

Implications of Asset Market Data for Equilibrium Models of Exchange Rates*

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Abstract

We characterize the relation between exchange rates and their macroeconomic fundamentals without committing to a specific model of preferences, endowment or menu of traded assets. When investors can trade home and foreign currency risk-free bonds, the exchange rate (conditionally) appreciates in states of the world that are worse for home investors than foreign investors. This prediction is at odds with the empirical evidence. We first show that it can be overturned (unconditionally) if the deviations from U.I.P. are large and exchange rates are highly predictable, which are conditions that do not hold in the data. More broadly, it is not possible to match the empirical exchange rate cyclicalities (the Backus-Smith puzzle), the deviations from U.I.P. (the Fama puzzle) and the lack of predictability (the Meese-Rogoff puzzle). Second, our minimalist approach allows us to delineate the class of models that can resolve these puzzles. We show that introducing Euler equation wedges consistent with a home currency bias, home bond convenience yields/financial repression, or intermediary frictions can resolve all of these puzzles.

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1 Introduction

We start by listing four key stylized facts about exchange rates. First, real exchange rates are only weakly positively correlated with relative aggregate consumption growth [Kollmann, 1991, Backus and Smith, 1993]. The home currency tends to depreciate when the home investors experience adverse macro-economic shocks and thus have high marginal utility growth. Exchange rates are weakly pro-cyclical. Second, more generally, exchange rates seem disconnected from the other macro variables that should determine them [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000]. Third, as documented by Tryon [1979], Hansen and Hodrick [1980] and Fama [1984], interest rate differences do not predict changes in exchange rates with the right sign to enforce the uncovered interest rate parity (U.I.P.). Instead, currency returns are predictable, but exchange rates themselves are not. In order to explain the negative slope coefficients, risk premia have to be extremely volatile [Fama, 1984]. Fourth, other macro variables also fail to predict exchange rates, as shown by Meese and Rogoff [1983]. It is hard to beat a random walk when predicting exchange rates.

In a large class of international real business cycle models, as long as investors can trade home and foreign risk-free bonds frictionlessly, their Euler equations impose strong restrictions on the relationship between exchange rates and marginal utilities. We first show that these restrictions imply that it is not possible to simultaneously address all of these facts. That is, these stylized facts are tied together in a model and are not disparate phenomena. We then show that adding an Euler equation wedge, which can reflect home currency bias or market segmentation, can address these facts. We derive a minimum wedge, which we estimate at 38 basis points, that is necessary to address the facts. More broadly, we outline a diagnostic test that a model must satisfy in order to be address the four facts we have outlined.

Our starting point is the complete-market setting, in which real exchange rates have to appreciate—conditionally and unconditionally—when the domestic marginal utility growth is higher than the foreign marginal utility growth to enforce no arbitrage. When domestic investors have a higher marginal willingness than foreign investors to pay for consumption in some state tomorrow, i.e. to save into that state, then the state-contingent interest rate is correspondingly lower at home, and the real exchange rate has to appreciate in that state to keep arbitrageurs from borrowing domestically and investing abroad in that state of the world. The exchange rate has to appreciate to keep the state prices at home and abroad aligned state-by-state. When investors have power utility, this state-contingent version of interest rate parity induces a perfectly negative correlation with aggregate consumption growth.

Restricting trade in securities markets does not alleviate the puzzle. Standard two-country international real business cycle (IRBC) models feature four Euler equations that must hold in equilibrium. These equations implicitly describe the risk-adjusted returns home and foreign investors require for holding home and foreign risk-free bonds. More concretely, let $m_{t,t+1}$ and $m_{t,t+1}^*$ denote the home and foreign SDF in log, let r_t and r_t^* denote the home and foreign risk-free rates in log, and let s_t denote the log spot exchange rate in units of foreign currency per dollar. When s_t increases, the home currency appreciates. Then, the four bond Euler equations are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} + r_t)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t^*)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t)]. \end{aligned}$$

The first two equations are the Euler equations for the home investor investing in domestic and foreign currency risk-free bonds. The second set of two Euler equations pertains to the foreign investor. In this paper, we start from these four Euler equations and show that they impose strong restrictions on the exchange rate's cyclicity, which is defined as the covariance between the exchange rate movement Δs_{t+1} and the SDF differential $m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*$. A positive covariance means that the home currency's exchange rate tends to appreciate when the home investors' marginal utility growth rate is higher than the foreign investors'.

First, we characterize the conditional exchange rate cyclicity. We obtain a stark result, building on the work by [Lustig and Verdelhan \[2019\]](#). The conditional covariance is still positive, which means that the exchange rate has to be conditionally counter-cyclical to enforce these bond Euler equations. A more restrictive version of this conditional result was derived by [Lustig and Verdelhan \[2019\]](#). As long as investors can trade home and foreign risk-free bonds frictionlessly, an average version of the complete markets state-contingent interest rate parity prediction survives. The exchange rate has to appreciate in bad states for the home investor to keep the state prices at home and abroad aligned and enforce the bond Euler equations.

Second, we characterize the unconditional exchange rate cyclicity in order to link our result directly to the [Kollmann \[1991\]](#) and [Backus and Smith \[1993\]](#) evidence.¹ To replicate unconditionally pro-cyclical exchange rates, the first stylized fact, we need very

¹The unconditional cyclicity is equal to the mean of the conditional exchange rate cyclicity plus a term that captures the extent to which exchange rates can be predicted by the expected SDF differential.

volatile forward premia or highly predictable exchange rates. The first condition is at odds with the [Tryon \[1979\]](#), [Hansen and Hodrick \[1980\]](#), and [Fama \[1984\]](#) evidence on the violation of U.I.P, the third stylized fact. The second condition is at odds with the [Meese and Rogoff \[1983\]](#) evidence, the fourth stylized fact.

We thus end up with an impossibility result: when investors can trade domestic and foreign currency bonds, we cannot generate procyclical exchange rates (stylized fact 1) while matching the observed U.I.P. deviations (stylized fact 3) and the lack of exchange rate predictability (stylized fact 4). Our results allow for arbitrary currency risk premia. While U.I.P. deviations may help to generate an exchange rate disconnect, we show that they are not sufficient. Our analytical results show that we also need a counterfactual amount of exchange rate predictability to deliver pro-cyclical exchange rates.

We next turn to a resolution: we show analytically that cross-currency bond Euler equation wedges on home investors in foreign bonds can simultaneously address all of these facts. The wedge can be interpreted as investors acting as if they face large (perceived or actual) transaction costs or inconvenience yields associated with buying bonds denominated in a foreign currency. They can also be interpreted as high convenience yields that home investors derive on their home bonds, which can arise for example because home bonds function as private liquidity or due to financial repression. These results clarify the role of frictions in equilibrium models of exchange rates. The key ingredient needed to make progress on the disconnect and Backus-Smith puzzles is not market incompleteness. Likewise, currency risk premium shocks that drive U.I.P. deviations do not resolve the puzzle. In the literature, both risk premium shocks and cross-currency bond Euler equation wedges are often referred to collectively as U.I.P. or financial shocks [see, e.g., [Farhi and Werning, 2014](#), [Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2021](#)]. We show that as long as all of the cross-currency bond Euler equations hold without wedges, the Backus-Smith puzzle reappears. Financial shocks that only drive risk premium variations cannot overturn this result unless the Euler equations are violated.

Quantitatively, when we calibrate the exchange rate predictability, volatility, the Fama regression coefficient, and the SDF variance to match the data, the cross-currency bond Euler equation wedges have to be at least 38 basis points in order to generate a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclical. In other words, the home investor needs to act as if they face a 38 basis point transaction cost when buying foreign currency bonds, and vice versa.

There is a wealth of evidence to support the notion that investors act as if they face large transaction costs in buying foreign securities [[Lewis, 1995a](#)]. Moreover, there is recent empirical evidence to specifically support a home currency bias in bonds. [Maggiori,](#)

Neiman, and Schreger [2020b] report strong evidence of a home currency bias in international mutual fund holdings of corporate bonds. The only exception is the dollar, the international reserve currency. Investors will buy dollar-denominated bonds. Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger [2020a] attribute this home currency bias to the costs of currency hedges and behavioral bias.

Surprisingly, we find that only the mean of the cross-currency bond Euler equation wedges matters. The covariance of these wedges with the SDFs does not matter for disconnect. The level of the wedges matters because addressing the four facts requires a model to disconnect the relation between relative marginal utility growth ($m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*$) and exchange rate changes Δs_{t+1} . Without wedges, the U.I.P. conditions tie these objects together. With an Euler equation wedge, it is possible to satisfy the U.I.P. conditions while disconnecting the covariance between marginal utility growth and exchange rate changes. We show that this is the key to a resolution of the puzzles.

Literature. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2002] analyze a complete-market model of exchange rates with sticky prices and identify the Backus-Smith puzzle as the key failure of their model. Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2008], Pavlova and Rigobon [2012] consider incomplete market models of exchange rates. In their model, domestic and foreign investors only invest in a risk-free bond that pays off in a global numéraire, implicitly dropping all 4 Euler equations. This implicitly introduces wedges in one of the four bond Euler equations. They report progress on the Backus-Smith puzzle.

A different strand of the literature segments the markets and thus introduces wedges into the bond Euler equations. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe [2002a, 2009a] consider a Baumol-Tobin style model in which investors pay a cost to transact in currency and bond markets. Relatedly, Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig [2018], Jiang, Krishnamurthy, Lustig, and Sun [2024] explore the dollar exchange rate implications of convenience yields earned on dollar safe assets, another type of the Euler equation wedges.² Diamond and Van Tassel [2021] shows that risk-free government bonds around the world carry convenience yields.

Finally, a third strand of the literature imputes a central role to financial intermediaries, drawing on insights from the literature on intermediary asset pricing. Gabaix and Maggiori [2015], Itskhoki and Mukhin [2021], Fukui, Nakamura, and Steinsson [2023] all consider models in which most investors cannot directly access currency markets. In Itskhoki and Mukhin [2021], domestic investors only invest in the domestic bond mar-

²There is a growing literature on convenience yields in bond markets, starting with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2012]

ket. Only the intermediaries can trade foreign currencies. Similarly, [Gourinchas, Ray, and Vayanos \[2020\]](#), [Greenwood, Hanson, Stein, and Sunderam \[2020\]](#) study models with domestic preferred-habitat investors and global arbitrageurs. This class of models keep only two of the Euler equations we consider and add a third Euler equation that captures the global arbitrageurs' long-short portfolio decision over a carry trade return. The approach of these intermediary-centered models are complementary to ours. The approach implies an infinite transaction cost for investing in the foreign currency as domestic investors are disallowed from investing in foreign currency. This is clearly extreme. Our approach provides the minimum bounds needed on investors' Euler equation wedges needed to address exchange rate facts. One can interpret these wedges as the direct cost of investing in foreign markets or the indirect costs of doing so when investing via the intermediaries modeled in this strand of the literature.

