

# Data Science for Justice: Evidence from a Nationwide Randomized Experiment in Kenya

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*We conduct a randomized controlled trial across Kenyan courts to tackle a major source of court delays: adjournments. Partnering with the Kenyan Judiciary, we introduce a simple, cost-effective one-page document that outlines the main reasons for adjournments in each court. We test this intervention in two experimental arms: one where the information is shared with judges, and the other where it is shared with both judges and court user committees. Our intervention successfully prevents approximately 20,000 adjournments nationwide, with each adjournment previously delaying cases by an average of 3 months. The acceleration of court proceedings leads to a notable increase in the demand for and utilization of the legal system, increasing the filing of cases—especially in commercial and succession matters—as well as citizen trust in the justice system. Our findings demonstrate that tackling the underlying reasons for court delays can substantially enhance both the perceived and actual performance of judicial systems, fostering greater usage and trust in legal institutions.*

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## I. Introduction

The efficiency of court proceedings has long been recognized as a key driver of economic development. Both cross-country and within-country studies suggest that court efficiency affects contract enforcement, access to credit, and economic growth (Djankov et al., 2003; Mehmood, 2022; Rao, 2022; Amirapu, 2021; Boehm and Oberfield, 2020; Lichand and Soares, 2014; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Visaria, 2009; Chemin, 2020). Despite this relevance, court proceedings throughout the world — and particularly in developing countries — are perceived to be extremely slow. The average time to disposition of court cases in the commercial court of a country’s main capital has been estimated to be 654 days, being even higher for developing countries and firms often consider the slow resolution of disputes as a significant hurdle for their business activity.<sup>1</sup> This often leads to low access to justice, lack of reliance on contracts, and limited trust in courts.

While recognizing the importance of efficient justice for economic development, the question on how to improve the efficiency of court proceedings has received limited empirical attention. A key barrier to efficient court proceedings are adjournments, i.e., postponement of cases to later dates. Across developed and developing countries, adjournments are frequently cited as a large proportion of delays in court cases (Runciman and Baker, 2016). Legal experts further argue that the prevalence of adjournments not only prolongs proceedings but also diminishes their quality, causing frustration among litigants, loss of files, fading memories, and disappearing witnesses Messick (2015). In Kenya, our study site, the Chief Justice identified in 2019 that “endless adjournments on frivolous grounds” were a major contributor to case backlog throughout the country (Muriuki, 2019).

In this study, we partner with the Kenyan Judiciary and the World Bank to test a simple, cost-effective intervention to reduce adjournments and increase the efficiency of court proceedings. This is, to our knowledge, the first nationwide randomized controlled trial (RCT) implemented in judicial proceedings.<sup>2</sup> We leverage a dataset of over 14 million observations between 2016 to 2023 to meticulously quantify adjournments for each court in Kenya. Additionally, we identify the specific causes of adjournments, whether related to judges, the parties, or other court actors such as the

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<sup>1</sup>See the World Bank’s *Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys*

<sup>2</sup>This is a significant undertaking for institutions that are slow and hard to reform, with little external oversight, and reluctant to data-driven and empirical interventions that are not directly implemented through a legal reform.

police, prosecutors, or witnesses. We display this information, including court performance metrics and the top three reasons for adjournments, on an easy-to-read, one-pager official document from the Kenyan judiciary. We call this intervention the “One-Pager”.

The RCT, launched across 123 courts, includes two treatment arms. one where the One-Pager is received only by the judges in the court, and another one where both judges and Court User Committees (CUCs)—which bring together civil society and court actors on a quarterly basis to discuss aspects related to court cases—also receive the intervention. This design allows us to discern different potential mechanisms of the intervention. The One-Pager sent only to judges brings top-down information to judges regarding the causes of delay; on the other hand, the One-Pager discussed with CUCs creates transparency and accountability from external court actors of the court, who are now aware of the reasons for adjournments and may be able to exercise pressure on judges and other court actors. Our design thus allows us to test the impact of informing and empowering civil society to create external accountability mechanisms relative to only informing judges and creating top-down accountability mechanisms within their own organizational structure.

We implement the intervention in two stages. First, we send one wave of One-Pagers in February 2019 (Wave 1). This enables us to assess short-term effects and identify how long (if at all) the effects of the intervention last. We then send 4 waves of One-Pagers every quarter from August 2021 to August 2022 (Wave 2). This allows us to see whether the effects are stronger when the One-Pagers are repeatedly sent. Analyzing the results post-August 2022 allows us to investigate any enduring effects that may persist even after the end of the intervention.

We find a large reduction in adjournments for both interventions One-Pager and One-Pager\_CUC in Wave 2. Prior to the interventions, each hearing had a 20 percent probability of ending with an adjournment—a significant figure given that, on average, cases involve four hearings such that most cases will experience an adjournment. Post-interventions, this probability is cut in half. Considering the nationwide implementation of the intervention across two-thirds of the courts in Kenya, we estimate that this initiative averted a total of 20,000 adjournments. Considering an adjournment postpones a case by 3 months on average, this translates to a remarkable saving of 5,000 years in cumulative waiting time between hearings. In the context of such low-cost intervention, we consider these results to be remarkable. The intervention utilizes already existing data, involves merely the analysis of this data, the creation of One-Pagers, and their distribution to the courts. Thus, this approach offers a scalable, low-cost solution with substantial potential to enhance judicial efficiency significantly.

Additional findings provide insights into the mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of this

intervention. The impact of Wave 1, involving the dispatch of a single One-Pager, proves to be short-lived and fades away after a 6-month period. In contrast, the influence of Wave 2, characterized by the consistent distribution of four One-Pagers every quarter over a year, extends into the years 2022 and 2023. This suggests enduring effects when One-Pagers are recurrently sent, serving as a continuous signal to judges that their conduct is subject to ongoing scrutiny. This long-term impact stands out, especially in contrast to findings by Chemin (2020), who identified no sustained effects of judicial reforms once discontinued. In contrast, we find a long-term effect of our intervention on Kenyan courts.

We then disaggregate adjournments by their causes to understand which type of adjournment is affected. We find a strong reduction in adjournments by the court (i.e., the judge is not present) with both interventions, implying that top-down monitoring is effective. Additionally, there is evidence supporting the efficacy of bottom-up accountability. Specifically, compared to the One-Pager intervention shared only with judges, the One-Pager CUC also reduces adjournments caused by unprepared parties, which falls under the responsibility of lawyers. Furthermore, the One-Pager CUC is more effective at reducing adjournments from repeat court users. We posit that the presentation of new data on the reasons for adjournments during CUC meetings empowers civil society to exert pressure on judges and potentially on other parties, influencing them to reduce all types of adjournments, not just those caused by judges but also those involving other court actors.

The reduction in adjournments translates into greater speed of courts: the time to disposition decreases by 10 percent. We confirm that the effect is not coming from judges closing cases too fast or dismissing cases after receiving the One-Pager.

Faster courts improve the demand for justice: more people file cases after both interventions. The surge in case filings does not lead to congestion in the courts; instead, there is a parallel increase in resolved cases, contributing to an overall reduction in time to disposition. Specifically, we observe a rise in commercial cases (related to contract enforcement) and succession cases (pertaining to property rights security), but no discernible increase in insolvency cases (related to credit markets). This allows us to discern the probable mechanisms through which faster courts influence the economy: in this case, the channel operates through contract enforcement and the security of property rights. The heightened number of case filings suggests that individuals are more inclined to seek legal recourse, anticipating the benefits of a faster dispute resolution process.

To evaluate the potential mechanisms for this effect, we examine the impact of our intervention on trust in courts. We use nationally representative household surveys that contain a measure of trust in courts, merge them with our treatment data, and build an index of contact with courts, due to

the respondent’s particular occupation (such as lawyers, police, farmers (because of the prevalent land conflicts and the process of succession which must be completed in court, see Aberra and Chemin (2021) and Aberra and Chemin (2023)), and shop owners (because of trade and contract enforcement), urban setting, education, gender and age. We find an increase in trust in courts, especially so for repeat users of courts. Those more knowledgeable with courts experience a greater increase in trust, confirming that the effect of the One-Pagers are felt by court users. Our estimates are very similar to Acemoglu et al. (2020), where the potential effects of a judicial reform increase trust in courts. Our study confirms that deep-rooted mistrust in state institutions can be redressed.

This paper is the first randomized experiments providing information and accountability to judges in courts to accelerate court proceedings. While the existing literature underscores the significance of legal institutions in fostering growth, it predominantly relies on the evaluation of judicial reforms implemented in certain places at certain times. This is a concern since the placement of judicial reforms is endogenous: progressive policymakers instituting judicial reforms may concurrently be introducing various other positive reforms. Consequently, comparing places with and without judicial reforms may inadvertently confound the impact of judicial reforms with the effects of these additional reforms. While rigorous studies have employed ingenious identification strategies to address this issue (Mehmood, 2022; Boehm and Oberfeld, 2020; Kondylis and Stein, 2021; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Visaria, 2009; Amirapu, 2021), a randomized experiment offers a more direct approach to tackle selection bias. By randomly assigning interventions, this methodology provides a robust means of isolating and understanding the specific impact of judicial reforms, contributing a novel dimension to the study of legal institutions and their role in fostering economic growth. On a related paper, Sadka et al. (2024) implement a randomized experiment in the Mexico City Labor Court to evaluate the impact of information provision to plaintiffs in severance cases. In this paper, the authors analyze the sources of court dysfunction and identify information asymmetries between plaintiffs and lawyers as a significant cause of delays and lack of settlements. Using administrative data, they develop a “calculator” to predict case outcomes and provide specific case information to the parties. This intervention improves settlement rates and reduces case delays. While their paper focuses on improving the functioning of the demand side for justice by providing litigants with information, our paper focuses on the supply side of justice. In this case, we find that personalized information provided to judges can also be an effective means to enhance the speed of court proceedings. Our study tackles a different, and potentially more widespread, source of court delays—the recurrence of adjournments. Our findings demonstrate a substantial potential effect on court speed by tackling the key sources of delays on the supply side of justice.

The findings of this paper carry significant implications for policy considerations. Judicial systems are increasingly adopting the practice of collecting real-time data on cases going through their courts. The straightforward intervention outlined in this paper, involving the counting and display of adjournments, has the potential to be easily replicated in various contexts. While its effectiveness has been demonstrated in Kenya, its applicability in other settings remains to be explored. Nevertheless, the issue of adjournments is a global concern, not confined to the Kenyan context. For instance, a report addressing prolonged court delays from the Canadian Senate recommended, as a primary measure, the reduction of “the number of unnecessary appearances and adjournments to ensure proceedings are dealt with more expeditiously” (Runciman and Baker, 2016, 7). Depending on the specific context, One-Pagers could potentially incorporate information beyond adjournments. This intervention serves as a proof of concept to the possibility of steering judiciaries toward an era of data science, wherein data can be leveraged to measure and influence behavior, ultimately expediting the pace of justice and enhancing access to courts.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the intervention. Section III presents the conceptual framework to understand and interpret the likely effects of the intervention. Section IV presents the experimental design and balance tests. Section V describes the empirical specification, while section VI discusses the results on legal outcomes. Section VII concludes.

## II. The Intervention

### A. Background

Until 2015, there was no systematic digital data collection in Kenyan courts. Case information was written on paper and stayed in local courts. It was impossible to systematically measure adjournments, and no feedback was given to judges on their performance. For the Kenyan judiciary, it was impossible to know whether a judge was present in court, especially for remote rural courts or whether lawyers were asking an excessive number of adjournments to delay cases.

