Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?¹

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Abstract
Banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) are commonly viewed either as operating in parallel, performing different activities, or as substitutes, performing substantially similar activities, with banks inside and NBFIs outside the perimeter of banking regulation. We argue instead that the two sectors have interwoven businesses and risks, and that bank risks are better described as having transformed over time, especially in response to regulation, rather than as having simply migrated to NBFIs. Banks continue to remain special as liquidity providers for NBFIs activities, through both routine and stress conditions. Supporting this perspective, (i) The new and enhanced financial accounts data for the United States (“From Whom to Whom”) show banks and NBFIs finance each other, with NBFIs especially dependent on banks; (ii) Case studies and confidential regulatory data show that banks remain exposed to credit and funding risks that at first glance seem to have moved to NBFIs, and also to contingent liquidity risk via provision of credit lines to NBFIs; and, (iii) Empirical work confirms bank-NBFI linkages through the correlation of their abnormal equity returns and market-based measures of systemic risk. We conclude that regulation should consider the two sectors holistically, rather than separately, and recognize new mechanisms for risk propagation and amplification implied by the evolving nature of their funding linkages.

Keywords: non-bank financial intermediaries, nonbanks, shadow banking, bank regulation, macroprudential regulation, regulatory arbitrage, systemic risk, credit lines, derivatives margins

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1. Introduction

Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have surpassed banks as the largest global financial intermediaries. And yet, most NBFIs continue to be lightly regulated relative to banks for safety and soundness, whether in terms of capital and liquidity requirements, supervisory oversight, or resolution planning. Figure 1a shows, using data from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), that the global financial assets of NBFIs have grown faster than those of banks since 2012, to about $239 trillion and $183 trillion, respectively, in 2021. In percentage terms, the share of the NBFIs sector has grown from about 44% in 2012 to about 49% as of 2021, while banks’ share has shrunk from about 45% to about 38% over the same time period.3

Figure 1b compares the assets of the NBFIs and bank sectors in the United States alone. As in the global data, NBFIs in the United States have accumulated substantially more assets than banks over the period shown. However, the NBI sector in the United States accounts for a much higher share of financial assets, which was over 60% in 2021. As an aside, this figure shows that NBFIs assets fell substantially during the global financial crisis (GFC), as large volumes of special purpose vehicles were unwound, but that the NBFIs sector as a whole subsequently resumed its steady growth.

One justification for the lighter-touch of NBFIs regulation, despite the sector’s prominence, is the view that banks and NBFIs pursue different or parallel intermediation activities. In particular, banks focus on deposits, loans, and payments, while NBFIs focus on capital markets. In this view, then, banks have to be heavily regulated to protect depositors and the real economy, while NBFIs can be lightly regulated and allowed to fail.4

This parallel view of NBFIs and banks has influenced financial regulation in the United States for at least 160 years, with banks being heavily regulated but restricted in the scope of their activities. The National Bank Acts of the 1860s prohibited national banks from many businesses, including trust activities, real estate lending, securities underwriting, and credit guarantees (Calomiris, 2020). The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 renewed the attempt to exclude commercial banks from underwriting securities. And the Volcker Rule, part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (DFA), severely restricts bank participation in certain investment vehicles, and limits

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3 The other sectors in the breakdown of these data include central banks and public financial institutions.
4 Paul Volcker described the parallel view very articulately in an interview just after the GFC. “In a crisis, everybody runs back to the commercial banks. They, after all, run the payment system... They provide a depository outlet for individuals and businesses, and they are still big credit providers for small and medium-sized businesses, but they backstop most of the big borrowers as well. The commercial-paper market is totally dependent on the commercial banking market. They are an essential financial institution that has historically been protected. It has been protected on one side and regulated on the other side... [i]t is extraneous to that function that they [banks] do hedge funds, equity funds and that they trade in commodities and securities, and a lot of other stuff, which is secondary in terms of direct responsibilities for lenders, borrowers, depositors and all the rest. There is nothing wrong with any of those activities, but let you nonbank people do it... If you fail, you’re going to fail, and I am not going to help you, and your stockholders are going to be gone, and your creditors will be at risk, and that is the way it should be.” Volcker (2009).
proprietary trading at banks to government securities and corporate loans (Richardson and Tuckman, 2017).

However, the parallel view of NBFI and bank activity, along with the regulatory conclusion that NBFI s should be allowed to fail, does not square easily with the de facto aid to or rescue of NBFI s, most notably during the GFC but more recently as well, as in the Federal Reserve’s interventions in the repo markets in 2019 and through the COVID pandemic and shutdowns (Duffie, 2020, Schrimpf, Shin and Sushko, 2020); the Bank of England’s support of the gilt market in response to the liquidity problems of UK pension funds in 2022; and European governments’ protection of energy producers and derivatives users, also in 2022. The dissonance of the parallel view with the realities of NBFI rescues is reflected in how the Federal Reserve’s 13(3) powers to lend to NBFI s were changed by the DFA, namely, to raise the procedural hurdles to such lending and to prohibit such lending to individual NBFI s, but, in the final analysis, to leave these broad powers in place.

The failure of policy that is based on the parallel view of the NBFI and bank sectors can be understood in terms of a corollary of Goodhart’s Law (Goodhart, 1975):

As the banking perimeter is used for “control” (regulatory) purposes, but activity around the perimeter can be “manipulated” (via regulatory arbitrage) by banks and NBFI s, the regulatory perimeter inexorably ceases to be useful for control purposes.

Put differently, the NBFI and bank sectors do not exist in parallel, but are actually substitutes in that business lines and intermediation activities flow over time from banks to NBFI s at least in part because of relatively burdensome bank regulation. Furthermore, in this substitution view, NBFI s take on intermediation roles, in kind and volume, that can be systemically important and can lead to rescues by authorities in times of financial stress.

It is not controversial to recognize that the growth of the NBFI sector has been significantly driven by bank regulation. One very well-known and widely-accepted example is how Regulation Q, which capped the rate banks could pay on deposits, contributed to the creation of the money market fund industry. As to more recent academic work, Chen et al. (2017), Cortes et al. (2018), Gopal and Schnabl (2020), and Irani et al. (2020) show that bank regulations contributed to the migration of small-business lending from banks to NBFI s such as finance companies and FinTech lenders. Chernenko et al. (2022) and Kim et al. (2016) show the same, with a particular focus on the riskiest loans. Buchak et al. (2018) show that NBFI s gained market share in the residential mortgage market through a combination of both regulatory and technological advantages. Kim et al. (2018) and Kim et al. (2022) find some evidence that non-bank mortgage originators and servicers may not have sufficient resources to weather stress events. Duffie (2023) describes the regulatory capital requirements that have reduced the
capacity of banks to make markets in the U.S. Treasury market, and Metrick and Tarullo (2022) discuss how NBFIs are replacing that capacity.

The substitution view of the NBFI and bank sectors, along with the implication that NBFIs can become systemically important, is consistent with the powers given by the DFA both i) to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate NBFIs as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and to regulate them accordingly; and ii) to the United States Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to resolve a failing large and complex financial company. Metrick and Tarullo (2022) recommend dealing with the substitution problem through a “congruence principle,” through which similar activities are regulated similarly, whether those activities are pursued within NBFIs or banks.

We take a different view of the NBFI and bank sectors in this paper, arguing that neither the parallel nor substitution views adequately describe how activities align across these sectors. Instead, we posit that intermediation activities—including the types of claims held by each sector, the manner of their financing, and contingent liquidity arrangements—endogenously transform across sectors so as i) to loosen regulatory constraints and reduce regulatory costs across the financial sector as a whole, along the lines of Goodhart’s Law, and ii) to harness the inherent funding and liquidity advantages of bank deposit franchises (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002) and access to safety nets (Gatev and Strahan, 2006), whether explicitly in the form of deposit insurance and central bank lender of last resort (LOLR) financing or implicitly in the form of too-big-to-fail insurance.5 Our transformation view predicts that the intermediation activities and risks of NBFIs and banks become intricately intertwined, which is a result we demonstrate through a variety of cases and empirical analyses of recent developments. Finally, this transformation view has distinct implications for policy, which are discussed later in the paper.6

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5 This paper focuses on the regulatory causes of these transformations, but the business, financial, and technological environments no doubt play important roles as well. Sarto and Wang (2023) write that the secular decline in interest rates might have played an important role in the shift of assets from banks to NBFIs. Also, see Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017) for theory that a search-for-yield by intermediaries in an environment of high real savings leads to the growth of non-monitoring banks, which can be understood as NBFIs, and in turn to a rise in financial fragility.

6 Cetorelli and Prazad (2023) show the extent to which subsidiaries of bank holding companies engage in non-banking financial business activities. Yankov (2020) shows that the introduction of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) resulted in increased liquidity reserves at banks and greater reliance of NBFIs on bank liquidity. Other theoretical and empirical work that features both banks and NBFIs has focused on drawdowns on credit lines during stress events (Acharya, Gopal, Jager, and Steffen, 2023; Kiernan, Yankov, and Zikes, 2021); contagion via credit risk transfer (Allen and Carletti, 2006); spillovers in the design of capital requirements (Harris, Opp and Opp, 2014); haircuts for refinancing by NBFIs (Plantin, 2015); split governance rights via variation in covenant tightness between loans held by banks and those held by NBFIs (Mitchell, Nini and Yu, 2020); differential exercise of lender bargaining power by banks and NBFIs based on their access to safety nets (Donaldson, Piacentino and Thakor, 2021); and determination of asset activity shifts between banks and NBFIs based on their capacity to provide balance-sheet financing (Buchak et al., 2022), including the secular decline of US bank lending (Buchak et al., 2024).
Before proceeding with a more concrete discussion of the transformations we see occurring in financial markets, we clarify this paper’s invocation of “regulatory arbitrage” in the context of Goodhart’s Law. First, we view regulatory arbitrage as the process by which finance professionals optimize their businesses subject to their perception of pertinent regulations. For example, bank management sets a framework of internal charges for the use of balance sheet, capital, liquidity, etc., and then bankers at that bank seek out profitable transactions given those charges. By this mechanism, resources across the financial system flow to where they are most profitable relative to regulatory costs and constraints. Explicit attempts to circumvent regulations are not necessary.

