Do Schools Matter? Measuring the Impact of California High Schools on Test Scores and Postsecondary Enrollment^{*}

Scott Carrell¹, Michal Kurlaender², Paco Martorell², Matthew Naven³, and Christina Sun²

¹University of Texas at Austin & NBER ²University of California, Davis ³Government Accountability Office

November 20, 2023

Abstract

Using a longitudinal panel of students' standardized test scores and college enrollment records in California, we estimate high school impacts on test score performance, post-secondary enrollment, and the relationship between the two. We estimate two measures of school quality – a base model measuring each school's "total" contribution to student outcomes and a second measure which isolates the "malleable" component of school quality accounting for peer, neighborhood, and family quality. Results show substantial variation in quality across schools in both test scores and college enrollment. A one-standard deviation increase in total school quality is associated with a 0.15 standard deviation increase in standardized test scores and a 9.9 percentage point increase in four-year college enrollment, although these impacts shrink considerably (0.10 s.d. & 4.8 p.pts.) when isolating the malleable component of school quality. Importantly, our results show that test score impacts "persist" to college enrollment. Higher test score value-added schools increase college enrollment across multiple margins – lower-ability students move from no college to two-year colleges while higher ability students move from two-year to four-year colleges.

^{*}This study was conducted in collaboration with the California Department of Education (CDE) with the support of U.S. Department of Education's Institute of Education Sciences Research Grant R305E150006. The findings and views contained in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the CDE or any other entity providing data for this study. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Government Accountability Office.

1 Introduction

The notion that "schools matter" is the rationale behind many types of education policies. For instance, policies that expand school choice and that establish school accountability systems emerge from the idea that access to high-quality schools and the incentives faced by schools have important consequences for students' educational outcomes. Moreover, policies and programs (e.g., school funding, or curricular materials) are also differently effectuated depending on school quality. Similarly, the widespread perception of the importance of schools has been the catalyst behind recent efforts to redraw school attendance zone boundaries and priorities for assigning students to oversubscribed schools (Goldstein, 2018; Veiga, 2021).

A number of recent studies have estimated school effects on student outcomes using quasi-experimental variation in settings with centralized school assignments and lotteries for oversubscribed schools (examples include Angrist et al. (2017, 2021); Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017, 2022); see Angrist, Hull and Walters (2022) for a review of recent advances in this literature). While these studies have produced valuable insights on school effects, these methods are not feasible in contexts without centralized school assignment. This has made it challenging to estimate the impacts of schools for the schools attended by the vast majority of students in the United States. Several studies show that observational "value-added" methods that control for incoming student test scores perform fairly well for estimating impacts on test scores (Deming, 2014; Angrist et al., 2017). However, there remain important concerns about the validity of this approach when examining other crucial outcomes, such as college enrollment, for which there are no lagged outcomes. As such, it difficult to ascertain the effect of schools on longer-run outcomes that may be more closely tied to lifetime well-being. In particular, even though policies such as school accountability often emphasize test scores when evaluating schools, it remains unclear whether schools' impacts on test scores "persist" to longerrun outcomes such as college enrollment.¹ And of course test scores are not the only, or even main, goal of schooling. Whether and how school quality influences longer-run outcomes, such as college attainment, is not well understood.

In this paper, we use rich statewide data from California that links K-12 student records to information on college enrollment to examine schools' contribution to test performance, post-secondary schooling outcomes, and the degree to which schools' impacts on test scores affect post-secondary outcomes. We begin by estimating the effect of high schools on 11th grade math and English tests using value-added models by adapting the procedure Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) use to estimate teacher effects.² We then

¹For instance, some have argued that any effect schools have on test scores might simply reflect "gaming" by schools (e.g., focusing on test preparation or manipulating the set of students taking the tests). Numerous studies have examined evidence of gaming as a response to school accountability (Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Jacob, 2005; Dee, 2005; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010; Dee, Jacob and Schwartz, 2013; Figlio and Rouse, 2006; Reback, 2008; Chiang, 2009; Rockoff and Turner, 2010)

 $^{^{2}}$ Value-added models were developed by researchers attempting to estimate teacher effectiveness, and a large literature examines the validity of value-added models in this context (see for exampleRothstein (2017, 2010); Chetty, Friedman and

estimate value-added models using postsecondary enrollment in either a two-year or four-year college as the outcomes to measure school effects on college-going.