In October 2015, the Kenyan judiciary began collecting a dataset called the Daily Court Return Template (DCRT). The DCRT dataset contains detailed data on every case going through Kenyan courts, with more than 14 million observations at the case-activity level. It includes information on the exact charge leveled against the defendant, the name of the presiding judge(s)<sup>3</sup>, the number of plaintiffs/appellants, the number of defendants/accused, whether any of the parties has legal

<sup>3</sup>The Kenyan judiciary consists of: Supreme Court, High Court, Employment and Labour Relations Court and Environment and Land Court (the superior courts) and Magistrate Courts (the lower-level courts). The superior courts have judges, and the lower-level courts have magistrates or judicial officers. For the sake of brevity, we use the word “judges” throughout the paper, but technically it should be “judges and judicial officers”.

representation, how many accused were remanded in custody, and whether a witness has testified.

The DCRT contains data on the precise outcome of each appearance. In particular, it contains data on whether the case was adjourned. We find that the probability that a hearing ends in an adjournment is 20 percent, as shown in Table 1 below. Cases at other stages of the process are less likely to be adjourned. For example, there are no adjournments when filing a case. There are also less adjournments at a stage called “mention”, where the purpose is for the court to guide the case and instruct both parties on what needs to be done next. There are only 6 percent adjournments at the judgement stage. Most adjournments happen at the hearing stage, where the substance of the case is discussed.

TABLE 1—PROBABILITY OF ADJOURNMENT BY STAGE OF THE CASE

	Probability Adjournment	N
Filing	0	186483
Hearing	20	337894
Judgement	6	169687
Mention	4	923387
Other	3	272958

*Note:* The data is at the High Court level. The data is from October 2015 to March 2023.

A 20 percent probability of adjournment is significant, given that the average case involves four hearings, making it likely that most cases will experience at least one adjournment. On average, the wait time for the next hearing following an adjournment is three months. This contributes significantly to delays, considering the average time to resolve a case is 2.7 years. Legal experts contend that frequent adjournments negatively impact the quality of legal processes: litigants become frustrated, files can be lost, memories fade, and witnesses may become unavailable (Messick, 2015).

The DCRT includes the precise reason for the adjournment, as shown in Table 2.

Some adjournments may be necessary (“death of a party”) or even desirable (“parties to negotiate”), but these only represent a tiny fraction of all adjournments (0.01 percent for “death of a party”, 0.6 percent for “parties to negotiate”).

The majority of adjournments, 33 percent, are initiated by the court itself. These adjournments occur when litigants are summoned to court on a specific day without prior notice that the judge will not be available. To prevent these adjournments, litigants should at least be informed in advance if the judge will not be present.

TABLE 2—ADJOURNMENT BY CAUSE

	Share of Total Adjournments
Adjournment: Court	33
Adjournment: Parties not ready	15
Adjournment: Parties not present	13
Adjournment: Lawyer	15
Adjournment: Witness	6
Adjournment: Police Prosecutor	1

*Note:* The rest of the adjournments is in a category “Other”, which has to be entered in text.

The next most common source of adjournments occurs when the parties are not ready, accounting for 15 percent of all adjournments. These adjournments should be avoidable if reasonable preparation time is provided. In Kenya, pre-trial conferences establish a reasonable schedule, allowing ample time for all parties to prepare. Consequently, there should be no justification for a party to be unprepared. Additionally, the Kenya Code of Civil Procedure explicitly advises that in such cases, the judge should not grant an adjournment but should proceed to decide the suit.<sup>4</sup> Finally, it is also the responsibility of the lawyer to make sure the parties are ready the day of appearance in court.

Thirteen percent of adjournments come from parties being not present. The Kenyan code of civil procedure gives very precise instructions on how to deal with such cases that do not require adjournments: the judge can dismiss the case in case of plaintiff’s absence, or proceed “ex-parte” in the defendant’s absence.<sup>5</sup>

Fifteen percent of adjournments are caused by lawyers. The Kenyan judiciary has issued clear guidelines to address such cases: “Frequent adjournment of cases: This may be as a result of unpreparedness of advocates or prosecutors leading to unnecessary delay. Judges and judicial officers will be required to be strict in considering applications for adjournments. Additional court adjournment fees ought to be levied upon parties who seek unnecessary adjournments to discourage the habit.” (PMMSC report, p. 38)

6 percent of adjournments are caused by witnesses not being present. The Kenyan laws outline very clear procedures for witnesses who disobey summons, through the use of “warrants” or

<sup>4</sup>Kenya Civil Procedure Rules, Order 17, rule 4: Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith.

<sup>5</sup>Civil Procedure Rules, Order 12, rule 1: If on the day fixed for hearing, after the suit has been called on for hearing outside the court, neither party attends, the court may dismiss the suit. When only plaintiff attends, Order12, rule: may proceed ex-parte



“commissions”.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, a very small number of adjournments are attributed to the police or prosecutors.

### *B. The “One-Pager”*

The goal of the intervention is to display for the first time the number of these adjournments on an official visually appealing document from the Kenyan judiciary. For this purpose, we develop the “One-Pager” (see Figure 1 below for an example).

The first section of the One-Pager shows basic numbers of cases filed, cases resolved, rulings, and adjournments during the month. The goal is to start with a section easy to understand for any judge.

The second section shows the “case clearance rate” (CCR), which is calculated by dividing the number of cases resolved by the number of cases filed within a month in a given court. This metric assesses the court system’s ability to manage its caseload. A CCR below 100% indicates that more cases are being filed than resolved, leading to an accumulating backlog. The Kenyan judiciary has established a target CCR of 100%. The CCR is one of the most relevant indicators of court efficiency and is used in all evaluations of courts within the Kenyan judiciary. It also influences judges’ promotions and transfers, making it a well-known metric among them.

The novel part is the third section, which presents the number of monthly adjournments in the court. In particular, the feedback report highlights the top three reasons for adjournments for each specific court. For the particular court in Figure 1, the primary reason for adjournments is “Court not sitting”, followed by “Parties not ready” and “Police file not availed” for civil cases. The goal is to determine whether openly displaying the number of these unnecessary adjournments in an official document will lead to a decrease in their occurrence.

Finally, the fourth section shows the link between adjournments and performance (measured by the CCR). More adjournments (i.e., delays) lead to a lower number of resolved cases and thus reduce the CCR. We quantify this relationship in the data and verify that there is indeed a negative


<sup>6</sup>Criminal Procedure Code section 145: Warrant for witness who disobeys summons If, without sufficient excuse, a witness does not appear in obedience to the summons, the court, on proof of the proper service of the summons a reasonable time before, may issue a warrant to bring him before the court at the time and place as shall be therein specified.

Criminal Procedure Code section 154: Issue of commission for examination of witness Whenever, in the course of a proceeding under this Code, the High Court or a magistrate empowered to hold a subordinate court of the first class is satisfied that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of the witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, the court or magistrate may issue a commission to any magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the witness resides, to take the evidence of the witness.

Civil Procedure Rules, Order 16, rule 10(3): Procedure where witness fails to comply with summons. In lieu of or at the time of issuing such proclamation, or at any time afterwards, the court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant, either with or without bail, for the arrest of such person, and may make an order for the attachment of his property to such amount as it thinks fit, not exceeding the amount of the costs of attachment and of any fine which may be imposed under rule 12.

Civil Procedure Rules, Order 28, rule 2: A commission for the examination of a person who resides within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court issuing the same may be issued to any person whom the court thinks fit.

FIGURE 1. EXAMPLE OF A ONE-PAGER



correlation between both factors, i.e., more adjournments means less CCR. Our model can thus predict the likely improvement in CCR if adjournments were addressed. Appendix A provides greater details on the analysis. This is the first time a quantitative link is made between these adjournments and the CCR. By displaying the potential improvement in the CCR from reducing adjournments, we aim to incentivize judges to reduce adjournments, as they care about the CCR due to its impact on transfers and promotions.

Adhering to the key conditions for success of information experiments identified by Haaland et al. (2022), our experiment leverages visually appealing One-Pagers to present new and credible information drawn from the Kenyan judiciary’s administrative dataset.

### *C. The Experiment*

We implement two different treatments:

- 1) One-Pager: we send the One-Pagers to judges alone
- 2) One-Pager\_CUC: as above, but also sharing the One-Pager with Court User Committees (CUCs), which includes court actors such as lawyers, prosecutors, the police, as well as representatives from local communities

This experiment is implemented nationwide, including all the 123 courts in Kenya.<sup>7</sup> One third of the courts receives the first treatment, another third receives the second treatment, and the final third is the control group.

We send one wave of One-Pagers in February 2019. We then send 4 waves of One-Pagers every quarter from August 2021 to August 2022.

To increase legitimacy, the One-Pagers were sent through the internal mailing system of the Kenyan Judiciary. It came with specific instructions from the Chief Justice to implement the recommendations of the One-Pagers. For example for the One-Pager\_CUC treatment, the Chief Justice writes: “You will therefore receive a one page summary of your court every month which you will table for discussion during your quarterly Court User Committee (CUC) meetings, as a standing agenda item, with a view to identifying and implementing interventions aimed at improving service delivery and addressing the leading causes of adjournments in your court”. The full text accompanying the interventions is available in Appendix B.

<sup>7</sup>The experiment included all the high courts and magistrate courts of Kenya, but it did not include the Supreme Court and the four Court of Appeals, which were deemed to be too different from the regular courts in Kenya by the Kenyan judiciary.

### III. Conceptual Framework

#### A. *Effect of the One-Pager on Court Speed*

The rationale for the first intervention was top-down monitoring, and for the second bottom-up accountability.

Consider a principal-agent model where the principal is the Chief Justice, the agent is the judge, and the problem is lack of effort on the judges' part. In that model, the Chief Justice genuinely cares about fast courts.<sup>8</sup> Monitoring is imperfect: judges operate in remote courts with no data flowing back to the center or being analyzed prior to the One-Pagers. Thus, the model predicts that effort by judges is provided at a suboptimal level. The treatment increases the monitoring of adjournments by displaying them on the One-Pager. They were never reported before. According to this model, the One-Pager treatment would serve to reduce adjournments as it makes salient for judges that there is monitoring of their lack of effort.

The rationale for the second intervention was bottom-up pressure in addition to the top-down monitoring. In the CUC meetings, there is a new set of principals (civil society) and a new set of agents (external court users such as lawyers, police, prosecutors). Civil society cares about faster courts in general, but external court users may not be properly incentivized to resolve cases faster. For example, lawyers may wish to delay cases, whether it is for monetary reasons (e.g., some lawyers are paid by court appearances) or strategic reasons (e.g., some lawyers may want to delay cases in the interests of the parties they represent).. Civil society representatives are present at the CUC meetings and gain access to previously unreported information about adjournments. They can place pressure on either judges or the external court users depending on the exact sources of delays.

To understand the mechanisms, in the empirical analysis, we will disaggregate adjournments by their exact cause (judges or lawyers, police, prosecutor) to understand the channels through which the intervention is working.

#### B. *Effect of Court Speed on Access to Justice*

If the One-Pagers improve court speed, this may, in turn, influence the use of courts. More people may file cases in court. The composition of cases provides an opportunity to examine the channels through which faster courts might impact economic development.

<sup>8</sup>The Chief Justice has been on record saying: “by the end of my tenure in December 2020, we shall have no cases in court older than 3 years”. Or: “endless adjournments of cases on frivolous grounds are a major cause of case backlog in the country”.