Second, given the mechanism just described, regulatory arbitrage transformations of business lines across NBFIs and banks occur whenever regulations and supervision do not perfectly internalize the relevant risks or costs of scarce resources. In this paper, we do not attempt to identify the exact components of the regulatory regime that are not perfect from this perspective. We simply note that it is not difficult to imagine opportunities for this sort of regulatory arbitrage given the complexity of safety and soundness regulation of both banks and NBFIs, which actually works in combination with other components of bank regulation, like anti-money-laundering rules, community reinvestment requirements, and operational risk charges.

To explain our transformation view of the NBI and bank sectors more concretely, Figure 2 gives examples of three categories of transformations that describe relatively recent trends in financial markets.

(i) **Loans and Mortgages:** Traditionally (post the Great Depression and the ensuing reforms), banks held corporate and mortgage loans and bore the associated interest rate and default risks. Over time, however, at least in part due to higher capital requirements and tighter regulations on leveraged lending, large volumes of these loans no longer reside on bank balance sheets. Instead, banks have retained indirect loan exposures through senior loans to private credit companies, collateralized loans to mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts (mortgage REITs, or mREITs), and the generally more senior claims of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). Hence, risks of the underlying loans may seem to have left the banking system, but have actually been transformed into more senior holdings of exposures to NBFIs.

(ii) **Activities Using Short-Term Funding:** Traditionally, banks participated in various businesses that rely on regular or continuing short-term funding. Examples include the following: securitization, in which the purchases of underlying assets are funded until they are securitized and sold as MBS (mortgage-backed securities), collateralized loan obligation (CLOs), other ABS (asset-backed securities); financing acquisitions in general, and leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in particular, in which acquisitions are funded in anticipation of bond sales to investors; and mortgage servicing, which requires servicers to fund payments of delinquent amounts to MBS investors until government insurance pays the related claims. These activities used to be
dominated by banks, but are now dominated by NBFIs. However, banks provide NBFIs with the short-term funding used to carry out these activities in the forms of direct loans, warehouse financing, credit lines, subscription finance loans,\(^7\) and bank-sponsored (or credit-enhanced) commercial paper. Hence, activities using short-term funding are another category of activities that are better described as having transformed across the bank and NBFIs sectors than as having shifted from banks to NBFIs.

(iii) Contingent Funding: While the second category of transformations just described refers to the regular or continuing use of short-term funding, which can take the form of credit lines, this third category refers to the provision of unusual or emergency short-term funding, or liquidity insurance, which is most often manifested in the drawing down of bank credit lines in unusually high volumes. Activities in this category are those in which NBFIs have replaced banks in financing or other activities but rely themselves on banks for the necessary contingent funding. In other words, the entirety of these activities is not a shift from banks to NBFIs, but a transformation in that regular or continuing financing shifts to NBFIs while the unusual or emergency financing remains with banks. This category of transformations is easily explained by the inherent funding and liquidity advantages of banks mentioned earlier. A relatively unheralded example is the post-GFC mandate to clear most derivatives, like interest rate swaps (IRS), that had previously been bilateral and traded over-the-counter (OTC). This mandate has transformed the counterparty risk that banks had as derivative counterparties of NBFIs to the liquidity risk banks have in providing credit lines to NBFIs to meet calls for additional initial and variation margin. Note that bank credit lines can also provide liquidity insurance for futures contracts, which have always been cleared, but this would not be an example of a recent transformation of market arrangements.

Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c show the importance of the first two transformations just described in terms of the increasing amounts of bank loans and credit commitments to NBFIs from 2013 to 2023. (Section 3.c. will present data on the third of these transformations.)

Figure 3a depicts the growth of bank loans to NBFIs rising from about $125 billion to over $300 billion. The greatest growth was for bank loans to “Other Investment Pools and Funds,” which includes, e.g., both open-end and closed-end funds (money market and mutual funds), mREITS, special purpose financial vehicles, among others. Figure 3b depicts the growth of bank credit line commitments to NBFIs rising from about $500 billion to over $1,500 billion, with the greatest growth again to Other Investment Pools and Funds. Figure 3c shows in aggregate loans and credit commitments to NBFIs as a share of total bank loans and credit commitments. Hence, while Figures 3a and 3b show that funding of NBFIs by banks has increased in dollar terms, Figure 3c shows that this funding has also increased as a percentage of total bank funding.

\(^7\) Subscription finance loans are made by banks to private equity funds and are secured by investor commitments to the fund. Using these loans, funds can invest swifty as opportunities arise without making irregular capital calls on their investors.
We develop the transformation view of bank risks and bank-NBFI linkages as follows.

Section 2 of the paper uses new and enhanced financial accounts data for the UNited States (“From Whom To Whom”) to show that bank and NBFI businesses are significantly interdependent. More specifically, banks and individual NBFI sectors are both asset- and liability-dependent, that is, they hold each others’ assets and rely on each other for funding. However, while banks are significantly dependent on the NBFI sector as a whole, they do not have significant asset- or liability-dependence on any individual sector of NBFI. By contrast, individual NBFI sectors are heavily asset- or liability-dependent on banks. Furthermore, individual NBFI sectors are, in general, not asset- or liability-dependent on each other. In short, consistent with the transformation view described earlier, NBFI have grown as financial intermediaries, but banks have retained their special role as financiers and intermediaries for NBFI.

Section 3 presents concrete examples and case studies to support the qualitative and empirical importance of the transformations summarized in Figure 2. The topics covered include private credit markets; mortgage origination and servicing; drawdowns of bank credit lines, in general and by REITs, during the COVID pandemic and shutdowns; and drawdowns of bank credit lines in 2022 to meet increased derivatives margin calls on UK pension funds and European electricity producers.

In Section 4, we explain conceptually how shocks leading to fire sales can propagate extensively through the financial system and, in particular, can spread across the NBFI and bank sectors. One source of propagation arises from commonalities in asset holdings across sectors, which can lead to both direct effects—when one sector holds assets that are also held by a sector conducting fire sales under stress—and indirect effects—when a sector holds assets that were liquidated in a previous round of fire sales. Another source of propagation arises from liability dependencies, in which stress from fire sales causes an affected sector to restrict lending to other sectors.

Section 5 empirically confirms that the linkages between banks and NBFI, which we have pointed out in earlier sections, are also evident in the interdependence of their abnormal equity returns and of their market-based measures of systemic risk, in particular, NYU Stern’s SRISK measure of expected capital shortfall under aggregate stress.8

Section 6 draws out the policy implications of our transformation view of the NBFI and bank sectors. We first rationalize the observed extension of central bank LOLR (and other official backstrops) to NBFI, given the significance of their intermediation activities and their intimate ties to the banking system. We then derive implications for the ex-ante regulation of NBFI to limit the need for such extension, primarily to suggest better monitoring of bank-NBFI

8 See Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) and vlab.stern.nyu.edu/srisk.
funding linkages, ex-ante pricing of NBFI access to LOLR, ex-post supervision of NBFIAs that access LOLR, and broadly, an integrated approach across the bank and NBFI sectors.

Section 7 concludes, briefly summarizing the paper and suggesting topics for future research.

2. Asset- and Liability-Interdependencies of Banks and NBFIAs

The transformation view of the NBFI and bank sectors predicts that NBFI and bank businesses will be interwoven with complex interdependencies. But, given the special role of banks from their deposit franchises and access to official backstops, NBFIAs can be expected to be more liability-dependent on banks than *vice versa*, and also more liability-dependent on banks than on each other.

We provide empirical evidence for these conjectures using a new version of the Federal Reserve System’s Flow of Funds data, namely, FWTW (From Whom To Whom), which was introduced in the Spring of 2023. While Flow of Funds quantifies the aggregate asset and liability positions of each sector operating in the United States, and breaks down those aggregates by financial instrument, FWTW further breaks down each sector’s assets and liabilities into positions against each other sector. For example, Flow of Funds gives the liabilities of banks by instrument (e.g., deposits, repurchase agreements, etc), but FWTW also gives the quantity of each of those instruments held by Life Insurers, Finance Companies, the Real Sector, etc. In other words, FWTW data quantify the entire bilateral matrix of asset-liability interconnections.

Figure 4a shows the FWTW matrix of asset- and liability-dependencies as of Q1 2023. Sectors are reported both in rows, as *Issuers*, in which case the entries represent their liabilities, and in columns, as *Holders*, in which case entries represent their assets. For convenience, we have aggregated some sub-sectors: “Banks” include “holding companies” (i.e., the unconsolidated balances of top tier bank/financial holding companies) and “private depository institutions” (i.e., U.S.-chartered depository institutions, foreign banking offices operating in the U.S., banks in U.S.-affiliated areas, and credit unions); and “Real Sector” includes the balances of households, government and non-financial corporations. We retain the Rest of the World sector and all of the NBFI sub-sectors, which include ABS issuers, Broker-Dealers, Equity REITs, Finance Companies, government sponsored enterprises and Agencies (GSEs), Life Insurers, Money Market Funds, Mortgage REITs, Mutual Funds, Other financial businesses, Property and Casualty Insurers, and Pension Funds. Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper, we aggregate across all financial instruments. To illustrate the interpretation of the figure, then, consider the Banks row, that is, Banks as issuers. The rightmost column of this row shows that liabilities

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9 It is possible to adjust the results here so that the category of banks includes only depositories and so that broker-dealer subsidiaries of bank holding companies are moved to the category of broker-dealers. These adjusted results do not change our overall themes and are available on request.
issued by Banks total about $30.2 trillion. Other entries of this row show that the largest holders of the liabilities of Banks are the Real sector, holding $18.8 trillion, and the Rest of the World, holding $4.4 trillion. The remaining liabilities of Banks are spread across the banking sector itself, $3.1 trillion, and across NBFI.