For both sets of outcomes, we estimate two classes of value-added models. Our base model controls for prehigh school test scores and student demographics. These are standard covariates available in administrative school records and have been used to estimate school value-added in other studies (Willms and Raudenbush, 1989; Meyer, 1997; Everson, 2017; Kane and Staiger, 2008; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014; Deming, 2014; Angrist et al., 2017). The second model goes beyond the typical controls and includes a much richer set of covariates. Using student name and home address, we construct measures of neighborhood quality, proximity to colleges, and sibling characteristics. We also include school-level averages of these covariates to account for peer characteristics (Altonji and Mansfield, 2018). The estimates from the base model serve as a useful benchmark for comparability to other estimates in the literature as well as estimates from our models with richer sets of controls. The base model also incorporates potential peer and neighborhood effects that may contribute to a school's "total" effect. However, the second model is less prone to omitted variables bias from student sorting to schools. Furthermore, since peer and neighborhood effects are largely not under the control of schools, the second model helps isolate school effects driven by factors more "malleable" to school practices (e.g., teacher effectiveness, school disciplinary practices), and are likely more appropriate for school accountability purposes.

We present a number of tests of the identifying assumptions underlying each model, including "forecast bias" tests that examine the correlation between estimated value-added and covariates excluded from the value-added model. A key advantage of the rich set of controls we have available is that it allows us to control for many key omitted variables while still retaining "leave-out" variables that we can use to evaluate whether estimated value-added is correlated with excluded omitted variables. These tests are especially valuable for college enrollment where lagged outcomes cannot be used as a control and the selection-on-observables assumption may be less plausible.

Having estimated short- and long-run value-added and examined the validity of these estimates, we then examine the link between test score value-added and postsecondary enrollment. First, we see if schools that generate test score gains also generate positive impacts on postsecondary outcomes. The degree to which test score and postsecondary value-added are imperfectly correlated is informative about the multidimensionality of school quality (Beuermann et al., 2023; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2020) and whether policies that focus on test scores miss important components of school effectiveness (Jennings et al., 2015). Second, we estimate postsecondary value-added models that control for test score value-added. The coefficient on test score value-added provides information about whether test score gains attributable to a student's high school "persist" Rockoff (2014); Bacher-Hicks, Kane and Staiger (2014); Bacher-Hicks et al. (2017)).

to longer-run outcomes. We also explore how this relationship varies by academic ability (measured by prehigh school test scores) and different postsecondary enrollment margins (i.e., no college to two-year college and two-year college to four-year college).

Finally, we examine potential mechanisms driving variation in school effectiveness using data from parent and student climate surveys. In particular, we estimate the relationship between estimated value-added and contemporaneous perceptions of school climate, teacher and staff quality, and counseling support. In addition to helping understand potential mechanisms, these results provide an additional validity check of the valueadded estimates as these survey measures offer an alternative measure of school quality based on perceptions of parents, students, and staff.

Our findings suggest that schools make important contributions to both test scores and college going. A one standard deviation increase in the estimated "total" school effectiveness in our base value-added model is associated with a 0.15 standard deviation increase in test scores and a 9.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of attending a four-year college. In models that control for the richest set of covariates (including peer, sibling, and student neighborhood controls), these impacts shrink substantially to 0.10 standard deviations and 4.8 percentage points, respectively. We also find strong evidence that test score impacts "persist" to postsecondary outcomes. A one-standard deviation increase in a school's math test score value-added is associated with a 1.6 to 3.6 percentage point increase in four-year college enrollment, while the association with two-year enrollment is close to zero and negative in some specifications. When examining heterogeneity in persistence by pre-high school test scores, we find this latter result is driven by higher value-added schools increasing college enrollment across multiple margins – lower ability students move from no college to two-year enrollment and higher ability students move from two-year to four year enrollment.

The validity of our analysis rests on whether estimated value-added reflects causal school effects or bias from sorting of students to schools. We show that our base value-added estimates on test scores have only minimal correlation with both excluded lagged test scores and sibling college-going. Further, when we control for peer means of the controls in the base model, there is only minimal correlation between estimated valueadded and neighborhood quality. We interpret these results as providing support for the strong "selection on observables" assumption required for the validity of the value-added estimates in models that control for peer averages of standard coviariates used in value-added models. Furthermore, the correlation between the value-added estimates in models with the base and richest set of controls is about 0.9, suggesting the base model produces similar estimates to the model with the richest controls. These findings are consistent with research that finds that test score value-added models that control for lagged achievement and student demographics eliminate much of the selection bias and are useful for evaluating school performance (Angrist et al., 2017; Deming et al., 2014; Angrist et al., 2021).

