The Preference for Wealth and Inequality: Towards a Piketty Theory of Wealth Inequality *

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Abstract

What are the consequences of the preference for wealth for the accumulation of capital and for the dynamics of wealth inequality? Assuming that wealth *per se* is a luxury good, inequality tends to rise whenever the interest rate is larger than the economic growth rate. This induces the economy to converge towards an equilibrium with extreme wealth inequality, where the capital stock is equal to the golden rule level. Far from immiseration, this equilibrium results in high wages and in the golden rule level consumption for ordinary households. We then introduce shocks to the preference for wealth and show that progressive wealth taxation prevents wealth from being held by people with high saving rates. This permanently reduces the capital stock, which is detrimental to the welfare of future generation of workers. This also raises the interest rate, to the benefit of the property-owning upper-middle class. By contrast, a progressive consumption tax successfully and persistently redistributes welfare from the very rich to the poor.

Keywords: Capital accumulation, Progressive wealth tax, Wealth inequality, Wealth preference

JEL Classification: D31, E21, E22, H20

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> The immense accumulations of fixed capital which, to the great benefit of mankind, were built up during the half-century before the war, could never have come about in a society where wealth was divided equitably.
>
> John Maynard Keynes
> *The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919)*

1 Introduction

Under capitalism, the distribution of wealth is highly unequal, much more so than the distribution of labor income. The neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous labor earnings cannot account for the extent of this wealth inequality. Instead, the desire to accumulate wealth, or to leave bequests, appears to be an essential driver of the saving behavior of wealthy households, who consume much less than their permanent income, thereby accumulating ever more wealth. The preference for wealth has therefore become a common ingredient of models of wealth inequality such as to account for the thickness of the upper tail of the wealth distribution.

The goal of this paper is to investigate the implications of the preference for wealth for the accumulation of capital, for the dynamics of wealth inequality, and for the interplay between the two. Our analysis relies on a continuous-time neoclassical growth model with a rate n of demographic growth and rate g of productivity growth. We add a preference for wealth, assuming that wealth is a luxury good. We also impose a borrowing constraint (i.e. a minimum wealth level). We initially consider that all households have identical preferences. Throughout our analysis, we interpret infinitely-lived households as dynasties.

We begin by characterizing the behavior of households in partial equilibrium, with a fixed capital stock. We show that, whenever the interest rate r is greater than the economic growth rate $n + g$, wealth trajectories diverge. With $r > n + g$, there is a threshold level of personal wealth above which wealth diverges to infinity and below which it converges to a low level. Conversely, when $r < n + g$, the wealth of all households converges to the same level.

In his magnum opus, Piketty (2014) has argued that the main driver of wealth

inequality over the long-run is the gap between r and $n+g$.[1] He explained that, when $r > n+g$, households only need to consume a bit less than their permanent income to see their wealth inexorably grow over time (relative to the size of the economy). Moreover, wealthy households are the most likely to take advantage of $r > n+g$ since their income is so large that they can afford to consume only a small fraction of it. But, why would wealthy households consume less than their permanent income? Because the accumulation of wealth *per se* is a luxury good! We therefore provide the microfoundation that induces the saving behavior of households to be in line with Piketty (2014)'s theory of wealth inequality. Not only does it result in rising inequality when $r > n+g$, but also in falling inequality when $r < n+g$.[2]

We then investigate the general equilibrium consequences of these results. With endogenous capital accumulation, the economy can either converge to an egalitarian steady state or to a (degenerate) inegalitarian steady state. The former is characterized by an equal distribution of wealth (for all households with identical labor earnings). The latter by a degenerate distribution of wealth, where a vanishing fraction of households hold arbitrarily large wealth while all the others converge to a low wealth level. The interest rate r tends to $n+g$ and the capital stock to the golden rule level. Far from immiseration, this equilibrium is characterized by high wages and the golden rule level of consumption (which maximizes steady state aggregate consumption) for wealth-poor households. The total consumption of the rich asymptotically has zero mass, which implies that extreme wealth inequality is not detrimental to the long-term prosperity of the population.

The egalitarian steady state always exists when the preference for wealth is so strong that, even with an equal distribution of wealth, the capital stock is above the golden rule level. Conversely, the inegalitarian steady state only exists when the preference for wealth is weaker, in which case wealth inequality is necessary to bring the capital stock to the golden rule level. This shows that the preference for wealth is an essential driver of capital accumulation, which prevents the capital stock from remaining much below the golden rule level. This complements the finding from our previous research that, whenever the egalitarian steady state has a capital stock above the golden rule level, the preference for wealth can generate a rational bubble that prevents the over-accumulation of capital, exactly as in an OLG economy (Michau, Ono, and Schlegl, 2023). Thus, the preference for wealth creates a fundamental tendency for

[1] Piketty (2014) denotes the growth rate of the economy by g, which corresponds to $n+g$ within our analysis. We carefully distinguish demographic growth n from productivity growth g, since they are not interchangeable. We find that the long-run dynamics of wealth inequality is nonetheless determined by $n+g$, consistently with Piketty (2014)'s argument.

[2] Appendix A provides quotations from Piketty (2014) summarizing his r vs. $n+g$ theory. His narrative exactly corresponds to the forces at play within our analysis.

the capital stock to approach the golden rule level. There is also a range of parameters for which both steady states exist. However, a thick upper tail to the initial wealth distribution induces convergence to the inegalitarian steady state, which makes this outcome empirically more likely whenever both are possible.

In practice, dynasties are unlikely to sustain a preference for wealth forever. We therefore subsequently allow for shocks to the preference for wealth. We assume that only a fifth of households have a preference for wealth and that it is only sustained on average for three generations. We rely on a mean field game formulation *à la* Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2022) to run numerical simulations. Our calibration satisfies $r > n + g$ and matches the thickness of the upper tail of the wealth distribution. We obtain an equilibrium where dynasties with a preference for wealth get richer over time, until they lose this preference, which induces them to gradually spend their accumulated savings. The average saving rate is strongly increasing in wealth.

We then rely on simulations to investigate a number of tax reforms. We first consider a 20% levy on wealth above \$10 million financing a lump-sum transfer to poor households. Recall that, within the neoclassical growth model, a one-off lump-sum redistribution of wealth has no impact on the aggregate variables of the economy. By contrast, with a preference for wealth, the poor quickly spend the wealth that would have been saved by the rich. This leads to a consumption boom and to an investment bust. The resulting decline in the capital stock raises the interest rate and reduces wages. This induces middle-class households, who are not directly affected by the policy, to reduce their consumption. These general equilibrium effects generate a welfare gain for middle-class households with a preference for wealth, whose saving behavior is rewarded by a higher interest rate, and a welfare loss for poorer households who do not qualify for the lump-sum transfer and who suffer from lower wages.

We then simulate a progressive wealth tax at rate 2% per year above \$10 million to finance redistribution to poor households. The consequences are similar as for the wealth levy, except that rich households respond by sharply increasing their consumption. Their saving plummets, which allows the policy to persistently compress wealth inequality, to such an extent that the tax revenue continuously decreases over time. By preventing the concentration of wealth within the hands of few households with high saving rates, this policy permanently reduces the capital stock. This entails sizeable welfare losses for future generations of workers. This policy also substantially increases the wealth of the upper-middle class, who benefit from a higher interest rate without being hurt by the wealth tax. Hence, over the long-run, the progressive wealth tax redistributes wealth and welfare from the very rich to the property-owning upper-middle class.

Finally, we consider a progressive consumption tax with a rate of 50% for consump-

tion above $200 000 per year. It turns out to be a more efficient redistribution tool since it targets wealthy dynasties who have lost their preference for wealth and who therefore have a low saving rate. The policy slightly raises the capital stock. While wealth inequality remains almost unchanged, consumption inequality falls. The progressive consumption tax successfully redistributes consumption and welfare from rich to poor households, even over the long-run.

Related literature. The relationship between the distribution of wealth and the accumulation of capital has long been a controversial topic. As the opening quotation of this paper indicates, Keynes (1919) viewed the high saving rate of the capitalist class as an essential driver of the accumulation of capital. Moreover, he believed that the thrifty behavior of wealthy households was due to a preference for wealth: *"Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory,–the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you"*.

Kaldor (1955, 1957) emphasized the different saving rates of capitalists and workers as critical to the accumulation of capital. Pasinetti (1962) showed that, in the long-run, the accumulation of capital is uniquely determined by the saving behavior of capitalists. Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) established that this result can be reversed if the saving rate of workers is sufficiently high, in which case they end up owning the entire capital stock of the economy. This early literature shows the importance of heterogeneity in saving rates across people for the determination of both the distribution of wealth and the accumulation of capital.

Instead of assuming class-dependent saving behavior, Bourguignon (1981) assumed scale-dependent saving, whereby the saving rate is an increasing function of income. He showed that, when the interest rate is larger than the growth rate of the economy, both an egalitarian steady steady state and an inegalitarian steady state can exist. Our work generalizes this insight by providing a microfoundation, by allowing for more than two types, and by taking transitional dynamics into account.

While these early contributions assume exogenous saving functions, the literature now provides microfoundations that endogenize the heterogeneity in saving rates. Yaari (1964) was the first to assume a bequest motive for saving, modeled as utility from bequeathed wealth. Atkinson (1971) then showed that, if the utility from bequeathed wealth is less convex than the utility from consumption, then bequests are luxury goods and the saving rate is increasing in wealth. This is directly related to our work since the preference for wealth of an infinitely-lived household can be interpreted as a warm-glow bequest motive within an altruistic dynasty. And we do assume throughout our analysis that the utility from wealth is less convex than the utility from consumption, resulting in wealth being a luxury good.

The related empirical literature provides strong support for the forces at play within

our analysis. At the microeconomic level, the saving rate is increasing in wealth, which is inconsistent with the permanent-income hypothesis. The preference for wealth or the bequest motive appears to be a key driver of this heterogeneity (Carroll, 2000; Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2004; Lockwood, 2018; Straub, 2019; Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik, 2021b; De Nardi, French, Jones, and McGee, 2021).[3] At the macroeconomic level, the wealth distribution has a thick upper tail. Again, heterogeneity in saving rates appears to be a major driver of this wealth inequality (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and Piketty, 2021; Ozkan, Hubmer, Salgado, and Halvorsen, 2023). Turning to dynamics, it was estimated that the cumulated stock of inherited wealth accounts for more than 50% of the total wealth of the economy and that this number is likely to rise to over 80% by the end of the century (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981; Piketty, 2011, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2015). This shows that wealth accumulation is an intergenerational process, which is consistent with our dynastic perspective (whereby our infinitely-lived households should be interpreted as dynasties).

Our paper contributes to a sizeable literature in quantitative macroeconomics on the determinants of wealth inequality.[4] An important challenge is to be able to account for the thickness of the upper tail of the wealth distribution. In a seminal contribution, that is closely related to our work, De Nardi (2004) has shown that the bequest motive, and the resulting high saving rate of wealthy households, can account for top-end wealth inequality. Our contribution is to investigate the range of equilibrium possibilities induced by this bequest motive or preference for wealth, emphasizing the possibility of rising or falling inequality depending on the relative magnitude of the interest rate and the economic growth rate. We also carefully analyze the impact of the distribution of wealth on the accumulation of capital over the short and long term.

An alternative way to generate heterogeneity in saving rates is to assume heterogeneity in discount rates. Ramsey (1928) had hypothesized that, under differences in discount rates, *"equilibrium would be attained by a division of society into two classes, the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence level"*. This conjecture was formally verified by Becker (1980). Assuming that the discount rate is stochastic can generate a thick upper tail to the wealth distribution (Krusell and Smith, 1998; Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka, and White, 2017; Toda, 2019). A preference for wealth and a low discount rate have similar effects: in the absence of shocks, they lead to extreme inequality; with stochastic shocks, the persistence over time of a high saving rate within

[3] Fagereng, Holm, Moll, and Natvik (2021a) find that, in Norway, the saving rate (as a fraction of income) is increasing in wealth if income includes capital gains, and is flat otherwise. Our work does not distinguish capital gains from dividends.

[4] See De Nardi and Fella (2017), De Nardi, Fella, and Yang (2017), and Benhabib and Bisin (2018) for excellent surveys.

some dynasties results in a thick upper tail. The main difference is that the preference for wealth endogenously generates scale-dependence in the saving behavior of households, while the heterogeneity in discount rates only induces type-dependence.

A related source of wealth concentration is stochastic aging, whereby older households have had more time to accumulate wealth (Wold and Whittle, 1957; Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull, 2003; Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu, 2016). Again, this is related to the persistence over time of the preference for wealth within some dynasties.[5]

A completely different explanation for the thick upper tail of the wealth distribution is stochastic returns to capital (Champernowne, 1953; Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu, 2011, 2015; Toda, 2014; Nirei and Aoki, 2016; Cao and Luo, 2017).[6] This is particularly relevant for entrepreneurs whose portfolios cannot be properly diversified (Quadrini, 2000; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006). Our work abstracts from this source of wealth dispersion, which could amplify the diverging wealth dynamics that we find, especially if wealthy households obtain higher returns on their saving (Bach, Calvet, and Sodini, 2020; Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, and Pistaferri, 2020; Best and Dogra, 2023).

While much of the literature (including our own contribution) focuses on one or two mechanisms in isolation, a few papers have combined these different sources of wealth dispersion to assess quantitatively their ability to account for wealth inequality in the United States (De Nardi and Yang, 2016; Benhabib, Bisin, and Luo, 2019; Kaymak, Leung, and Poschke, 2022; Gaillard, Hellwig, Wangner, and Werquin, 2023). They all find that a non-homothetic bequest motive *à la* De Nardi (2004), whereby bequests are luxury goods, is an essential ingredient to account for top-end wealth inequality.[7]

Piketty (2014) forcefully argues that wealth inequality tends to rise whenever $r > n + g$, which he denotes $r > g$. To provide a theoretical justification for this conjecture, a number of microfoundations were found leading to a Pareto upper tail to the wealth distribution, with a thickness that is increasing in $r - g$. Piketty and Zucman (2015) proposed a generational model (where one period corresponds to one generation) with a stochastic bequest motive, but no altruism. An alternative is to either rely on a stochastic aging model (Jones, 2014; Hiraguchi, 2019) or on stochastic returns to wealth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2015; Cao and Luo, 2017). This yields a Pareto tail

[5] Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003) also assumes earnings inequality, which feeds into wealth inequality. However, empirically, the upper tail of the wealth distribution is much thicker than that of the earnings distribution. Hence, earnings inequality alone cannot account for top-end wealth inequality, which was formally shown by Stachurski and Toda (2019). For clarity and simplicity, we shut down this channel by assuming that labor earnings are identical across all individuals.

[6] Interestingly, Ma and Toda (2021) have shown that stochastic returns to capital can be consistent with a saving rate that is increasing in wealth.

[7] An exception is Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2021) who rely on stochastic discount rates. But, as previously mentioned, the effects of the bequest motive and of stochastic discount rates are comparable.

with thickness proportional to $r-g-MPC$, where MPC denotes the marginal propensity to consume out of income. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to offer a microfoundation where inequality is rising whenever $r > g$ and falling whenever $r < g$, which is more in line with the narrative of Piketty (2014).