Figure 4b and 4c show the same matrix of asset-liability interconnections, with the entries in Figure 4b as shares of each issuing sector’s total liabilities and in Figure 4c as shares of each holding sector’s assets. We call Figure 4b the “Matrix of Liability-Dependencies,” as it portrays the extent to which each sector depends on each of the others for funding. For example, Banks are highly dependent for funding on the real sector (62%) and on the Rest of the World (15%). On the other hand, we call Figure 4c the “Matrix of Asset-Dependencies,” as it portrays the extent to which each sector is exposed to each of the others by holding their respective liabilities. For example, 16% of Broker-Dealers holdings and 13% of Equity REITs holdings are liabilities of Banks.

We draw three overall lessons from the FWTW interdependency matrices in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c. First, while banks are significantly dependent on the NBFI sector as a whole, consistent, for example, with Forbes, Friedrich, and Reinhardt (2023), banks do not have significant asset- or liability-dependence on any individual sector of NBFI. From Figures 4a and 4b, banks get $23.2 trillion or 77% from the Real and Rest of the World sectors and $3.1 trillion or 10% from other banks. These levels leave the liability-dependence of banks on the NBFI sector as a whole at a small though non-negligible $3.8 trillion or 13%, which, by the way, includes deposits and commercial paper investments from money market funds; bonds bought by insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds; and repos loans from broker-dealers. However, banks are not liability-dependent on any individual NBFI sub-sector, with the largest sub-sector, GSEs, supplying only $1.1 trillion or 4% of bank funding. A similar result holds with respect to bank asset-dependence on NBFI from Figures 4a and 4c. Banks hold $5.6 trillion or 19% of their financial assets in claims on NBFI, but the greatest dependence is on GSEs, at $3.2 trillion or 11%.

The second lesson from the interdependency matrices is that NBFI has significant asset- and liability-dependence on banks, in addition to their significant dependencies on the Real and Rest of World sectors. Starting with Figures 4a and 4b, several NBFI sub-sectors depend meaningfully on banks for funding: GSEs at $3.2 trillion or 35% of their liabilities; Broker-Dealers at $1.4 trillion or 25%; Equity REITs at $224 billion or 25%; Finance Companies at $196 billion or 15%; and ABS Issuers at $143 billion or 10%. To our knowledge, these significant NBFI dependencies on banks are not widely appreciated. Furthermore, we note that FWTW understates these dependencies because these data do not include undrawn bank credit commitments to NBFI, which will be discussed further in Section 3.c. In any case, turning to the asset-dependence of NBFI on banks, from Figures 4a and 4c, several NBFI sub-sectors hold as assets meaningful amounts of bank liabilities: Other Financial Businesses at $247 billion or
19%; Broker-Dealers at $685 billion or 16%; Equity REITs at $43 billion or 13%; and Money Market Funds at $429 billion or 12%.

The third and final lesson from these figures is that individual NBFI sub-sectors are, in general, not asset- or liability-dependent on other sub-sectors. In terms of Figures 4b and 4c, most of the relevant entries (i.e., those outside of the Banks, Real, and Rest of World rows and columns) are relatively small. There are, of course, some exceptions. On the liability side, ABS Issuers get 40% of their funding from Life Insurers; Mutual Funds get 27% from Pension Funds; and Other Financial Businesses get 54% from Broker-Dealers. And, on the asset side, Broker-Dealers hold 21% of their assets in Other Financial Businesses; Life Insurers hold 17% in Mutual Funds; Money Market Funds and Mortgage REITs hold 23% and 31%, respectively, in GSEs; Other Financial Businesses hold 33% in Money Market Funds; and Pension Funds hold 24% in Mutual Funds. But to repeat, there are relatively few significant dependencies of NBFI sub-sectors on other NBFI sub-sectors.10

We find in unreported results that the data in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, which are as of Q1 2023, are relatively robust representations of dependencies over longer time-series. In support of this robustness, however, we present Figure 5, which reports averages over the time-series of asset- and liability-dependencies between Q1 2000 and Q1 2023. As above, banks are not particularly asset- or liability-dependent on any particular NBFI sub-sector, while several NBFI sub-sectors are asset- or liability-dependent on banks.

In summary then, the FWTW are consistent with the transformation view of NBFI and banks. The sectors are interlinked with many asset- and liability-dependencies, and, generally speaking, banks are more significant sources of funding for NBFI than NBFIs are for banks or for each other.

3. Concrete Examples and Case Studies of the Transformation View

This section uses a combination of concrete examples and case studies to illustrate how intermediation activities in the financial system have not simply shifted from banks to NBFI, but have transformed so as to be spread across the two sectors. The organization here follows that of Figure 2. To illustrate the transformation view under the category of “Loans and Mortgages,” Subsection 3.a discusses how NBFI borrow from banks to support their loans in the private credit market. Under “Activities Using Short-Term Funding,” Subsection 3.b discusses how NBFI mortgage originators and servicers rely on financing from banks. And under “Contingent Funding,” Subsection 3.c discusses two sets of cases and examples of NBFI drawing down on bank credit lines. The first set concerns NBFI in general and REITs in particular during the COVID pandemic and shutdowns, and the second set concerns the

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10 We note that the exact extent of asset- and liability-dependencies across banks and NBFI would need to account for foreign banks and any NBFI included in the Rest of World aggregate.
derivatives margin calls on UK pension funds and European electricity producers in September 2022. In addition to fleshing out Figure 2, then, this section illustrates the qualitative nature of some of the bank loans and credit line commitments to NBFIs that comprise Figures 3a and 3b.

3.a. The Private Credit Market

The private credit market is a good example of the transformation of intermediation in the context of business loans. In this market, NBFIs make loans, which are typically secured or relatively senior in the capital structure of the borrowers, who are predominantly medium- and small-sized businesses. Assets under management for private lending are currently between $1 and $1.5 trillion and have grown over the last couple of decades to over 30% of the total outstanding of high-yield bonds, syndicated loans, and private credit. The market also seems to be expanding most recently as a consequence of higher bank capital requirements from the Basel III Endgame.

To begin, consider a recent set of transactions depicted in Figure 6a. PacWest, a regional bank that had been losing deposits in the wake of the regional banking crisis of March 2023, sold $2.3 billion of loans backed by various accounts receivable to Ares Management, which is one of the largest private fund managers in the world. The purchase of these loans, however, was financed in part by Barclays, that is, while the loans seemingly left the banking system through their sale from PacWest to Ares, some of the exposure to these same loans returned to the banking system through the financing of Ares' purchase by Barclays. The transformation of the corporate loan business in the private credit market is actually broader than this simple example, because banks are also partnering with NBFIs to create private credit funds.

For a somewhat more detailed case study, consider Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED), currently the largest private credit fund in the world with over $50 billion of assets. Figure 6b lists the 19 secured credit commitment facilities arranged by subsidiaries of BCRED as of December 2022. The total of the committed amounts was about $23.5 billion, and 98% of that total from 18 of these 19 facilities were provided by 13 banks, with the remaining amount in one facility from an insurance company. The outstanding or amounts drawn on these facilities was about $14 billion, which accounted for about 50% of BCRED’s total debt liabilities.

Board of Governors (2023), in a recent Financial Stability Report, concluded that the financial stability risks of the private credit market “are likely limited,” because, while assets are illiquid and default risks difficult to evaluate, leverage is low and investors are subject to very

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11 See Blackstone (2022), Exhibit 2.
12 See, for example, Ren (2023) and van Steenis (2023).
13 See Lex (2023). Note that the entity of Barclays making the loans was outside of the UK ring-fenced bank.
14 See Schneider et al. (2023) and van Steenis (2023).
15 See privatedebtinvestor.com
long lockups. The report does note, however, that a deterioration of credit conditions “could limit the capacity of private credit funds to provide new financing to firms that rely on private credit.” In terms of this paper, the report's conclusion is more along the lines of the parallel view of NBFIs and banks, while the caveat is more along the lines of the transformation view.

To the extent that the private credit market is an important source of intermediation, and to the extent that banks and central banks are the ultimate sources of funding and liquidity under stress conditions, the essentially joint bank-NBFI business model has to be integrated into studies of financial stability. In terms of policy, prudential regulation faces the challenge of calibrating capital, liquidity, and other requirements as the private credit market expands and spreads exposures dynamically across banks and NBFIs. In fact, this challenge is often even more difficult because many private credit companies lend through insurance company subsidiaries, which are part of a separate regulatory environment.\(^{16}\)

3.b. Mortgage Origination and Servicing\(^{17}\)

Since the late 1960s, banks have not held in their portfolios all of the mortgage loans they make. Instead, banks originate many mortgages specifically to be securitized into agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Put differently, many mortgage loans made by banks are then sold to investors in the form of MBS. Furthermore, banks often retain mortgage servicing rights, which means that banks collect fees for passing payments from borrowers to investors and for advancing payments to investors when borrowers become delinquent. (These advances are ultimately recovered either by subsequent borrower payments or through government mortgage insurance.)

Over the last couple of decades, however, the bank share of mortgage origination has fallen from about 70% to less than 50%. (See FDIC, 2019, Chart 2.) In parallel, the bank share of mortgage servicing rights has fallen to about 40% (Bancroft, 2022). At first glance, the shift of mortgage origination and servicing to NBFIs appears to move risk from the banking system to NBFIs. However, as in the case of private credit, and consistent with the transformation view of this paper, the role of banks has been changing rather than vanishing. First, banks provide warehouse credit lines to non-bank mortgage originators, which draw down these lines as they make or purchase mortgage loans and then pay off these drawdowns as they sell these loans into securitizations. Second, either through credit lines or by sponsoring the issuance of commercial paper, banks finance the payment advances required of non-bank mortgage servicers. Hence, the

\(^{16}\) See also Foley-Fisher, Heinrich and Verani (2024) who document that large US life insurers have grown new businesses aimed at lending to risky firms—against a backdrop of tighter bank regulation and unconventional monetary policy from 2009 onwards—by exploiting tax and capital arbitrage opportunities through complex on- and off-balance sheet arrangements, and, in the process become more interconnected with other financial institutions.