For postsecondary enrollment, however, the base-valued estimates are strongly correlated with a student's own-neighborhood quality, proximity to the nearest public two and four-year college, and older-sibling collegegoing. These are factors outside of the control of school administrators and that significantly influence student outcomes, which implies that the base value-added models likely provide a misleading picture of schools' effects on college going. However, when we control for sibling college going, neighborhood quality and school peer averages of the included controls, we find that proximity to college is nearly uncorrelated with four-year college value-added and only weakly correlated with two-year college value-added. Adding peer averages to the base specification alone also reduces most of the correlation between estimated value-added and neighborhood quality. Altogether, these results suggest that using a rich set of covariates in value-added models may be sufficient to generate estimates that are reflective of actual school impacts on postsecondary enrollment.

Finally, our results examining student and parent perceptions of school climate, teacher and staff quality, and the level of counseling support are positively correlated with schools that are better at improving shorter-run test-score outcomes and longer-run four-year college enrollment. Additionally, similar to our persistence results, value-added on two-year college enrollment is negatively correlated with parent and student perceptions of school quality. As such, in addition to providing evidence on the potential mechanisms driving school quality, these results provide a validation of our value-added estimates.

Our study contributes to a growing literature on estimating school quality using value-added methods (see Angrist, Hull and Walters (2022) for a review of this work). Several recent studies use quasi-random variation arising in settings with centralized school assignment or lotteries for oversubscribed schools (Angrist et al., 2017; Beuermann et al., 2023; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2020; Angrist et al., 2021). While these studies produce well-identified estimates of school impacts, the methods they employ cannot be used to measure school effectiveness in the vast majority of schools in the United States where centralized school assignment and admissions lotteries remain rare. Our paper takes an alternative approach, which is to compare estimated school impacts from conventional value-added models to those that control for a much richer set of controls (e.g., peer and neighborhood characteristics) than have been used in most prior studies. Although the validity of our estimates requires stronger assumptions than those based on quasi-experimental variation in school assignments, our approach can be applied broadly and our results arguably have greater external validity.

This paper also builds on other studies that have examined school impacts on non-test score outcomes and the relationship between impacts on test scores and impacts on non-test score outcomes. Dobbie and Fryer (2020) find that Texas charter schools that reduce test scores also reduce labor market earnings, while those that increase test scores have no detectable effect on earnings. Jackson et al. (2020) estimates the effect of Chicago high schools on self-reported measures of socioemotional development and relates these to estimates of schools' effects on test scores and longer-run outcomes. Other studies have found that school impacts on high school test scores are positively correlated with school impacts on longer-term outcomes including college enrollment and earnings (Altonji and Mansfield, 2011; Hubbard, 2017; Jennings et al., 2015; Mbekeani et al., 2023). Finally, Deming et al. (2016) find that students subjected to strong accountability pressure in Texas experienced significant test score gains as well as improved longer-run outcomes, while lower-scoring students suffered negative effects. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that the relationship between school-level test score impacts and longer-run outcomes varies across student ability, and by demonstrating that estimates of impacts on long-run outcomes are sensitive to the covariates used to control for student sorting to schools.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on the factors that drive school quality. Education scholars have long been interested in the practices that characterize effective schools (see Coleman et al. (1966); Phillips (1997); Purkey and Smith (1983); Sammons et al. (1995) for a review of this research). Several recent studies have examined the practices and attributes associated with positive charter school impacts (Angrist, Pathak and Walters, 2013; Hoxby and Murarka, 2009; Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2013). A number of studies have used survey data to generate measures of school contexts and related these to student outcomes (Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2013; Kraft, Marinell and Shen-Wei Yee, 2016; Bloom et al., 2015; Davis and Warner, 2018). Our analyses relating estimated school impacts to survey-based measures of school contexts focus on a much broader set of schools than the charter and urban schools examined in earlier work. In addition, we examine how measures of school contexts correspond to school impacts on postsecondary schooling outcomes.

2 Data

Our dataset consists of four 11th-grade cohorts of students from 2014-15 through 2017-18 who attended California public high schools and took the Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium (SBAC)³ tests in mathematics and English Language Arts (ELA). In total there are nearly two million students in our data who attended one of California's roughly 1,400 public high schools.

We place a series of restrictions on the analytic sample similar to those found in other school value-added studies. First, we only include schools in the analysis that serve traditional high school grades (since our empirical approach uses middle school test scores as controls and we do not want the lagged test scores to be from the same school as their 11th-grade school), enroll at least 10 students, and are conventional

³Scores on the SBAC tests are part of California's accountability system and all public-school students take these tests in grades 3-8 and grade 11.

high schools.⁴ Next, we only include students with non-missing high school test scores as well as pre-high school test scores and demographic variables used as controls in the value-added models (e.g., race, economic disadvantage and special education status). For students who repeat 11th grade, we use scores from the earliest instance of that grade. For the pre-high school ELA test scores we use scores from 8th grade.⁵ For mathematics, we have to use sixth-grade scores because that is the last grade in which all students took the same mathematics exam.⁶ After imposing these restrictions, the final sample used to estimate value-added consists of over 1.2 million students. Online Appendix A: provides additional information on the restrictions imposed when creating our samples.