Other recent work by [Hassan \[2013\]](#), [Dou and Verdelhan \[2015\]](#), [Chien, Lustig, and Naknoi \[2020\]](#), [Jiang and Richmond \[2023\]](#) takes a different tack by introducing heterogeneity in household trading technologies. Active households can freely trade bonds and other state contingent claims, whereas the inactive households have no access to the asset market. In this case, while the four Euler equations we consider in this paper hold for the active households without any wedges, their marginal utilities have different cyclicalities than the country-level aggregate marginal utilities. As a result, the model disconnects aggregate consumption from the SDF of the Euler equation to which the model applies.

[Lustig and Verdelhan \[2019\]](#) ask whether market incompleteness helps to resolve outstanding currency puzzles. They focus only on the conditional Backus-Smith puzzle, not the unconditional version, the focus of our paper. In closely related work, [Chernov, Haddad, and Itskhoki \[2023\]](#) develop a framework that maps the space of tradable assets to restrictions on the exchange rate moments. They conclude that the exchange rate moments require the asset markets to be segmented or intermediated, and, in this environment, the local financial markets are uninformative about the exchange rate. Consistent with this result, our paper examines the Euler equations governing the cross-country positions in risk-free bonds, and finds that wedges in these Euler equations are required to match the exchange rate moments. However, we argue that this is precisely how financial markets are informative about the exchange rate, as they discipline the properties of these Euler equation wedges which we ultimately interpret as home bias or domestic convenience yields.

The paper is organized as follows. We start by discussing the benchmark complete-market case in section 2. Next, section 3 discuss the conditional Backus-Smith puzzle in the incomplete-market case. Section 4 analyzes the unconditional Backus-Smith puzzle

in the incomplete-market case. Finally, section 5 inserts bond Euler equation wedges. In this section, we characterize the restrictions these wedges need to satisfy in order to make progress on the unconditional Backus-Smith puzzle. Lastly, the Appendix contains the proof of the propositions.

2 Complete Markets and Exchange Rate Puzzles

In the case of complete markets, exchange rates act as shock absorbers for the shocks to the pricing kernels:

$$\Delta s_{t+1} = m_{t+1} - m_{t+1}^*.$$

This expression for the log change in the real exchange rate has puzzling implications.

Volatility puzzle. As was noted by [Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara \[2006b\]](#), the implied volatility of the exchange rate will be too high if the market price of risk clears the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds, unless the pricing kernels are highly correlated across countries.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= \text{var}_t(m_{t+1}^*) + \text{var}_t(m_{t+1}) \\ &\quad - 2\rho_t(m_{t+1}, m_{t+1}^*) \text{std}_t(m_{t+1}) \text{std}_t(m_{t+1}^*). \end{aligned}$$

We would need a correlation of the pricing kernels $\rho_t(m_{t+1}, m_{t+1}^*)$ close to one. In the case of the standard Breeden-Lucas SDF $m_{t+1} = \log \delta - \gamma \Delta c_{t+1}$, this would imply close to perfectly correlated consumption growth across countries: $\rho_t(\Delta c_{t+1}, \Delta c_{t+1}^*)$. This prediction is counterfactual [see [Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992](#)].

Counter-cyclical/Backus-Smith puzzle. When markets are complete, the unconditional exchange rate cyclicalities satisfies

$$\text{cov}(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) > 0.$$

We obtain a very general result: in any complete-market models, the unconditional exchange rate cyclicalities is always positive: a higher marginal utility growth in the home country is associated with a home currency appreciation. The model can only generate exchange rate disconnect by shrinking the variance of the exchange rate to zero. In the

Breeden-Lucas case, the implied changes in the log exchange rates are perfectly negatively correlated with consumption growth differences $\rho_t(\Delta c_{t+1} - \Delta c_{t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = -1$, which is strongly counterfactual [Kollmann, 1991, Backus and Smith, 1993].

These puzzles are partially governed by the specific nature of the pricing kernel. The Breeden-Lucas SDF assumes time-additive utility. Colacito and Croce [2011] impute a preference for early resolution to uncertainty to the stand-in investor in an endowment economy with long run risks [Bansal and Yaron, 2004a]. In this long run risks economy, it is feasible to make progress on the volatility puzzle by choosing highly correlated persistent components of consumption growth, while still matching the low correlation of consumption growth observed in the data. In this long run risks economy, we can push the correlation of the pricing kernels $\rho_t(m_{t+1}, m_{t+1}^*)$ to one by choosing perfectly correlated long-run consumption growth $\rho_t(x_{t+1}, x_{t+1}^*) = 1$. However, in their benchmark calibration, this mechanism reduces the exchange rate cyclicity to zero, but does not overturn the sign. Next, we examine the exchange rate cyclicity when we shut down some asset markets. In closely related work, Verdelhan [2010] explores the habit model's exchange rate implications, and concludes that this model cannot entirely resolve the Backus-Smith puzzle.

3 Conditional Exchange Rate Cyclicity and Incomplete Markets

We start by assuming that investors can invest in risk-free bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency. Our analysis is silent on the rest of the market structure.

We assume that the return, exchange rate and pricing kernel innovations are jointly normally distributed. Then, the four risk-free bond Euler equations imply:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}) + r_t, \\ 0 &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) + r_t^*, \\ 0 &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}^*] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*) + r_t^*, \\ 0 &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}^*] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) + r_t. \end{aligned}$$

Reorganizing the terms, we can obtain two expressions that relate the expected excess return of a strategy that goes long in foreign currency and borrows at the domestic risk-

free rate to the riskiness of the exchange rate

$$\begin{aligned}(r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}var_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -cov_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}), \\ (r_t - r_t^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}var_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -cov_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}).\end{aligned}$$

The first expression takes the home investors' perspective. If the foreign currency tends to appreciate (i.e., higher $-\Delta s_{t+1}$) in the home investors' high marginal utility states (i.e., higher $m_{t,t+1}$), then, the foreign currency is a good hedge and the home investors demand lower expected returns to hold it. As a result, the foreign currency has a lower expected excess return leading to a lower $(r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}var_t(\Delta s_{t+1})$ on the left-hand side. Similarly, the second expression takes the foreign investors' perspective, and relates the currency excess return to the covariance between the foreign investors' SDF and the exchange rate movement.

Given the exchange rate variance $var_t(\Delta s_{t+1})$ is positive, these expressions imply

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + r_t - r_t^* &> cov_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}), \\ -(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + r_t - r_t^*) &> cov_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}),\end{aligned}$$

which leads to the following proposition.

Proposition 1. *In the log-normal case, the conditional exchange rate cyclicity satisfies*

$$cov_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = var_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) > 0. \quad (1)$$

Lustig and Verdelhan [2019] derive a more restrictive version of this result assuming incomplete market wedges that are jointly log-normal with the SDF and the exchange. Our derivation does not use incomplete market wedges.³

In this paper, we define the exchange rate cyclicity as the covariance between the exchange rate movement Δs_{t+1} and the SDF differential $m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*$. This proposition shows that exchange rate innovations are counter-cyclical in a Gaussian model. The home currency's exchange rate tends to unexpectedly appreciate when the home investors' marginal utility growth is unexpectedly higher than the foreign investors'.

³While Lustig and Verdelhan [2019] find that market incompleteness helps with the Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara [2006a] puzzle in reducing volatility, it cannot change the sign of the conditional covariance. We have not assumed that markets are complete to derive this result. In the case of complete markets, state-contingent interest rate parity obtains $m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^* = \Delta s_{t+1}$ and this covariance result is directly obtained. Our proposition shows that this result is much more general, as long as investors can freely trade home and foreign risk-free bonds. In other words, the risk-free bond Euler equations discipline the joint dynamics of the exchange rates and marginal utility growth to imply counter-cyclical exchange rates.

Proposition 1 is a strong restriction, and it is striking that it only arises from the four bond Euler equations we consider. The pairs of bond Euler equations each define a carry trade return. The expected carry trade return, if it is non-zero, has to be a compensation for covariance risk with SDFs of both home and foreign households. It is this required compensation that underlies the result: if the carry return is compensation for covariance risk, then the covariance of the relative pricing kernels with the exchange rate change has to be positive. We also need not consider the Euler equations for any more traded assets to reach this stark conclusion, as for example, are considered in [Chernov, Haddad, and Itskhoki](#). The Euler equations on investment in two short-term bonds are sufficiently informative to yield this strong result.

The result also calls into question the approach of introducing “risk premium shocks” that drive U.I.P. deviations into international finance models. In the literature, both risk premium shocks and cross-currency bond Euler equation wedges are often referred to collectively as U.I.P. or financial shocks [see, e.g., [Farhi and Werning, 2014](#), [Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2021](#)]. However, we see that accounting for risk explicitly and tying risk premia to covariance with the SDF implies a strong restriction such that the the Backus-Smith puzzle reappears. Financial shocks that only drive risk premium variations cannot overturn this result

Finally, the SDF and exchange rate dynamics might not be conditionally Gaussian, e.g., as in [[Rietz, 1988](#), [Longstaff and Piazzesi, 2004](#), [Barro, 2006](#), [Farhi and Gabaix, 2016](#)]. We can extend our results to non-Gaussian settings and we present the details in [Appendix A.5](#).

4 Unconditional Exchange Rate Cyclicity and Incomplete Markets

In IRBC models that link the SDFs to aggregate consumption shocks, we are interested in understanding how the exchange rate moves in response to relative consumption growth. [Backus and Smith \[1993\]](#) summarize this relationship by regressing the exchange rate movement on relative consumption growth, and find procyclical exchange rates. To relate our result to this Backus-Smith coefficient, we need to characterize the unconditional exchange rate cyclicity. To do so, we use the law of total covariance:

$$cov(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \mathbb{E}[cov_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1})] + cov(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]).$$

Our previous result shows the conditional exchange rate cyclicity $cov_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1})$

is always positive. To generate a negative unconditional cyclicality $cov(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1})$, we need a negative $cov(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])$ that is greater in magnitude than the average conditional cyclicality $\mathbb{E}[cov_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1})]$. In other words, the exchange rate movement needs to be strongly predictable by the expected SDF differential $\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*]$. This connects the unconditional exchange rate cyclicality to exchange rate predictability.

Recall the case of complete markets, $\Delta s_{t+1} = m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*$. The exchange rate has to absorb all of the shocks to the pricing kernels in each state of the world. When markets are complete, the unconditional exchange rate cyclicality satisfies

$$cov(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = var(\Delta s_{t+1}) > 0.$$

In any complete-market models (which by definition allows home and foreign agents to trade risk-free bonds), the unconditional exchange rate cyclicality is always positive: a higher marginal utility growth in the home country is associated with a home currency appreciation. The model can only generate exchange rate disconnect by shrinking the variance of the exchange rate to zero.