Thirty-four percent of cases are of a commercial civil nature. This includes cases of contract enforcement. With faster courts, firms might be more willing to file cases, knowing they will be resolved faster. However, the effect on the number of filed cases is not straightforward, as firms may respond by breaching less contracts in light of the greater net present value of penalties. In this paper, we will test the effect of both interventions on the number of such cases filed.

TABLE 3—TYPE OF CASES

	Percent Cases
Commercial Civil	34
Succession	18
Credit	3
AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes	0
Criminal	25
Political	7
Family	15

Eighteen percent of cases are related to the process of succession. In Kenya, people must use the High Courts for a proper transfer of title in a succession process. Faster courts may entice more people into following the proper process. If more cases of succession are filed, there will be more transfers of property rights, and more security of property rights, which may increase agricultural productivity. In this paper, we are able to test the first step of this reasoning with the DCRT data, i.e., whether faster courts translate into more succession cases filed.

Three percent of cases are related to credit, and are called: insolvency, bankruptcy, or winding up cases. In case a borrower does not repay, the lender must sue in court to seize the collateral. Faster courts may entice more lenders to use this avenue, which may translate into more recovery of loans and more credit lending.

There are also anticorruption and economic crimes cases in the data, albeit in a very small number.

Twenty-five percent of cases are criminal in nature, 7 percent are political (judicial review, constitutional, election cases), and 15 percent are family cases (divorce, child custody).

## IV. Experimental Design

### A. Randomization

The experiment was conducted nationwide, with the unit of randomization being a court station. A court station is a geographic compound that can include a high court and a magistrate court. Each court station has one CUC. We randomized at the court station level to minimize the spillover effects between treated and control judges within the same geographic compound. Instead, if a court station is treated, all judges receive the same intervention.

One third of the court stations in Kenya were randomly selected to receive the treatment “One-Pager”, whereby the judges receive the One-Pager. Another third of the courts receive the treatment “One-Pager\_CUC”, whereby all judges receive the One-Pager and the One-Pagers are also distributed to all members of the CUC to be discussed in the CUC meeting.

There are 123 court stations in Kenya. To achieve balance, we follow Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and use a stratification technique. We stratify based on geographical variables, since the effect may be different in different places. In practice, we established a list of 8 regions in Kenya to make sure that there was an approximately equal number of control and treated court stations in each of these 8 regions. Appendix C provides more details on how we determined these 8 regions.

We also stratify based on fast versus slow court stations, since the effects could be different depending on ex-ante court speed. One may expect a large effect of the interventions on slow courts, and possibly a smaller effect on fast courts, which are already more efficient in handling cases. Thus, it will be important to look at heterogenous effects of the One-Pager across fast and slow courts. The proper way to do this is to stratify on initial speed such that the sample is balanced across fast and slow courts. Appendix C provides more details on how we created these indicators of fast or slow courts.

We obtained ethical approval for this project (McGill REB 20-06-027), and filed a pre-analysis plan (AEARCTR-0006228).

### B. Balance Tests

Our analysis below shows that all the dependent variables used in this analysis were balanced before the treatment. Additionally, we access other sources of data available before the experiment to verify balance. We use the 2019 Kenya Continuous Household Survey Programme (KCHSP), the 2013-2017 County GDP data, and the 2015 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KI-HBS) collected by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). To create a mapping between

the court stations and the surveys in which the most disaggregated geographical identifier is at the county level, we calculate the fraction of court stations treated with the One-Pager or One-Pager\_CUC interventions. The treatment and control groups are well balanced for basic socio-demographics (gender, age, years on the job, education, household size), as can be seen in Table D1 in Appendix D. There is also good balance on investment, business creation, access to credit, consumption, and contracting behavior; as shown in Table D2. The treatment and control groups are also well balanced for their county GDP levels (Table D3), or when using the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2015-2016 (Table D4).

## V. Empirical Specification

The main outcome specified in our pre-analysis plan was adjournments. To evaluate the effect on adjournments, we estimate the following specification:

$$Adjournment_{ict} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \sum_{j=-m}^q (\beta_{1j} OnePager_{cj} + \beta_{2j} OnePagerCUC_{cj}) + \beta X_{ict} + \epsilon_{ict}$$

$Adjournment_{ict}$  is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case coming to court ends in an adjournment, 0 otherwise; such that the regression is predicting the average probability that a case will be adjourned. The subscript  $i$  corresponds to each individual court appearance.  $c$  refers to court  $c$  within a court station,  $t$  refers to the time period (a month-year).

$OnePager_{cj}$  is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 in the  $j^{th}$  month after a court first received a One-Pager in February 2019, 0 otherwise. The omitted category is January 2019, the month just before the One-Pagers. The model has  $q$  lags (after the One-Pager) and  $m$  leads (before the One-Pager) to test for parallel pre-trends before the treatment. The coefficients of interest in this specification are the  $\beta_{1j}$  for the  $j$  time period after the sanction.

$OnePagerCUC_{cj}$  is defined similarly for the One-Pager\_CUC intervention.

$X_{ict}$  is a vector of controls which can include: legal representation of the defendant, number of witnesses for the plaintiff or defendant. Moreover, we include detailed case code fixed effects <sup>9</sup> and judges fixed effects.

$\epsilon_{ict}$  is a stochastic error term. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the level of courts.

<sup>9</sup>Case codes are used for administrative purposes to categorize the 42 different types of cases.

## VI. Results

### A. Effect on Adjudgments

The figure below shows the effect on adjournment. Each point in blue represents the different  $\beta_{1j}$ , the treatment effect of the One-Pager intervention in different months. The points in red are the treatment effects for the One-Pager\_CUC intervention.

In February 2019 (month 0 on the graph), there is a statistically significant reduction in adjournments for both interventions. There is a decrease in the next 6 months but the effect is short-lived. Past this initial effect, it is difficult to see a statistically significant reduction in adjournments.

Four more waves of One-Pagers were sent after August 2021: the four dashed lines on the graph. We see a clear reduction in adjournments at this time. We see approximately a 5 percentage point reduction in the probability that a case ends in an adjournment on this graph.


The effect continues even after the One-Pagers are discontinued in August 2022. Thus the effect seems to be sustained over time. While the first wave of One-Pagers in February 2019 had a short-lived effect, sending more waves of One-Pagers over an entire year significantly reduces adjournments in the long-run. This is important for policy recommendation: the One-Pagers need to be sent repeatedly for them to lead to a sustained behavior change and have a lasting effect.

Notice that these effects come from high courts. There is less of an effect on lower-level courts (called magistrate courts in Kenya), as shown in Figure E1 in Appendix E. This is logical since cases at the high court level are more complex and thus more subject to adjournments. Judges may prefer to adjourn due to the complexity of cases, and the involvement of more lawyers and external actors increases the probability of adjournments. In contrast, cases at lower-level courts are simpler and of lesser monetary importance. For example, there are numerous traffic cases. These cases are judged on the spot, oftentimes with no legal representation, and are thus less subject to adjournments. Another explanation for the greater effect in High courts is the lower number of high court judges. Some high courts have only one judge, making the One-Pager a direct measure of individual performance and reducing the possibility of free-riding in these courts.

One potential issue with these results could be that judges may not have changed their behavior at all but simply manipulated the data to reflect fewer adjournments which are now monitored. However, this is unlikely since the data is not entered by judges themselves but by court clerks following public processes. The Kenyan judiciary places a strong emphasis on data quality, with teams of statistical officers regularly conducting back checks and training local court staff on data accuracy, further reducing the likelihood of manipulation.



FIGURE 2. EFFECTS ON ADJOURNMENT



To simplify the presentation of the results, rather than showing one by one all these treatment effects in different months, we aggregate months in the following way. Wave 1 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 in the first 6 months after February 2019. We then define a “Transition” variable, equal to 1 after that and until the start of the second wave. Wave 2 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 after August 2021.

The baseline is 2018 until Jan 2019. To test for pre-trends, the “Pre” period is from 2015 to 2017.

We interact these dummies with the two treatments and present the results below in Table 4.

The main finding is that there is a statistically significant reduction in adjournments in Wave 2 of the One-Pagers. Specifically, there is approximately a 5 percentage points reduction in the probability that the case ends in an adjournment for both interventions, which is consistent with the graphical results.

This is a very large result since this is a nationwide intervention affecting two thirds of the courts in Kenya. During Wave 2, approximately 400,000 cases went to court in the two treatment groups (449,327 cases, to be exact). The probability of a case ending in an adjournment decreased by approximately 5 percentage points, according to the findings. 5 percent of 400,000 cases translates

TABLE 4—EFFECTS ON ADJOURNMENTS IN HC

	(1)
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.059*** (0.021)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.045** (0.020)
One-Pager * Wave 1	-0.00023 (0.012)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.019** (0.0081)
One-Pager * Transition	-0.0061 (0.017)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	-0.0025 (0.017)
One-Pager * Pre	0.031 (0.020)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	0.011 (0.015)
Court FE	Yes
Day FE	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063
SD	0.24
Observations	1984942

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise.

into 20,000 cases that did not end in an adjournment due to the intervention (21,908 cases, to be exact).

The time between two hearings is approximately 3 months (91 days, to be exact). Therefore, avoiding 20,000 adjournments results in a substantial reduction in the time cases spend in court. Specifically, 20,000 adjournments multiplied by 3 months equals 5,000 years less for cases in court (21,908 adjournments multiplied by 91 days equals 5,508 years, to be exact).

The results are robust to the inclusion of different sets of control variables in the model, as shown in Table 5. Column (1) presents the main result from above. Column (2) controls for case code fixed effects.<sup>10</sup> Column (3) includes controls for the complexity of the case (legal representation and number of witness for the plaintiff or defendant). Column (4) includes judges fixed effects.<sup>11</sup> Regardless of the type of controls included, the results remain very similar.

<sup>10</sup>Case codes are used for administrative purposes to categorize the 42 different types of cases.

<sup>11</sup>There are 384 judge fixed effects. To keep all the data, the value of zero is assigned to the cases where the judge id is

TABLE 5—EFFECTS ON ADJOURNMENTS IN HC

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Case code FE	Controls	Judge FE
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.059*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.020)	-0.059*** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.019)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.045** (0.020)	-0.049** (0.018)	-0.045** (0.020)	-0.035* (0.018)
One-Pager * Wave 1	-0.00023 (0.012)	0.0017 (0.011)	-0.00023 (0.012)	-0.00021 (0.012)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.019** (0.0081)	-0.021*** (0.0075)	-0.019** (0.0081)	-0.012 (0.0093)
One-Pager * Transition	-0.0061 (0.017)	-0.0054 (0.017)	-0.0061 (0.017)	-0.0064 (0.016)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	-0.0025 (0.017)	-0.0052 (0.015)	-0.0025 (0.017)	-0.0014 (0.013)
One-Pager * Pre	0.031 (0.020)	0.034 (0.021)	0.031 (0.020)	0.033 (0.022)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	0.011 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.011 (0.015)	0.011 (0.016)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Observations	1984942	1984941	1984942	1984942

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. Column (1) replicates the main result, whereby the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), 42 case code fixed effects are added. In Column (3), the presence of legal representation and number of witness for the plaintiff or defendant is added to the model. In Column (4), 285 judge fixed effects are added.


We do not find any evidence of spillovers. In Appendix F, we collect the GPS data on all courts and calculate the minimum distance of control courts to courts treated with the One-Pager and One-Pager\_CUC. We find no effect of being nearby treated courts. This is to be expected given our method of randomization. Recall that we randomized at the court station level. A court station is a geographic compound that can include a high court and a magistrate court. We did this specifically to minimize spillover effects. Court stations are far from each other (the average minimum distance is 42km), such that it is unlikely that the One-Pager would also have an effect in control courts.