Information on postsecondary enrollment comes from linking students in our sample to college enrollment records from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). We focus on initial enrollment following high school, and define a student to have enrolled in a college if they are observed attending college in the NSC data within two years of 11th grade (i.e. within one year of graduating high school). The analyses below distinguish between enrollment at a four-year and two-year college, with students enrolling in both a two- and four-year college coded as a four-year college enrollee.

We use student-level home addresses and names to augment these data in two important ways.⁷ First, we construct sets of siblings by matching students who share a home address and surname in a given year and then linking all students who share a common sibling. Second, we geocode the student addresses in order to construct measures of college proximity and link students to Census tracts. Specifically, we match a student's address in sixth grade to average Census-tract characteristics, such as income, education, and race. For college proximity, we compute the minimum distance to public two- and four-year colleges in California, which has been shown to be strongly predictive of college enrollment and college choice (Card, 1993; Mountjoy, 2022). As described below, we use these additional sibling, neighborhood, and college proximity measures to conduct validity checks and to estimate models while controlling for peer, neighborhood and family controls. To our knowledge, this is the first study to incorporate neighborhood-of-residence and sibling-level controls when estimating school quality, which we find economically important when estimating the quality of a school that is subject to administrative control.

Sample means for the samples we use in our study are reported in Table 1. The first column contains values for the full population of 11th grade test-takers. The second column has data for the "base" value-

⁴Examples of non-conventional schools include special education centers and juvenile court schools.

 $^{^{5}}$ California did not administer tests in the 2013-2014 school year as they were transitioning to SBAC from the former California Standardized Test (CSTs) used for accountability, so we use 7th grade ELA scores for the 2016-2017 11th-grade cohort.

⁶For the cohorts in this study, the pre-high school math scores come from the test used prior to the adoption of the SBAC test, which had 7th and 8th grade math assessments that were tied to the mathematics course a student was taking. All 6th graders took the same test. However, students take standardized mathematics tests under the SBAC that are directly comparable across students, so we use eighth-grade mathematics test scores for the 2018 cohort.

⁷Student addresses were only available in our test score data during the 2002-2003 to 2012-2013 academic years.

added sample with the restrictions described above. The third column is for the subsample with data on older siblings and neighborhood quality. Panel A shows summary statistics for our four cohorts of 11th-grade test takers. With the exception of cohort size, the variables in Panel A are the dependent variable (current z-score) or independent variables included in the "base model" version of equation 1.

Mirroring the demographics of the state of California, students in our sample are racially and economically diverse. Comparing the values in the first and second column indicates that students in the base value-added sample have higher prior test scores and are more socioeconomically advantaged in a number of characteristics. For instance, average math scores column 2 are 0.16 standard deviations higher than in the full sample. These patterns are accentuated when dropping students missing the sibling and neighborhood quality measures. The fact that our value-added sample is positively selected is not surprising and is similar to the large teacher value-added literature that also relies on linking students to prior test scores (Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014).

Table 1 Panel B shows postsecondary-enrollment summary statistics for the students in our base sample who we linked to NSC outcomes as well as the students excluded from our base sample who we linked to NSC outcomes.⁸ College going rates in California are quite high, with 35 percent of all 11th-grade test takers enrolling in a two-year college the year after scheduled high school graduation, and 28 percent attending a four-year college. College-going rates among students we use in the value-added estimation are higher; in the most restricted sample (column 3), 36 percent of students attend a two-year college and 37 percent attend a four-year college.

3 Methods

We use a value-added framework to estimate school effectiveness on shorter-run test score outcomes and longer-run college going outcomes. Value-added on test scores is important since test scores are the primary metrics used in school accountability systems, while value-added on college-going provides an indication of how a school affects student's longer-run well-being.

