Liquidity Dependence and the Waxing and Waning of Central Bank Balance Sheets[1]

First Draft: August 2022

This Draft: October 2023

Viral V Acharya
(NYU Stern School of Business, CEPR, ECGI & NBER)

Rahul S Chauhan
(University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

Raghuram Rajan
(University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER)

Sascha Steffen
(Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)

Abstract

When the Federal Reserve (Fed) expands its balance sheet via quantitative easing (QE), we show commercial banks finance their reserve holdings with demandable deposits, especially uninsured ones, and also issue lines of credit to corporations. These bank-issued claims on liquidity did not shrink when the Fed halted its balance-sheet expansion in 2014 and eventually reversed it during quantitative tightening (QT) starting in 2017. Consequently, the financial sector, especially smaller and less-well-capitalized banks that increased liquidity risk exposure more, became vulnerable to potential liquidity shocks. This in turn has necessitated further liquidity provision by the Fed, as witnessed in September 2019 (repo market spike), March 2020 (COVID-19 outbreak), and March 2023 (uninsured depositor runs on banks). The evidence suggests that the expansion and shrinkage of central bank balance sheets leads to liquidity dependence in the financial system, suggesting potential tradeoffs between monetary policy and financial stability.

JEL: G01, G2, E5

Keywords: Federal Reserve, quantitative easing, large-scale asset purchases, quantitative tightening, Fed normalization, uninsured deposits, lines of credit, financial stability, monetary policy.

[1] Rajan thanks the Fama-Miller Center at the Booth School and the Hoover Institution for research support. Steffen is grateful for financial support from the BMWi and DLR. We are grateful to Gara Afonso, Ryan Banerjee, Richard Berner, Wenxin Du, Michael Fleming, Florian Heider, Anil Kashyap, Gabriele La Spada, Lorie Logan, Stephan Luck, Emanuel Moench, Bill Nelson, Charlie Plosser, Rodney Ramacharan, Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, Bruce Tuckman, Quentin Vandeweyer, attendees at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Jackson Hole Economic Symposium in August 2022 on "Reassessing Constraints on the Economy and Policy", and seminar participants at various central banks, conferences, policy think-tanks and universities, for helpful comments. An early draft of this paper was named "Liquidity Dependence: Why Shrinking Central Bank Balance Sheets is an Uphill Task".

Shouldn't the reduction of the size of central bank balance sheets be an entirely benign process "like watching paint dry", as senior Fed officials put it?[2] The central bank will either let bonds held as assets on its balance sheet mature or sell them, thus extinguishing reserves, its liabilities. While bond prices may have to adjust to draw in sufficient private replacement demand, and the swap of bonds for reserves with the private sector may enhance the term premium, these possible price adjustments seem natural consequences to the rebalancing of portfolios, reversing in part the price effects at the time of expansion of central bank balance sheets.

Yet, when the Federal Reserve embarked on quantitative tightening (QT) in 2017, that is, a shrinkage of reserves, financial markets in the United States experienced two episodes of significant liquidity stress: in September 2019 and again in March 2020 (by when the Fed had already restarted injecting reserves). The former episode was attributed, in part, to significant reserve flows into the Treasury's Fed account leaving the private sector short and, in part, to the uneven distribution of reserves across banks (see Copeland, Duffie and Yang (2021) or D'Avernas and Vandeweyer (2021), for instance). The latter episode is attributed to the panic surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak that led to a "dash for cash" among corporations (Kashyap, 2020).

Once again, in March 2023, after a massive expansion of the Fed's balance sheet during the pandemic and a subsequent modest balance-sheet shrinkage (though accompanied by large interest-rate hikes), mid-size and regional US banks suffered runs (notably Silicon Valley Bank [SVB], Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank) or significant outflows of uninsured deposits. This episode has been largely attributed to failures in risk management at individual banks and supervisory laxity (see Barr (2023)). Notwithstanding the relevance of these proximate causes for financial fragility, we ask whether the prior expansion and then shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet had left the private financial sector more vulnerable to such liquidity disruptions.

Acharya and Rajan (forthcoming) argue that when the central bank expands its balance sheet during quantitative easing (QE) by buying securities, commercial banks, which (typically) have to hold the reserves the central bank issues to finance its securities purchases, tend to finance them with uninsured demandable deposits. This need not always be the case, though empirically it is. Figure 1 (based on Leonard, Martin and Potter (2017)) is illustrative. In Panel A, the central bank buys securities from banks. In this case, there is no expansion of the commercial bank balance

[2] Fed Chair Janet Yellen citing Fed President Pat Harker, https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/fomcpresconf20170614.pdf

sheet, as the central bank simply swaps reserves for securities with the banks. In Panel B, the "public" such as non-bank financial institutions, family offices, high net-worth individuals, etc., sells securities to the central bank, and deposits the payment in the commercial bank. Banks now hold reserves and (typically) owe wholesale demandable bank deposits to the public. In this case, the mechanical effect is that bank balance sheets expand one to one with the expansion of the central bank balance sheet. What makes it less mechanical is that banks can subsequently alter their capital structure, moving away from these wholesale deposits towards longer-term liabilities. The question that motivates this paper is what happens to commercial bank balance sheets when the central bank balance sheet first waxes then wanes, and could this increase the likelihood of systemic liquidity stress.

We focus on the waxing and waning of the Fed balance sheet during the 2008Q4 to 2021Q4 period, but extend the sample period to 2023Q1 in descriptive analysis as well as in the cross-sectional examination of banking stress in 2023. During Fed balance-sheet expansions – Quantitative Easing (QE) I from Nov 2008 to June 2010, QE II from November 2010 to June 2011, and QE III from September 2012 to October 2014, as well as during the pandemic QE from March 2020 to end of 2021, demand deposits issued, in particular uninsured ones, as well as credit lines written by the commercial banks, increase. However, far from rebalancing towards longer maturities, we see banks reduce their time deposits. Importantly, bank-written claims on liquidity do not fall significantly when QE ends in October 2014 or when the process of actively shrinking the Fed's balance sheet during quantitative tightening (QT) starts in October 2017. Instead, the ratio of demandable claims to potential liquidity (reserves plus holdings of assets eligible for repo transactions at the Fed) increases steeply over these periods. This ratio also rises during the QT that starts in March 2022.

In other words, when the central bank expands its balance sheet during QE, the commercial banking system expands its balance sheet too, a simple but important fact that has not been fully appreciated. In fact, the banking system acquires more on- and off-balance-sheet demandable claims during QE that are not simply reversed or do not shrink fast enough in QT relative to the loss of bank liquidity. We refer to this phenomenon as "liquidity dependence", since it necessitates even greater central bank balance sheet support in the future when stresses materialize.

Liquidity claims also affect the aggregate pricing of liquidity. We build on the work of Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022) by showing that the Effective Fed Funds Rate less the

Interest on Excess Reserves, a measure of the price of liquidity, is not just associated (negatively) with aggregate reserves but also (positively) with aggregate commercial bank demandable deposits (especially uninsured ones) and lines of credit. This reinforces the point that aggregate claims on liquidity need to be accounted for before we can judge how much spare liquidity the system has. Building on the work of Lee Smith and Valcarel (2023) who focus on reserves, we find the negative association of reserves and the positive association of uninsured deposits with the price of liquidity is significantly amplified during periods of active QT by the Fed. This suggests that QT is associated with an increase in the risk of aggregate liquidity stress.

We need stronger evidence to conclude commercial banks drive this process. Hence, we turn to the cross-section of banks to ascertain the causal impact of reserves on the banking sector's demandable claims. Using instruments based on a bank's "beta" on aggregate bank reserves and the overall size of the Fed's balance sheet, we find that during the periods of QE, banks that exogenously obtain more reserves tend to increase both uninsured demand deposits and issue credit lines, while simultaneously shrinking time deposits. Importantly, banks do not reliably shrink deposits or credit lines when they lose reserves as QE ends and QT begins. The panel analysis also helps rule out (via time fixed-effects) confounding factors such as GDP growth and the level of interest rates, as well as helps control for time-varying bank-level characteristics.

What about bank-level pricing of liquidity? Banks that have a greater concern about liquidity risk should nudge term deposit rate spreads higher so that they can reduce their dependence on demand deposits. Therefore, a proxy for the price of liquidity at the bank level is how much higher the spread between term deposit interest rates and savings deposit interest rates are at the bank. We find that during periods of QE, banks with greater (instrumented) reserves tend to reduce the term spread. Interestingly again, we find that these patterns do not reliably persist in the period between when the first sequence of QE ends in October 2014 and when the central bank resumes expanding its balance sheet in September 2019. Put differently, banks that lose reserves do not raise term spreads to raise the maturity of their deposits.

One possibility that might account for the asymmetric bank behavior between QE and QT is that banks feel confident they will retain their access to liquidity during QT if they substitute lost reserves with bonds that are eligible collateral for repo transactions.[3] Of course, to the extent that repos must be conducted with other banks (because there is stigma associated with borrowing from the Fed at the discount window, and the Standing Repo Facility (SRF) allowing financial institutions to borrow additional reserves from the Fed was not operational before 2021), banks will all be reliant on a diminishing pool of ultimate liquidity, that is, reserves. So, in a situation where every bank wants to transform eligible assets into reserves (a "dash for cash"), there will be too little to satisfy all.

Indeed, it turns out that *Claims to Potential Liquidity,* the ratio of demandable claims (uninsured demandable deposits and outstanding credit lines) to liquidity (reserves plus assets eligible for repo with Fed), increases for the aggregate banking system during QT (except during March 2023 when the bank runs and deposit outflows bring down the ratio). In the cross-section of banks, we document that the ratcheting-up of demandable claims to potential liquidity is driven especially by the smaller banks not subject to liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirement; in contrast, the largest banks subject to the most stringent LCR requirement show a significant decline in the ratio of demandable claims to potential liquidity since 2008. In the cross-section of banks, we find that the distribution of this ratio steadily shifts to the right, i.e., the ratio moves to higher levels, through the different episodes of QE, continuing its momentum post-QE and during QT, and ends up with a significantly fatter right tail.

Why does a shortfall of reserves relative to commercial bank claims on liquidity matter, especially if the system has plentiful safe assets such as Treasury bonds? The problem is that the system becomes more vulnerable to a dash-for-cash episode where everyone who has issued claims on liquidity rushes to corner reserves or hoards what they already have, effectively an aggregate bank run. If inter-bank markets cease working due to hoarding, while the fear of stigma prevents banks from accessing reserves from Fed windows, then the dash for cash could lead to spikes in collateralized borrowing rates in the repo markets, and if unaddressed by Fed intervention, fire sales and distress. Of course, anticipating such stress as shortfalls of reserves develop, well-managed banks may become much more conservative in their activities, which not only might

[3] Put differently, while QE empirically seems to consist of Fed securities purchases from non-banks, which creates additional bank deposits, the pre-pandemic QT seems predominantly to be Fed securities sales to banks, which reduces bank reserves (an asset swap) and does not alter the stock of bank deposits.

slow economic activity but also contribute to the difficulties of risk-sharing by banks as a dash for cash materializes (see Acharya and Rajan (forthcoming)).

Does liquidity risk exposure matter? We examine two episodes of financial fragility, the first at the time of COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020 and the second at the time of bank runs and uninsured deposit outflows in March 2023. In both cases, the stocks of banks with a higher ratio of demandable claims to potential liquidity perform worse, and they experience greater credit line drawdowns; in the March 2020 episode, which seemed more a situation where the entire economy needed liquidity, corporations drew down more on credit lines offered by more-exposed banks, perhaps fearing the lines would not be available later; in March 2023, which seemed to be driven by concerns about both bank solvency and liquidity, uninsured demand deposits were withdrawn, especially from more vulnerable mid-size and smaller banks.[4]

Finally, we also document that there is an element of "picking up pennies in front of a steamroller" in bank behavior that leads to such fragility. Banks where demandable claims to potential liquidity moves to higher levels are also ones that generate higher accounting profits (return on equity or ROE) and tend to be less well-capitalized, suggesting that taking on liquidity risk may be a form of search for yield or gambling for resurrection, with steady returns most of the time and a small probability of significantly adverse returns. This is consistent with the findings of Meiselman, Nagel and Purnanadam (2023) that higher-ROE banks were more exposed to aggregate tail risk during the 2007-09 global financial crisis and the 2023 banking stress.

In sum, we have three key findings. QE creates (typically uninsured) demandable deposits in the commercial banking system, and shrinks time deposits (that is, it is not just an asset swap between the central bank and banks). Second, as QE stops and QT gets under way, these demand deposits (and credit lines that banks originate) do not shrink commensurately with reserves. Third, in the cross-section of banks, reserves do not remain where the claims on reserves are, which can exacerbate liquidity stress if surplus banks are unwilling to lend reserves.

[4] We do not empirically analyze the repo rate spike of September 2019 given its short-lived nature and lack of publicly available data at daily frequency. While the accumulation of reserves in the Treasury account and the uneven distribution of remaining reserves across banks were possibly the proximate causes of the Treasury repo rate spike in September 2019, Fed studies earlier in that year suggested the banking system had ample reserves, even accounting for unexpected variations such as in the Treasury's Fed account (see Logan (2019)). Our evidence suggests that the shrinkage of aggregate reserves *without a commensurate decline in aggregate claims on liquidity* was a deeper catalyst. At a minimum, by leaving the system vulnerable, it likely amplified other channels.

The shortage of reserves relative to claims can never be a problem if the Federal Reserve can always lend reserves at short notice to any degree desired – that is, it has an infinitely elastic balance sheet. If interbank markets for reserves have ceased operating, an additional requirement is that it should lend to specific liquidity-stressed entities. Of course, if the Fed floods the system with additional reserves, it may remove any possibility of an immediate shortage, and facilitate plentiful interbank lending. We will discuss the costs of such intervention and why they are no panacea.

The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the data we employ in our aggregate and bank-level analyses. Section 3 presents time-series analysis linking quantities of reserves, deposits (and their various types) and credit lines, as well as the pricing of liquidity in the inter-bank reserves market. Section 4 then further analyzes these patterns using bank-level panel data on reserves, deposits (amounts and rates), and credit lines. Section 5 documents the ratcheting-up of bank liquidity risk and how the distribution across banks of the ratio of demandable claims to liquid assets has evolved over time, relating it to recent episodes of financial fragility, and providing some evidence of likely bank incentives in taking on liquidity risk. Section 6 discusses implications for policy. Section 7 concludes with some directions for future research.

2. Data

We now describe the data sets we employ for our aggregate time-series tests, as well as for panel tests with a cross-section of banks. Descriptive summary statistics of all variables of interest are in the Online Appendix Table A1.

2.1. Time-series

From the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database, we collect data on central bank reserves with the banking system (H6 release) and bank deposits (H6 and H8 release), as well as the time-series of outstanding off-balance-sheet credit lines to corporations (FDIC-sourced).[5] We also obtain the effective federal fund rate (EFFR), interest on excess reserves (IOR), and U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from FRED. Wherever possible, we use monthly data, else

[5] Fed reserves can be held (i) in the Government Treasury Account and (ii) by non-banks via the Reverse Repo Facility. For instance, in August 2022, the Fed's liabilities of around \$9 trillion corresponded to roughly \$4 trillion reserves with the banking system, \$1 trillion in the U.S. Government Treasury Account or with agencies and market utilities, \$2 trillion in reverse repos of non-banks (which was small before the pandemic QE), and \$2 trillion currency-in-circulation. Given our focus on the banking system, we will refer to the reserves it holds as "aggregate reserves".

quarterly data (in specifications involving credit lines). The time-series data are from 2008Q4 onward.

2.2. Panel with Individual Banks

Bank-level deposits: We use FDIC's Summary of Deposits – Branch Office Deposits data to obtain branch-level deposits, and Call Reports of the FDIC for bank balance-sheet data from 2001Q1 onward, including bank-level reserves (defined as cash and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks). For each bank in the Call Reports data, we use the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) relationships table to link the bank to the Bank Holding Company (BHC). While the analysis of bank reserves, deposits, and deposit rates is at the depository level in the panel tests, the analysis of credit lines is at the BHC level starting only in 2010Q1.