Building on Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), there is a large literature on the taxation of the capital owned by infinitely-lived households. Rather than derive optimal taxation formulas, we emphasize the non-trivial general equilibrium effects of wealth taxation, emphasizing the sizeable impact on people who are not directly affected by the policy. Some of our main insights could not be obtained within the neoclassical growth model, on which much of the literature on capital taxation relies.[8]

Finally, our work is related to the growing literature on Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models, which investigates the macroeconomic consequences of heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume (Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2018; Auclert and Rognlie, 2020; Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub, 2023). In particular, under a preference for wealth, wealth inequality can be rising over time resulting in a fall in aggregate demand (Ono, 1994; Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant, 2015; Illing, Ono, and Schlegl, 2018; Mian, Straub, and Sufi, 2021). While similar dynamics are at work within our framework, the absence of nominal rigidities implies that aggregate demand is fully determined by the supply side of the economy, i.e. by the capital stock through the production function.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 characterizes the behavior of households in partial equilibrium, with a fixed capital stock. General equilibrium results are presented in Section 4. Shocks to the preference for wealth are introduced in Section 5, which relies on a numerical simulation of our model. Section 6 investigates a wealth levy, a progressive wealth tax, and a progressive consumption tax. The paper ends with a conclusion.

2 Model

Time is continuous. There is a unit mass of infinitely-lived households. Each household should be interpreted as a dynasty where the current generation is altruistic towards future generations. The size of any household at time t is equal to $N_t = e^{nt}$, which implies that population grows at rate n within each household. Technological progress is characterized by a labor-augmenting level of productivity $G_t = e^{gt}$, which

[8] Saez and Stantcheva (2018) have derived insightful formulas for the optimal taxation of capital under a preference for wealth. However, their analysis either assumes that wealth or bequests are not luxury goods (since utility from consumption is linear) or they take convergence to steady state for granted, which our analysis shows is only justified when $r < n + g$.

grows at an exogenous rate g. Thus, at time t, each household is endowed with $N_t G_t$ efficiency units of labor, which grows at rate $n + g$.

2.1 Firms

A representative firm uses capital K_t and labor N_t to produce output Y_t using a constant returns to scale neoclassical production function

$$Y_t = G_t N_t f\left(\frac{K_t}{G_t N_t}\right), \tag{1}$$

where $f(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. At each point in time, the firm must choose how much capital K_t to rent from households at price R_t and how much labor N_t to employ at wage $\tilde{w}_t$ such as to maximize its profits

$$G_t N_t f\left(\frac{K_t}{G_t N_t}\right) - R_t K_t - \tilde{w}_t N_t. \tag{2}$$

The real interest rate r_t is equal to the rental cost of capital R_t net of depreciation δ, i.e. $r_t = R_t - \delta$. In equilibrium, each factor of production must be paid its marginal product, which gives

$$r_t = f'(k_t) - \delta, \tag{3}$$

$$w_t = f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t), \tag{4}$$

where $k_t = K_t/(G_t N_t)$ denotes capital per efficiency unit of labor and $w_t = \tilde{w}_t/G_t$ denotes the wage rate relative to labor productivity.

2.2 Households

Each household is indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$. Let a_t^i and c_t^i denote the wealth and consumption of household i per efficiency unit of labor, respectively. The initial distribution of wealth a_0^i across households is exogenously given by an initial density function $\phi(\cdot, 0)$.

The household's flow of funds is given by

$$\dot{a}_t^i = (r_t - n - g)\, a_t^i + w_t - c_t^i. \tag{5}$$

We impose the borrowing constraint

$$a_t^i \geq \underline{a}, \tag{6}$$

where $\underline{a} \leq 0$.[9]

Individuals within household i derive utility from their consumption level per capita $c_t^i G_t$. They also derive utility from their holding of wealth per capita $a_t^i G_t$ relative to their labor productivity G_t.[10] We assume balanced growth preferences *à la* King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). This entails

$$u(c_t^i G_t, a_t^i) = \begin{cases} \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[\ln\left(c_t^i G_t\right)+v\left(a_t^i\right)\right]\right)-1}{1-\sigma} & \text{if } \sigma \neq 1 \\ \ln\left(c_t^i G_t\right) + v\left(a_t^i\right) & \text{if } \sigma = 1 \end{cases}, \tag{7}$$

where $v(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave and $\sigma \in (0, \infty)$. Following Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) and Michau (2023), we consider that the subutility of wealth $v\left(a_t^i\right)$ is characterized by constant relative risk aversion, relative to a reference point $\zeta \leq 0$, which gives $v\left(a_t^i\right) = \gamma \frac{\left(a_t^i - \zeta\right)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}$. Households discount the future at rate ρ, with $\rho > n + (1-\sigma)g$. Their intertemporal utility is therefore given by

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} N_t \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[gt + \ln\left(c_t^i\right) + \gamma \frac{\left(a_t^i - \zeta\right)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right) - 1}{1-\sigma} dt. \tag{8}$$

For these preferences to be homothetic (as in Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011) and Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2016)), we would need to have both $\zeta = 0$ and $\mu = 1$. We instead impose $\mu < 1$, which implies that wealth is a luxury good (as in Atkinson (1971) and De Nardi (2004)). When preferences are additively separable between consumption and wealth, i.e. when $\sigma = 1$, our preference for wealth can be interpreted as a warm-glow bequest motive within a stochastic aging model (as in Mian, Straub, and Sufi (2021)).

The household maximizes its intertemporal utility (8) subject to its wealth accumulation equation (5), with a_0^i given, and to its borrowing constraint (6).[11] By the maximum principle, the solution to household i's problem is characterized by the consumption Euler equation

$$\frac{\dot{c}_t^i}{c_t^i} \geq \frac{1}{\sigma}\left[r_t - \rho - \sigma g + \frac{\gamma\left(a_t^i - \zeta\right)^{-\mu}}{\left(c_t^i\right)^{-1}} + (1-\sigma)\gamma\left(a_t^i - \zeta\right)^{-\mu} \dot{a}_t^i\right] \text{ and } a_t^i \geq \underline{a}, \tag{9}$$

[9] Note that this borrowing constraint (6) cannot be binding if $\underline{a}$ is below the natural borrowing limit given at time t by $-\int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^s (r_u - n - g)du} w_s ds$.

[10] An alternative is to assume that individuals derive utility from their holding of wealth per capita, $a_t^i G_t$, relative to output per capita, $Y_t/N_t = f(k_t)G_t$, or relative to the average wealth per capita, $K_t/N_t = k_t G_t$. These alternative formulations would introduce an externality from wealth accumulation, but would not fundamentally modify our results on the dynamics of wealth inequality.

[11] The borrowing constraint (6) is the only limit that we are imposing on indebtedness. In particular, our formulation does not rule out Ponzi schemes.

with complementary slackness, together with the transversality condition

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} e^{-(\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g)t+(1-\sigma)\gamma\frac{\left(a_t^i-\zeta\right)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}}\left(c_t^i\right)^{-\sigma}\left[a_t^i-\underline{a}\right]=0. \tag{10}$$

The preference for wealth adds a new term to the consumption Euler equation: the ratio of the marginal utility of wealth to the marginal utility of consumption. This new term introduces heterogeneity in saving behaviors across wealth levels. As we shall see, this dramatically affects the dynamics of wealth inequality.

2.3 Market clearing

The goods market clearing condition imposes that total output must be equal to the sum of investment and consumption

$$G_tN_tf\left(\frac{K_t}{G_tN_t}\right)=\left[\delta K_t+\dot{K}_t\right]+\int_0^1 c_t^iG_tN_tdi. \tag{11}$$

As $\dot{k}_t=\dot{K}_t/(G_tN_t)-(n+g)k_t$, we must have

$$\dot{k}_t=f\left(k_t\right)-\left(\delta+n+g\right)k_t-\int_0^1 c_t^idi. \tag{12}$$

Households' supply of savings must be equal to firms' demand for capital, which gives the asset market clearing condition

$$\int_0^1 a_t^idi=k_t. \tag{13}$$

2.4 Equilibrium

Let us now define the equilibrium of the economy.

Definition 1 *The equilibrium of the economy* $\left(\left(c_t^i,a_t^i\right)_{i=0}^1,k_t,r_t,w_t\right)_{t=0}^\infty$ *is characterized by:*

- *The profit maximizing behavior of firms, which determines the real interest rate (3) and the wage rate (4);*
- *The solution to the household's problem, which is jointly given by the flow of funds constraint (5), the Euler equation with the borrowing constraint (9), the transversality condition (10), and the distribution* $\phi(\cdot,0)$ *of initial wealth* a_0^i *across households;*
- *The asset market clearing condition (13).*

By Walras' law, the goods market clearing condition (12) can be deduced from the other equilibrium conditions of the economy. Appendix B defines this equilibrium as

a "mean field game". This alternative, but equivalent, exposition is particularly useful to characterize numerically the evolution over time of the wealth distribution, denoted by $\phi(a,t)$.

3 Fixed capital stock

Before turning to the general equilibrium of the economy, we now characterize the dynamics of wealth accumulation at the household level for a given capital stock k, real interest rate $r = f'(k) - \delta$, and wage rate $w = f(k) - kf'(k)$. We consider that the real interest rate $r = f'(k) - \delta$ is strictly smaller than $\rho + \sigma g$ as, otherwise, by the Euler equation (9), we cannot have a steady state with constant consumption and wealth per efficiency unit of labor.

If we ignore the borrowing constraint (6), the dynamics of consumption and wealth accumulation are jointly determined by the household's flow of funds constraint (5) and by the Euler equation (9) with equality. Any steady state $\{c, a\}$ is characterized by

$$c = (r - n - g)a + w, \tag{14}$$

$$c = \frac{\rho + \sigma g - r}{\gamma}(a - \zeta)^{\mu}, \tag{15}$$

where the first equation ensures constant wealth and the second constant consumption. Recall that we assume $\mu < 1$ throughout our analysis. Equation (14) implies that there are two cases to consider: $r > n + g$ and $r \leq n + g$.

Let us start by focusing on the former case, where $r > n + g$. In Figure 1, equation (14) is represented by the $\dot{a}_t = 0$ curve and equation (15) by the $\dot{c}_t = 0$ curve. A first possibility is that the wage rate w is so high that there is no steady state, with every household's consumption and wealth (per efficiency unit of labor) diverging to infinity. Let us now focus on the more interesting situation where the wage rate is sufficiently low to ensure the existence of a steady state. When $\zeta \geq -w/(r - n - g)$, there exists two solutions $\{c, a\}$ to the system given by equation (14) and (15). We denote by a^U the upper solution for wealth and by a^S the lower one, as displayed in Figure 1. When $\zeta < -w/(r - n - g)$, only one solution exists, which we denote by a^U. The following lemma, proved in Appendix C.1, gives the corresponding equilibrium possibilities taking into account the borrowing constraint (6) and the non-negativity of consumption.

Lemma 1 *When $r > n + g$, if the wage rate w is not too high, the steady state with wealth a^U always exists and is unstable. Hence,*

- *if $a_0 \in (a^U, \infty)$, then wealth diverges to infinity;*

- *if* $a_0 \in \left[\max\left\{\underline{a}, \frac{-w}{r-n-g}\right\}, a^U\right)$, *then wealth converges to* $\max\left\{a^S, \underline{a}\right\}$ *when* $\zeta \geq \frac{-w}{r-n-g}$ *and to* $\max\left\{\underline{a}, \frac{-w}{r-n-g}\right\}$ *when* $\zeta < \frac{-w}{r-n-g}$.

This establishes that a critical determinant of wealth dynamics is whether initial wealth is above or below a^U. If it is above, then wealth diverges to infinity. If it is below, then wealth either converges to a^S, or to the natural debt limit $-w/(r-n-g)$, or to the borrowing constraint $\underline{a}$, whichever exists and is higher. Wealth inequality is therefore rising over time.



Figure 1: Phase Diagram for $r > n + g$

Figure 1 displays the corresponding phase diagram for the case where $\zeta > -w/(r-n-g)$ and $\max\{a^S, \underline{a}\} = a^S$. For any given level of initial wealth, a household must be on the trajectory represented by the solid line. Alternative trajectories, represented by dashed lines can be ruled out. They either converge to zero consumption, which violates the transversality condition (10), or have exploding consumption and falling

wealth, which either eventually violates the borrowing constraint (6) if $\underline{a} > \zeta$ or reach infinite consumption in finite time and result in $a < \zeta$ if $\underline{a} \leq \zeta$. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the increase in wealth $\dot{a}_t$ as a function of wealth a_t.

These diverging wealth dynamics are resulting from the fact that, when $\mu < 1$, beyond a certain wealth level, the accumulation of savings becomes an increasing function of wealth (as can be seen from the lower panel of Figure 1). Intuitively, when $\mu < 1$, the marginal utility of consumption declines faster than the marginal utility of wealth, resulting in rising wealth accumulation as households get richer. In other words, when $\mu < 1$, wealth is a luxury good. This saving behavior of very wealthy households is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Carroll (2000), Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004), Lockwood (2018), Straub (2019), Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik (2021b), and De Nardi, French, Jones, and McGee (2021).

Let us now turn to the case where $r \leq n + g$. There must now be a unique solution $\{c, a\}$ to the system given by equations (14) and (15). We denote the corresponding wealth level by a^S. The following lemma is proved in Appendix C.2.

Lemma 2 *When $r \leq n + g$, the steady state with wealth a^S is saddle-path stable. Hence, wealth converges to $\max\{a^S, \underline{a}\}$.*

This establishes that, when $r \leq n + g$, inequality is falling over time with all households (with identical labor income) converging to the same wealth level $\max\{a^S, \underline{a}\}$, irrespective of their initial wealth. In fact, once $r \leq n + g$, the upper steady state of Lemma 1 ceases to exist, leaving the economy with the lower steady state, which is now guaranteed to exist provided that $a^S \geq \underline{a}$. Figure 2 displays the corresponding phase diagram.

Lemma 1 and 2 formalize Piketty (2014)'s insight that, when $r > n + g$, wealthy households get wealthier over time, resulting in rising inequality; while the opposite occurs when $r \leq n + g$. These dynamics of wealth inequality are induced by the preference for wealth.

Let us now endogenize the capital stock to investigate how the real interest rate and the wage rate respond to these dynamics of wealth accumulation. Throughout the following section, we shall consider that the steady state levels of individual wealth a^U and a^S are functions of k.

4 General equilibrium

We now solve for the general equilibrium of the economy, as implied by Definition 1. We begin by characterizing the egalitarian steady state whereby all households have



Figure 2: Phase Diagram for $r < n + g$

the same wealth level, equal to k^E. This steady state $\left\{c^E, k^E\right\}$ is determined by

$$c^E = f(k^E) - (\delta + n + g)k^E, \tag{16}$$

$$c^E = \frac{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k^E)}{\gamma} \left(k^E - \zeta\right)^{\mu}, \tag{17}$$

which is obtained by substituting the expression for the interest rate (3), the wage rate (4), and $a = k^E$ into the partial equilibrium steady state conditions (14) and (15) of the previous section.

Let us now introduce an assumption that we will maintain throughout our analysis.

Assumption 1 *The equation* $\gamma\left(k + \alpha - \zeta\right)^{-\mu}\left[f(k) - (\delta + n + g)k\right] = \left[\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'\left(k\right)\right]$ *defines* α *as a decreasing function of* k *for all admissible values of* k.

This assumption implies that, in the egalitarian steady state, an exogenous increase α in wealth reduces households' propensity to save and therefore reduces the corresponding steady state capital stock k. Not only is it the natural economic scenario to expect, but it is also technically a very mild condition. Totally differentiating this equation with respect to k reveals that Assumption 1 must be satisfied for any given calibration provided that ρ is sufficiently close to $n + (1 - \sigma)g$.

The following lemma is proved in Appendix C.3.