3.1 Estimating value-added

To measure each high school's value-added on student's outcomes, we first consider the following base model:

$$Y_{ist} = \phi_0 + \phi_1 X_{ist} + \gamma_t + \underbrace{\lambda_{st} + \xi_{st} + \epsilon_{ist}}_{u_{ist}} \tag{1}$$

⁸The sample size for the postsecondary outcomes is slightly smaller than the sample used to estimate test score value-added because some records were not able to be linked to data from the National Student Clearinghouse.

where Y_{ist} is student *i*'s outcome (e.g., 11th grade test score or college enrollment) in school *s* and year *t*. X_{ist} is a vector of controls including prior test scores, student age, and indicators for gender, race and ethnicity (Hispanic/Latino, white, Asian, black, "other"), economic disadvantage, limited English proficiency, and disability. For prior test scores, we use cubic polynomials in 8th-grade ELA scores and 6th-grade math scores. The γ_t are year fixed effects for each of the four cohorts in our sample. The error term u_{ist} is comprised of three components: school-by-year value-added λ_{st} , a school-by-year common shock ξ_{st} , and a student-specific random term ϵ_{ist} .

The goal of this model estimation is to isolate λ_{st} , which provides a yearly measure of a school's total contribution to student outcomes beyond what would be expected given a student's demographic characteristics and prior test scores. We refer to this parameter as the "total effect" of schools. A component of this total effect is driven by factors controlled (or at least influenced) by school administrators including teacher quality, class size, and the quantity and quality of school support personnel (e.g., counselors). It also includes a component that arises from factors that are less malleable to the decisions of school leaders including peer composition and neighborhood effects (Altonji and Mansfield, 2018).

We start with this base model for two reasons. First, the controls included in the base model are similar to those used in other studies that use "observational" value-added models, as they are available in a typical district or state-level education dataset. Thus estimates from this model provide a useful benchmark that can be compared to other estimates in the literature, and could be estimated by policymakers interested in measuring school effectiveness. Second, this parameter is useful whenever the school effect of interest includes the influence of factors over which school administrators have little or no control. For instance, a parent seeking schools that would generate good outcomes for their children might be interested in a school's effect inclusive of peer and neighborhood effects.

We are also interested in isolating the malleable component of school quality. This would be the parameter of most relevance for school accountability and for evaluating the effectiveness of a school's administrators and staff. To estimate this type of effect, we need to further control for peer, neighborhood and family factors that are largely outside the control of school administrators. To do so, we re-estimate our base model while additionally including a vector of peer, neighborhood, and family controls. To control for neighborhood characteristics, we control for characteristics of the student's Census tract including measures of income, race/ethnicity and educational attainment of Census tract residents.⁹ To control for family characteristics, we control for indicator variables measuring whether an individual's older sibling enrolled in either a two-year

⁹Specifically, we matched student addresses in sixth grade to their specific Census tract which we then link to the American Community Survey (ACS). The variables we include to control for neighborhood characteristics are percent Asian, percent Hispanic, percent Black, proportion high-school dropout, proportion with a bachelor's degree or higher, the percent of families with children under the age of 18 in poverty, and median household income.

or four-year college. Finally, to control for peer quality at the school, we include school-by-grade-by-year means of all the individual control variables in the model.

An important contribution of this study is our ability to compare estimates from the base value-added model (i.e., what parents care about) to our fully specified model. If the estimates are highly correlated, this would indicate the base value-added model is a useful metric for both parents choosing schools and for school accountability. It would also provide support for the validity of widely-estimated school value-added models as a metric to measure the effectiveness of school administrators. Conversely, if the correlation is weak (or negative), this indicates that the standard base value-added model should be avoided in assessing school quality for accountability purposes.

For both sets of models, we employ the value-added with drift procedure developed in Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) for estimating teacher effectiveness.¹⁰ The first step involves estimating Equation (1) and computing the residuals (which we refer to as "student performance residuals"). We then collapse the student performance residuals u_{ist} to the school by year level:

$$u_{st} = \frac{1}{N_{st}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{st}} [\lambda_{st} + \xi_{st} + \epsilon_{ist}]$$

$$= \lambda_{st} + \xi_{st} + \frac{1}{N_{st}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{st}} \epsilon_{ist}$$

$$= \lambda_{st} + \xi_{st} + \bar{\epsilon}_{st}$$
 (2)

where N_{st} is the number of 11th-grade students in school s in year t. Under the assumption that ϵ_{ist} is a mean zero error term and that students do not sort to schools on unobservable characteristics, we have that $\mathbf{E}[\epsilon_{ist}|st] = \mathbf{E}[\epsilon_{ist}] = 0$, thus the average student performance residual at each school in each year $\bar{\epsilon}_{st}$ will converge to zero.