Another way to interpret the magnitude of the effect is to compare with the average proportion of cases ending in an adjournment in the control group at baseline: 6.3 percent. The intervention essentially eradicates adjournments.

missing.

An average probability of adjournment of 6.3 percent in the control group may appear small, but this is because the data includes all stages of cases, including filing or mention which are less adjourned.

We focus now on hearings, which are more likely to be adjourned. Figure 3 below shows a significant effect of the first wave and second wave of One-Pagers.



The results are confirmed in Table 6 which shows a large reduction of adjournments: an 8 percentage point reduction. The average in the control group at baseline is 17 percent, this corresponds to a  $(8/17=)$  47 percent reduction in adjournments.

TABLE 6—EFFECTS ON ADJOURNMENTS OF HEARINGS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Case Stage:			
	Hearing	Filing	Mention	Judgement
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.078** (0.034)	0.00014 (0.0010)	-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.038 (0.040)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.073** (0.033)	0.00094 (0.00075)	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.040 (0.036)
One-Pager * Wave 1	0.011 (0.035)	-0.0011 (0.0011)	-0.027** (0.013)	0.0075 (0.020)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.093*** (0.020)	-0.0031 (0.0025)	-0.018** (0.0074)	-0.021 (0.019)
One-Pager * Transition	0.0082 (0.052)	0.00023 (0.0013)	-0.030** (0.014)	0.015 (0.021)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	0.013 (0.049)	-0.00031 (0.0010)	-0.0059 (0.016)	-0.0070 (0.024)
One-Pager * Pre	0.044 (0.037)	0.0011 (0.0014)	0.018 (0.030)	0.025* (0.014)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	0.052 (0.037)	0.0029* (0.0017)	0.0079 (0.014)	0.018 (0.016)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.18	0.00068	0.031	0.023
SD	0.38	0.026	0.17	0.15
Observations	331217	182657	905293	167689

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to hearings in Column (1), filing of a case in Column (2), mentions (asking for directions from the court) in Column (3), and judgment in Column (4).

### *B. Effect on Adjournments by Cause*

We now disaggregate the effect on adjournment by their cause to understand the mechanisms through which the intervention works. Column (1) of Table 7 shows a clear reduction in adjournments caused by the court. This brings support to the principal-agent model, whereby the agent (the judge) is motivated to work harder by increased monitoring.

The effect of the One-Pager\_CUC intervention is coming from more sources. Similar to the One-Pager intervention, it reduces the number of adjournments by the court in Column (1). It also reduces the adjournments caused by parties not ready or parties not present in Columns (2) and (3). One explanation is the following. The CUC meetings involve the civil society representatives. At the CUC meetings, they receive the One-Pager revealing that some adjournments come from parties not ready or parties not present, despite there being clear guidelines in Kenyan laws to avoid this. In the interest of speedy justice, civil society may put pressure on judges to not grant adjournments in such cases and instead follow the remedies provided by Kenyan law. Judges respond by granting less adjournments in such cases. Furthermore, parties themselves may be less likely to request fewer adjournments due to the increased accountability towards civil society.

There is no effect on adjournments by lawyers in column (4), although the adjournments due to parties not ready or not present can be viewed as being the responsibility of the lawyers. There is also no effect on adjournments due to witnesses in column (5) or police / prosecutors in column (6), but this may be due to the low number of such adjournments in the first place.

TABLE 7—EFFECT ON ADJOURNMENT BY CAUSE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Court	Parties Not Ready	Parties Not Present	Lawyer	Witness	Police Prosecutor
	Cause of Adjourment:					
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.034*** (0.013)	-0.0016 (0.0035)	-0.0042 (0.0035)	-0.0049 (0.0033)	-0.0014 (0.0013)	-0.00032 (0.0013)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.0071* (0.0039)	-0.0064* (0.0033)	-0.0023 (0.0024)	-0.0013 (0.0012)	-0.00025 (0.0011)
One-Pager * Wave 1	-0.0076 (0.0068)	0.0014 (0.0036)	-0.00036 (0.0028)	0.0050* (0.0030)	-0.0024 (0.0020)	0.00066 (0.0014)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.0076 (0.0062)	-0.0099*** (0.0034)	-0.0061** (0.0027)	0.00037 (0.0021)	-0.0030** (0.0015)	-0.00040 (0.00096)
One-Pager * Transition	0.0029 (0.0064)	-0.0014 (0.0035)	-0.0012 (0.0032)	-0.0014 (0.0036)	0.000042 (0.0015)	0.00035 (0.0013)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	-0.0012 (0.0068)	-0.0046 (0.0034)	-0.0041 (0.0026)	0.000044 (0.0022)	-0.00087 (0.00090)	0.00027 (0.00093)
One-Pager * Pre	0.0073 (0.0081)	0.0052 (0.0063)	0.0059 (0.0040)	0.0082* (0.0046)	0.00036 (0.0018)	-0.00036 (0.0014)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	0.0061 (0.0077)	-0.0023 (0.0044)	-0.0013 (0.0037)	0.0067** (0.0030)	0.00025 (0.0021)	0.000036 (0.0010)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.011	0.0044	0.00079
SD	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.066	0.028
Observations	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The next columns are defined similarly, with adjournment due to parties not ready in Column (2), not present in Column (3), lawyers in Column (4), witnesses in Column (5), and police / prosecutor in Column (6).

### *C. Effect on Adjournments by Type of Case*

We now look at the effects on adjournment by the type of case: civil or criminal. Recall that the One-Pager presents separate results for civil and criminal cases (see Figure 1). We find a difference between civil and criminal cases: when we estimate our model linking adjournments to the CCR (see details in Appendix A), we find a larger elasticity for civil cases. This is visible in the One-Pager in Figure 1: in the “recommended action” section, addressing adjournments leads to a much greater effect on the CCR for civil cases. This provides a test for the mechanism: if this section is important, then the effect of the One-Pager should be greater for civil cases.

Table 8 disaggregates the effect for civil cases in Column (1) and criminal cases in Column (2). Consistent with the theory, there is a greater effect for civil cases, confirming the importance of the recommended action section. For the One-Pager\_CUC, there is a similar effect for civil and criminal cases, which can be explained by the fact that the mechanisms are different for the two interventions. For the One-Pager intervention, only judges receive the One-Pagers. They see a stronger link with the CCR for civil cases and respond by exerting greater effort in these cases. The mechanism is different for the One-Pager\_CUC as explained in the previous section: civil society also receives the One-Pagers and may exert pressure on judges to reduce adjournments for all cases, civil or criminal. Therefore, one might expect that the One-Pager\_CUC would have a similar effect on both civil and criminal cases.



TABLE 8—EFFECT ON ADJOURNMENTS BY TYPE OF CASE

	(1)	(2)
	Adjournment	
	Civil	Criminal
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.076*** (0.022)	-0.028 (0.025)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.048** (0.021)	-0.052** (0.025)
One-Pager * Wave 1	0.0015 (0.0094)	-0.0055 (0.020)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.021** (0.0078)	-0.026* (0.013)
One-Pager * Transition	-0.014 (0.015)	0.014 (0.022)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	-0.018 (0.014)	0.0019 (0.023)
One-Pager * Pre	0.029* (0.017)	0.030 (0.042)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	0.0063 (0.014)	0.028 (0.025)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24
Observations	1137776	573770

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to civil cases in Column (1) and criminal cases in Column (2).

#### *D. Effect on Quality*

The One-Pager may have an effect on speed at the detriment of quality. Judges may be closing cases too fast at the expense of making sound decisions. We investigate this in Table 9.

In Column (1) of Table 9 below, the dependent variable is whether the case is an appeal. Appeals are frequently used in the legal literature as a measure of quality. Too many cases appealed reflect poor quality decisions. Column (1) shows no increase in appeals after the One-Pagers.

In Column (2), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in the case being either terminated, dismissed, struck out, or closed; 0 otherwise. There is no significant effect of the interventions on the case being closed.

In Column (3), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in a judgement; 0 otherwise. Judges do not rush to judgement after receiving the One-Pagers.

In Column (4) of Table 9 below, the dependent variable is whether the case ends in a conviction. If cases are closed too early because of a desire to reduce delays, we might expect judges to rush their judgements and convict people too often. There is no effect of either intervention on this dimension either. Notice the smaller sample size since this variable is only defined for criminal cases.

In Column (5), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the case in court ends in remand (i.e., sending back the accused to prison before the judgement); 0 otherwise. Judges do not increase remand after receiving the One-Pagers. In fact, remand seems to decrease, with the effect being slightly significant for One-Pager\_CUC..

Overall, we find no significant evidence of more appeals or that judges close cases fast after receiving the One-Pagers. Thus, we find no evidence of a potential detrimental effect on the quality of judicial decisions.

TABLE 9—EFFECT ON QUALITY

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Appeal	Case Closed	Judgment	Convicted	Remand
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.020 (0.030)	0.0016 (0.024)	0.027 (0.017)	-0.0046 (0.0054)	-0.073 (0.11)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	0.0031 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.038)	-0.0034 (0.016)	-0.00053 (0.0035)	-0.14* (0.080)
One-Pager * Wave 1	0.014 (0.025)	0.016 (0.025)	0.0086 (0.015)	0.0071 (0.0068)	0.079 (0.054)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	0.023 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.030)	0.0045 (0.015)	0.0047 (0.0041)	-0.079 (0.11)
One-Pager * Transition	-0.013 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.024)	0.014 (0.017)	-0.0021 (0.0042)	-0.014 (0.100)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	-0.0094 (0.020)	-0.042 (0.038)	0.013 (0.014)	0.00044 (0.0037)	-0.12 (0.079)
One-Pager * Pre	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.026)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.0030 (0.0052)	0.033 (0.11)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	-0.0063 (0.019)	-0.031 (0.037)	0.024 (0.016)	-0.0043 (0.0033)	-0.031 (0.11)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.21	0.057	0.075	0.016	0.40
SD	0.41	0.23	0.26	0.13	0.49
Observations	1984942	1984942	1984942	573770	573770

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case is an appeal, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in the case being either terminated, dismissed, struck out, or case closed; 0 otherwise. In Column (3), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in a judgement; 0 otherwise. In Column (4), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in a conviction, 0 otherwise. In Column (5), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the case in court ends in remand (i.e., sending back the accused to prison before the judgement); 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to criminal cases for columns (4) and (5).

### *E. Effect on Time to Disposition*

To analyze the effects on time to disposition, the analysis is slightly different from above. The identification strategy is based on the date of filing of the case. Cases filed after the start of Wave 2 are treated by the intervention.

When studying time to disposition, a challenge arises due to the average time to disposition being 2.7 years. Consequently, cases filed in 2022 or 2023 are unlikely to be completed by the end of the data collection period (March 2023). Therefore, we focus on cases filed in the second half of 2021. These cases are treated, and many are resolved by March 2023. We thus interact the treatment dummies with a binary indicator equal to 1 if the case was filed in the second half of 2021 (between August and December 2021). Out of completeness, we also include the interaction of the treatments with indicators for whether the case is filed after 2022, but we do not report these coefficients since most of those cases are not resolved by 2023. The omitted category is cases filed before the first half of 2021.