Lemma 3 *An egalitarian steady state equilibrium* $\{c^E, k^E\}$ *always exists and, under Assumption 1, it must be unique. This steady state is locally stable if and only if*

$$r^E < n + g + \frac{\mu c^E}{k^E - \zeta}, \tag{18}$$

where $r^E = f'(k^E) - \delta$.

We now consider throughout our analysis that Assumption 1 is satisfied (but we explicitly refer to it in the proofs whenever it is being used).

From the perspective of any household taking the capital stock k^E as fixed, the egalitarian steady state corresponds to the stable steady state of the previous section, which implies $a^S(k^E) = k^E$. When $r^E > n + g$, we know by Lemma 1 that, under a fixed capital stock equal to k^E, there also exists an unstable upper steady state, with wealth level $a^U(k^E) \in (k^E, \infty)$. Hence, if initially the aggregate capital stock is in the neighborhood of k^E and the wealth distribution has an upper bound that is much below $a^U(k^E)$, then the economy converges to the egalitarian steady state. Conversely, if the initial wealth distribution has an unbounded support, with a strictly positive mass of households with wealth well above $a^U(k^E)$, then wealth inequality is growing over time, which pulls the economy away from the egalitarian steady state. This implies that a one-off lump-sum redistribution of wealth can have a permanent impact on the dynamics of wealth inequality.

Let k^* denote golden rule level of the capital stock, which maximizes aggregate consumption in steady state. From the capital accumulation equation (12), it is determined by $f'(k^*) - \delta = n + g$. We now characterize the alternative steady state towards which the economy can converge, which we call the inegalitarian steady state. The following lemma is proved in Appendix C.4.

Lemma 4 *If and only if* $r^E > n + g$, *the economy can converge to an inegalitarian steady state with the aggregate capital stock equal to* k^*, *the real interest rate equal to* $n + g$, *a mass one of households holding wealth* $\max\{a^S(k^*), \underline{a}\}$, *and a zero mass of arbitrarily wealthy households.*

Clearly, while the aggregate variables converge to a steady state, the wealth distribution is degenerate with a vanishing fraction of households accumulating arbitrarily large fortunes. This corresponds to a situation of extreme wealth inequality.

As wealthy households accumulate ever more wealth, the capital stock converges to the golden rule level and the threshold $a^U(k)$ diverges (formally $\lim_{k \to k^{*-}} a^U(k) = \infty$). This progressively reduces the mass of wealthy households, which converges to zero. In the limit, the real interest rate is equal to $n + g$.

As the economy approaches the golden rule, the natural debt limit becomes infinitely low. Hence, consistently with Lemma 1, the wealth of poor households must converge to $\max\left\{a^S(k^*), \underline{a}\right\}$. Note that, for the average wealth of households to be equal to k^*, we must have $a^S(k^*) < k^*$. The proof of Lemma 4 establishes that $a^S(k^*) < k^*$ if and only if $r^E > n+g$, which turns out to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the inegalitarian steady state.

What does extreme wealth inequality imply for consumption? By the household's flow of funds constraint (5) with $r = n + g$, the consumption of poor households with wealth $\max\left\{a^S(k^*), \underline{a}\right\}$ must be equal to their labor income $w(k^*) = f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*) = f(k^*) - (\delta + n + g)k^*$. Despite extreme wealth inequality, and a possibly very low wealth level $\max\left\{a^S(k^*), \underline{a}\right\}$, this consumption level is higher than in the egalitarian steady state, where by equation (16) consumption is equal to $f(k^E) - (\delta + n + g)k^E$.[12] This paradoxical result is due to the behavior of the richest households who accumulate ever larger fortunes to satisfy their preference for wealth. This induces the capital stock to approach the golden rule level, which raises the steady state consumption of ordinary households. In addition, the consumption share of the wealthiest households tends to zero. On the one hand the richest are getting ever wealthier, but on the other hand their mass converges to zero and their propensity to consume also converges to zero.

We have therefore established that, over the long-run, the economy can either converge to an egalitarian steady state or to a degenerate inegalitarian steady state. More precisely, we have the following possibilities:

- When $r^E \in (-\delta, n + g)$, the economy converges to the egalitarian steady state;
- When $r^E \in \left(n + g, n + g + \frac{\mu c^E}{k^E - \zeta}\right)$, depending on the initial wealth distribution, the economy either converges to the egalitarian or to the inegalitarian steady state;
- When $r^E \in \left(n + g + \frac{\mu c^E}{k^E - \zeta}, \infty\right)$, the economy converges to the inegalitarian steady state.

[12] Recall that k^* maximizes $f(k) - (\delta + n + g)k$.

In the middle case, if the initial wealth distribution has a thick upper tail, the economy will converge to the inegalitarian steady state. A one-off redistribution of wealth that cuts this upper tail can set the economy on an egalitarian path. This shows that, even over the very long-run, the distribution of wealth can be history dependent.

What are the welfare consequences of these alternative equilibrium possibilities? If households have a preference for holding physical capital and if the borrowing constraint is not binding, then the first fundamental theorem applies and, for any given initial wealth distribution, the general equilibrium must be Pareto efficient. If households have a preference for holding financial wealth, rather than physical capital, then asset prices exert a pecuniary externality that could make the equilibrium inefficient. In fact, whenever $r^E < n + g$, there could exists a rational bubble on an infinitely-lived asset (Michau, Ono, and Schlegl, 2023). Such a bubble would generate a Pareto improvement, by fulfilling households' preference for wealth without accumulating capital beyond the golden rule level k^*.[13]

Hence, with a preference for wealth, either of two forces that can push the real interest rate towards $n + g$: a thick upper tail to the initial wealth distribution when $r^E > n + g$ and a rational bubble when $r^E < n + g$. This shows that, in a market economy, the preference for wealth can always induce convergence to the golden rule level of the capital stock k^*, which maximizes steady state consumption. However, whenever $r^E < n + g + \frac{\mu c^E}{k^E - \zeta}$, it is also possible that the economy converges to the egalitarian steady state without any bubble, resulting in a capital stock above the golden rule when $r^E < n + g$ and below when $r^E > n + g$.

In Appendix D, we show that the possibility of a rational bubble can easily be incorporated within our framework by introducing an infinitely-lived asset that is intrinsically worthless. We illustrate how, when $r^E < n + g$, the bubble can simultaneously raise total wealth and reduce the capital stock such as to bring it down to the golden rule level.

Our inegalitarian steady state is degenerate, with a vanishing fraction of the population acquiring a growing share of the capital stock. However, in practice, the preferences of wealthy dynasties might change as their wealth diverges to infinity. To capture this, we now introduce shocks to the preference for wealth.

5 Preference for wealth shocks

We now assume a two-state Poisson process for the preference for wealth, where $j \in \{W, N\}$ denotes a state. In state W the household has a preference for wealth, while in

[13] This is similar to a dynamically inefficient OLG economy, where a rational bubble can fulfill young households' desire to save for retirement without over-accumulating capital.

state N it does not. Let λ_W denote the rate at which households lose their preference for wealth, i.e. the transition rate from state W to N, and λ_N the rate at which households acquire a preference for wealth, i.e. the transition rate from state N to W.

An infinitely lived household should be interpreted as a dynasty. Whenever a parent has a preference for wealth, sometimes known in the literature as a "capitalist spirit", she transmits this trait to her child with probability $1 - \lambda_W$. Conversely, the daughter of a parent who does not have a preference for wealth nonetheless has a probability λ_N of acquiring it from some role model in society.[14]

Let $\phi_j(a,t)$ denote the density of the wealth distribution in state $j \in \{W, N\}$ at time t, where $\int \phi_W(a,t)\,da + \int \phi_N(a,t)\,da = 1$. Appendix E relies on a "mean field game" formulation of this economy to provide a formal definition of equilibrium in the presence of the preference for wealth shocks.

We now rely on numerical simulations to investigate the properties of this economy. In this section, we first calibrate the model, before analyzing the properties of our simulated economy. In the following section, we will consider a number of tax experiments. Our numerical algorithm, which builds on Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2022), is described in Appendix F.

5.1 Calibration

Our model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function $f(k) = Ak^{\alpha}$. The capital share α is set equal to 0.3. To match the U.S. GDP per household in 2012, which was equal to \$132 000, the scale parameter A is set equal to 2885.[15] The depreciation rate δ is calibrated such as to match an average wealth per household in the U.S. in 2012 of \$343 000, as reported in Table 1 from Saez and Zucman (2016). This gives $\delta = 7.55\%$.

Population grows at $n = 1\%$ per year and productivity at $g = 2\%$ per year, which corresponds to the U.S. averages over the past century. For simplicity, we assume that households cannot borrow, so $\underline{a} = 0$. This is a natural assumption within a dynastic context, where parents cannot pass on debt to their children. We set the discount rate ρ equal to 4% per year and assume additively separable preferences between consumption and wealth, which gives $\sigma = 1$.

Recall that the subutility of wealth is given by $v(a) = \gamma \frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}$. The reference wealth level ζ is set equal to 6 months worth of GDP per household.[16] The intensity γ

[14] This narrative is reminiscent of cultural transmission *à la* Bisin and Verdier (2001). However, endogenizing the process of cultural transmission is beyond the scope of our analysis.

[15] The World Bank reports U.S. GDP per capita for 2012 as \$51 780, while the U.S. Census Bureau estimates an average household size of 2.55 for the same year. This implies that GDP per household was around \$132 000.

[16] Neither the other parameters of the calibration nor the non-targeted moments from our simulation

and the curvature μ of the preference for wealth are calibrated such as to match moments of the U.S. wealth distribution reported in Table 1 of Saez and Zucman (2016). At the lower end of the wealth distribution, we target the average wealth of the bottom 90% of the distribution to be equal to \$84 000; while, at the upper end, we target the average wealth of the top 1% to be equal to \$13.84 million. This yields $\gamma = 7.65 \cdot 10^{-6}$ and $\mu = 0.23$.

Regarding the distribution of preferences, we assume that the fraction of households with a preference for wealth is always in steady state, and is therefore equal to $\lambda_N/(\lambda_N + \lambda_W)$. We consider that the preference for wealth persists on average for three generations, 75 years, which gives $\lambda_W = 1/75$. And we assume that only 20% of households have a preference for wealth, which implies that the absence of a preference for wealth persists on average for 12 generations, 300 years, yielding $\lambda_N = 1/300$. While we could easily assume a higher share of households with a preference for wealth, this calibration illustrates that only a fairly small share is sufficient to have dramatic consequences on the dynamics of wealth inequality.

Finally, the initial wealth distribution is partly endogenously determined. More precisely, we start our simulations from a double Pareto-lognormal distribution that is identical in state W and N and we run our model for 100 years before matching the moments described in the previous paragraphs. Following the survey by Benhabib and Bisin (2018), the parameter determining the thickness of the upper tail of the Pareto distribution is set equal to 1.5. Our numerical simulations rely on a wealth grid going up to \$5 billion. We impose an upper bound of \$3.5 billion to our initial Pareto-lognormal distribution, which is rescaled such as to account for the missing mass. Full details are provided in Appendix F.

As we shall see below, this economy does not necessarily reach a stationary state. However, the aggregate variables of the economy, such as output or the capital stock, converge after about 50 years and remain almost constant thereafter. Over the following 100 years (i.e. from year 100 to 200 after our initial double Pareto-lognormal distribution), output increases by 0.2%, the capital stock by 0.8%, and the average wealth of the top 1% decreases by 3.9% (less than 0.04% per year). While the wealth distribution keeps evolving, it does so sufficiently slowly to consider that the economy is in a quasi-stationary state 100 years after the beginning of the simulations. Moreover, wealth dynamics over thousands of years are of little empirical relevance to analyse wealth inequality within our modern world. The calibration is summarized in Table 1.

are very sensitive to the choice of ζ. Choosing instead one or two years worth of GDP would hardly modify our findings.

Parameter	Calibration	Moment
Capital intensity	$\alpha = 0.3$	Capital share
Scale parameter	$A = 2885$	U.S. GDP per household in 2012
Depreciation rate	$\delta = 7.55\%$	Average household wealth in 2012
Population growth rate	$n = 1\%$	Long-run U.S. average
Productivity growth rate	$g = 2\%$	Long-run U.S. average
Borrowing limit	$\underline{a} = 0$	No borrowing
Discount rate	$\rho = 4\%$	·
Complementarity parameter	$\sigma = 1$	Additively separable preferences
Reference wealth level	$\zeta = -66000$	6 months worth of GDP per household
Concavity parameter	$\mu = 0.23$	Average wealth of bottom 90%
Intensity parameter	$\gamma = 7.65 \cdot 10^{-6}$	Average wealth of top 1%
Transition rate from W to N	$\lambda_W = 1/75$	Average persistence of state W of 75 years
Transition rate from N to W	$\lambda_N = 1/300$	20% of households in state W

Table 1: Calibration

5.2 Simulation

Let us now investigate the properties of our simulated economy. Throughout this section we focus on the equilibrium at the point in time used for the calibration (which is 100 years after the double Pareto-lognormal distribution used to initiate our simulation).

Table 2 contrasts the moments from our simulation with their empirical counterparts in the U.S., where the matched moments are highlighted in bold. Our model successfully matches the thickness of the upper tail of the U.S. wealth distribution. Our calibration strategy forces our model to match the average wealth of the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. However, our model induces 72% of households to be at the borrowing limit, while in the data only 20% of U.S. households have non-positive wealth (Wolff, 2021). This gross overestimation of the share of households with zero wealth is clearly due to the absence of precautionary saving. However, such precautionary saving of poor households would not fundamentally affect the dynamics of wealth inequality that we emphasize in this paper.

Recall that in a neoclassical growth model, without a preference for wealth, the interest rate converges to $\rho+\sigma g = 6\%$ (which follows from the Euler equation (9) without a preference for wealth, i.e. with $\gamma = 0$). In the previous section, we have shown that with a representative household who has a preference for wealth, in the inegalitarian steady state, the interest rate converges to $n + g = 3\%$.[17] In our calibration, the interest

[17]Our calibration implies that, in the absence of wealth preference shocks, the economy would converge to the inegalitarian steady state since the initial wealth distribution has a thick upper tail and we have $r^E > n + g$, where $r^E = f'(k^E) - \delta$ with k^E and c^E jointly defined by (16) and (17).

Moment	Empirical	Model
U.S. GDP per household in 2012	132000	132000
Average wealth per household in 2012	343000	342000
Average wealth: Bottom 90%	84000	84000
Average wealth: Top 10%	2.56 mil.	2.67 mil.
Average wealth: Top 1%	13.84 mil.	13.82 mil.
Average wealth: Top 0.1%	72.8 mil.	84.06 mil.
Average wealth: Top 0.01%	371 mil.	348.67 mil.
Top 10% wealth percentile	660000	1.04 mil.
Top 1% wealth percentile	3.96 mil.	2.69 mil.
Top 0.1% wealth percentile	20.6 mil.	22.7 mil.
Top 0.01% wealth percentile	111 mil.	185 mil.
Wealth share: Bottom 90%	0.228	0.221
Wealth share: Top 10%	0.772	0.779
Wealth share: Top 1%	0.418	0.404
Wealth share: Top 0.1%	0.220	0.246
Wealth share: Top 0.01%	0.112	0.102
Share of households with $a \leq 0$	0.198	0.722

Table 2: Comparison of moments

Sources: GDP per household in 2012 is obtained by combining data for GDP per capita from the World Bank with the average household size in 2012 from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data for average wealth, wealth percentiles and wealth shares in 2012 are from Table 1 of Saez and Zucman (2016). Data on the share of households with non-positive wealth is taken from Table 1 of Wolff (2021), where we report the average value over 2001-2019.

rate is equal to 4.02%. Hence, even though only 20% of households have a preference for wealth, their saving behavior substantially raises the capital stock relative to the neoclassical growth model. Note that, at the golden rule, the capital stock would be 13.8% higher and output 4.0% higher; while, in the absence of preference for wealth, the steady state capital stock would be 20.3% lower and output 6.6% lower.

