abstention, the reverse is true for far-right voters (Yen and Zampelli, 2014). Interestingly, this effect is specific to the far right; we do not find a similar effect for the far-left voters who, if anything, tend to contribute more than abstainers.[14]

Importantly, this gap in the propensity to donate between far-right citizens and other voters does not disappear or change in magnitude when we add controls. On the other hand, for other candidates, we see a drop in the conditional propensity to donate, in particular when we control for demographics for Emmanuel Macron and Valérie Pécresse voters, who tend to be older than abstainers. In other words, the observable characteristics such as income and life satisfaction can partly explain why supporters of other parties donate more than abstainers, but cannot rationalize why far-right supporters contribute less.

Robustness We find similar results if, rather than using the expected votes, we use a self-evaluated political preference scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) as the independent variable; the results are reported in the online Appendix Table C.4.[15]

Moreover, the results are robust to using a Logit or a Probit specification rather than a linear probability model (online Appendix Tables C.5 and C.6) and to using intended future donations instead of reported past donations (Table C.7). They are also robust to considering the intensive rather than the extensive margin of the donations (Figure D.3[16]).

However, since the survey data rely on self-reported donations, there could be a concern over misreporting, in particular due to the social desirability bias. To deal with this, we next turn to the use of the administrative tax data and document a similar pattern.

[14]The difference between far-right voters and voters for "other right" candidates is not statistically different. This is not surprising given that these other right candidates, and in particular Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, are close to the Rassemblement National. Both in 2017 and in 2022, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan endorsed Marine Le Pen in the second round of the presidential elections.

[15]Online Appendix Figure D.1 plots the average share of individuals who report a charitable donation depending on their self-reported placement on the left-right scale. Le Pen voters mainly declare themselves in the 8 to 10 categories (Figure D.2). While 6.55% of the surveyed individuals declare themselves very on the right, this share reaches 19.44% among Le Pen voters.

[16]In this case – and given that we only have information on the total amount donated, including potentially both donations to charities and donations to political parties/campaigns – we focus on the subset of surveyed individuals who declare a charitable donation but no political donation.



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (1), using OLS. An observation is an individual ($N = 12,600$) and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table C.3. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The "Far Left" candidates include Fabien Roussel (Parti communiste, 2.28% of the votes), Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 0.77%), and Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière, 0.56%). The "Left" candidates include Anne Hidalgo (Parti socialiste, 1.75%) and Yannick Jadot (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, 4.63%). The "other right" candidates include Jean Lassalle (Résistons, 3.13%) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, 2.06%). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote.

Figure 2: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Evidence from self-reported donations (2022 electoral survey)

3.2 Evidence from administrative tax data

We merge the city-level electoral results with the administrative tax data on the annual share of households in a city that report a charitable donation in their tax declaration. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$Donation_{c(d),t} = \pi_0 + \boldsymbol{Elections'_{c(d)t}}\pi_1 + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}\pi_2 + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t} \quad (2)$$

where c indexes the cities, d the departments and t the years.

The dependent variable, $Donation_{c(d),t}$, is respectively the share of households that deducted a charitable donation on their tax return in city c in year t when considering the extensive margin, the average value of the donations when considering the intensive margin, and the total amount donated (normalized by number of households). In our preferred specification, we use the logarithm of these variables.[17]

The main independent variable, $\boldsymbol{Elections'_{c(d)t}}$, is a vector of the (logarithm of the) vote shares obtained by the candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections, with the share of the registered voters abstaining or voting blank or null as the reference category. We use the 2012 election results when considering the donations made between 2013 and 2016, and the 2017 election results when considering the donations made between 2017 and 2019.

$\boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}$ is a time-varying vector of city-level controls, which, as before, we introduce sequentially. It includes measures of socio-economic characteristics: population of the city, population of the conurbation, and average age of the population; municipal wealth proxied by the real estate capital and the share of owners; average income per inhabitants; share of foreigners; employment structure (share of farmers and self-employed, share of employees and blue-collar workers, share of managers and professionals, and share of unemployed); and education level (share of baccalaureate holders and share of university graduates over 25 years old) from Cagé and Piketty (2023). All these controls are introduced non-linearly (for each variable, we classify the municipalities by population-weighted deciles, and control for the municipality's position in the characteristics of interest distribution – e.g. as functions of their proportions of employees and blue-collar workers). Finally, we control for department fixed effects (γ_d); we also introduce time fixed effects (ω_t) when using a pooled cross-section. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments.

Figure 3 reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) separately for the 2012 presidential elections (sub-Figure 3a) and for the 2017 presidential elections (sub-Figure 3b).[18] The patterns we obtain are consistent with the survey-level results: both in 2012 and 2017, cities with a higher vote share for Le Pen also have a lower share of households declaring a donation to charities. In terms of magnitude, with

[17] Note that – given that the tax administration only provides information for those cities with at least five donors for statistical secrecy reasons – these variables are always strictly higher than zero. We show robustness to the use of different functional forms below.

[18] The corresponding regression tables are reported in the online Appendix (respectively Table C.8 and C.9).

respect to abstention, a one-percent increase in the vote share for Le Pen in 2012 is associated with a 0.13 to 0.21% decrease in the share of donors. This finding is robust to controlling for the local socioeconomic conditions, and the magnitude is roughly similar for the 2017 elections (0.10 to 0.19% decrease).

Note also that, similarly to what we observe in the survey data, the negative relationship holds for the far right independently of the set of covariates included. Regarding the other political parties, we find as before that their voters tend to give more to charities than abstainers, an effect partly driven by a number of observables such as real estate capital, but not entirely. Just as in Figure 2, once the full set of controls is introduced, Mélenchon supporters do not behave differently than abstainers; however, this implies that they give significantly more than far-right voters.

Magnitude of the effects Note also that the magnitude of the estimates is consistent with the one we obtain when using the survey data. As reported in Figure 3, a 1% increase in the vote share for Le Pen is associated with a decrease of around 0.15% in the share of donors, which implies that moving from abstaining to voting Le Pen (i.e. a 100% increase in the vote share for Le Pen) leads to a 15% decrease in the share of donors. According to the survey data, the share of donors among abstainers is equal to 35.4%; hence, a 15% drop would decrease this share to 30.1% i.e. a drop of 5.3 percentage points in the share of donors, consistent with the fact that, according to our survey estimations, Le Pen's voters are around 5 percentage points less likely to make a charitable donation than abstainers. It is thus unlikely that the reported difference between far-right voters and the rest of the population comes from a reporting bias.

Robustness The estimates presented in Figure 3 are robust to using a number of different empirical strategies and specifications, as shown in online Appendix Table C.10. First, they are robust to using the level (rather than the logarithm) of the share of donors (Columns (1) and (2)). They are also robust to using a Poisson regression (Columns (3) and (4)) (Mullahy and Norton, 2024). Last, they are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar if, rather than considering each election separately, we pooled the data for 2013-2019 (Column (5)), and are unchanged if we weight the observations by the population of the cities (Column (6)). They also hold when breaking the tax data down annually (Table C.11).

Next, we show that our results are robust to using the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin of charitable donations, i.e. to investigating how much individuals contribute conditional on making a donation (online Appendix Table C.12). According to our estimates, a one-percent increase in the vote share for Le Pen compared to abstention is associated with a 0.07% decrease in the average amount given, conditional on giving (Column (2)). They are also robust to considering the overall amount of donations (Column (3)).

Finally, some households may decide not to report their donations on their tax returns, in particular if they are not eligible to the tax deductions (see e.g. Fack and Landais, 2010). In Section 4 below, we show that the negative relationship between far-right voting and the share of donors holds when we use charity records – which do not suffer from a such an under-reporting bias – and that furthermore it is of a similar



(a) 2012 votes and 2013-2016 donations



(b) 2017 votes and 2017-2019 donations

Notes: The figure reports the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Tables C.8 (sub-Figure 3a) and C.9 (sub-Figure 3b). All specifications control for department fixed effects, and the set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and coefficients for smaller candidates are not reported for the sake of readability.

Figure 3: Far-right voting and share of donors: Evidence from administrative tax data and electoral results

order of magnitude.

3.3 Charitable donations, volunteering and political donations

Lastly, we show that the far-right donation gap is not due to a substitution between time and money, or between charitable and political donations.

Time vs. money First, we show that the far-right donation gap does not come from the fact that far-right donors prefer to donate time rather than to contribute financially to the associations. While we do not have questions on volunteering in our survey data, this appears clearly from other surveys. In particular, in the online Appendix Section E.1, relying on the ELIPSS surveys, we show that Le Pen's supporters as well as individuals who place themselves to the right on a left-right scale do not have a higher probability of being members of an association, and even less of being active members. If anything, they tend to volunteer less that the rest of the electorate.

Political donations Next, as seen clearly in the online Appendix Figure D.4, the far-right donation gap seems to be specific to charitable donations; we do not observe a similar pattern for political donations in the survey data.[19] However, far-right voters may substitute between political and charitable donations. To investigate whether this is the case, we rely on two different datasets which give similar results. First, we focus on the sub-sample of municipalities in our data for which information on the aggregate amount of political donations declared on the households' tax forms is available.[20] Second, we collect additional data on the individual donations received by the main political parties (including the far-right Rassemblement National) between 2016 and 2022, with precise information on the location of the donor. These data come from the *"Commission Nationale des Comptes de Campagne et des Financements Politiques"* (CNCCFP), the French agency in charge of approving candidates' campaigns accounts.[21] In the online Appendix Table C.13, we estimate equation (2) but introduce as a control the share of households in the municipalities that declare a political donation. Whether we use the tax data (Column (2)) or the CNCCFP data (Column (4)), we see that controlling for the share of political donors does not significantly impact the negative relationship between far-right votes and charitable donations.[22] This is also the case when we control

[19] On average, the probability of making a donation is much lower for political than for charitable donations (4% for donations to parties and 2% for donations to campaigns). Le Pen supporters are not less likely than other voters (e.g. Macron supporters) to make a political donation. The higher probability we observe for Eric Zemmour (another far-right candidate) voters is due to the specifics of the 2022 presidential elections. Zemmour was not a professional politician before 2021 and so his party, Reconquête, did not receive public funding and had to rely entirely on private donations. Furthermore, compared to the rest of the population, Zemmour's voters have a high income, and high-income households tend to give more to politics (see e.g. Bouton et al., 2022; Cagé, 2018). Once we control for their income, part of the effect disappears.

[20] This includes all the municipalities for which there is a high-enough number of households making a political donation so as to guarantee anonymity. The data is from Cagé and Guillot (2022) and was provided to them by the tax administration. Unfortunately, the beneficiary of the political donation is not included in the administrative tax data.

[21] The CNCCFP anonymized the raw donation data before delivering them to us as part of a research agreement. We then merge and clean these data to make them consistent at the party/year/city level.

[22] The magnitude of the effect differs between the two data sources given that the set of cities included is not the same.

separately for the households who make a political donation to the Rassemblement National and those who make a political donation to another party (Column (5)).

In Column (6), we only consider the cities in which there is no donation for the Rassemblement National party and in Column (7) only those in which there is at least one donation for this party. We see that, despite the fact that there is a positive correlation between political and charitable donations, the far-right donation gap holds both in places where people donate to the RN and in places where they do not.

Overall, while these results should be interpreted with caution – the share of political donors can indeed be considered as a bad control in our context – they point toward the fact that the far-right donation gap does not seem to be driven by a substitution effect between political and charitable donations among far-right voters.

Overall, our results show that the propensity to donate to charities is lower among far-right voters. Further, when contributing to charities, far-right voters tend to give less than other citizens, including those who abstain. However, the charitable sector is highly diverse, from health care and social assistance to the provision of educational services, through arts, entertainment, and recreation or the fight against poverty, at home or abroad. While hostility to immigration is a driving force behind far-right voting and one might thus expect far-right voters to be unwilling to contribute to charities rescuing migrants at sea or fighting world hunger, far-right supporters might be more tempted to support associations that act locally. Hence, we next investigate whether far-right voters are simply hostile toward a given type of charity, or less willing to give overall.

4 Heterogeneity of the effects: Depending on the purpose of the charities

To do so, we rely on our unique data collected directly from 14 charities with different purposes; as already highlighted, these charities account for more than 8% of the individual donations in France. We estimate equation (2), but use as the dependent variable either the number of donors (normalized by the number of households) or the average value of the donations (conditional on giving) in city c in year t for each of these charities considered in turn. Given that the number of donors often take the value 0 in the charity records data, we use the level of the dependent variable. For the sake of simplicity, and given that we have shown in Section 3 above that the donation gap is specific to the far right, we simply use as our main independent variable the vote share obtained by the far right.[23] For the sake of comparison, we always report the estimates obtained when using the tax data. We use a pooled cross-section and control for election fixed effects; all the controls described in Section 3.2 are included.

Figure 4 presents the results when considering the extensive margin (the share of households making a donation).[24] For the sake of comparison, we first consider a balanced sample, i.e. only include the cities

[23] For the sake of comparison with the above results, this share is computed using the total number of registered voters as the denominator (rather the total number of votes cast). However, the results are robust to using the total number of votes cast and are available upon request.