Next, we consider a more general case of less than complete markets in which we shut down some trade in non-bond asset markets. We begin by introducing some concepts.

The Fama Regression Coefficient b We use f_t to denote the log of the one-period forward exchange rate in units of foreign currency per dollar. The log excess return on buying foreign currency forward is

$$rx_{t+1} = f_t - s_{t+1} = -\Delta s_{t+1} + f_t - s_t,$$

where $f_t - s_t$ denotes the forward discount and Δs_{t+1} denotes the appreciation of the home currency. When the Covered Interest Rate Parity holds, we further obtain $f_t - s_t = r_t^* - r_t$ and, as a result, we can restate the log excess return on a long position in foreign currency as $rx_{t+1} = -\Delta s_{t+1} + r_t^* - r_t$.

Now, consider the standard [Tryon \[1979\]](#), [Hansen and Hodrick \[1980\]](#), [Fama \[1984\]](#) time-series regression:

$$\Delta s_{t+1} = a + b(f_t - s_t) + \varepsilon_{t+1}.$$

In the data, the slope coefficient b tends to be negative: a higher-than-usual foreign interest rate predicts further appreciation of the foreign currency. Following [Fama \[1984\]](#),

we use $p_t = \mathbb{E}_t[rx_{t+1}] = f_t - \mathbb{E}_t[s_{t+1}]$ to denote the currency risk premium and $q_t = \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]$ to denote the expected exchange rate movement. The forward discount can be decomposed as $f_t - s_t = p_t + q_t$. When the Covered Interest Rate Parity holds, $p_t = r_t^* - r_t - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]$, and $p_t + q_t = r_t^* - r_t$.

As shown by Fama, the slope coefficient in this regression can be restated as:

$$\frac{\text{cov}(f_t - s_t, \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])}{\text{var}(f_t - s_t)} = \frac{\text{cov}(p_t + q_t, q_t)}{\text{var}(p_t + q_t)} = \frac{\text{cov}(p_t, q_t) + \text{var}(q_t)}{\text{var}(p_t + q_t)}$$

To get negative slope coefficient b , we need $\frac{\text{cov}(p_t, q_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)} < -1$. Two necessary conditions have to be satisfied in order to obtain negative slope coefficients: $\text{corr}(p_t, q_t) < 0$ and $\text{std}(p_t) > \text{std}(q_t)$. Risk premia have to be more volatile than the expected change in the spot rate. [Backus, Foresi, and Telmer \[2001\]](#) analyze sufficient conditions for these U.I.P. violations in a large class of affine asset pricing models.

The Meese-Rogoff R^2 The [Meese and Rogoff \[1983\]](#) puzzle states that exchange rates are hard to forecast. Put differently, the $R^2 = \text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) / \text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})$ in a forecasting regression is low. In a recent survey of exchange rate predictability, [Rossi \[2013\]](#) concludes that the Meese-Rogoff findings have not been conclusively overturned.⁴ There is some limited evidence of exchange rate predictability but the evidence usually is specific to certain countries, horizons and the predictability is not stable.

When the linear projection yields the best forecast, we can obtain this R^2 from a projection of the exchange rate changes on its predictors. We will assume the linear predictor yields the best forecast. Let R^2 denote the fraction of the predictable variation in the exchange rate:

$$R^2 = \frac{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})},$$

and let R_{Fama}^2 denote the R^2 of the Fama regression:

$$R_{Fama}^2 = \frac{\text{var}(b(f_t - s_t))}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})}.$$

Our main result characterizes the unconditional exchange rate cyclicity. Without

⁴At higher frequencies ranging from one day to one month, order flow seems to predict changes in the spot exchange rate [see [Evans and Lyons, 2002, 2005](#)]. This data is proprietary and may not be available in real-time to all investors. [Gourinchas and Rey \[2007\]](#) report evidence that the net foreign asset position predicts changes in the exchange rate out-of-sample.

loss of generality, we assume that the covariance between the home SDF's conditional variance and the exchange rate movement from the home perspective is higher than the covariance between the foreign SDF's conditional variance and the exchange rate movement from the foreign perspective:

$$\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) \geq \text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), -\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]).$$

If this condition is not satisfied, we simply need to swap the labeling of the home and foreign countries.

Proposition 2. *Each of the following is a necessary condition for a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclical-ity, i.e., $\text{cov}(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) < 0$:*

(a)

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} + \sqrt{R^2} \left(\frac{1}{b} \frac{R_{Fama}^2}{R^2} - 1 \right). \quad (2)$$

If the Fama regression yields the best predictor of the exchange rate movement, then, we can simplify this formula to

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} + \sqrt{R^2} \left(\frac{1}{b} - 1 \right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} - \sqrt{R^2} + \text{sign}(b) \frac{\text{std}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})}. \quad (3)$$

(b)

$$\sqrt{\frac{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[rx_{t+1}])}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])}} \geq \frac{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}}.$$

Between these conditions,

- (a) \Rightarrow (b).
- If Fama regression yields the best predictor and $b \notin (0, 1)$, (b) \Rightarrow (a); otherwise (b) is a weaker condition.

Conditions (a) and (b) are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclical-ity. The bounds tighten as the R^2 decreases: as exchange rates become less predictable, we need more variations in the conditional risk premia and the conditional price of risk to generate a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclical-ity. In the limit, as we approach the [Meese and Rogoff \[1983\]](#)'s benchmark random walk case in which exchange rate movements are not predictable, $1/\sqrt{R^2}$ on the right-hand

side approaches infinity. The model simply cannot deliver pro-cyclical exchange rates. As such, these bounds deliver an impossibility result: if we take Meese and Rogoff [1983] random walk result regarding *exchange rate predictability* at face value, then we cannot make progress on the Backus and Smith [1993] puzzle regarding *exchange rate cyclicity*.

On the other hand, while it is enticing to conclude that, holding R^2 constant, a small but negative Fama coefficient b can lower the right-hand side of Eq. (2) and make this condition more likely to hold, we note that $\sqrt{R^2}$ and b are closely related. When the b shrinks towards zero, the R^2 shrinks towards zero as well. In fact, Eq. (3) shows that, holding R^2 constant, a small but negative b means a high forward premium volatility $std(f_t - s_t)$ relative to the exchange rate volatility $std(\Delta s_{t+1})$, which is also rejected by the data.

Before we turn to more realistic cases, we make two more observations. First, in the case of U.I.P., $b = 1$ and Eq. (3) becomes:

$$\frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}}.$$

A natural case to consider under the U.I.P. is the case of constant market prices of risk. Then, we get an impossibility result: $0 \geq 1/\sqrt{R^2}$, so the unconditional exchange rate cyclicity cannot be negative.

Second, in the case of a fully predictable exchange rate movement, the R^2 tends to one and Eq. (3) becomes:

$$\frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{b}.$$

As long as the slope coefficient b is negative, then the bound is trivially satisfied, even when the R^2 is very high but not equal to 1.

4.1 Numerical Example

Let us compute bounds using some empirically plausible values. In the data, the exchange rate movements are only moderately predictable. Suppose the Fama regression yields the best predictor of the exchange rate movement, $R^2 = 5\%$ at the one-year horizon, the Fama regression coefficient is $b = -1$, and the annualized exchange rate volatility is $std(\Delta s_{t+1}) = 10\%$. Then, Eq. (3) implies that the log SDF needs to have a very high

variability in its conditional variance:


$$\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) \geq 0.4. \quad (4)$$

For comparison, the unconditional standard deviation of the log SDF variance is only 0.067 in the long-run risk model in [Bansal and Yaron \[2004b\]](#), and 0.26 in the external habit model in [Campbell and Cochrane \[1999\]](#), even though both models manage to generate empirically plausible levels of the equity risk premium. [Figure \(1\)](#) plots the distributions of the conditional SDF volatility in these two models, which are related to the maximum Sharpe ratio in the economy according to the [Hansen and Jagannathan \[1991\]](#) bound. In the long-run risk model, the conditional log SDF volatility is between 0.3 and 0.7, a narrow range that gives rise to a small $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))$. In the external habit model, the conditional log SDF volatility is more variable, at the expense of having some states in which the SDF is not very volatile and the maximum Sharpe ratio is very small, and some states in which the SDF is extremely volatile and the maximum Sharpe ratio is very high.


If we take either model as a quantitatively accurate representation of the SDF, then, [Eq. \(4\)](#) implies that the model cannot generate a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicity. In other words, the home and foreign investors' Euler equations governing their risk-free bond holdings impose important restrictions on the equilibrium exchange rate dynamics, such that a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicity requires a very volatile SDF conditional variance that is not in line with standard asset pricing models.

We can also generalize the bound in [Eq. \(4\)](#) to a wider range of exchange rate predictability. In [Figure \(2\)](#), we vary the R^2 from the Fama regression and report the bound on the volatility of the conditional log SDF variance. As the exchange rate predictability increases, the lower bound on the unconditional volatility of the conditional log SDF variance declines. When R^2 is 20% in the Fama regression, the lower bound becomes 0.13, compared to 0.40 when R^2 is 5%. In other words, as the exchange rate becomes more predictable, the Euler equations can rationalize a negative exchange rate cyclicity without requiring a higher degree of variability in the conditional SDF variance.

Moreover, [Proposition 2](#) offers a loose bound in the sense that we used the property $\text{corr}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) \leq 1$ to derive the inequality, which makes the bounds in this proposition necessary but not sufficient conditions. The bounds are only sufficient conditions when $\text{corr}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) = 1$. If, instead, the correlation is $1/2$, [Eq. \(4\)](#) in the numerical example becomes $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) \geq 0.4/(1/2) = 0.8$, which further sharpens the result by doubling the lower bound on $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))$.



(A) LONG-RUN RISK MODEL



(B) EXTERNAL HABIT MODEL

FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE CONDITIONAL LOG SDF VOLATILITY IN DIFFERENT ASSET PRICING MODELS

Notes: The figure plots the distributions of the conditional log SDF volatility in the long-run risk model in [Bansal and Yaron \[2004b\]](#) and the external habit model in [Campbell and Cochrane \[1999\]](#). We simulate 1,000,000 monthly periods in each model and report the histogram of the annualized log SDF volatility.




FIGURE 2. LOWER BOUND ON THE VARIABILITY OF THE CONDITIONAL LOG SDF VARIANCE AS A FUNCTION OF EXCHANGE RATE PREDICTABILITY

Notes: The figure plots the lower bound on $std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))$ as a function of the Fama regression R^2 as implied by Eq. (3). We take $b = -1$ and $std(\Delta s_{t+1}) = 10\%$.

