Seth Benzell Chapman University Stanford University Erik Brynjolfsson Stanford University NBER Ruyu Chen Stanford University

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### Introduction: Scalability and Firm Size

- CEO's tasks can be decomposed into two parts (Baker and Hall, 2004):
  - **'Scalable'** part: marginal product of the task increases with firm size
    - *Example:* CEO decides firm will adopt a GenAI tool
  - **'Non-scalable'** part : additive, marginal product of the task not increase with firm size
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  - 'Non-scalable' part : additive, marginal product of the task not increase with firm size
    - *Example:* CEO redecorates office
- Gabaix and Landier (2008) find CEO compensation increases about 20% with doubling of firm size.
  - CEO's marginal product is proportional to firm size
  - In a competitive market, CEO's compensation reflect their marginal product

### Introduction: Scalability and Firm Size

In theory, all occupations conduct these two types of tasks. But the ratios may vary.

Occupations	Scalable tasks	Non-scalable tasks
Salespersons	Closing a large B2B sales	Checkout at the counter
Doctors	Writing a guide for residents	Treating a patient
Factory Workers	Discovering a dangerously faulty part	Installing a windshield

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# **Research** Questions

- Do occupations beyond CEO experience wage scaling?
- If so, which jobs scale and why?
  - Ranking of worker
    - Top vs. median
  - Nature of tasks
  - Type of technology

# What we do

- Our unique data allows us to split wage scaling with size by occupational characteristics for the first time.
  - The "large-firm wage premium" was first identified in (Moore 1911)
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- Analyze a large-scale, high-frequency administrative payroll dataset of over 15 million U.S. workers of 898 occupations 2017-2023.
- Measure how wages scale with firm size and across occupations, jobs, and industries

MOTIVATIO 00000 Empirical Strategy and Re

# What we find

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  - Stronger scaling among occupations that are intensive in abstract tasks, leadership and decision making roles
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- 4. Firms with more intensive IT investment in previous years

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  - Stronger scaling among occupations that are intensive in abstract tasks, leadership and decision making roles
  - Weaker scaling in occupations intensive in routine and manual tasks
- 4. Firms with more intensive IT investment in previous years
- 5. Results are robust for establishment vs. firm size; including firm-fixed effects, individual fixed effects; and using job-level features

### 1 Motivation

### **2** Theoretical Framework

### 3 Data

4 Empirical Strategy and Results

### **5** Conclusion

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### • Informational economy of scale:

- Innovation
- Span-of-control

### • O-Ring-Style Complementarity:

• Production functions heavily dependent on the quality of the weakest link input.

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  - Positions requiring leadership or decision-making skills; higher-wage earners in their occupation-firm group.
  - The employees and divisions of the firm that a worker can directly command, guide, or otherwise help or hinder in their pursuit of company goals (Drucker, 2007)

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# Theories Driving Task Scalability

### • O-Ring-Style Complementarity:

- Production functions heavily dependent on the quality of the weakest link input.
- If the most complex firms are the most productive, then all workers might have very high marginal products.

Empirical Strategy and Result

A worker's log wage in firm i, of size  $S_i$ , is the sum of their marginal product in scalable and non-scalable tasks:



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$$log(w_{i,j,o,t}) = log(S_{i,t})C_{i,o,p}T_{i,j,o} + D_{o,i,t}$$
(1)

- *o*: the occupation type
- *j*: the individual potential job/worker
- $T_{i,j,o}$ : the individual's talent
- $C_{i,o,p}$ : how complementary the talent is to firm size for this occupation
- p: skill percentile the worker is in at their occupation at the firm.
- $D_{o,t}$ : the average *direct* contribution to output of a worker at a given occupation and time to a firm of size 0.

That model motivates the following reduced form regression:

$$log(w_{i,j,o,t}) = \beta log(S_{i,t}) + \eta X_{o,i,j,t} + \alpha$$
(2)

This regression asks how wage in a firm scales with firm size after controlling for a vector of fixed effects  $X_{o,i,t}$ . We sometimes restrict attention to specific occupation o or firm-occupation wage percentiles p.