In order to reduce the variation due to common shocks ξ_{st} , our value-added estimates are the predicted value from a regression of u_{st} on $u_{st'}$, where $u_{st'}$ is the vector of $u_{st'}$ for all $t' \neq t$. By construction, the common shocks are uncorrelated with school value-added $(cov(\lambda_{st}, \xi_{st'}) = 0)$ and the common shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated across time $(cov(\xi_{st}, \xi_{st'}) = 0)$. Therefore, this functions as the first stage of an instrumental variables regression in which we isolate variation in λ_{st} while eliminating variation in ξ_{st} . The variation in λ_{st} under this methodology comes from the assumption that school value-added is correlated from year to year $(cov(\lambda_{st}, \lambda_{st'} \neq 0))$, which is likely given that most schools will not experience complete faculty and staff turnover between years. Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) and Naven (2022*a*) provide

¹⁰In practice, Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) is a reweighted version of Carrell and West (2010).

additional methodological details.¹¹

3.2 Validity of Value-Added Estimates

The validity of the base value-added measures depends on the strong assumption that, after controlling for pre-high school (i.e. lagged) test scores and student demographics, variation in high school outcomes (e.g. test scores or college going) across schools reflects the influence of schools and not omitted variables. This assumption has been criticized in the teacher effectiveness literature by Rothstein (2009, 2010, 2017), though test score teacher value-added models have been shown to perform well when controlling for lagged achievement (Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014; Kane and Staiger, 2008). Similarly, while recent studies show that school value-added estimates based on observational methods are useful for policymakers, some studies show that these estimates have some bias, even when controlling for lagged achievement Angrist et al. (2017).

To assess the validity of our school value-added estimates, we follow Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) and Rothstein (2017) and perform specification and forecast bias tests on our value-added estimates. Specifically, the specification test examines whether a change in estimated school value-added corresponds to a one-for-one change in student outcomes. If instead there is a larger or smaller than one-for-one change in student outcomes associated with a change in school value-added it would suggest that the value-added estimates are biased. Below we present specification tests for both our shorter-run outcomes (i.e. test score value-added) as well as our longer-run outcomes (i.e. two- and four-year college going value-added).

In contrast, the forecast bias test examines whether our value-added estimates are correlated with prehigh school measures (e.g. prior test scores) that are not included in our base value-added model.¹² If our school value-added estimates are uncorrelated with these excluded or "hold-out" variables, it suggests that any bias from omitted variables would have to be from factors that are themselves uncorrelated with the hold-out variables. For the forecast bias tests, as with Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014), we start by using (further) lagged ELA scores as our hold-out variable. For test score value-added, we believe this is a reasonable approach since the hold-out variable is a highly correlated lagged dependent variable. However, for our models estimating college-going value-added, an obvious concern is that using lagged test scores as the hold-out variables is a weaker test, since we are no longer using a lagged dependent variable as the hold

¹¹Our value-added estimates differ slightly from Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) and Naven (2022*a*) because our estimates do not include a school fixed effect when estimating equation (1), which would account for potential correlation between school value-added and the demographic characteristics of students. This is because we want to use across-school comparisons when controlling for test score value-added when estimating school value-added on long-run outcomes that operates independently of test scores in Table 5. Test score value-added estimates that include a school fixed effect in equation (1) have a correlation of 0.99 with the value-added estimates used in this paper.

¹²The coefficient from the forecast bias test is an estimate of the value of $\frac{cov(\epsilon_{ist}, \hat{\lambda}_{st})}{var(\hat{\lambda}_{st})}$

out.¹³ Since there is no lagged outcome for postsecondary enrollment, we use two factors which are strongly predictive of college enrollment as our hold-out variables for college-going value-added. One is geographic proximity, specifically, the linear distance from a student's high school to the nearest public two- and four year college (Card, 1993; Mountjoy, 2022). The second are indicator variables for whether the student's older sibling attended a two- or four-year college.

4 Results

4.1 Test Score Value-Added

Panels A and B of Table 2 present results for our estimates of ELA and mathematics test score valueadded, respectively. Each column represents a different combination of sample and controls, starting with the least restrictive base model to the most restricted model controlling for peer, neighborhood and family controls. Row 1 shows the standard deviation of the estimated test score value-added across our various specifications, which is a measure of variation in schools' contribution to test scores. The standard deviation in test score value-added ($\sigma_{\hat{\lambda}}$) in the base model is 0.146 for ELA and 0.151 for mathematics. These results indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in school effectiveness on test scores is associated with an increase in average student test scores of about 0.15 standard deviations of the student standardized test score distribution. These magnitudes are similar to estimates of school effectiveness from other settings.¹⁴