Figure 3 displays the saving and consumption behavior of households. The upper two panels depict the increase in wealth $\dot{a}_0^j$ at time 0 of households of type $j \in \{W, N\}$ as a function of their wealth a_0^j. The upper left panel focuses on the saving behavior of households with wealth up to \$20 million, while the upper right panel raises that threshold to \$500 million.[18] Wealth accumulation in both states exhibits a U-shaped pattern, similar to the one depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1 for the partial equilibrium case. Under our calibration, households with a preference for wealth always accumulate wealth (as shown by the solid line). By contrast, households without a preference for wealth dissipate wealth, unless their own wealth level is above \$250

[18]Our wealth grid goes up to \$5 billion but, under our simulation, less than 0.0016% of households owning 2.99% of aggregate wealth are above \$500 million.

million, beyond which they also accumulate wealth (as shown by the dashed line). This saving behavior of wealthy households of type N is due to their anticipation that they might eventually regain the preference for wealth.



Figure 3: Saving and consumption behavior

The fact that wealth diverges above a certain threshold regardless of the state $j \in \{W, N\}$ suggests that, even with wealth preference shocks, the economy never converges to a stationary state. However, this divergence of very wealthy households appears to be of limited empirical relevance over time horizons of interest. At time 0 (which is 100 years after the double Pareto-lognormal distribution), less than 0.0051% of households of type N own more than \$250 million and their cumulative wealth amounts to 4.8% of the total wealth of the economy. Our simulation over several centuries shows that the dynamics of wealth inequality is primarily driven by the rising wealth of households of type W and the falling wealth of households of type N, not by the rising wealth of a very small number of households of type N. Thus, compared to the previous section, the wealth preference shocks considerably slow down the diverging wealth accumulation dynamics, to such an extent that the aggregate variables of the economy are almost constant over time.[19]

[19] Alternatively, to have a stationary wealth distribution, we could assume that households who do not have a preference for wealth either fail to foresee that some of their descendants might have a

The lower left panel of Figure 3 plots the consumption functions, where c_0^j denotes the consumption at time 0 of households of type $j \in \{W, N\}$ as a function of their wealth a_0^j. Households with a preference for wealth choose to consume much less and save much more for any given wealth level than households who do not directly value wealth.

The last panel of Figure 3 depicts the saving rates s_0^j at time 0 of households of type $j \in \{W, N\}$ as a function of their wealth a_0^j. Let A_t^j denotes real wealth, with $a_t^j = A_t^j/(G_t N_t)$ being wealth per efficiency unit of labor. The household's flow of funds given by (5) can equivalently be written as $\dot{A}_t^j = r_t A_t^j + w_t G_t N_t - c_t^j G_t N_t$. Hence, the saving rate should be defined as $s_t^j = \dot{A}_t^j/(r_t A_t^j + w_t G_t N_t)$, which can equivalently be written as

$$s_t^j = \frac{\dot{a}_t^j + (g+n)a_t^j}{r_t a_t^j + w_t}. \tag{19}$$

As the economy is growing over time, some households of type N can simultaneously have a positive saving rate, i.e. $s_t^N > 0$, and a decreasing level of wealth per efficiency unit of labor, i.e. $\dot{a}_t^N < 0$. This shows that, in a growing economy, the dynamics of wealth inequality is primarily driven by changes in wealth per efficiency unit of labor $\dot{a}_t^j$ rather than by the saving rate s_t^j, despite the later being commonly emphasized in policy discussions.

As households of type W always accumulate wealth, none of them is borrowing constrained. By contrast, 90.2% of households of type N are borrowing constrained. The average wealth of households is equal to \$1.23 million for type W and to \$120 000 for type N (and to \$1.22 million for the 9.8% of households of type N who are not borrowing constrained). Thus 72.12% of the wealth of the economy is owned by the 20% of households who are of type W. However, among the wealthiest households, a sizeable fraction is of type N. Households of type N account for 10.9% of households within the top 10% of the wealth distribution, 32.0% of households within the top 1%, and 50.4% of households within the top 0.1%. Many of these wealthy individuals of type N belong to dynasties that were formally of type W. Despite this composition effect, the average saving rate is increasing in wealth: the saving rate reaches 41.5% for the top 1%, 30.9% for the following 9%, and only 2.1% for the bottom 90%.

preference for wealth or never value the preference for wealth of their descendants (which corresponds to "imperfect empathy" *à la* Bisin and Verdier (2001)). Both interpretations imply that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of households of type N should be written with $\lambda_N = 0$.

6 Wealth taxation

Let us now rely on numerical simulations to investigate the effects of the taxation of wealth. We first consider a wealth levy, before turning to a progressive tax on wealth, and finally to a progressive consumption tax.

6.1 Wealth levy

A wealth levy is a one-off lump-sum redistribution of wealth. In 1945, after World War II, France implemented a wealth levy of up to 20% (and up to 100% on war profits). In 1947, about 40% of Japan's cultivated land was redistributed, from landlords to their tenants. While such wealth levies are exceptional, they offer a good way to analyze the general equilibrium effects of wealth redistribution within our model. We therefore consider a 20% levy on wealth above a \$10 million threshold, redistributed lump-sum to borrowing constrained households with zero wealth. This levy raises \$16 026, amounting to 4.7% of the total wealth of the economy. It finances a lump-sum transfer of \$22 199 for each borrowing-constrained household, amounting to 24.0% of their annual labor income.

Figure 4 shows the impact of the wealth levy on the aggregate variables of the economy. For each variable, the dashed line displays the trajectory that the economy would have followed in the absence of the levy, while the solid line shows the trajectory following the implementation of the policy. Borrowing constrained households, who are of type N, spend their lump-sum transfer within less than 6 years. This results in a consumption boom. However, on impact, output remains equal to $f(k_0)$. Hence, the 5.3% surge in consumption leads to a 14.0% drop in investment. This induces a contraction of the capital stock of up to 3.1%. Hence, output and wages fall, while the interest rate rises. Once the recipients have spent the transfer, aggregate consumption falls. This allows investment, and subsequently the capital stock, to recover.

Changes in future interest rates and wages induce strong general equilibrium effects. Hence, households who are not directly affected by the wealth levy modify their behavior. In particular, households with positive but limited wealth respond to higher interest rates and lower wages by reducing their consumption and raising their saving, thereby limiting the contraction in investment.

Figure 5 displays the consumption-equivalent welfare gain of households at time 0 as a function of their type $j \in \{W, N\}$ and of their wealth a_0^j (before the implementation of the levy). As expected, the mechanical impact of the policy induces a welfare gain for households with zero wealth, who benefit from the transfer, and a welfare loss for very wealthy households, who are subject to the levy. More interestingly, the general equilibrium effects generate a sizeable welfare gain for moderately wealthy



Figure 4: Effects of a 20% wealth levy on macroeconomic aggregates

households of type W with wealth between \$152 000 and \$11.7 million and of type N with wealth between \$825 000 and \$11.7. Their saving is rewarded by a higher interest rate, which is particularly beneficial to households of type W who enjoy accumulating wealth. Conversely, the capital levy is detrimental to low wealth households of type W who own less than \$152 000 and of type N who own less than \$825 000. Having non-zero wealth, they do not receive the transfer and they lose from the reduction in the wage rate induced by the fall in the capital stock.

These general equilibrium effects are the consequence of the heterogeneity in saving rates. In the neoclassical growth model, i.e. without any preference for wealth, the interest rate converges to $\rho + \sigma g$ and all households consume their permanent income $(r - n - g)a + w$. Hence, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is identical, and equal to $r - n - g$, for all households. This implies that a wealth levy does not have any impact on capital accumulation, or on any other macroeconomic aggregate of the economy. Hence, the middle class, who neither pay the levy nor receive the transfer, are not affected by this policy.

By contrast, under a preference for wealth, the tax levy redistributes resources from rich households with a high saving rate to poor households with a low saving rate,



Figure 5: Consumption-equivalent welfare gain from the wealth levy

resulting in a fall in aggregate saving and, hence, in investment.[20] To be more precise, an individual with wealth a has income $ra+w$. So, when one dollar is taken away from a wealthy individual, her income falls by r dollars and her consumption by $(1-s)r$, which is typically very small since her saving rate s is high, especially if she is of type W (as can be seen from the lower left panel of Figure 3). For instance, with $r = 4\%$ and $s = 75\%$, a dollar taken from a wealthy individual reduces her consumption by only 1 cent. By contrast, poor households at the borrowing constraint have a very high marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and therefore choose to spend much of that dollar of transfer over a short period of time. So, the increase in the consumption of the poor is an order of magnitude larger than the decline in the consumption of the rich. Aggregate consumption is therefore bound to surge, and investment bound to contract.

In a nutshell, the levy transforms the stock wealth into a flow of consumption. While this redistribution policy trivially satisfies the government budget constraint, it cannot bypass the aggregate resource constraint, which entails a meaningful trade-off: the consumption boom of the poor occurs at the expense of investment and of capital accumulation. This is detrimental to poor households who do not receive the

[20] Formally, $\int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty}[s_t^W(a)[r_t a + w_t]\phi_W(a,t) + s_t^N(a)[r_t a + w_t]\phi_N(a,t)]da = i_t - \delta k_t$, where i_t denotes the flow of investment per efficiency unit of labor. This expression follows from the capital accumulation equation (12), which gives $i_t = \dot{k}_t + (\delta + n + g)k_t$, together with the asset market clearing equation (13), and the definition of the saving rate (19).

transfer. Moreover, the tax levy results in permanently less wealth in the hands of rich households with very high saving rates, leading to a permanently lower capital stock. Under a dynastic interpretation of our infinitely-lived households, this is detrimental to future generations of poor households who will suffer from lower wages.[21]

While a levy on initial wealth used to finance redistribution to poor households is a free lunch within the neoclassical growth model, such is not the case under a preference for wealth. This is fundamentally due to the heterogeneity in saving behavior across households with different wealth levels. Hence, these insights are valid under alternative microfoundations leading to heterogeneity in saving behavior, such as differences in discount rates.

6.2 Progressive wealth tax

Wealth inequality in the U.S. is high. This has induced some politicians to advocate for a progressive wealth tax. In 2019, Elizabeth Warren proposed to tax at 2% per year wealth above $50 billion, and at 3% per year wealth above $1 billion. Bernie Sanders proposed an even more progressive tax, starting at a rate of 1% above $32 million and rising to 8% above $10 billion. Saez and Zucman (2019a,b) even considered a "radical wealth tax", with a constant marginal rate of 10% above $1 billion. The aim of this policy would not be to collect revenue, but to "deconcentrate wealth".

Until 2017, France has had a progressive wealth tax with a marginal tax rate of 0.7% above $1.4 million, rising up to 1.5% above $10 million. However, "professional wealth" (defined as wealth related to the primary source of labor income) was exempt, allowing many wealthy entrepreneurs to avoid this tax. In 2018, this tax became a progressive real estate tax, with similar rates and rules.

While progressive wealth taxes are rather uncommon, bequests taxes are widespread. They are typically progressive, with a maximum rate that was equal in 2013 to 45% in France, 40% in the U.K., 35% in the U.S., and 30% in Germany (Piketty, 2014). From the 1950s to the 1970s, this maximum rate in the U.K. and the U.S. rose above 70%. Recall that the preference for wealth of an infinitely-lived household can be interpreted as a bequest motive within an altruistic dynasty. This makes our framework particularly suitable to investigate the taxation of dynastic wealth. Note that when the interest rate is equal to 4%, a 40% bequest tax levied once a generation, i.e. once every 25 years, is roughly equivalent to a 2.1% annual wealth tax, since $1.04^{25}(1-0.4) = (1.04-0.021)^{25}$.

In light of these policies, we simulate a progressive wealth tax with a 2% marginal rate per year above a threshold of $10 million. The proceeds are redistributed to house-

[21] This is also detrimental to the future selves of the receivers, but this is not detrimental from a welfare perspective since they could have chosen to save the money and chose not to. By contrast, future generations of not-yet-born individuals could not have made that choice.

holds at the borrowing constraint (or just above such as to avoid taxing the wealth of very poor households at more than 100%). Initially, 0.23% of households have wealth above \$10 million. They own 30.0% of the capital stock of the economy. The tax finances a transfer of \$2 216 per household with zero wealth (and a transfer of size $\$2\ 216 - a$ for households with initial wealth a below \$2 216). At the borrowing constraint, this amounts to 2.4% of annual labor income.

Figure 6 displays the impact of this policy on the main macroeconomic aggregates of the economy. Unlike the wealth levy, this wealth tax yields a continuous flow of income to its recipients. Hence, the transfers are all spent instantly by borrowing constrained households, who therefore remain borrowing constrained. The continuous flow of transfers therefore induces a much more persistent boom in consumption than the wealth levy. The flip side is a more persistent decline in investment, resulting in a contraction of the capital stock of up to 3.1% (relative to the trajectory without the tax). Output falls by up to 0.9% and wages by up to 0.9%.



Figure 6: Effects of progressive wealth tax on macroeconomic aggregates

To fully account for these macroeconomic effects, we need to understand how different households respond to this progressive wealth tax. Figure 7 displays the increase in saving Δa_0^j and in consumption Δc_0^j at time 0 for households of type $j \in \{W, N\}$ as a function of their wealth a_0^j. By each household's flow of funds con-

straint (5), the sum of these two responses must be equal to the transfer received net of the tax paid.[22] Borrowing constrained households raise their consumption by the amount of the transfer and their wealth remains equal to zero. Type N households with wealth below \$578 000 raise their consumption to deplete their wealth such as to qualify for the transfers. Very wealthy households who pay the tax respond by reducing their saving, but also by raising their consumption. Higher consumption is the consequence of the tax-induced distortion to their intertemporal allocation of consumption. Type W households who are just below the \$10 million threshold are no longer expecting to cross it. They therefore anticipate their future saving to be lower and their future consumption to be higher. This induces them to raise their current consumption even though, in equilibrium, they will never pay the tax. Households with smaller wealth respond to the higher interest rates and the lower wages by reducing their consumption and raising their saving, as was the case under the tax levy.



Figure 7: Effects of progressive wealth tax on impact

The sharp decline in saving above the \$10 million threshold implies that, over time, the tax successfully compresses wealth inequality. This is shown by the top three panels of Figure 8. The average wealth of the top 1% shrinks by 60.8% over a century. As the capital sock falls by a much smaller amount, the average wealth of the top 10% to 1% increases considerably, by 46.7% over a century. This sharp reduction in wealth inequality has an ambiguous impact on consumption inequality, as shown by

[22] Formally, for any wealth level a, we have $\Delta \dot{a}_0^j(a) + \Delta c_0^j(a) = \max\{T_0 - a, 0\} - \tau \max\{a - a^T, 0\}$, where T_0 denotes the initial transfer, τ that tax rate, and a^T the exemption threshold.

the bottom three panels of Figure 8. Initially both the top 1% and bottom 90% raise their consumption, while the remaining 9% are induced to consume less by general equilibrium effects, which allows them accumulate more wealth. Over the long-run, the smaller wealth of the top 1% induces them to consume less, while the much higher wealth of the following 9% allows them to consume more.