[24] The corresponding regression table is the online Appendix Table C.14.

and years for which the tax donation data is available, and report the results in standard deviations, i.e. consider the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in Le Pen's vote share on the standardized share of donors to a given association. A one standard-deviation increase in Le Pen's vote share is associated with a 0.19 standard-deviation decrease in the share of donors in the administrative tax data (blue bar). We similarly find a negative effect of the same order of magnitude for the charities fighting against global poverty (varying between -0.21 and -0.09). Further, the magnitude of the estimates is roughly similar if we consider the donations made to the charity rescuing migrants (SOS Méditerranée, -0.14), the charity providing assistance to undocumented immigrants (La Cimade, -0.11), and the charity fighting for global health (Institut Pasteur, -0.12). It is smaller in magnitude but also negative and statistically significant at the one-percent level for the charities fighting for the environment (-0.06 for the WWF and -0.08 for Bloom), as well as for the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme (-0.04). Importantly, the negative relationship between far-right voting and giving also holds for the two charities dedicated to social solidarity and fighting against isolation among the elderly, respectively La Cause and the Petits Frères des Pauvres, even if these charities act locally.

The only exceptions to the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to give come from the charity whose mission is to safeguard French local heritage (the Fondation du Patrimoine) and from 30 Millions d'Amis, which combats animal suffering. In the first case, there is simply no relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to give. In the latter one, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between Le Pen voting and the probability of giving to 30 Millions d'Amis: a one standard-deviation increase in Le Pen's vote share is associated with a 0.02 standard-deviation increase in the share of donors to this charity.

The picture is roughly similar if we consider the intensive margin, i.e. the average amount given conditionally on making a donation, even if – consistently with the above results – the magnitude of the estimated effects is smaller in this case (online Appendix Figure D.5). Conditionally on giving, the higher the support for the far right, the lower the amount given. In the tax data, we find that a one standard-deviation increase in Le Pen's vote share is associated with a 0.02 standard-deviation decrease in the amount given by donors; the magnitude of the effect varies between -0.05 and -0.03 for the charities fighting against global poverty and supporting migrants; it is of similar order for the two charities defending the environment. However, for the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme, the Institut Pasteur and La Cause, while we observe a negative relationship, it is not statistically significant. Hence, the negative relationship between far-right voting and giving is mostly driven by the extensive margin. If we now turn to the two charities for which there is no negative effect at the extensive margin – the Fondation du Patrimoine and 30 Millions d'Amis – we also find that, if anything, cities with more support for the far right tend to give more to these charities conditional on giving. However, while positive, the estimated effects are not statistically significant.



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city/election and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table C.14. All specifications control for department and election fixed effects, and the set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.

Figure 4: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Balanced sample

Robustness These results are robust to considering all the years/cities for which the charity data are available (i.e. all the cities from 2012 to 2024, with the exception of SOS Méditerranée which was created in 2015), rather than only the subset of cities/years for which we also have the administrative tax data. They are presented in the online Appendix Figure D.6 and are consistent with those reported above.

In recent years, the charitable sector has seen a rise in micro-donations. In the online Appendix Figure D.7, we show that our results are also robust to dropping the donations whose amount is below €5. For the Fondation du Patrimoine, 2019 was a special year due to the Notre-Dame fire which led to a very large increase in both the number of donors and the total amount given; Figure D.7 also reports the results without the donations to Notre-Dame for this charity and shows that the magnitude of the estimates is unchanged.

Overall, the findings of this section show that far-right donors give less than other citizens. To some extent and consistently with the results of Enke (2020), they are particularly hostile toward "global" charities and somewhat more positive toward charities with a more "local" focus. But they do not substitute universalistic donations with more communal ones. There is simply no statistically significant relationship in the data between far-right voting and the propensity to donate to the Fondation du Patrimoine. The relationship is negative for the two charities dedicated to social solidarity, even if they do act locally. At the end of the day, the only noticeable exception to this regularity is for 30 Millions d'Amis, i.e. the charity working to combat animal suffering. In other words, while the decrease in the share of donors partly comes from the drop in the propensity to give to universalistic nonprofit organizations – consistently with a decline in universalistic values by far-right supporters – communal morality cannot entirely drive the far-right donation gap, given that far-right voters do not seem to compensate less universalistic preferences by more local donations. They simply give less overall. That is, the rise of far-right political movements is accompanied by a general decline of altruism and solidarity, rather with a refocusing of altruism and solidarity.

5 Mechanisms

In Sections 3 and 4 above, we have shown that far-right voters are consistently less likely to donate to charities than other citizens, including those who abstain in elections. Not only is this donation gap robust to controlling for a wide range of covariates (including demographics, income, religion, and various measures of social capital), but the results of Section 4 indicate that it holds across a wide range of charitable purposes. This seems to suggest that the rise of far-right political movements is accompanied by a general decline of altruism and solidarity, instead of a shift in the focus of solidarity towards the more local.

In this section, we investigate the mechanisms that might be at play behind the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to donate. First, we show that it is unlikely that other factors such as trust or social acceptability drive the relationship (Section 5.1). Second, we show that the effect

is not driven by a lack of supply of communal charities, using data from France as well as novel evidence from Italy (Section 5.2). Finally, we provide suggestive evidence of a negative causal impact of far-right voting on the probability of giving, relying on the panel dimension of our data (Section 5.3).

5.1 Trust and Social acceptability

Far-right electoral support correlates First, it is important to note that our results are not driven by a number of correlates that have been associated to far-right voting in the literature (Algan et al., 2017; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). As shown in Section 3.1 above, they are robust to controlling for life satisfaction and trust. Further, if anything, there is an higher proportion of donors among surveyed individuals whose state of mind is characterized by uncertainty or worry than among those for whom it is characterized by happiness or well-being (online Appendix Figure D.8).

Social pressure Second, we investigate whether social pressure drives the far-right donation gap (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Malmendier et al., 2014). If this were the case, one might expect far-right voters to give less in places where they are more dominant – in these places, not giving may indeed be more acceptable. We estimate equation (2) separately for cities with below and above the median far-right vote. Online Appendix Figure D.9 plots the results. For both the 2012 and the 2017 elections, the far-right donation gap is statistically significant not only in cities with above-median Le Pen vote shares, but also in cities with below-median electoral support for the far right. We observe no significant differences between the two, despite the fact that one might expect households to suffer less from the stigma of not donating in cities where Le Pen scores better at the ballot box; if anything, the far-right donation gap is *larger* in cities with relatively fewer Le Pen voters. In other words, the far-right donation gap does not seem to be (only) driven by concerns about violating social norms.

Despite the electoral success of Marine Le Pen in presidential elections and the relatively high scores obtained in recent years by far-right candidates in the first round of legislative elections, the electoral system (two-round system in single-member constituencies) is such in France that, until very recently, very few far-right politicians were elected. In addition, there are almost no far-right mayors in France. Hence, we cannot exploit a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of electing a far-right politician. However, we can investigate whether the magnitude of the far-right donation gap differs in the (few) places with a far-right MP following the 2017 legislative elections. Online Appendix Figure D.10 shows that this is not the case. Unfortunately, we cannot perform the same analysis for the places with a far-right mayor, given that there are too few cities concerned.[25] However, we can check whether our results are robust to dropping these few cities. Online Appendix Table C.17 shows that this is indeed the case. Further, they are also robust to not including the municipalities that have at least one far-right city

[25] 0 in 2008, 15 in 2014 (Hénin-Beaumont, Le Hamel, Béziers, Marseille's 7th district, Hayange, Fréjus, Beaucaire, Villers-Cotterêts, Cogolin, Le Pontet, Le Luc, Mantes-La-Ville, Camaret-sur-Aigues, Orange, Bollène), and 12 in 2020: Perpignan, Hénin-Beaumont, Fréjus, Camaret-sur-Aigues, Hayange, Beaucaire, Le Pontet, Villers-Cotterêts, Béziers, Mazan, Bruay-la-Buissière, and Moissac.

councilor.

5.2 Charitable giving and the supply of local charities

Does the far-right donation gap result from the lack of supply of communal charities – supporting local good causes? To investigate whether this is the case, we consider the supply of local charities.

5.2.1 Geographical heterogeneity depending on the supply of local charities

First, relying on the French national directory of associations (see Section 2.4.1 above), we estimate the relationship between far-right voting and charitable giving separately in municipalities with at least one local charity and in municipalities with none. Online Appendix Table C.18 shows the results.

Column (1) reports the baseline results for the sake of comparability. In Column (2), we interact the vector of the vote shares with an indicator variable equal to one if a municipality has a local charity and to zero otherwise, and Columns (3) and (4) estimate equation (2) separately for municipalities with no local charity and for municipalities with one or more. We see that the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to make a charitable contribution holds both in municipalities with or without a local charity, pointing to the fact that the far-right donation gap may not be driven by the supply side of the charitable sector.

5.2.2 Evidence from Italy using novel administrative tax data

To investigate whether the negative relationship between far-right voting and donating to charities is driven by a lack of supply of local charities – or of charities better corresponding to far-right supporters' view of altruism – we next collect novel data from the Italian tax administration. This also allows us to show that this relationship is not specific to France.[26]

The 5 per mille mechanism As described in Section 2.2.2 above, in Italy citizens can devote five-thousandths of their total income tax to third sector entities and non-profit organizations, including the social activities in their municipality of residence. To do so, all they have to do is fill in the sheet specifying the destination of the 5 per thousand at the end of their tax return. Hence, Italy provides us with a unique framework where citizens have to decide on an annual basis whether they want to devote part of their taxes to the funding of the nonprofit sector, including any social activity in their municipality of residence, i.e. independently of any "formal" supply of local NGOs. Interestingly, despite the fact that expressing a

[26]Online Appendix Figure D.16 provides additional evidence – albeit anecdotal – of the fact that the far-right donation gap is not specific to France, nor Italy. Using the German Socioeconomic Panel – a large household panel that records voting intentions and various self-reported donation behavior between 2010 and 2020 – we investigate the relationship between far-right voting (as measured by support for the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD)) and donations. We see that voters for the far-right AfD party differ drastically from other voters and are 10 to 25% less likely to report donations to charities; they behave like abstainers (left-wing panel). Further, they give significantly less than all other voters including abstainers to refugees (centre panel). Finally, they are also less likely than other voters to donate blood (right-wing panel).

preference as part of the 5 per thousand comes at no cost for Italian taxpayers, we observe a drop in the share of citizens who do so in recent years, consistently with the drop in the propensity to give observed in other countries (Figure 1).

We obtain non-publicly available administrative tax data covering the years 2018 to 2022, with annual information at the city level on the number of choices and amount contributed to (i) third sector entities and non-profit organizations, (ii) scientific research, (iii) health research, (iv) cultural and landscape heritage, (v) amateur sports associations, (vi) management bodies of protected areas, and to (vii) the social activities in the municipality of residence. Similarly to what we did in Section 3.2 above, we merge these data with the electoral results at the city level (using the 2018 and 2022 general elections) and estimate the following model:

$$y_{c(r),t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Fratelli d'Italia}_{c(r),t} + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(r),t}}\alpha_2 + \gamma_r + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(r),t} \tag{3}$$

where c index the municipalities ($\simeq$8,000), r the regions and t the years (2018 to 2022). Our outcome of interest, $y_{c(r),t}$, is either the standardized share of taxpayers in the municipality who express a choice as part of the 5 per mille mechanism or, focusing on this subset of expressed preferences, the share of taxpayers who select each of the different choices.

In the first case, given that Italian citizens can devote not only five-thousandths of their total tax liability to NPOs, but also two-thousandths to the political party of their choice and eight-thousandths to the religion of their choice (see online Appendix Section E.2), on top of estimating equation (3) using an OLS, we also estimate a seemingly unrelated system of equations (SUR) of the relationship, in each city/election, between far-right support and the share of the households who express a preference for each of these choices. While the preferences expressed are completely independent (e.g. a household can decide to express a preference in favor of the 5 per mille mechanism but not opt for the 2 per mille choice), given that taxpayers specifically fill in the "sheet specifying the destination of the 8 per thousand, 5 per thousand, and 2 per thousand" at the end of their tax return, one might expect the probabilities of expressing a preference to somehow be correlated. Similarly, when focusing on the specific choices expressed as part of the 5 per mille, given that households can only express one choice, we estimate the relationship between the voting preferences and the choices expressed simultaneously via seemingly unrelated regressions.

The main independent variable, Fratelli d'Italia$_{c(r),t}$, is the standardized vote share obtained by Fratelli d'Italia in city c (in region r) in year t (we use the 2018 electoral results for $t = 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021$ and the 2022 results for $t = 2022$). $\boldsymbol{X'_{c(r),t}}$ is a vector of time-varying city-level controls including the following covariates built from census data: the population of the city; the age structure: share of the population between 18 and 24, between 25 and 49, between 50 and 64, and above 65; the education level: the share of residents who have completed primary school, middle school, high school and university education; the employment structure: the share of the adult population in the labor force and employed, in the labor force and seeking a job, not in the labor force and receiving a pension, not in the labor force and a student, not in the labor force and a homemaker; and the share of foreigners. We also control for measures

of income obtained from the tax administration website: the share of taxpayers with a total income lower than €$10,000$, between €$15,000$ and €$26,000$, and between €$26,000$ and €$55,000$, as well as the share of owners. As for France, these controls are introduced non-linearly (classifying the municipalities by population-weighted deciles).

Finally, we control for year (ω_t) and region (γ_r) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the regions.

Results Table 2 reports the results. In Columns (1) and (2), we consider the probability of expressing a preference for the 5 per mille (as well as for the other two mechanisms when using the SUR model). We see that voting for the far-right party Fratelli d'Italia is negatively correlated with the propensity to express a preference for the 5 per mille. A one standard-deviation increase in the vote share for Fratelli d'Italia is associated with a 0.04% standard-deviation decrease in the share of taxpayers who express a preference (Columns (1) and (2)). The relationship is also negative for the 2 per mille and the 8 per mille mechanisms; however, it is not statistically significant for the latter.