The results are in Table 10. Cases treated and filed in the second half of 2021 have a lower time to disposition, between 89 days for the One-Pager intervention and 115.2 days for the One-Pager\_CUC intervention, i.e., roughly 3 months. The effect found is much larger than the one implied by the effect on adjournment (5 percent fewer adjournments, each postponing cases by 3 months). This may be due to two reasons. First, a lower probability of adjournment on each hearing has a compounding effect. If hearing 1 is adjourned, there is a greater probability it will go to hearing 2, which is also more adjourned. Thus, a lower probability of adjournment has a greater impact than merely 5 percent of 90 days. Second, there may be other channels than adjournment through which time to disposition is impacted. Judges are also receiving further information on their overall case clearance rate, which might now be more salient to them. Thus, judges may be exerting greater effort overall, in addition to the reduction in adjournments.

Using censoring regression models to account for the fact that we observe time to disposition only for cases that have been resolved, we find similar results as shown in Appendix G.

TABLE 10—EFFECTS ON TIME TO DISPOSITION

	(1) Time to Disposition
One-Pager * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-89.1* (47.8)
One-Pager_CUC * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-115.4*** (42.3)
Court FE	Yes
Day FE	Yes
Control Group mean	992.9
SD	1355.1
Observations	181444

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent. The sample size is smaller since time to disposition is only defined for resolved cases.

#### *F. Effect on Access to Justice*

So far, our results indicate fewer adjournments, with no reduction in quality, and a reduced time to disposition.

In this section, we evaluate the effect of greater court speed on access to justice. If the resolution of cases in courts is faster, people may be more inclined to file cases, increasing the demand for justice services. The broad category of cases at the high courts are: commercial cases, succession, credit cases (called insolvency, bankruptcy, winding up cases), anticorruption and economic crimes, criminal, political (constitutional, election and judicial review cases), and family cases.

The analysis is at the daily level. The dependent variable is the number of cases filed per court per day. Wave 2 is a dummy for Wave 2, after August 2021. We do not examine Wave 1 since the effects on adjournments were due to the brief nature of the intervention (only one wave of One-Pagers was sent). The reference category is two years before the start of Wave 2. The “pre” period, to test for parallel trends, is the time period before that (i.e., before August 2019). Changing the definition of the pre period makes very little difference to the results.

The goal is to see whether there are more cases filed after Wave 2 of the One-Pagers. Column (1) shows that there are more commercial and civil cases filed after Wave 2. While there are 0.61 such cases filed per day per court in the period before the One-Pagers, this goes up by 0.27 and 0.41 in the two treatment groups. This represent a  $(0.27/0.61=)$  44 and 67 per cent increase respectively. This means a greater access to justice for such cases. The pre-trends are no significantly different from zero.

There is also an increase in succession cases in Column (2), which is important for the proper transfer of land and the security of property rights.

There is no effect on credit cases (which include insolvency, bankruptcy, and winding up cases). This tends to show that the channels through which the intervention matters for economic activity are contract enforcement and the security of property rights, more than the credit channel.

There is no effect on anticorruption and economic crimes, yet these cases represent a tiny fraction of all filed cases.

There is an increase in criminal cases in Column (5).

There is no change in political cases (i.e., judicial review, election and constitutional cases) or family cases (child custody, divorce).

Overall, there is an increase in filed cases in Column (8).

One may wonder how people become aware of the One-Pagers such that they file more cases in court. One explanation is the involvement of repeat players: lawyers, firms, prosecutors, or debt

TABLE 11—EFFECTS ON NUMBER OF CASES FILED

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Commercial	Succession	Credit	Anticorruption and Economic Crimes	Criminal	Political	Family	Total
One-Pager * Wave 2	0.27 (0.17)	0.062* (0.032)	-0.039 (0.029)	0.00026 (0.00028)	0.75** (0.37)	-0.0027 (0.073)	-0.022 (0.12)	1.06** (0.46)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	0.41** (0.20)	0.031 (0.038)	0.100 (0.11)	0.0035 (0.0035)	0.17 (0.27)	-0.061 (0.14)	0.66 (0.71)	1.08 (0.77)
One-Pager * Pre	0.12 (0.14)	0.21 (0.16)	-0.012 (0.0089)	0.00020 (0.00022)	0.59 (0.37)	-0.069 (0.079)	-0.0044 (0.097)	0.85* (0.44)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	-0.54 (0.73)	0.72 (0.75)	-0.56 (0.55)	-0.0032 (0.0032)	0.66* (0.35)	-0.026 (0.062)	-0.38 (0.47)	0.89 (0.61)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.61	0.28	0.0049	0	0.99	0.11	0.033	2.01
SD	2.36	1.85	0.083	0	5.05	0.52	0.22	6.18
Observations	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of commercial cases filed per day per court. The other columns are defined similarly with the number of cases filed per day per court for succession cases in Column (2), credit cases (insolvency, bankruptcy, and winding up cases) in Column (3), anticorruption and economic crimes in Column (4), criminal cases in Column (5), political cases (i.e., judicial review, election and constitutional cases) in Column (6) and family cases (child custody, divorce) in Column (7). Column (8) is the total number of cases filed per court per day.

collection agencies who frequently engage with the court system and are well-informed about its workings. This could be especially true in the One-Pager\_CUC intervention where these courts actors may be involved in the CUC meetings, where the One-Pagers are openly discussed.

We test this in Table 12 below. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation: there are more such cases with both interventions, especially so for the One-Pager\_CUC intervention. This confirms that more cases are filed by these repeat players who know more about the state of courts.

Next, we turn to firms as other repeat players. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed by organizations: there are more such cases filed with both interventions, especially so for the One-Pager\_CUC intervention.

Regarding prosecutors, Column (5) of the previous table already documented an increase in criminal cases, which are filed by prosecutors.

Overall, we observe an increase in the number of cases filed by repeat players such as lawyers, firms, and prosecutors. These repeat players are more familiar with the One-Pagers and the resulting increase in court speed, and file more cases.

TABLE 12—EFFECTS ON NUMBER OF CASES FILED BY REPEAT PLAYERS

	(1)	(2)
	Filed with Legal Representation	Filed by Organizations
One-Pager * Wave 2	0.63 (0.41)	1.03 (0.65)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	2.24** (0.90)	2.06* (1.08)
One-Pager * Pre	0.57*** (0.21)	0.37 (0.53)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	-1.00 (0.92)	0.43 (0.52)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	1.16	1.31
SD	3.63	5.22
Observations	62883	62883

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed by organizations.

One may be concerned that an increased number of filed cases will clog the courts and negate the beneficial effects on speed. Table 13 below shows that the increase in cases filed is matched by an



increased number of resolved cases in Column (1). The CCR (the ratio of cases resolved over cases filed) even increases slightly, albeit not significantly so in Column (2). Thus the increased supply of cases is matched by an increased capacity of the judiciary to resolve cases such that there is no accumulation of backlog.

TABLE 13—EFFECTS ON NUMBER OF CASES RESOLVED

	(1) Number Resolved Cases	(2) CCR
One-Pager * Wave 2	0.85** (0.42)	16.6 (15.2)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	0.90* (0.46)	10.6 (9.06)
One-Pager * Pre	0.76 (0.47)	0.0086 (26.7)
One-Pager_CUC * Pre	1.78* (1.04)	47.0 (34.2)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	3.73	215.8
SD	12.5	820.6
Observations	62883	44412

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases resolved per day per court. In column (2), the dependent variable is the CCR (the ratio of cases resolved over cases filed times 100). The sample size is smaller since some courts have zero cases filed in the day.

### G. Effect on Trust in Courts

In this section, we test the mechanism of an increase in cases filed in court by looking at trust in courts, a variable specified in our pre-analysis plan.<sup>12</sup> We use the Afrobarometer surveys, which contain the following question: “How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?”. This question is only asked to respondents who are knowledgeable about the courts, as there is an option to answer “haven’t heard enough to say.” We exclude all such responses from our analysis. The rest of the answers are coded on a 3 point scale (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot), which we rescale on a 0-100 scale, such that the variables can be interpreted as an approval rating of courts on a 0-100 scale.

The data’s most disaggregated geographical variable is at the county level. We therefore calculate the fraction of treated court stations per county. For example, the county of Mombasa has 5 court stations, two of which received the One-Pagers; a fraction of  $(2/5=)$  0.4. This fraction varies between 0 and 1, such that there are some counties with no court stations receiving One-Pagers and other counties where all court stations receive One-Pagers. This is a measure of the intensity of the treatment per county. We calculate the same fraction for the One-Pager\_CUC intervention.

We interact this variable with a dummy variable “Wave 2”, equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. While this round of data would have been preferably collected after the 4 waves of One-Pagers ending in August 2022, it is at least collected after the start of Wave 2 in August 2021. The results might be even greater with future rounds of data available.

We also interact this variable with a dummy variable “Wave 1”, equal to 1 in the previous round (round 8) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019, after February 2019 (Wave 1 of the One-Pagers). This round of data is thus measuring the impact of the first wave of One-Pagers.

The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014.<sup>13</sup> To test for pre-trends, we use the round 5, collected in 2011.<sup>14</sup> We called this period “Before” in our regressions.

The results are displayed in Table 14. The average of the variable Trust in Courts is 56 percent in the sample, indicating that 57 percent of the knowledgeable respondents have a positive view of

<sup>12</sup>In our pre-analysis plan, we had specified that if another round of the “Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey” would become available, we would look at: investment, business creation, access to credit, consumption; and if another round of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys would become available, we would look at: contracting behavior, trust in courts, courts as obstacles to business. To date, only the Afrobarometer survey is available post-Wave2. Therefore we use the Afrobarometer and its question on “Trust in courts”, specified in our pre-analysis plan.

<sup>13</sup>Round 7 does not have any county-level data, only provincial level data, too coarse to define a treatment variable at that level. We use the geocoded data available for rounds 6 and below, which includes county identifiers. For rounds 8 and 9, there is no geocoded data available, but the county identifier is present in the data.

<sup>14</sup>Previous rounds of data cannot be used since the variables change and some variables used in the analysis become unavailable or change wording, such that it is preferable to work with rounds 5 and above.

the courts. This figure increases by almost 10 percentage points after the One-Pagers in Wave 2, a sizeable and significant effect. This represents a  $(9.99/55.78=)$  18 percent increase in the trust in courts. This is consistent with the effects found in Acemoglu et al. (2020), where they also find an 18 percent increase in the trust in courts after informing people of a reform that will likely increase the speed of courts. Notice that the effect of the One-Pager\_CUC is slightly smaller, but no significantly different from the effect of the One-Pager intervention. The effect is smaller in Wave 1 (after sending only one wave of One-Pagers).

There are no pre-trends in the “Before” period. The coefficient of One-Pager in the before period is large (7.41), however it is showing the opposite of a positive pre-trend: trust in courts was higher in the period “Before” (in 2011) than in the baseline period (in 2014). Thus, it is not the case that the areas treated were on a positive pre-trend (which may have continued post-treatment and confounded the effect of the reform), they were on a negative pre-trend. In any case, the coefficient of “One-Pager \* Before” is not significantly different from zero.

To evaluate this further, we present in Appendix H the effect on trust in other state institutions, such as the president, parliament, local government, the police and the army. We find no effect of the One-Pagers for any other institutions, as expected.

Despite the fact that this question is only asked to people knowledgeable with the court system, one may wonder how people obtain their information on the One-Pagers and the resulting increase in court speed. We thus follow the same analysis as above and identify in the data repeat users of courts.