An important part of our analysis focuses on uninsured demandable deposits of banks. Using FDIC Call Reports data, we first obtain the breakdown of deposits into its uninsured-demandable, uninsured-time, insured-demandable, and insured-time components. *Total Uninsured Deposits* are computed as the sum of total foreign deposits and domestic deposit accounts with balances over $100,000 before 2008Q4 and over $250,000 after 2008Q4 (reflecting the increase in deposit insurance limit), reported in schedule RC-O. Note that Call Reports fields RCONF-051 & 052, however, reflect this change only in 2009Q2. *Total Insured Deposits* are the domestic deposit accounts which fall under the corresponding deposit insurance limits. *Uninsured Time Deposits* are Time Deposits above $100,000 till 2008Q4 and above $250,000 after 2008Q4. However, the Call Reports items RCON2604 (Time Deposits Accounts with balance over $100,000) changed to RCONJ473 (Time Deposits Accounts with balances between $100-250k) and RCONJ474 (Time Deposits Accounts with balances over $250k) only in 2010Q1, in schedule RC-E. *Insured Time Deposits* are Time Deposits which fall below the corresponding deposit insurance limits. We then compute *Uninsured Demandable Deposits* as the difference between Total Uninsured Deposits and Uninsured Time Deposits, and by extension, *Insured Demandable Deposits* as the difference between Total Insured and Insured Time Deposits.[6]

We obtain deposit rate data from S&P Global's *RateWatch* deposits database with the sample period 2001Q1-2022Q2, including weekly branch-level deposit rate data of different

[6] We do not adjust for the FDIC's Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) Program's implicit insurance of all non-interest-bearing transaction accounts of balances over $250,000 when we compute Uninsured Domestic Deposits. Hence, Uninsured Demandable Deposits include temporarily insured transaction deposits and Insured Demandable Deposits do not include those deposits.

product types, along with product size and maturity information. For our deposit rate analysis, we use the average 3-month Certificate of Deposit (CD), 12-month CD, 18-month CD and 24-month CD rates, and Savings account rates, aggregated to the bank-quarter level.

Bank-level credit lines issuance: We obtain data on the origination of credit lines by U.S. non-financial firms from *Refinitiv LoanConnector*. These data include the name of the company contracting the line as well as the relevant contract terms. LoanConnector also includes the company credit rating at line origination. To obtain lender information, we use the Schwert (2018) link-file to map lenders in LoanConnector to the ultimate parent level (extending the file to the end of 2021) and obtain their respective CRSP/Compustat identifier (GVKEY). Finally, we use the GVKEY-RSSD mapping provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to obtain call report identifiers (RSSD) for bank holding companies (BHC).

Before proceeding to our main tests, we note that the reliance on multiple datasets (FRED, Call Reports, LoanConnector) implies that the start date of our sample periods across time-series and panel tests must unfortunately vary in some cases, but do not affect our overall conclusions.

3. The Aggregate Time-series: Bank reserves, deposits and credit lines

3.1. Descriptive evidence

In Figure 2, we plot reserves, deposits, and undrawn credit lines aggregated over all commercial banks using data from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds for the period 2008Q4 to 2023Q1. In Panel A, we plot them as percentages of GDP. The vertical lines correspond to the beginning of the different Federal Reserve Quantitative Easing (QE) / Quantitative Tightening (QT) programs: (1) Nov 2008 (QE I), (2) Nov 2010 (QE II), (3) Nov 2012 (QE III), (4) Oct 2014 (QE halted without actively reducing balance sheet size), (5) October 2017 (Quantitative Tightening or active balance sheet reduction), (6) Sept 2019 (Repo-market "spike" and liquidity infusion, followed by Pandemic-induced QE starting March 2020, which for simplicity we collectively refer to as "Pandemic QE"), and (7) March 2022, end of pandemic QE and the beginning of Fed rate hikes.

Central bank reserves expanded from the start of QE I in November 2008 to the end of QE III in Sep 2014 from less than 5% of GDP to more than 15% of GDP. There was some stabilization, even decline, in reserves when each phase of QE ended and before the next phase began. At the same time, bank deposits grew from below 50% to over 60% of GDP, again with some stabilization when each phase of QE ended and before the next one began. Undrawn outstanding credit lines decreased initially, from $2.37 trillion in Q4 2007 to $1.89 trillion in Q4 2011, largely due to concerted drawdowns by corporations during and following the global financial crisis (see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Acharya and Mora (2015)). However, they too increased from November 2010 (the start of the QE II) from about 12% to over 15% of GDP by Sep 2014. Importantly, while reserves dropped by more than half between the end of QE in Oct 2014 and the end of the first QT in September 2019, both credit lines, as well as deposits, remained remarkably flat. This highlights the pattern that neither of these claims on bank liquidity reversed their QE I-III increase when the central bank balance sheet shrank.

When reserves increased from about 7% to more than 17% of GDP during the pandemic QE period, bank deposits jumped again from 60% to almost 80% of GDP and credit lines also increased from 15% to over 17% of GDP. From 2022, however, reserves, deposits and outstanding credit lines all started declining sharply (relative to the GDP) once the Fed signaled the end of monetary easing. Banks first lost deposits to money market funds reflecting the standard deposits channel of monetary policy wherein banks do not raise deposit rates in order to benefit from sticky deposits (Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl (2017)), but starting in March 2023 there were also depositor runs on mid-size and regional banks (also see Caglio, Dlugosz, and Rezende (2023)).

Next, we split deposits into demand deposits and time deposits in Panel B.[7] Overall, the figure suggests a positive correlation between demand deposits and reserves as well as a negative correlation between time deposits and reserves during the QE I-III periods as well as the pandemic QE period. While reserves relative to GDP almost quadrupled over the 2009 to 2021 period, time deposits all but lost their importance, declining from about 15% of GDP to just about 5% of GDP. Demand deposits (uninsured and insured together), on the other hand, increased from 40% to about 80% of GDP over the same period. This shift from time to demand deposits suggests a substantial shortening of the maturity of deposit contracts during QE periods. Interestingly, the decline in time deposits flattens out whenever the Fed ceases QE (indeed reverses slightly during QT), suggesting that QE tends to push banks to increase the "demandability" of bank claims.

[7] Note that due to the aforementioned discrepancy in the dates on which Call Reports reflect the change in the definition of Total Uninsured Deposits (2009Q2) and Uninsured Time Deposits (2010Q1), we see a temporary blip up in Insured Demandable Deposits and a blip down in Uninsured Demandable Deposits during 2009Q2-2010Q1. Also, the sudden rise in Insured Time Deposits (and the corresponding fall in Uninsured Time Deposits) in 2010Q1 reflects the change in definition in Call Reports.

Focusing on uninsured and insured demandable deposits separately, we observe that while both rose in a similar way during QE I-III, and also stayed flat post QE III, uninsured deposits grew and fell faster respectively during the pandemic QE and QT. As insured deposits typically are held by households while larger uninsured deposits typically are held by non-bank institutions, this suggests that the most correlated deposit flows with reserves seem unlikely to come from households. Of course, as we explained in the introduction, if the central bank purchases bonds from non-banks, reserves and deposits would rise together simply by virtue of the non-banks depositing the receipts from bond sales in their banks. But Panel B suggests that banks are not simply absorbing deposits passively – they also seem to be shortening maturities of their borrowing as reserves pile up, probably because demand deposits are cheaper than time deposits, and rising reserves offer a liquidity cushion with which to pay off any depositors that demand payment.[8]

From a financial stability point, the stock of reserves becomes critical only when there is a "dash for cash", when even safe securities like Treasuries may trade at a discount relative to instruments for final settlement like reserves. What matters then is the extent of claims on liquidity relative to reserves. In Panel C, we plot overall deposits, uninsured demandable deposits and outstanding credit lines, all as multiples of central bank reserves. All three multiples, shown in Panel C, fall at the beginning of each QE period but eventually flatten or start to rise by the end of the QE period and continue to rise during the subsequent QT periods. Interestingly, the multiple to reserves of credit lines and uninsured deposits by Q3 2019 is similar to that at the beginning of QE I in 2009, in spite of the substantially greater level of reserves with banks in Q3 2019. In other words, a shrinkage of the Fed balance-sheet during QT by a magnitude much smaller than the expansion undertaken during QE (bank reserves were about \$1.4 trillion in beginning of Sep 2019 and only \$314 billion in October 2008) led to the claims on liquidity relative to available reserves rising significantly.

[8] In the Online Appendix, we analyze in detail the role played by the large US government fiscal stimulus in affecting bank deposit growth during the pandemic QE. In particular, we examine the relation between the quarterly change in uninsured demandable deposits and the change in aggregate reserves, and separately the change in insured deposits and the change in aggregate reserves. We find that while both relations are positive during the pandemic QE, the relation of insured deposits with reserves is driven entirely by quarters of the fiscal stimulus (2020Q2, 2020Q4 and 2021Q1) whereas the relation of uninsured demandable deposits with reserves is robust even during the non-stimulus, i.e., QE-only, quarters. This is consistent with our interpretations of the patterns in Figure 2, Panel A, and conforms to the intuitive reasoning that fiscal stimulus drove more the growth of household, typically insured, deposits whereas QE drove more the growth of non-bank financial, typically uninsured, demandable deposits.

Copeland, Duffie and Yang (2021) use evidence from delayed payments and possible reserve hoarding by banks to argue that reserves may have been inadequate in September 2019. Our data, showing an increase in the outstanding demandable claims banks had written relative to available reserves, suggests why banks might have been especially eager to conserve their scarce reserves when markets were disrupted. Indeed, in March 2023, illiquidity, as evidenced by uninsured depositor runs, increased in funding markets when bank reserves were in excess of $3.25 trillion, highlighting again the central role played by the stock of demandable claims written by banks in understanding liquidity stress.

In the rest of this section, we turn to time-series regressions, both on aggregate quantities and prices, and offer econometric support for the descriptive patterns we have identified.

3.2. Time-series Regressions

3.2.1. Quantities: Bank deposits, credit lines, and reserves

We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha \Delta X_t + \beta X_{t-12} + \varepsilon_t, \qquad (1)$$

where $\Delta Y_t = Y_t - Y_{t-12}$ is either the monthly change in Ln(*Deposits*) or Ln(*Credit Lines*) or the change in the *Deposits* or *Credit Lines*, with the change taken over the past year to control for any calendar effects, and $\Delta X_t = X_t - X_{t-12}$ is respectively either the change in Ln(*Reserves*) or the change in *Reserves*. As in the descriptive analysis, we also split deposits into demand and time deposits in some estimations. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation in the residuals up to 12 months.

In Table 1 Panel A, we present estimates of model (1) for the 2008Q4 to 2021Q4 period. Columns (1) to (4) respectively use changes in the natural logarithm of *Deposits, Demand Deposits, Time Deposits,* and (undrawn) *Credit Lines* over the previous 12-months as the dependent variable. The results suggest that the growth in *Reserves* is positively correlated with the growth in *Deposits, Demand Deposits*, as well as *Credit Lines*, and negatively correlated with the growth in *Time Deposits*. Our point estimates suggest that an increase in *Reserves* by 10% over the last 12 months is associated with an increase in *Deposits* of about 1.4%, *Demand Deposits* of 1.8%, and *Credit Lines* of 0.8%, but with a reduction in *Time Deposits* of 2.4%, consistent with demand and time deposits moving in opposite directions with reserves as we saw in Panel B of Figure 2. Importantly, this suggests that banks do not just issue deposits to finance reserves, but they shift toward issuing more demandable claims as reserves increase.

The correlation with lagged *Ln*(*Reserves*) is statistically significant, relatively smaller than the coefficient on changes in reserves for deposits (and statistically insignificant for demand and time deposits) but relatively larger in magnitude for credit lines, suggesting that changes in reserves take some time to translate into additional deposits and especially credit lines (or alternatively, that there is some momentum from past changes in reserves).

In columns (5) to (8), we use arithmetic changes in *Deposits* or *Credit Lines* (instead of log changes) as dependent variables, since the coefficients are easier to interpret. The point estimate in column (5) suggests that for the aggregate banking system, deposit liabilities change in levels almost one for one with reserves. Such a relationship would arise if on the margin banks finance an expansion in their holdings of reserves largely through deposits. Equivalently, it is consistent with the Fed injecting reserves by buying assets from non-banks, who then deposit the proceeds with banks. Of course, this requires that after receiving deposits banks do not rebalance their capital structure away from deposits. Since the new assets (reserves) have zero risk weights, banks have no need to issue additional capital if the leverage ratio does not bind, and since the asset is very liquid, they have no need to rebalance assets to meet liquidity ratios. Columns (6) and (7) imply that demand deposits increase more than one for one with reserves, and time deposits in fact shrink. Column (8) indicates changes in reserves are positively correlated with changes in outstanding credit lines.

In Panel B, we break the dependent variable, deposits, into insured and uninsured. Columns (1)-(4) has the variables in log changes and columns (5)-(8) are in arithmetic changes. While uninsured deposits are statistically related to reserves (columns (1) and (5)), with a large coefficient, insured deposits are not (columns (2) and (6)). Within demand deposits, the coefficient estimates for uninsured demandable deposits (see columns (3) and (7)) is 30-40% greater than that of insured demandable deposits (see columns (4) and (8)). These results are overall in line with the descriptive patterns seen in Figure 2, Panel B.

Collectively, these estimates suggest that an increase in central bank reserves is associated with an increase in uninsured deposits. This should imply that reserves have both direct and indirect effects on the price of liquidity when injected into the banking system. On the one hand, the direct impact of reserve injection, holding all else equal, should reduce the price of liquidity; on the other hand, the indirect impact of reserves injection is to increase demandable claims on banks, which should raise the price of liquidity. In effect, the overall impact of reserve expansion on the price of liquidity may be muted than implied by an analysis that ignores the issuance of demandable claims. To illustrate this, we turn to time-series evidence on the price of liquidity in the market for reserves, focusing on the role played by demandable claims, and how that role modulates between QE and QT periods.

3.2.2. Price of liquidity

The effective fed funds rate (*EFFR*) is how much suppliers of liquidity will receive in the Fed Funds market. The interest on excess reserves (*IOR*) reflects the price the Fed would like to set in this market. The difference (possibly negative) is a measure of the price of liquidity, adjusting for the prevailing Fed-intended rate (typically shadowing the policy rate). Our initial regressions follow the "demand for reserves" approach outlined in Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen [LS-VJ] (2022), but augmented for outstanding bank credit lines as another claim on liquidity that could affect its price:[9]

$$EFFR - IOR_t = \gamma + \alpha \, Ln(Reserves)_t + \beta \, Ln(Deposits)_t + \gamma Ln(Credit\ Line)_t + \varepsilon_t \qquad (2)$$

We estimate versions of this specification using OLS on quarterly data during 2008Q4 to 2021Q4 to match the frequency of data on outstanding credit lines and report the results in Table 2 Panel A. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation in the residuals up to 4 quarters.

In column (1), we only include *Ln(Reserves)* as the explanatory variable and find there is a statistically insignificant correlation between *EFFR-IOR* and reserves over time, replicating the finding of LS-VJ (2022). Column (2) includes *Ln(Deposits)* and shows a positive correlation of deposits with the price of liquidity, with the coefficient on *Ln(Reserves)* now turning statistically significant (and growing by a factor of over 15 relative to column (1)). Note also that the coefficient on deposits is close to twice the magnitude of that on reserves. Importantly, because changes in deposits are positively correlated with changes in reserves, this regression suggests we are not simply picking up some common component, since they have diametrically opposite correlations with the price of liquidity. This is further supported when we split deposits into demand and time deposits in column (3). In particular, the coefficient on demand deposits is about 1.5 times the magnitude of the coefficient on reserves, and nearly three times the coefficient

[9] The literature offers several approaches to estimating the so-called "aggregate reserves demand" of banks (see, e.g., Hamilton (1996), Carpenter and Demiralp (2006), and Afonso, Giannone, La Spada and Williams (2022)).

estimate on time deposits. This suggests that it is the demandable nature of bank liabilities that primarily offsets the impact of reserves on reducing the price of liquidity.

We then estimate versions of columns (1)-(3) that also employ undrawn credit lines from FRED, *Ln(Credit Lines)*, along with quarterly data on credit lines usage of U.S. firms from Capital IQ , *Ln(Usage)*. The various specifications are in columns (4)-(7). In particular, the coefficient on *Ln(Reserves)* in all specifications (columns 2-7) is negative, large in magnitude, and statistically significant. The coefficient on demandable deposits is positive and large. While the coefficient on credit lines outstanding is positive and statistically significant (except in column 6) suggesting that their demandability is also associated with a higher price of liquidity, that on credit line usage is not as robust in sign or magnitude.