4.2 Role of the Horizon

We consider a Fama regression with horizon k periods:

$$\Delta s_{t,t+k} = a_k + b_k(f_t^k - s_t) + \varepsilon_{t+k}.$$

Similarly, we use $R_{Fama,k}^2$ to denote the R^2 of this regression, and we define

$$R_k^2 = \frac{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t,t+k}])}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t,t+k})}.$$

There are opposing forces on the left-hand side of the bounds we derived. As we increase the horizon, $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+k}))$ increases faster than the \sqrt{k} , while $\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t,t+k}])$ converges to zero if a long-run version of PPP holds and the real exchange rate is stationary.⁵ On the other hands, as $k \rightarrow \infty$, a long-run version of U.I.P. kicks in and $b_k \rightarrow 1$. In fact, long-run U.I.P. is implied by no arbitrage when real exchange rates are stationary [Lustig, Stathopoulos, and Verdelhan, 2019].

Proposition 3. *Each of the following is a necessary condition for a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicalty, i.e., $\text{cov}(m_{t,t+k} - m_{t,t+k}^*, \Delta s_{t,t+k}) < 0$:*

(a)

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+k}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t,t+k})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R_k^2}} + \sqrt{R_k^2} \left(\frac{1}{b_k} \frac{R_{Fama,k}^2}{R_k^2} - 1 \right).$$

If the Fama regression yields the best predictor of the exchange rate movement, then, we can simplify this formula to

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+k}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t,t+k})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R_k^2}} + \sqrt{R_k^2} \left(\frac{1}{b_k} - 1 \right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{R_k^2}} - \sqrt{R_k^2} + \text{sign}(b_k) \frac{\text{std}(f_t^k - s_t)}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t,t+k})}$$

(b)

$$\sqrt{\frac{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[rx_{t,t+k}])}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t,t+k}])} + \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+k}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t,t+k}])}} \geq \frac{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t,t+k})}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t,t+k}])} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{R_k^2}}.$$

Among these conditions,

- (a) \Rightarrow (b).

⁵As noted by Rogoff [1996], the real exchange rate's rate of convergence to its long-run mean is slow.

- If Fama regression yields the best predictor and $b \notin (0, 1)$, $(b) \Rightarrow (a)$; otherwise (b) is a weaker condition.

5 Bond Euler Equation Wedges

Proposition 1 shows that IRBC models with the four bond Euler equations cannot simultaneously generate a negative Backus-Smith coefficient and replicate the Fama regression coefficient and the Meese-Rogoff puzzle. As a result, we need to entertain models that break these four Euler equations in one way or another.

One approach to doing so is in [Corsetti et al. \[2008\]](#), [Pavlova and Rigobon \[2012\]](#). These papers consider incomplete-market settings in which only one type of bond is traded. When the bond is denominated in a given country's numéraire, this set-up drops two of the four Euler equations we consider. When the bond is denominated in a basket of country-level numéraires, this set-up drops all of our four Euler equations and replaces them with two new ones. Investors around the world clearly do trade bonds in different currencies, so that we will not entertain this possibility as a resolution to the puzzle.

We instead outline three other approaches that can work: introducing convenience yields on home bonds, introducing transaction costs when investing in foreign bonds, and introducing financial intermediary frictions. We study each of these cases next and explain how they implicitly insert cross-currency Euler equation wedges into the model we have considered.

5.1 Home Currency Bias, Convenience Yields and Financial Repression

We break the four Euler equations by considering the case where investors have an extra preference from purchasing the bonds in their own currency. We denote these home wedges for the domestic and foreign investor respectively as (ϕ_t, ϕ_t^*) . Then, the four Euler equations can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \exp(\phi_t) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} + r_t)], \\
 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t^*)], \\
 \exp(\phi_t^*) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\
 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t)].
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Assuming log-normality, we obtain two expressions that relate the expected currency excess return to the perceived risks from the home and foreign perspectives as well as the

wedges:

$$\begin{aligned}(r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) - \phi_t, \\(r_t - r_t^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) - \phi_t^*.\end{aligned}$$

Combining these equations yields the following characterization of the conditional exchange rate cyclicity:

Proposition 4. *In the presence of Euler equation wedges, the conditional exchange rate cyclicity is given by:*

$$\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*),$$

and the conditional correlation is given by:

$$\text{corr}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \frac{\text{std}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{std}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*)} \left(1 + \frac{(\phi_t + \phi_t^*)}{\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

In order to obtain a pro-cyclical exchange rate with $\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) < 0$, we need

$$\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) < -(\phi_t + \phi_t^*). \quad (6)$$

In other words, there is no need to shrink the conditional exchange rate variance to zero in order to generate an exchange rate disconnect from SDF innovations. Negative wedges ϕ and ϕ^* can mitigate the conditional version of the Backus-Smith puzzle. These wedges reduce the need for the exchange rate to respond to SDF shocks in order to enforce the bond Euler equations.

Importantly, the wedges enter the determination of the exchange rate cyclicity directly in their first moments, as opposed to their variances or covariances with other variables. In fact, the wedges can even be constant and still matter for exchange rate cyclicity. This is because the wedges directly enter the investors' Euler equations (9), which require endogenous adjustments in the covariances between the exchange rate and the SDFs. In other words, these wedges are substitutes for covariances between the exchange rate and the SDFs.

The negative bond wedges ϕ and ϕ^* can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, they can reflect a home bias by investors, which has been documented extensively in the literature [see, e.g. Lewis, 1995b], and particularly a home currency bias in bond holdings

as documented by [Maggiore et al. \[2020b\]](#).

Second, they can be a symptom of high convenience yields that home investors receive on their home bond holdings. [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen \[2012\]](#) present such evidence for U.S. Treasury bonds, while [Diamond and Van Tassel \[2021\]](#) present evidence for risk-free government bonds around the world. Note that the negative ϕ and ϕ^* can capture home investors' preference for home bonds, and not foreign investors' preferences for U.S. dollar bonds as argued for in [Jiang et al. \[2018\]](#). We return to this latter case below.

Third, the negative ϕ and ϕ^* can be seen as a symptom of financial repression. Governments routinely adopt measures to allow themselves to borrow at below-market rates. This is usually referred to as financial repression [see [Reinhart, Kirkegaard, and Sbrancia, 2011](#), [Chari, DAVIS, and Kehoe, 2020](#)]. During the Great Financial Crisis, banks were induced by their national governments to buy the sovereign debt of their countries [[Acharya and Steffen, 2015](#), [De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016](#), [Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen, 2019](#)]. Since the 2008 GFC, central banks in advanced economies have increased the size of their balance sheets to purchase government bonds, a new wave of financial repression [see [Hall and Sargent, 2022](#), for a comparison of the pandemic and two World Wars]. Financial repression come in other forms, including macro-prudential regulation that favors government bonds, direct lending to the government by domestic pension funds and banks, moral suasion used to increase domestic bank holdings of government bonds [see [Acharya and Steffen, 2015](#), [De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016](#), [Ongena et al., 2019](#), for examples from Europe during the GFC].⁶ Japan, and its yield curve control policy, is a textbook example of financial repression.

5.2 Cross-Currency Wedges and Costs of Foreign Bond Investment

We next consider wedges only in the Euler equations of investors buying foreign currency risk-free bonds. These wedges for the home and foreign investors respectively are denoted as ζ_t and ζ_t^* . Then, the four Euler equations can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} + r_t)], \\ \exp(\zeta_t) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t^*)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\ \exp(\zeta_t^*) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t^*)]. \end{aligned}$$

⁶[Chari et al. \[2020\]](#) derive conditions under which forcing banks to hold government debt may be optimal, because it acts as a commitment device.

These wedges are security-specific: they only apply to the bonds denominated in a currency different from the domestic currency. If the wedges are positive, investors effectively apply a higher discount rate to the foreign-currency bond payoffs and therefore require a higher expected return.

Reorganizing the terms, we obtain two expressions that relate the expected currency excess return to the perceived risks from the home and foreign perspectives as well as the wedges:

$$\begin{aligned} (r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) + \zeta_t, \\ (r_t - r_t^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) + \zeta_t^*. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Combining these expressions, we directly obtain the following characterization of the conditional exchange rate cyclicity in the presence of Euler equation wedges.

Proposition 5. *In the presence of Euler equation wedges, the conditional exchange rate cyclicity is given by:*

$$\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) - (\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t),$$

and the conditional correlation is given by:

$$\text{corr}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \frac{\text{std}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{std}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*)} \left(1 - \frac{(\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t)}{\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

In order to obtain conditionally pro-cyclical exchange rates with $\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) < 0$, we need positive wedges that exceed the exchange rate variance:

$$\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) < (\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t). \quad (8)$$

Consider an equilibrium in which agents hold a positive quantity of foreign bonds, as is the case in the data, then the ζ s are effectively a tax on the return obtained by investors on the foreign bond holdings. Thus, this case can reflect home currency bias as well as the transaction cost models of [Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe \[2002b, 2009b\]](#) in which agents need to pay a cost to access foreign securities and currency markets.

5.3 Four Wedges and Foreign Demand for Dollar Bonds

Finally, we consider the case with all four wedges:

$$\begin{aligned}
\exp(\phi_t) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} + r_t)], \\
\exp(\xi_t) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t^*)], \\
\exp(\phi_t^*) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\
\exp(\xi_t^*) &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t,t+1}^* + \Delta s_{t+1} + r_t)].
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

Assuming log-normality, we obtain two expressions that relate the expected excess return of a strategy that goes long the foreign bond to the perceived risks from the home and foreign perspectives as well as the wedges:

$$\begin{aligned}
(r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) + \xi_t - \phi_t, \\
(r_t - r_t^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) &= -\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) + \xi_t^* - \phi_t^*.
\end{aligned}$$

Combining these equations yields the following characterization of the conditional exchange rate cyclicity.

Proposition 6. *In the presence of Euler equation wedges, the conditional exchange rate cyclicity is given by:*

$$\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) - (\xi_t^* + \xi_t) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*),$$

and the conditional correlation is given by:

$$\text{corr}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \frac{\text{std}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{std}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*)} \left(1 + \frac{(\phi_t + \phi_t^*) - (\xi_t^* + \xi_t)}{\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

In order to obtain pro-cyclical exchange rates $\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) < 0$, we need

$$\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) < (\xi_t^* + \xi_t) - (\phi_t + \phi_t^*).$$

Next, we derive restrictions on the wedges that are needed to change the sign of the unconditional exchange rate cyclicity.

Proposition 7. *Let*

$$\omega = \mathbb{E}[-(\xi_t^* + \xi_t) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*)] - \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t)$$

In the presence of Euler equation wedges, each of the following is a necessary condition for a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicity, i.e., $cov(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) < 0$:

(a)

$$\frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{var(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) + \sqrt{R^2} \left(\frac{1}{b} \frac{R_{Fama}^2}{R^2} - 1 \right)$$

If the Fama regression yields the best predictor of the exchange rate movement, then, we can simplify the formula to

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(\Delta s_{t+1})} &\geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{var(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) + \sqrt{R^2} \left(\frac{1}{b} - 1 \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{var(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) - \sqrt{R^2} + sign(b) \frac{std(f_t - s_t)}{std(\Delta s_{t+1})}. \end{aligned}$$

(b)

$$\sqrt{\frac{std(\mathbb{E}_t[rx_{t+1}])}{std(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + \frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])}} \geq \frac{1}{R^2} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{var(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

Among these conditions,

- (a) \Rightarrow (b).
- If Fama regression yields the best predictor and $b \notin (0, 1)$, (b) \Rightarrow (a); otherwise (b) is a weaker condition.