We start by identifying in the dataset occupations more likely to know about the courts: lawyers, police, farmers (because of the prevalent land conflicts and the process of succession which must be completed in court Aberra and Chemin (2021) and Aberra and Chemin (2023)), and shop owners. We first verify that such occupations have more contact with courts in Table I1 in Appendix I by using two rounds of data (collected before Wave 2) which contain a question on contact with courts. We find that these occupations are indeed more likely to go to court than other occupations (such as unskilled or skilled workers, student, housewife, domestic worker). We thus split the sample into two: those occupations more likely to go to court because of their particular jobs, and the other occupations.

The results are shown in Table 15 below. Column (1) shows a larger effect for occupations more likely to come to court and therefore more cognizant about the inner workings of courts than for other occupations in Column (2). These results show that the results are especially strong for these job categories more knowledgeable about the courts due to their professional activity. Notice that the

TABLE 14—EFFECT ON TRUST IN COURTS

	(1)
	Trust courts
One-Pager * Wave 2	9.99* (5.34)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	4.41 (5.02)
One-Pager * Wave 1	4.45 (5.89)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	1.33 (6.42)
One-Pager * Before	7.41 (6.69)
One-Pager_CUC * Before	1.94 (6.19)
Observations	9,315
County fixed effects	YES
Time FE	YES
Mean control group	55.78
SD control group	31.16

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: “How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering “haven’t heard enough to say” are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale.

The variable “One-Pager” is the fraction of court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. “One-Pager\_CUC” is defined similarly. The variable “Wave 2” is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable “Wave 1” is a dummy equal to 1 in the previous round (round 8) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable “Before” is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011.

coefficients for “One-Pager \* Before” and “One-Pager\_CUC \* Before” cannot be estimated because the variable on occupation is missing in the round Before (round 5). All respondents are assigned to the group “Other Occupations” in Column (2), such that the coefficient can be estimated there, but there cannot be a parallel pre-trends test for this occupation variable.

The rest of the columns repeat the analysis with education, persons living in cities, and gender. We find that more educated people (with a secondary education), persons living in cities, and males have more contact with courts, as shown in Table II in Appendix I. These respondents are more cognizant with courts and their trust in courts increase more after the One-Pagers as shown in Columns (3), (5), and (7).

The ethnic group can also be used to predict greater contact with courts. We use an insight uncovered by a recent empirical literature on judiciaries: some ethnic groups have better access to

courts because of their political connections to the co-ethnic executive that capture local judiciaries by nepotism (Behrer et al., 2021; Sanchez De La Sierra, 2021). In Appendix I, we use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset collected by Vogt et al. (2015) to classify each ethnic group into being connected to executive power (called a “senior partner” or “junior partner” in government in the EPR dataset), or unconnected (called “powerless” or “discriminated” according to the EPR dataset). We verify that connected ethnic groups have more contact in courts in Table I1 in Appendix I. Column (9) shows that connected ethnic groups with more contact to courts and therefore more information about the courts experience an increase in trust with courts, more so than for unconnected groups in Column (10) who have less information about the courts.

Overall, the conclusion from this table is that individuals with more knowledge about the courts experience an increase in the trust with courts after the One-Pagers.

We also use these results to build a prediction index of contact with courts. We predict for each individual in the database their likelihood to contact courts, based on their occupation, education, presence in cities, gender, connectedness of their ethnic group. Appendix I shows that each of these variables is significantly associated with contact with courts. We classify each respondent as a likely court user or not, depending being above or below the median of this index. In Column (11), we find that it is the trust of these likely court users which increases, more so than for not likely court users in Column (12).

Overall, we find that trust in courts increases, especially so for those with greater contact and therefore more knowledge of courts.

TABLE 15—EFFECT ON TRUST IN COURTS BY CATEGORIES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Occup.	Other	Secondary	Primary	Urban	Rural	Male	Fem.	Connected	Unconn.	Likely	Not Likely
	Contact Courts	Occup.	Educ.	Educ.							user	user
One-Pager * Wave 2	13.79** (6.49)	8.02 (5.40)	13.85** (5.98)	9.22 (6.70)	13.70** (5.86)	10.46* (6.12)	15.00** (6.16)	5.68 (5.81)	8.90 (5.75)	0.68 (6.21)	16.37** (6.35)	4.67 (6.55)
One-Pager-CUC * Wave 2	3.25 (9.83)	6.46 (4.43)	4.00 (5.70)	5.46 (6.67)	6.74 (5.44)	2.86 (6.69)	4.75 (5.69)	4.68 (5.99)	0.00 (6.68)	-4.41 (7.59)	3.28 (5.65)	5.31 (7.04)
One-Pager * Wave 1	11.02 (7.70)	0.90 (6.05)	8.72 (5.91)	2.71 (6.86)	6.44 (6.85)	4.19 (6.44)	2.70 (7.14)	6.42 (6.94)	0.91 (5.95)	-2.71 (4.88)	4.94 (6.66)	3.48 (6.43)
One-Pager-CUC * Wave 1	-4.20 (8.60)	2.21 (5.91)	1.52 (7.06)	2.85 (7.35)	4.29 (7.40)	1.04 (7.58)	-3.01 (6.92)	5.76 (7.74)	-0.28 (6.28)	-10.17 (6.97)	-1.86 (6.82)	4.98 (7.27)
One-Pager * Before		7.68 (6.98)	13.51* (6.99)	3.04 (7.21)	12.37 (10.04)	6.37 (6.72)	9.80 (6.26)	6.64 (8.66)	9.42 (7.28)	-3.82 (6.50)	9.34 (7.60)	6.37 (7.25)
One-Pager-CUC * Before		3.91 (6.06)	6.70 (7.43)	-0.10 (6.91)	2.89 (9.13)	-0.97 (6.36)	-0.91 (6.44)	5.24 (6.91)	3.13 (6.60)	-9.21 (5.49)	-1.79 (7.29)	5.93 (6.87)
Observations	2,273	7,002	4,269	5,006	3,396	5,879	4,703	4,572	6,443	2,832	4,791	4,484
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean control group	57.49	54.92	54.23	56.99	52.43	57.77	55.06	56.54	55.45	58.54	54.50	57.62
SD control group	31.06	31.19	30.16	31.90	31.08	31.06	31.11	31.22	31.32	29.77	31	31.33

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level. \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot); People answering "haven't heard enough to say" are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. "One-Pager-CUC" is defined similarly. The variable "Wave 2" is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable "Wave 1" is a dummy equal to 1 in the previous round (round 8) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable "Before" is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011. In Column (1), the sample is restricted to occupations in greater contact with courts. In Column (2), the sample is restricted to all other occupations. In Column (3), the sample is restricted to respondents with secondary education or more. In Column (4), the sample is restricted to respondents with primary education or less. In Column (5), the sample is restricted to respondents living in urban settings. In Column (6), the sample is restricted to respondents living in rural settings. In Column (7), the sample is restricted to males. In Column (8), the sample is restricted to females. In Column (9), the sample is restricted to connected ethnic groups. In Column (10), the sample is restricted to unconnected ethnic groups. In Column (11), the sample is restricted to respondents scoring above the median of the prediction index of contact with courts. In Column (12), the sample is restricted to respondents scoring below the median of that index.

## VII. Conclusion

This paper presents results from the first randomized nationwide experiment addressing delays in courts. Across the world, practitioners and legal experts have identified unnecessary and excessive adjournments as a major source of delay. When judges face no incentives to reduce them, they may not come to court and instead postpone cases to the next available date. Lawyers can request adjournments to strategically delay cases and increase their fee. Judges may grant them since they face little pressure to reduce adjournments. Legal experts have argued that excessive adjournments can not only reduce the speed of courts but decrease the quality of proceedings, as litigants become discouraged, files get lost and witnesses may disappear. This global issue significantly hampers court efficiency and diminishes the overall demand for judicial services.

Our research project is the first, to our knowledge, to conduct a randomized experiment aiming to address this critical issue. Leveraging administrative court data, we identify that the majority of cases encounter adjournments, each postponing proceedings by an average of three months. Our intervention employs a simple and cost-effective solution: displaying adjournment information on visually appealing One-Pager documents, including the top three reasons for adjournments, which are then distributed back to the respective courts. This initiative serves as a clear signal that such behavior is now under scrutiny. In an additional treatment arm, these One-Pagers are distributed to both courts and Court User Committees (CUCs), which bring together court actors and other civil society representatives, promoting bottom-up accountability.

The results demonstrate a substantial reduction in adjournments through this straightforward intervention. The probability of a hearing being adjourned decreases from 20 to 10 percent, resulting in a nationwide saving of 20,000 adjournments. Given the average delay caused by each adjournment, this translates into a substantial saving of 5,000 years of waiting time as a result of the intervention.

The One-Pager intervention reduces adjournments caused by the judge not being present, which underscores the significance of top-down monitoring. The One-Pager\_CUC intervention exhibits additional benefits in reducing adjournments by other court actors, which may be explained by bottom-up accountability to civil society represented in the CUC. Both translate into an even greater reduction in the time to disposition of judicial cases.

The decline in adjournments results in a surge in the demand for justice, as evidenced by an increase in case filings. This shift signifies public acknowledgment and appreciation for the positive changes in the court system. We find more commercial cases (contract enforcement) and succession cases (security of property rights) filed. The mechanism goes through increased trust in courts.

An avenue of future research will be to investigate whether this will translate into a change in contracting behavior, more investment and economic development.

In conclusion, our study provides valuable insights into the benefits of leveraging technology and accountability in the judicial system. As countries around the world face similar challenges in court delays and backlogs, the findings of our study offer a promising pathway towards achieving more efficient and effective justice systems, and highlight the need for continued investments in technology and data-driven solutions to enhance court performance globally.

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# ONLINE APPENDIX (Not For Publication)

## APPENDIX A: MODEL IN THE ONE-PAGER

We use the DCRT data to measure the link between adjournments and court performance. We use the following specification:

$$CCR_{cm} = \beta_0 + \beta_{adj}Adj_{cm} + \alpha_c + \delta_m + \varepsilon_{cm} \quad (1)$$

where  $c$  is for court  $c$ ,  $m$  for month  $m$ ,  $CCR_{cm}$  is the CCR of court  $c$  in month  $m$ ,  $Adj_{cm}$  is the proportion of cases seen in the month ending with an adjournment,  $\alpha_c$  court fixed effects,  $\delta_m$  month-year fixed effects, and  $\varepsilon_c$  is the disturbance term.

We estimate this relationship separately for civil and criminal cases. Based on data on and before 2018, we find a statistically significant coefficient  $\beta_{adj}$  of -5 for civil cases (and -1 for criminal cases), i.e., a 1 percentage point reduction in the proportion of adjourned cases would result in a 5 percentage point increase in the case clearance rate. The logic is simple: if there are less adjournments, more cases get resolved, which increases the CCR.

These estimates are quantitatively large since the average proportion of cases ending with an adjournment is 14 percent, and the average clearance rate is M=94 (SD=64). Thus reducing adjournments from 14 to 0 percent, i.e. eradicating adjournments, would be associated with a [14\*5=] 70 percentage point increase in the clearance rate.