Column 2, row 1 shows the standard deviation of value-added when restricting the sample to those students who have information on the full set of covariates (specifically older sibling college-going, additional lagged test scores, and student neighborhood characteristics).¹⁵ In this sample, the standard deviation for both ELA and math value-added declines slightly to 0.122 and 0.127, respectively. The correlations between the full value-added sample and the restricted sample are high: 0.920 for ELA and 0.900 for math, as shown in Figure 1, panels 1a and 1b. Columns 3-5 of Table 2 show results when sequentially adding peers, neighborhoods, and prior test score leave-out control variables. Specifically, column 3 includes average peer characteristics for all of the covariates in the base specification. Column 4 adds both own and average peer Census tract characteristics. Column 5 adds both own and average peer sibling college going and 7th-grade

 $^{^{13}}$ Tables 2 and 3 show the F-statistic for the hypothesis that coefficients on the leave-out variables added to 1 are jointly zero. In all cases, the F-statistics are large and we strongly reject that the leave-out variables have no predictive power for both test scores and postsecondary outcomes.

¹⁴Hubbard (2017) finds that a standard deviation in school value-added corresponds to 0.23 standard deviations in student test scores, Deming (2014) reports standard deviations ranging from about 0.05 to 0.1, Naven (2022*a*) and Naven (2022*b*) report standard deviations between 0.06 and 0.09, and Angrist et al. (2017) report standard deviations ranging from 0.15 to 0.25. They are also similar to those found in the teacher quality literature which show that a one-standard deviation increase in teacher quality is associated with between a 0.10 and 0.20 increase in student achievement (Kane, Rockoff and Staiger, 2008; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014).

 $^{^{15}}$ For brevity, we only show results from our base model and the model with the richest set of controls. In results not shown, but available upon request, we also estimated models for each combination of samples and leave-out controls.

ELA scores. The standard deviation of test score value-added continues to shrink with each successive inclusion of additional controls. For the fully specified model in column 5, the standard deviation in ELA and math value-added are 0.105 and 0.101, or about 15 to 20 percent smaller than the standard deviation of the value-added in the restricted sample and base controls (column 2). These results are consistent with the variation in the malleable component of school quality (i.e., what administrators can control) being smaller than the total variation in school quality (which would include, for instance, peer effects). Nonetheless, Figure 2, panels 2a and 2b, shows that the correlation between value-added from the base model (column 2) and the model with the richest set of controls (column 5) is high - 0.931 for ELA and 0.876 for math.

Row 2 in Table 2 presents results for the specification test across the various samples and controls. For both ELA and mathematics, all the models perform quite well, indicating a change in estimated school test value-added corresponds to a one-for-one change in student achievement.

Rows 3-4 present results for the forecast bias test on lagged test scores and sibling college going. Reassuringly, our test score value-added estimates have little correlation with these leave-out variables. Specifically, results in column 4 suggest that only 0.9% and 0.4% of the variation in school value-added for ELA and math, respectively, is due to students sorting to schools on unobservable ability as measured by excluded lagged test scores. Furthermore, students with *lower* excluded test scores sort to schools with *higher* estimated value-added, which would bias our results toward zero. Only 0.1% and 0.2% of the variation in school value-added for ELA and math, respectively, is due to sorting on omitted sibling college going.

Finally, rows 5-6 present results when conducting the forecast bias tests using our Census tract neighborhood characteristics and proximity to the nearest two and four-year college as the leave-out variables. Results indicate these leave-out variables are correlated with the base value-added estimates, particularly math value-added. For math, the results in column 2 indicate that 8.8% of variation in math value-added is related to omitted neighborhood characteristics and 1.7% is due to college proximity. However, these correlations shrink substantially when controlling for peer averages of the base controls (2.6% and 1.6%, respectively) but remain statistically significant (column 3). For ELA, very little of the variation in value-added is related to neighborhood characteristics or college proximity once we control for peer averages (column 3).

In column 5 we examine the correlation between college proximity and our fully specified value-added model, which additionally controls for peer, sibling and neighborhood controls. Results show the correlation with college proximity is negligible and no longer statistically significant, highlighting the potential importance of controlling for peer, family and neighborhood characteristics in value-added models used for school accountability purposes. Column 6 shows that the results from the specification test and the standard deviation of value-added are unchanged when controlling for college proximity.