Since there are well-known problems with regressions in levels, we also estimate versions of specification (2) in log changes in Table 2 Panel B. This has the advantage of absorbing confounding variation that may simply shift the levels of dependent and explanatory variables:

$$\Delta(EFFR - IOR)_t = \alpha\, \Delta Ln(Reserves)_t + \beta\, \Delta Ln(Deposits)_t + \gamma \Delta Ln(Credit\ Line)_t + \varepsilon_t$$

The results largely support the findings of Panel A in levels, with a few differences: one, reserves are now negatively and significantly related to the price of liquidity even without controlling for deposits or credit lines (column 1); secondly, the coefficient estimates on deposits and demandable deposits (columns 2-3 and 5-6) are magnified in differences while that on uninsured demandable deposits is somewhat smaller (column 7); and, finally, coefficients on outstanding credit lines (usage) are robustly positive (negative) and significant.[10, 11]

[10] In the Online Appendix Table A3, we separate the data on deposits and reserves into those for the overall banking system, for US banks only, and for foreign banks (overall minus US banks) only, and estimate the specification of Panel B with reserves only and with reserves and deposits (or separately demandable deposits in the case of US banks). Throughout, we find that bank reserves have a negative and significant coefficient estimate, not only for the reserves held by US banks but also for Fed reserves held by foreign banks, the latter being consistent with the evidence in Anderson et al. (2021) that global banks played an important intermediation function between the Fed and money market funds when they did not have access to interest on reserves. Furthermore, demandable US bank deposits have the expected positive significant coefficient estimate that is larger than that on overall US bank deposits, while the coefficient on time deposits is insignificant. Unfortunately, we cannot break up foreign bank deposits into demand and time. At any rate, foreign banks face regulatory constraints in raising such deposits and hold a relatively small stock. Overall, this is supportive of the view that while foreign bank holdings of Fed reserves do matter for the price of liquidity, both demandable deposits and reserves of US banks play an important role.

[11] One concern may be that the Fed's provision of reserves to the financial system following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the Treasury repo rate spike of September 2019 was a direct response – among other things – to the elevated *EFFR*, which create potential endogeneity issues in "reserves demand" estimation. In the Online Appendix, we also verify that our conclusions are robust to focusing on the period from Q3 2009 to Q2 2019, a period over which the alteration of aggregate reserves by the Fed was most likely unrelated to the state of the inter-bank markets, in particular, to *EFFR-IOR*.

Figure 2, Panel C suggested that the stock of demandable claims relative to reserves falls during the QE episodes and rises subsequently during the QT periods. Concerns about falling short in a dash for cash should rise during a period when claims on liquidity are high relative to available reserves. To see this, we follow Lee Smith and Valcarcel (2023) in estimating a version of specification (2) with reserves and (unlike their work) uninsured deposits as the explanatory variables. To allow the coefficients to vary over time, we estimate rolling regressions with a window of 12 quarters over the period 2008Q4 to 2023Q1 (which includes the pandemic QT). Figure 3 shows the rolling coefficients of *EFFR-IOR* on reserves and uninsured deposits along with 95% confidence bands.

Panel A, which shows the rolling coefficient on reserves, is consistent with the results of LS-VJ (2022) and Table 2 that controlling for deposits, the price of liquidity is negatively associated with the quantity of reserves, but importantly the association is particularly large and significant during periods when the ratio of claims on liquidity relative to reserves is high as in Figure 2 Panel C. The association is strongly negative and statistically significant during the QT periods (especially during the pandemic QT). Panel B, which shows the rolling coefficient on uninsured deposits, is even more striking. Uninsured deposits are positively associated with the price of liquidity, but this is robustly positive and quantitatively large only post QE I-III and during the QT periods (again, especially during the pandemic QT). Quantitatively, the elasticity of *EFFR-IOR* to banking system's uninsured deposits rose to above 1.5 by March 2023.

To summarize, the association of reserves (as suggested by Lee Smith and Valcarcel (2023)) and demandable claims with the price of liquidity is asymmetric between QE and QT. This is consistent with liquidity having a low price in normal times, but the price shooting up when supply is low relative to demand. Ignoring this time-variation and the implied importance of demandable claims can be potentially misleading. For instance, a rise in the (negative) sensitivity of *EFFR-IOR* to reserves might make it tempting as a policy to inject more reserves on a durable basis, but as we have explained, this raises banking system's deposits, precisely at a time when the (positive) sensitivity of *EFFR-IOR* to deposits rises too.

While these correlations are informative, aggregate time-series analysis is not conducive to inference about the causal impact of reserves on variables of interest, especially when we examine different phases of central bank activity, since we run into issues of statistical power given the small number of observations within each phase. Time-series analysis also cannot adequately rule out confounding effects from economy-wide factors such as the level of economic activity, the consequent change in household financial assets and interest rates, which directly affect deposit creation and deposit demand in the economy. We, therefore, turn to panel tests with a cross-section of banks (at a depository- or bank-holding-company level).

4. Central bank reserves and bank deposits (quantities and rates).

In our panel tests, we do not analyze bank deposits as a whole but instead focus on its two components – demandable (especially uninsured demandable) and time – individually. The reason is the divergence documented in Figure 2 Panel B and Tables 1 and 2 in their time-series evolution. We now describe the methodology underlying our panel tests.

4.1. Methodology

An immediate concern we must address is that while the aggregate stock of bank reserves is set by the central bank and therefore is likely to be exogenous to total bank deposits, the bank-level stock of reserves could be *endogenous* to the bank's deposit funding. For instance, there could be reverse causality from deposits to reserves. Conversely, a bank that has had adverse performance may experience weaker deposit inflows (or even deposit outflows) and a relative fall in reserves but may also try to seek reserves to meet withdrawals. Banks may also be subject to regulations such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). Because the LCR is relaxed if a bank chooses time deposits over demand deposits, liquidity-constrained banks may seek reserves at the same time as they seek time deposits – inducing a positive correlation we need to correct for. Also, large banks that have access to equity and bond markets may raise a part of their funding from non-deposit sources, which would increase reserves but simultaneously not increase deposits.

To allay such endogeneity concerns which can bias the estimated relationships of interest, we employ a 2-stage least squares (2-SLS) specification, instrumenting the change in bank-level reserves in the first stage to obtain the impact of an exogenous change in bank-level reserves on bank-level deposits. We employ two bank-level *Reserve Instruments*, z_{it}^{R1} and z_{it}^{R2}, each of which is effectively a form of "reserves beta" of the bank.

The first instrument z_{it}^{R1} is computed as the product of two components, viz., the most recent change in aggregate reserves and the bank's recent share of reserves:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Aggregate\ Reserves_t}{Aggregate\ Reserves_{t-1}}\right) \times \frac{1}{4}\sum_{k=1}^{4} Bank\ i's\ share\ of\ aggregate\ reserves_{t-k} \quad . \qquad (3a)$$

The first component, the growth in aggregate banking system reserves, is plausibly not driven by an individual bank's circumstances, but by the Fed's monetary stance.

As to the second component, banks will differ in their propensity to use reserves (their "beta" with respect to aggregate reserves). Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) argue that banks can use their reserve holdings best if they can write multiple diversified commitments against them, earning a fee on each – the same pool of low-yielding reserves backs many potential calls on them. Some banks will find it easier to write these multiple commitments, for instance because of the diverse nature of their regular clientele. Other banks may be at the center of networks, which in network theories of banks will position them best to use reserves for the benefit of the network. Such centricity could also be determined by relationships. During QE, non-banks may tender assets, placing the associated deposits with their relationship bank or prime broker. Given they are likely to attract reserves because of their activity, network centricity, or relationships, banks with a more "reserve-intensive" past are likely to attract more incremental reserves today if the central bank expands its aggregate stock. These more stable underlying factors would cause a bank to have a relatively higher reserve share but will not affect its structure of liquidity claims directly other than through the reserves-induced bank choices that we focus on.

This reasoning drives the second component of the instrument, *Bank i's lagged share of aggregate reserves*. It is calculated by dividing the bank-level reserves by aggregate bank reserves. We average the share over the past 4 quarters to deal with possible seasonality or noise in bank-level reserves, as well as to reduce the impact of any endogenous adjustment of reserves of the bank (assuming that such adjustment is transient and uncorrelated or weakly correlated from one quarter to the next). Effectively, we assume that a bank's averaged lagged share in reserves captures some persistent characteristic such as some banks being money-center banks or primary dealers or having strong non-bank relationships.

The second instrument z_{it}^{R2} is similarly defined as the first, but instead of using the growth in aggregate reserves with the banking system, it uses the growth in the overall balance sheet of the Fed as the first component, while keeping the second component the same:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Fed\ Assets_t}{Fed\ Assets_{t-1}}\right) \times \frac{1}{4}\sum_{k=1}^{4} Bank\ i's\ share\ of\ aggregate\ reserves_{t-k} \quad . \qquad (3b)$$

The rationale for using the overall balance-sheet growth of the Fed rather than the growth in aggregate bank reserves is that aggregate banking reserves are a residual from the Fed's choice on balance sheet size and the economy's demand for cash in circulation (and in recent years, the overnight reverse repo facility for money market funds). Our results are robust to employing only the first instrument, which is the more intuitive version of an individual bank's reserve beta.[12]

4.2. Impact of reserves on quantities of deposits

We then estimate a 2-stage least square specification. The first-stage is estimated as

$$\Delta Ln(Reserves)_{it} = \gamma_1 z_{it}^{R1} + \gamma_2 z_{it}^{R2} + \gamma_3 Ln(Reserves_{it-5}) + \mu X_{it-1} + \delta_t + \vartheta_{it} \quad (4)$$

$where\ \Delta(Y)_{it} = Y_{it} - Y_{it-4}$, and X_{it-1} represents bank controls lagged by one quarter which are bank size (measured as *Ln(Assets)*), profitability (*Net Income-to-Assets*), and capitalization (*Equity-to-Assets*), as well as a dummy variable *Primary Dealer Indicator* that identifies banks that are primary dealers. Finally, δ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects which soak up any aggregate temporal change in conditions. Note that we assume $Ln(Reserves_{it-5})$ to be exogenous to $\Delta Ln(Deposits)_{it}$ given the 5-quarter lag.

We will typically report estimates for the overall period (column (1)), the QE I-III plus post pandemic QE period (column (2)), QE I-III periods (column (3)), and for the post QE III and QT period (column (4)). To ensure we do not have too many gaps in the panel analysis, we include the period Aug-Oct 2010 (between QE I and QE II) and Sep 2011-Aug 2012 (between QE II and QE III) as part of the QE period, even though these were periods in between phases of QE. Excluding them does not change the results qualitatively. Note also that there are too few quarters at the time of writing this draft to do an analysis of the pandemic QT period (given the incidence of bank runs during this period, we analyze the attendant financial fragility consequences later in the paper).

In the first-stage estimation, we find that $\Delta Ln(Reserves)$ has a positive and strong correlation with the two *Reserves Instruments* for the overall period, the QE periods, as well as the post QE III and QT period. The first-stage results and F-statistics are reported in Online Appendix Table A4 and satisfy the usual criteria for rejecting the null hypothesis of a weak instrument, again for the overall period as well as the sub-periods.

In the second stage, we regress the change in deposits, $\Delta Ln(Deposits)$, against instrumented $\Delta Ln(Reserves)$ and $Ln(Reserves)_{it-5}$ as independent variables:

$$\Delta Ln(Deposits)_{it} = \beta_1 Instr\ \Delta Ln(Reserves)_{it} + \beta_2 Ln(Reserves)_{it-5} + \mu X_{it-1} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (5)$$

[12] Results from alternative instrument choices are in the Online Appendix Tables B1 and B2.

where X_{it-1} represents time-varying bank controls lagged by one quarter as in equation (4). Quarter time-fixed effects τ_t absorb any aggregate trends in deposit growth such as due to fluctuations in economic activity or increases in household financial assets.

In Table 3 Panel A.1, we present OLS estimates, and in Panel A.2, instrumental variable (IV) estimates, for the impact of reserves on demandable deposits. For parsimony, we do not report estimated coefficients on the 5-quarter-lagged reserves. The coefficient estimates for our main variable of interest, the change in log reserves, are positive and significant in the OLS estimates for the overall period and all sub-periods. In the IV estimates, the instrumented change in log reserves is indeed positively and significantly correlated with the change in log demandable deposits in the overall sample (column (1)), the QE periods (column (2)), and QE I-III periods (column (3)), but for the Post QE III/QT period (column (4)) it is economically less than half the magnitude in the other three columns and statistically insignificant. Since reserves shrink during the Post QE III/QT periods, the lack of an economically and statistically significant IV coefficient supports the time-series finding that demandable deposits do not (reliably) shrink in these periods.

In terms of magnitudes, an exogenous 10 percent year-on-year increase in a bank's reserves leads to a 1.33 percent rise in its demandable deposits in the overall sample, and 1.1-1.2 percent rise in the QE periods. The statistically significant IV magnitudes in Panel A.2 are greater than those observed in the OLS estimation in Panel A.1, suggesting there is some bank-level endogeneity that shrinks the magnitude of the OLS estimate. Interestingly, however, the panel IV causal estimate is of the same order of magnitude as the simple time-series estimate based on aggregate data (Table 1, Column 2).

Panel B presents results on time deposits. While the OLS estimates (Panel B.1) suggest a positive relation between reserves and time deposits, the IV estimates (Panel B.2) imply a negative relation in the overall and QE periods (Columns 1-3). This IV estimate is consistent with our aggregate time-series results (Table 1, Panel A, Column 3), again suggesting that there is indeed some endogeneity in individual bank responses that the IV estimates address. Once again, there is a statistically insignificant, albeit large-in-magnitude, positive coefficient in the Post QE III and QT period (Column 4). Turning to magnitudes, an exogenous 10 percent year-on-year increase in a bank's reserves leads to approximately a 1.2-1.6 percent *decrease* in the bank's time deposits in the overall and the QE periods.

Finally, in Panel C we find that an exogenous increase in bank reserves increases uninsured demandable deposits.[13] Indeed, the IV coefficient magnitude for the overall and the QE periods for uninsured demandable deposits is of the same order as that in Panel A for overall demandable deposits, and it is negative and statistically insignificant for the QT period (since reserves shrink then, this implies that uninsured demandable deposits do not reliably shrink along with reserves during QT). This is an important test as bank financing of QE-enhanced reserves is likely to operate via uninsured deposits from non-banks (as the Fed buys bonds from them) rather than sticky or relatively inelastic insured deposits.

Overall, Table 3 suggests that there is a maturity-shortening of deposits at the bank level during QE periods, as a bank's demand and savings deposits increase with an influx of reserves, while longer-maturity time deposits decrease. This maturity-shortening, however, does not reverse when the central bank stops injecting or reduces aggregate reserves during the Post QE III and QT periods. The differential effect for demand and time deposits suggests that it is not just that deposit financing passively grows with reserves; there seems to be an active move by banks to substitute term financing with demandable financing.

One value of our panel tests is to rule out confounding possibilities that make the aggregate time-series regressions hard to interpret. For instance, the desire for time deposits may shrink during times of low interest rates, especially if quantitative easing is accompanied by forward guidance that rates will remain "low for long". Since we identify greater rotation towards demandable deposits away from time deposits for reserve-intensive banks controlling for such time fixed-effects, we can be confident that this rotation is in fact an active bank preference rather than a passive one. We will add to this confidence when we examine bank pricing of term deposits.

Finally, the substitution of demand deposits for term deposits also suggests the implementation of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in 2015 (or anticipation of it) is not the primary causal factor behind our results. Banks would favor time deposits over demand deposits under LCR, because the former require significantly lower liquid assets to be maintained.

---

[13] The uninsured component of non-time or Demandable deposits may also contain deposits held in foreign offices of the banks, which are not insured by the FDIC. The results are consistent even if we focus only on the domestic uninsured demandable deposits.

4.3 Impact of bank-level reserves and deposits on deposit rates

One way to get further insights into the issuance of claims on liquidity by commercial banks is to examine their pricing across banks. As econometricians operating outside the Fed, we do not have inter-bank data in order to determine a variant of *EFFR-IOR* at the bank level; hence, we must examine alternative measures of the price of liquidity. Our intent is to examine whether banks with more (exogenous) reserves tend to offer a lower spread for term deposits, that is, a lower price for liquidity protection. We estimate the relative spreads off the cross-section of banks, accounting for the prevailing aggregate price of liquidity at any point of time (which we established varies with aggregate reserves).