We use the estimate  $\beta_{adj}$  obtained above to predict the impact on CCR of reducing adjournments. We take the absolute value since  $\beta_{adj}$  is negative (more adjournments mean less CCR). One can then simply predict the impact on CCR if the top reason for adjournments was reduced from their current level in month  $m$  (i.e.,  $AdjTop1_{cm}$ ) to zero with the formula:

$$PredictionCCR_{cm}AdjTop1 = |\beta_{adj}| \times AdjTop1_{cm}$$

The interpretation is: a reduction in the top reason for adjournment from current levels (i.e.,  $AdjTop1_{cm}$ ) to zero is associated with an increase in CCR by  $PredictionCCR_{cm}AdjTop1$ . After extensive piloting with officials in the Kenyan judiciary and judges, this sentence was judged slightly difficult to understand and simplified to: “Addressing [the top reason for adjournment] increases CCR by [ $PredictionCCR_{cm}AdjTop1$ ]”. This sentence is added on the One-Pager (see Figure 1

for an example). We predict the impact on CCR if the top three reasons of adjournments were addressed. These three sentences constitute the actionable information presented to the judge or to the judge and the public.

#### APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF JUSTICE

Here is the full text of instructions from the Chief Justice accompanying the One-Pager\_CUC. The text for the other intervention One-Pager is the same except for the paragraph mentioning the CUC meetings.

FIGURE B1. INSTRUCTIONS BY CHIEF JUSTICE





FIGURE B2. INSTRUCTIONS BY CHIEF JUSTICE



## APPENDIX C: SAMPLING FOR EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

To achieve balance, we stratify on geographical variables and on a slow/fast court dummy.

For the geographical variables, we established a list of 8 regions that do not correspond exactly to the official regions but that make sense distance-wise to organize potential future regional meetings to debrief court stations about the interventions. For example, Thika court is in Central province but it is easier and cheaper for them to travel to Nairobi for the meeting. Therefore, Thika was classified in Nairobi, not Central.

We also stratify on a slow/fast court dummy. To build this dummy, we use average time to disposition at the station level. We compute the median of time to disposition, and define a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the court station is above the median time to disposition, 0 otherwise.

We then stratify on 1) regions, and 2) time to disposition. This means creating 8 (regions)\*2 (above median time to disposition, i.e., slow stations, or below median time to disposition, i.e., fast stations) = 16 strata of court stations. Within each strata, we then split the court stations into three groups: control, “One-Pager” and “One-Pager + CUC”. This produces a sampling plan with 41 stations in the control group, 41 in the “One-Pager”, and 41 in the “One-Pager + CUC”.<sup>15</sup>

This procedure ensures that the treatment is balanced on time to disposition. In fact, one can regress time to disposition on control, “One-Pager” and “One-Pager + CUC”, and we find a t-statistic of -0.38 and -0.29 respectively.

This technique does not ensure that the treatment and control groups will be balanced on other variables. To check this, we regress treatment on four other variables: number of cases filed at the station level, number of adjournments civil, number of adjournment criminal, and due process.<sup>16</sup> The number of cases filed at the station level is a proxy for court size. Ideally, one would like to have a balance of small and big courts in each treatment group. The number of adjournments is an important intermediate variable in this project since the One-Pager aims at reducing adjournments. Finally, due process will be an important outcome of this project since one would expect the One-Pagers to increase speed, but not at the detriment of due process.

<sup>15</sup>The size of the strata can vary: for example, strata1 has 8 stations. The issue is that 8 cannot be neatly divided by 3 (for Control/One-Pager/One-Pager\_CUC). The sampling plan starts by assigning 2 stations to control, 3 to “One-Pager”, and 3 in the “One-Pager + CUC”. To make sure that the control group does not always get less stations, we rotated the order of the treatments. This achieves a 44/40/39 split. We then randomly select three stations from the Control group and assign one of them to One-Pager, and two of them to One-Pager\_CUC. This ensures a 41/41/41 split. All of this is done randomly, such that balance is achieved in the end.

<sup>16</sup>To get an estimate of due process, we used the 2017 Court User Satisfaction Survey and calculated the average of answers to the section “court room experience”. Question 19.1 The judge/magistrate was courteous 19.2 My matter took the time I was expecting 19.3 The judge/magistrate listened and led the hearing well 19.4 My matter was started in time 19.5 The judge/magistrate made decision in a timely manner 19.6 The judge/magistrate was neutral in his/her decision. Average: 70%, as in “COURT USER SATISFACTION SURVEY, REPORT BY PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, JUNE, 2017”

The maximum t-statistic across all these variables is 1.84.

To achieve even better balance, this process can be repeated by rerandomizing: we draw 10,000 allocations to treatment and control, and chose the one that shows best balance on the observable variables. In that winning iteration, the “minimum maximum” t-stat is 0.57.

In particular, this plan achieves balance on the number of cases filed per station. When regressing number of cases filed per station on control, “One-Pager” and “One-Pager + CUC”, we find a t-statistic of 0.15 and 0.32 respectively.

## APPENDIX D: BALANCE TESTS

### D1. Balance Test in the KCHSP

We use the Kenya Continuous Household Survey Programme (KCHSP). The continuous data collection was implemented all throughout 2019 by the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) which allows us to look at the effects of the intervention before and after the treatment. This data is a representative sample of Kenya. It includes individual-level data with basic sociodemographic, a labor force survey with measures of entrepreneurship, investment and access to credit, as well as some variables on contracting behavior.

We present a balance test focusing on the first quarter of 2019. We regress the outcome on the variable  $FracOnePager_c$  which is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers.<sup>17</sup> For example, the county of Mombasa has 5 court stations, two of which received the One-Pagers; a fraction of  $(2/5=)$  0.4. This fraction varies between 0 and 1, such that there are some counties with no court stations receiving One-Pagers and other counties where all court stations receive One-Pagers.

Table D1 below restricts the sample to quarter 1, and simply regresses the outcome on  $FracOnePager_c$  and  $FracOnePagerCUC_c$ .<sup>18</sup>

In Column (1), the constant term shows that 50 percent of the individuals are male in the counties with no treated court stations.<sup>19</sup> This proportion is not significantly different in counties with more treated courts, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients of  $FracOnePager_c$  and  $FracOnePagerCUC_c$ . Thus, the sample is well balanced across treatment and control groups as far as this variable is concerned.

The average age is 25 years old, number of years on the job is 8.5 years (for those with a job), 49 percent of the sample went to primary school, 20 percent went to secondary school, and the average household size is 3.3. The proportion of the sample with primary education is slightly lower for the treatment arm One-Pagers, but not for the other treatment arm of One-Pagers sent to CUC.

<sup>17</sup>The KCHSP data's most disaggregated geographical variable is at the county level.

<sup>18</sup>We cannot include the stratification dummies in these regressions (the 8 region dummies and the Slow/Fast dummy) since these stratification variables are defined at the court level, whereas the KCHSP is at the individual level, with county being the most disaggregated geographical variable. For the 8 region dummies, the Kenyan judiciary established their own list at the court level that does not correspond exactly to the official counties but that make sense distance-wise to organize potential future regional meetings to debrief court stations about the interventions. For example, Thika court is in Central province but it is easier and cheaper for them to travel to Nairobi for the meeting. Therefore, Thika was classified in the Nairobi region, not Central. Thus, there is no exact correspondence between an individual living in a certain county and the region created by the Kenyan judiciary. The Slow/Fast dummy is similarly defined at the court level, it is thus impossible to assign a specific individual to a Slow/Fast dummy since one does not know exactly which the individual would file a case were he to do so.

<sup>19</sup>In this table, we display the constant term and not the mean dependent variable as in all other tables since they are the same in this particular table. There are no variables in this model other than  $FracOnePager_c$  and  $FracOnePagerCUC_c$ , therefore the constant term is also the mean of the dependent variable in the control group.



TABLE D1—BALANCE TEST (QUARTER 1 OF 2019)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gender	Age	Years on Job	Primary	Secondary	HH Size
FracOne-Pager	-0.02 (0.01)	-1.59 (1.59)	0.37 (1.63)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.22 (0.31)
FracOne-Pager_CUC	0.00 (0.01)	-0.06 (1.40)	0.81 (1.49)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.15 (0.28)
Constant	0.50*** (0.01)	24.89*** (1.02)	8.46*** (0.93)	0.49*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	3.30*** (0.17)
Observations	22,732	22,732	5,409	22,732	22,732	22,732

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the county. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, \*\* Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1) the dependent variable is gender, a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for males, 0 for males. The variable “FracOne-Pager” is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers. In Column (2), the dependent variable is age in years. In Column (3), the dependent variable is the number of years on the job. In Column (4), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has completed any years of primary school, 0 otherwise. In Column (5), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has completed any years of secondary school, 0 otherwise. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the size of the household.

Table D2 below shows the balance test with the following economic outcomes: investment (purchase of farm inputs for crop production in Column (1) and income from self employment in Column (2)), business creation (applications to permit to start businesses in Column (3) and transitions to entrepreneurship in Column (4)), access to credit (applied for a loan from a bank to look for a job or start any kind of business/income generating activity in Column (5)), contracting behavior (written labor contract in Column (6)), and wage in Column (7)).

All the coefficients are not statistically significant, except for contract for the One-Pager intervention, significant at the 10 percent level. (but not for the One-Pager sent to CUC intervention). Getting one significant coefficient out of 14 in this table (7 outcomes \* 2 interventions) is expected at the 10 percent level.

TABLE D2—BALANCE TEST WITH ECONOMIC OUTCOMES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Agri. Inv.	Income Self Emp.	Permit Business	Transition Entrepreneur	Applied Loan	Contract	No PAP Wage
FracOne-Pager	0.01 (0.01)	-23.51 (31.77)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.04* (0.02)	-19.31 (37.94)
FracOne-PagerCUC	0.01 (0.01)	25.96 (52.84)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.04)	-28.83 (43.87)
Constant	0.00 (0.00)	260.12*** (25.04)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.14*** (0.01)	263.06*** (26.51)
Observations	22,732	5,456	11,465	19,504	11,465	8,271	2,154

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the county. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, \*\* Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the answer to the question: “Did the household purchase farm inputs for crop production during the last month (Yes/No)”. This question is asked for each and every crop produced. The dependent variable is the sum of all answers at the household level. Results are similar if we take a dummy taking the value 1 if the household answers yes for any crop produced by the household, 0 otherwise. The variable “FracOne-Pager” is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers. The variable “Post” is equal to 1 in the quarters 2, 3, and 4, and equal to 0 in quarter 1. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the earnings after expenses for both worker employers and own account workers, otherwise called income from self-employment in the dataset. In Column (3), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answered: “Applied for permit to start business” to the question: “In the past 4 weeks what actions has ... taken to look for a job or start any kind of business/income generating activity? rank the three main ones”. This question is only asked to unemployed persons and persons not in the labour force. In Column (4), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual is a working employer or an own-account worker, 0 otherwise, conditional on being a year ago employed, unemployed, student, housewife, retired, family worker, incapacitated, discouraged worker. In Column (5), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answered: “Applied for a loan from a bank” to the question: “In the past 4 weeks what actions has ... taken to look for a job or start any kind of business/income generating activity?”. In Column (6), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answers “a written contract” to the question “Is ... employed on the basis of”. Other answers are verbal agreement, implied contract, no contract. In Column (7), the dependent variable is payment for wages and gross salary in the last one month, trimmed at the 5 percent level.

D2. Balance Test With County GDP

Table D3 below shows the balance test using County GDP collected between 2013 and 2017 by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (all figures are in Million USD PPP). There is no significant association between county GDP and the fraction of court stations treated with either the One-Pager or the One-Pager\_CUC.