When we turn to the intensive margin and focus on the choices expressed as part of the 5 per mille mechanism, we see that, conditionally on expressing a preference, far-right voters are more likely to opt for the social activity of their commune of residence than abstainers (Column (3)). A one standard-deviation increase in the vote share for Fratelli d'Italia is associated with a 0.04% standard-deviation increase in the share of taxpayers who chose to support their municipality. Hence, consistently with the results obtained for France, while far-right voters seem to have more communal preferences than abstainers, overall, they simply contribute less to the charitable sector. Online Appendix Table C.19 reports the results of the estimation of equation (3) when we consider both margins at the same time – i.e. express each of the preferences (including the fact of not expressing a preference) as a share of the total number of taxpayers. We obtain a positive and statistically significant relationship between the fact of not expressing a choice and voting for Fratelli d'Italia.

5.3 The impact of far-right voting on the willingness to give: Does the far-right hurt charities?

Finally, we investigate whether people abandon charities when they are won over by the far right, or are already less altruistic and thus more prone to be influenced by the far right. I.e. whether similar unobservable characteristics drive both the rise of the far right and the decline in the propensity to donate, or the fact of moving to the far right has a causal negative impact on the willingness to give. To answer this question, we proceed in three steps. First, using the administrative tax data, we investigate the extent to which controlling for city unobservable characteristics impacts the magnitude of the far-right donation gap (Section 5.3.1). Second, using historical charity records, we show that, if anything, the places characterized by a higher probability of giving historically did vote *more* for the far right in the 2002 presidential elections, which were marked by Le Pen's first electoral breakthrough (Section 5.3.2). Finally, using survey data, we

Table 2: Far-right voting and willingness to give: Evidence from Italian "5 per mille" system

	5 per mille (OLS)	Preference expressed (sureg)			Within 5 per mille: Choices made (sureg)					
	(1)	(2)			(3)					
	_	2 per mille	8 per mille	5 per mille	Commune	NGOs	Scientif. res.	Health res.	Cultural her.	Sport
Fratelli d'Italia	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.04**	0.04*	-0.04	0.06***	0.00	0.04**	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Region FEs	✓	✓			✓					
Year FEs	✓	✓			✓					
Controls	✓	✓			✓					
Observations	38,438	38,438			38,438					
Clusters (Regions)	20	20			20					

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using OLS in Column (1) and seemingly unrelated regressions in Columns (2) and (3) (standard errors clustered at the region level between parentheses). An observation is a city/year, and all the specifications include region and year fixed effects. Controls are annual city-level controls and are listed in Section 5.2.2. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the standardized share of taxpayers who express a choice as part of the 5 per mille mechanism. In Column (2), the dependent variables are respectively the share of taxpayers who express a choice as part of the 2 per mille, the 8 per mille and the 5 per mille mechanisms. In Column (3), we focus on the preferences expressed as part of the 5 per mille mechanism. The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Fratelli d'Italia in the 2018 and 2022 general elections.

investigate whether our survey results are driven by past Le Pen voters or by "converters" (Section 5.3.3).

Further, the far-right relationship to the charitable sector might have evolved in recent years; in particular, the salience of far-right criticism of the charitable sector might have increased. To investigate whether this is the case, we finally collect data from the main French national newspapers covering the entire political spectrum between 2012 and 2022, and study the evolution of their coverage of the charitable sector (Section 5.3.4).

5.3.1 Evidence from administrative tax data: Controlling for city fixed effects

Do voters who have recently started voting for the far right but have not done so in the past also contribute less to charities? To tackle this question, we exploit the panel dimension of the administrative tax data and estimate the following model:

$$Donation_{c(d),t} = \alpha_0 + \boldsymbol{Elections'_{c(d),t}}\alpha_1 + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}\alpha_2 + \gamma_c + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t} \tag{4}$$

where γ_c are city fixed effects and the other variables are as in equation (2). Introducing city fixed effects allows us to investigate the impact of the change in the vote for the far right between 2012 and 2017 on the change in the propensity to make a charitable donation.

Table 3 reports the results considering separately the share of donors (extensive margin; Columns (1) to (3)), the average amount donated conditional on giving (intensive margin; Columns (4) to (6)), and the overall amount given in each city (Columns (7) to (9)). For the sake of comparison, we report the estimates we obtain when only controlling for department fixed effects in Columns (1), (4) and (7), and the panel estimates in the remaining ones. We find that a one-percent increase in Le Pen vote shares compared to abstention between 2012 and 2017 is associated with a 0.03 percent decrease in the share of donors, an effect statistically significant at the one-percent level (Column (2)). Hence, while controlling for city fixed effects decreases the magnitude of the far-right donation gap, not only the level of the support for the far right but also the change matters. Furthermore – consistently with the results of Section 3.2 above – the negative relationship holds for the far right independently of the set of covariates included (in Columns (3), (6) and (9), we report the panel estimates absent any control and show that there is no statistically significant difference from the estimates of Columns (2), (5) and (8)).

Next, we estimate equation (4) using as a left-hand side variable the share of donors to the charities for which we have annual city-level data. This allows us to include three presidential elections: 2012, 2017 and 2022 (thus covering the time period 2012-2024). Figure 5 reports the results; consistently with the results of Table 3, we see that the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to give to charities still holds when controlling for city fixed effects, even if it is smaller in magnitude. In particular, we find that a one standard-deviation increase in the Le Pen vote share is associated with a 0.02 standard-deviation decrease in the share of donors to Oxfam, and a 0.02 to 0.09 drop in the share of donors to the charities helping migrants. Further, we observe a 0.05 standard-deviation drop for the

Table 3: Far-right voting and charitable donations (three margins): Panel estimates, using tax data

	Extensive			Intensive			Both margins		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Mélenchon (Far Left)	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.08***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*	0.09***	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	0.13***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01	0.02***	0.02***	0.14***	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
UMP/LR (Right)	0.19***	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.19***	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.15***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.21***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Department FEs	✓			✓			✓		
City FEs		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	
Observations	54,560	54,560	54,560	54,560	54,560	54,560	54,560	54,560	54,560
Clusters (Cities)	27,280	27,280	27,280	27,280	27,280	27,280	27,280	27,280	27,280
Mean DepVar	2.42	2.42	2.42	5.74	5.74	5.74	8.16	8.16	8.16
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.59	0.59	0.59

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors clustered at the city level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include election fixed effects. Columns (1), (4) and (7) also control for department fixed effects, while all the other columns control for city fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the (log of) the share of donors in city c and election t in Columns (1) to (3) (extensive margin), the average amount given conditional on giving in Columns (4) to (6) (intensive margin), and the total amount given in Columns (7) to (9) (both margins). The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space.



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (4) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the cities). An observation is a city/election and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table C.20. All specifications control for city and election fixed effects, and the set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012, 2017 and 2022 presidential elections.

Figure 5: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Panel estimates, Depending on the purpose of the charity, Complete sample (2012-2024)

environmental NGO Bloom, and a 0.01 decrease for the charity fighting for human rights (LDH).

The only exception is Action Contre la Faim, for which we obtain a positive sign. But it is important to note that, since 2019, faced with increasing precariousness, non-use and barriers to access to rights and food, this association has decided to intervene in France. The idea is to make its humanitarian expertise available to those involved in helping the most vulnerable people, and to act alongside them. In other words, it now acts "locally" (from the point of view of the French donors). More broadly, and consistently with the results of Section 4, the negative relationship between far-right voting and giving does not hold for the more local charities in our sample, such as the Fondation du Patrimoine and Les Petits Frères des Pauvres.

Granger causality In the spirit of a Granger causality test, we finally perform an additional exercise to investigate whether past far-right voting predicts future charitable donations. We estimate the following model: $Donors_{c(d),t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Donors_{c(d),t-1} + \beta_1 \text{Le Pen}_{c(d),t-1} + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}\psi + + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t}$, where $Donors_{c(d),t}$ is as before the share of donors in city c and election cycle t, and $Donors_{c(d),t-1}$ its lagged

value. Le Pen$_{c(d),t-1}$ is the vote share obtained by Le Pen in the previous presidential elections. Online Appendix Table C.21 reports the results. We find that, conditional on the time varying city-level covariates and on the past propensity to give, the past electoral support for the radical right is predictive of the share of donors to all the global charities in our sample, pointing toward a causal impact of far-right voting on donations.[27] Consistently with the above results, we observe no relationship for the more local charities.

5.3.2 Evidence from historical charity records

For three charities – ACF, La Cimade and the WWF – we obtain data on their donors going back to the 1990s. We exploit this unique data to investigate whether the places that voted more for the far right in 2002 – Le Pen's first electoral breakthrough – were already characterized by a lower propensity to give to charities. To do so, we estimate the following model: $Donors_{c(d),t} = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}\beta_1 + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t}$, where $\boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}$ is a time-varying vector of municipality-level controls similar to the one described in Section 2 , c index the cities and t the years. This allows us to obtain the residualized number of households that donate to each of these charities (considered separately). We do so separately for the cities depending on their 2002 votes, using the median value of the Le Pen vote shares. Figure 6 reports the results. The patterns observed for the three charities are similar: before the electoral rise of the far right in 2002, cities that voted more for Le Pen in 2002 were, if anything, characterized by a higher number of donors, once the main observable drivers of donations and voting patterns (demographics, education, income, wealth, etc.) had been taken into account. We observe an inversion of the trends between the 2002 and the 2007 presidential elections, depending on the charities, and a growing gap in recent years.

The change in the total number of donors observed each year can be driven either by existing donors donating less often (e.g. every other year rather than every year) or by past donors exiting the sample. We compute for each year the total stock of potential donors defined as the donors who gave in the past and are observed giving in the future.[28] We then follow the same strategy as in Figure 6 and plot for each of the charities the residualized stock of donors. Online Appendix Figure D.12 plots the results and shows that, if anything, the places that voted more for Le Pen in 2002 had an higher stock of donors before the electoral rise of the far right.

Even if they should be interpreted with caution given that they only rely on a limited number of charities, these results provide additional suggestive evidence of the fact that the negative relationship we document between far right voting and the propensity to give reflects at least partly a negative causal impact of the votes for the far right on giving (in Section 5.3.4 below we relate this to the growing salience of far-right criticism of the charitable sector). Indeed, the places that started to vote more for the far right in the early 2000s were not giving less before – if anything, they contributed more to charities.

[27] Consistent with the results of the existing literature documenting path-dependence in charitable giving (see e.g. Heger and Slonim, 2022), we also find a positive relationship between past donations and the propensity to give.

[28] In the online Appendix Figure D.11, for each of the three charities for which we have historical records, we plot annually the total stock of donors, the number of donors observed each year, the number of novel donors and the number of exiting donors. Exiting donors are defined as the donors who give for the last time in the data in a given year. We observe an increasing propensity to exit beginning in the mid-2000s.



(a) Action Contre la Faim



(b) La Cimade



(c) WWF

Notes: The figure plots the residualized number of donors to ACF (sub-Figure 6a), La Cimade (sub-Figure 6b), and the WWF (sub-Figure 6c) obtained by estimating the following model: $Donors_{c(d),t} = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}\beta_1 + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t}$ (see the text for details). The estimation is performed separately for cities with below-median Le Pen vote shares in the 2002 presidential elections (blue line with dots) and above-median vote shares (red line with triangles).

Figure 6: Donations to charities and far-right electoral success: Using historical charity records

5.3.3 Survey data: Far-right converters

Our survey data provides additional evidence of the intensification of the preferences of far-right supporters against the charitable sector. We can indeed decompose the 2022 far-right donation gap depending on the respondent's reported vote in 2017. In Table 4, we divide the respondents who report a Le Pen vote in 2022 into "converters" and "faithfuls" depending on whether they already voted for Le Pen in 2017.[29] In Columns (1) to (3), we report the extensive margin, and in Columns (4) to (6) the intensive one. Columns (1) and (4) report the baseline estimates for the sake of comparability. The negative relationship between far-right voting and the probability of reporting a donation is driven by Le Pen "faithfuls" (Columns (2) and (4)). Furthermore, at the extensive margin, we observe no differences among Le Pen converters depending on who they voted for in 2017 (Column (3)). At the intensive margin – i.e. conditional on giving – we observe a negative relationship between voting for Le Pen and the amount given not only among Le Pen faithfuls but also among Le Pen converters who previously voted for far-left candidates, for Emmanuel Macron and for other right-wing candidates (Column (6)).

Besides, the fact that Le Pen Converters do not give less than abstainers is not an indicator that the change in the electoral support for Le Pen does not affect the probability of giving. Indeed, for example, if one considers left-wing voters (including far-left voters and Mélenchon's supporters), we see that on average they are more likely to give than abstainers. Hence, the fact that when those voters switch from voting left to voting Le Pen they no longer give more than those who abstain means that their probability of giving has actually decreased alongside the change in their vote. Overall, these results thus hint at both an intensifying far-right donation gap for voters with a longer history of voting for Le Pen and a change in the preferences of individuals when they are won over by the far right.