Figure 8: Redistributive effects of progressive wealth tax

The fall in the average wealth of the top 1% implies that tax revenue contracts over time. Hence, the magnitude of the transfer to the poor converges to zero, as shown by the left panel of Figure 9. Hence, the consumption of borrowing constrained households eventually converges back to their labor income, which is reduced by the progressive wealth tax due to a smaller capital stock. The right panel of Figure 9 displays the sum of the wage rate and of the transfer, which corresponds to the consumption of borrowing-constrained households. It shows that, 38.8 years after its implementation, the progressive wealth tax results in lower consumption for poor households. Over the long-run, the progressive wealth tax benefits the upper-middle class, rather than the poor.

In the neoclassical growth model, i.e. without the preference for wealth, such a progressive wealth tax would initially entail comparable general equilibrium effects,



Figure 9: Effects of progressive wealth tax on the transfer to the poor

since the tax would also induce wealthy households to reduce their saving. However, as the wealth of these households falls below the $10 million threshold, the interest rate would converge back to $\rho + \sigma g$ and the aggregate variables of the economy would return to the same steady state as before. Hence, the progressive wealth tax would permanently reduce wealth inequality, without reducing the long-term capital stock. By contrast, with a preference for wealth, the progressive wealth tax prevents the concentration of wealth in the hands of few dynasties that are so wealthy that their propensity to save is very high. This permanently reduces the capital stock.

Figure 10 displays the consumption-equivalent welfare gain of households at time 0 as a function of their type $j \in \{W, N\}$ and of their wealth a_0^j. The result are qualitatively similar as for a wealth levy: very wealthy households loose from the tax, borrowing-constrained households gain from the transfer, while moderately wealthy households benefit from a higher interest rate that rewards their high propensity to save, especially if they are of type W and therefore enjoy accumulating wealth.

Social welfare. An infinitely-lived household should be interpreted as a dynasty. By focusing on welfare at time 0, we only attach some weight to the welfare of future generations through the altruism of their parents. Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007) have forcefully, and correctly, argued that the social planner can also directly care about future generations of not-yet-born individuals, independently of the altruism of their parents. Let $\theta \in [0, \infty)$ denote the *social discount factor*. Over a time horizon of length T, social welfare can therefore be defined as

$$W(\theta) = \int_0^T \frac{\theta e^{-\theta t}}{1 - e^{-\theta T}} \bar{v}_t dt, \tag{20}$$

where $\bar{v}_t$ denote social welfare for the generation alive at time t.[23] When $\theta = \infty$,

[23]Such a formulation is more natural in a discrete time setting where one time period corresponds



Figure 10: Consumption-equivalent welfare gain at time 0

the planner does not directly care about future generations and we have $W = \bar{v}_0$. And when $\theta = 0$, the planner cares equally about all future generations and we have $W = (1/T)\int_0^T \bar{v}_t dt$.[24] Social welfare within generation t can be utilitarian, which gives $\bar{v}_t = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty}[v_W(a,t)\phi_W(a,t) + v_N(a,t)\phi_N(a,t)]da$, where $v_j(a,t)$ denote the welfare at time t of a household of type j with wealth a. Alternatively, social welfare at t can be Rawlsian with $\bar{v}_t = v_N(\underline{a}, t)$.

Figure 11 displays the consumption-equivalent social welfare gain from the implementation of the progressive wealth tax as a function of the social discount rate θ.[25] The solid line corresponds to the utilitarian case, and the dashed line to the Rawlsian case. As the social discount rate θ goes down, the planner cares more about future generations and, in the Rawlsian case, social welfare is lower. In fact, whenever θ is below 0.045, the progressive wealth tax generates a social welfare loss. This results from the adverse effect of the progressive wealth tax on the capital stock, on wages and, hence,

to one generation. Our formulation can be seen as the limit as the life span of each generation tends to zero. As we focus on the long-term evolution of inequality, this simplification has no bearing on the qualitative insights from our analysis.

[24] While in theory the length T of the horizon can be arbitrarily large, our simulations take $T = 300$ years.

[25] Given that we have logarithmic utility of consumption, the consumption-equivalent social welfare gain x is simply determined by $\Delta W(\theta) = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho-n)s}\ln(1+x)ds$, where $\Delta W(\theta)$ is the increase in social welfare due to the tax policy. This gives $x = e^{(\rho-n)\Delta W(\theta)} - 1$. It corresponds to the proportional increase in consumption within the pre-reform allocation that yields the same social welfare as obtained after the implementation of the tax policy.

on the welfare of future generations of poor households. In particular, the Rawlsian planner with $\theta = 0$, which Piketty and Saez (2013) emphasize as the "meritocartic Rawlsian steady state" benchmark, rejects our progressive wealth tax.



Figure 11: Social welfare gain

Figure 12 shows the consumption-equivalent social welfare gain for the generation alive at time t.[26] The Rawlsian case shows that the progressive tax policy fails to raise the welfare of poor households born more than 16.5 years after the implementation of the policy. This explains the social welfare loss displayed in Figure 11 for θ sufficiently small.

Figure 11 shows that, in the utilitarian case, the progressive wealth tax always enhances social welfare. Moreover, the social welfare gain is larger if the planner cares more about future generations. Figure 12 shows that this is driven by the benefit that households of type W derive from the policy. Indeed, the progressive wealth tax induces a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, which benefits upper-middle class households of type W. Future generations of households who value owning some assets (such as their house) are the main beneficiary of the progressive wealth tax that prevents the concentration of wealth within the top 1% of the population.

[26] Formally, it displays $e^{(\rho-n)\Delta\bar{v}_t} - 1$ as a function of t, where $\Delta\bar{v}_t$ denotes the increase in social welfare due to the tax policy for the generation alive at time t.



Figure 12: Consumption-equivalent social welfare gain for each generation

6.3 Progressive consumption tax

The problem with the progressive wealth tax is that it penalizes wealthy households of type W who did not intend to spend their wealth. A progressive consumption tax seems preferable since, conditional on wealth, it targets the big spenders of type N rather than the savers of type W. Let us therefore investigate such a progressive consumption tax. Note that, in practice, a non-linear consumption tax can be implemented by taxing total income $ra + w$ net of saving $\dot{a} + (n + g)a$. As the saving entails a tax deduction, households have no incentive to under-report them.

We consider a 50% tax on consumption in excess of a threshold of \$200 000 per year. As before, the proceeds are redistributed to households at the borrowing constraint (or just above, as for the progressive wealth tax). At time 0, this tax is paid by 0.25% of households, which is comparable to the 0.23% subject to the progressive wealth tax in the previous section. Initially, the transfer amounts to \$426. While this is only a fifth of the initial transfer under the progressive wealth tax, as we shall see, the amount of the transfer is substantially more persistent over time.[27]

Figure 13 displays the impact of the progressive consumption tax on the main macroeconomic aggregates of the economy. Initially, households with very low wealth deplete their wealth such as to qualify for the transfer, which results in a small consumption boom. Wealthier households, who would have consumed more than \$200 000 in the absence of the tax, significantly reduce their consumption. This leads to a protracted fall in consumption, which raises investment, the capital stock, and output. While the magnitude of the effect is moderate, this results in higher wages, which is the opposite of the effect of the progressive wealth tax.

Figure 14 shows that the progressive consumption tax hardly compresses wealth

[27]The rate of our progressive consumption tax is below the peak of the Laffer curve. Reducing the marginal tax rate above \$200 000 to 49% reduces tax revenue at time 0.



Figure 13: Effects of consumption tax on macroeconomic aggregates

inequality. However, it sharply and persistently reduces consumption inequality. Figure 15 shows that the policy results in a permanent transfer of wealth from rich to poor households, unlike the progressive wealth tax of the previous section.

Figure 16 shows that, in both the utilitarian and the Rawlsian case, the progressive consumption tax generates a positive social welfare gain for any value of the social discount rate θ. The social welfare gain is even larger in the Rawlsian case since the policy is particularly beneficial to the poor. Over the long-run, the progressive wealth tax redistributes welfare from the very rich to the upper-middle class, while the progressive consumption tax redistributes from the rich to the poor. This is due to the elimination of adverse general equilibrium effects that hinder the accumulation of capital.

While we have taken the preference for wealth as exogenously given, a consumption tax could alter that preference. In particular, it could reduce the extent to which households of type W enjoy accumulating wealth, even if they had no intention of spending it. This could greatly diminish the merits of a progressive consumption tax. While these considerations are important, the endogeneity of the preference for wealth to the tax system is beyond the scope of our analysis and therefore left for future research.

Finally, relaxing the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, it is interesting



Figure 14: Effects of progressive consumption tax on macroeconomic aggregates



Figure 15: Effects of progressive consumption tax on the transfer to the poor

to think about the special case of the luxury industry and of its interaction with wealth inequality. Rich dynasties that have lost their preference for wealth are likely to spend lavishly on luxury goods. Indeed, over the previous decades, the rise in wealth inequality throughout the world has fueled an unprecedented expansion of the luxury industry. Given the power of branding, this industry is characterized by very high mark-ups. Hence, this conspicuous consumption shifts wealth to the owners of the



Figure 16: Social welfare gain

luxury brands, such as Bernard Arnault (the owner and CEO of LVMH) who has become in 2023 the wealthiest individual on earth and who appears to have a strong preference for wealth. This suggests that the luxury industry may, to some extent, act as a progressive consumption tax that redistributes its proceeds to billionaires with a preference for wealth, which contributes to the accumulation of capital. Our analysis suggests that, however frivolous, this conspicuous consumption is not as wasteful as first meets the eye.[28]

7 Conclusion

The preference for wealth captures the essence of the spirit of capitalism, which entails frugality and thriftiness. According to Weber (1930): *"When the limitation of consumption is combined with this release of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious: accumulation of capital through ascetic compulsion to save"*. Our analysis has shown that this spirit of capitalism can indeed be an essential driver of the enduring prosperity of a capitalist economy.

If the overwhelming majority of the population has a high discount rate and a weak

[28]In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Adam Smith argues that the "invisible hand" operates through the consumption of luxuries, which redistributes the excesses of wealth inequality. By contrast, the "invisible hand" of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) emphasizes the social usefulness of investment and capital accumulation. For an interesting discussion of these two "invisible hands", see Brewer (2009).

propensity to save, how will the economy accumulate the capital it needs for long-term prosperity? By concentrating wealth in the hands of few households who, thanks to their spirit of capitalism and to their immense wealth, have high saving rates! Our analysis therefore extends the scope of the invisible hand. Indeed, without a preference for wealth, the market mechanism fails to ensure the well-being of the not-yet-born descendants of non-altruistic parents. Thanks to the preference for wealth, the greed of wealthy households serves the interests of these future generations of workers, even though this was not part of their intention. The spirit of capitalism ensures that markets are not only efficient, but also caring about future generations. Moreover, wealth inequality only expands when it is needed to foster capital accumulation. Indeed, if thriftiness is sufficiently widespread, we end up with $r < n + g$, which spontaneously induces convergence towards an egalitarian distribution of wealth.[29]

Empirically, the saving rate is strongly increasing in wealth. This implies that redistribution from rich to poor is bound to reduce the supply of savings, which is detrimental to future generations. An alternative would be for the government to implement a progressive wealth tax and to save, rather redistribute, the proceeds. However, in addition to hindering the incentives to work hard to accumulate wealth, such a policy would reduce the welfare that thrifty households derive from holding wealth and it would probably deteriorate the quality of investment as rich households are likely to be more careful when investing their own money than a government agency is when investing public money.

A progressive wealth tax induces general equilibrium effects that benefit the property-owning upper-middle class. A progressive consumption tax targets wealthy households with a low propensity to save, which makes it preferable for redistribution to the poor. In many countries, wealthy households already face a progressive consumption tax: the personal income tax is progressive and wealthy households can avoid it by reinvesting their income from capital within their firm. Our work provides a justification for this tax practice, which is widespread albeit controversial.

While we have assumed a neoclassical economy, our results can be overturned in a Keynesian setup, at least in the short-run. When aggregate demand is deficient, wealth redistribution from rich to poor households raises consumption, output, and, hence, investment and capital accumulation. This a consequence of the paradox of thrift: a decline in the aggregate propensity to save *raises* the volume of aggregate savings.[30] In fact, in practice, the existence of nominal rigidities implies that progressive wealth

[29]Our earlier research shows that, in this case, the preference for wealth can also be a source of efficiency by generating a rational bubble that prevents an over-accumulation of capital (Michau, Ono, and Schlegl, 2023).

[30]Such Keynesian insights can be obtained under a preference for wealth by simply introducing money and assuming a downward nominal wage rigidity (Ono, 1994, 2001; Michau, 2018).

taxation is likely to create a spending boom and, hence, an investment boom in the short-run. This suggests that the adverse consequences of progressive wealth taxation that we have emphasized throughout this paper are likely to be hard to identify empirically following tax reforms, even if they are predominant over the long-run.

Clearly, our analysis has abstracted from major political economy problems caused by an extreme concentration of wealth. Billionaires can buy influence and distort the political process to their advantage, as the robber barons showed in the U.S. in the late 19th century. More generally, excessive wealth inequality can trigger revolutionary forces that should be avoided through progressive wealth taxation (Farhi, Sleet, Werning, and Yeltekin, 2012; Farhi and Werning, 2014). Restraining wealth inequality may therefore be necessary to preserve a healthy balance of power in society, even if this reduces the accumulation of capital.

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A Piketty (2014)'s theory of wealth inequality

In his introduction (page 34), Piketty (2014) argues that:

> In slowly growing economies, past wealth naturally takes on disproportionate importance, because it takes only a small flow of new savings to increase the stock of wealth steadily and substantially.
>
> If, moreover, the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for an extended period of time, then the risk of divergence in the distribution of wealth is very high.
>
> When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy (as it did through much of history until the nineteenth century and as is likely to be the case again in the twenty-first century), then it logically follows that inherited wealth grows faster than output and income. People with inherited wealth need save only a portion of their income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly than the economy as a whole. Under such conditions, it is almost inevitable that inherited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime's labor by a wide margin, and the concentration of capital will attain extremely high levels.

In chapter 10 (page 442), he further explains:

> The primary reason for the hyperconcentration of wealth in traditional agrarian societies and to a large extent in all societies prior to World War I is that these were low-growth societies in which the rate of return on capital was markedly and durably higher than the rate of growth.
>
> For example, if $g = 1\%$ and $r = 5\%$, saving one-fifth of the income from capital (while consuming the other four-fifths) is enough to ensure that capital inherited from the previous generation grows at the same rate as the economy. I one saves more, because one's fortune is large enough to live well while consuming somewhat less of one's annual rent, then one's fortune will increase more rapidly than the economy, and inequality of wealth will increase even if one contributes no income from labor. For strictly mathematical reasons, then, the conditions are ideals for an "inheritance society" to prosper – where by "inheritance society" I mean a society characterized by both a very high concentration of wealth and a significant persistence of large fortunes from generation to generation.

Piketty (2014) hardly delves into the general equilibrium consequences of the $r > g$ dynamics of wealth inequality. In chapter 10 (page 455), he nonetheless briefly men-

tions "the forces that can avoid an indefinite inegalitarian spiral and stabilize inequality of wealth", emphasizing that:

> if the fortunes of wealthy individuals grow more rapidly than average income, the capital / income ratio will rise indefinitely, which in the long run should lead to a decrease in the rate of return of capital. Nevertheless, this mechanism can take decades to operate.