Specifically, we focus in our cross-sectional deposit-rate tests on the spread between time-deposit rates (in particular, rates on 3-, 12-, 18- and 24-month Certificates of Deposits where the depositor is locked in for the term by high withdrawal penalties) and money market savings rates (henceforth MM savings rates). A narrowing of the difference between the two as reserves grow, coupled with a reduction in the quantum of time deposits, would suggest a bank preference for shorter maturity deposits as its reserves increase, i.e., the bank is not willing to pay more for term protection, and indeed reduces the issuance of term deposits.[14]

Formally, we employ a 2-SLS specification by instrumenting bank-level reserves and bank-level deposits in the first stage. We have already discussed our instruments for reserves. Deposit rates might be jointly determined with bank-level deposits as well – for example, a bank seeing an outflow of term deposits may raise term deposit rates, and this could show up as a negative correlation between deposits and spreads. To correct for such endogeneity, our instrument for deposits focuses on the counties the bank is present in and the growth in deposits there. Specifically, the instrument $z_{it}^{D} = \ln\left(\sum_{c\in Ci,t} w_{ict} \cdot \frac{Dep_{c,t}}{Dep_{c,t-1}}\right)$ where $w_{ict} = \frac{Dep_{c,t-1}}{\sum_{c'\in C_{i,t}} Dep_{c',t-1}}$. w_{ict} is the bank-

[14] The results are similar if we replace money market savings rates with non-money market savings rates as shown in the Online Appendix Table A9. Figures A3 and A4 also show that the time-series of the average spread between CDs of different maturities and various demandable deposit rates co-move. Indeed, these spreads move with the spread between the effective federal funds rate and the target federal funds rate (*EFFR-TFFR*) and the spread between the effective federal funds rate and the interest on excess reserves (*EFFR-IOR*), validating our focus on them as bank-level proxies for the price of liquidity.

specific weight accorded to county *c* the bank operates in time *t*, and $\frac{Dep_{c,t}}{Dep_{c,t-1}}$ is the growth rate in aggregate deposits in that county over the past period. The bank-specific weight is determined as the level of aggregate deposits in that county at time *t-1* divided by the sum of aggregate deposits over all the counties the bank has a presence in. In other words, our deposit instrument for a bank is the overall deposit growth rates of the counties the bank has a presence in, weighted by their relative aggregate deposit size last period among all the counties the bank has a presence in.

Implicitly, we assume the deposit growth rates in the larger counties (in terms of aggregate deposits) that the bank has a presence in will drive the growth rate in its own deposits, else the correlation of the instrument with deposits will be weak, and the instrument will fail the standard *F*-tests. The exclusion restriction is that the bank's presence in those counties, the relative size of deposit banking in those counties, and the growth of deposits in those counties, are factors that do not determine the bank's deposit spreads, other than through the size and growth of its own deposits.[15]

Formally, we estimate the following model in the first stage:

$$Ln(Deposits)_{it} = \gamma_{11} Deposit\ Instrument_{it} + \gamma_{12,13}.Reserves\ Instruments_{it} + \mu X_{it-1} + \rho_i + \delta_t + \mu_{it} \quad (6)$$

$$Ln(Reserves)_{it} = \gamma_{21} Deposit\ Instrument_{it} + \gamma_{22,23}.Reserves\ Instruments_{it} + \mu X_{it-1} + \rho_i + \delta_t + \mu_{it} \quad (7)$$

where *i* represents bank, *t* represents quarterly data, ρ_i represents bank-fixed effects, and δ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects. All regressions include bank-time-varying controls lagged by one quarter (X_{it-1}). In interest of space, the first-stage results are relegated to the Online Appendix Table A6 but *Ln(Deposits)* has a positive and significant correlation with the *Deposit Instrument* and *Ln(Reserves)* has a positive and significant correlation with the two *Reserves Instruments.*

In the second stage, we regress deposit spreads against instrumented *Ln(Deposits)* and *Ln(Reserves)*; in particular, we estimate

$$Deposit\ Rate\ Spread_{it} = \beta_1 Instr\ Ln(Deposits)_{it} + \beta_2\ Instr\ Ln(Reserves)_{it} + \mu X_{it-1} +$$

[15] In Online Appendix Tables B3-B4, we test the robustness of our results with alternative instruments for deposits that are based on different assumptions of exogeneity. Note also that as the FDIC's Summary of Deposits data only contains total deposits by bank branch, we cannot estimate the deposit instrument using demandable deposits.

$$\pi_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (8)$$

where *i* represents bank i, *t* represents the quarterly date, X_{it-1} again represents bank-time varying controls lagged by one quarter as in the first-stage, π_i represents bank-fixed effects and τ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects. *Deposit Rate Spread* refers to the *3-, 12-, 18-, or 24-month Certificate of Deposit (CD) Rate to MM Savings Rate Spread*. The primary coefficient of interest is β_2 from model (8), the hypothesis being that it is negative, i.e., an exogenous injection of reserves induces a preference in banks for a shorter maturity of deposits, whence they reduce time deposit spreads.

Table 4, Panel A presents the second-stage of the 2-SLS regression results for the overall sample period (corresponding OLS results are in the Online Appendix Table A8). We see that the coefficients on *Ln(Reserves)* are always negative as expected, and statistically significant except for the 12-month CD spread (there may be more variation in the 12 month CD spread across banks, because some treat it as a short term CD with minimal loss of interest if the CD is withdrawn prematurely, while others treat it as a long term CD with substantial penalty for early withdrawal). In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the instrumented log reserves (demeaned for bank and time fixed effects) translates into a 46 basis points narrower 18-month CD to MM Savings Rate Spread, which is about 1.12 times the standard deviation of the (demeaned) 18-month CD to MM Savings Rate Spread. We note here that the unreported coefficients on *Ln(Total Deposits)* are positive but insignificant.

Panels B-D replicate the analysis for individual time periods and find that relative to the overall sample period, the negative effect of reserves on the term spread for deposits is stronger or similar for all of the QE periods (Panel B) and only the QE I-III periods (Panel C). Interestingly however, pricing in the Post QE III/QT period (panel D) becomes much noisier, with the coefficients on *Ln(Reserves)* turning positive for three of the four maturities. We conclude that similar to some of the estimates from quantities, the cross-sectional bank pricing of liquidity turns noisy with the shrinkage in reserves instead of simply reversing.

Is the maturity shortening truly driven by reserve–flush banks? Dreschler, Savov and Schnabl (2017) suggest banks in concentrated deposit markets have more power to set rates, while banks in competitive markets simply match the competition. Importantly, banks in competitive markets may simply lose their deposits if they seek to rotate their maturity structure via a reduction in term deposit spreads (rather than nudging depositors to shorter maturities). In contrast, banks with market power over their deposit base can afford to bring about such a rotation without a loss of deposits. Therefore, an exogenous accretion of reserves to a bank in concentrated deposit markets should lead to a greater change in term deposit interest rates.

We find that this is indeed the case, for both deposit quantities and deposit rate spreads (long versus short), but the results are reported only in Online Appendix for sake of parsimony. Using branch-level data from FDIC's summary of deposits, we estimate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of Deposits at the county-level and aggregate it to the bank-level using the banks' deposit share in the counties as weights. We estimate the average HHI for each bank for the overall period of 2001-2021. We then take the median across the sample of banks and split them into above and below median HHI banks. We find that both demandable deposit accretion and shrinking of the deposit rate spread in response to exogenous reserves accretion (Tables 3 and 4) is driven by the above median HHI banks, that is, banks in concentrated counties. This lends support to the hypothesis that banks in fact actively seek maturity-shortening when flush with reserves rather than simply mechanically absorbing deposit inflows when the central bank buys securities from non-banks during QE.

4.4. Impact of Reserves on Origination of Credit Lines

As discussed earlier, banks can also create demandable claims on liquidity through the provision of credit lines. There has been a significant increase since 2010 (post global financial crisis and its aftermath) in credit lines as a percentage of GDP, as shown in Figure 2 earlier. Credit line usage has also evolved into an important source of liquidity management for corporations. During the Pandemic QE, there was a dash for cash (Kashyap, 2020) and credit lines were substantially drawn down in March 2020 (see e.g. Acharya and Steffen (2020) and Acharya, Engle, Jager and Steffen (2021)). Despite this unprecedented usage, the amount of undrawn outstanding credit lines increased even beyond the pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2021.

In this sub-section, we provide corroborating evidence using panel data that banks with higher exogenous reserves originate more credit lines. To investigate the effect of an exogenous change in reserves on the origination of credit lines across banks, we re-compute the instrument for reserves at the bank holding company (BHC) level, since data on bank participation in the syndicates that offer credit lines are at the BHC level. We estimate the following regressions at the BHC (i) -quarter (t) level:

$$\Delta Ln(Credit\ Lines)_{it} = \beta_1 \Delta Ln(Reserves)_{it} + \beta_2 Ln(Reserves)_{it-5} + \mu X_{it-1} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (9)$$

where X_{it-1} represents bank-time-varying controls lagged by one quarter, τ_t is a quarter-time fixed effect, again to control for aggregate growth trends induced by fluctuations in economic activity. $Credit\ Lines_{it}$ is the total amount of lines of credit to IG-rated corporations (Table 5, Panel A) and Non-IG rated corporations (Table 5, Panel B) originated by bank holding company *i* in quarter *t*. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the quarter level.

A possible concern with OLS estimates is (again) that of endogeneity. Banks that need more central bank reserves, for example, due to an increase in risk, may also cut back on new credit lines to reduce risk. This can result in a negative correlation, or dampen the otherwise positive correlation, between reserves and credit lines. Indeed, when we estimate the regressions outlined in equation (6), reporting the OLS estimates in Panels A.1 and B.1, we find that an increase in reserves is often associated with a *decrease* in the amount of credit lines that are originated though the coefficients are not statistically significant. An IV estimate would correct for possible endogeneity driving the OLS estimates.

The IV estimate is reported in Panels A.2 and B.2.[16] We find that during the overall and QE periods, an exogenous 10% increase in a bank's reserves leads to an *increase* in the origination of lines of credit to investment-grade firms by about 1-3 percent (the effect being 3% and statistically significant only for QE I-III periods) and non-investment-grade firms by 3-3.5 percent (the effect being similar in magnitude and statistically significant for overall period as well as the QE sub-periods). So, the instrumenting of reserves changes the sign of the effect from the OLS, again re-establishing consistency with the aggregate time-series analysis.

Such a statistically significant relationship between reserves and credit lines is, however, missing in the QT period, with the coefficient dampening in magnitude and turning insignificant, as well as standard errors becoming significantly higher. It may well be that the first stage is simply not well-identified at BHC level for the post QE III/QT period, rendering difficult any statistical inference in the second stage.

[16] We report the first-stage results in the Online Appendix Table A5, which show a positive and statistically significant relationship between Δ*Ln(Reserves)* and the instruments for reserves in the Overall and QE periods, and F-statistics pass the usual criteria too. This is, however, not so for the QT period at BHC level (unlike at bank level in the Online Appendix Table A4); the coefficient is positive but insignificant and the F-statistic low too.

5. Financial Fragility in Moving from QE to QT.

Our findings suggest it is wrong to think about QE as simply an expansion of reserves, taking the nature of claims on liquidity on the banking sector as static. Were it so, an increase in central bank balance sheet size would always lower the price of liquidity and improve financial stability over the medium term, so that a solution to any liquidity stress is to inject even more reserves. In contrast, our liquidity dependence view suggests that banks write new liquidity claims when the central bank issues reserves that it does not intend to withdraw quickly. Furthermore, banks don't shrink these claims easily when the central bank switches from expanding to shrinking its balance sheet. In other words, the supply of reserves during QE creates its own additional demand via these new claims.[17]

In this section, we first look for patterns in how an excess of claims on liquidity relative to actual liquidity builds up across banks. We then study the consequences of this vulnerability when aggregate stress materializes, first at the time of COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020 and, second following sharp interest-rate hikes by the Fed in 2022-23. Finally, we explore why some banks do not shrink liquidity claims when reserves fall and instead take on more liquidity risk.

5.1. Ratcheting-up of liquidity risk at some banks

5.1.1. Growth in uninsured demandable deposits and its variation by bank size

Figure 4, Panel A shows the evolution of the average across banks of uninsured demandable deposits to book assets for three size partitions. The partitions are banks with assets in 2014Q3 above $250bln, banks with assets between $50 bln and $250bln, and banks with assets below $50bln. These partitions are where the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) regulation is applied most severely, moderately, or not at all, respectively. As noted by Yankov (2020), these partitions were known ahead of time and banks did exhibit some balance-sheet adjustments even prior to the eventual implementation in 2014.

Relative to assets, uninsured demandable deposits followed an upward trend during 2008Q3-2021Q4 from 35.8% to 49.8% for the largest banks, 20.9% to 37.6% for mid-size banks, and 10.4% to 33.5% for the smallest banks. The largest increase in uninsured demandable deposits

---

[17] The increase in demand for reserves is described in a Federal Reserve survey of senior loan officers in November 2022: "*the majority of respondents from domestic banks reported that their bank's lowest comfortable level of reserves (LCLOR) had increased [since the end of 2019]…; most of the group reported the change being an increase by more than 20 percent…A large majority of respondents reported that their bank always preferred to hold additional reserves above their bank's LCLOR*." (see Senior Financial Officer Survey Results, November 2022, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, p 2).

as a proportion of balance-sheet size seems to take place for the smallest banks, the ones not subject to the LCR regulations. Importantly, the ratio was stable for the largest and the smallest banks during the QT period of 2017-19, but it fell for all banks during the pandemic-QT in 2022-23 as policy rates were raised sharply (culminating with bank runs or sharp deposit outflows starting in 2023Q1).

Even if commercial banks find issuing liquidity claims worthwhile, why do they not shrink their issuance of claims on liquidity when the central bank withdraws reserves from the system? One possibility is that banks feel confident in their access to liquidity because they substitute lost reserves during QT with bonds that are eligible collateral for repo transactions. It is important to note that eligible securities are not cash, though they may give holders the illusion of ready access to reserves. In a dash for cash, everyone will want to borrow reserves, and few will want to lend them, exacerbating demand relative to supply. So substituting reserves with eligible securities does not eliminate exposure to liquidity stress, and may indeed exacerbate it if banks become overconfident about their access to reserves.

Nevertheless, to assess this, we use Call Reports data to calculate a bank's ratio of uninsured demandable deposits to a measure of its potential liquidity, its reserves plus eligible assets, where eligible assets are those that qualify as collateral for borrowing reserves form the Fed (any time during our sample period). Such eligible collateral is also commonly posted and accepted for repo market transactions. In Figure 4, Panel B we plot how the ratio of uninsured demandable deposits to potential liquidity (weighted by potential liquidity at the bank level) varies across bank size categories and how the cross-size variation evolves over time.

Relative to potential liquidity, uninsured demandable deposits fell during 2008Q3-2021Q4 from a multiple of 3.77 to 1.48 for the largest banks, and 2.5 to 1.02 for mid-size banks; for the smallest banks, however, it rose from 0.76 to 1.47. While the surge in the multiple for the smallest banks mirrors the rise in their uninsured demandable deposits relative to assets (Panel A), for the largest and the mid-size banks the trend is reversed. So there is important cross-size variation in the ratcheting-up of liquidity risk in the banking sector. While there may be other explanations (which we will explore below), that LCR regulation treats uninsured demandable deposits punitively relative to insured and time deposits is likely to be one important reason why the largest and the mid-size banks which are subject to LCR see a decline in the multiple whereas the smallest banks that are not subject to LCR take more liquidity risk via uninsured demandable deposits.

The post-pandemic quantitative tightening, when rates also move up rapidly, is particularly interesting. Initially, from 2021Q4 to 2022Q4, the multiple rose for the largest, the mid-size, and the smallest banks to 1.76, 1.15 and 1.71, respectively. But with the onset of banking stress in the first quarter of 2023, and the rapid movement in deposits, the ratio fell to 1.66, 1.02 and 1.34, respectively, a particularly significant fall for the smallest banks.

5.1.2. Claims to potential liquidity: a composite measure of liquidity risk

A broader measure of liquidity risk is to include credit lines, another form of demandable claim on bank liquidity, in the numerator. As noted earlier, this measure is available only at the BHC level starting in 2010Q1. Using Call Reports data, we compute *Claims to Potential Liquidity* as the ratio of uninsured demandable deposits and outstanding credit lines to reserves plus eligible assets. In Figure 5, we plot how this ratio varies over time and also study its distribution across banks. Panel A shows the ratio calculated for the aggregate balance sheet of the BHCs. The ratio shows variation between 1.6 and 2.6, between 2010 and 2022, with falls during QE and rises during the post-QE III and (especially) QT periods. However, the aggregate numbers mask important across-bank variation.