MOTIVATION 00000 Empirical Strategy and Result

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We also investigate interactions between job characteristics and firm size in predicting wage

$$log(w_{i,j,o,t}) = \beta_0 log(S_{i,t}) + \eta Y_{o,i,j,t} + \beta_1 Y_{o,i,j,t} log(S_{i,t}) + \alpha$$
(3)

- Y: job characteristic that might effect scalability
- $\beta_1$ : how much stronger or weaker scaling is for occupations with the characteristics Y

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### 1 Motivation

### 2 Theoretical Framework

### 3 Data

4 Empirical Strategy and Results

### **5** Conclusion

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## Data

### • ADP Payroll Data:

- One of the world's leading payroll processing firms
- Covers about 20% of the U.S. workforce
- Key variables:
  - Monthly total taxable income for each employee
  - 6-digit O\*NET occupation code and job description; 2-digit NAICS industry code
  - Zip code of employees and establishments

MPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULT

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### • Sample Selection:

- Full-time workers with above minimum wage, aged 18-70
- Firms with at least 10 employees, 2017-2023
- Over 15 million employees, 128,376 unique firms, about 75k - 77k firms every year, 36,049 firms in the balanced sample
- Analysis conducted at the *occupation-firm-year* level
- Approximately 11 million observations

### • Additional Data Sources:

- Over 200 O\*NET descriptors
  - Work context impact of decisions on co-workers or company results, etc.
- Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) dataset
  - Number of firms/establishments at the 2-digit NAICS level as the weight for regression

DATA

MPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULT

# **Baseline Empirical Strategy**

Complementarity between skill and size motivates:

 $log(Wage_{j,i,t}) = \alpha + \beta log(Size_{i,t}) + Fixed \ Effects + \varepsilon_{j,i,t} \quad (4)$ 

- $log(Wage_{j,i,t})$ : An occupation-firm-year measure of wage for:
  - Highest-paid worker
  - Median worker
  - Workers at other percentiles
- $log(Size_{j,i,t})$ : An occupation-firm-year measure of firm size
  - Firm payroll
  - Firm employment
- Year, 2-digit NAICS industry, and occupation fixed effects depending on specification

# Baseline Results

- Positive scaling for all size measures
- Stronger scaling for highest-paid workers than median workers

	(1)	(2)	(0)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	log(wages fo	or highest-paid workers)	log(wages fo	r median workers)
Log of firm payroll size	$0.169^{***}$ (0.001)		$0.086^{***}$ (0.001)	
Log of firm employment size		$0.132^{***}$ (0.001)		$0.041^{***}$ (0.001)
Observations	9,606,243	9,606,243	9,606,243	9,606,243
$Adj.R^2$	0.495	0.448	0.473	0.446
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
2-digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
O*NET occupational FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

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## **Baseline Results**

Stronger positive scaling for workers at higher wage percentile in their firm-occupation



### Scaling for Selected Occupations - Highest-paid workers



#### Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

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### Scaling for Selected Occupations - Median workers



Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Empirical Strategy and Results 

# What Characteristics Drive Scaling?

$$\log(Wage_{ijsmt}) = \alpha + \beta_0 \log(Size_{ismt}) + \eta OccChar_j + \beta_1 \log(Size_{ismt}) \times OccChar_j + \delta_t + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{ijsmt}$$
(5)

#### $\bullet \ OccChar$ is some characteristic of the occupation-firm-year

- Belonging to a specific occupation
- The IT exposure of the firm or industry
- Occupational or job-level characteristics

We're primarily interested in  $\beta_1$ , which reports the effect of an occupational characteristic on scaling.

### Scaling as a Function of Occupational Task Type

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Log of Wages for highest-paid Workers				
Log of firm size	0.174***	0.134***	0.220***	0.194***
Log of firm size $\times$ Abstract task score	(0.001)	(0.001) 0.085*** (0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log of firm size $\times$ Routine task score		()	-0.157*** (0.001)	
Log of firm size $\times$ Manual task score			(0.001)	$-0.287^{***}$ (0.004)
Observations	9,974,733	9,673,093	9,673,093	9,673,093
$Adj.R^2$	0.492	0.497	0.501	0.497
Panel B: Log of Wages for Median Workers				
Log of firm size	0.086***	0.074***	0.102***	0.090***
Log of firm size $\times$ Abstract task score	(0.001)	(0.001) 0.025*** (0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log of firm size $\times$ Routine task score		· · /	-0.054***	
Log of firm size $\times$ Manual task score			(0.001)	$-0.053^{***}$ (0.003)
Observations	9,974,733	9,673,093	9,673,093	9,673,093
Adj.R <sup>2</sup>	0.474	0.476	0.477	0.476
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
2-digit INAICS FE O*NET occupational FE	Y V	Y V	Y V	Y V
O HET Occupational FE	1	1	1	1

Notes: "routine/manual/abstract" categorization of Autor and Handel (2013)

OTIVATION	Theoretical Framework	Data	Empirical Strategy and Results	Conclusion
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2-digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
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Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
2-digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
O*NET occupational FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

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MOTIVATION .	Theoretical Framework	Data	Empirical Strategy and Results	Conclusion
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# Scaling and Firm IT