By contrast, we show that, unless a high propensity to save is so widespread that the economy converges to an egalitarian steady state, the economy reaches an equilibrium where r asymptotically converges to g, the capital stock converges to the golden rule level, and wealthy inequality grows without bounds. Hence, this process does neither "avoid an indefinite inegalitarian spiral" nor "stabilize inequality of wealth".

B Mean field game

This appendix offers a "mean field game" representation of the equilibrium given by Definition 1.

The household's problem consists in maximizing intertemporal utility (8) subject to the flow of funds constraint (5) and the borrowing constraint (6), for a given level of initial wealth. The following lemma defines the detrended value function $v(a,t)$ that will be constant in steady state.

Lemma A1 *The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the detrended value function $v(a,t)$ is given by*

$$\begin{aligned}(\rho - n - (1-\sigma)g)\, v(a,t) \;=\; \max_{c} \; & \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[\ln(c) + \gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right)-1}{1-\sigma} \\ & + v_a(a,t)\left[(r_t - n - g)\, a + w_t - c\right] + v_t(a,t), \quad \text{(A1)}\end{aligned}$$

where $v_a(a,t) = \partial v(a,t)/\partial a$ and $v_t(a,t) = \partial v(a,t)/\partial t$.

Proof. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation corresponding to the household's problem is given by

$$\begin{aligned}(\rho - n)\,\tilde{v}(a,t) \;=\; \max_{c} \; & \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[gt + \ln(c) + \gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right)-1}{1-\sigma} \\ & + \tilde{v}_a(a,t)\left[(r_t - n - g)\, a + w_t - c\right] + \tilde{v}_t(a,t),\end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{v}(a,t)$ denotes the value function for the original (non-detrended) household's problem. Let $c(a,t)$ denote the corresponding policy function. Using the intertemporal utility function (8), we know that the value function is defined as

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{v}(a,t) &= \int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho-n)(s-t)} \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[gs+\ln(c(a,s))+\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right)-1}{1-\sigma} ds, \\
&= e^{(1-\sigma)gt}\int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g)(s-t)} \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[\ln(c(a,t))+\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right)-1}{1-\sigma} ds \\
&\quad + \frac{e^{(1-\sigma)gt}}{1-\sigma}\int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g)(s-t)} ds - \frac{1}{1-\sigma}\int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho-n)(s-t)} ds, \\
&= e^{(1-\sigma)gt} v(a,t) + \frac{1}{\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g}\frac{e^{(1-\sigma)gt}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{1}{\rho-n}\frac{1}{1-\sigma},
\end{aligned}$$

where $v(a,t)$ denotes the detrended value function. We therefore have $\tilde{v}_a(a,t) = e^{(1-\sigma)gt} v_a(a,t)$ and $\tilde{v}_t(a,t) = (1-\sigma)ge^{(1-\sigma)gt}v(a,t) + e^{(1-\sigma)gt}v_t(a,t) + \frac{ge^{(1-\sigma)gt}}{\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g}$. Substituting these expressions into the above Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for $\tilde{v}(a,t)$ and multiplying both sides by $e^{-(1-\sigma)gt}$ yields

$$\begin{aligned}
&(\rho-n)\left[v(a,t)+\frac{1}{\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g}\frac{1}{1-\sigma}-\frac{1}{\rho-n}\frac{e^{-(1-\sigma)gt}}{1-\sigma}\right] \\
&\quad = \max_c \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[\ln(c)+\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right)-e^{-(1-\sigma)gt}}{1-\sigma} \\
&\qquad + v_a(a,t)\left[(r_t-n-g)a+w_t-c\right] + (1-\sigma)gv(a,t) + v_t(a,t) + \frac{g}{\rho-n-(1-\sigma)g}.
\end{aligned}$$

After simplification, we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the lemma for the detrended value function $v(a,t)$. ■

The first-order condition yields

$$(c(a,t))^{-\sigma} e^{(1-\sigma)\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}} = v_a(a,t),$$

where $c(a,t)$ is the policy function.

The borrowing constraint $a_t \geq \underline{a}$ implies that, when $a_t = \underline{a}$, we must have

$$\dot{a}_t \geq 0.$$

This implies

$$\begin{aligned}
(r_t - n - g)\,\underline{a} + w_t - c\,(\underline{a}, t) &\geq 0, \\
(r_t - n - g)\,\underline{a} + w_t &\geq c\,(\underline{a}, t)\,, \\
((r_t - n - g)\,\underline{a} + w_t)^{-\sigma} &\leq (c\,(\underline{a}, t))^{-\sigma}\,, \\
((r_t - n - g)\,\underline{a} + w_t)^{-\sigma}\, e^{(1-\sigma)\gamma \frac{(\underline{a}-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}} &\leq v_a\,(\underline{a}, t)\,,
\end{aligned} \tag{A2}$$

which is the state constraint boundary condition.

Let $\phi\,(a, t)$ denote the density of the wealth distribution at time t, where the initial wealth distribution $\phi\,(a, 0)$ is exogenously given. The Kolmogorov forward equation is

$$\begin{aligned}
\phi_t\,(a, t) &= -\frac{\partial}{\partial a}\Big(\left[(r_t - n - g)\,a + w_t - c\,(a, t)\right]\phi\,(a, t)\Big), \\
&= -\left[r_t - n - g - c_a\,(a, t)\right]\phi\,(a, t) \\
&\qquad - \left[(r_t - n - g)\,a + w_t - c\,(a, t)\right]\phi_a\,(a, t)\,,
\end{aligned} \tag{A3}$$

where $\phi_a\,(a, t) = \partial\phi\,(a, t)\,/\partial a$, $\phi_t\,(a, t) = \partial\phi\,(a, t)\,/\partial t$, and $c_a\,(a, t) = \partial c\,(a, t)\,/\partial a$.

We now have all the elements to define the equilibrium of the economy as a "mean field game".

Definition A1 *The general equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (A1), the state constraint boundary condition (A2), the Kolmogorov forward equation (A3), the given initial wealth distribution $\phi\,(a, 0)$, the asset market clearing equation*

$$k_t = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a\phi\,(a, t)\,da, \tag{A4}$$

and the factor market pricing equations $r_t = f'\,(k_t) - \delta$ and $w_t = f\,(k_t) - k_t f'\,(k_t)$.

This definition of equilibrium is equivalent to the one given by Definition 1.[31]

[31] Note that, in an economy without capital, we can consider that the wage rate w is given by a fixed parameter and the interest rate r_t at time t is determined by the asset market clearing equation, which simplifies to

$$0 = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a\phi\,(a, t)\,da.$$

C Proofs

C.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Any state equilibrium must satisfy $c \geq 0$. Hence, by equation (14), we must have $a \geq -w/(r-n-g)$ and, by equation (15), we must have $a \geq \zeta$. To prove the lemma, we first characterize the solution to the system given by equations (14) and (15) for $a \in [\zeta, \infty)$ before establishing the consequences of the borrowing limit $a \geq \underline{a}$ and the natural debt limit $a \geq -w/(r-n-g)$.

Let us define the function $h(a)$ as the difference between equation (14) and equation (15):

$$h(a) = (r-n-g)a + w - \left(\frac{\rho + \sigma g - r}{\gamma}\right)(a-\zeta)^{\mu}. \tag{A5}$$

In the absence of borrowing constraints, a steady state equilibrium is characterized by any wealth level $a \in [\zeta, \infty)$ that solves $h(a) = 0$. The function $h(\cdot)$ is continuous over $[\zeta, \infty)$. We have

$$h'(a) = r - n - g - \mu\left(\frac{\rho + \sigma g - r}{\gamma}\right)(a-\zeta)^{-(1-\mu)},$$

with $h''(a) > 0$, $\lim_{a\to\zeta} h'(a) = -\infty$, and $\lim_{a\to\infty} h'(a) = r - n - g > 0$. Let $\hat{a} \in [\zeta, \infty)$ denote the unique solution to $h'(\hat{a}) = 0$. We clearly have $h'(a) < 0$ for all $a < \hat{a}$ and $h'(a) > 0$ for all $a > \hat{a}$.

The function $h(\cdot)$ therefore has the following four properties:

- $h''(a) > 0$;
- $h'(a) < 0$ for all $a < \hat{a}$ and $h'(a) > 0$ for all $a > \hat{a}$;
- $\lim_{a\to\infty} h(a) = \infty > 0$, since $\mu < 1$;
- $h(\zeta) = (r-n-g)\zeta + w > 0$ if and only if $\zeta > -w/(r-n-g)$.

It immediately follows that we have the following possibilities:

- if $\zeta < -w/(r-n-g)$, then $h(\zeta) < 0$, implying that there must exist a unique steady state with $a \in (\hat{a}, \infty)$ and $h'(a) > 0$;
- if $\zeta \geq -w/(r-n-g)$ and $h(\hat{a}) < 0$, then $h(\zeta) \geq 0$, implying that there must exist two steady states, the lower one with $a \in [\zeta, \hat{a})$ and $h'(a) < 0$ and the upper one with $a \in (\hat{a}, \infty)$ and $h'(a) > 0$;
- if $\zeta > -w/(r-n-g)$ and $h(\hat{a}) > 0$, then $h(\zeta) > 0$, implying that there is no steady state.

Note that $\hat{a}$, as defined by $h'(\hat{a}) = 0$, is independent of w. Hence, if w is sufficiently low (or "not too high"), we must have $h(\hat{a}) < 0$, which rules out this last possibility.

A steady state with $h'(a) > 0$ must be unstable, while a steady state with $h'(a) < 0$ must be saddle-path stable. This can be readily seen from Figure 1. This can also be formally established by linearizing the differential equations (5) and (9) around the steady state. When they exist, the unstable steady state is denoted by a^U and the stable one by a^S.

Finally, let us impose the borrowing limit $a \geq \underline{a}$ and the natural debt limit $a \geq -w/(r-n-g)$. Assuming that $\underline{a} < a^U$, these borrowing limits are only relevant if $a_0 < a^U$. Let us therefore consider that $a_0 \in [\max\{\underline{a}, -w/(r-n-g)\}, a^U)$. Two cases should be considered:

- when $\zeta \geq -w/(r-n-g)$ and $h(\hat{a}) < 0$, wealth converges to $\max\{a^S, \underline{a}\}$;
- when $\zeta < -w/(r-n-g)$, wealth converges to $\max\{\underline{a}, -w/(r-n-g)\}$.

C.2 Proof of Lemma 2

Let $h(a)$ be defined as in the proof of Lemma 1. We are now assuming that $r \leq n+g$. We therefore have $h(\zeta) = (r-n-g)\zeta + w > 0$, since $\zeta \leq 0$. We also have $\lim_{a\to\infty} h(a) = -\infty < 0$. Finally, $h(\cdot)$ is continuous over $[\zeta, \infty)$ with $h'(\cdot) < 0$. Hence, there must exists a unique steady state, characterized by $h(a) = 0$. As this steady state satisfies $h'(a) < 0$, it must be saddle-path stable. It is denoted by a^S.

For any initial wealth, the economy must therefore either converge to a^S or to the borrowing limit $\underline{a}$, whichever is higher.

C.3 Proof of Lemma 3

Let us define the following two functions

$$c_1(k) = f(k) - (\delta + n + g)k,$$
$$c_2(k) = \frac{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k)}{\gamma} (k - \zeta)^{\mu}.$$

Clearly, by equations (16) and (17), a steady state equilibrium k^E is the solution to $c_1(k^E) = c_2(k^E)$.

Let us define $\tilde{k}$ and k^* by $f'(\tilde{k}) = \rho + \delta + \sigma g$ and $f'(k^*) = \delta + n + g$, respectively. We have $f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta = \rho + \sigma g > n + g = f'(k^*) - \delta$, which implies $\tilde{k} < k^*$. Let us also define $\hat{k}$ by $f(\hat{k}) = (\delta+n+g)\hat{k}$ with $f'(\hat{k}) < \delta+n+g$. We therefore have $f'(k^*) = \delta+n+g > f'(\hat{k})$, and hence $k^* < \hat{k}$. This establishes that $\tilde{k} < k^* < \hat{k}$.

We clearly have $c_1(k) > 0$ for all $k \in [\tilde{k}, \hat{k})$ with $c_1(\hat{k}) = 0$. We also have $c_2'(k) > 0$ for all $k \in [\tilde{k}, \hat{k}]$ with $c_2(\tilde{k}) = 0$. Hence, as $c_1(\cdot)$ and $c_2(\cdot)$ are both continuous within $[\tilde{k}, \hat{k}]$, there must exist at least one solution to $c_1(k) = c_2(k)$ within $(\tilde{k}, \hat{k})$.

Let us now show that, under Assumption 1, this solution must be unique. We have

$$\begin{aligned} c_1'(k) - c_2'(k) &= c_1'(k) + \frac{f''(k)}{\gamma}(k-\zeta)^{\mu} - \frac{\mu}{k-\zeta}c_2(k), \\ &= \frac{\mu}{k-\zeta}c_2(k)\left[\frac{k-\zeta}{\mu}\frac{c_1'(k)}{c_2(k)} + \frac{f''(k)}{\mu}\frac{(k-\zeta)^{\mu+1}}{\gamma c_2(k)} - 1\right]. \end{aligned}$$

From Assumption 1, we can compute $d\alpha/dk$ at the equilibrium where $\alpha = 0$. It exactly corresponds to the term in the square bracket, and we know from Assumption 1 that it must be strictly negative. This establishes that any solution to $c_1(k) = c_2(k)$ must satisfy $c_1'(k) < c_2'(k)$. By continuity of $c_1(\cdot)$ and $c_2(\cdot)$, it follows that under Assumption 1 the egalitarian steady state must be unique.

For the egalitarian steady state to be locally stable when capital stock is equal to k^E and the real interest rate to r^E, no household should want to individually deviate from holding that wealth level. Hence, by the proof of Lemma 1, we must have $h'(k^E) < 0$ (with the $h(\cdot)$ function defined in the proof of Lemma 1). This gives

$$r^E < n + g + \mu\left(\frac{\rho + \sigma g - r^E}{\gamma}\right)\left(k^E - \zeta\right)^{-(1-\mu)}.$$

Using the steady state condition (17), this inequality can be written as

$$r^E < n + g + \frac{\mu c^E}{k^E - \zeta}, \tag{A6}$$

which is the condition from Lemma 3.

Note that a stronger requirement for stability is that, starting from the steady state, households do not want to collectively deviate from it. To check the stability of the steady state to a joint deviation, we impose $a_t^i = k_t$ and $c_t^i = c_t$ for all i into the flow of funds constraint (5) and the consumption Euler equation (9). We then linearize the resulting system around the steady state. As c_t is a jump variable, while k_t is not, at least one of the two eigenvalues should be negative. A sufficient condition for this is given by

$$r^E < n + g + \frac{\mu c^E}{k^E - \zeta} - f''(k^E)\frac{(k^E - \zeta)^{\mu}}{\gamma}. \tag{A7}$$

As $f''(k^E) < 0$, this condition is milder than (A6). Hence, if (A6) is satisfied, then so is (A7). Decreasing returns to scale reduces the attractiveness of a collective deviation, relative to an individual deviation.

C.4 Proof of Lemma 4

Before proving the main result about the inegalitarian steady state, we establish the following lemmas. Recall that k^* denotes the capital stock at the golden rule, such that $f'(k^*) - \delta = n + g$.