5.3.4 The growing salience of far-right criticism of the charitable sector

How to explain the intensification of the far-right opposition to the charitable sector over time? We finally investigate whether far-right criticism of the charitable sector has gained salience in recent years. To do so, we collect data on the media coverage of the charitable sector, using the content of seven large French national newspapers, covering the entire political spectrum (from the left to the right): *Libération*, *Le Monde*, *L'Express*, *La Croix*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Point*, and *Valeurs Actuelles*. For each of these newspapers, we recover the number of articles published everyday between 2012 and 2022 (we identify them by searching for the common word "le" in the database Europresse) and then identify the subset of articles dealing with the charitable sector.[30]

First note that, anecdotally, far-right politicians have been openly critical of the charitable sector in recent years. In 2014, Éric Zemmour devoted several pages of his best-selling book *Le Suicide français*

[29] Summary statistics are reported in the online Appendix Table C.22: about 61% of Le Pen supporters in 2022 already voted for her in 2017, 4% voted for another far-right candidate (Nicolas Dupont-Aignan), while the others come from a wide range of positions on the political spectrum (about 7% from the Left, 5% from Macron, 11% from the Right, while 7% abstained in 2017).

[30] See online Appendix Section B for details on the data collection procedure and the list of keywords used to identify the articles dealing with the charitable sector.

Table 4: The 2022 far-right donation gap depending on the reported vote in 2017, Using survey data

	Probability of reporting a donation			Amount reported (cond. on reporting)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Far Left	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***		0.148	0.145
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.106)	(0.106)
Mélenchon	0.040*	0.039*	0.039*		-0.088	-0.089
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.095)	(0.095)
Left	0.119***	0.119***	0.119***		0.092	0.091
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)		(0.096)	(0.096)
Macron	0.022	0.023	0.022		-0.008	-0.012
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.085)	(0.085)
Pécresse	0.042	0.042	0.043		0.136	0.135
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)		(0.096)	(0.096)
Other Right	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001		-0.184	-0.183
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.117)	(0.117)
Le Pen	-0.054**					
	(0.021)					
Zemmour	-0.044*	-0.045*	-0.044*		-0.140	-0.140
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)		(0.111)	(0.111)
Le Pen Faithfuls (61.4%)		-0.082***	-0.081***		-0.401***	-0.400***
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.103)	(0.103)
Le Pen Converters (38.6%)		-0.011			-0.190	
		(0.026)			(0.118)	
Le Pen Converters - Far Left (0.5%)			-0.013			-0.835***
			(0.120)			(0.217)
Le Pen Converters - Mélenchon (5.8%)			0.000			0.268
			(0.057)			(0.286)
Le Pen Converters - Left (1.5%)			-0.032			-0.263
			(0.078)			(0.294)
Le Pen Converters - Macron (5.3%)			-0.077			-0.466**
			(0.053)			(0.206)
Le Pen Converters - Right (11.4%)			0.008			-0.114
			(0.044)			(0.171)
Le Pen Converters - Other Right (4.6%)			0.018			-0.552***
			(0.053)			(0.200)
Le Pen Converters - Abst (9.0%)			-0.019			-0.196
			(0.040)			(0.235)
Controls (all)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	10,581	10,581	10,581	4,631	4,631	4,631
Mean DepVar	0.44	0.44	0.44	4.58	4.58	4.58
Sd DepVar	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.31	1.31	1.31

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. In Columns (1) to (3), the sample includes all the individuals who are part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey and who reported their 2017 vote ($N = 10,569$). In Columns (4) to (6), we focus on the subset of those individuals who reported a charitable donation ($N = 4,622$). In Column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. In Column (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the total amount donated reported by the respondents (conditional on making a donation). The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote. Le Pen voters are further split into "Le Pen Faithfuls" (i.e. voters who voted for Le Pen both in 2017 and in 2022) and "Le Pen Converters" (i.e. voters who voted for Le Pen in 2022 but for another candidate in 2017).

(Zemmour, 2014) to a critique of the charitable sector, which he described as destructive for the "moral and economic foundations of the French Catholic-social state." These criticisms sometimes go beyond words. There are several occurrences of far-right mayors in France ending public subsidies to associations[31], and in recent years, NGOs such as SOS Méditerranée and La Cimade have come under attack.[32] Of course, these attacks are not specific to France. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni's government targets NGOs rescuing migrants at sea.[33] Importantly, these attacks do not only target charities helping migrants. In June 2024 for example, Guillaume Peltier, a far-right candidate at the 2024 European elections, frontally attacked "Planning familial', an association that defends sex education, the right to contraception and abortion, and birth control in general.

News coverage of the charitable sector Have these criticisms gained more media attention in recent years? Figure 7a plots the evolution of the overall share of articles covering the charitable sector between 2012 and 2022. This share has been on a steady rise since 2012, from below 0.80 percent to around 1.20 percent, showing the charitable sector's increased media salience.

However, such an increase may not be linked to criticism of this sector; it could, for example, be due to changes in the tax benefits of the sector or indicate a growing interest in philanthropy. To investigate whether far-right criticism of the sector partly drives this increase, we proceed as follows. To begin with, we study whether the coverage of the charitable sector is also linked to far-right criticism. To do so, we search for far-right related keywords.[34] First, we identify whether the articles mention the names of far-right political parties or politicians (e.g. Marine Le Pen or "Rassemblement National"; to build the list of politicians, we include all the far-right MPs or members of the European Parliament) (online Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2). Second, given that part of the far-right criticism of the charitable sector directly targets global charities or charities helping migrants, we identify keywords related to migration (online Appendix Table B.3).

Third, and inspired by the results of the previous sections suggesting that the far-right donation gap goes beyond a lack of global morality, we search for keywords that can be broadly defined as "anti-poor" (online Appendix Table B.4). There is indeed increasing evidence that far-right voters believe that the poor free-ride the welfare system or prefer to live on handouts rather than work (see e.g. Cavaillé and der Straeten, 2023).[35] In the online Appendix Figure D.13, using data from the ELIPSS surveys (see also Appendix Section E.1), we show that hostility toward the poorest – measured as the propensity to agree

[31] E.g. in 2015, the far-right mayor of Mantes-la-Ville ended the public subsidies to the *"Ligue des droits de l'homme"* (the Human Rights League) (see e.g. France Info, March 3, 2015).

[32] In September 2024, far-right activists tried to shut down the screening of a documentary broadcast by SOS Méditerranée in Corsica (see e.g. *Le Monde*, September 24, 2024). In December 2022, the Bordeaux premises of La Cimade were vandalized by the far-right group Action Directe Identitaire. Several other associations such as SOS Racisme had been targeted by the same group during the previous month.

[33] See e.g. *Le Monde*, June 1, 2023.

[34] See online Appendix Section B.2 for the list of the keywords included in each of these three categories.

[35] Interestingly, at the same time there is also evidence that donors prefer to give to poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non-diligent (see in particular Drenik and Perez-Truglia, 2018).

with the statement "the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to"[36] – is much higher among the surveyed individuals who are likely to vote for the Rassemblement National than among those who are not. Furthermore, this hostility increased among far-right supporters between 2013 and 2017, while remaining nearly unchanged among the rest of the population.

Figure 7b reports the share of articles that include far-right keywords thus defined among all articles with charitable keywords. While articles containing those far-right related keywords represented around 25% of charity-related articles in 2012, this share reaches 35% in 2022 (continuous black line). What kind of keywords are driving this increase? The first set of articles thus identified contains migration-related keywords (dashed yellow line with triangles), such as "migrants" or "réfugiés," While some of these articles may be characterized by a negative coverage of the charitable sector – e.g. an article in *Le Point* denouncing what is described as the "increasing control by ethnic groups" ("l'emprise communautaire") in sports associations[37] – this is not the case for all of them. Some of them are indeed simply descriptive of the actions performed by the nonprofit organizations covered. We come back to this point below when turning to sentiment analysis.

Interestingly, we also observe a growing number of charity-related articles containing the name of far-right politicians (dashed red line with dots) or political parties (dashed green line with squares). For example, in 2022 a number of articles were published detailing the far-right opposition to a mini-project to welcome migrants in Callac (a small village in Côtes d'Armor), a project supported by the endowment fund "Merci." While articles containing the keywords classified as anti-poor are less frequent, they are nonetheless not negligible (around 5%).

In addition to this simple dictionary approach, we further calculate the textual similarity between the newspaper articles and the far-right Rassemblement National's electoral manifesto, using natural language processing techniques.[38] We compute a similarity score that ranges between 0 and 1. Figure 7c shows that this similarity has increased over time: it rose by 0.15 standard deviation between 2012 and 2022. Yet, this does not necessarily reflect a more negative coverage of the charitable sector. To investigate whether this is the case, we next delve further into the content of the articles.

Sentiment analysis More precisely, we analyze the textual sentiment of all the charity-related articles using the TextBlob Python library.[39] For each article, the algorithm returns a positivity index that varies between -1 (very negative) and 1 (very positive).[40] Online Appendix Figure D.14 plots the evolution of the positivity index (averaged over all the charity-related articles) over time. We see that the overall trend is decreasing, from 0.116 on average in 2012 to 0.108 at the end of 2022.

[36] *"Les chômeurs pourraient trouver du travail s'ils le voulaient vraiment."*

[37] "Des sports sous surveillance," Nadjet Cherigui and Clément Pétreault, *Le Point*, May 2, 2019.

[38] Specifically, we calculate the cosine similarity using the word embedding of the French natural language model in the SpaCy Python library. The Rassemblement National's manifesto comes from the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al., 2024). For previous work using French electoral manifestos, see Le Pennec (2024) and Cagé et al. (2023).

[39] The *Textblob-fr* documentation is available here.

[40] A few examples of the most positive articles include an article covering the restoration of the Saint-Germain-des-Prés church thanks to charitable contributions, and an article with the straightforward title "Long live philanthropy!".



(a) Share of articles covering the charitable sector



(b) Share of articles containing far-right keywords



(c) Textual similarity with far-right manifestos

Notes: The figure reports the evolution of the media coverage of the charitable sector between 2012 and 2022. The articles are downloaded from the Europress database and the figures are average on a six-month basis. Sub-Figure 7a reports the evolution of the share of articles containing charity-related keywords (see online Appendix Section B.1 for the list of the keywords). Sub-Figure 7b focuses on the subset of articles that contain at least one charity-related keyword and computes the share of those articles that contain far-right related keywords (see online Appendix Section B.2 for the list of the keywords). Sub-Figure 7c reports the evolution of the standardized textual similarity between the charity-related newspaper articles and the Rassemblement National's electoral manifestos.

Figure 7: Evolution of the media coverage of the charitable sector, 2012-2022

We next investigate whether the increasing presence of far-right related content among articles covering the charitable sector might lead to a more negative portrayal of the charitable sector overall. Online Appendix Figure D.15 plots the average positivity index for articles with and without a far-right keyword: charity-related articles with far-right keywords are consistently more negative than those with none.

To further quantify the magnitude of this effect, in Table 5 we regress the standardized positivity index of each newspaper article on indicator variables for far-right topics (measuring the presence of far-right keywords in the article) and on our similarity measure between the article content and the Rassembleent National's electoral manifestos. Column (1) shows that articles with far-right keywords are on average 0.3 standard deviations less positive than the articles without, controlling for newspaper and year fixed effects. In Column (2), we consider separately the different far-right keywords: articles including migration-related keywords tend to be the most negative. However, articles including the other far-right related keywords such as anti-poor keywords or the name of far-right politicians are also more negative than those that do not include such keywords.[41] Finally, Column (3) shows that the closer the content of the article is to the Rassemblement National's manifestos, the more negative it tends to be. With the articles with far-right keywords being significantly more negative and representing a growing share of the news coverage of the charitable sector, they contribute to an overall drop in positivity.

In addition, articles with far-right keywords have also become increasingly negative over time (Column (5)), further contributing to a drop in positivity. This is not the case of the charity-related articles that do not include far-right keywords (Column (6)).

Overall, while mostly descriptive, these latest findings point toward the fact that the charitable sector has received increasing media attention in recent years, and that a large share of the articles devoted to this sector are related to far-right criticism of immigration. Furthermore, besides immigration, the tone of the coverage of the sector has became more negative in recent years (e.g. with growing criticism of the "undeserving poor"). This might help to better understand the intensification of far-right voters' preferences against charitable giving.

6 Conclusion

While the size of the philanthropic sector has grown steadily over the past few years in terms of the amounts involved, the share of the individuals making an annual contribution to this sector has seen an important decline in recent years in many Western democracies. Can this observed drop in the share of charitable donors be explained by the electoral rise of the far right? In this paper, using novel evidence from survey data, administrative tax data and charity records, we document a systematic negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to donate to charities, which holds across charitable purposes.

[41] Given that articles can contain multiple categories of keywords – for instance both the far-right parties and migration-related keywords – the magnitude of the coefficients for each of the four indicator variables can be smaller than the coefficient estimated for the "far-right keyword (any)" indicator variable.

Table 5: News coverage of the charitable sector: Positivity index and far-right vocabulary

	Far-right topics			Time trend		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				All articles	Far-right keywords	No far-right keywords
=1 if far-right keyword (any)	-0.327***			-0.324***		
	(0.037)			(0.037)		
=1 if Far-right politicians keywords		-0.168***				
		(0.023)				
=1 if Far-right parties keywords		-0.251***				
		(0.049)				
=1 if Migration keywords		-0.292***				
		(0.033)				
=1 if Anti-poor keywords		-0.152***				
		(0.032)				
Std. Similarity to FN manifesto			-0.054**			
			(0.018)			
Time Trend (Year)				-0.008	-0.011*	-0.007
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Newspaper FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓			
Observations	13,541	13,541	13,541	13,541	3,999	9,542
Clusters (Newspaper)	7	7	7	7	7	7

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using OLS (robust standard errors clustered by newspaper in parentheses). An observation is an article. In Columns (1) to (4), the sample includes all the charity-related newspaper articles included in our database between 2012 and 2022. In Columns (5) and (6), the sample includes the newspaper articles with and without a far-right keyword as documented in Appendix Section B.2. The dependent variable is the standardized positivity index. All specifications include newspaper fixed effect, and Columns (1) to (3) include year fixed effect.