Figure 5, Panel B shows how this broader measure of liquidity risk is distributed across bank size categories by the nature of LCR regulation. Interestingly, while the ratcheting-up of the measure over the entire period from 2010Q1 to 2023Q1 is seen again for the smaller banks, the broader measure – which includes outstanding bank credit lines – rises during the QT period of 2017-19 even for the largest banks. The rise in credit lines implied by the latter pattern will be an important feature of our discussion of the liquidity stress witnessed during the dash for cash at the time of COVID outbreak. Finally, all three sets of banks – the largest, the mid-size, and the smaller ones – show a rise in the broader measure of liquidity risk during the post-pandemic QT period of 2022-2023.

Panel C shows the cross-sectional dispersion vividly by plotting the distribution of the measure in a density plot, separately for QE I-III, post-QE III and QT periods, in each case bunching all values greater than or equal to 6 as a single point of mass at 6. It is clear that the ratio of demandable claims to (potentially) liquid assets of BHCs ends up at September 2019 (end of pre-pandemic QT) with a significantly fatter right tail at values greater than or equal to 6.[18] In

[18] While not shown here for simplicity, we observe a further shift to the right in the distribution of demandable claims to potential liquidity following the pandemic.

other words, by September 2019, in addition to the system having a larger ratio of demandable claims to reserves (Figure 2, Panel C), there was an increase in dispersion among banks in demandable claims relative to reserves plus eligible assets. As reserves started shrinking during QT, reserve-deficient banks were now effectively reliant on repo markets to obtain reserves from surplus banks by pledging eligible assets. As Acharya and Rajan (forthcoming) explain, such interdependence can render the system fragile and illiquid. Treasury repo rates could spike up if surplus banks hoard liquidity, and with the overall system being tight, there may have been incentive for them to do so.[19] Similarly, the onset of the pandemic might not have caused the dash for cash on corporate credit lines in March 2020 (Kashyap (2020), Acharya, Engle, Jager and Steffen (2021)) if the system had not already seen a significant tightening of reserves relative to demandable claims on liquidity.

5.2. Consequences of ratcheting-up of bank liquidity risk

Does this ratcheting-up of liquidity risk matter for measurable outcomes? We now investigate two episodes when it should have mattered, the COVID-19 outbreak of March 2020 and runs on banks by uninsured depositors in March 2023.

5.2.1. COVID-19 outbreak (March 2020)

We first examine bank returns during March 2020, i.e., at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the financial system experienced intense liquidity stress. Panel A of Figure 6 shows the time-series over the Jan 1 to June 30, 2020 period of the stock return difference between banks split into those with high and those with low *Claims to Potential Liquidity* ratio (median split) measured as of December 2019. Panel A shows that stock prices of banks with an above-median *Claims* ratio dropped, on average, about 2.5 percentage points more by April 2020 compared to banks with a below-median ratio. The decline is particularly sharp March 1, 2020 onward, as awareness of the likely impact of the pandemic dawned, and until March 23, 2020, when a series of liquidity interventions by the Federal Reserve Bank stemmed the market decline including of bank stock prices (Acharya, Engle, Jager and Steffen, 2021).

To test this econometrically, we employ the following cross-sectional regression:

$$r_i = \alpha + \gamma \; Log\;(Claims\ to\ Potential\ Liquidity)_i + \sum \beta \; X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{10}$$

[19] Such hoarding might be an attempt to signal their "fortress" balance sheet with high reserves, a consequence of regulatory requirements to hold liquidity (Copeland, Duffie and Yang (2021), D'Avernas and Vandeweyer (2021)), or the fear of supervisory stigma from having to access the Fed for intra-day reserves (Nelson (2019, 2022)).

We compute cumulative excess returns for bank holding company *i*, r_i, over a period as the total return on the stock of the BHC minus the cumulative stock market (S&P500) return over that period. We employ log of claims to potential liquidity as the explanatory variable, given its skewed distribution, to ensure that inference is not drawn by extreme outliers. *X* is a vector of BHC-level control variables at the end of 2019: Log of Assets, Net Income/Assets, Equity/Assets and the Primary Dealer Indicator.

The results are reported in Table 6. In column (1), excess stock returns are measured over the Jan 1 to Feb 28, 2020 period as a placebo, and in column (2) to (4) over the March 1 to March 23, 2000 period. Not surprisingly, we do not see significant statistical explanatory power of the *Claims to Potential Liquidity* ratio for bank stock returns when we include only the January and February 2020 period suggesting parallel pre-trends. Focusing in contrast on the March 1 to March 23, 2020 period, we observe an economically and statistically significant effect (column (2)). A one-standard deviation increase in the ratio is associated with 1.5 percentage point lower stock returns, which is about 12.5% of the unconditional mean decline in bank stock prices during this period. Interestingly, the effect is driven by unused credit lines (*Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity* ratio in column (3)) as well as by uninsured demandable deposits (*Uninsured Demandable Deposits to Potential Liquidity* ratio in column (4)). This is not surprising, as we will argue below.

To investigate the role of bank credit lines further, we present direct evidence of dash for cash on banks that had written substantial credit lines relative to their reserves and eligible assets. In Panel B of Figure 6, we plot the realized *Gross Drawdowns* (measured as the change in outstanding corporate credit lines during Q1 2020 relative to total assets) against the log of *Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity* ratio of banks. The scatter plot as well as the fitted regression line show a clear positive association. We verify this in Table 6, column (5) where an increase in *Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity* ratio increases *Gross Drawdowns* (as the dependent variable in model (10) instead of excess returns) A one standard deviation increase in *Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity* ratio increases *Gross Drawdowns* by about 0.18%, which is almost 36% of the unconditional increase in *Gross Drawdowns*. Further, as column (6) suggests, corporate credit line drawdowns are also higher for banks with greater *Uninsured Demandable Deposits to Potential Liquidity*, suggesting an interaction of liquidity risks from the two types of demandable claims.

What explains the excess credit line drawdowns in banks that had stretched liquidity positions, and their stock price decline? Clearly, access to liquidity became tighter at the onset of the pandemic (especially in view of its uncertain duration). Firms that had obtained credit line commitments from banks called on promises, perhaps also worried that banks that were overcommitted would tighten conditions for drawdowns. These drawdowns encumbered bank capital as discussed in Acharya, Engle, Jager and Steffen (2021). Not surprisingly, banks that had written these claims and had few reserves or eligible assets to back them up, would have had to also look for potentially pricier sources of liquidity, thus hurting their profits and stock price. However, as a result of early and unprecedentedly large Fed intervention, and perhaps because banks were better-capitalized and more solvent than during the global financial crisis, the dash for cash did not turn into a full-scale panic. Indeed, some firms may have simply redeposited credit line drawdowns with their banks, transforming a possibly revocable promise (credit line) to an irrevocable one (deposit). In other words, the events of March 2020 remained simply a warning of what could happen. We turn next to the bank runs of March 2023 relating them to the ratcheting-up of liquidity risk during the pandemic QE.

5.2.2. Mid-sized bank runs and regional banking stress (March 2023)

In March 2023, a mid-sized bank, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) Financial Group, with over $200 billion in assets, became distressed during the ongoing raising of interest rates as well as quantitative tightening by the Fed. SVB gained 140 billion dollars in deposits during the Pandemic QE period of 2019 Q4 - 2022Q1 (see Online Appendix, Figure A5, Panel A), over 90% being uninsured deposits. SVB had invested the influx of deposits mostly in a long-dated Treasury portfolio and the rest in loans to tech-sector startups that were also its depositors in a large measure. The pace of its expansion was so rapid that both total assets and deposits more than tripled during the Q1 2020 to Q4 2022 period. Tech-sector losses and the value erosion of SVB's bond portfolio induced a loss of $25 billion of deposits once QT and Fed rate hikes took hold between 2022 Q2-2022Q4. This accelerated to a full-fledged run based on concerns of bank insolvency from depositors such as tech-sector venture-capital firms and there was a significant loss in deposits in March 2023. The bank failed on March 10, 2023 and was put under the FDIC receivership. Signature Bank, with an almost similar asset and deposit growth pattern, met with a similar fate, while the fate of First Republic Bank, was uncertain for a few weeks until it too had to be sold off to JPMorgan Chase to avoid further runs in end of April 2023. The FDIC has incurred losses exceeding $30 billion to date in the process.[20]

The problems affecting these banks are likely to be emblematic of small and medium banks in general. Online Appendix Figure A5, Panel B shows that uninsured bank deposits grew on average at over $390 billion per quarter during the pandemic-QE, increasing their share in overall deposits from 48% to 53% within a span of eight quarters. When interest rates were raised sharply in 2022-23, the banking sector's exposure to liability repricing was higher, implying higher losses and depositor concerns of solvency.

Once again, we find in Figure 7 that bank-level stock returns during March 1-13, 2023 (around the failure of SVB) are related in the cross-section to bank-level measure of the log of *Claims to Potential Liquidity* as of 2022Q4. The relationship is negative for banks with less than $250billion in assets as of 2022Q4, whereas it is positive for large banks due to a flight-to-quality of uninsured deposits to the largest banks (see, for instance, Caglio, Dlugosz, and Rezende (2023)). While the latter may in part be due to their too-big-to-fail or too-systemic-to-fail status, as we showed earlier in Figure 5 these banks have, on average, brought down their *Claims to Potential Liquidity* substantially since 2008Q3.

Table 7 supports these findings econometrically, also employing bank-level control variables in the cross-sectional regressions. Panel A, Column (1) confirms the parallel pre-trends by employing Jan-Feb 2023 as the placebo period in which there is no effect of claims to liquidity on excess stock returns of banks. Columns (2)-(4) then show that banks with greater demandable claims to potential liquidity had worse excess stock market returns during 1st-13th March 2023, but the effect seems to be driven by those with substantial uninsured demand deposits. Interestingly, because the concerns in March 2023 were centered around banks and their solvency, not around corporate needs to drawdown credit lines, credit lines outstanding seem to play less of a role in this episode. Furthermore, Columns (5)-(7) show that banks also lost a greater amount of their uninsured demandable deposits over the quarter if they had more demandable claims to potential liquidity; credit lines and uninsured demandable deposits matter for deposit withdrawals individually as well as collectively.

[20] See Statement by Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, FDIC, *On the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Long-Term Debt*, August 29 2023: https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2023/spaug2923a.html

Panel B suggests there is indeed the divergence in effects between large banks and mid-size plus small ones seen in Figure 7. In particular, interacting claims to potential liquidity with a bank dummy for its 2022Q4 asset size being below $250 billion shows that the adverse stock market and uninsured deposit loss effects seen in Panel A, Columns (2)-(7) are entirely from the mid-size and smaller banks, whereas there is a relatively positive stock market return and uninsured deposit flow into the largest banks.

In sum, the build-up of financial fragility due to QE having raised demandable claims relative to liquidity in (parts of) the banking system offers a unified view of liquidity stresses that materialized in March 2020 and March 2023. It does, however, leave open the question as to why some banks seek liquidity risk such in spite of the associated vulnerability. We now offer suggestive evidence on this important question.

5.3. Liquidity risk seeking as a form of search for yield by banks

Meiselman, Nagel and Purnanandam (2023) show that banks with high accounting returns on equity (ROE) had higher systematic tail risk during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). They show ROE has strong predictive power for materialization of such tail risk both during the 2007-09 global financial crisis as well as the 2023 banking sector stress. Since bank top management has high powered incentives to generate ROE, this may also incentivize them to take tail risks that generate steady returns in normal times (lower funding costs with uninsured demandable deposits, higher fee premia by writing credit commitments) in return for a small probability of a really bad outcome when massive drawdowns are realized (see, for example, Rajan (2006)). The post-GFC regulation was meant to curb this kind of risk taking, but as we noted, it applies more to large banks than smaller banks, and supervision has been uneven, as suggested by Barr (2023).

Figure 8 shows the relationship between bank ROE, measured as Income before Tax divided by Total Book Equity, and *Claims to Potential Liquidity*, controlling for bank and time fixed effects. Panel A shows the bin-scatter for post QE-III and QT period of 2014Q4 to 2019Q3, and Panel B shows it for the post-pandemic QT period of 2022Q1 to 2023Q1 (conclusions are unaffected if we stop at 2022Q4, i.e., drop 2023Q1 when bank runs occurred). The relationship is strongly positive in both periods with a unit increase in *Claims to Potential Liquidity* associated with an increase in bank ROE by around 20 basis points. The relationship is sharper than the average fit in the (more densely populated) middle of the distribution of *Claims to Potential*

Liquidity. These relationships are also robust to employing the *Claims to Potential Liquidity* level immediately prior to each of the two QT periods rather than during the QT periods.

Seeking liquidity risk to boost ROE ought to be most attractive to less well-capitalized banks, since they have a particular incentive to build capital through accounting profits. To this end, in Table 8 we relate quarterly bank ROE during the period 2008Q4 to 2023Q1 to *Claims to Potential Liquidity,* controlling for bank and time fixed effects, as well as bank-time varying controls. Importantly, we interact the dependent variable with a dummy for the bank being below median in its book equity to book assets in the previous quarter. We examine the relationship in various sub-periods of interest.

Panel A shows that the coefficient estimate of the interaction between being below-median capitalized and demandable claims to potential liquidity is positive for the overall period as well as during QEI-III and post-QE III plus QT periods. While the interaction term is insignificant during the pandemic-QE and post-pandemic QT periods, the magnitude is comparable to the other periods, suggesting the lack of statistical power is due to the limited observations in these two periods. For the overall period, while a unit increase in the demandable claims to potential liquidity ratio is associated with a 5 basis point higher ROE for well-capitalized banks, it is associated with an additional 13 basis points higher ROE in case of less well-capitalized banks. In other words, incentives to allow liquidity risk to ratchet up may very well be related to weak bank capitalization. When the risk materialized during QT, we saw solvency concerns in March 2023.

Panel B adds an interaction term of claims to potential liquidity with a bank dummy for its 2022Q4 asset size being below \$250 billion. The coefficient on this interaction term is mostly insignificant, implying that while size categories that determine the application of the LCR regulation appear to discriminate well between smaller banks that ratchet-up liquidity risk and the largest banks that do not (as seen in Figures 4 and 5), these size categories do not robustly explain well the cross-sectional relationship between ROE and liquidity risk.[21] An important exception is during the pandemic-QE period (column (4)) wherein the interaction with mid-size and small banks is economically as well as statistically significant. This departure is, however, consistent with this set of banks having sought liquidity risk to boost ROE and eventually

[21] One possibility that can reconcile this with the evident role of bank capitalization is that the largest banks have also been subject to tighter capital requirements since the GFC compared to other banks.

experiencing bank runs or uninsured deposit outflows in the banking stress that ensued in March 2023 (Figure 7).

5.4. Other Explanations

Consider now other, not mutually exclusive, explanations for why banks might expose themselves to liquidity risk by not shrinking liquidity claims as reserves shrink. One is institutional hysteresis. For instance, if units are set up by banks to write lines of credit, it may be hard for them to withdraw committed lines, or disband units, when reserves shrink. The need to maintain corporate relationships may be a related reason why banks may be reluctant to cut back on liquidity claims. Silicon Valley Bank maintained uninsured transaction deposit accounts for tech companies (see, for example, Chang, Cheng and Hong (2023)). Until the shortage of aggregate liquidity makes itself felt through disruptions, individual banks may not realize, or have an incentive to ignore, tightening aggregate conditions. Such behavior may be especially pronounced and rational if banks believe the Fed will always come to the rescue. Indeed, since the Fed has repeatedly come to the rescue and reaffirmed the liquidity put, it is hard to assess the counterfactual.

Could regulation explain bank behavior? There has been substantial liquidity and capital regulation put in place since the Global Financial Crisis. But if regulatory capital and/or liquidity requirements are binding, it would make sense for banks to take advantage of QT to shrink reserves (see, for example, the discussion in Stulz, Taboada, and van Dijk (2022)) and simultaneously also reduce the claims written on liquidity. That they shrink reserves (at least on average) but not claims on liquidity is hard to attribute to regulation alone. In particular, US banks have been subject to liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirements since 2015, with the largest banks having to meet them on a daily basis and indeed reducing their demandable claims against potential liquidity since 2009 (recall Figures 4 and 5). However, if LCR constraints were the sole explanation, then starting 2015, which is immediately post QE III when aggregate reserves started shrinking, banks should have increased their time deposits while shrinking demand deposits, since deposits with maturity greater than 1 month attract zero run-off rates in LCR calculation. They did not.

A somewhat related explanation is that some other balance-sheet constraint such as capital requirements has reduced the mobility of US bank reserves within the banking system, and from banks to non-banks (D'Avernas and Vandeweyer (2021)). If so, liquidity stress at specific banks would be more likely to trigger liquidity stress in the system, requiring Fed injection of more reserves. Such explanations are not mutually exclusive to ours.