\(^{17}\) On the transformation of mortgage origination and servicing see Jiang (2023), Kim et al. (2018), and Kim et al. (2022). Benson et al. (2023) explicitly show that banks, which exited the mortgage origination business, “funded through warehouse credit lines a large share... of the nonbanks that replaced them.”
funding risks of mortgage origination and servicing remain with banks through NBFIs. A systemic risk implication of this transformation manifested itself during the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdowns, when NBJI originators and servicers – and by implication the banks funding their operations – were rescued from stress by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and other government insurers. This rescue likely implies that banks would have otherwise experienced stress as well.18

3.c. Contingent Funding of NBFIs by Banks

The third category of Figure 2, contingent funding, describes transformations in which certain parts of businesses shift from banks to NBFIs, but unusually high or emergency contingent funding remains the responsibility of banks. As mentioned earlier, banks are particularly suited to provide liquidity insurance. First, their deposit and lending franchises diversify liquidity risk because depositor demand for liquidity is not perfectly correlated with borrower demand for drawdowns (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002). Second, the high correlation of liquidity demand with financial conditions brings enormous and unique value to banks having access to official backstops such as deposit insurance, central bank lender-of-last-resort financing, access to funds from Federal Home Loan Banks (in the United States), and implicit too-big-to-fail guarantees. Third, because of these official backstops, banks gain deposits in a systemic “flight to safety,” precisely when liquidity is most scarce and valuable (Gatev and Strahan, 2006).19

This section, focusing on NBF drawdowns of bank credit lines in times of stress, is a particularly dramatic illustration of the systemic risk implications of the transformation view of NBFIs and banks. Subsection 3.c.i presents data on the extent of drawdowns by the NBI sector as a whole and by REITs in particular over time. Subsection 3.c.ii describes how the mandatory clearing of the most commonly traded derivatives, like IRS, handed banks the responsibility of financing margin calls on NBFI positions and how, despite bank provision of liquidity to meet elevated margin calls in 2022, both for IRS and for electricity futures contracts, authorities felt obliged to rescue two distinct groups of NBFI derivatives users.

3.c.i. Drawdowns of Bank Credit Lines by NBFIs (and REITs)

Figures 7a and 7b, reproduced from Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen (2023), describe the extent to which NBFIs drew down on bank credit lines over time and, in particular, during the dash for cash of the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdowns. The left plot in Figure 7a shows that the dollar amount of NBFI drawdowns rose to a peak of $69 billion in Q4 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and then fell precipitously with the post-GFC contraction of the

18 See Loewenstein (2021) for further details.
19 Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) and Acharya, Gopal and Steffen (2023) find respectively that these backstops notwithstanding, banks do price into credit line fees the aggregate risk of non-financial borrowers and the rollover risk of financial borrowers. Acharya and Mora (2015) provide empirical evidence that during 2007-08 there was indeed “a crisis of banks as liquidity providers.”
NBFI sector, mentioned above. Since 2010, however, the dollar drawdowns of the sector have generally increased. There was a peak at $91 billion in Q2 2015, during the 18-month oil price correction starting in December, 2014, and then an all-time peak at $113 billion in Q1 2020.

The right plot of Figure 7a shows the share of NBFI drawdowns as a percentage of the sum of NBFI and non-financial corporation drawdowns. The NBFI share averages 26% over the sample period. It is particularly low, at between 20% and 21% in Q3-Q4 2008, partly with the contraction of the NBFI sector and partly with the large-scale drawdowns by non-financial corporations at the time (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). The NBFI share was also below average, at between 21% and 24%, during Q1 and Q2 2020, again due to the larger than usual drawdowns of non-financial corporations (Acharya, Engle, Jager and Steffen, 2021). This does not imply that NBFI utilization rates of their bank credit lines, measured as the ratio of the drawn down portion of commitments to total outstanding commitments, were low. In fact, Figure 7b shows that utilization rates for the lower-rated NBFI were higher than those of equivalently-rated non-financial corporations not only during Q1 2020 but also on average during 2005 to 2019. In other words, relative to committed amounts, banks faced more intense drawdowns during Q1 2020 from NBFI than from non-financial corporations.

We next turn to REITs, which emerged by 2023 as among the largest users of bank credit lines. See Figure 3b. REITs mix debt and equity financing in their capital structures, with mREITs relatively more reliant on repo financing. REITs tend to use bank credit lines as warehouse financing, drawing on them to purchase assets, meaning property in the case of equity REITs and mortgages in case of mREITs. Figures 8a and 8b, also from Acharya, Gopal, Jager, and Steffen (2023), describe the use of credit lines by REITs over time.

The left graph of Figure 8a shows that the dollar amounts of bank credit commitments to REITs have increased more than 2.5 times, from under $60 billion in Q1 2009 to over $150 billion in Q1 2020. The right graph of the figure shows that the dollar drawdown by REITs roughly follows the time series pattern for all NBFI, as shown in the left graph of Figure 7a.

Figure 8b shows, however, that REIT utilization of credit lines is somewhat different from that of other NBFI. First, the left graph (in contrast with Figure 7b) shows that REIT utilization rates are relatively high compared with those of all NBFI during normal times and at onset of the pandemic: utilizations for REITs in normal times are between 25% and 35%, while utilizations in peak times are above 40% and 45% during the GFC and the COVID pandemic and shutdowns, respectively. Second, the right graph of Figure 8b shows that the share of REIT drawdowns did not fall through the GFC and the onset of the pandemic and shutdowns, as did those of the NBFI sector as a whole in the right graph of Figure 7a.

3.b.ii. Bank Liquidity Provision for Derivatives Clearing

We now turn to the role of banks in providing liquidity to support NBFI positions in cleared derivatives. There were extraordinary demands for liquidity in two derivatives markets in the third quarter of 2022: U.K. pension funds faced large margin calls from their IRS positions that
hedged against falling interest rates, and European electricity producers faced large margin calls from their electricity futures positions that hedged against rising electricity prices. European electricity producers are usually not considered NBFIs, but have to be liquidity managers, in the manner of other NBFIs, on account of margin calls on their cleared derivatives positions. In any case, banks provided significant amounts of liquidity in both instances, but conditions ultimately worsened enough to result in the intervention of authorities.

Figure 9 illustrates how the post-GFC shift from bilateral to centrally-cleared IRS resulted in a transformation of NBFi and bank businesses. The top schematic shows a bank-dealer with a bilateral IRS facing a pension fund. As was typical before the GFC, the bank-dealer does not collect margin from this pension fund. Hence, the bank bears counterparty risk from the trade and may have to manage its own liquidity risk from margin calls on IRS that it executes with other dealers to hedge its IRS with the pension fund. In contrast to this bilateral trade with the pension fund, the bottom schematic shows a pension fund with a cleared IRS against a central counterparty (CCP), which requires the pension fund to post initial margin and to be prepared to make variation margin calls. Furthermore, to manage these margin requirements, the pension fund engages a bank to make loans to cover initial margin and to provide credit lines to finance variation margin payments and increases in initial margin requirements. All in all then, Figure 9 illustrates how the shift from bilateral to cleared IRS transformed the role of the banking system from bearing counterparty risk from derivatives trades with clients to providing loans and credit lines to clients managing derivatives margin.

It should be noted that the margin implications of the shift from bilateral to cleared derivatives were quantitatively massive, both in trend and through stress events. Customer funds in cleared swap accounts at U.S. intermediaries rose from a bit over $20 billion in 2014 to about $120 billion by the end of 2019, before jumping to about $150 billion during the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdowns (FIA, 2020, p. 13). Furthermore, and particularly relevant for the cases to be discussed presently, are margin amounts held at European CCPs in Q3 2022. For interest rate products, margin for interest rate products rose from about €40 billion through 2021 to about €100 billion in Q3 2022. For commodities contracts, which are mostly futures that have always been cleared—and as such not part of the transformation of Figure 9—margin rose from about €10 billion in early 2021 to about €90 billion in Q3 2022 (European Systemic Risk Board (2023), Chart 23).

**U.K. Pensions in September 2022**

U.K. defined-benefit pension funds hedge the interest rate risk of their long-term liabilities by investing in long-term fixed income assets, like government bonds, or gilts; government-issued inflation-linked bonds, or linkers; and corporate bonds. But—as in other countries—total pension fund liabilities in the U.K. are rather large relative to the supply of long-term fixed income assets. Hence, to balance the interest rate risk of their assets and liabilities, U.K. pension
funds also "receive fixed" and “pay floating” in long-term IRS, which has the same effect on interest-rate exposure as buying long-term government bonds.

Long-term interest rates had been increasing in the U.K. (and globally) since early 2022, but spiked sharply up on September 23 after the unveiling of a government budget proposal that would have increased borrowing without offsetting increases in revenue. Most U.K. pension funds seem to have been relatively well-hedged against increasing interest rates or, if anything, were positioned to benefit slightly from rate increases. Despite that economics, however, rapidly rising rates greatly reduced the value of their IRS positions and generated large margin calls. In response, banks provided liquidity to pension funds through a variety of loans and advances.20

Despite the liquidity support from the banking sector just described, many pension funds were forced to sell gilts to raise cash, which pushed prices lower (and rates higher), which in turn led to additional margin calls. There were several institutional and operational factors that added to the liquidity challenges of the funds at this time, but funds that were clearly solvent—with respect to the value of their assets against the value of their liabilities—suffered losses by having to liquidate assets in fire-sales to raise cash to meet margin calls or by being forced out of hedges for failing to meet margin calls, which exposed them to subsequent portfolio losses when rates declined.

In response to the stress on pension funds and the resulting stress in the gilt market, the Bank of England intervened on September 29 and again on October 11 to contain falling gilt prices by committing to purchase and fund large volumes of bonds and by adding linkers and corporate bonds as eligible collateral against loans made to banks to be passed on to pension funds. This intervention was particularly striking in that it ran in the opposite direction as the Bank of England's contractionary monetary policy at the time.