To sum up, our findings offer a relatively pessimistic interpretation of the rise of the nationalist far right in recent decades. Generally speaking, one might expect the rise of anti-migrant sentiment to go hand in hand with greater solidarity at the local level, i.e. declining solidarity and altruism toward people from different cultures would be accompanied by rising solidarity and altruism toward "people like me." However, this is not what we find: the rise of the nationalist far-right seems to come with an overall decline in solidarity and altruism.

Further, according to our results, the drop in the share of donors could become more pronounced over the next few years. This may pose a threat to the total revenue of the charitable sector through a change in social norms. Moreover, a shrinking base of supporters for charities may trigger a debate about the democratic legitimacy of the large tax breaks that support them in many countries and thus jeopardize the charitable sector as a whole.

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Online Appendix to the Paper: The Far-Right Donation Gap

Julia Cagé*[1] and Moritz Hengel[2] Yuchen Huang[3]

[1]Sciences Po Paris and CEPR
[2,3]Sciences Po Paris

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Contents

*Corresponding author: julia [dot] cage [at] sciencespo [dot] fr.

A Charitable-level data: Description of the charities

In this section, we describe the charities that give us access to geo-localized information on the number of donors and amount of donations received each year in each city (listed in alphabetical order). We then provide descriptive statistics.

Action Contre la Faim ACF (*Action against Hunger*) is an NGO that fights hunger in the world. According to its website, *"its mission is to save lives by eradicating hunger through the prevention, detection, and treatment of malnutrition, in particular during and after emergency situations caused by conflicts and natural disasters."* The organization was created in 1979 by a group of French intellectuals, and is structured on an international network. It provides a coordinated response in nearly 50 countries.

Bloom Bloom is a non-profit organization founded in 2005 that works to protect marine environments and species from unnecessary destruction and increase social benefits in the fishing sector. Bloom wages awareness and advocacy campaigns in order to accelerate the adoption of concrete solutions for the ocean, humans and the climate. It carries out scientific research projects, independent studies and evaluations that highlight crucial and unaddressed issues such as the financing mechanisms of the fishing sector.

La Cause La Cause is a Protestant foundation established in 1920 and dedicated to social solidarity and evangelism.

La Cimade La Cimade is an NGO founded at the beginning of World War II by French Protestant student groups to give assistance and support to people displaced by war. Today, it provides assistance to uprooted people, especially undocumented immigrants in France. In particular, La Cimade is active (i) providing legal assistance to foreigners held in administrative detention centers, managing health and social facilities, assisting with language training and adaptation, and (ii) receiving foreigners at legal clinics, organizing international solidarity actions and interventions in prisons and detention centers, and raising public and political awareness of the issues addressed by the association.

La Fondation du Patrimoine La Fondation du Patrimoine (*The Heritage Foundation*), created in 1996, is a private, independent, non-profit organization whose mission is to safeguard and promote local French heritage.

Institut Pasteur The Institut Pasteur (*Pasteur Institute*) is a French non-profit private foundation dedicated to the study of biology, micro-organisms, diseases, and vaccines.

Ligue des Droits de l'Homme The Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH, *The Human Rights League*) is a human rights NGO whose mission is to observe, defend and promulgate human rights within the French

Republic in all spheres of public life. It strives to defend justice, freedoms, civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and fight against racism and antisemitism.

Médecins Sans Frontières Médecins Sans Frontières (*Doctors Without Borders*) is a French NGO that provides humanitarian medical care. It is known for its projects in conflict zones and countries affected by endemic diseases. The organization, founded in 1971, provides care for those suffering from diabetes, drug-resistant infections, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, neglected tropical diseases, tuberculosis, vaccines and COVID-19.

Oxfam Oxfam is a British-founded confederation of 21 independent charitable organizations focusing on the alleviation of global poverty, founded in 1942 and led by Oxfam International. Oxfam France, the French branch of Oxfam International, was founded in 1988 – under the name "Agir ici pour un monde solidaire" – and became part of Oxfam International in 2003 (first as an observer and then as a member in 2006).

Les Petits Frères des Pauvres Les Petits Frères des Pauvres (*Little Brothers of the Poor*) is a non-profit organization committed to relieving isolation and loneliness among the elderly. Its aim is to create links between elderly people who are in need of friends, for example through clubs or classes. It was created in 1946 by Armand Marquiset.

SOS Méditerranée SOS Méditerranée is a European maritime and humanitarian search and rescue organization established in 2015, currently operating in the Mediterranean sea in international waters north of Libya. The organization chartered the Aquarius and more recently the Ocean Viking in order to rescue people fleeing by sea from Libya who are at risk of drowning. It was founded by German former marine captain Klaus Vogel and Frenchwoman Sophie Beau after the Italian navy ended the rescue Operation Mare Nostrum in 2014. It has headquarters in Marseille (France), Milan (Italy), Frankfurt (Germany), and Geneva (Switzerland).

30 Millions d'Amis 30 Millions d'Amis (*30 Million Friends*) is a foundation focused on pets (cats, dogs, horses, etc.), and whose objective is to combat any kind of animal suffering. It is for example well known for launching an annual summer campaign to persuade people not to abandon their pets ahead of the summer break.[1]

UNICEF UNICEF is a United Nations agency responsible for providing humanitarian and developmental aid to children worldwide. The organization is one of the world's most widely known and visible social

[1] More than $100,000$ pets are abandoned in France every year, more than half of them dumped just before or during the long summer holidays; see e.g. "France's animal shelters reach capacity as holidaymakers dump pets at roadside," *The Guardian*, Kim Willsher, August 15, 2023.

welfare entities, operating in 192 countries and territories. UNICEF's activities include providing immunizations and promoting disease prevention, administering treatment to children and mothers with HIV, enhancing childhood and maternal nutrition, improving sanitation, promoting education, and providing emergency relief in response to disasters.

WWF The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) is a Swiss-based international NGO founded in 1961 that works in the field of wilderness preservation and the reduction of human impact on the environment.

For each of these charities, we obtain annual data on all the donations received from individuals residing in France between 2012 and 2023 (with the exception of SOS Méditerranée, which was created in 2015, the first year for which we have data). Table A.1 provides summary statistics, and Figure A.1 plots the temporal evolution of these donations.

Table A.1: Summary statistics: Donations received by specific charities, 2012-2024

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
ACF (€/hh)	40.22	261.46	0.00	113,034	416,538
Bloom (€/hh)	0.64	20.51	0.00	7,258	416,538
La Cause (€/hh)	0.40	13.62	0.00	5,669	416,538
La Cimade (€/hh)	3.46	54.01	0.00	16,854	416,538
Fondation du Patrimoine (€/hh)	44.46	633.01	0.00	105,727	416,538
Institut Pasteur (€/hh)	20.66	85.17	0.00	21,459	416,538
LDH (€/hh)	1.04	15.23	0.00	3,045	416,538
MSF (€/hh)	76.86	209.58	0.00	39,494	416,538
Oxfam (€/hh)	2.44	21.82	0.00	8,408	416,538
Petits Freres des Pauvres (€/hh)	17.12	172.90	0.00	40,227	416,538
SOS Méditerranée (€/hh)	4.47	125.12	0.00	54,348	312,064
30M (€/hh)	15.86	87.14	0.00	42,135	416,538
Unicef (€/hh)	60.05	102.84	0.00	16,325	416,538
WWF (€/hh)	14.11	88.09	0.00	47,934	416,538

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the donations received from individual donors located in France by the eight non-profit organizations for which we have geo-localized information on donations. The charities are described in Section A. Each observation is a city/year. For each charity, we report the aggregated summary statistics between 2012 and 2024, to the exception of SOS Méditerranée, which was created in 2015.



Notes: The figure plots the annual amount of donations received from individual donors located in France by the eight non-profit organizations for which we have geo-localized information on donations. The charities are described in Section A.

Figure A.1: Evolution of the amount of donations received by charities, Charity-level information, 2012-2023

B Newspaper content analysis

B.1 Charity-related keywords and query process

Europresse To build the set of news articles used to study whether the coverage of the charitable sector has increased in recent years, we rely on the Europresse database[2], and download the content of seven large national newspapers in France (both dailies and weeklies), covering the entire political spectrum (from the left to the right): *Libération*, *Le Monde*, *L'Express*, *La Croix*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Point*, and *Valeurs Actuelles*.

First, for each of these newspapers and to approximate the number of articles they publish on each date, we quest the database using the very common word "le" (corresponding to "the" in English). Figure B.1 reports the results of this quest, assuming that we capture the entire set of articles published using this keyword.



Notes: For each of the newspapers, the figure plots the number of articles in Europresse per six months that contain the French definite article "le" (the). This serves as a proxy for the total number of articles published by each newspaper. The peak observed for the newspaper *Le Monde* (in orange) in 2013 corresponds to a special issue for its 70th anniversary.

Figure B.1: Total number of articles published by each newspaper proxied by articles containing "le," By newspaper, 2012-2022

[2] https://www.europresse.com

Table B.1: Far-right vocabulary: List of far-right politicians keywords

Notes: The table lists the far-right keywords in the "far-right politicans" category. It includes the full names of all deputies from the far-right Rassemblement National Party in the French National Assembly following the 2017, 2022 and 2024 legislative elections, as well as the names of French far-right Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected in the 2014, 2019 and 2024 European elections.

Table B.2: Far-right vocabulary: List of far-right political parties keywords

Notes: The table lists the far-right keywords in the "far-right parties" category. It includes names and acronyms of the major French far-right political parties in the 2017 and 2022 elections.

Charity-related keywords We next identify, for each date and newspaper, the overall set of articles covering the charitable sector, using the following charity-related vocabulary:

- *associatif* ($\simeq$ associative);
- *caritatif/caritative* ($\simeq$ charitable);
- *donation*;
- *donateur* ($\simeq$ donor);
- *fonds de dotation* ($\simeq$ endowment fund);
- *philanthropie* ($\simeq$ philanthropy);
- *philanthropique* ($\simeq$ philanthropic); and
- *mécénat* ($\simeq$ patronage).

B.2 Far-right vocabulary

Next, focusing on the subset of charity-related articles, we identify those that contain far-right related keywords. To do so, we search for three different types of far-right related vocabulary: (i) far-right politicians and parties, (ii) migration-related keywords, and (iii) anti-poor keywords.

Far-right politicians and parties Regarding far-right politicians and parties, we search for the following keywords:

- The full name and acronyms of the far-right political parties, such as *"Front National", "Rassemblement National", "Reconquête"*.
- The full name of all far-right MPs in the French National Assembly and European Parliament between 2012 and 2024. In addition, we add the full name of the far-right presidential candidate Eric Zemmour, who has not been an MP in either the National or the European legislature.

Tables B.1 and B.2 report the list of keywords included.

Migration-related keywords Far-right criticism of the charitable sector may be partly driven by criticism of global charities, in particular charities helping migrants and foreigners. To identify the articles dealing with this question, we search for the migration-related keywords that are listed in Table B.3.

Table B.3: Far-right vocabulary: List of migration-related keywords

Notes: The table lists far-right keywords in the "Migration" category. It includes keywords about migration and migrants and their grammatical variations.

Table B.4: Far-right vocabulary: List of anti-poor keywords

Notes: The table lists the far-right keywords in the "Undeserving Poor" category. It includes keywords about the belief that the poor are lazy, undeserving and welfare-reliant ("assisted"), and their grammatical variations.

Anti-poor keywords Finally, given that the far-right criticism of the charitable sector may also be related to the fact that far-right voters are critical toward the poor (e.g. they believe that the poor free-ride the welfare system), we search for keywords that can be related to this "anti-poor" criticism. They are listed in Table B.4.