6. Discussion and Policy Implications.

One possible explanation of our finding that banks expand their balance sheets at the same time as the Fed does is that it is not causal. Instead, as LS-VJ (2022) argue, the value of household assets increased during QE, and the rise in deposits could be a natural consequence if the households maintained a constant deposit to asset ratio. The fact that demand deposits expand disproportionately with reserves while time deposits shrink, both in the aggregate and in individual banks, suggests this cannot be the entire story. Moreover, the effects of reserve expansion are seen in uninsured demand deposits, which are typically not held by households. Finally, it is not clear why, if banks passively accommodated deposit flows, they would shade time deposit rates lower when flush with reserves. [22]

Turning to policy, clearly a primary function of a central bank is to provide emergency temporary liquidity support of the kind provided most recently by the Bank of England during the pension crisis in October 2022. Indeed, the shortage of reserves relative to claims can never be a problem if the Federal Reserve can lend reserves at short notice to the degree desired to all who desire and have eligible collateral to borrow.[23]

Our point is that Fed balance-sheet expansion followed by contraction can magnify the quantum of the needed liquidity support significantly, and the need can be in hard-to-reach entities like small under-capitalized banks. Such entities may prefer not to borrow from usual Fed facilities like the discount window for fear of stigma.[24] Furthermore, given the aggregate shortage is not

[22] A more direct way to test our explanation is to re-estimate Table 1 Panel A controlling for the change in household financial assets. However, since household financial assets also contain deposits, which is the dependent variable, we include the change in household financial assets minus deposits (or insured deposits, which are typically held by households) to rule out a mechanical correlation in the time-series, and to capture the effect of household financial assets alone. Formally, if $D_t = \alpha \text{Reserves}_t + \gamma(HA_t^{OtherThanDeposits} + D_t) + \varepsilon_t$ is the true model, then we can recover γ by estimating $D_t = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\text{Reserves}_t + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}HA_t^{OtherThanDeposits} + \pi_t$. We find in Online Appendix, Table A2 that the coefficient on household assets less deposits is not statistically significant, while the coefficient estimate on reserves increases. Furthermore, when we examine the correlation of reserves with demand deposits, the coefficient estimate is largely unchanged by household financial assets (with or without deposits), and the coefficient on household assets is statistically insignificant.

[23] The costs of repeated emergency liquidity infusion include distortions in the price of liquidity, windfall gains to those who have access to central bank-provided liquidity or who can game or time central bank liquidity intervention, and distortions in private sector credit and investment when the private sector knows the central bank will be available whenever liquidity bets go sour. See Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2012), or Farhi and Tirole (2012) on the theoretical modeling of such collective moral hazards.

[24] Another set of hard-to-reach entities is non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Given the significant role they play in markets and the broader economy, a standing repo facility for NBFIs (the Fed opened one for primary dealers in 2021) against high quality collateral, such as the one introduced recently by the Bank of England, has

based on potential payment mismatches but on mismatches between the stock of reserve assets and the stock of potential claims on liquidity, it poses a more persistent concern, and raises the risk of dash-for-cash episodes. Unless participants are confident of repeated and timely Fed intervention, seemingly the best way for the Fed to eliminate the overhang of liquidity risk is through a durable infusion of additional reserves into the market, that is, a central bank balance sheet expansion. This is precisely what raises the spectre of liquidity dependence, our key message.

In other words, unless Fed's balance sheet expansion at the time of intervention is quickly and predictably reversed, commercial bank responses will ratchet up the need for a bigger central bank balance sheet for longer, as well as require possibly larger future liquidity infusions when the central bank attempts to shrink its balance sheet again. Put differently, intervention makes QT even harder as banks become more liquidity dependent; furthermore, if the central bank is forced to reverse QT in a time of high inflation, it may send confusing signals to the market; and also, it may foster irresponsible fiscal policy if government finances become more strained, as seems currently the case in industrial economies.

Our findings, therefore, also have implications for monetary policy and financial stability as well as suggest an important trade-off between the two.

On the monetary policy side, one of the channels through which QE is intended to work is "portfolio rebalancing". Essentially, by buying long-term bonds from the market using reserves, the Federal Reserve expects to compress the yield on long-term financing, thereby facilitating the financing of long-term projects. However, our evidence suggests banks in aggregate do not seem to be taking advantage of the compression in term spreads. Instead, banks have been shortening the maturity of their liabilities over the period of QE, making it harder for them to finance long-term loans without incurring costly asset/liability maturity mismatches. In other words, the maturity-shortening effect of QE on the bank's liability side may limit any maturity-lengthening effects of QE on the bank asset side, dampening the effectiveness of the portfolio-rebalancing channel. This may partly explain why it has been challenging to identify the real effects of quantitative easing (Greenlaw et al., 2018, and Fabo et al., 2021).[25]

merit. However, it is still an open question whether these facilities will also suffer from stigma since they are not used frequently.

[25] Indeed, we show in the Online Appendix, Table A11 that an exogenous increase in bank's reserves affects its loan growth adversely, echoing the findings of Diamond, Jiang and Ma (2021) who also document a restraining effect of quantitative easing on non-reserve assets of banks.

From a financial stability perspective, the obvious takeaway is that QE could incentivize an accumulation of liquidity risk in some banks that QT could exacerbate. Our description of commercial bank behavior could also modulate important theoretical arguments. For instance, Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2016) suggest that central banks should issue more reserves in order to reduce the "money-ness" of demandable claims. This will induce commercial banks to issue longer-term claims instead of demand deposits, thus reducing banking sector risk. The argument works best if reserves are held by non-banks. However, if they are held by banks, we see that commercial banks not only issue demand deposits to finance reserves, but also shorten the maturity of their deposits in response to an expansion in reserves, in aggregate and individually. Thus, reserve issuance may elicit an endogenous bank response that may make the system more, rather than less, prone to liquidity risk.

7. Further Research and Conclusion.

While we have tried to draw lessons from the pre-pandemic QE and QT episodes, the post-pandemic QT is still underway. This is happening against the backdrop of significant interest rate increases, which has already led to deposit withdrawals, bank runs, and massive Fed cum Treasury solvency and liquidity intervention in March 2023. It may well be that bank balance sheets and liquidity claims shrink substantially going forward as banks deal with a higher cost of financing. QT in the midst of significant policy rate increases may be different from QT in the midst of modest policy rate increases. More data will be available with time to help us understand this.

Obviously, we need a better understanding of bank behavior to craft appropriate policy. Liquidity regulation, besides being applied more uniformly across banks, may need to become more contingent on aggregate circumstances and more forward-looking. For instance, individual banks could be required/incentivized to maintain a longer duration of deposits, especially during QE when we observe substantial duration-shortening. Similarly, capital and liquidity stress tests could factor in higher drawdowns on demandable bank liquidity claims in aggregate risk scenarios. At the same time, policy measures aimed at ensuring a relatively unconstrained flow of liquidity between banks would also mitigate liquidity stress. In particular, supervisors should be particularly wary of "ratcheting up" implicit liquidity requirements (see Nelson (2019, 2022)) as the fear of such supervisory action in response to a bank's intra-day overdrafts can accentuate the phenomenon of reserve hoarding by surplus banks (Bank of England (2022), Copeland, Duffie, and Yang (2021)). Indeed, regulators could allow some state-contingent tolerance (e.g., +/- 5% or 10% band) in meeting liquidity requirements on a daily basis, while always insisting that requirements be met on average over (say) a fortnight. Such "reserves averaging" could also reduce surplus banks' worries about falling short if they lend into high inter-bank rates in times of stress. They would then reallocate liquidity in times of stress rather than hoard it.

Finally, more granular data in time-series (e.g., around QE and QT announcements and central bank's asset purchases and sales) and in the cross-section (e.g., by retail, corporate and financial holders of bank deposits) can help better understand how central bank balance sheet expansion and contraction transmit to banks and non-banks. Teasing out the relation between the expansion of banking sector's demandable claims and the impediments to transmitting unconventional monetary policy to real activity is another fertile area for future analysis. Finally, our evidence is based entirely around the balance-sheet decisions of the Federal Reserve. What commercial bank behaviors are seen in other systems when the central bank expands its balance sheets? Our understanding is only at a very early stage.

References

Acharya, Viral V., Tim Eisert, Christian Eufinger and Christian Hirsch, "Whatever It Takes: The Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy", Review of Financial Studies, 2019, 32(9): 3366-3411.

Acharya, Viral V., Robert Engle, Maximilian Jager and Sascha Steffen, 2021, "Why Did Bank Stocks Crash During COVID-19?", Working Paper, NYU Stern School of Business.

Acharya, Viral V. and Nada Mora, "A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers", Journal of Finance, 2015, 70(1), 1-44.

Acharya Viral V., and Raghuram Rajan, "Liquidity, liquidity everywhere, not a drop to use : Why flooding banks with central bank reserves may not expand liquidity", forthcoming, *Journal of Finance*.

Acharya, Viral V., Hyun-Song Shin and Tanju Yorulmazer, "Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity," Review of Financial Studies, 24(6), 2011, 2166-2205.

Acharya, Viral V. and Sascha Steffen, 2020. "The risk of being a fallen angel and the corporate dash for cash in the midst of COVID" Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 430-471.

Afonso, G., D. Giannone, G. La Spada and J. C. Williams (2002) "Scarce, Abundant or Ample? A Time-Varying Model of the Reserve Demand Curve", Working Paper 1019, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Anderson, Alyssa, Wenxin Du, and Bernd Schlusche, 2021, "Arbitrage Capital of Global Banks", working paper.

Bank of England (2022), “The Prudential Liquidity Framework: Supporting Liquid Asset Usability”, Discussion Paper 1/22.

Barr, Michael (2023), “Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank”, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf

Caglio, Cecilia, Jennifer Dlugosz, and Marcelo Rezende (2023), “Flight to Safety in the Regional Bank Crisis of 2023”, working paper, Federal Reserve Board.

Carpenter, S. and S. Demiralp (2006) “The Liquidity Effect in the Federal Funds Market: Evidence from Daily Market Operations”, *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,* 901-920.

Chang, Briana, Ing-Haw Cheng and Harrison Hong (2023) “The Fundamental Role of Uninsured Depositors in the Regional Banking Crisis”, Working Paper, Columbia University.

Copeland, Adam, Darrell Duffie and Yilin (David) Yang (2021) “Reserves Were Not So Ample After All”, Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

D’Avernas Adrien and Quentin Vandeweyer (2021) “Intraday Liquidity and Money Market Dislocations”, Working Paper, University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

Diamond, D W and R G Rajan, (2012), "Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy," Journal of Political Economy, 120(3): 552 - 591.

Diamond, William, Zhengyang Jiang, and Yiming Ma (2021), “The Reserve Supply Channel of Unconventional Monetary Policy”, SSRN working paper.

Drechsler, Itamar, Alexi Savov, and Philipp Schnabl. "The deposits channel of monetary policy." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132, no. 4 (2017): 1819-1876.

Fabo, Brian, Martina Jancokova, Elisabeth Kempf, and Lubos Pastor, (2021), “Fifty Shades of QE: Comparing Findings of Central Bankers and Academics”, SSRN working paper.

Farhi, Emmanuel and Jean Tirole 2012. “Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts.” *American Economic Review* 102: 60–93.

Gatev, Evan and Philip Strahan 2006. “Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market”, Volume 61, Issue 2, Pages 867-892.

Greenlaw, D.; Hamilton, J. D.; Harris, E. S.; and West, K. D. (2018) “A Skeptical View of the Impact of the Fed’s Balance Sheet.” Working Paper. Available at https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/igm/docs/2018-usmpf-report.pdf.

Greenwood, Robin, Samuel G. Hanson and Jeremy C. Stein (2016) “The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 2016 Economic Policy Symposium in Jackson Hole.

Hamilton, J. D. (1996) “The Daily Market for Federal Funds”, *Journal of Political Economy,* 104, 26-56.

Ivashina, Victoria and David Scharfstein (2010) “Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008", Journal of Financial Economics 97 (3): 319–338.

Kashyap, Anil (2020), “The Dash for Cash and the Liquidity Multiplier: Lessons from March 2020”, speech at the LBS AQR Asset Management Institute Virtual Summit.

Kashyap, Anil, Raghuram G Rajan and Jeremy Stein (2002) "Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking", Journal of Finance, LVII(1), 33-73.

Lee Smith, A. and Victor J. Valcarcel (2023) "The financial market effects of unwinding the Federal Reserve's balance sheet", *Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control*, 146.

Leonard, Deborah, Antoine Martin, and Simon M. Potter (2017), "How the Fed Changes the Size of its Balance Sheet", *Liberty Street Economics*, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Logan, Lorie, "Observations on Implementing Monetary Policy in an Ample-Reserve Regime", Remarks before the Money Marketeers of New York University, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, April 2019.

Lopez-Salido David and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2022) "Reserve Demand and Balance-sheet Runoff", Working paper, Federal Reserve Board of Governors.

Meiselman, Ben S., Stefan Nagel and Amiyatosh Purnanadam (2023) "Judging Banks' Risk by the Profits They Report", Working Paper, University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

Nelson, Bill (2019) "Fed's Balance Sheet Can and Should Get Much Smaller", Remarks at Brookings Symposium on Repo Market Disruption, Bank Policy Institute.

Nelson, Bill (2022) "More Taxis Sitting Idle", Blog, https://bpi.com/more-taxis-sitting-idle/

Rajan, Raghuram (2006) "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", European Financial Management, 12(4), pp. 499-533.

Saunders, Anthony, Alessandro Spina, Sascha Steffen and Daniel Streitz (2022) "Corporate Loan Spreads and Economic Activity" Working Paper, NYU Stern School of Business.

Schwert, Michael. "Bank capital and lending relationships." The Journal of Finance 73, no. 2 (2018): 787-830.

Stulz, René M., Alvaro G. Taboada, and Mathijs A. Van Dijk. The Determinants of Bank Liquid Asset Holdings. No. w30340. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022.

Yankov, Vladimir, 2020, The liquidity coverage ratio and corporate liquidity management, FEDS Notes, 2020-02.

Figure 1. Quantitative Easing and the Commercial Bank Balance Sheets

The figure below shows how the Federal Reserve's balance sheet expansion does and does not mechanically cause an expansion in commercial bank balance sheets. Panel A shows the Fed purchasing from banks, with banks effectively swapping eligible securities for reserves. Commercial bank balance sheets do not expand with the expansion of the Fed balance sheet. Panel B shows the Fed purchasing eligible securities directly from the public or non-banks. In this case, commercial bank balance sheets expand with the expansion of the Fed balance sheet as the public deposits the Fed payment in the bank.

Panel A: Purchase from Banks

Source: "How the Fed Changes the Size of its Balance Sheet" (Leonard, Martin and Potter, *Liberty Street Economics*, 2017)

Panel B: Purchase from Non-banks or the Public



Source: "How the Fed Changes the Size of its Balance Sheet" (Leonard, Martin and Potter, *Liberty Street Economics*, 2017)

Figure 2. Time-Series of Aggregate Credit Lines, Deposits and Reserves

This figure plots the time-series of credit lines, deposits and reserves in the 2008Q4 to 2023Q1 period. Panel A plots credit lines (left y-axis), deposits (right y-axis) and reserves (left y-axis) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for all commercial banks using data from the Federal Reserve's Financial Accounts of the United States (Flow of Funds). Panel B shows the break-up of demandable (demand and savings deposits) and time deposits into insured and uninsured deposits using FDIC's Call Reports Data. Estimates of Insured and Uninsured Domestic Deposits are based on the items in the call report schedule RC-O. Insured deposits are defined as deposits below the FDIC deposit insurance size thresholds of $100,000 before 2008Q4 and $250,000 after 2008Q4. Uninsured deposits are domestic deposits above the aforementioned deposit insurance thresholds and all foreign deposits. We do not adjust insured and uninsured deposits for the (temporary) FDIC Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) program.. Time Deposits are partitioned into insured and uninsured deposits based on the quantum under the aforementioned deposit insurance thresholds in schedule RC-E. Demandable Insured and Uninsured deposits are estimated by taking the difference between Total Insured/Uninsured Deposits and Insured/Uninsured Time Deposits respectively. Demandable Deposits include Checking Account, Money Market Savings and Non-Money Market Savings Account. All deposit variables are shown on the right y-axis whereas Reserves are shown on the left y-axis in Panels A and B. Panel C plots credit lines, total deposits and uninsured demandable deposits as multiples of central bank reserves. The vertical lines correspond to the beginning of the different Federal Reserve QE / QT phases: (1) Nov 2008 (QE I), (2) Nov 2010 (QE II), (3) Nov 2012 (QE III), (4) Oct 2014 (Post-QE III), (5) QT period, (6) Sept 2019 (Pandemic QE) (7) March 2022 (Pandemic QT).