In this episode, the liquidity resources of U.K. pension funds were overwhelmed by sudden and large margin calls on their IRS positions. Years ago, bank-dealers might have been exposed to counterparty risk from bilateral interest rate derivatives with pension funds. But with the shift to the central clearing of IRS mandated by post-GFC regulation, banks in 2022 instead had exposure from loans and liquidity provision to pension funds that were scrambling to meet margin obligations. In short, the linkages between banks and NBFIs have not been eliminated with clearing arrangements for derivatives but simply transformed. Furthermore, these transformed risks were substantial enough in September 2022 to lead to turmoil in the U.K. government bond market and, ultimately, to the intervention of the Bank of England, with the possibility that banks would have suffered significant losses otherwise.21

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20 Banks loaned money to some pension funds on the collateral of their bonds, or loaned money to market participants purchasing bonds from pension funds on a levered basis. Also, banks that are members of IRS clearing houses or CCPs somewhat eased liquidity pressures by settling intraday margin calls from the CCPs on behalf of their pension fund clients while continuing to call those pension funds for margin on an overnight basis.

21 See Plender (2022), for example, for a news account of this episode.
European Electricity Producers in Q3 2022

Energy prices began to increase in Europe in 2021 for a variety of reasons, including the emergence of economies from pandemic lockdowns and a Russian supply squeeze. Prices rose higher after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and increased even more steeply from July through August 2022. Electricity producers that had sold electricity futures contracts to hedge against falling prices were perfectly solvent, but faced liquidity pressures from variation margin calls and increases in initial margin rates.

As the demand for liquidity to meet margin calls increased, banks increased their exposures to the energy sector by supplying significant amounts of liquidity in several forms. And, in addition to this liquidity provision by banks, support in the form of guarantees was offered or provided to electricity producers by many governments, including Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Switzerland.

In short, while electricity producers are not normally considered NBFIs, derivatives margin requirements mean that they have to manage liquidity like other NBFIs. Furthermore, while banks were not directly exposed to counterparty risk from electricity producers’ (cleared) futures positions, they were exposed to the sector through lending and credit lines and through bilateral electricity derivatives contracts that producers substituted for futures positions over the course of the stress so as to avoid future margin calls. Finally, as bank liquidity support proved insufficient, government authorities felt compelled to intervene with guarantees.

4. Propagation of Risks arising from Bank and NBFI Linkages

A key manifestation of the transformation view of the NBFI and bank sectors advanced in this paper is that these sectors have asset- and liability-dependencies, that is, the asset portfolio values and sources of funding of each sector depend on the other sector. And these interdependencies have systemic risk implications, because shocks within one of the sectors can readily spread to the others. We illustrate this mechanism in the context of the systemic risk framework of Cetorelli, Landoni and Lu (2023), who study another way in which shocks can propagate across the financial system, and in particular across NBFIs and banks, namely the

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22 These included margin waivers by clearing members based on letters of credit or guarantees from other banks; intraday or overnight advances of margin and other short-term credit lines; credit lines backed by uncollateralized guarantees of other banks; uncollateralized guarantees to clearinghouses (when European regulators temporarily allowed this); committed repurchase agreement facilities (to borrow cash on bond collateral); collateral transformation services (providing cash or highly liquid bonds in exchange for less liquid collateral at a haircut); relatively low-margin bilateral swaps (as a substitute for high-margin futures); and liquidity swaps (in which banks took over high-margin futures positions in exchange for low-margin bilateral swaps). Of course, not all banks were accommodating: some asked clients to reduce risk or to take their business elsewhere. See European Banking Authority (2022) for further details.

23 See Turnstead (2023), Wilkes and Turnstead (2022), and Wilson and Stafford (2022) for news accounts of this episode.
direct and indirect effects of fire-sale liquidations. Their line of argument is illustrated in Figure 10a.

Consider a shock to the real economy that reduces the value of claims on non-financial firms depicted in the upper-right corner of the figure. This shock, by distressing the portfolio of, say, asset managers holding those claims, could trigger forced sales of any or all of the assets held by those asset managers. In the stylized example of Figure 10a, asset managers respond to the original shock by selling both Treasuries and corporate bonds. Banks—who in this simple example are assumed to hold Treasuries and loans, but not corporate bonds—suffer losses due to the depressed, fire-sale prices of Treasuries. This direct effect is referred to and labeled in the figure as the “Round 1” effect.

Continuing with the example, the asset manager’s fire sales of corporate bonds stress the portfolios of life insurance companies, which contain corporate bonds and bank loans, and cause those insurers to liquidate some of their bank loans. The resulting price pressure on these loans could inflict additional losses on bank portfolios. This indirect effect of asset managers selling corporate bonds on bank portfolios is referred to and labeled in the figure as the “Round 2” effect.

Cetorelli, Landoni and Lu (2023) show empirically that Round 2 effects can be quite large relative to Round 1 effects, based on bank and NBFI sector portfolio holdings from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data as of Q4 2021. For example, there are large Round 1 effects on banks of pro rata portfolio liquidations of life insurers and finance companies, because these sectors are significant holders of bank loans. The impact on banks is large in the case of life insurer liquidations because life insurer portfolios are particularly large, while the impact on banks is large in the case of finance companies because finance company portfolios are particularly concentrated in loans. The Round 2 effect on banks of finance company liquidations is not large, however, because the high concentration of their portfolios in loans means that their liquidations do not affect other NBFI sectors enough to generate indirect effects on banks.

In contrast to finance companies, Cetorelli, Landoni and Lu (2023) show that liquidations of equity mutual funds do have large Round 2 effects on banks. The Round 1 effect of equity mutual fund liquidations on banks is very small because banks are not significant holders of equities. But liquidations by equity mutual funds inflict significant losses on other NBFI sectors, like P&C insurers, with large holdings that meaningfully overlap those of banks. All in all, then, equity mutual fund liquidations have a Round 1 impact on P&C insurers, whose liquidations, in turn, have a Round 2 impact on banks.

Cetorelli, Landoni and Lu (2023) define the “network multiplier” of an NBFI sector on banks as the sector’s Round 1 effect on banks as a fraction of the total of its Round 1 and Round 2 effects. Consistent with the brief discussion here, the empirical network multiplier of finance companies on banks was estimated at 32% and that of equity mutual funds on banks at 98%. (For completeness, the analogous multiplier for life insurers was estimated at 68%.) In short, equity
mutual funds and banks share little asset commonality, but the Round 2 effects of equity mutual funds on banks are nearly as large as their Round 1 effects. Furthermore, of the 12 NBFI sectors defined in Cetorelli, Landoni and Lu (2023), 11 were estimated to have multipliers above 50% and 8 with multipliers above 80%. Hence, a systemic analysis of Round 1 effects alone would severely underestimate the propagation of shocks across the system.

Combining the insights of Figure 10a with the NBFI and bank liability dependencies presented in Sections 2 and 3 reveal the potential for even further rounds of shock propagation. In particular, following on from Figure 10a, banks experiencing the Round 1 and Round 2 impacts depicted may, in turn, reduce lending to NBFIs and spark additional rounds of propagation. Figure 10b illustrates how this may play out. Banks may reduce credit lines to, say, REITs and reduce loans to CLOs in a “Round 3” propagation. Then, these NBFIs might reduce their investments in the real economy, that is, REITs might reduce their investments in real estate and CLOs might reduce their investments in leveraged loans in a “Round 4” propagation. Once again, the propagation of shocks along the lines of this section seem necessary for a complete analysis of systemic risk across the NBFI and bank sectors.

5. Correlation and Causation of NBFI and Bank Systemic Risks

According to the thesis of this paper, regulatory changes—like those following the GFC—can lead to a transformation of NBFI and bank businesses that increases their interconnectedness, which would imply that stresses in one sector can more readily flow into the other. The purpose of this section is to present some suggestive, preliminary empirical evidence supporting this implication. First, we measure the correlation of the systemic risks of the NBFI and bank sectors. Second, we test whether abnormal equity returns of the two sectors Granger-cause each other (Granger, 1969).

To study the correlation of systemic risks, we use SRISK, a measure of market-equity-based capital shortfall under aggregate market stress (Acharya, Engle and Richardson, 2012). The SRISK measure is calculated for a publicly-traded bank or NBFI through the following equation:

\[
SRISK = Exp_0 \left [ k(D_t + E_t) - E_t \mid Crisis \right ] = k.D_0 - (1 - k).(1 - LRMES).E_0
\]

where \( Exp_0 \) is the expectations operator (at date 0), \( Crisis \) is taken to be an aggregate market stress scenario from time 0 to \( t \) (e.g., a 40% correction to the S&P 500 or MSCI Global index over a six-month period); \( D_t \) denotes all non-equity liabilities of the institution at time \( t \), which, for simplicity, is assumed to be constant between time 0 and \( t \) at \( D_0 \); \( E_t \) denotes the market equity value of the institution at time \( t \); \( LRMES \) is its long-run marginal expected shortfall, i.e., the expected percentage loss in market value of its equity in the crisis scenario (estimated using dynamic conditional beta econometrics), so that \( Exp_0 [E_t \mid Crisis] = (1-LRMES).E_0 \); and, \( k \) is a
prudential market-equity-based capital ratio relative to which the capital shortfall \textit{SRISK} is computed, e.g., 8\%. \textit{SRISK} is publicly available at vlab.stern.nyu.edu/srisk.

If the \textit{SRISK} of an institution is positive, it is deemed to have a capital shortfall on the day of measurement. Aggregate capital shortfall for the financial sector as a whole or for a subsector (banks, NBFI, etc.) is computed as the sum of the positive \textit{SRISK} values of the individual institutions in the relevant set. Note that this calculation assumes a lack of perfect capital mobility across surplus and shortfall institutions, which is a reasonable assumption from a financial stability perspective given the uncertainties associated with the resolution of even mid-sized financial institutions. Also, because \textit{SRISK} relies on publicly traded equity, it can be computed only for financial institutions with listed stocks traded at observable daily prices.24 Finally, we restrict attention to institutions with at least $100 million of market capitalization of equity. The result is an aggregate \textit{SRISK} series for banks and NBFI.

Figure 11a reports the median 20-day rolling correlation of log changes in bank and NBFI \textit{SRISK} over several sequentially defined subperiods of interest from Jan 2000 to the end of April 2023. The subperiods, as defined in the figure, are the following: pre-GFC, GFC, post-GFC, Oil Price Shock, Rate Hike + Quantitative Tightening (QT),25 Pandemic, Post-Pandemic, and Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) Stress or, more broadly, regional banking stress.