C Additional Tables

Table C.1: Summary statistics, Survey data: Socio-demographic characteristics of the surveyed individuals

	Mean	Median	St. Dev	N
Demographics				
=1 if woman	0.5	1.0	0.5	12,600
Age	50.1	50.0	17.7	12,600
=1 if married/civ. union	0.5	0.0	0.5	12,600
=1 if unemployed	0.1	0.0	0.2	12,600
Profession				
=1 if Senior executive	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
=1 if Intermediate profession	0.2	0.0	0.4	12,600
=1 if Employee	0.2	0.0	0.4	12,600
=1 if Worker	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
=1 if Retired	0.3	0.0	0.5	12,600
Size of the city that the respondent lives in				
Less than 2,000 inhabitants	0.2	0.0	0.4	12,600
2,000-9,999 inhabitants	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
10,000-49,999 inhabitants	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
50,000-199,999 inhabitants	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
More than 200,000 inhabitants	0.4	0.0	0.5	12,600
Religion				
=1 if No religion	0.4	0.0	0.5	12,600
=1 if Catholic	0.5	1.0	0.5	12,600
=1 if Muslim	0.0	0.0	0.2	12,600
Income				
Below €1,250	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
€1,250-€1,999	0.2	0.0	0.4	12,600
€2,000-€2,499	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
€2,500-€3,499	0.2	0.0	0.4	12,600
€3,500-€4,999	0.2	0.0	0.4	12,600
Above €5,000	0.1	0.0	0.3	12,600
Life Satisfaction				
Overall life satisfaction	5.8	6.0	2.1	12,600
Political Trust				
Trust in: the President	2.7	3.0	1.0	10,785
Trust in: MPs	2.9	3.0	0.8	10,782
Trust in: my city mayor	2.3	2.0	0.9	10,784
Trust in: Media	2.9	3.0	0.8	10,783
Trust in: Political Parties	3.1	3.0	0.7	10,782
Social Trust				
Trust in: Family Members	1.3	1.0	0.6	10,785
Trust in: People I personally know	1.6	2.0	0.6	10,785
Trust in: People I meet for the first time	2.8	3.0	0.8	10,779

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

Table C.2: Summary statistics, Survey data: Political preferences of the surveyed individuals

	Mean	St.Dev
2022 elections		
=1 if intended vote E. Macron 2022, 1st round	0.23	0.42
=1 if intended vote M. Le Pen 2022, 1st round	0.20	0.40
=1 if intended vote JL. Melenchon 2022, 1st round	0.15	0.36
=1 if intended vote E. Zemmour 2022, 1st round	0.09	0.28
2017 elections		
=1 voted E. Macron 2017, 1st round	0.20	0.40
=1 if voted M. Le Pen 2017, 1st round	0.18	0.38
=1 voted JL. Melenchon 2017, 1st round	0.16	0.37
Preferences		
Self-reported political preference (0 (left) to 10 (right))	5.63	2.51
Observations	12,600	

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

Table C.3: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation: Evidence from self-reported donations (2022 electoral survey)

	Donated to charity (extensive margin)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Far Left	0.19***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Mélenchon	0.09***	0.10***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.05**	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left	0.22***	0.20***	0.19***	0.20***	0.19***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Macron	0.20***	0.14***	0.12***	0.11***	0.10***	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pécresse	0.22***	0.12***	0.10***	0.09***	0.08***	0.04*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Right	0.05*	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Le Pen	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Zemmour	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Political trust						✓	✓	✓
Social trust							✓	✓
City size								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,767	10,767
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis includes all the surveyed individuals who are part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ($N = 12,600$; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The "Far Left" candidates include Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 0.77%), and Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière, 0.56%). The "Left" candidates include Anne Hidalgo (Parti Socialiste, 1.75%) and Yannick Jadot (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, 4.63%). The "other right" candidates include Jean Lassalle (Résistons, 3.13%) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, 2.06%). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote.

Table C.4: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation, Robustness check: Using self-reported position on a Left-Right scale (2022 electoral survey)

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
0 - Very to the Left	-0.12***	-0.07*	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
1	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
2	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
3	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
5	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
6	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05*	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
7	-0.05**	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
8	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
9	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
10 - Very to the Right	-0.23***	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Political trust						✓	✓	✓
Social trust							✓	✓
City size								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,767	10,767
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis includes all the surveyed individuals who are part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ($N = 12,600$; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the respondent's self-reported position on the political spectrum from 0 (very on the left) to 10 (very on the right). The omitted category is 4.

Table C.5: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation, Robustness check: Using a Logit model (2022 electoral survey)

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Donated to charity								
Far Left	0.79***	0.67***	0.66***	0.68***	0.67***	0.47***	0.45***	0.45***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Mélenchon	0.40***	0.44***	0.43***	0.41***	0.40***	0.23**	0.20*	0.19*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Left	0.91***	0.88***	0.86***	0.86***	0.83***	0.64***	0.62***	0.62***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Macron	0.81***	0.59***	0.52***	0.50***	0.42***	0.10	0.11	0.11
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Pécresse	0.91***	0.53***	0.45***	0.40***	0.36***	0.18	0.20*	0.19
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Other Right	0.23*	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Le Pen	-0.17*	-0.19**	-0.22**	-0.24***	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.21**	-0.21**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Zemmour	0.07	-0.10	-0.16	-0.19*	-0.20*	-0.17	-0.15	-0.15
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Political trust						✓	✓	✓
Social trust							✓	✓
City size								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,767	10,767
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using a logit regression and we report odd ratios (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis includes all the surveyed individuals who are part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ($N = 12,600$; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The "Far Left" candidates include Fabien Roussel (Parti communiste, 2.28% of the votes), Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 0.77%), and Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière, 0.56%). The "Left" candidates include Anne Hidalgo (Parti Socialiste, 1.75%) and Yannick Jadot (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, 4.63%). The "other right" candidates include Jean Lassalle (Résistons, 3.13%) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, 2.06%). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote.

Table C.6: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation, Robustness check: Using a Probit model (2022 electoral survey)

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Donated to charity								
Far Left	0.49***	0.41***	0.41***	0.42***	0.41***	0.29***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Mélenchon	0.25***	0.27***	0.27***	0.25***	0.25***	0.14**	0.12*	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Left	0.56***	0.55***	0.53***	0.54***	0.52***	0.39***	0.39***	0.39***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Macron	0.51***	0.37***	0.33***	0.31***	0.26***	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Pécresse	0.57***	0.33***	0.28***	0.25***	0.23***	0.12	0.13*	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Other Right	0.14*	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Le Pen	-0.10*	-0.11**	-0.13**	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.12**	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Zemmour	0.04	-0.06	-0.09	-0.11*	-0.12*	-0.10	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Political trust						✓	✓	✓
Social trust							✓	✓
City size								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,767	10,767
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using a probit regression and we report odd ratios (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis includes all the surveyed individuals who are part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ($N = 12,600$; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The "Far Left" candidates include Fabien Roussel (Parti communiste, 2.28% of the votes), Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 0.77%), and Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière, 0.56%). The "Left" candidates include Anne Hidalgo (Parti socialiste, 1.75%) and Yannick Jadot (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, 4.63%). The "other right" candidates include Jean Lassalle (Résistons, 3.13%) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, 2.06%). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote.

Table C.7: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation, Robustness check: Intended donations next year (2022 electoral survey)

	Donated to charity (extensive margin)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Far Left	0.20***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.15***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Mélenchon	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Left	0.25***	0.23***	0.22***	0.22***	0.22***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Macron	0.20***	0.15***	0.13***	0.12***	0.11***	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pécresse	0.22***	0.13***	0.11***	0.09***	0.09***	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Right	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Le Pen	-0.05**	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Zemmour	0.01	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Political trust						✓	✓	✓
Social trust							✓	✓
City size								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,767	10,767
Mean DepVar	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.43
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ($N = 12,600$; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she will make a charitable donation in the next 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote. The "Far Left" candidates include Fabien Roussel (Parti communiste, 2.28% of the votes), Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 0.77%), and Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière, 0.56%). The "Left" candidates include Anne Hidalgo (Parti socialiste, 1.75%) and Yannick Jadot (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, 4.63%). The "other right" candidates include Jean Lassalle (Résistons, 3.13%) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, 2.06%). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote.

Table C.8: Far-right voting and share of donors (extensive margin): Evidence from 2013-2016 administrative tax data and 2012 electoral results, Log-log estimation

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Far Left)	0.03*	0.03*	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Hollande (Left)	0.23***	0.23***	0.17***	0.15***	0.12***	0.10***	0.09***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Bayrou (Centre)	0.25***	0.25***	0.19***	0.18***	0.16***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sarkozy (Right)	0.36***	0.35***	0.26***	0.24***	0.21***	0.19***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.17***	-0.15***	-0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Estate			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Income							✓
Observations	111,866	111,866	111,866	111,866	111,866	111,866	111,866
Mean DepVar	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.48
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city, and all the specifications include department fixed effects. The dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.9: Far-right voting and share of donors (extensive margin): Evidence from 2017-2019 administrative tax data and 2017 electoral results, Log-log estimation

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Far Left)	0.09***	0.09***	0.05***	0.04*	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Hamon (Left)	0.11***	0.11***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Macron (Centre)	0.43***	0.42***	0.30***	0.27***	0.25***	0.24***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Fillon (Right)	0.41***	0.38***	0.31***	0.30***	0.28***	0.27***	0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.16***	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.16***	-0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Estate			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Income							✓
Observations	77,812	77,812	77,812	77,812	77,812	77,812	77,812
Mean DepVar	2.35	2.35	2.35	2.35	2.35	2.35	2.35
Sd DepVar	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city, and all the specifications include department fixed effects. The dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.10: Far-right voting and share of donors, using administrative tax data: Robustness

	Level		Poisson		2012 and 2017	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2012	2017	2012	2017		Weight
main						
Mélenchon (Far Left)	-0.17	-0.17	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.05***
	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.87***	0.62***	0.08***	0.06***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.29)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	1.61***	1.94***	0.14***	0.19***	0.13***	0.13***
	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
UMP/LR (Right)	1.59***	2.15***	0.15***	0.22***	0.19***	0.17***
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-1.89***	-2.22***	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.18***
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Weight						✓
Observations	107,947	77,339	107,947	77,339	185,286	185,286
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	96
Mean DepVar	12.75	11.26	12.75	11.26	2.42	2.37
Sd DepVar	4.93	4.57	4.93	4.57	0.37	0.37

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS in the Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), and a Poisson regression in Columns (3) and (4) (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/year and the specifications include department and year fixed effects. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the presidential elections (we use the 2012 results in Columns (1) and (3), the 2017 results in Columns (2) and (4), and both elections in Columns (5) and (6)). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote for all specifications, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. In Columns (1) to (4), the dependent variable is the share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c (in level). We use 2013-2016 in Columns (1) and (3) and 2017-2019 in Column (2) and (4). In Column (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households, and election results are pooled. In Column (6), observations are weighted by the population of the city. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.11: Far-right voting and share of donors (extensive margin), Log-log estimation, Yearly breakdown

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Far Left)	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.10***	0.10***	0.09***	0.10***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	0.14***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***	0.20***	0.21***	0.23***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UMP/LR (Right)	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.15***	0.22***	0.23***	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Election year	2012	2012	2012	2012	2017	2017	2017
Year of tax declarations	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	28,134	28,582	28,221	26,925	26,592	26,137	25,080
Clusters(Departments)	95	95	95	95	95	95	95
Mean DepVar	2.47	2.52	2.48	2.43	2.41	2.37	2.27
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.38

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city, and all the specifications include department fixed effects. The dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c. We consider 2013 in Column (1), 2014 in Column (2), etc. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in presidential elections. Columns (1) to (4) use the 2012 presidential elections and Columns (5) to (7) the 2017 ones. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.12: Far-right voting and average amount given, Pooled cross-section, Log-log estimation

	Extensive margin	Intensive margin	Both margins
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mélenchon (Far Left)	0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.08***	0.02*	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	0.13***	0.01	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
UMP/LR (Right)	0.19***	0.00	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.14***	-0.07***	-0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,560	57,560	57,560
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96
Mean DepVar	2.42	5.73	8.14
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.46	0.59

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c and election t; in Column (2), the dependent variable is the (log of the) amount declared per household given that there is a donation declared; and in Column (3), the (log of the) total amount declared per household in the municipality. We take the average value between 2013 and 2016 for the 2012 presidential elections, and the average value between 2017 and 2019 for the 2017 ones. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.13: Far-right voting and share of charitable donors: The impact of political donations (Pooled cross-section)

	Administrative tax data		CNCCFP data				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
						No far-right donors	Far-right donors
Mélenchon (Far Left)	-0.03*	-0.03**	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.12***	0.12***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	0.18***	0.20***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.12***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
UMP/LR (Right)	0.18***	0.20***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.19***	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.10***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
% political donors (tax)		0.12***					
		(0.01)					
% political donors (CNCCFP)				0.03***			
				(0.00)			
% non far-right donors					0.03***	0.03***	0.04***
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
% far-right donors					0.02		
					(0.01)		
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9,233	9,233	57,560	56,665	56,665	30,125	26,540
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	93	96
Mean DepVar	2.44	2.44	2.42	2.42	2.42	2.45	2.38
Sd DepVar	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c and election t. We take the average value between 2013 and 2016 for the 2012 presidential elections, and the average value between 2017 and 2019 for the 2017 ones. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. In Columns (1) and (2), we further control for the share of households declaring a political donation on their tax form. The low number of observations come from the fact that, due to statistical secrecy, this variable is not available for all the municipalities. In Column (4) to (7), we further control for the number of donors to political parties in the municipality normalized by the number of tax households in the municipality, using the CNCCFP data. All the municipalities are included in Columns (3) to (5); Column (6) only includes the municipalities with no donor to the far-right party Rassemblement National, and Column (7) the municipalities with at least one donor to the far-right party Rassemblement National.

Table C.14: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Balanced sample

	Tax	Global poverty				Migrants		Human rights	Global health	Environment		Social solidarity		Local heritage	Help to animals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Tax	ACF	Oxfam	Unicef	MSF	SOS M	La Cimade	LDH	Institut Pasteur	WWF	Bloom	La Cause	Petits Freres Pauvres	Fondation Patrimoine	30 Millions
Share of vote received by Le Pen	-0.19***	-0.14***	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.04***	-0.12***	-0.06***	-0.08***	-0.03***	-0.11***	-0.02*	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,560	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the standardized share of donors in city c and year t. In Column (1), we consider the standardized share of donors in the administrative tax data; in Column (2), the donors to Action contre la Faim (ACF); in Column (3), to Oxfam; in Column (4), to UNICEF; in Column (5), to Médecin sans Frontières (MSF); in Column (6), to SOS Mediterranée (SOSM); in Column (7), to La Cimade; in Column (8), to the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH); in Column (9), to the Institut Pasteur; in Column (10), to the WWF; in Column (11), to Bloom; in Column (12), to La Cause; in Column (13), to the Petits Frères des Pauvres; in Column (14), to the Fondation du Patrimoine; and in Column (15), to 30 Millions d'Amis (30 Millions). The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.

