

Discussion of “Fiscal Transfers to Local Governments and the Distribution of Economic Activity”

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
Summary

- Research Question: What is the impact of fiscal equalization on local policy and economic activity (revenue, spending, jobs)?
- Context: Finland 2015-2019
 - Intergovernmental transfers from central gov't to municipalities
 - Reform in 2015: New grant formula → reallocation across municipalities
- Identification strategy: Difference-in-differences
 - Compare `winners' vs. `losers', before and after reform

2015 Reform (Empirical Strategy)

- Revenue-neutral formula overhaul
 - Idea: Fix population characteristics and calculate Δ in grants due to formula change
- Grants depend on various elements of the municipal population
 - Higher weight on “tax base equalization”
 - Shifts in cost weights (morbidity index up, age structure down)
 - New weight on “workplace self-sufficiency”
- Winners: $+\geq \text{€}50/\text{resident}$; Losers - $\geq \text{€}50/\text{resident}$


Effects of Reform on Grants per Resident




- Ideally: compare
 - winners vs. middle and
 - losers vs. middle
- Reality: non-parallel trends between middle and other groups

Main Findings

- Higher grants →
 - Lower municipal taxes and fees (1/3)
 - Increase public spending (1/3)
 - Reduce long-term borrowing (1/3)
- Increase private sector jobs
- Small/imprecise impact on employment overall
- Small/imprecise impact on migration
- Reduce out-commuting



(c) Total operational spending per resident



(a) Total number of jobs per 1,000 residents

Relation to Existing Literature

- This paper bridges two largely separate literatures:
 - Fiscal federalism
 - Place-based redistribution
- Why the separation?
 - Perhaps geographical: U.S. does not do (explicit) fiscal equalization via intergovernmental grants, but common in the rest of the world
 - Possibly disciplinary traditions: Public vs. Urban/Labor?
- Also connects to a literature on fiscal multipliers

Fiscal Equalization

- Why have unconditional grants from central gov't to sub-national gov'ts based on “fiscal need”?
- Rationale: Equity-based (rather than efficiency-based)
 - “...may provide the glue necessary to hold the federation together...”
– Oates (1999)
- Empirical literature focuses on “flypaper” effects; spending on public goods

Place-Based Redistribution

- Rationale:
 - Traditionally: equity-based
 - Possibly efficiency arguments e.g.,
 - Agglomeration economics (productivity spillovers)
- Place-based redistribution is typically more specific than “unconditional” block grants, e.g., tax credits to employers etc.
- Empirical literature focuses on job creation, wages, mobility

Connecting the Findings

- This paper considers both strands of the literature and considers
 - (Fiscal federalism) Revenues and spending
 - (Place-based redistribution) Jobs and mobility
- Suggestion: Draw a closer link between these
 - What was the nature of the spending increase?
 - Were there tax cuts for businesses?
 - Or do tax cuts → increase demand → increase jobs?

External Validity and Policy Implications

- Estimates imply that equalization can have effects on local economic activity, and with minimal distortions (migration)
 - However, mostly shifting work patterns
- Mechanisms: Important for understanding whether effects extrapolate to different types of place-based policies
- Generalizability: Finland = decentralized

Other Empirical Questions

- Explore winners vs. “no change” group and losers vs. “no change” group
 - Possibly find a “no change” group with similar characteristics
- Heterogeneous effects by municipality characteristics
- Longer-term outcomes: Do the job effects persist or do migration patterns change?

Conclusion

- Very comprehensive evaluation of the effects of an intergovernmental grant
- Convincing identification strategy that relies on a reform
- Bridges several literatures