- Firms with intensive IT investments experience stronger scaling
- But only among workers at higher wage percentiles

				-				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable is	Highest	99th	95th	90th	75th	Median	25th	1st
log of wages for:	paid							
Log of firm size	$0.172^{***}$	$0.162^{***}$	$0.144^{***}$	$0.131^{***}$	$0.108^{***}$	$0.086^{***}$	$0.067^{***}$	$0.016^{***}$
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
IT investment (lagged)	$-2.172^{***}$	-2.232***	$-1.630^{***}$	-1.137 * * *	-0.425	0.113	$0.486^{*}$	$1.244^{***}$
	(0.356)	(0.367)	(0.363)	(0.349)	(0.322)	(0.297)	(0.285)	(0.319)
$Log of firm size \times IT$	$0.166^{***}$	$0.171^{***}$	$0.137^{***}$	$0.108^{***}$	$0.065^{***}$	$0.033^{*}$	0.010	-0.035*
investment (lagged)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Observations	7.986.870	7.986.870	7.986.870	7.986.870	7.986.870	7.986.870	7.986.870	7.986.870
$Adj.R^2$	0.501	0.499	0.498	0.502	0.511	0.512	0.473	0.435
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2-Digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6-Digit O*NET FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

"IT Workers" are any employee in the "Computer and Mathematical" family of occupations;

"IT Developers" are Computer Programmers, Software Developers, and Web Developers

OTIVATION	Theoretical Framework	DATA	Empirical Strategy and Results	Conclusion	21/29
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Observations	7,986,870	7,986,870	7,986,870	7,986,870	7,986,870	7,986,870	7,986,870	7,986,870
$Adj.R^2$	0.501	0.499	0.498	0.502	0.511	0.512	0.473	0.435
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2-Digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6-Digit O*NET FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

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OTIVATION	Theoretical Framework	Data	Empirical Strategy and Results	Conclusion	21/29
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# What Characteristics Drive Scaling?

For the remainder we focus on

- Wage = highest-paid wage in a given occupation-firm-year
- Size = Firm payroll

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# R&D and creative workers

• Occupations in the creative, science, and engineering fields do not see much difference in scaling with firm size

Dependent variable is the	(1)	(2)	(3)
log of wages for highest-paid workers		. ,	
Log of firm size	$0.137^{***}$	$0.138^{***}$	0.137***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R&D workers	$0.060^{**}$		
	(0.030)		
$Log of firm size \times R\&D workers$	$0.003^{*}$		
	(0.002)		
Creative workers		$-0.226^{***}$	
		(0.034)	
Log of firm size $\times$ Creative workers		0.001	
		(0.002)	
Creative workers			$-0.151^{***}$
			(0.024)
Log of firm size $\times$ R&D or creative workers			0.008***
			(0.001)
Observations	9,974,736	9,974,736	9,974,736
$Adj.R^2$	0.121	0.122	0.120
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
2-digit NAICS FE	Υ	Υ	Υ

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# R&D and creative workers

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Dependent variable is the	(1)	(2)	(3)
log of wages for highest-paid workers	(-)	(-)	(0)
Log of firm size	$0.137^{***}$	$0.138^{***}$	$0.137^{***}$
0	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
R&D workers	0.060**	· /	· · /
	(0.030)		
Log of firm size $\times$ R&D workers	0.003*		
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			(0.001)
Observations	0.074.726	0 074 726	0 074 726
Observations	9,974,730	9,974,730	9,974,730
Auj.a-	0.121	0.122	0.120
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### Scaling and O\*NET Characteristics



Year and occupation fixed effects included.

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# Scaling, O\*NET Characteristics, and IT

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Dependent variable is the log of wages for highest-paid workers	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log of firm size	0.141***	0.216***	0.191***
IT investment (lagged)	(0.001) -4.620***	(0.001) -6.484***	(0.001) -7.197***
Log of firm size $\times$ IT investment (lagged)	(0.675) $0.299^{***}$	(0.556) $0.466^{***}$	(0.564) $0.490^{***}$
Log of firm size×Abstract task score	(0.042) $0.068^{***}$	(0.035)	(0.035)
Abstract task score×IT investment (lagged)	(0.002) -0.317		
Log of firm size $\times$ Abstract task score $\times$ IT investment (lagged)	(0.778) 0.108**		
Log of firm size×Routine task score	(0.048)	-0.154***	
Routine task score×IT investment (lagged)		(0.002) $3.565^{***}$	
${\rm Log~of~firm~size} \times {\rm Routine~task~score} \times {\rm IT~investment~(lagged)}$		(0.621) -0.235***	
Log of firm size×Manual task score		(0.038)	-0.278***
Manual task score×IT investment (lagged)			(0.004) 23.979***
Log of firm size $\times Manual$ task score $\times IT$ investment (lagged)			(2.220) -1.233*** (0.136)
Observations	7,847,602	7,847,602	7,847,602
Adj.R <sup>2</sup>	0.502	0.507	0.503
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
2-Digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y
6-Digit O*NET FE	Y	Y	Y