Table C.15: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Complete sample

	Tax	Global poverty				Migrants		Human rights	Global health	Environment		Social solidarity		Local heritage	Help to animals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Tax	ACF	Oxfam	Unicef	MSF	SOS M	La Cimade	LDH	Institut Pasteur	WWF	Bloom	La Cause	Petits Freres Pauvres	Fondation Patrimoine	30 Millions
Share of vote received by Le Pen	-0.22***	-0.12***	-0.08***	-0.17***	-0.21***	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.05***	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,560	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the standardized share of donors in municipality c and year t. In Column (1), we consider the standardized share of donors in the administrative tax data; in Column (2), the donors to Action contre la Faim (ACF); in Column (3), to Oxfam; in Column (4), to UNICEF; in Column (5), to Médecin sans Frontières (MSF); in Column (6), to SOS Mediterranée (SOSM); in Column (7), to La Cimade; in Column (8), to the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH); in Column (9), to the Institut Pasteur; in Column (10), to the WWF; in Column (11), to Bloom; in Column (12), to La Cause; in Column (13), to the Petits Frères des Pauvres; in Column (14), to the Fondation du Patrimoine; and in Column (15), to 30 Millions d'Amis (30 Millions). The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012, 2017 and 2022 presidential elections.

Table C.16: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Balanced sample, Only donations greater than €5

	Global poverty				Migrants		Human rights	Global health	Environment		Social solidarity		Local heritage		Help to animals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	ACF	Oxfam	Unicef	MSF	SOS M	La Cimade	LDH	Institut Pasteur	WWF	Bloom	La Cause	Petits Freres Pauvres	Fondation Patrimoine	Fondation Patrimoine (without Notre-Dame)	30 Millions
Share of vote received by Le Pen	-0.14***	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.04***	-0.12***	-0.06***	-0.08***	-0.03***	-0.11***	-0.02*	-0.02*	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959	55,959
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the standardized share of donors who made a donation larger than €5 in municipality c and year t. In Column (1), we consider the standardized share of donors in the administrative tax data; in Column (2), the donors to Action contre la Faim (ACF); in Column (3), to Oxfam; in Column (4), to UNICEF; in Column (5), to Médecin sans Frontières (MSF); in Column (6), to SOS Mediterranée (SOSM); in Column (7), to La Cimade; in Column (8), to the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH); in Column (9), to the Institut Pasteur; in Column (10), to the WWF; in Column (11), to Bloom; in Column (12), to La Cause; in Column (13), to the Petits Frères des Pauvres; in Column (14), to the Fondation du Patrimoine; and in Column (15), to 30 Millions d'Amis (30 Millions). The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.

Table C.17: Far-right voting and average amount given, Pooled cross-section, Log-log estimation, Depending on whether there is a far-right mayor or far-right city councilors

	All			No far-right mayor			No far-right city councillor		
	(1) Extensive	(2) Intensive	(3) Both	(4) Extensive	(5) Intensive	(6) Both	(7) Extensive	(8) Intensive	(9) Both
Mélenchon (Far Left)	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.08***	0.02*	0.10***	0.08***	0.02*	0.10***	0.08***	0.02*	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	0.13***	0.01	0.14***	0.13***	0.01	0.14***	0.13***	0.01	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
UMP/LR (Right)	0.19***	0.00	0.19***	0.19***	0.00	0.19***	0.19***	0.00	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.14***	-0.07***	-0.21***	-0.14***	-0.07***	-0.21***	-0.14***	-0.07***	-0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,560	57,560	57,560	57,547	57,547	57,547	57,013	57,013	57,013
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96
Mean DepVar	2.42	5.73	8.14	2.42	5.73	8.15	2.42	5.72	8.14
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.46	0.59	0.36	0.46	0.59	0.36	0.46	0.60

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. In Columns (1), (4) and (7) the dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c and election t (extensive margin); in Columns (2), (5) and (8) the dependent variable is the (log of the) amount declared per household given that there is a donation declared (intensive margin); and in Columns (3), (6) and (9) the (log of the) total amount declared per household in the municipality (both margins). We take the average value between 2013 and 2016 for the 2012 presidential elections, and the average value between 2017 and 2019 for the 2017 ones. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.18: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Pooled cross-section, Depending on the supply of local charities

	Share of donors (extensive margin)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			No local charity	Local charity
Mélenchon (Far Left)	0.008	0.010	0.013	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Green & Socialists (Left)	0.079***	0.076***	0.073***	0.112***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
MoDem/LREM (Centre)	0.128***	0.121***	0.119***	0.161***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)
UMP/LR (Right)	0.189***	0.187***	0.186***	0.179***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Le Pen (Far Right)	-0.143***	-0.126***	-0.125***	-0.181***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Local charity		-0.040		
		(0.134)		
Local charity × Mélenchon (Far Left)		0.003		
		(0.013)		
Local charity × Green & Socialists (Left)		0.018*		
		(0.010)		
Local charity × MoDem/LREM (Centre)		0.062***		
		(0.012)		
Local charity × UMP/LR (Right)		-0.004		
		(0.017)		
Local charity × Le Pen (Far Right)		-0.061***		
		(0.019)		
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,560	57,560	43,037	14,523
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	94	93
Mean DepVar	2.42	2.42	2.44	2.36
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.34

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department fixed effects. The dependent variable is the (log of the) share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax form in municipality c and election t. We take the average value between 2013 and 2016 for the 2012 presidential elections, and the average value between 2017 and 2019 for the 2017 ones. The independent variable is a vector of the (log of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and the coefficients for the small candidates are not reported for the sake of space. In Column (2), we interact the independent variables with an indicator variable equal to one if there is (at least) one local charity in the municipality during the election cycle, and to zero otherwise. In Column (3) (respectively Column (4)), we only include the municipalities with no (respectively at least one) local charity. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2.

Table C.19: Far-right voting and willingness to give: Evidence from Italian 5 per mille system, Choices expressed as a share of the overall number of taxpayers

	Preference expressed – 5 per mille						
	(1)						
	No choice	Commune	NGOs	Scientif. res.	Health res.	Cultural her.	Sport
Fratelli d'Italia	0.04**	0.03	-0.06**	0.03*	-0.01	0.04**	-0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Region FEs	✓						
Year FEs	✓						
Controls	✓						
Observations	38,438						
Clusters (Regions)	20						

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions (standard errors clustered at the region level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include region and year fixed effects. Controls are annual city-level controls and are listed in Section 5.2.2. The dependent variable is the standardized share of taxpayers depending on the choice they express (or not) as part of the 5 per mille mechanisms. The independent variable is a vector of the standardized vote share obtained by Fratelli d'Italia in the 2018 and 2022 general elections.

Table C.20: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Panel Estimates, Depending on the purpose of the charity, Complete sample (2012-2023)

	Global poverty				Migrants		Human rights	Global health	Environment		Social solidarity		Local heritage	Help to animals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	ACF	Oxfam	Unicef	MSF	SOS M	La Cimade	LDH	Institut Pasteur	WWF	Bloom	La Cause	Petits Freres Pauvres	Fondation Patrimoine	30 Millions
Share of vote received by Le Pen	0.02***	-0.02**	0.00	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.02**	-0.01*	-0.02	0.00	-0.05***	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467	104,467
Clusters (Cities)	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828	34,828

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at the city level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include commune and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the standardized share of donors in municipality c and year t. In Column (1), we consider the share of donors in the administrative tax data; in Column (2), the donors to Action contre la Faim (ACF); in Column (3), to Oxfam; in Column (4), to Unicef; in Column (5), to Médecin sans Frontières (MSF); in Column (6), to SOS Mediterranée (SOSM); in Column (7), to La Cimade; in Column (8), to the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH); in Column (9), to the Institut Pasteur; in Column (10), to the WWF; in Column (11), to Bloom; in Column (12), to La Cause; in Column (13), to the Petits Frères des Pauvres; in Column (14), to the Fondation du Patrimoine; and in Column (15), to 30 Millions d'Amis (30 Millions). The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012, 2017 and 2022 presidential elections.

Table C.21: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Impact of the past electoral support for the radical-right

	Global poverty				Migrants		Human rights	Global health	Environment		Social solidarity		Local heritage	Help to animals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	ACF	Oxfam	Unicef	MSF	SOS M	La Cimade	LDH	Institut Pasteur	WWF	Bloom	La Cause	Petits Freres Pauvres	Fondation Patrimoine	30 Millions
Share of donors (t-1)	0.66***	0.68***	0.75***	0.92***	0.81***	0.78***	0.92***	0.69***	0.72***	1.09***	0.77***	0.72***	0.76***	1.12***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Share of vote received by Le Pen (t-1)	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.06***	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.04***	-0.01***	-0.06***	0.00	-0.02***	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	174,064	174,064	139,276	174,064	69,653	174,064	174,064	104,469	174,064	69,653	174,064	174,064	139,276	104,469
Clusters (Departments)	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96
Mean DepVar	0.30	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.09
Sd DepVar	1.12	0.98	0.99	1.03	1.17	1.19	1.09	1.02	1.13	1.21	1.01	1.01	1.10	1.11
Time periods included	2002-2023	2002-2024	2007-2023	2002-2024	2017-2024	2002-2023	2002-2024	2012-2024	2002-2024	2017-2023	2002-2023	2002-2023	2007-2023	2012-2023

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at the department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are time-varying city-level controls and are listed in Section 3.2. The dependent variable is the standardized share of donors in city *c* and year *t*. The independent variables are the first lag of the dependent variable, and the first lag of the standardized vote share obtained by (either Jean-Marie or Marine) Le Pen in the presidential elections. In Column (1), we consider the share of donors in Action contre la Faim (ACF); in Column (2), to Oxfam; in Column (3), to Unicef; in Column (4), to Médecin sans Frontières (MSF); in Column (5), to SOS Mediterranée (SOSM); in Column (6), to La Cimade; in Column (7), to the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH); in Column (8), to the Institut Pasteur; in Column (9), to the WWF; in Column (10), to Bloom; in Column (11), to La Cause; in Column (12), to the Petits Frères des Pauvres; in Column (13), to the Fondation du Patrimoine; and in Column (14), to 30 Millions d'Amis (30 Millions). The time period covered for each charity depends on data availability and is reported in the last row of the table.

Table C.22: Survey data, Decomposition of 2017 votes for 2022 Le Pen voters

	Le Pen Converters: Breakdown	
	Frequency	Observations
N. Arthaud	0.001	2
P. Poutou	0.004	8
JL. Mélenchon	0.057	102
B. Hamon	0.015	47
E. Macron	0.053	144
J. Lassalle	0.005	17
F. Fillon	0.114	210
N. Dupont-Aignan	0.041	101
M. Le Pen	0.614	1328
J. Cheminade	0.000	2
F. Asselineau	0.004	9
Abstention	0.072	208
Blank and null	0.018	63
Total	1.000	2241

Notes: The table reports the reported votes in the 2017 presidential election of survey respondents who have reported to vote Le Pen in 2022. "Observations" reported the raw number of respondents who said they voted for this candidate in 2017 and "Frequency" refers to the (weighted) frequency among 2022 Le Pen voters. Respondents who voted Le Pen or Dupont-Aigant in 2017 are categorized as "faithfuls", while the others are categorized as "converters".

D Additional Figures



Notes: The Figure plots the mean and 95% confidence interval of the share individuals who reported a charitable donation in the 2022 French Electoral Survey, depending on their self-placement in the political spectrum from 0 (very on the Left) to 10 (very on the Right) ($N = 12,600$).

Figure D.1: Share of surveyed individuals who report a charitable donation, Depending on their self-reported placement on Left-Right scale



Notes: The Figure plots the distribution of the surveyed individuals' self-reported placement on a Left-Right scale depending on their reported intended vote in the 2022 French Electoral Survey ($N = 12,600$). The pink bars report this distribution for all the surveyed individuals, and the green bars only for the surveyed individuals who report that they intend to vote for Le Pen.

Figure D.2: Distribution of the self-reported placement on the Left-Right scale depending on the reported vote



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (1), using OLS. An observation is an individual ($N = 12,600$). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The depend variable is the amount given, conditional on reporting a donation. The "Far Left" candidates include Fabien Roussel (Parti communiste, 2.28% of the votes), Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, 0.77%), and Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière, 0.56%). The "Left" candidates include Anne Hidalgo (Parti socialiste, 1.75%) and Yannick Jadot (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, 4.63%). The "other right" candidates include Jean Lassalle (Résistons, 3.13%) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, 2.06%). The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote.

Figure D.3: Far-right voting and amount given (intensive margin)



Notes: The Figure plots the mean and 95% confidence interval of the share individuals who reported a political donation in the 2022 French Electoral Survey, depending on their intended vote ($N = 12,600$).

Figure D.4: Self-reported political donations depending on political preferences: 2022 presidential elections



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city/election and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table C.14. All specifications control for department and election fixed effects fixed effects, and the set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.

Figure D.5: Far-right voting and average amount given conditionally on making a donation (intensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Balanced sample



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city/election and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table C.15. All specifications control for department and election fixed effects, and the set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012, 2017, and 2022 presidential elections.

Figure D.6: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Complete sample



Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city/election and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table C.16. All specifications control for department and election fixed effects, and the set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The independent variable is the standardized vote share obtained by Le Pen in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.

Figure D.7: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation (extensive margin): Depending on the purpose of the charity, Balanced sample, Only donations greater than €5



Notes: The Figure plots the mean and 95% confidence interval of the share individuals who reported a charitable donation in the 2022 French Electoral Survey, depending on their state of mind ($N = 12,600$).