The results in Figure 11a show that the correlation of bank and NBFI \textit{SRISK} has risen steadily from 64\% in the pre-GFC period and remained elevated through the SVB Stress period. This increase in correlation seems at odds with the post-GFC reforms designed to strengthen the banking system and protect it from the failures of NBFI, but seems entirely consistent with the transformation view of this paper. Banks and NBFI operated more in parallel before the GFC. Since then, post-GFC reforms have encouraged transformations that split intermediation activities across NBFI and banks so as, in fact, to make the sectors more interdependent. As a result, the systemic risk of the two sectors is more highly correlated after than before the GFC.

As an empirical matter, the correlations in Figure 11a might simply reflect that NBFI and banks have similar exposures to markets. To demonstrate a stronger interdependence, consistent with the transformation view of this paper, Figure 11b reports results from Granger-causality tests of \textit{abnormal}, equally-weighted daily equity-return indices of NBFI and banks. To construct abnormal returns, we adjust each daily index return for that day’s S&P500 (market) return based on their 90-day rolling historical beta. Then, starting on the 91st day of each subperiod, as defined above, and until the last day of the subperiod, we conduct daily Granger causality tests for the abnormal NBFI and bank equity-return indices over the 90-day historical window. The fraction of days in each subperiod for which the p-value of the

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24 These requirements mean that privately held NBFI such as CLOs, pension funds, mutual funds, and ETFs, are not covered in our analysis of NBFI’s \textit{SRISK}. On the other hand, there is good coverage of insurance companies, standalone broker-dealers, REITs, and financial services companies, which tend to be publicly listed.
25 For simplicity, some months are added at the end of this period. QT ended in Sep 2019.
Granger-causality test is less than 10% is reported in Table 11b, with the left column for banks causing NBFIs and the right column for NBFIs causing banks.

Three observations are striking. One, consistent with the SRISK correlation in Figure 11a, NBFIs and bank sector abnormal equity returns Granger-cause each other more robustly during and after the GFC than before the GFC. Two, NBFIs Granger-cause bank returns more frequently in the post-pandemic and SVB-stress periods. Three, the GFC and Pandemic periods are particularly characterized by banks and NBFIs Granger-causing each other. NBFIs likely caused bank returns in the GFC through banks’ poorly performing (NBFI) off-balance sheet vehicles and in the Pandemic periods through drawdowns of bank credit lines. Banks likely caused NBFI returns during those periods through banks’ role as the providers of liquidity and liquidity insurance to NBFIs.

Overall, the results in this section further advance the theme of the paper that financial regulation needs to pursue a holistic approach that recognizes NBFIs and banks as the highly interdependent sectors they seem to be.

6. Implications for Financial Regulation

As discussed in the introduction, different views of the NBFIs and bank sectors have different implications for financial regulation. Under the parallel view, banks and NBFIs provide distinct intermediation services, with banks heavily regulated and supported by official backstops and with NBFIs lightly regulated and under the presumption that they will not be rescued out of failure. The substitution view, in contrast, accepts the realities that NBFIs provide some very bank-like intermediation services and have, in fact, been rescued by authorities in times of stress. According to this view, financial regulation has to eliminate the regulatory arbitrage and make it worthwhile for NBFIs to enter into systemically important, bank-like businesses.

This paper makes the case instead for the transformation view, in which NBFIs and banks, along the lines of Goodhart’s law, endogenously adapt to regulatory and other business conditions. As a result, the components of intermediation activities that are under the heaviest burden of bank regulation tend to move from banks to NBFIs, while the components that benefit most from deposit franchises and access to explicit and implicit official backstops tend to remain at banks. It follows, then, that stressed NBFIs are bound to impose systemic externalities, whether by ceasing to function as significant intermediaries; by defaulting on obligations that destabilize some combination of banks, other intermediaries, or parts of the real economy; by drawing down on bank credit lines; or, by starting fire sales in the course of liquidating assets. Hence, while NBFIs in the current regulatory framework are de jure outside the official safety net, they are de facto inside.
A systemic risk implication is that authorities might rescue NBFIs in times of stress to preserve their intermediation in the real economy or to ease the strain on banks supporting that same intermediation. Consider, for instance, the example of Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED) from Section 3.a. The reliance of BCRED on bank credit lines is consistent with this implication and reveals another, more subtle mechanism. BCRED is an affiliate of the Blackstone Group, which also manages a private equity business, which, in turn, controls non-financial corporations that, on their own, rely on bank credit lines. Hence, in a stress event, drawdowns could easily be coordinated by or at least highly correlated across NBFIs, like BCRED, and their affiliated non-financial corporations. In fact, at the start of COVID pandemic and shutdowns, in March 2020, Blackstone did request companies in its portfolio to draw down on their bank credit lines (Kiesche, 2020).

Given that such risk transformation typically involves entities subject to weaker capital and liquidity requirements, namely NBFIs, our perspective may well reveal the financial system as a whole as financially more fragile than a viewpoint that separates banks and NBFIs and ignores their extensive linkages.26

Given this brief motivation, the section describes our suggestions for regulatory reform under the transformation view of NBFI and bank interdependencies. These suggestions are divided into two parts. First, we discuss the ex-ante measuring and monitoring of systemic risks and proposals for inducing both banks and NBFIs to internalize the systemic risks generated by their interdependent intermediation activities. Second, we argue that authorities should explicitly articulate ex-post state-contingent responses to distresses in the NBFI sector.

a. Ex-ante measuring, monitoring, and regulation

A straightforward first step in addressing systemic risks arising from NBFIs is to measure those risks, not only as they appear in isolation, but also accounting for the NBFI-bank interdependencies described in this paper. Some encouraging progress has been made by the regulatory community along these lines, including the European Central Bank (2023), FDIC (2019), and FSB (2022).

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26 Historically too, there is ample support for this view (see, e.g., Pozsar et al., 2010, and Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2013). In particular, financial innovation and changes in laws and regulations during the 1990s boosted asset securitization, which shifted intermediation banks taking deposits and making (and holding to maturity) loans to loans being packaged into securities and sold to investors. With this shift, several non-bank activities grew in importance to provide specialized services in support of the securitization process, e.g., specialty lenders, dealers, asset managers, insurers, among others). However, banks were not passive observers of these developments: they adapted by transforming the scope of their businesses and by increasingly incorporating these non-bank entities under their organizational umbrella (Cetorelli, Mandel and Mollineaux, 2012) to reap synergistic benefits (Cetorelli, Jacobides and Stern, 2021). Banks also played a crucial role in supporting the growth of nonbanks (Mandel, Morgan and Wei, 2012). Similar dynamics have been observed somewhat earlier as well, as banks experienced lower balance sheet growth in the 1990s, while money market funds, insurers, broker-dealers and other nonbank segments were growing. Boyd and Gertler (1995) observed these trends and showed that banks’ role as intermediaries was not diminishing, but rather shifting away from lending and interest income into off-balance-sheet fee-based activities.
Another step in the right direction is for regulators to incorporate these NBFI and bank interdependencies into their supervision. Some holistic approaches along these lines have appeared with respect to the supervision of CCPs. CFTC (2019) conducted a stress test in which a set of large clearing members and their largest customers simultaneously defaulted to three CCPs. The analysis examined not only the resources on hand at the CCPs to meet the contingency, but also the CCPs' plans for drawing liquidity from the banking system. These plans included lists of individual banks to be tapped, the volumes of liquidity required from each bank, and each source of funds (e.g., bank deposits, lines of credit from banks, maturing overnight reverse repurchase agreements, and new repurchase agreements27). Bank of England (2022) conducted a similarly-spirited exercise.

A further step is regulation that addresses the moral hazards that lead to the interdependent activities of NBFIs and banks described in this paper. While introducing laws and rules to govern NBFIIs along the lines of banks would represent a vast expansion of financial regulation, a bold but more limited approach could internalize the systemic costs of NBFI and bank linkages.28 A complete analysis of reforms along these lines is beyond the scope of this paper, but we mention three existing proposals here:

(1) **Committed Liquidity Facilities (CLFs).** Under this proposal, banks would post collateral to CLFs at central banks against which, in the future, they could borrow funds at predetermined haircuts and rates. Furthermore, to incentivize banks to post collateral to these facilities, the amounts that banks could draw down on these facilities would count as high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) in satisfying liquidity coverage ratios (see Nelson, 2023). The existence of CLFs would likely raise the relative costs of the more unusual extensions of bank credit to NBFIIs. To explain, say that accounts receivables from a particular corporation were accepted as collateral by the CLF at a certain haircut, while investor commitments to a private equity fund were not accepted at all. Then a bank lending against accounts receivables could post them to the CLF and gain HQLA equal to their ex-haircut value. By contrast, a bank lending against investor commitments would have to commit additional funds to claim the same quantity of HQLA.

(2) **Pawnbroker for All Seasons (PFAS).** King (2016) proposed that all short-term bank and NBFI claims be fully collateralized at the central bank at appropriate haircuts. PFAS would significantly expand regulation over the NBFI sector. It would also significantly increase equity and long-term debt as a proportion of bank liabilities, because collateral

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27 In its reverse repurchase agreements, a CCP lends money on securities collateral. In new repurchase agreements, the CCP would be borrowing money on securities it would have to post as collateral.

28 Yankov (2020) discusses one attempt at regulatory reform along these lines. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio penalizes bank liquidity facilities to NBFIIs more than those to nonfinancial businesses, with an assumed outflow rate of 100% for the former but 30% for the latter. This differential treatment, however, induced banks to shift to giving NBFIIs liquidity facilities—which are designed as liquidity management tools, at that 100% outflow rate—to giving NBFIIs credit facilities—which are for general corporate purposes, at an outflow rate of only 40%.
haircuts – which under PFAS have to be funded by equity or long-term debt – are typically large relative to the currently required ratios of equity and long-term debt to assets. However, by requiring that every short-term liability be fully collateralized, the PFAS proposal would discourage bank lending to NBFIs on unusual collateral that would attract relatively high haircuts. Furthermore, assuming that the collateralization requirement is checked frequently, this proposal would effectively induce a certain amount of real-time supervision of NBFIs, along the lines of supervising the liquidity coverage ratio of large banks.