#### Year and occupation fixed effects included.

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Log of firm size×IT investment (lagged)	0.299***	0.466***	0.490***
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Log of firm size×Abstract task score	0.068***	()	(,
	(0.002)		
Abstract task score×IT investment (lagged)	-0.317		
	(0.778)	_	
Log of firm size×Abstract task score×IT investment (lagged)	0.108**		
	(0.048)		
Log of firm size×Routine task score		$-0.154^{***}$	
		(0.002)	
Routine task score×IT investment (lagged)		3.565***	
		(0.621)	
Log of firm size $\times$ Routine task score $\times$ IT investment (lagged)		-0.235***	
I		(0.038)	0.079***
Log of firm size×manual task score			-0.278
Manual task score VIT investment (lagred)			23 070***
Manual task score×11 investment (lagged)			(2.220)
Log of firm size×Manual task score×IT investment (lagged)			-1.233***
nog of him bibo(framan cash booto(fr mrcoomone (mggod)			(0.136)
			(
Observations	7,847,602	7,847,602	7,847,602
Adj.R <sup>2</sup>	0.502	0.507	0.503
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
2-Digit NAICS FE	Y	Y	Y
6-Digit O*NET FE	Y	Y	Y

### Year and occupation fixed effects included.

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CONCLUSION

# Robustness Checks

- Individual-level analysis
- Job feature- extract scores from text descriptions for 6,494 jobs
- Wage scaling with establishment size, with additional controls for local market (commuting zone)

## Robustness 1: Individual-level Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)
log of wages for each worker	with	n Individual FE	2
Log of firm size	$0.028^{***}$	$0.039^{***}$	$0.034^{***}$
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
$Log firm size \times Abstract task score$	$0.026^{**}$		
	(0.010)		
$Log firm size \times Routine task score$		$-0.022^{***}$	
		(0.003)	
Log firm size×Manual task score			0.001
			(0.009)
Num. obs.	169, 365, 043	169, 365, 043	169, 365, 043
$Adj. R^2$	0.630	0.630	0.630
O*NET FE:	Y	Y	Y
2-digit NAICS FE:	Y	Y	Y
Year FE:	Y	Υ	Υ
Individual FE:	Y	Y	Y

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#### WHICH JOBS SCALE AND WHY?

### Robustness 1: Individual-level Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)
log of wages for each worker	with	h Individual FE	C
Log of firm size	$0.028^{***}$	0.039***	$0.034^{***}$
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Log firm size  imes Abstract task score	$0.026^{**}$		
	(0.010)		
$Log firm size \times Routine task score$		$-0.022^{***}$	
		(0.003)	
Log firm size  imes Manual task score			0.001
			(0.009)
Num. obs.	169, 365, 043	169, 365, 043	$1\overline{69}, 365, 043$
Adj. $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.630	0.630	0.630
O*NET FE:	Y	Y	Y
2-digit NAICS FE:	Y	Y	Υ
Year FE:	Y	Y	Y
Individual FE:	Y	Y	Y

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WHICH JOBS SCALE AND WHY?

## Robustness 2: Job-level Features

- Extract job features from 6,949 distinct job titles and text descriptions
- Example prompt: To what extent are the negative consequences if someone makes a mistake in this job? (Answer 1-10)



### WHICH JOBS SCALE AND WHY?

# Conclusion

- 1. Most occupations, not just CEOs, scale with firm size
  - Significant heterogeneity in scalability
- 2. Stronger scaling:
  - Leadership and decision making occupations
  - Abstract task occupations
  - Top percentile workers in a firm-occupation
- 3. Weaker scaling:
  - Routine task occupations
  - Manual task occupations
  - Low-percentile workers
- 4. Little or no effects:
  - R&D workers
  - Creative workers

# Conclusion

- 1. Most occupations, not just CEOs, scale with firm size
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- 3. Weaker scaling:
  - Routine task occupations
  - Manual task occupations
  - Low-percentile workers
- 4. Little or no effects:
  - R&D workers
  - Creative workers
- 5. IT increase scaling directly and amplifies the above Interpretation:

Informational Economies of Scale are associated with wage scaling. O-ring complementarity appears to be less important

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