Panel A. Credit Lines, Deposits, and Reserves as percentage of GDP



Panel B. Uninsured and Insured Demand and Time Deposits, and Reserves as percentage of GDP



Panel C. Credit Lines, Deposits and Uninsured Demandable Deposits as multiples of Reserves



Figure 3: Quarterly Rolling Coefficient of EFFR-IOR on Reserves and Uninsured Deposits

This figure shows the time-series of the coefficients from rolling regressions $EFFR - IOR_t = \gamma + \alpha\, Ln(Reserves)_t + \beta\, Ln(Uninsured\ Deposits)_t + \varepsilon_t$ using quarterly data and a rolling window of 12 quarters. The sample period starts in Q1 2008 and ends in Q1 2023. *Ln(Reserves)* is the natural logarithm of reserves from the H.6 release. *Ln(Uninsured Deposits)* is the natural logarithm of total uninsured checkable and time and savings deposits. Confidence bands are determined as the estimate coefficient times +/- 1.96 times the standard deviation. All data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) online database. Panel A shows the coefficient on Reserves while Panel B shows the coefficient on Uninsured Deposits.

Panel A: Coefficient on Reserves



Panel B: Coefficient on Uninsured Deposits



Figure 4: Ratcheting-up of Uninsured Demandable Deposits

Panel A plots the ratio of aggregate uninsured demandable deposits to aggregate book assets of banks that fall within the size buckets of (i) Bank Assets above $250bn in 2014Q3, (ii) Bank Assets between $50-250 bn in 2014Q3, and (iii) Bank Assets below $50bn in 2014Q3. Uninsured demandable deposits are defined as the difference between Total Uninsured Deposits and Uninsured Time Deposits. Bank Assets refer to Total Book Assets. Panel B plots the ratio of aggregate uninsured demandable deposits to the aggregate sum of bank reserves and eligible assets of banks within aforementioned size buckets. Bank Reserves refer to balances due at Federal Reserve Banks. Eligible assets consist of Treasury and Agency securities that were eligible for swapping against Reserves with the Fed in at least one Quantitative Easing round between 2008Q4-2023Q1. The sample ranges 2008Q4 to 2023Q1. All data is sourced from FDIC's Call Reports data.

Panel A: Uninsured Demandable Deposits/Assets



Panel B: Uninsured Demandable Deposits/(Reserves + Eligible Assets)



Figure 5. Claims to Potential Liquidity: (Credit Lines + Uninsured Demandable Deposits)/(Reserves + Eligible Assets)

This figure plots the time-series of *Claims to Potential Liquidity,* which is the ratio of the sum of aggregate credit lines and demandable deposits to the sum of reserves and eligible assets between 2010Q1-2023Q1 as well as its distribution across bank holding companies (BHCs) over time. Panel A plots the time-series of the ratio, with data (field) obtained for each component from Call Reports: Off-balance sheet unused loans or credit lines (RCFDJ457); Uninsured demandable deposits, obtained by subtracting time deposits of more than $250,000 ($100,000 before 2008Q4) from total uninsured deposits, the latter being estimated from schedule RC-O of Call Reports. Reserves reflect field RCFD0090, and Eligible assets consist of Treasury and Agency securities that were eligible for swapping against Reserves with the Fed in at least one Quantitative Easing round between 2008Q4-2023Q1.. In particular, bank holdings of Treasury and Agency securities are estimated as the sum of the bank's holdings of US treasuries, obligations of US Government agencies, and agency-backed mortgage-backed securities. We set the value of reserves and credit lines to zero if they are missing at the consolidated bank or bank holding company level for a given quarter. Panel B plots the ratio of credit lines and uninsured demandable deposits to reserves and eligible assets, aggregated by bank size categories, for banks that fall within the size buckets of (i) Bank Assets above $250bn in 2014Q3, (ii) Bank Assets between $50-250 bn in 2014Q3, and (iii) Bank Assets below $50bn in 2014Q3. Panel C plots the density (across BHCs) of distribution of the ratio in different QE and QT periods. QEI-III refers to the period 2010Q1-2014Q3, Post QE-III period refers to 2014Q4-2017Q3, and QT period refers to 2017Q4-2019Q3. All data is sourced from FDIC's Call Reports and aggregated at the bank holding company level.

Panel A: Aggregate claims to potential liquidity



Panel B: Claims to potential liquidity by bank size



Panel C: Density (across BHCs) of Claims to Potential Liquidity, for different QE and QT periods



Figure 6. Demandable Claims and Fragility: The COVID Shock

Panel A shows the difference in stock return performance (in percentage points) between banks with high vs. low *Claims to Potential Liquidity* ratio over the 1st January to 30th June 2020 period. We measure *Claims to Potential Liquidity* ratio as (Undrawn Credit Lines + Uninsured Demandable Deposits)/(Eligible Assets + Reserves) as of December 31, 2019 and use a median split to distinguish between the two groups of banks. Panel B plots *Gross Drawdowns* to bank assets over the Q1 2020 period against the log *Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity* ratio, defined using only banks' credit line exposures as the demandable claims: (Undrawn Credit Lines)/(Eligible Assets + Reserves).

Panel A. Implications for bank stock returns (1st January to 30th June, 2020)



Panel B. Gross drawdowns of credit lines (Q1 2020)



Figure 7: Bank Stock Returns during SVB Stress: 1-13th March 2023

This figure is a scatter plot of the residuals of banks' excess stock returns on the log of claims to potential liquidity ratio and plots separate linear fit lines for banks above and below $250bn in Assets in 2022Q4. Excess returns are estimated as the bank's cumulative return during the period 1st and 13th March minus the cumulative return on the S&P 500 index for the same time period. The residuals are calculated from the cross-sectional regression of excess stock returns on Bank Ln(Assets), Equity/Assets ratio, Net Income /Assets and Primary Dealer indicator. Bank stock price data is taken from CRSP. Claims to potential liquidity ratio is as defined in Figure 5, using bank balance sheet data sourced from Call Reports.



Figure 8: Return on Equity and Claims on Potential Liquidity Ratio

This figure plots the binned scatters of bank return on equity on the Claims to Potential Liquidity ratio defined as the ratio of the sum of off-balance sheet credit lines and uninsured demandable deposits to the sum of reserves and eligible assets. Return on Equity is the ratio of Income before Tax to Total Bank Book Equity. Claims to potential liquidity ratio is as defined in Figure 5, using bank balance sheet data sourced from Call Reports. Both variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their sample distribution. We control for bank and time fixed effects. The Panel A plots the figure for 2014Q4-2019Q3 (Post QE III + QT) and the Panel B for 2022Q1-2023Q1 (Post-Pandemic QT).

Panel A: Post-QE+QT (2014Q3 – 2019Q3)



Panel B: Post-Pandemic QT (2022Q1-2023Q1)



Table 1. Aggregate Deposits and Credit Lines vs Reserves (Time-Series)

This table reports the results from time-series regression of changes in deposits or credit lines on changes in reserves. Panel A columns (1) to (4) use changes in the natural logarithm of deposits (1), demand deposits (2), time deposits (3) and credit lines (4) as dependent variables. Data on these variables is available on a monthly frequency from Fed's Flow of Funds data. Panel A columns (5) to (8) uses changes in the level of the same variables. Demand deposits is the sum of demand and other liquid deposits from the H.6 release. Time deposits is the sum of small- and large-time deposits (H6 and H8 release). Since data is monthly, differences are observed monthly. Panel B uses Call Reports data which has quarterly frequency. Call Report data helps us aggregate Changes in Insured Demandable and Uninsured Demandable deposits as the dependent variables. Panel B columns (1) to (4) use changes in the natural logarithm of uninsured deposits (1), insured deposits (2), uninsured demandable (3) and (4) insured demandable deposit as dependent variables. Columns (5) to (8) uses changes in the level of the same variables. Standard errors (Newey-West) account for auto-correlation up to 12 months in Panel A and 4 quarters in Panel B and are reported in parentheses. Thes sample ranges 2008Q4-2021Q4. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Panel A

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Δ Ln(Deposits)	Δ Ln(Demandable Deposits)	Δ Ln(Time Deposits)	Δ Ln(Credit Lines)	Δ Deposits	Δ Demandable Deposits	Δ Time Deposits	Δ Credit Lines
Δ Ln(Reserves)	0.137***	0.180***	-0.242**	0.0802***				
	(0.0368)	(0.0541)	(0.114)	(0.0282)				
$Ln(Reserves)_{t-12}$	0.0503***	0.0136	-0.0251	0.0882***				
	(0.0140)	(0.0227)	(0.0702)	(0.0323)				
Δ Reserves					0.999***	1.358***	-0.224**	0.147***
					(0.242)	(0.314)	(0.0932)	(0.0392)
$Reserves_{t-12}$					0.329***	0.343***	0.0726	0.146***
					(0.0691)	(0.0838)	(0.0684)	(0.0399)
Constant	-0.327***	-0.0265	0.163	-0.616**	-88.97	-15.98	-220.0	-162.4*
	(0.106)	(0.172)	(0.533)	(0.249)	(169.3)	(164.0)	(150.2)	(91.28)
Obs	147	147	147	147	147	147	147	147
R-sq	0.592	0.589	0.296	0.232	0.663	0.673	0.334	0.416

Panel B

	(1) Δ Ln(Uninsured Deposits)	(2) Δ Ln(Insured Deposits)	(3) ΔLn(Uninsured Demandable Deposits)	(4) Δ Ln(Insured Demandable Deposits)	(5) Δ Uninsured Deposits)	(6) ΔInsured Deposits)	(7) Δ Uninsured Demandable Deposits)	(8) Δ Insured Demandable Deposits)
Δ Ln(Reserves)	0.217**	0.0818	0.181**	0.140**				
	(0.101)	(0.0734)	(0.0701)	(0.0631)				
$Ln(Reserves)_{t-4}$	0.0945	0.0211	0.0147	-0.00274				
	(0.0900)	(0.0293)	(0.0572)	(0.0445)				
Δ Reserves					0.687***	0.324	0.797***	0.479***
					(0.089)	(0.219)	(0.174)	(0.160)
$Reserves_{t-4}$					0.212	0.116	0.125	0.0809
					(0.151)	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.0859)
Constant	-0.609	-0.129	-0.0418	0.0870	-78.02	-12.75	83.39	174.9
	(0.693)	(0.224)	(0.437)	(0.346)	(372.7)	(293.6)	(226.6)	(207.4)
N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
R-sq	0.0526	0.0536	0.303	0.274	0.366	0.101	0.586	0.423
S.E.(# Lags)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)

Table 2. Aggregate Price of Liquidity (Time-Series)

This table reports the results from time-series OLS regression of levels and changes in levels of the Effective Federal Fund Rate (EFFR) minus Interest on Reserves (IOR) on reserves, deposits, and credit lines. *Ln(Reserves)* is the natural logarithm of reserves from the H.6 release, *Ln(Demand Deposits)* is the natural logarithm of the sum of demand and other liquid deposits from the H.6 release. *Ln(Time Deposits)* is the sum of small and large time deposits (H6 and H8 release). *Ln(Credit Lines)* is the natural logarithm of unused (other) loan commitments from FDIC insured banks (including corporate credit lines but not credit card commitments). *Ln(Usage)* is the natural logarithm of quarterly drawn credit lines of U.S. publicly listed firms sourced from Capital IQ. Uninsured demandable deposits are obtained by subtracting time deposits of more than $250,000 ($100,000 before 2008Q4) from total uninsured deposits, the latter being estimated from schedule RC-O of Call Reports. Panel A reports the regression of the level of EFFR-IOR on the levels of reserves, deposits (and its constituents), and credit lines. All columns use quarterly frequency and the sample ranges 2008Q4-2021Q4. Panel B represents the analogous regressions for changes in levels. Standard errors (Newey-West) account for auto-correlation up to 4 quarters. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Panel A: Regression in Levels

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				EFFR-IOR			
Ln(Reserves)	-0.0105	-0.190***	-0.189***	-0.146***	-0.182***	-0.191***	-0.209***
	(0.0273)	(0.0133)	(0.0157)	(0.0109)	(0.0143)	(0.0170)	(0.0151)
Ln(Deposits)		0.365***			0.275***		
		(0.0164)			(0.0582)		
Ln(Demandable Deposits)			0.316***			0.248***	
			(0.0142)			(0.0449)	
Ln(Time Deposits)			0.107***			0.0705	
			(0.0354)			(0.0478)	
Ln(Uninsured Demandable Deposits)							0.186***
							(0.0299)
Ln(Credit Lines)				0.295***	0.0830	0.0915*	0.182***
				(0.0199)	(0.0537)	(0.0488)	(0.0271)
Ln(Gross Drawdowns)				0.0196**	0.00304	-0.00653	-0.00435
				(0.00784)	(0.00766)	(0.00647)	(0.00857)
Constant	-0.00839	-2.035***	-2.370***	-1.709***	-1.972***	-2.039***	-1.438***
	(0.203)	(0.111)	(0.411)	(0.188)	(0.128)	(0.505)	(0.137)
Obs	52	52	52	52	52	52	52
R-sq	0.005	0.911	0.913	0.870	0.916	0.921	0.929
SE (# Lags)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)

Panel B: Regressions in Changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Δ(EFFR – IOR)			
ΔLn(Reserves)	-0.149***	-0.198***	-0.206***	-0.174***	-0.207***	-0.219***	-0.183***
	(0.0335)	(0.0291)	(0.0204)	(0.0312)	(0.0190)	(0.0213)	(0.0293)
ΔLn(Deposits)		0.464**			0.343*		
		(0.222)			(0.194)		
ΔLn(Demandable Dep)			0.430***			0.360***	
			(0.106)			(0.0951)	
ΔLn(Time Dep)			0.0586			0.0423	
			(0.0542)			(0.0603)	
ΔLn(Unins Dem Dep)							0.0776**
							(0.0338)
ΔLn(Credit Lines)				0.182***	0.160***	0.170***	0.188***
				(0.0496)	(0.0511)	(0.0487)	(0.0508)
ΔLn(Gross Draws)				-0.0154***	-0.0138*	-0.0120*	-0.0142***
				(0.00512)	(0.00693)	(0.00657)	(0.00437)
Constant	0.00474**	-0.00182	-0.00333	0.00321	-0.00146	-0.00359*	0.00164
	(0.00195)	(0.00427)	(0.00296)	(0.00199)	(0.00379)	(0.00210)	(0.00240)
Obs	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-sq	0.468	0.518	0.530	0.562	0.588	0.605	0.575
SE (# Lags)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)	Newey-West (4)

Table 3: Effect of Reserves on Deposit Quantities –OLS and Second Stage

The table shows OLS and the second-stage of 2SLS IV regressions of *Deposit types* as the dependent variable against Δ*Ln(Reserves)*. Deposit and reserve data are sourced from *FDIC's Call Reports*. *Reserves* are cash and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks at the consolidated bank-level (RCFD0090). Panel A uses the Ln(*Demandable Deposits*) (RCON2210+RCON6810+RCON0352), Panel B uses Ln(*Time Deposits)* or (RCON6648+RCON2604 before 2009Q4) and (RCON6648 + RCONJ473 + RCONJ474 after 2009Q4) as the dependent variables. Panel C and D use Uninsured Time and Demandable Deposits as the dependent variable. $\Delta Y = Y_t - Y_{t-4}$. Panels C and D represent the second-stage results of uninsured demandable and time deposits. Computation of Insured and Uninsured Domestic Deposits are based on call report schedule RC-O. Insured deposits are defined as deposits lying below the FDIC deposit insurance thresholds of $100,000 before 2008Q4 and $250,000 after 2008Q4. Uninsured deposits are domestic deposits above the aforementioned deposit insurance thresholds and all foreign deposits. Split of Time Deposits into Insured vs. Uninsured Deposits are based on the aforementioned deposit insurance thresholds in schedule RC-E. Demandable Insured and Uninsured deposits are estimated by taking the difference between Total Insured/Uninsured Deposits and Insured/Uninsured Time Deposits respectively. All specifications control for Time-FE, lagged Ln(assets), Equity-Capital Ratio, Net Income/Assets, indicator for Primary Dealers and Ln(Reserves) lagged by five quarters. Columns (1) represent the regressions on the overall sample ranging 2001 Q1 – 2021 Q4. Columns (2) represent QE I-III + Pandemic QE of 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4-2021Q4. Columns (3) represent the QEI-III period: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3. Columns (4) show results for the Post-QE III + QT period 2014Q4 - 2019Q3. In all second-stage regressions, Δ*Ln(Reserves)* is instrumented by two reserve instruments (z^{R1}_{it}): *Growth in Aggregate Reserves × Average Lagged Share in Reserves over the previous 4 quarters and* (z^{R2}_{it}): *Growth in Aggregate Reserves × Average Lagged Share in Reserves over the previous 4 quarters.* Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank and time level. Newey-West SE adjusted for autocorrelation up to 4 quarters are also reported for OLS. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Panel A: ΔLn(Demandable Deposits)				
Panel A.1: OLS				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.0113***	0.0137***	0.0138***	0.0161***
	(0.00173)	(0.00258)	(0.00283)	(0.00129)
Newey-West s.e.	(0.00130)	(0.00206)	(0.00223)	(0.00102)
N	116731	50797	43009	32165
Panel A.2: IV				
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.133***	0.123***	0.113***	0.0544
	(0.0193)	(0.0226)	(0.0321)	(0.0730)
N	111952	50770	42990	30677
Period	Overall	QE I-III + Pandemic QE	QE I-III	Post-QE III + QT