Figure D.8: Share of surveyed individuals who report a charitable donation, Depending on the state of mind



(a) 2012 votes and 2013-2016 donations



(b) 2017 votes and 2017-2019 donations

Notes: The figure reports the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city and all specifications control for department fixed effect. The blue coefficients with squares report the results of the estimation when we only include the municipalities where the vote share obtained by Le Pen is below the median. The red coefficients with triangles report the results of the estimation when we only include the municipalities where the vote share obtained by Le Pen is above the median. The set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and coefficients for smaller candidates are not reported for the sake of readability.

Figure D.9: The far-right donation gap: High vs. low electoral support for the far right



Notes: The figure reports the estimation of equation (2) with 95% confidence intervals. Models are estimated using OLS (standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments). An observation is a city/year and all specifications control for department and year fixed effects ($t = 2017, 2018, 2019$). The blue coefficients with squares report the results of the estimation when we only include the municipalities that did not have a far-right MP following the 2017 legislative elections. The red coefficients with triangles report the results of the estimation when we only include the municipalities with a far-right MP following the 2017 legislative elections. The set of controls included is listed in Section 3.2. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote, and coefficients for smaller candidates are not reported for the sake of readability.

Figure D.10: The far-right donation gap: Depending on whether there is a far-right MP, 2017 votes and 2017-2019 donations



(a) Action Contre la Faim



(b) La Cimade



(c) WWF

Notes: The figure plots the total stock of donors (blue bars), the observed number of donors (red bars), the number of novel donors (green bars) and the number of exiting donors (yellow bars) to ACF (sub-Figure D.11a), La Cimade (sub-Figure D.11b), and the WWF (sub-Figure D.11c), between 1990 and 2023.

Figure D.11: Total number, entry and exit of donors: Using historical charity records



(a) Action Contre la Faim



(b) La Cimade



(c) WWF

Notes: The figure plots the residualized stock of donors, considering respectively donors to ACF (sub-Figure D.12a), La Cimade (sub-Figure D.12b), and the WWF (sub-Figure D.12c). The residualized stock of donors is obtained by estimating the following model: $Donors_{c(d),t} = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{X'_{c(d),t}}\beta_1 + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t}$ (see the text for details). The estimation is performed separately for communes with below-median Le Pen vote shares in the 2002 presidential elections (blue line with dots) and above-median vote shares (red line with triangles).

Figure D.12: Total stock of donors depending on the 2002 presidential election results



Notes: The figure plots the share of individuals who show hostility toward the poorest, defined as the individuals who agreed with the statement "the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to", depending on their probability of voting for the Rassemblement National. The data come from the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th and 18th waves of the ELIPSS survey.

Figure D.13: Far-right support and beliefs regarding undeserving poor



Notes: The figure plots the evolution of the positivity index of the charity-related articles published between January 2012 and December 2022 (the index is average over all the articles by half-year intervals). The list of articles included is detailed in Section B.1. The positivity index is calculated using the Python package *Textblob_fr* which provides a score for each article ranging from -1 (very negative) to 1 (very positive).

Figure D.14: Evolution of the media coverage of the charitable sector: Mean positivity index of the charity-related articles, 2012-2022



Notes: The figure plots the evolution of the positivity index of the charity-related articles published between January 2012 and December 2022, depending on whether they contain far-right keywords (the index is average over all the articles by half-year intervals). The list of articles included is detailed in Section B.1, and the list of keywords classified as far-right in Section B.2. The positivity index is calculated using the Python package *Textblob_fr* that provides a score for each article ranging from -1 (very negative) to 1 (very positive).

Figure D.15: Evolution of the media coverage of the charitable sector: Mean positivity index of the charity-related articles, Depending on whether they contain far-right keywords, 2012-2022



German Socioeconomic Panel. Baseline: Non-aligned. Parties from left to right, with AfD as only far-right party.
Donations: dummy if donated past year (charities, refugees) or past five years (blood) SE clustered at the individual level
and control for state & year FEs, gender, age, employment, income, marital status, religion, trust and subjective well-being.

Notes: The figure reports the estimation of a specification equivalent to equation (1) with 95% confidence intervals, using survey data from Germany. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (panel data). The dependent variable is a an indicator variable equal to one if the surveyed individual has reported a donation in the survey, and to zero otherwise. The independent variable is a vector of the surveyed individuals' reported party preferences. The omitted category is abstention, blank vote or null vote. Controls include year and state fixed effects, as well as measure of demographics (gender, marital status), the logarithm of income, measures of trust for society in general, religion, and employment status.

Figure D.16: Far-right voting and probability of making a donation: External Validity, Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 2010-2020)

E Other additional information

E.1 Far-right voting and probability of volunteering

To investigate whether far-right voters have a higher probability of volunteering than the rest of the electorate, we rely on the ELIPSS surveys.[3] The 2018 wave provides information on the share of individuals who are members of an association; Figure E.1 plots the results. Whether we consider members of humanitarian or social organizations (sub-Figure E.1a) or members of a sports or cultural association (sub-Figure E.1b), we see that, if anything, far-right voters have a *lower* probability than the rest of the population of reporting membership.



(a) Humanitarian or social organization



(b) Sports or cultural association

Notes: The figure plots the share of individuals who report being a member of a humanitarian or social organization (sub-Figure E.1a) or a sports or cultural association (sub-Figure E.1b) depending on their self-reported placement on a left-right scale. The data come from the 2018 wave of the ELIPSS survey.

Figure E.1: Probability of being a member of an association depending on political preferences

This can be seen even more clearly if we consider *active* membership. In the 2015 wave of the ELIPSS survey, respondents are asked whether they campaign (*"militent"*) for a nonprofit organization. Figure E.2 reports the results depending on their self-reported placement on a left-right scale, and Figure E.3 depending on their intended vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. In both cases, we

[3]ELIPSS is a French probability-based web panel dedicated to social science research.

see that there is no statistically significant difference between far-right voters on the one hand, and center and right-wing voters on the other hand. Further, far-left voters have a higher probability of being active members of an association than the rest of the electorate.



Notes: The figure plots the share of individuals who report being an active member of an association depending on their self-reported placement on a left-right scale. The data come from the 2015 wave of the ELIPSS survey.

Figure E.2: Probability of being an *active* member of an association depending on political preferences



Notes: The figure plots the share of individuals who report being an active member of an association depending on their intended vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. The data come from the 2015 wave of the ELIPSS survey.

Figure E.3: Probability of being an *active* member of an association depending on intended vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections

E.2 The 5 per mille mechanism in Italy

In Italy, citizen can devote respectively (i) two-thousandths (0.2 percent), (ii) five-thousandths (0.5 percent) and (iii) eight-thousandths (0.8 percent) of their total tax liability (income tax – IRPEF) to (i) the political party of their choice, (ii) third sector entities and non-profit organizations, and (iii) the religion of their choice. In order to do so, all they have to do, at the end of their tax return, is fill in the "sheet specifying the destination of the 8 per thousand, 5 per thousand, and 2 per thousand" (see e.g. Cagé, 2018).

8 per mille The 8 per mille system was introduced in 1985.[4] The beneficiaries of the 8 per mille are the Catholic Church and the religious confessions (non-Catholic) that stipulated an agreement with the Italian State (twelve as of 2023).

5 per mille The 5 per mille system was introduced experimentally in 2006[5], and then applied nationally in 2010, but with a limit on the total amount the State could devolve to it.[6]

A taxpayer can decide either (i) to express a preference toward a *given organization* (identifying it with the fiscal code of the association), (ii) to express a preference toward a *category of organizations*, e.g. scientific research or health research[7], (iii) to express a preference toward the "social activities in the commune of residence" (in this case, taxpayers can only contribute to the municipality they live in), or – just like for the 8 per mille and the 2 per mille – (iv) not to express any preference. In cases of non-preference, the equivalent of 5 per thousand of the taxpayer's income taxes is simply transferred to the general budget (just like the rest of the taxes). See Figure E.4 for an illustration.

In the first three cases, the State has to devote 5 per thousand of the taxpayer's income taxes to the chosen sector or organization. We obtain annual data covering the years 2018 to 2022, with information at the commune level on the number of choices and amount contributed to (i) third sector entities and non-profit organizations ("enti del terzo settore e onlus"), (ii) scientific research ("ricerca scientifica"), (iii) health research ("ricerca sanitaria"), (iv) cultural and landscape heritage ("beni culturali e paesaggistici"), (v) amateur sports associations ("associazioni sportive dilettantistiche"), (vi) management bodies of protected areas ("enti gestori delle aree protette"), as well as to (vii) the social activities in the commune of residence ("attivita' svolte dai comuni").

On average, during our time period, 40% of the taxpayers express a choice as part of the 5 per mille. Overall, the 5 per mille program cost €$524,995,360$ in 2022. With the data at our disposal, we can study

[4] Art.47 of law n.22 of May 20, 1985.

[5] Law n.266 of December 23, 2005.

[6] When introduced experimentally from 2006 to 2009, the 5 per mille system was not capped. The funds allocated through it depended entirely on taxpayers' choices. To limit the impact of the system on the State budget – as the 5 per mille was significantly growing in popularity – a cap was first introduced by the financial law of 2010, so that no more than 400 million euros could be allocated to the system. This cap was raised to 500 million euros by the stability law of 2014 in response to an increased demand from taxpayers wishing to allocate funds to specific entities and in a context of growing awareness and support for the third sector in general. From 2015 to 2020, the cap remained unchanged at €500 million, and it was increased again in 2021 (€520 million) and 2022 (€525 million).

[7] The amount collected through the preferences expressed for the entire category is then redistributed among the different entities registered in the category.



Notes: The figure shows how the taxpayer can express her preference for the 5 per mille when filing her tax return. The seven boxes correspond to the six categories in which associations can register to receive the benefit, plus the choice of the social activity of their municipality ("attivita' svolte dai comuni"). The indication at the bottom translates as follows: *"To express a choice in favor of one destination for the Cinque per mille, the taxpayer must affix her/his signature in the corresponding box. The taxpayer has, moreover, the possibility to indicate also the fiscal code of the subject beneficiary. The choice must be made for exclusively one of the beneficial purposes."*

Figure E.4: 5 per mille preference expression

whether taxpayers prefer to allocate their 5 per mille to a given organization, to a category of organizations or to their municipality. To do so, we focus on the subset of taxpayers who express a preference. Figure E.5 reports the results. The large majority of taxpayers who express a preference as part of the 5 per mille do so for third sector entities and non-profit organizations.

2 per mille The 2 per mille system was introduced in 2014.[8] To allocate two thousandths of their taxes to a given political party, taxpayers simply have to place their chosen party's code (A20 for the Democratic Center, for example) in the correct box and sign on the dotted line.[9]

[8]It was introduced in 2014 for income received in 2013 (art.4, leg. decree n.149 of December 28, 2013). The system was designed to replace the public funding of parties, including the reimbursement of campaign expenses, which was completely phased out in Italy between 2014 and the end of 2017 (see Cagé, 2018).

[9]The list of codes can be found only at the end of the explanatory notes on the tax return published online by the tax authorities.



Notes: The figure plots the allocation of the choices expressed as part of the 5 per mille. An observation is a municipality/year, and observations are weighted by the number of taxpayers in the municipality.

Figure E.5: Allocation of the choices expressed as part of the 5 per mille

E.3 The local supply of charities

Definition of a "charity" The "*Répertoire National des Associations*" (RNA) contains about 2 million observations, including both active, dissolved and inactive associations. In this paper, we focus on the subset of "charities" among the non-profit organizations.

To do so, we follow the WALDEC nomenclature of associations provided by the French Ministry of the Interior.[10] The nomenclature is a five-digit code that separate the charities into 27 categories (on a two-digit level) and more than 300 smaller categories. See Figure E.6.



Notes: The figure plots the number of active associations by WALDEC categories in the National Directory of Associations by year. An active association in the year t is defined as an association that has been created before year t and has not declared a formal dissolution or stop of activity before year t.

Figure E.6: Number of active associations

A "charity" is an association that is part of the category "20 - *associations caritatives, humanitaires, aide au développement, développement du bénévolat*." There are roughly $80,000$ "active" associations in this category as of December 2024.[11]

[10] The codebook is available on Data.gouv.fr.

[11] "Active" here is defined as non-dissolved. One caveat of the the RNA data is that it does not accurately report the dissolutions: many associations do not report their inactivity or dissolution. So the stock of associations should be considered a proxy – a cumulative flow rather than an accurate estimation of the number of active charities.

Table E.1: Global keyword dictionary: List of words included, By frequency

Identification of the local and global charities To investigate whether a municipality has a local charity, we need to disentangle local vs. global charities. To do so, we generate a list of global keywords. We proceed as follows.

1. We list all the active charities in the RNA ($\simeq 80,000$).
2. Then we analyze the content of their statement of purposes. We remove the stop-words, de-root the rest of the words included and list them by frequency. The procedure of de-rooting and removing stop-words is done using the natural language processing package *spaCy*.
3. We then take the $6,000$ most frequent words (this covers all the words that appear more than 10 times in the description of all charities) and manually identify the words that satisfy the following characteristics:
    - Name of a foreign country or location, and associated adjective forms (e.g. "Mali", "Moroccan", "Indonesia", "Asia", etc.)
    - Synonyms of "global", "European" and "international".
    - Words unlikely to be related to the situation in France or other developed countries, such as "war", "famine", "genocide" and "refugees."
    - Words that indicate a form of global exchange, such as "expatriates" or "intercultural"
4. This set of thus identified words form our "global dictionary." They are listed in Table E.1.

Categorization of the charities Finally, we categorize the charities as global if their statement of purpose contains at least one global keyword, and as local otherwise.

References

Cagé, J. (2018). *Le prix de la démocratie*. Fayard (English version: The Price of Democracy, Harvard University Press, 2020).