In the presence of the Euler equation wedges, these conditions can now be satisfied even if the exchange rate is close to a random walk with small R^2 . If ω is negative enough to flip the sign on the right-hand side, then, we do not need to rely on a highly volatile market price of risk and/or large U.I.P. deviations. This being the case, the necessary condition of a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicity can be satisfied if $b \leq 0$, even with constant market prices of risk.

Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig [2021] present evidence that foreign investors obtain a higher convenience yield on dollar bonds than U.S. investors. They show that this possibility helps to explain why the dollar appreciates during global recessions.

This case is one where $\tilde{\zeta}_t^* < 0$ and $\zeta_t^* < \phi_t$, or $-\tilde{\zeta}_t^* + \phi_t > 0$. Note that this case makes it harder to satisfy the restriction in Proposition 7. That is, with,

$$\omega = \mathbb{E}[(-\tilde{\zeta}_t^* + \phi_t) + (-\zeta_t^* + \phi_t^*)] - cov(\phi_t^*, q_t) + cov(\phi_t, q_t),$$

if $(-\zeta_t^* + \phi_t) > 0$, the rest of the terms need to be sufficiently negative to offset this positive term. This can occur if $\zeta_t > 0$ and U.S. investors face transaction costs of investing in foreign bonds, as well as if $\phi_t^* < 0$ and foreign investors derive a convenience yield on their own domestic currency holdings. As such, while foreign investors' bond convenience yield can generate the dollar appreciation during global recessions, a different type of the Euler equation wedge, which is closer to home bias, is needed to generate a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicalities.

5.4 Numerical Example

Let us return to the numerical example we considered in Section 4.1. If we assume that the Fama regression yields the best predictor, we can rearrange the condition in Proposition 7 to obtain

$$-\omega \geq \text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) \left[1 + R^2 \left(\frac{1}{b} - 1 \right) \right] - \sqrt{R^2} \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) \text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1}),$$

which provides a lower bound on the sum of the wedges. If we assume $\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) \leq 0.1^2$, $R^2 \leq 0.05$ and $b = -1$ from data, and $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) = 0.067$ from the long-run risk model, then, we obtain

$$-\omega \geq 0.75\%.$$

For example, if we attribute ω all to the wedges ζ_t and ζ_t^* associated with the foreign transaction costs, then, the average cost $\mathbb{E}[\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t]/2$ that is necessary to generate a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicalities is about 38 basis points.

Moreover, given a negative Fama coefficient, i.e., $b < 0$, this bound becomes even tighter if the exchange rate is less predictable. In the limit, $R^2 = 0$ and the bound becomes $-\omega \geq \text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) = 1\%$, which is in line with our characterization of the conditional exchange rate cyclicalities in Proposition 5 and Eq. (8) in particular. The bound is also tighter if $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))$ is smaller, i.e., if the conditional log SDF variance has a lower volatility.

We can also vary the value of $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))$ and plot the lower bound on the wedge $-\omega$. Figure (3) plots this relationship. Consistent with our results in Section 4.1, $\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))$ needs to be about 0.40 in order to generate a negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicalities without the Euler equation wedges. This value, as we showed above, is much higher than the moments from standard asset pricing models such as the long-run risk model and the external habit model.




FIGURE 3. LOWER BOUND ON THE EULER EQUATION WEDGE AS A FUNCTION OF THE VARIABILITY OF THE CONDITIONAL LOG SDF VARIANCE

Notes: The figure plots the lower bound on $-\omega$ as a function of $std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))$ as implied by Proposition 7. We take $b = -1$, $R^2 = 5\%$, and $std(\Delta s_{t+1}) = 10\%$.

Finally, in more recent research, new variables have been shown to predict exchange rate movements. [Kremens and Martin \[2019\]](#) show that a combination of the quanto risk premium and interest rate differential can capture 16% of the exchange rate variation at the two-year horizon. If we assume that a similar explanatory power can be attained at the one-year horizon, then, Proposition 7(a) gives,

$$-\omega \geq var(\Delta s_{t+1}) \left[1 + R^2 \left(\frac{1}{b} \frac{R_{Fama}^2}{R^2} - 1 \right) \right] - \sqrt{R^2} std(\Delta s_{t+1}) std(var_t(m_{t,t+1})).$$

Using the same calibration targets $var(\Delta s_{t+1}) \leq 0.1^2$, $R_{Fama}^2 \leq 0.05$ and $b = -1$, and $std(var_t(m_{t,t+1})) = 0.067$, we obtain a lower bound of $-\omega$ at 0.52%. Compared to the bound of 0.75% we obtained above, this example shows that greater exchange rate predictability lowers the magnitude of the wedges required to generate a pro-cyclical exchange rate.

5.5 Intermediation Models

[Gabaix and Maggiori \[2015\]](#), [Itskhoki and Mukhin \[2021\]](#) consider models in which the bond markets are segmented between countries and financial intermediation is required for cross-country investments. Since the households cannot directly trade the foreign

bond, their Euler equations for the foreign bonds do not hold. That is, this model is consistent with our characterization by eliminating two of the four Euler equations we consider. The intermediation models include a third set of agents (“arbitrageurs”) that partly integrate markets and whose Euler equations price currency returns. In particular, these models consider an agent that chooses a portfolio to maximize wealth w_{t+1} , where this wealth can be measured in either home or foreign currency without any substantive change in results. The arbitrageur trades in both home and foreign bonds and prices the carry trade return:

$$(r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) = -\text{cov}_t(w_{t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) + \chi_t. \quad (10)$$

The covariance term here is the risk premium required for bearing carry trade risk by the intermediary, as in intermediary pricing models [He and Krishnamurthy, 2013]. The additional wedge χ_t can reflect a Lagrange multiplier on a leverage constraint as in Gabaix and Maggiori [2015]. The signs of both terms can depend on which currency the arbitrageur invests and which it borrows.

These models fall within the set of models that in our characterization can address exchange rate disconnect. They do so by adding wedges in two of the Euler equations. To understand the connection in further detail, we consider the Gabaix and Maggiori [2015] model and map the key equations of that model to the wedges we have considered.

Specifically, we consider an extension of the Gabaix and Maggiori [2015] model in which households receive non-tradable endowment shocks which drive variations in their marginal utilities. The model can be presented in a two-period setting, with periods $t = 0$ and 1. We leave the details in Appendix B.

In this model, the households can freely trade domestic risk-free bonds. So, the Euler equations for domestic bonds holds:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \mathbb{E}_0[\exp(m_1 + r_0)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_0[\exp(m_1^* + r_0^*)]. \end{aligned}$$

However, due to market segmentation, the households cannot directly trade foreign bonds. The Euler equations for foreign bonds have endogenously determined cross-currency wedges:

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(\xi_0) &= \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_1 - \Delta s_1 + r_0^*)], \\ \exp(\xi_0^*) &= \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_1^* + \Delta s_1 + r_0)]. \end{aligned}$$




FIGURE 4. EULER EQUATION WEDGE AND EXCHANGE RATE CYCLICALITY IN THE [GABAIX AND MAGGIORI \[2015\]](#) MODEL

These wedges can be interpreted as the reductions in the expected returns on foreign bonds that would make the households indifferent between holding domestic and foreign bonds. If we open the foreign bond markets but keep the risk-free rates as they are, the households have incentives to either buy or short-sell the foreign bonds when the wedges are zero.

The model has a date 1 non-traded endowment shock (which affects the SDF) and an import demand shock which must be financed via international capital flows. Since households cannot directly access international financial markets, the currency imbalance is accommodated by an arbitrageur. Exchange rates and the expected return on the exchange rate adjust to satisfy the pricing condition for the arbitrageur. The details of the model are in Appendix B.

Figure (4) present the equilibrium magnitude of the Euler equation wedges $\zeta_0 + \zeta_0^*$ and exchange rate cyclicality $corr(m_1 - m_1^*, \Delta s_1)$ as we vary correlation between the non-traded endowment shock (which affects the SDF) and the import demand shock (which affects the currency imbalance that the arbitrageur needs to absorb). Our calibration details are also presented in Appendix B. In the presence of market segmentation, the wedges are always non-zero and lower $1 - (\zeta_0 + \zeta_0^*) / var(\Delta s_1)$ below 1. When an increase in the home SDF becomes more correlated with the import demand shock which increases the demand for foreign goods and depreciates the home currency, the exchange rate becomes more procyclical (i.e., more negative $corr(m_1 - m_1^*, \Delta s_1)$) while the wedges increase (i.e., more negative $1 - (\zeta_0 + \zeta_0^*) / var(\Delta s_1)$).

This result supports the exchange rate cyclicality result in Proposition 5, reproduced

below:

$$\text{corr}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \frac{\text{std}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{std}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*)} \left(1 - \frac{(\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t)}{\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

Even when the Euler equation wedges ζ_t and ζ_t^* are not directly measurable transaction costs or convenience yields, but instead arise as the “shadow prices” in a segmented market setting, their properties still help us characterize the exchange rate cyclicity. In this sense, the wedge accounting provides a framework to understand the exchange rate cyclicity in intermediation models.

5.6 Discussion of Other Specific Models

Lastly, we discuss other specific models that nest our Euler equations and clarify the wedges they imply.

Bond Convenience Yields. The wedge equation wedges can also arise from bond convenience yields. For simplicity, we follow [Jiang et al. \[2024\]](#) and assume convenience yields arise from a bond-in-utility set-up, which can be microfounded by more structural models.

Specifically, the home households’ utility is derived over consumption and the market value of home bond holdings:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t (u(c_t) + v(b_{H,t})) \right],$$

and their budget can be expressed as

$$y_t + b_{H,t-1} \exp(r_{t-1}) + b_{F,t-1} \exp(r_{t-1}^* - s_t) = c_t + b_{H,t} + b_{F,t} \exp(-s_t) + \bar{b}_{t-1} \exp(r_{t-1}).$$

Similarly, the foreign households also derive utility from holding the home bond, which leads to the following set of Euler equations:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - \frac{v'(b_{H,t})}{u'(c_t)} &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1} - \Delta e_{t+1} + r_t^*)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\ 1 - \frac{v'(b_{H,t}^*)}{u'(c_t^*)} &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1}^* + \Delta e_{t+1} + r_t)]. \end{aligned}$$

In this setting, due to the non-pecuniary utility derived from holding the home bond, home and foreign households are willing to accept a lower return on the home bond, which is determined by the marginal utility of bond holding scaled by the marginal utility of consumption. The Euler equation wedges can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_t &= \log \left(1 - \frac{v'(b_{H,t})}{u'(c_t)} \right), & \phi_t^* &= 0, \\ \tilde{\zeta}_t^* &= \log \left(1 - \frac{v'(b_{H,t}^*)}{u'(c_t^*)} \right), & \tilde{\zeta}_t &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

This specification also has a simple interpretation: for example, when the foreign households derive a higher marginal utility $v'(b_{H,t}^*)$ from holding the home bond, they accept a lower risk-adjusted return on the home bond, which is associated with a lower wedge $\tilde{\zeta}_t^*$.