Panel B: ΔLn(Time Deposits)				
		Panel B.1: OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.0121***	0.0133***	0.0130***	0.0160***
	(0.00125)	(0.00174)	(0.00189)	(0.00125)
Newey-West s.e.	(0.000997)	(0.00153)	(0.00162)	(0.00129)
N	115886	50430	42733	31946
		Panel B.2: IV		
ΔLn(Reserves)	-0.137***	-0.120***	-0.158***	0.423
	(0.0123)	(0.0103)	(0.0275)	(0.303)
N	111138	50406	42714	30460
Period	Overall	QE I-III + Pandemic QE	QE I-III	Post-QE III + QT

Panel C: ΔLn(Uninsured Demandable Deposits)				
		Panel C.1: OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.0268***	0.0262***	0.0264***	0.0344***
	(0.00212)	(0.00311)	(0.00353)	(0.00255)
N	100173	42459	34837	31238
		Panel C.2: IV		
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.104***	0.110***	0.109***	-0.253
	(0.0281)	(0.0295)	(0.0300)	(0.202)
N	96284	42439	34825	29807
Period	Overall	QE I-III + Pandemic QE	QE I-III	Post-QE III + QT

Table 4: Effect of Reserves on CD Rate – Money Market Savings Rate Spread: Second Stage

The table shows the second stage of 2SLS IV regressions of *3, 12, 18 and 24-month CD – Money Market (MM) savings spread* against bank-level *Ln(Reserves).* Panel A represents the overall sample. Panel B represents the sub-sample QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4. Panel C represents the sub-sample QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3. Panel D shows results for the Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 CD and Money Market (MM) savings rates are sourced from *S&P Global's RateWatch* deposit data. Bank-level variables are sourced from *FDIC's Call Reports* data. *Reserves* are cash and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks at the consolidated bank level (RCFD0090). *Ln(Reserves)* are instrumented with *Growth in Aggregate Reserves × Lagged Share in Reserves, averaged over previous 4 quarters* (z^{R1}_{it}) and *Growth in Federal Reserve's Assets × Lagged Share in Reserves, averaged over previous 4 quarters* (z^{R2}_{it}). *Ln(Total Deposits)* instrumented with the *Deposit Growth Instrument* (z^{D}_{it}) All specifications control for lagged Ln(Assets), Equity/Assets Ratio, Net Income/Assets, Primary Dealer indicator, and Bank HHI along bank and time fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank and time level. The sample period is 2001Q1 – 2021Q4. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	(1) 3 month CD Rate - MM Savings Rate	(2) 12 month CD Rate - MM Savings Rate	(3) 18 month CD Rate - MM Savings Rate	(4) 24 month CD Rate - MM Savings Rate
Panel A - Overall Period: 2001Q1 – 2021Q4				
Ln(Reserves)	-0.154***	-0.0690	-0.220***	-0.104***
	(0.0320)	(0.0654)	(0.0582)	(0.0146)
N	78827	84196	70531	82941
Panel B - QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 – 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 – 2021Q4				
Ln(Reserves)	-0.192***	-0.0802**	-0.252*	-0.134**
	(0.0557)	(0.0385)	(0.126)	(0.0610)
N	37872	40491	33661	39863
Panel C - QE I-III: 2008Q4 – 2014Q3				
Ln(Reserves)	-0.203***	-0.0777*	-0.265*	-0.141**
	(0.0547)	(0.0420)	(0.132)	(0.0623)
N	33180	35311	29287	34716
Panel D - Post-QE III + QT: 2014Q3-2019Q3				
Ln(Reserves)	0.247	0.132	-0.0538	0.321
	(0.155)	(0.393)	(0.378)	(0.380)
N	21001	22860	19024	22571

Table 5. Effect of Reserves on Credit Line Originations

The table shows OLS and the second-stage of 2SLS IV regressions of the change in the amount of originated credit lines Δ*Ln(Credit Lines)*) of IG-rated (Panel A) and Non-IG rated firms (Panel B) in the U.S. as the dependent variable against change in bank's reserve holdings aggregated to the BHC level. Reserve data is sourced from FDIC's Call Reports, credit line originations from the Refinitiv LoanConnector database. *Reserves* are cash and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks at the consolidated bank-level (RCFD0090). Change is the contemporary level minus the deposit level lagged by 4 quarters. Columns (1) represent the regressions on the overall sample ranging 2001 Q1 – 2021 Q4. Columns (2) represent QE I-III + Pandemic QE of 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4-2021Q4. Columns (3) represent the QEI-III period: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3. Columns (4) show results for the Post-QE III + QT period: 2014Q4 - 2019Q3. We report the second stage where Δ*Ln(Reserves)* is instrumented by two reserve instruments (z^{R1}_{it}): *Growth in Aggregate Reserves × Average Lagged Share in Reserves over the previous 4 quarters and* (z^{R2}_{it}): *Growth in Aggregate Reserves × Average Lagged Share in Reserves over the previous 4 quarters.* All specifications control for Time-FE, lagged Ln(assets), Equity-Capital Ratio, Net Income/Assets, indicator for Primary Dealers and Ln(Reserves) lagged by five quarters. Standard errors are clustered at the time level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Panel A: IG-rated firms

Panel A.1: OLS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		ΔLn(Credit Lines)		
ΔLn(Reserves)	-0.0493**	-0.0484	-0.0290	-0.0442
	(0.0206)	(0.0348)	(0.0370)	(0.0874)
N	1718	649	486	430
Panel A.2: IV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		ΔLn(Credit Lines)		
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.109	0.149	0.300***	0.0208
	(0.183)	(0.149)	(0.0511)	(0.362)
N	1605	640	478	426
Period	Overall: 2001 Q1 - 2021 Q4	QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4	QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3	Post-QE III + QT: 2014Q4-2019Q3

Panel B: Non-IG rated firms

Panel B.1: OLS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		ΔLn(Credit Lines)		
ΔLn(Reserves)	-0.0270	-0.0636*	-0.0606*	0.0450
	(0.0191)	(0.0313)	(0.0344)	(0.0755)
N	1898	731	562	492
Panel B.2: IV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		ΔLn(Credit Lines)		
ΔLn(Reserves)	0.354*	0.337*	0.295**	0.0921
	(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.131)	(0.236)
N	1768	719	550	484
Period	Overall: 2001 Q1 - 2021 Q4	QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4	QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3	Post-QE III + QT: 2014Q4-2019Q3

Table 6. Demandable Claims and Fragility: The COVID Shock

This table reports the results of OLS regressions of U.S. *banks' excess stock returns over the 1/1/2020 – 2/28/2020* period (column (1)), or over the *3/1/2020 – 3/23/2020 period* (columns (2)-(4)), and *Gross Drawdowns* relative to assets over the period Q1 2020 (columns (5)-(6)) on *Claims to Potential Liquidity* ratio as the log of (Undrawn Credit Lines + Demand Deposits)/(Eligible Assets + Reserves) as of December 31, 2019, or on *Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity* ratio, defined using only banks' credit line exposures as the demandable claims [the log of (Undrawn Credit Lines)/(Eligible Assets + Reserves)], or *Uninsured Demandable Deposits to Potential Liquidity* ratio, defined using only banks' uninsured demandable deposits as the demandable claims [the log of (Demandable Deposits)/(Eligible Assets + Reserves)]. Excess returns over a period are measured as cumulative stock return net of S&P 500 return over the same period. We control for bank assets, equity/assets, primary dealer indicator and net income/assets in 2019Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Excess Returns				Gross Drawdowns		
	2nd Jan – 28th Feb 2020	1st – 23rd March 2020			2020Q1		
Ln(Claims to Potential Liquidity)	0.0117**	-0.0165**			0.00194**		
	(0.010)	(0.027)			(0.027)		
Ln(Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity)			-0.0194***			0.00196***	
			(0.000)			(0.001)	
Ln(Uninsured Demandable Deposits to Potential Liquidity)				-0.0146*			0.00156*
				(0.054)			(0.062)
N	0.270	0.0555	0.0957	0.0514	0.314	0.356	0.307
R-Sq	309	310	304	309	131	128	131

Table 7: Demandable Claims and Fragility: The SVB Episode

The table below shows the cross-sectional regressions for Excess returns and Uninsured Demandable deposit withdrawals against banks' claims to potential liquidity. All explanatory variables are as of 2022Q4. Excess returns are estimated as the bank's cumulative return over a period net of the S&P 500 return over the same period. Change in uninsured demandable deposits is measured as the quarterly change between 2022Q4 and 2023Q1. Claims to Potential Liquidity ratio is the Log of (Credit Lines + Uninsured Demandable Deposits)/(Reserves + Eligible Assets). Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity Ratio is Log of (Credit Lines)/(Reserves + Eligible Assets). Uninsured Dem. Deposits to Potential Liquidity is Log of (Uninsured Demandable Deposits)/(Reserves + Eligible Assets). All specification control for Bank Ln(Assets), Equity/Assets ratio, Net Income /Assets and Primary Dealer indicator as at end of 2022. Panel A shows the results with the claims to potential liquidity ratios as the main independent variable controlling for bank assets, equity/assets, primary dealer indicator and net income/assets while Panel B shows the results with interactions of claims to potential liquidity ratios with the size indicators which are equal to one if bank assets in 2022Q4 are less than $250bn. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Panel A: Excess Returns and Change in Uninsured Demandable Deposits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
		Excess Returns			ΔLn(Uninsured Demandable Deposits)		
	03rd Jan – 28th Feb 2023	1st-13th Mar 2023			2022Q4 -2023Q1		
Ln(Claims to Potential Liquidity)	0.00691	-0.0157**			-0.0223***		
	(0.00455)	(0.00638)			(0.00719)		
Ln(Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity)			-0.00334			-0.0123***	
			(0.00333)			(0.00366)	
Ln(Uninsured Demandable Deposits to Potential Liquidity)				-0.0169**			-0.0242***
				(0.00679)			(0.00836)
N	308	305	299	304	3890	3613	3890
R-Sq	0.114	0.400	0.383	0.403	0.00770	0.00534	0.00870

Panel B: Interactions with Size Indicator for Mid-Size and Small Banks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Excess Returns 1st-13th Mar 2023			ΔLn(Uninsured Demandable Deposits) 2022Q4 -2023Q1	
Ln(Claims to Potential Liquidity)	0.0495**			0.168***		
	(0.0193)			(0.0531)		
Bank Assets<=$250 bn (1/0)	0.00469	-0.0605	-0.0103	0.0641	-0.154	0.00804
	(0.0476)	(0.0576)	(0.0478)	(0.101)	(0.136)	(0.103)
Bank Assets<=$250 bn (1/0) x Ln(Claims to Potential Liquidity)	-0.0769***			-0.201***		
	(0.0203)			(0.0535)		
Ln(Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity)		0.00615			0.0440*	
		(0.0102)			(0.0238)	
Bank Assets<=$250 bn (1/0) x Ln(Credit Lines to Potential Liquidity)		-0.0171			-0.0601**	
		(0.0131)			(0.0237)	
Ln(Uninsured Dem Deposits to Potential Liquidity)			0.0575***			0.153**
			(0.0201)			(0.0735)
Bank Assets<=$250 bn (1/0) x Ln(Uninsured Dem Deposits to Potential Liquidity)			-0.0863***			-0.189**
			(0.0216)			(0.0738)
N	305	299	304	4094	3800	4094
R-sq	0.0973	0.0814	0.0993	0.0116	0.0105	0.0134

Table 8: Return on Equity and Claims to Potential Liquidity X (Capitalization, Size)

This table represents the regressions of Bank Return on Equity on the interaction between the Claims to Potential Liquidity ratio and Below Median Equity/Assets indicator, along with bank-time varying controls. The Claims to Potential Liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of the sum of off-balance sheet credit lines and uninsured demandable deposits to the sum of reserves and eligible assets. Return on Equity is estimated as the ratio of Income before Tax and Total Bank Book Equity. Off-balance sheet credit lines are unused credit lines written for commercial and industrial borrowers. Uninsured demandable deposits are defined as the difference between Total Uninsured Deposits and Uninsured Time Deposits in FDIC's Call Reports data. Bank Reserves refer to balances due at Federal Reserve Banks. Eligible Assets constitute Treasury and Agency securities that were eligible for swap against bank reserves in at least one Quantitative Easing round between 2008Q4-2023Q1. All data is sourced from FDIC's Call Reports data. Below Median Equity Assets Ratio indicates whether the Banks' Total Book Equity to Total Assets ratio fell below the median of the cross-section of banks in the previous quarter. ROE and Claims to Potential Liquidity Ratio are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the overall sample. We control for lagged bank assets, net income to assets ratio, bank-level deposit HHI, and the Primary Dealer indicator. All specifications include Bank & Quarter-time Fixed Effects. Column (1) represents the overall sample of 2010Q1-2023Q1, (2) represents 2010Q1 - 2014Q3 (QE I-III), (3) represents 2014Q4-2019Q3 (Post-QE III + QT), (4) represents 2019Q4-2021Q4 (Pandemic QE) and (5) represents 2022Q1-2023Q1 (Post-Pandemic QT). Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank and time level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Panel A: ROE and Claims to Potential Liquidity x Below Median Capitalization

	(1)	(2)	(3) ROE	(4)	(5)
$(CL+UDD)/(RES+ELA)_{t-1}$	0.0482*	-0.0584	0.0614**	-0.0322	-0.0758
	(0.0269)	(0.0340)	(0.0240)	(0.0643)	(0.0727)
Below Median (1/0) $Equity/Assets_{t-1}$	0.0997	-0.276*	0.519***	-0.310	-0.719
	(0.165)	(0.151)	(0.143)	(0.282)	(0.529)
Below Median (1/0) $Equity/Assets_{t-1}$ x $(CL+UDD)/(RES+ELA)_{t-1}$	0.134***	0.156***	0.0507*	0.0886	0.172
	(0.0301)	(0.0429)	(0.0254)	(0.0496)	(0.0795)
N	89495	40123	37216	8459	3565
R-sq	0.639	0.654	0.775	0.806	0.837
Period	2010Q1-2023Q1	2010Q1-2014Q3 QE I-III	2014Q3-2019Q4 Post-QE III + QT	2019Q4-2021Q4 Pandemic QE	2022Q1-2023Q1 Post-pandemic QT

Panel B:

ROE and Claims to Potential Liquidity x (Below Median Capitalization, Mid-Size and Small Bank)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$(CL+UDD)/(RES+ELA)_{t-1}$	-0.00610	-0.0177	0.0713	-1.104***	-0.103
	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.639)	(0.0711)	(0.559)
Bank Assets <= $250bn in 2014Q3 (1/0) x $(CL+UDD)/(RES+ELA)_{t-1}$	0.0557	-0.0440	-0.00989	1.109***	0.0273
	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.638)	(0.0658)	(0.537)
Below Median (1/0) $Equity/Assets_{t-1}$	0.0996	-0.275*	0.519***	-0.246	-0.719
	(0.165)	(0.150)	(0.143)	(0.289)	(0.529)
Below Median (1/0) $Equity/Assets_{t-1}$ x $(CL+UDD)/(RES+ELA)_{t-1}$	0.134***	0.156***	0.0507*	0.0631	0.172
	(0.0301)	(0.0421)	(0.0254)	(0.0518)	(0.0793)
N	89495	40123	37216	8459	3565
R-sq	0.639	0.654	0.775	0.807	0.837
Period	2010Q1-2023Q1	2010Q1-2014Q3 QE I-III	2014Q3-2019Q4 Post-QE III + QT	2019Q4-2021Q4 Pandemic QE	2022Q1-2023Q1 Post-pandemic QT