Lemma A2 *$a^S(k^*)$ exists. $a^U(k)$ exists for k in the neighborhood of k^* with $k < k^*$ and it satisfies $\lim_{k \to k^{*-}} a^U(k) = \infty$.*

Proof. Let us define the function $h(a, k)$ by substituting $r = f'(k) - \delta$ and $w = f(k) - kf'(k)$ into equation (A5) from the proof of Lemma 1. This yields

$$h(a,k) = (f'(k) - \delta - n - g)a + f(k) - kf'(k) - \left(\frac{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k)}{\gamma}\right)(a - \zeta)^{\mu}. \quad \text{(A8)}$$

Let us denote $h_1(a,k) = \partial h(a,k)/\partial a$ and $h_2(a,k) = \partial h(a,k)/\partial k$. The function $a^U(k)$ is defined by $h(a^U(k), k) = 0$ and $h_1(a^U(k), k) > 0$; while $a^S(k)$ is defined by $h(a^S(k), k) = 0$ and $h_1(a^S(k), k) < 0$.

We have

$$h(a, k^*) = f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*) - \left(\frac{\rho - n - (1-\sigma)g}{\gamma}\right)(a - \zeta)^{\mu}.$$

Recall that we have assumed $\rho > n + (1-\sigma)g$. It immediately follows that $a^S(k^*)$ exists such that $h(a^S(k^*), k^*) = 0$ with $h_1(a^S(k^*), k^*) < 0$.

By continuity, for k in the neighborhood of k^*, there must also exist some $a^S(k)$ such that $h(a^S(k), k) = 0$ with $h_1(a^S(k), k) < 0$. Also, when k satisfies $\rho + \sigma g + \delta > f'(k) > n + g + \delta$ (which implies $k < k^*$), by equation (A8) with $\mu < 1$, we also have $\lim_{a \to \infty} h(a,k) = \infty$. Having $h(a^S(k), k) = 0$, $h_1(a^S(k), k) < 0$, and $\lim_{a \to \infty} h(a,k) = \infty$ for $k < k^*$ implies that $a^U(k) \in (a^S(k), \infty)$ must exist such that $h(a^U(k), k) = 0$ with $h_1(a^U(k), k) > 0$. By the proof of Lemma 1, $a^U(k)$ must be unique.

Let $\hat{a}(k)$ be defined by $h_1(\hat{a}(k), k) = 0$. From equation (A8), we have

$$f'(k) - \delta - n - g = \mu\left(\frac{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k)}{\gamma}\right)(\hat{a}(k) - \zeta)^{\mu - 1},$$

$$\hat{a}(k) = \zeta + \left[\frac{\mu}{\gamma}\left(\frac{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k)}{f'(k) - \delta - n - g}\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\mu}}.$$

Clearly, we have $\lim_{k \to k^{*-}} \hat{a}(k) = \infty$. But, by the proof of Lemma 1, we know that $a^U(k) > \hat{a}(k)$. It follows that $\lim_{k \to k^{*-}} a^U(k) = \infty$. ■

Lemma A3 *We have $a^S(k^*) < k^*$ if and only if $r^E > n + g$.*

Proof. From equation (A8) with $k = k^*$, where $f'(k^*) - \delta = n + g$, $a^S(k^*)$ is determined by

$$f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*) = \frac{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k^*)}{\gamma} \left(a^S(k^*) - \zeta\right)^{\mu}.$$

This implies

$$\begin{aligned} a^S(k^*) &= \zeta + \left(\frac{\gamma[f(k^*) - k^* f'(k^*)]}{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k^*)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\mu}}, \\ &= \zeta + \left(\frac{\gamma[f(k^*) - (\delta + n + g)k^*]}{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k^*)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\mu}}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that, by equations (16) and (17), k^E is the solution to

$$k^E = \zeta + \left(\frac{\gamma[f(k^E) - (\delta + n + g)k^E]}{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k^E)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\mu}}.$$

Let us define the following function

$$b(k) = \zeta + \left(\frac{\gamma[f(k) - (\delta + n + g)k]}{\rho + \sigma g + \delta - f'(k)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\mu}}.$$

By the above expressions, we have $b(k^*) = a^S(k^*)$ and $b(k^E) = k^E$. By definition of $\alpha(k)$ in Assumption 1, we have $b(k) = k + \alpha(k)$. Assumption 1 implies $\alpha'(k) < 0$ and, hence, $b'(k) = 1 + \alpha'(k) < 1$. Thus, whenever $k^E \neq k^*$

$$\frac{b(k^E) - b(k^*)}{k^E - k^*} = \frac{k^E - a^S(k^*)}{k^E - k^*} < 1.$$

It follows that $a^S(k^*) < k^*$ if and only if $k^E < k^*$ or, equivalently, if and only if $r^E > n + g$. ■

By Lemma 1, an inegalitarian steady state can exist under a fixed capital stock provided that $r = f'(k) - \delta > n + g$ or, equivalently, that $k < k^*$. How is this possibility affected by endogenizing the capital stock?

Clearly, the capital stock cannot converge to $k > k^*$ as, by Lemma 2, the steady state distribution of wealth is egalitarian whenever $k \geq k^*$. We therefore focus on the possibility that $k < k^*$. To establish that there exists a steady state with the capital stock converging to k^*, we henceforth consider that k is in the (left-)neighborhood of k^*. By Lemma A2, we know that $a^U(k)$ exists.

Assuming that the wealth distribution has an unbounded support, i.e. $\int_{\hat{a}}^{\infty} \phi(a, t)da > 0$ for any $\hat{a}$, if the capital stock converges to some fixed k with $k < k^*$, we would eventually have $\dot{k} > 0$, since the wealth of households with wealth above $a^U(k)$ would

diverge to infinity. Thus, the only possibility is for the capital stock k to converge to the golden rule level k^*.

We have $\lim_{k \to k^{*-}} -w/(r-n-g) = -\infty$. Hence, the wealth of poor households cannot converge to the natural debt limit and, by Lemma 1, it must instead converge to $\max\{a^S(k^*), \underline{a}\}$. If $a^S(k^*) > \underline{a}$, we consider that in the neighborhood of the inegalitarian steady state there is no household with wealth below the neighborhood of $a^S(k^*)$ (i.e. the wealth of poor households has effectively converged to the neighborhood of $a^S(k^*)$). Hence, as k converges to k^*, the capital stock can only increase because of households with wealth above $a^U(k)$. But, as $\lim_{k \to k^{*-}} a^U(k) = \infty$, k cannot exceed k^* as the economy converges to the inegalitarian steady state, since $a^U(k)$ would reach infinity before k becomes higher than k^* (thereby preventing $\dot{k}$ from being positive once $k = k^*$).[32] As k converges to k^*, $a^U(k)$ diverges and the mass of wealthy households converges to zero.

Finally, this steady state possibility exists if and only if the wealth of poor households $\max\{a^S(k^*), \underline{a}\}$ is smaller than k^* as, otherwise, the average wealth in the economy would be strictly above k^*. By Lemma A3, we have $a^S(k^*) < k^*$ if and only if $r^E > n + g$. Hence, $r^E > n + g$ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of this inegalitarian steady state.

D Rational bubble

In our previous work (Michau, Ono, and Schlegl, 2023), we have shown that a rational bubble can exist under a preference for wealth whenever $r^E < n + g$. Building on this, we can easily incorporate the possibility of rational bubbles within the present framework.

Let us introduce an infinitely-lived asset with price (per efficiency unit of labor) equal to b_t. For simplicity, we assume that this asset does not yield any dividends and is therefore intrinsically worthless.[33] In the absence of bubble, its price would trivially be equal to zero. Under a rational bubble, the return on this asset must be the same as

[32] If, however, $a^S(k^*) > \underline{a}$ and many poor households have wealth much below $a^S(k^*)$, then we can simultaneously have $k = k^*$ and $\dot{k} > 0$, since the increase in the capital stock is then driven by poor households. However, this is not possible in the neighborhood of the inegalitarian steady state, once the wealth of poor households has converged to $a^S(k^*)$.

[33] In Michau, Ono, and Schlegl (2023), we allow for the more general case where the bubble can be on an asset that does yield dividends. This does not fundamentally modify the nature of the rational bubble.

the market rate of return, which implies

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{b}_t &= (r_t - n - g)b_t, \\ &= (f'(k_t) - \delta - n - g)b_t. \end{aligned} \tag{A9}$$

In the presence of the infinitely-lived asset, which introduces the possibility of a rational bubble, the equilibrium remains characterized by Definition 1 with the market clearing condition (13) replaced by

$$\int_0^1 a_t^i di = k_t + b_t,$$

and with the dynamics of b_t given by equation (A9). Importantly, the initial price of the bubble b_0 is an equilibrium object that is not specified from the outset. We only require that $b_0 \geq 0$ since the asset can be freely disposed of.

The infinitely-lived asset can also be introduced within our mean field game definition of equilibrium from Appendix B. The equilibrium is still characterized by Definition A1 with the goods market clearing condition (A4) replaced by

$$k_t + b_t = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a\phi\left(a, t\right) da, \tag{A10}$$

and with the dynamics of b_t given by equation (A9).

Figures A1 illustrates the equilibrium consequences of a rational bubble.[34] Starting from a given initial wealth distribution $\phi(\cdot, 0)$, the equilibrium path without a bubble is represented by the black lines, while the path converging to a bubbly steady state is represented by the blue lines.[35] As $r^E < n + g$, in the absence of bubble, the capital stock converges to a level that is above the golden rule, while the real interest rate converges to r^E which is below $n+g$. The bubble induces the capital stock to converge to the golden rule and the interest rate to converge to $n + g$.

The bubble raises total wealth, as shown by the dashed-blue line of the left panel (while total wealth without the bubble is just equal to the capital stock shown by the black line). By raising wealth, the bubble reduces the marginal utility of wealth, which reduces households' propensity to save, thereby crowding out capital. Note that, on the left panel, the magnitude of the bubble corresponds to the difference between the dashed-blue line and the solid-blue line.

[34] This illustrative simulation was performed under the following calibration $\rho = 0.1$, $n = 0.02$, $g = 0.01$, $\delta = 0.05$, $\alpha = 0.3$, $A = 1$, $\sigma = 1$, $\mu = 0.5$, $\gamma = 0.236$, $\zeta = -2.47$, $\underline{a} = 0$.

[35] Our bubbly and bubble-less economy start with the same initial distribution of wealth but different capital stocks. Alternatively, we could have started with the same capital stock in both cases, but higher wealth in the bubbly equilibrium. The main insights from this exercise would have been unchanged.



Figure A1: Transition dynamics with a rational bubble

E Preference for wealth shocks

We now assume that, at any point in time, a household can be in either of two states. In state W the household has a preference for wealth, while in state N it does not. Let λ_W denote the rate at which households lose their preference for wealth, i.e. the transition rate from state W to N. Similarly, let λ_N denote the rate at which households get a preference for wealth, i.e. the transition rate from state N to W.

Let $j \in \{W, N\}$ denote a state, and $-j$ the other state. Thus, if $j = W$, then $-j = N$, and vice versa. Let I_j be the indicator function such that $I_j = 1$ if $j = W$ and $I_j = 0$ if $j = N$. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the detrended value function is given by

$$(\rho - n - (1-\sigma)g)\, v_j(a,t) = \max_c \frac{\exp\left((1-\sigma)\left[\ln(c) + I_j\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}\right]\right) - 1}{1-\sigma} + v_{j,a}(a,t)\left[(r_t - n - g)\,a + w_t - c\right] + \lambda_j\left[v_{-j}(a,t) - v_j(a,t)\right] + v_{j,t}(a,t)\,. \quad \text{(A11)}$$

The first-order conditions is

$$(c_j(a,t))^{-\sigma} e^{(1-\sigma)I_j\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}} = v_{j,a}(a,t)\,. \quad \text{(A12)}$$

The state constraint boundary condition is

$$((r_t - n - g)\,a + w_t)^{-\sigma} e^{(1-\sigma)I_j\gamma\frac{(\underline{a}-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}} \leq v_{j,a}(\underline{a},t)\,. \quad \text{(A13)}$$

The distribution of households across wealth and states is jointly given by $\phi_W(a,t)$ and $\phi_N(a,t)$, where $\int \phi_W(a,t)\,da + \int \phi_N(a,t)\,da = 1$. The Kolmogorov forward equation is

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\phi_j(a,t) = -\frac{\partial}{\partial a}\left[\left((r_t - n)\,a + w_t - c_j(a,t)\right)\phi_j(a,t)\right] - \lambda_j\phi_j(a,t) + \lambda_{-j}\phi_{-j}(a,t)\,. \quad \text{(A14)}$$

Relying on this "mean field game" formulation, we can now provide a formal definition equilibrium.

Definition A2 *The general equilibrium of the economy with preference for wealth shocks is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (A11), the state constraint boundary condition (A13), the Kolmogorov forward equation (A14), the initial wealth distribution given by* $\phi_W(a,0)$ *and* $\phi_N(a,0)$*, the asset market clearing equation*

$$k_t = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a[\phi_W(a,t) + \phi_N(a,t)]da, \tag{A15}$$

and the factor market pricing equations

$$r_t = f'(k_t) - \delta \tag{A16}$$

and

$$w_t = f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t). \tag{A17}$$

F Numerical resolution of the model

In this appendix, we outline the algorithm that we use to numerically solve the model with preference for wealth shocks of Section 5 and 6. From Appendix E, the mean field game definition of equilibrium is given by equations (A11), (A13), (A14), (A15), (A16), (A17), together with the initial wealth distribution $\phi_W(a,0)$ and $\phi_N(a,0)$. To solve this equilibrium numerically, we rely on the finite difference method proposed by Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2022).

We approximate the detrended value functions $v_j(a,t)$, where $j \in \{W,N\}$ denotes the type of the household, at $i = 1,...,I$ discrete points in the state space dimension, i.e. $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^I$, using a non-uniform grid where $\Delta a_i \equiv a_{i+1} - a_i$ denotes the distance between grid points $i+1$ and i. Note that a_1 constitutes the borrowing limit, i.e. $a_1 = \underline{a}$. Starting from an initial distribution $\phi(a,0)$, we simulate the evolution of the wealth distribution over T years, subdivided into $m = 1,...,M$ equally spaced discrete points in the time space dimension, such that each time step represents $\delta t = T/M$ years.

Step 1: Initial guess for the long-run capital stock k_M

Let k_M denote the long-run value of the capital stock at the end of the simulation period M (i.e. after T years). The numerical algorithm starts with an initial guess for k_M, which is subsequently updated. The subscript $s = 0,1,...$ indicates the number of steps in this iteration process so that k_M^s denotes the guess for the long-run capital

stock in iteration loop s. The associated long-run values for the real interest rate r_M^s and the real wage w_M^s follow from the factor pricing equations (A16) and (A17).

Step 2: Numerical resolution of the associated long-run value function

Given k_M^s, r_M^s and w_M^s, we solve the discretized version of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation (A11) for the associated long-run value functions $v_j(a,M)^s$ under the assumption $v_{j,m}(a,m) = 0$ for $m = M$.

This requires another iteration process. Let $q = 0, 1, ...$ denote the associated steps and $v_j(a,M)^{s,0}$ for $j \in \{W, N\}$ the initial guess of the long-run value functions over the state space. The updating process requires an approximation of the derivative $v_{j,a}(a,t)$ in (A11). We use an upwind scheme to approximate this derivative with either a forward, $v_{j,a,F}^{s,q}(a,M) \approx \frac{v_j(a_{i+1},M)^{s,q} - v_j(a_i,M)^{s,q}}{\Delta a_i}$, or backwards difference approximation, $v_{j,a,B}^{s,q}(a,M) \approx \frac{v_j(a_i,M)^{s,q} - v_j(a_{i-1},M)^{s,q}}{\Delta a_{i-1}}$, depending on the sign of the associated optimal saving function.