(3) Federal Liquidity Options (FLOs). Tuckman (2012) proposed that any bank or NBFI be able to purchase options on secured borrowing from the central bank at predetermined haircuts and rates. Furthermore, the central bank would sell a sufficient quantity of FLOs so that it could credibly commit to provide no additional liquidity in a crisis. If this commitment were indeed credible, then ad hoc crisis bailouts would no longer be necessary and banks and NBFIs would use FLO prices to internalize the cost of liquidity in stress scenarios.

A full evaluation and treatment of these proposals is left for future research, but we believe it is important that they be carefully considered. First, quantifying the liquidity risk implications of bank funding linkages to NBFIs is crucial to effective regulation of the two sectors. Second, to the extent that these linkages are the result of purposeful or fortuitous regulatory arbitrage and take advantage of explicit or implicit safety nets, reforms that narrow the scope for such arbitrage can be useful in mitigating systemic risk.

b. State-contingent measures

Ex-ante approaches to mitigating systemic risk, like those of the previous subsection, do not preclude the possibility of individual or groups of NBFIs becoming more systemically important over time or of failing, that is, ex-ante approaches are unlikely to get into “all the cracks” of the complex and dynamically evolving financial system described in this paper. We therefore propose in this subsection a state-contingent approach that predetermines regulatory safeguards to be imposed on those parts of the NBFI sector where systemic has ex-post materialized.

The power of authorities in the United States to designate NBFIs as SIFIs, mentioned in the Introduction, is not quite what we have in mind as designations are based on static criteria, like present size, market power, or centrality within the system. We are suggesting a more prospective assessment that requires an ongoing monitoring of evolving NBFI risks and of the NBFI-bank linkages highlighted in the rest of this paper. Regulators would follow

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30 An alternative approach of not expecting to get into “all the cracks” is to complement financial regulation with monetary policy that leans against the wind (Stein, 2013). This approach is not incompatible with the measures proposed in this paper.
predetermined, but principles-based criteria for (i) designation of NBFI s as SIFIs; (ii) classification of NBFI subsectors as “systemic as a herd” even without individual NBFI s that meet size or concentration criteria (e.g., the money-market fund industry); and (iii) inclusion of SIFI-designated NBFI s in regulatory stress tests for imposition of capital and liquidity requirements. Regulation of NBFI s along these lines would be forward-looking, time-varying, and state-contingent.

A special case of the prospective approach of the previous paragraph could be a determination that directly- or indirectly-rescued NBFI s are *prima facie* SIFIs and subject to the applicable regulatory regime. For example, during the GFC, the Federal Reserve included broker-dealers in its lending of last resort in the form of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) without assuming any regulatory authority over the recipients (although they did remain for some time subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission). Similarly, the Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities in March 2020 benefited an expansive set of NBFI s with no discussion of expanded oversight.

Finally, we believe that it would be useful to debate the extent to which NBFI s that receive lender of last reserve support should be, at that time, presumptively subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve (Acharya, 2022). Another possibility would be to subject such recipients to one-off corrective actions, like deleveraging or increasing liquidity buffers, within a reasonable period of time (Acharya and Tuckman, 2014). The objective of this debate is not necessarily to expand central bank regulation over NBFI s. Instead, a credible commitment by authorities to regulate entities receiving official support would work in concert with the *ex-ante* approaches of the previous subsection to mitigate moral hazard.

### 7. Conclusion

There are a number of views of how the NBFI and banks sectors relate to each other, and each view has different implications for financial regulation. Under the parallel view, banks manage the payments system, take deposits, make loans, are supported by explicit and implicit official backstops, and are heavily regulated for safety and soundness. In contrast, NBFI s focus on securities markets, by making markets and providing liquidity, and are disciplined by the possibility of failure without any hope of official rescues. The parallel view is difficult to reconcile, however, with the realities that some NBFI intermediation looks very much like banking, that NBFI intermediation can be systemically important, and that, consequently, NBFI s have indeed been rescued by authorities in times of stress. These realities give rise to the substitution view, in which the assumption of some bank intermediation activities by NBFI s is a regulatory arbitrage that, almost by definition, increases systemic risk. In this view, safety and soundness bank regulation needs to be supplemented by regulations that in some way stop this regulatory arbitrage, either by preventing NBFI s from taking on certain business activities or by internalizing the societal costs of their doing so.
This paper argues for a transformation view, in which NBFIs and banks structure their intermediation businesses so as to loosen regulatory constraints and lower regulatory costs while retaining the liquidity benefits of the banking industry from deposit franchises and explicit or implicit access to official backstops. According to this view, the intermediation activities of NBFIs and banks are not distinct from one another or the same as one another, but interwoven in complex ways. In support of our argument, we present a variety of evidence: relatively new data on the asset- and liability-dependencies of the NBFI and bank sectors; case studies of businesses that have reallocated activities between NBFIs and banks; a conceptual framework as to how fire sales can propagate because of NBFI and bank linkages beyond asset commonality; and some empirical support for the proposition that the systemic risks of NBFIs and banks have become more interconnected since the GFC.

In the transformation view of the NBFI and bank sectors, not only can NBFIs be sources of systemic risk, but their fate in a crisis is intricately interwoven with that of banks. The resulting policy implications are that regulation should measure, monitor, and account for the linkages we describe; should attempt to internalize the systemic risk externalities of these linkages; and should, to the extent possible, predetermine the rules governing future decisions to designate NBFIs as SIFIs and to subject NBFIs receiving emergency support to additional regulatory oversight.

Fleshing out an important part of our argument is left to future research, namely, to identify with much more care the imperfections of the current regulatory regime that explain the profitability of NBFIs and banks transforming in the way we describe. Other research possibilities include: creating a more complete taxonomy of the relevant regulatory arbitrages; further quantifying NBFI and bank interdependencies; conducting more rigorous econometrics as to the systemic risk linkages across the sectors; and expanding the agenda to countries and areas other than the United States. All of these agendas would be invaluable in better understanding our financial systems and in forming more effective policy responses.

References


Richardson, Matthew, and Bruce Tuckman (2017), “The Volcker Rule and Regulations of Scope,” in Regulating Wall Street: Choice Act vs. Dodd Frank, Matthew Richardson, Kermit Schoenholtz, Bruce Tuckman, and Lawrence White, editors, NYU Stern School of Business.


Yankov, Vladimir, 2020, The liquidity coverage ratio and corporate liquidity management, FEDS Notes, 2020-02.
Figure 1a. Global Financial Assets of NBFI and Bank Sectors, 2002-2021

The NBFI sector includes all financial institutions that are not central banks, banks, or public financial institutions. Included are all 19 Euro area countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Kingdom, and the United States. Source: Financial Stability Board [FSB] (2022).
Figure 1b. Financial Assets of NBFI and Bank Sectors in the United States, 2002-2021

The NBFI sector includes all financial institutions that are not central banks, banks, or public financial institutions. Source: FSB (2022)
Figure 2. Examples of Transformations of Intermediation Activities Across the NBFI and Bank Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Activities and Products Historically Within the Banking System</th>
<th>Activities and Products Spread Across Banks and NBFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans and Mortgages</td>
<td>· Corporate loans · Mortgage loans</td>
<td>· Banks make senior loans to private credit companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans shift from being made and held by banks to being made by NBFIIs with collateralized or senior financing provided by banks.</td>
<td>· Mortgage, CLO, and other ABS origination · Acquisition/LBO financing · Mortgage servicing</td>
<td>· Banks make collateralized loans to mortgage REITs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities Using Short-Term Funding</td>
<td>· Mortgage, CLO, and other ABS origination · Acquisition/LBO financing · Mortgage servicing</td>
<td>· Banks make short-term loans to private equity companies, including subscription finance loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities that require short-term funding transform from being conducted and funded by banks to being conducted by nonbanks and funded by banks.</td>
<td>· Credit lines to nonfinancial businesses · OTC bilateral derivatives</td>
<td>· Banks sponsor CP or directly lend to nonbank mortgage servicers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent Funding</td>
<td>· Credit lines to nonfinancial businesses · OTC bilateral derivatives</td>
<td>· Banks provide credit lines to NBFIIs to be drawn down during periods of stress.</td>
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<tr>
<td>While the footprint of NBFIIs has grown relative to that of banks, banks retain responsibility for providing contingent funding in the form of credit lines to the NBFI sector.</td>
<td>· Credit lines to nonfinancial businesses · OTC bilateral derivatives</td>
<td>· Banks bear mutualized counterparty risk as derivative clearinghouse members and provide credit lines to NBFIIs to meet margin requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3a. Bank Loans to NBFIs, by NBFI Sector, 2013-2023

Term loans from U.S. bank holding companies, U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations, and savings and loans holding companies with $100 billion or more in total consolidated assets. Borrowers are grouped based on their business activities as identified by the North American Industry Classification (NAICS) code. Source: Form FR Y-14Q, Schedule H.1.
Figure 3b. Bank Credit Line Commitments to NBFIs, by NBFI Sector, 2013-2023

Credit line commitments from U.S. bank holding companies, U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations, and savings and loans holding companies with $100 billion or more in total consolidated assets. Borrowers are grouped based on their business activities as identified by the North American Industry Classification (NAICS) code. Source: Form FR Y-14Q, Schedule H.1.
Figure 3c. Bank Loans and Credit Line Commitments to NBFIs as Shares of Total Bank Loans and Credit Line Commitments, 2013-2023

Term loans and credit line commitments from U.S. bank holding companies, U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations, and savings and loans holding companies subject to consolidated financial statement reporting requirements. Source: Form FR Y-9C.
Figure 4a: Matrix of Asset- and Liability-Interdependencies, Q1 2023.