Financial Repression. We consider a very stylized setting in which agents find domestic bonds more desirable due to regulatory reasons. This can be modeled as a shadow value $h(\cdot)$ from holding the domestic bond, which similarly enter the households' utility functions. This implies the following Euler equations:

$$\begin{aligned}1 - \frac{h'(b_{H,t})}{u'(c_t)} &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1} - \Delta e_{t+1} + r_t^*)], \\ 1 - \frac{h'(b_{F,t}^*)}{u'(c_t^*)} &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1}^* + \Delta e_{t+1} + r_t)].\end{aligned}$$

In this case, the Euler equation wedges can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_t &= \log \left(1 - \frac{h'(b_{H,t})}{u'(c_t)} \right), & \phi_t^* &= \log \left(1 - \frac{h'(b_{F,t}^*)}{u'(c_t^*)} \right), \\ \tilde{\zeta}_t^* &= 0, & \tilde{\zeta}_t &= 0,\end{aligned}$$

which implies that the regulatory constraints effectively lower the required return on the domestic bond, which gives rise to home bias in bond holdings for both home and foreign households.

As long as $\phi_t < 0$ and $\phi_t^* < 0$, the ω term in the unconditional exchange rate cyclical

bound can be negative, which will make it easier to generate a procyclical exchange rate.

Holding Cost. Moreover, if the agents face a holding cost or capital gain tax from holding the foreign bond, the Euler equations also imply wedges. For example, if the home and foreign households both have positive positions on the cross-country bond holdings, the Euler equations can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1} - \Delta e_{t+1} + r_t^* - \tau_t)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1}^* + r_t^*)], \\ 1 &= \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(m_{t+1}^* + \Delta e_{t+1} + r_t - \tau_t^*)], \end{aligned}$$

where τ_t and τ_t^* are positive numbers denoting the reduction in returns from the cross-country positions. These wedges can be motivated by the capital gain tax on the returns r_t and r_t^* from foreign bond holdings, or by the management fee for international portfolios. In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_t &= 0, & \phi_t^* &= 0, \\ \zeta_t^* &= \tau_t^*, & \zeta_t &= \tau_t. \end{aligned}$$

As long as the transaction costs ζ_t and ζ_t^* are positive, the ω term in the unconditional exchange rate cyclical bound can be negative, which will make it easier to generate a procyclical exchange rate.

Having said this, if the households hold negative positions on the foreign bond, the Euler equation wedges τ_t and τ_t^* will be negative in order to reflect the reductions in their short positions.

6 Conclusion

We derive a simple and general characterization of the bilateral exchange rate's cyclical-ity with respect to the differential between home and foreign SDFs. If investors can freely trade the risk-free bonds in both countries, their optimality conditions impose strong restrictions on the relation between exchange rates and macro fundamentals that is difficult to reconcile with the data. In order to break this relation, models need to impute a home currency bias to bond market investors. Alternatively, these investors need to derive large convenience yields from their holdings of domestic bonds. These results offer a model-

free diagnosis for the necessary conditions of explaining the exchange rate disconnect and predictability.

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Appendix

A Proof

A.1 Proposition 1

Proof. Combining

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + r_t - r_t^* &= \text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) + \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}), \\ -(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + r_t - r_t^*) &= \text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) + \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}),\end{aligned}$$

we directly obtain

$$\text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) > 0.$$

□

A.2 Proposition 2

Proof. Using the definition of p_t and q_t , we can restate the covariance as follows:

$$\text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) = \text{cov}(p_t + q_t, q_t) + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), q_t) - \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t).$$

Note $\text{cov}(p_t + q_t, q_t) = b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t)$ by the construction of the Fama regression.

Then,

$$\text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) = b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), q_t) - \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t).$$

A negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicity then implies

$$\begin{aligned}\text{cov}(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) &= \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] + b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), q_t) - \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) \leq 0\end{aligned}$$

Rearranging terms,

$$\frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), -q_t) \geq \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] + b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t)$$

Without loss of generality,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) &\geq \frac{1}{2} \text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) + \frac{1}{2} \text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), -q_t) \\ &\geq \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] + b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) \end{aligned}$$

We note $\text{corr}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) \leq 1$. Hence, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) &\geq \frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \\ \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) - \text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \\ \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) + \text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \\ \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + 1 &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + 1 - b \times \frac{\text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} = \frac{1}{R^2} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Now, notice that

$$b = \frac{\text{cov}(\Delta s_{t+1}, f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(f_t - s_t)} = \frac{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{std}(f_t - s_t)} \text{corr}(\Delta s_{t+1}, f_t - s_t).$$

We obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})\sqrt{R^2}} + 1 - b \times \frac{\text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})R^2} &\geq \frac{1}{R^2} \\ \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} + \sqrt{R^2} - b \times \frac{\text{corr}(\Delta s_{t+1}, f_t - s_t)^2}{b^2\sqrt{R^2}} &\geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \\ \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} &\geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} - \sqrt{R^2} + \frac{R_{Fama}^2}{b\sqrt{R^2}} \end{aligned}$$

When Fama Regression yields the best predictor, $R_{Fama}^2 = R^2$, the formula is simplified to

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} - \sqrt{R^2} + \frac{1}{b}\sqrt{R^2},$$

where

$$\frac{1}{b} \sqrt{R^2} = \frac{1}{b} \frac{|b| \text{std}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} = \text{sign}(b) \frac{\text{std}(f_t - s_t)}{\Delta s_{t+1}}.$$

Hence, we arrive at condition (a).

Next, we show condition (b). By using the definition of covariance and imposing symmetry:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) &= \text{cov}(p_t + q_t, q_t) - \text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) \\ &= \text{var}(q_t) + \text{cov}(p_t, q_t) - \text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t). \end{aligned}$$

Using the definition of the covariance, this covariance expression on the left-hand side can be bounded below as follows:

$$\text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) \geq \text{var}(q_t) - \text{std}(p_t) \text{std}(q_t) - \text{std}(q_t) \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})).$$

This lower bound can be restated as:

$$\text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) \geq \text{var}(q_t) \left(1 - \frac{\text{std}(p_t)}{\text{std}(q_t)} - \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(q_t)} \right).$$

To get a negative unconditional Backus Smith coefficient, we need the following condition:

$$\text{cov}(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] + \text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) \leq 0.$$

This can be restated as follows:

$$-\mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] \geq \text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) \geq \text{var}(q_t) \left(1 - \frac{\text{std}(p_t)}{\text{std}(q_t)} - \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(q_t)} \right).$$

Rearranging terms, we obtain the following result:

$$\frac{\text{std}(p_t)}{\text{std}(q_t)} + \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(q_t)} \geq 1 + \frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})]}{\text{var}(q_t)}.$$

Note that

$$1 + \frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})]}{\text{var}(q_t)} = \frac{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) + \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})]}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} = \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])}.$$

Hence, we obtain the necessary condition (b) by using the definition of the unconditional variance:

$$\sqrt{\frac{std(p_t)}{std(q_t)} + \frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(q_t)}} \geq \frac{std(\Delta s_{t+1})}{std(q_t)} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}}.$$

To compare conditions (a) and (b), note that condition (a) can be written as Eq. (A.1), reproduced below,

$$\frac{std(var_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{std(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + 1 - b \times \frac{var(f_t - s_t)}{var(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \geq \frac{1}{R^2},$$

it suffices to compare the term $std(\mathbb{E}_t[rx_{t+1}])/std(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) = std(p_t)/std(q_t)$ in (b) with $1 - bvar(f_t - s_t)/var(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) = 1 - bvar(p_t + q_t)/var(q_t)$ in (a). Consider the general case, when Fama regression does not necessarily yield the best predictor. Take conditional expectation on both sides of the regression yields

$$q_t = a + b(p_t + q_t) + x_t$$

where $x_t = \mathbb{E}_t[\varepsilon_{t+1}]$ satisfies that

$$\begin{aligned} cov(x_t, p_t + q_t) &= cov(\varepsilon_{t+1}, p_t + q_t) - cov(\varepsilon_{t+1} - x_t, p_t + q_t) = 0 \\ cov(x_t, q_t) &= cov(x_t, b(p_t + q_t)) + var(x_t) = var(x_t) \end{aligned}$$

Hence, $var(q_t) = b^2 var(p_t + q_t) + var(x_t)$, and

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - b \frac{var(p_t + q_t)}{var(q_t)} &= 1 - \frac{1}{b} \left(1 - \frac{var(x_t)}{var(q_t)} \right) \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{b} \right) + \frac{1}{b} \frac{var(x_t)}{var(q_t)}. \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, $p_t = -a/b + (1/b - 1)q_t - x_t/b$, which implies

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{std(p_t)}{std(q_t)} &= \frac{1}{std(q_t)} \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{b} - 1 \right)^2 var(q_t) + \frac{1}{b^2} var(x_t) - \frac{2}{b} \left(\frac{1}{b} - 1 \right) var(x_t)} \\ &= \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{b} - 1 \right)^2 + \left(\frac{2}{b} - \frac{1}{b^2} \right) \frac{var(x_t)}{var(q_t)}}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \left(1 - b \frac{\text{var}(p_t + q_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)}\right)^2 &= \left(\frac{1}{b} - 1\right)^2 + \left(\frac{2}{b} - \frac{2}{b^2}\right) \frac{\text{var}(x_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)} + \frac{1}{b^2} \left(\frac{\text{var}(x_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)}\right)^2 \\ &= \left(\frac{\text{std}(p_t)}{\text{std}(q_t)}\right)^2 - \frac{1}{b^2} \left(1 - \frac{\text{var}(x_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)}\right) \frac{\text{var}(x_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)} \end{aligned}$$

which implies that, when $\text{var}(x_t) > 0$, i.e., the Fama regression does not yield the best predictor, condition (a) is always tighter.