Specifically, the optimal consumption functions $c_{j,p}^{s,q}(a,M)$ satisfies the first-order condition (A12), where the subscript $p \in \{F, B\}$ indicates the forward (F) and backwards (B) difference approximations respectively. The associated saving functions are $s_{j,p}^{s,q}(a,M) = (r_M^s - n - g)\, a_i + w_M^s - c_{j,p}^{s,q}(a,M)$. If the value function is concave in a, it holds that $v_{j,a,F}^{s,q}(a,M) < v_{j,a,B}^{s,q}(a,M)$ and hence $s_{j,F}^{s,q}(a,M) < s_{j,B}^{s,q}(a,M)$. We therefore use a forward difference approximation when $s_{j,F}^{s,q}(a,M) > 0$, while a backwards difference approximation is used when $s_{j,B}^{s,q}(a,M) < 0$. For grid points with $s_{j,F}^{s,q}(a,M) \leq 0 \leq s_{j,F}^{s,q}(a,M)$, we set savings equal to zero and the derivative of the value function equal to the corresponding consumption level. At the first grid point a_1 we implement the state constraint boundary condition (A13), which is enforced whenever the forward difference would result in negative savings and hence prevents households from violating their borrowing limit. A similar state constraint boundary condition needs to be implemented at the last grid point a_I on the forward difference. Specifically we set $v_{j,a,F}^{s,q}(a_I,M) = \left((r_M^s - n - g)\, a_I + w_M^s\right)^{-\sigma} e^{(1-\sigma) I_j \gamma \frac{(a_I - \zeta)^{1-\mu} - 1}{1-\mu}}$.

Using this upwind scheme for the choice of the difference approximation, we iterate on the long-run value function until convergence according to

$$v^{s,q+1} = \left[\left(\frac{1}{\Delta} + \rho - n - (1-\sigma)g\right)\mathbf{I}_{2\cdot I} - \mathbf{A}^{s,q}\right]^{-1}\left[u^{s,q} + \frac{1}{\Delta}v^{s,q}\right], \tag{A18}$$

where Δ denotes the step size in the iteration process, $\mathbf{I}_{2\cdot I}$ is the identity matrix of dimension $2 \cdot I$, $u^{s,q}$ and $v^{s,q}$ denote the stacked (by wealth level i and household type j) $2 \cdot I$ vectors of utility and value functions and $\mathbf{A}^{s,q}$ denotes the $2 \cdot I$ x $2 \cdot I$ transition

matrix consisting of saving functions and transition probabilities λ_j.[36] The converged value function $v_j(a, M)^s$ will be imposed as terminal condition on the time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in step 4.

Step 3: Initial guess for the time path of the capital stock

Given the long-run capital stock k_M^s and the value functions $v_j(a, M)^s$, we next solve for the dynamics over the time space. For this purpose, we make an initial guess for the dynamics of the capital stock, which is subsequently updated. Let $l = 0, 1, ...$ denote the steps in this iteration process and $k_m^{s,l}$ the time path of the capital stock in iteration l. For each iteration s, the initial guess is denoted by $k_m^{s,0} \equiv \{k_m^{s,0}\}_{m=1}^M$, where the capital stock $k_1^{s,0}$ is determined by the initial wealth distribution $\phi(a, 0)$, and hence independent of s, and the capital stock $k_M^{s,0}$ is given by our guess for the long-run value in step 1, i.e. $k_M^{s,0} \equiv k_M^s$. The associated dynamics of the real interest rate and the real wage are denoted by $r_m^{s,l}$ and $w_m^{s,l}$ respectively.

Step 4: Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation

Given $k_m^{s,l}$, we solve the discrete approximation of the HJB equation (A11) backward in time for the terminal condition $v_j(a, M)^s$ derived in step 2. The choice of the derivative $v_{j,a}(a, t)$ in (A11) follows an equivalent upwind scheme using the optimal saving functions calculated based on the forward and backwards difference approximations. In addition, the two state boundary conditions are implemented at the each time step m.

Starting from the terminal condition $v_j(a, M)^s$, we solve for the value function backward in time as

$$v^{s,l,m} = \left[\left(\rho - n - (1-\sigma)g + \frac{1}{\delta t}\right)\mathbf{I}_{2\cdot I} - \mathbf{A}^{s,l,m+1}\right]^{-1}\left[u^{s,l,m+1} + \frac{1}{\delta t}v^{s,l,m+1}\right], \qquad \text{(A19)}$$

where $v^{s,l,m}$ and $u^{s,l,m}$ are $2 \cdot I$ vectors of stacked value and utility functions respectively, i.e. $v^{s,l,m} \equiv [v_W(a_1, m)^{s,l}...v_W(a_I, m)^{s,l}v_N(a_1, m)^{s,l}...v_N(a_I, m)^{s,l}]'$, $\mathbf{I}_{2\cdot I}$ denotes the identity matrix with dimension $2 \cdot I$, δt the step size of the time grid, and $\mathbf{A}^{s,l,m}$ the $2 \cdot I$ x $2 \cdot I$ time-dependent transition matrix consisting of saving functions and transition probabilities λ_j.

Step 5: Solving the Kolmogorov Forward equation

Given the optimal consumption and saving functions of step 4, we use the discrete approximation of the Kolmogorov Forward equation (A14) to solve for the dynamics of the wealth distribution, starting from the initial distribution $\phi(a, 0)$. We approximate

[36] For details on the construction and composition of A, we refer to Achdou et al. (2022)

the derivative $[s_j(a_i,m)\phi_j(a_i,m)]'$ by forward and backward differences following the same scheme as in step 4. Starting from the initial wealth distribution, equation (A14) is solved forward in time as

$$\phi^{m+1} = \left[\mathbf{I}_{2\cdot I} - (\mathbf{A}^{s,l,m})^T \delta t\right]^{-1} \phi^m. \tag{A20}$$

where ϕ^m is the $2 \cdot I$ vector of stacked densities over wealth space and types j, i.e. $\phi^m \equiv [\phi_W(a_1,m)...\phi_W(a_I,m)\phi_N(a_1,m)...\phi_N(a_I,m)]'$, and $(\mathbf{A}^{s,l,m})^T$ is the transpose of the transition matrix $\mathbf{A}^{s,l,m}$ from step 4.

Note that before solving (A20), the density ϕ^m is transformed in order to preserve mass under a non-uniform grid as $\tilde{\phi}_j(a_i,m) = \phi_j(a_i,m)\frac{\Delta a_i + \Delta a_{i-1}}{2}$ and subsequently recovered.[37]

Step 6: Updating the guess for $k_m^{s,l}$

The dynamics of the wealth distribution from the previous step imply a corresponding time path of the capital stock $k_m^{s,l,new}$ given by asset market clearing condition (A15). We then use a relaxation mechanism to update the guess of the time path of the capital stock $k_m^{s,l}$ from step 3 with the new value $k_m^{s,l,new}$ according to

$$k_m^{s,l+1} = \psi k_m^{s,l} + (1-\psi) k_m^{s,l,new}, \tag{A21}$$

where $\psi \in (0,1)$ determines the weight on the initial guess. So $k_m^{s,l+1}$ is the updated guess for the time path of the capital stock with corresponding paths for the real interest rate $r_m^{s,l+1}$ and the real wage $w_m^{s,l+1}$.

Step 7: Convergence of $k_m^{s,l}$

Steps 4 to 6 are repeated for the updated guess of the capital stock dynamics until convergence of $k_m^{s,l}$, with $l = 0, 1, ...$ We denote the converged time path by $k_m^{s,L}$.

Step 8: Update of the long-run capital stock

The long-run value of the capital stock $k_M^{s,L}$ implied by $k_m^{s,L}$ is endogenously determined by the evolution of the wealth distribution and in most cases not consistent with the initial guess for the long-run capital stock k_M^s in step 1. Hence, we update the initial guess using a similar relaxation mechanism as in step 6, i.e.

$$k_M^{s+1} = \tilde{\psi} k_M^s + (1-\tilde{\psi}) k_M^{s,L}. \tag{A22}$$

where $\tilde{\psi} \in (0,1)$ determines the weight on the initial guess.

[37] This procedure is described in detail in section 7 of the numerical appendix of Achdou et al. (2022).

Step 9: Convergence of k_M^s

Steps 2 to 8 are repeated for the updated guess of the long-run capital stock until convergence of k_M^s, with $s = 0, 1, ...$

This completes the description of the numerical algorithm. The following remarks discuss some additional considerations.

Specification of the wealth and time grid: We set the number of grid points to $I = 10\,000$ and choose an upper limit of $a_I = \$5$ billion for the wealth grid.[38] We simulate the model for $T = 400$ years, which are equally spread across $M = 1600$ grid points on the time dimension. Hence, each iteration step represents $\delta t = T/M = 0.25$ years. At the beginning and end of the wealth grid, we implement the state constraint boundary conditions. The lower state space constraint is enforced whenever the forward difference approximation would result in negative savings and hence prevents households from violating their borrowing limit. In contrast, the upper state space is enforced whenever the backward difference approximation would result in positive savings and hence prevents households from accumulating wealth above a_I. While the lower constraint has an economic rationale, the upper constraint is a technical necessity that distorts the behavior of households towards the end of the wealth grid, preventing them from further wealth accumulation.[39] When specifying the initial distribution, we do not allocate any mass above \$3.5 billion. Hence, the mass of households above \$3.5 billion is virtually zero (up to 10 digits) after 100 years of simulations (i.e. the time we conduct the tax experiments). This implies that these distortions at the upper end of the wealth grid seem to be of little relevance for our simulations, which are very reliable up to at least \$3.5 billion.

Initial distribution: We start our simulations from a double Pareto-lognormal distribution that is identical in state W and N and we run our model for 100 years before matching the moments described in Section 5.1. The probability density function $f^{PL}(\cdot)$ of the double Pareto-lognormal distribution is given by

$$f^{PL}(a) = \frac{\alpha^{PL}\beta^{PL}}{(\alpha^{PL}+\beta^{PL})a}\tilde{\phi}\left(\frac{\ln(a)-m^{PL}}{\sigma^{PL}}\right)\left(\frac{1-\tilde{\Phi}(x_1)}{\tilde{\phi}(x_1)}+\frac{1-\tilde{\Phi}(x_2)}{\tilde{\phi}(x_2)}\right),$$

with $x_1 = \alpha^{PL}\sigma^{PL} - \frac{\ln(a)-m^{PL}}{\sigma^{PL}}$ and $x_2 = \beta^{PL}\sigma^{PL} - \frac{\ln(a)-m^{PL}}{\sigma^{PL}}$ where $\tilde{\phi}(\cdot)$ and $\tilde{\Phi}(\cdot)$ denote

[38] We choose a non-uniform grid to put more grid points at the lower end such that 20% of the grid points are below \$1 million.

[39] The effects of the upper state boundary condition are equivalent those of a 100% wealth tax above the upper threshold.

the pdf and the cdf of the standard normal distribution. We set $\alpha^{PL} = 1.5$, $\beta^{PL} = 10$, $m^{PL} = 15$ and $\sigma^{PL} = 0.6$. We do not allocate any mass at grid points above \$3.5 billion (see previous remarks on the specification of the wealth grid) and rescale the distribution for the remaining grid points to mass 1.

Wealth levy: The 20% wealth levy of Section 6.1 is implemented 100 years after the initial double Pareto-lognormal distribution (which we denote as year 0 in the text, as this is the year when the moments are matched to calibrate the model, as described in Section 5.1). The wealth distribution is modified consistently with the tax levy. The density of households above the \$10 million threshold is reallocated using a linear interpolation. The mass of households at the borrowing limit is reallocated to the two grid points around their post-transfer wealth level, where the allocation is determined such as to maintain aggregate wealth unchanged. We then simulate the model for 300 years, without any modification to the solution algorithm.

Wealth tax: The 2% wealth tax of Section 6.2 is implemented via the household's flow of funds constraint as

$$\dot{a}_t = (r_t - n - g)a_t + w_t - c_t + \max\{T_t - a_t, 0\} - \tau \max\{a_t - a^T, 0\},$$

where $\tau = 0.02$ is the tax rate, $a^T = \$10$ million is the deduction, and T_t is the transfer payment. This affects the value function via the savings function within the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (A11), which shows up in the transition matrix $\mathbf{A}$ of the numerical algorithm. However, this does not affect the first-order condition (A12). Otherwise, the structure is unaffected. The budget-neutral path of the transfer T_t is endogenously determined by the evolution of the wealth distribution such as to balance the government's budget

$$\int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} \left(\max\{T_t - a, 0\} - \tau \max\{a - a^T, 0\}\right) [\phi_W(a,t) + \phi_N(a,t)] da = 0.$$

This is implemented at the end of step 3 in the algorithm: For $l = 0$, we make a guess on the time path of the transfer $T_m^{s,l}$. For the following iterations $l > 0$, we use the simulated path of the wealth distribution from the previous iteration $l - 1$ to calculate the associated budget-neutral transfer $T_m^{s,l}$. As the capital stock $k_m^{s,l}$ converges to $k_m^{s,L}$, the budget-neutral transfer converges to $T_m^{s,L}$ as well.

Consumption tax: The 50% consumption tax of Section 6.3 affects the household's

flow of funds constraint as

$$\dot{a}_t = (r_t - n - g)a_t + w_t - c_t + \max\{T_t^c - a_t, 0\} - \tau_c \max\{c_t - c^T, 0\},$$

where $\tau_c = 0.5$ is the tax rate, $c^T = \$200\ 000$ is the deduction, and T_t^c is the transfer payment. This is implemented in the same way as for the progressive wealth tax. An important difference, however, is that the progressive consumption tax does affect the first-order condition (A12) from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (A11), which is now given by

$$(c_j(a,t))^{-\sigma} e^{(1-\sigma)I_j\gamma\frac{(a-\zeta)^{1-\mu}-1}{1-\mu}} = \begin{cases} v_{j,a}(a,t) & \text{if } c_j(a,t) < c^T \\ (1+\tau_c)v_{j,a}(a,t) & \text{if } c_j(a,t) \geq c^T \end{cases}, \tag{A23}$$

where $c_j(a,t)$ is the policy function. We implement this in the numerical algorithm in steps 2 and 4 when deriving the optimal consumption function based on the forward and backwards approximations of the value functions. Specifically, we calculate each of the two policy functions $c_j(a,m)^0$ and $c_j(a,m)^\tau$ for the marginal tax rate equal to 0 and τ_c, respectively, for both the forward and backward difference approximations based on the two cases in (A23). For each point on the wealth grid, the optimal consumption function is then derived as

$$c_j(a_i,m) = \begin{cases} c_j(a_i,m)^0 & \text{if } c_j(a_i,m)^0 < c^T \\ c_j(a_i,m)^\tau & \text{if } c_j(a_i,m)^\tau \geq c^T \\ c^T & \text{else} \end{cases}, \tag{A24}$$

which implies the possibility of bunching at c^T. The choice of the approximation is then determined by the same upwind scheme based on the signs of the saving functions associated with (A24). The same selection criterion is then used to recover the policy functions $c_j(a,m)$ from the approximation of $v_{j,a}(a,m)$, which appear in both the transition matrix $\mathbf{A}$ (via the saving function) and the utility u in steps 2 and 4. Otherwise, the structure of the algorithm and the iteration process is unaltered.