TABLE D3—BALANCE TEST WITH COUNTY GDP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	CGDP2013	CGDP2014	CGDP2015	CGDP2016	CGDP2017
Frac. One-Pager	-466.66 (448.76)	-493.80 (515.86)	-557.23 (623.72)	-473.94 (753.35)	-476.21 (886.56)
Frac. One-Pager_CUC	857.06 (1,783.93)	977.13 (1,973.39)	994.50 (2,190.73)	1,150.76 (2,460.23)	1,189.46 (2,667.47)
Observations	47	47	47	47	47
Mean control group	2062	2062	2062	2062	2062
SD control group	3298	3658	4083	4618	5038

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, \*\* Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the 2013 county GDP, expressed in Million USD PPP. The variable “One-Pager” is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers.

D3. Balance Test With KIHBS

This section presents the balance test using the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2015-2016. Column (1) of Table D4 shows a regression of gender (1 for males, 0 for females) on the fraction of court stations in the county treated with the One-Pager or One-Pager\_CUC. There is no significant association there. Columns (2), (3), and (4) show no significant relationship between age, highest grade completed and wage in 2015.

TABLE D4—BALANCE TEST WITH KIHBS


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gender	Age	Highest Grade Completed	Wage
Frac. One-Pager	0.01 (0.01)	-1.75 (1.52)	-0.10 (0.13)	-18.26 (27.01)
Frac. One-Pager_CUC	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.98 (1.41)	-0.11 (0.09)	51.98 (40.48)
Observations	92,846	92,846	69,353	38,681
Mean Dep Var	0.494	23.50	4.144	174.9
SD	0.500	30.76	2.352	394.3

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, \*\* Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1) the dependent variable is gender, a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for males, 0 for males. In Column (2), the dependent variable is age in years. In Column (3), the dependent variable is equal to the highest grade completed. In Column (4), the dependent variable is the wage, defined as the basic salary in last month. The variable “Frac. One-Pager” is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers.

APPENDIX E: EFFECTS ON ADJOURNMENT IN MAGISTRATE COURTS

The effect is lower in Magistrate Courts.

FIGURE E1. EFFECTS ON ADJOURNMENT IN MC



## APPENDIX F: SPILLOVERS

In Table F1, we test for the presence of spillovers. To do so, we focus on the control group. We use the GPS data collected on all courts. For each court in the control group, we calculate the minimum distance to the nearest court treated by the One-Pager. We also calculate the minimum distance to the nearest court treated by the One-Pager\_CUC. Spillovers may be different between the two interventions since more people are aware of the intervention in the One-Pager\_CUC, therefore spillovers may be stronger for that intervention.

We then regress the main outcome, i.e., adjournment on this minimum distance, interacted with all the time periods considered. The intuition is that the closest a control court is situated to a treated court, the more likely a control group might be affected by the intervention.

We find no evidence of this in the data. In Column (1), we find no effect of being nearby treated courts.

This is due to our method of randomization. Recall that we randomized at the court station level. A court station is a geographic compound that can include a high court and a magistrate court. We did specifically to minimize spillover effects. Court stations can be far from each other. The average minimum distance for control courts to courts treated with the One-Pager is 42km (41km for One-Pager\_CUC). We conclude it is unlikely that the One-Pager would have effects in control courts also.

TABLE F1—SPILLOVERS

	(1) Adjournment
Min Distance to One-Pager * Wave 2	0.015 (0.026)
Min Distance to One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.014 (0.026)
Min Distance to One-Pager * Wave 1	-0.0053 (0.0094)
Min Distance to One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	0.0051 (0.0092)
Min Distance to One-Pager * Transition	-0.019 (0.022)
Min Distance to One-Pager_CUC * Transition	0.018 (0.022)
Min Distance to One-Pager * Pre	-0.0046 (0.013)
Min Distance to One-Pager_CUC * Pre	0.0045 (0.012)
Court FE	Yes
Day FE	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063
SD	0.24
Observations	308424

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The variable “Min Distance to One-Pager” is the minimum distance to the nearest court treated by the One-Pager.

APPENDIX G: CENSORING MODEL

In the table below, we use a censoring model accounting for the fact that we observe time to disposition only for cases that have been resolved. We use a tobit model with an upper limit at 635 days, since cases filed in August 2021 but not resolved by March 2023 have been in the system for that period of time. Table G1 shows the same decrease in time to disposition.

TABLE G1—CENSORING MODEL

	(1) Time to Disposition
One-Pager * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-51.1* (30.5)
One-Pager_CUC * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-72.1*** (26.1)
Court FE	Yes
Day FE	Yes
Control Group mean	992.9
SD	1355.1
Observations	181449

*Note:* Tobit model with an upper limit at 635 days. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent.



APPENDIX H: TRUST IN OTHER STATE INSTITUTIONS

In Table H1, we look at the effects on trust in other state institutions. The One-Pagers have an effect on trust in courts, but no effect on trust in other state institutions, such as the president in Column (2), parliament in Column (3), the local government in Column (4), the police in Column (5) or the army in Column (6).

TABLE H1—EFFECT ON TRUST IN OTHER STATE INSTITUTIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Trust	Trust	Trust	Trust	Trust	Trust
	Courts	President	Parliament	Local Government	Police	Army
One-Pager * Wave 2	9.99* (5.34)	2.12 (9.52)	1.91 (6.72)	7.55 (8.02)	0.22 (5.20)	3.45 (4.13)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	4.41 (5.02)	-11.54 (9.26)	-6.91 (5.38)	-0.02 (4.81)	-5.88 (4.11)	-0.79 (5.05)
One-Pager * Wave 1	4.45 (5.89)	0.44 (6.12)	-0.48 (4.67)	5.53 (5.55)	-0.24 (6.13)	2.60 (5.51)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	1.33 (6.42)	-7.77 (6.82)	-11.34** (5.02)	0.30 (6.06)	-9.12 (6.50)	-0.46 (6.06)
One-Pager * Before	7.41 (6.69)	7.25 (9.41)	6.95 (7.20)	10.20 (7.61)	3.03 (6.03)	5.43 (5.19)
One-Pager_CUC * Before	1.94 (6.19)	-7.75 (9.28)	-2.04 (6.81)	6.08 (6.81)	-1.52 (6.33)	-2.39 (5.35)
Observations	9,315	9,472	9,357	9,320	9,534	9,253
County fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean control group	55.78	68.01	52.20	50.86	38.93	64.74
SD control group	31.16	33.59	31.65	32.37	33.36	32.41

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: “How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering “haven’t heard enough to say” are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The question relates to trust in the president in Column (2), parliament in Column (3), the local government in Column (4), the police in Column (5) or the army in Column (6).

The variable “One-Pager” is the fraction of court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. “One-Pager\_CUC” is defined similarly. The variable “Wave 2” is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable “Wave 1” is a dummy equal to 1 in the previous round (round 8) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable “Before” is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011.

## APPENDIX I: CONTACT WITH COURTS

In Table II, we look at the determinants of contacts with courts. The question is: “In the past two years, have you had contact with government courts?” (0=No, 1=Yes). This variable is only available in rounds 8 and 6 (collected before Wave 2).

In Column (1), the explanatory variable “Occupation Contact Courts” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for job categories likely more in contact with courts, 0 otherwise. Examples of job categories likely more in contact with courts are lawyers, police, farmers (due to land conflicts and the process of succession which must be completed in court), and shop owners (due to trade and contract enforcement).<sup>20</sup>

Column (1) confirms that those job categories indeed have more contact with the courts. The average probability to have contact with the courts is 8 percent, this increases by 2 percentage points, a (2/8=) 25 percent for these job categories.

The rest of the table show that people with secondary education or more (as opposed to primary education) (column 2), living in cities (Column 3), males (Column 4), and older (but with decreasing returns) (Column 5) also frequent more the courts.

In Column (6), we look at ethnic groups and their political connectedness with executive power. We use an insight uncovered by a recent empirical literature on judiciaries: some ethnic groups have better access to courts because of their political connections to the co-ethnic executive that may have captured local judiciaries (Behrer et al., 2021; Sanchez De La Sierra, 2021).

To measure the political connectedness of each ethnic group, we use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset collected by Vogt et al. (2015). The data is collected from hundreds of national and regional experts who are asked to classify ethnic groups according to their degree of access to executive power. For example, in Kenya in 2018, data from EPR indicate that the Kikuyu-Meru-Embu and the Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu tribes were the senior partners, and the Kisii and Mijikenda were junior partners. These tribes are thus classified as the “Connected” group. In contrast, the Luhya, Luo, and Kamba are classified “powerless” and the Somali “discriminated” so they are classified as the “Unconnected” group. Each year, the classifications can change depending on the political fortunes of each ethnic group.

Column (6) shows that the “Connected” ethnic groups have more contact with the courts, in line

<sup>20</sup>The exact job categories are called: Upper-level professional (e.g. lawyer, banker / finance, doctor, engineer, accountant, professor, senior-level government officer), Security services (police, army, private security), Agriculture / Farming / Fishing / Forestry; and Retail / Shop. “Occupation Contact Courts” is equal to 0 for all other occupations. This includes: Unskilled manual worker (e.g. cleaner, laborer, domestic help, unskilled manufacturing worker); Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g. trades like electrician, mechanic, machinist, or skilled manufacturing worker); Never had a job; Student; Housewife / Homemaker; Trader / Hawker / Vendor; Clerical or secretarial; Supervisor / Foreman / Senior manager; Mid-level professional (e.g. teacher, nurse, mid-level government officer).

with the theory.

In Column (7), we include all variables together. This column shows that all coefficients retain their significance even when included together. These factors are thus important in determining access to courts.

We use the results in Column (7) to build a prediction index of contact with courts. We predict for each individual in the database their likelihood to contact courts. Recall that the data on contact with courts is only available in rounds 6 and 8.<sup>21</sup> We thus use the value of the explanatory variables in Column 7 together with their regression coefficients to predict the likely contact with courts. We then split the sample according to the median of this prediction. Respondents with a likelihood to contact the courts above this median are considered “Likely court user”, while other respondents are considered “Not likely court user”. This classification is then used in the main body of the paper in Table 15 to test whether

<sup>21</sup>The results are similar if we use only round 6 collected before any treatment including Wave 1 of the One-Pagers. We use both rounds 6 and 8 to increase the sample size, and because Wave 1 of the One-Pagers were found to have a relatively small effect on court speed, therefore unlikely to change the composition of people with contact with courts.

TABLE II—CONTACT WITH COURTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Contact with Courts						
Occupation Contact Courts	0.02** (0.01)						0.02* (0.01)
Secondary Education		0.02*** (0.01)					0.02* (0.01)
Urban			0.02*** (0.01)				0.02*** (0.01)
Male				0.04*** (0.01)			0.04*** (0.01)
Age					0.00** (0.00)		0.00** (0.00)
Age Squared					-0.00* (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
Connected						0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Observations	4,797	4,789	4,797	4,797	4,789	4,797	4,781
Mean control group	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842
SD control group	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278

*Note:* Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. \*\*\* Significant at 99 percent confidence level, \*\* Significant at 95 percent, \* Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent answers Yes to the question “In the past two years, have you had contact with government courts?”, 0 otherwise. This variable is only available in rounds 8 and 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. In Column (1), “Occupation Contact Courts” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for job categories likely more in contact with courts, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), “Secondary education” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent acquired secondary education or more, 0 if only primary education. In Column (3), “Urban” is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is situated in an urban setting, 0 in a rural setting. In Column (4), “Male” is equal to 1 for males, 0 for females. In Column (5), the explanatory variable is age and the square of age, to measure decreasing returns with decreasing returns). In Column (6), “Connected” is equal to 1 if the respondent is from an ethnic group that is either a senior partner or junior partner in government, 0 otherwise.