$Billions. For example, Broker/Dealers borrowed a total of $5.430 trillion, $1.370 trillion of which was from Banks. Source: Federal Reserve System, Enhanced Financial Accounts (From Whom To Whom)

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<th>PCs</th>
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38
Figure 4b: Matrix of Liability-Dependencies, Q1 2023

Percentage of total issued liabilities. For example, 25% of Broker/Dealers liabilities are held by banks. Source: Federal Reserve System, Enhanced Financial Accounts (From Whom To Whom)

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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Fin. Bus.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC Ins.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NBFIs            |      |      |        |     |      |         |     |        |     |           |         |          |      |      |       |
| Real Sector      | 14   | 1    | 1      | 0   | 1    | 9       | 3    | 1      | 0  | 3         | 0      | 1        | 11   | 15    | 100   |
| Rest of World    | 22   | 0    | 3      | 0   | 3    | 1       | 7    | 3      | 0  | 5         | 1      | 3        | 48   | 0     | 100   |
Figure 4c: Matrix of Asset-Dependencies, Q1 2023.

Percentage of total assets. For example, 5% of Bank assets are the liabilities of Broker/ Dealers. Source: Federal Reserve System, Enhanced Financial Accounts (From Whom To Whom)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUERS</th>
<th>Holders</th>
<th>NBFis</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>ABS/Bs</td>
<td>eREITs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABS Issuers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker/Dealers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity REITs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Companies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSE and Agency</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Ins</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage REITs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Funds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Fin. Bus.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC Ins</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Sector</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of World</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5: Summary of Bank-NBFI Asset- and Liability-Dependencies, 2000-2023

As an example of the left side of the figure, on average over the sample, 15% of assets of Broker/Dealers were liabilities of Banks, and this holding constituted 3% of the total liabilities of Banks. As an example of the right side, on average over the sample, 23% of the liabilities of Broker/Dealers were held by banks, and these liabilities constituted 5% of the assets of Banks.

Source: Federal Reserve System, Enhanced Financial Accounts (From Whom To Whom)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issuer</th>
<th>Holder</th>
<th>Average Issuer Share</th>
<th>Average Holder Share</th>
<th>Issuer</th>
<th>Holder</th>
<th>Average Issuer Share</th>
<th>Average Holder Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Holder</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Banks</td>
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<td>12%</td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Holders</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker/Dealers</td>
<td>Broker/Dealers</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Broker/Dealers</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity REITs</td>
<td>Equity REITs</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Equity REITs</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Companies</td>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>Finance Companies</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSE and Agency</td>
<td>GSE and Agency</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>GSE and Agency</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Ins.</td>
<td>Life Ins.</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Life Ins.</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMF</td>
<td>MMF</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>MMF</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage REITs</td>
<td>Mortgage REITs</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Mortgage REITs</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Funds</td>
<td>Mutual Funds</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Mutual Funds</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Fin. Bus.</td>
<td>Other Fin. Bus.</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Other Fin. Bus.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC Ins.</td>
<td>PC Ins.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>PC Ins.</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real</td>
<td>Real</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Real</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of World</td>
<td>Rest of World</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>Rest of World</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6a: An Example of Transformation in the Corporate Credit Market—PacWest Loans on Accounts Receivable, June 2023

In the wake of the regional banking crisis of March 2023, PacWest, a U.S. regional bank, sold a portfolio of loans backed by accounts receivable to Ares Management, a large private fund manager. Some of the purchase was financed by Barclays PLC.

Bank Financing of Private Credit Companies

Previously

June 2023: Ares Management bought loan portfolio from PacWest Bancorp, partly financed by Barclays PLC
Figure 6b: Special Purpose Vehicle Facilities of Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED), December 2022.

Source: Blackstone Private Credit Fund, Form 10-K, pp. 206-214, 227-228

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Facility</th>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>Principal Committed ($)</th>
<th>Outstanding Principal ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bard Peak</td>
<td>BNP Paribas</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
<td>1,235,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear Peak</td>
<td></td>
<td>468,494</td>
<td>166,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle Peak</td>
<td>Citibank, N.A.</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,146,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolving Credit Facility</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,150,000</td>
<td>1,470,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maroon Peak</td>
<td>Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A.</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Peak</td>
<td></td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>596,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Peak</td>
<td>Société Générale</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>1,691,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021-1 BSL WH</td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denali Peak</td>
<td>Deutsche Bank AG</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>749,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushnell Peak</td>
<td>Bank of America, N.A.</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bison Peak</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,182,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borah Peak</td>
<td></td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>223,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granite Peak</td>
<td>Goldman Sachs Bank USA</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>647,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanca Peak</td>
<td>Barclays Bank PLC</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,081,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windom Peak</td>
<td>Wells Fargo Bank</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,741,465</td>
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<td>Monarch Peak</td>
<td>MUFG Bank</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>873,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naomi Peak</td>
<td>Natixis</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meridian Peak</td>
<td>Mass Mutual Life</td>
<td>500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haydon Peak</td>
<td>HSBC Bank USA</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
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Figure 7a: Quarterly Drawdowns of Bank Credit Lines to NBFIs


Source: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen (2023)
Figure 7b: Bank Credit Line Utilization Rates by Rating Category for Non-financial Corporates and NBFIs during the COVID-19 shock (2020 Q1) and period before (2005 to 2019).

Sources: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen, 2023; Compustat, 2005-2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating category</th>
<th>Non-financial corporates</th>
<th>Non-bank financial corporates</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2020Q1</td>
<td>2005 to 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA -- A</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-IG</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-rated</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
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</table>
Figure 8a: Outstanding Bank Credit Commitments to REITs and their Quarterly Drawdowns

Sources: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen, 2023; Compustat, 2005-2020
Figure 8b: Utilization Rate of Bank Credit Commitment to REITs and REIT Drawdowns as a Share of Aggregate Drawdowns by Non-bank Corporations

Source: Acharya, Gopal, Jager and Steffen, 2023; Compustat, 2005-2020
Figure 9: Transformation of Counterparty Risk to Liquidity Risk from Derivatives Clearing—UK Pension Funds

In the top part of the figure, representative of business practice before the GFC, the Bank-Dealer bore counterparty credit risk from its bilateral (and over-the-counter or OTC traded) IRS position with a Pension Fund, and the Bank-Dealer managed the liquidity risk arising from margin requirements from any IRS hedge of its trade with the Pension Fund. In the bottom part of the figure, representative of the post-GFC regulatory environment, the IRS of the Pension Fund is with a central counterparty (CCP), and the Pension Fund must itself manage the liquidity risk arising from the CCP’s margin requirements.

Liquidity Risk from Derivatives Clearing: UK Pension Funds

Bank-Dealer manages liquidity risk, if any, and also counterparty risk from pension fund

Pension fund manages liquidity risk with support from Bank-Dealer. CCP manages counterparty risk.
Figure 10a: An Illustration of How NBFI Shocks Affects Banks through Asset Commonality

A shock impacting Non-financial firms induces Asset Managers to sell Treasuries and Corporate Bonds. The resulting price pressure on Corporate Bonds induces Life Insurance Companies to sell Bank Loans. The portfolios of Banks suffer losses both from both the direct or Round 1 impact of falling prices of Treasuries and from the indirect or Round 2 impact of falling prices of bank loans.

Asset-Commonality Amplification: NBFI s -> Banks
Shocks to the portfolio values of Banks shown in Figure 10a result in Banks tightening credit both in the provision of credit lines to REITs and in the provision of loans to CLOs. This tightening of credit, in turn, has a negative impact on Real Estate and Leveraged Loans, which rely on the intermediation of these NBFIs.

**Figure 10b: An Illustration of How Bank Shocks Affect NBFIs through the liability-dependence of NBFIs on Banks.**

**Liability-linked Amplification: Banks -> NBFIs**

- Banks → Tighter lending → Credit Lines → REITs → Real Estate
- Banks → Tighter lending → Loans → CLOs → Leveraged Loans
Figure 11a: Rising Correlation of Bank and NBFI SRISK over Time

SRISK measures market-equity-based capital shortfall under aggregate market stress (Acharya, Engle and Richardson, 2012) and is computed at vlab.stern.nyu.edu/srisk. Aggregate SRISK for a financial subsector (banks or NBFIs) is computed as the sum of the positive SRISK values of individual publicly-listed institutions in that subsector with equity valuation of at least $100 million. The graph on the right reports the median 20-day rolling correlation of log changes in bank and NBFI SRISK over the sequentially defined subperiods on the left, spanning the period from the beginning of Jan 2000 to the end of April 2023.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subperiod</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-00 to 31-Jul-07</td>
<td>Pre-GFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Aug-07 to 31-Oct-09</td>
<td>GFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Nov-09 to 30-Nov-14</td>
<td>Post-GFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Dec-14 to 30-Jun-16</td>
<td>Oil Price Shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jul-16 to 31-Dec-19</td>
<td>Rate Hike + QT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-20 to 31-Oct-21</td>
<td>Pandemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Nov-21 to 31-Dec-22</td>
<td>Post-pandemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-23 to 1-May-23</td>
<td>SVB Stress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 11b: Granger-Causality Tests of Bank and NBFI Abnormal Returns

Abnormal returns are computed by adjusting each daily NBFI or Bank index return for that day’s S&P500 (market) return using a 90-day rolling historical beta. From the 91st day of each sub-period until the last day of the subperiod, daily Granger-causality tests are conducted for the abnormal NBFI and bank equity return indices over a 90-day historical window. The table reports the fraction of days in each subperiod for which the p-value of the Granger-causality test is less than 10%, with the left column for banks causing NBFI and the right column for NBFI causing banks. All tests are conducted using the optimal number of lags for the Granger-causality test, based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Banks cause NBFI</th>
<th>NBFI cause Banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-00 to 31-Jul-07</td>
<td>Pre-GFC</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Aug-07 to 31-Oct-09</td>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Nov-09 to 30-Nov-14</td>
<td>Post-GFC</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Dec-14 to 30-Jun-16</td>
<td>Oil Shock</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jul-16 to 31-Dec-19</td>
<td>Hike + QT</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-20 to 31-Oct-21</td>
<td>Pandemic</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Nov-21 to 31-Dec-22</td>
<td>Post-pandemic</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jan-23 to 1-May-23</td>
<td>SVB Stress</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
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</table>