When $\text{var}(x_t) = 0$, i.e., Fama regression yields the best predictor, we obtain

$$\left(1 - b \frac{\text{var}(p_t + q_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{\text{std}(p_t)}{\text{std}(q_t)}\right)^2,$$

and

$$1 - b \frac{\text{var}(p_t + q_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{b}\right).$$

When $1 - 1/b > 0$, i.e., $b < 0$ or $b > 1$, condition (a) and (b) are equivalent. Otherwise, $1 - b \frac{\text{var}(p_t + q_t)}{\text{var}(q_t)} < 0 < \frac{\text{std}(p_t)}{\text{std}(q_t)}$, and condition (a) is tighter. □

A.3 Proposition 3

The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 2. Just replace the one-period objects (e.g., $m_{t,t+1}$) with the multi-period objects (e.g., $m_{t,t+k}$).

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Proof. From

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_t &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}) + r_t, \\ \zeta_t &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}, -\Delta s_{t+1}) + r_t^*, \\ \phi_t^* &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}^*] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*) + r_t^*, \\ \zeta_t^* &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1}^*] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \text{cov}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) + r_t, \end{aligned}$$

we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*] = \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*) + r_t^* - \phi_t^* - \frac{1}{2}\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}) - r_t + \phi_t$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cov}(\mathbb{E}_t[m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*], \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) &= \text{cov}(p_t + q_t, q_t) + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), q_t) - \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) \\ &\quad - \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t) \\ &= b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), q_t) - \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) \\ &\quad - \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t) \end{aligned}$$

A negative unconditional exchange rate cyclicity then implies

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{cov}(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) \\ &= \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) - (\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*)] + b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), q_t) - \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) - \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t) \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging terms,

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) + \frac{1}{2}\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}^*), -q_t) - \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) \\ &\geq \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) - (\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*)] + b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) \end{aligned}$$

By assumption,

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{cov}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}), q_t) - \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) \\ &\geq \mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1}) - (\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*)] + b \times \text{var}(p_t + q_t) \end{aligned}$$

Let $\omega = \mathbb{E}[-(\zeta_t^* + \zeta_t) + (\phi_t + \phi_t^*)] - \text{cov}(\phi_t^*, q_t) + \text{cov}(\phi_t, q_t)$ denote the new adjustment term that arises from the wedges. Then, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) &\geq \frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{var}_t(\Delta s_{t+1})] + \omega + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \\ \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) - \text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) + \omega + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1})) + \text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}]) &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \omega + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \\ \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + 1 &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \omega + b \times \text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + 1 - b \times \frac{\text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} &\geq \frac{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) + \omega}{\text{var}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} \\ &= \frac{1}{R^2} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Recall that $R_{Fama}^2 = b^2 \text{var}(f_t - s_t) / \text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})$. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1}) \sqrt{R^2}} + 1 - b \times \frac{\text{var}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1}) \sqrt{R^2}} &\geq \frac{1}{R^2} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) \\ \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} + \sqrt{R^2} - \frac{R_{Fama}^2}{b} &\geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) \\ \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} &\geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) - \sqrt{R^2} + \frac{R_{Fama}^2}{b \sqrt{R^2}} \end{aligned}$$

When Fama Regression yields the best predictor, $R_{Fama}^2 = R^2$, the formula is simplified to

$$\frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{R^2}} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right) - \sqrt{R^2} + \frac{\sqrt{R^2}}{b}$$

where

$$\frac{1}{b} \sqrt{R^2} = \frac{1}{b} \frac{|b| \text{std}(f_t - s_t)}{\text{std}(\Delta s_{t+1})} = \text{sign}(b) \frac{\text{std}(f_t - s_t)}{\Delta s_{t+1}}$$

Hence, we arrive at condition (a).

Similarly, condition (b) can be derived as

$$\sqrt{\frac{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[rx_{t+1}])}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])} + \frac{\text{std}(\text{var}_t(m_{t,t+1}))}{\text{std}(\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}])}} \geq \frac{1}{R^2} \left(1 + \frac{\omega}{\text{var}(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

the relation between condition (a) and (b) depends only on the Fama regression but not

the Euler equations, thus are identical to that in Proposition 2. □

A.5 Non-Gaussian Case

We define conditional entropy as follows:

$$L_t(X_{t+1}) = (\log \mathbb{E}_t[X_{t+1}] - \mathbb{E}_t[x_{t+1}]).$$

We can use μ_{it} to denote the i -th central conditional moment of $\log X$. Then we can state:

$$\log \mathbb{E}_t \exp(sx_{t+1}) = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} s^j \kappa_{j,t} / j! = k_t(x_{t+1}; s)$$

where $\kappa_{1t} = \mu_{1t}$, $\kappa_{2t} = \mu_{2t}$, $\kappa_{3t} = \mu_{3t}$, $\kappa_{4t} = \mu_{4t} - 3\mu_{2t}^2$. This implies that the conditional entropy can be stated as the sum of the higher order *cumulants*:

$$L_t(X_{t+1}) = \sum_{j=2}^{\infty} \kappa_{j,t} / j! = k_t(x_{t+1}; 1) - \kappa_1.$$

The log of the currency risk premium (in levels) earned by domestic investors can be stated as:

$$(r_t^* - r_t) - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + L_t \left[\frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right] = -C_t \left(M_{t+1}, \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right),$$

where co-entropy is defined as $C_t(x_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) = L_t(x_{t+1}y_{t+1}) - L_t(x_{t+1}) - L_t(y_{t+1})$ [Backus, Boyarchenko, and Chernov, 2018]. If x_{t+1} and y_{t+1} are independent, then $C_t(x_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) = 0$. If we define the cumulant generating function,

$$\log \mathbb{E}_t \exp(s_1 x_{t+1} + s_2 y_{t+1}) = k_t(s_1, s_2)$$

then $C_t(x_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) = k_t(1, 1) - k_t(1, 0) - k_t(0, 1)$. A long position in foreign currency is risky for the domestic investor when the foreign currency tends to depreciate (and the home currency appreciates) in worse states for the domestic investor, i.e. when

$$C_t \left(M_{t+1}, \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right) < 0$$

is more negative. Similarly, the log of the currency risk premium (in levels) earned by domestic investors can be stated as the co-entropy of the domestic SDF with the domestic

currency's rate of appreciation:

$$(r_t - r_t^*) + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + L_t \left[\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right] = -C_t(M_{t+1}^*, \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}).$$

Proposition 8. *In the non-normal case, the conditional exchange rate cyclicity satisfies*

$$-C_t(M_{t+1}^*, \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}) - C_t \left(M_{t+1}, \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right) = L_t \left[\frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right] + L_t \left[\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right] > 0. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

In the normal case, we recover the covariance result in Proposition 1. When the domestic currency appreciates in worse states for the domestic investor, we have $C_t \left(M_{t+1}, \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right) < 0$. Similarly, when the foreign currency appreciates in worse states for the foreign investor, we have $C_t(M_{t+1}^*, \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}) < 0$.

Because the right-hand side is positive, as entropy is non-negative, we know that exchange rates will have to be counter-cyclical for at least one of the countries, and possibly both.

Proof. The U.S. Euler equations are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t)] &= 1 \\ \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t^* - \Delta s_{t+1})] &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

where $m_{t+1} = \log M_{t+1}$. By the definition of entropy and co-entropy, we recast the equations as follows

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t)] \\ &= \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1})] + r_t \\ &= \log \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1}] + L_t(M_{t+1}) + r_t \\ 0 &= \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} + r_t^* - \Delta s_{t+1})] \\ &= \log \mathbb{E}_t[\exp(m_{t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1})] + r_t^* \\ &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1}] + L_t(M_{t+1} \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}}) + r_t^* \\ &= \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1} - \Delta s_{t+1}] + r_t^* + C_t(M_{t+1}, \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}}) + L_t(M_{t+1}) + L_t(\frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}}) \end{aligned}$$

Subtract the first equation from the second to get

$$r_t^* - r_t + \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + L_t\left(\frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}}\right) = -C_t\left(M_{t+1}, \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}}\right).$$

Similarly, from the foreign Euler equations we obtain

$$r_t - r_t^* - \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta s_{t+1}] + L_t\left(\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}\right) = -C_t\left(M_{t+1}^*, \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}\right)$$

Add up the two equations to get the proposition. Note that entropy is always greater than zero, which ensures the inequality in the proposition.

□

B Details of the Gabaix and Maggiori [2015] Model

We present details of the Gabaix and Maggiori [2015] model. Relative to their benchmark two-period model, we introduce a stochastic χ/Y_{NT} ratio instead of assuming that it is a constant 1. We do this because in the benchmark model, the SDF is a constant in the numéraire in which bond returns are denominated.

B.1 Environment

Time is discrete and there are two periods: $t = 0$ and 1. There are two countries, the US (H) and the foreign country (F). Each country is populated by a unit mass of households, and has a non-tradable good and a tradable good. For the convenience of exposition, we use the word currency interchangeably with the numéraire of the economy. The *dollar* value and the *foreign currency* value mean values expressed in units of the non-tradable good in each country. To make the results comparable to those in Gabaix and Maggiori [2015], we adopt their exchange rate convention: \mathcal{E}_t is defined as the quantity of the dollar per unit of the foreign currency, which measures the strength of the foreign currency. We use $e_t = \log \mathcal{E}_t$ to denote the log exchange rate.

Households The US households derive utility from consumption in both periods:

$$\theta_0 \log C_0 + \beta \mathbb{E}_0[\theta_1 \log C_1],$$

where C_t is a consumption basket consisting of $C_{NT,t}$ units of the local non-tradable good, $C_{H,t}$ units of the US tradable good, and $C_{F,t}$ units of the foreign tradable good:

$$C_t = ((C_{NT,t})^{\chi_t} (C_{H,t})^{a_t} (C_{F,t})^{\iota_t})^{1/\theta_t}.$$

The preference parameters χ_t , a_t and ι_t are non-negative and stochastic. we define $\theta_t = \chi_t + a_t + \iota_t$. we use the local non-tradable good as the numéraire in each country, so that its price in local currency is $p_{NT,t} = 1$ in both periods.

Non-tradable goods can only be traded domestically, whereas tradable goods can be traded internationally without any friction. In each period, the US households receive an endowment of $Y_{NT,t}$ units of the local non-tradable good and $Y_{H,t}$ units of the US tradable good. The household owns the claim to this endowment and this claim cannot be sold.

By the first-order conditions,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\chi_t}{C_{NT,t}} &= \lambda_t \\ \frac{a_t}{C_{H,t}} &= \lambda_t p_{H,t} \\ \frac{l_t}{C_{F,t}} &= \lambda_t p_{F,t}\end{aligned}$$

For simplicity, we fix χ_t to be a constant between 0 and 1, and allow $C_{NT,t} = Y_{NT,t}$ to vary, which creates variations in λ_t , which we treat as an exogenous variable.

The setup for the foreign households is similar. The foreign households' utility is

$$\theta_0^* \log C_0^* + \beta^* \mathbb{E}_0[\theta_1^* \log C_1^*], \quad \text{where } C_t^* = \left((C_{NT,t}^*)^{\lambda_t^*} (C_{F,t}^*)^{a_t^*} (C_{H,t}^*)^{\zeta_t} \right)^{1/\theta_t^*}.$$

The net export in dollar is

$$NX_t = \mathcal{E}_t p_{H,t}^* C_{H,t}^* - p_{F,t} C_{F,t} = \frac{\zeta_t \mathcal{E}_t}{\lambda_t^*} - \frac{l_t}{\lambda_t}$$

Domestic bond market The bond is denominated in the domestic non-tradable goods. Households can freely trade the domestic bond. For the U.S. households, the Euler equation is

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\beta \exp(r_0) \frac{U'_{NT,t+1}}{U'_{NT,t}} \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\beta \exp(r_0) \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \right]$$

For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of λ_t is such that $\mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}/\lambda_t] = 1$, which implies $\exp(r_0) = 1/\beta$. Similarly, we assume $\mathbb{E}_t[\lambda_{t+1}^*/\lambda_t^*] = 1$, which implies $\exp(r_0^*) = 1/\beta^*$.

The financial market is segmented. The US households can only trade the dollar bond, and the foreign households can only trade the foreign bond. Let $b_{H,0}$ denote the quantity of the dollar bond held by the US households in period 0, which is redeemed in period 1, and let r denote the log dollar risk-free rate. The US households' budget constraints in the two periods are

$$\begin{aligned}Y_{NT,0} + p_{H,0} Y_{H,0} &= C_{NT,0} + p_{H,0} C_{H,0} + p_{F,0} C_{F,0} + b_{H,0}, \\ Y_{NT,1} + p_{H,1} Y_{H,1} &= C_{NT,1} + p_{H,1} C_{H,1} + p_{F,1} C_{F,1} - \exp(r_0) b_{H,0}.\end{aligned}$$

Financiers In period 0, risk-neutral financiers are born, who intermediate currency flows subject to a financial friction. In period 1, all financiers unwind their portfolios. To simplify the expression, we follow [Gabaix and Maggiori \[2015\]](#) and assume their profits or losses are paid to the foreign households.

Each financier manages a financial intermediary that can hold bonds in both currencies. In period 0, the financier has zero net worth, and its balance sheet consists of Q_0 units of the dollar and $-Q_0/\mathcal{E}_0$ units of the foreign currency. When $Q_0 > 0$, the financier takes a long position on the dollar bond, and when $Q_0 < 0$, it takes a short position. The expected profit in dollar terms is

$$V_0 = \mathbb{E}_0[\beta(\exp(r_0) - \exp(r_0^*)\mathcal{E}_1/\mathcal{E}_0)Q_0].$$

Although the financiers are risk-neutral, they have limited risk-bearing capacity due to the agency friction considered by [Gabaix and Maggiori \[2015\]](#). In period 0, each financier can divert a portion of the funds under its management. If it chooses to do so, it unwinds its portfolio and receives the portion it diverts, and its lenders receive the rest of the funds. As the lenders rationally anticipate the financier's incentive and diversion is a less desirable outcome, they supply funding to the financier only when the financier has no incentive to divert the fund, which leads to the following credit constraint:

$$\underbrace{\frac{V_0}{\mathcal{E}_0}}_{\text{Intermediary Value in Foreign Currency}} \geq \underbrace{\left| \frac{Q_0}{\mathcal{E}_0} \right|}_{\text{Portfolio Size}} \cdot \underbrace{\Gamma \left| \frac{Q_0}{\mathcal{E}_0} \right|}_{\text{Divertible Portion}}, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where the divertible portion is increasing in the size of the balance sheet $|Q_0/\mathcal{E}_0|$ and in the parameter $\Gamma > 0$ proxying for the severity of the financial constraint.

Since the value function V_0 is linear in the financier's currency position Q_0 while the constraint is convex, the constraint is always binding. Let

$$\rho_0 = \mathbb{E}_0[\beta(\exp(r_0) - \exp(r_0^*)\mathcal{E}_1/\mathcal{E}_0)]$$

denote the expected excess return of the dollar against the foreign currency. Then, the equilibrium portfolio allocation on the dollar bond is

$$Q_0 = \frac{\rho_0 \mathcal{E}_0}{\Gamma} = \frac{1}{\Gamma} \mathbb{E}_0[\beta(\exp(r_0)\mathcal{E}_0 - \exp(r_0^*)\mathcal{E}_1)].$$

Intuitively, the portfolio position on the dollar bond Q_0 is increasing in the dollar bond's expected excess return ρ_0 , and decreasing in the severity of the financial friction as cap-

tured by the parameter Γ . A higher Γ means the manager has a stronger incentive to divert the funds, leading to less risk taking in equilibrium. In this way, the agency friction gives rise to a well-defined currency position and rules out pricing inconsistency despite the currency financiers being risk-neutral.

B.2 Equilibrium

In equilibrium

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\tilde{\xi}_0 \mathcal{E}_0}{\lambda_0^*} - \frac{\iota_0}{\lambda_0} + Q_0 &= 0 \\ \frac{\tilde{\xi}_1 \mathcal{E}_1}{\lambda_1^*} - \frac{\iota_1}{\lambda_1} - Q_0 \exp(r_0) &= 0\end{aligned}$$

To streamline the algebra and concentrate on the key economic content, we follow [Gabaix and Maggiori \[2015\]](#) to impose the following simplifying assumption: $\beta = \beta^* = \exp(r_0) = \exp(r_0^*) = 1$, $\tilde{\xi}_t = 1$, $\lambda_t^* = 1$, and $\iota_t > 0$ for $t = 0, 1$. We also assume $\lambda_0 = 1$ and $\iota_0 = 1$. Then, the equilibrium conditions simplify to

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{E}_0 - 1 + \frac{1}{\Gamma} \mathbb{E}_0[\mathcal{E}_0 - \mathcal{E}_1] &= 0 \\ \mathcal{E}_1 - \iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1} - \frac{1}{\Gamma} \mathbb{E}_0[\mathcal{E}_0 - \mathcal{E}_1] &= 0\end{aligned}$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{E}_0 &= \frac{(1 + \Gamma) + \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2 + \Gamma} \\ \mathcal{E}_1 &= \iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1} - \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1}] + \frac{1 + (1 + \Gamma) \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2 + \Gamma}\end{aligned}$$

Denote the home and foreign SDFs as

$$\begin{aligned}\exp(m_1) &= \beta \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_0} \\ \exp(m_1^*) &= \beta \frac{\lambda_1^*}{\lambda_0^*}\end{aligned}$$

The four Euler equations are

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_0[\exp(m_1 + r_0)] &= 1 \\ \mathbb{E}_0[\exp(m_1^* + r_0^*)] &= 1\end{aligned}$$

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\exp(m_1 + r_0^*) \frac{\mathcal{E}_1}{\mathcal{E}_0} \right] = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\lambda_1 \frac{\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1} - \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1}] + \frac{1+(1+\Gamma)\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}}{\frac{(1+\Gamma)+\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}} \right]$$

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\exp(m_1^* + r_0) \frac{\mathcal{E}_0}{\mathcal{E}_1} \right] = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\frac{\frac{(1+\Gamma)+\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}}{\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1} - \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1}] + \frac{1+(1+\Gamma)\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}} \right]$$

In the language of our wedge algebra,

$$\xi_t = \log \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\lambda_1 \frac{\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1} - \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1}] + \frac{1+(1+\Gamma)\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}}{\frac{(1+\Gamma)+\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}} \right], \quad \zeta_t^* = \log \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\frac{\frac{(1+\Gamma)+\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}}{\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1} - \mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1 \lambda_1^{-1}] + \frac{1+(1+\Gamma)\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1]}{2+\Gamma}} \right]$$

The exchange rate cyclicity is

$$\text{cov}_0(m_1^* - m_1, e_1 - e_0) = \text{cov}_0(-\log \lambda_1, e_1 - e_0)$$

If we mute the variability of ι_1 , then, the foreign currency strength \mathcal{E}_1 is decreasing in the home households' marginal utility λ_1 , which generates a pro-cyclical exchange rate. The intuition is that the higher marginal utility in the home country is created by a shortage of the non-tradable goods, which also lowers the demand for the imported foreign goods. To equilibrate the trade balance, the foreign currency must depreciate, which is consistent with the standard frictionless setting that leads to the Backus-Smith puzzle.

To overturn this result, we need to introduce a negative correlation between ι_1 and λ_1^{-1} , so that a higher marginal utility in the home country is associated with a higher home demand for the foreign goods, which appreciates the foreign currency. The variation in the correlation between ι_1 and λ_1^{-1} also affects the exchange rate wedges ξ_t and ζ_t^* . As such, the levels of these wedges can be interpreted as covariances under this segmented market model.

B.3 Numerical Example

To make this point more concretely, we consider a very stylized numerical example. We set $\Gamma = 1$, and $(\log \lambda_1, \log \iota_1)$ is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. To emphasize the role played by ι_1 , we assume that $\log \lambda_1$ has a standard deviation of 0.1, and $\log \iota_1$ has a standard deviation of 0.4. We set the mean so that $\mathbb{E}_0[\lambda_1] = 1$ and $\mathbb{E}_0[\iota_1] = 1$.


We vary the correlation between $\log \lambda_1$ and $\log \iota_1$ from -1 to 1 . We simulate this model by drawing 1,000,000 random samples and compute the exchange rate moments.

To return to our notation in the main text, we define $s_t = -e_t$ as the home currency strength. Figure (B.1)(a) reports the exchange rate cyclicality, defined as $corr_0(m_1 - m_1^*, \Delta s_1)$. Consistent with our theoretical argument, as we increase the correlation ρ between $\log \lambda_1$ and $\log \iota_1$, we introduce a negative correlation between ι_1 and λ_1^{-1} , which depreciates the foreign currency when the home marginal utility is high. The exchange rate becomes procyclical.


Consistent with this exchange rate behavior, the exchange rate wedge also adjusts as we vary the correlation ρ . By Proposition 5, the conditional correlation is given by:

$$corr_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*, \Delta s_{t+1}) = \frac{std_t(\Delta s_{t+1})}{std_t(m_{t,t+1} - m_{t,t+1}^*)} \left(1 - \frac{(\xi_t^* + \xi_t)}{var_t(\Delta s_{t+1})} \right).$$

Figure (B.1)(b) reports the wedge $1 - (\xi_0^* + \xi_0)/var_0(\Delta s_1)$, which is decreasing and eventually negative as we increase the correlation ρ . This result makes it clear that the exchange rate cyclicality in this segmented market model is consistent with our characterization based on the Euler equation wedges.



(A) FX CYCLICALITY $corr_0(m_1 - m_1^*, \Delta s_1)$



(B) WEDGE $1 - (\xi_0^* + \xi_0)/var_0(\Delta s_1)$

FIGURE B.1. THE EXCHANGE RATE CYCLICALITY AND WEDGE IN GABAIX-MAGGIORI MODEL