4.2 College Going Value-Added

Panels A and B of Table 3 present results for our estimates of two and four-year college-going value-added, respectively. Similar to the previous section, each column represents a different combination of sample and/or controls. Results in column 1, for the base model, show there is substantial variation in college-going valueadded across schools. The estimates of σ_{λ} (in percentage points) indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in school effectiveness is associated with an increase in students' enrolling either a two or four-year college by nearly ten percentage points.¹⁶

Similar to our test score results, as shown in Table 2, when restricting the sample in column 2, row 1, the distribution of the base value-added estimates shrinks slightly for both two- and four-year value-added (0.088 and 0.091). Likewise, as shown in Figure 1, panels 1c and 1d, the correlation between estimates when changing the sample is high (0.896 and 0.908). Results in columns 3-5 of Table 3 show the standard deviation of college-going value-added shrinks substantially with the inclusion of controls for peers, neighborhoods, and sibling college going. For the fully specified model in column 5, the standard deviation in two and four-year value-added is nearly cut in half relative to the base model to 0.047 and 0.048, respectively. Figure 2 panels 2c and 2d shows the relationship between value-added obtained using the base controls (i.e., the specification in column 2 of Table 2)and the fully-specified model. The correlation between the two sets of estimates is 0.755 for 2-year enrollment and 0.797 for 4-year enrollment. Though positive, these correlations are weaker compared to our test score value-added results, further suggesting controlling for peer and neighborhood controls affects the value-added estimates more for postsecondary enrollment than for test scores.

Row 2 in Table 3 presents results for the specification test across the various samples and controls. For both two and four-year value-added, all the models perform fairly well, indicating a change in estimated college-going value-added corresponds to a one-for-one change in college enrollment.

Rows 3-4 present results for the forecast bias test on both lagged test scores and sibling college going. Results show both our two and four-year value-added estimates are virtually uncorrelated with leave-out test scores. We find a statistically significant, but relatively small, correlation between these value-added estimates and our leave out for older sibling college going. Specifically, results in column 4 suggest that 2.0% and 2.7% of the variation in two- and four-year value-added is due to students sorting to schools on unobservable ability as measured by sibling college-going.

Rows 5-6 present results when conducting the forecast bias tests using our neighborhood characteristics and proximity to the nearest two- and four-year colleges as the leave-out variables. The magnitudes of the

 $^{^{16}}$ Note that these results come from separate models, each using a different indicator of postsecondary enrollment as the dependent variable. 2-year and 4-year college enrollment are mutually exclusive such that students who have enrollment records at both types of universities are coded as attending a 4-year university.

correlations are high for both sets of leave out variables, even when controlling for peer characteristics in column 3 for our two-year (5.0% and 4.7%, respectively) and four-year (8.2% and 3.6%, respectively) valueadded estimates. However, similar to our test score estimates, results in column 5 show the correlations with our college proximity leave-out variables is substantially reduced when controlling for peer, family and neighborhood controls. Though some bias remains for two-year value-added (3.0%), the correlation with four-year value-added is only 1.0% and marginally statistically significant. These results underscore the importance of controlling for peer, family and neighborhood characteristics in value-added models for longer-run outcomes for which lagged outcomes are not available. At the same time, the weak correlation between value-added estimates obtained from the fully-specified model and proximity to college, especially for four-year college, suggests that the models with the richest set of controls are useful measures of schools' impacts on postsecondary enrollment.

5 Relationship Between Test Score Value-Added and College Enrollment

The findings in the previous section show that schools have sizeable impacts on both test scores and college enrollment. An important question is whether schools that are effective at improving test scores also improve college enrollment. To address this question, we start by examining the raw correlation between collegeenrollment value-added and test-score value-added in Figures 3 and 4. As shown in panels 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b, there is weak negative relationship (corr = -0.004 and -0.044) between both a school's ELA and math value-added and their two-year enrollment value-added. However, as shown in panels 3c, 3d, 4c, and 4d, there is a positive relationship (corr = 0.278 and 0.341) between test-score value-added and four-year enrollment value-added. These results indicate that test score value-added is predictive of college value-added, but that this relationship is far from one-to-one, and that this relationship differs not just in magnitude but in sign for two- and four-year college enrollment. We now explore these relationships in greater depth.

5.1 Persistence in test-score value-added

Next, to examine the degree to which test score value-added is associated with postsecondary enrollment, we employ techniques first developed by Jacob, Lefgren and Sims (2010) and Carrell and West (2010) to estimate the "persistence" of test score valued-added to college enrollment. Specifically, we consider the following value-added model in equation (3):

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_{ist} + \gamma_t + \underbrace{\rho \lambda_{st} + \beta_{st} + \theta_{st} + e_{ist}}_{\nu_{ist}}$$

$$= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_{ist} + \gamma_t + \underbrace{\pi_{st} + \theta_{st} + e_{ist}}_{\nu_{ist}}$$

$$(3)$$

where Y_{ist} is a student *i*'s longer-run outcome who attended high school *s* in year *t*. X_{ist} is the same vector of demographic controls as in equation (1) and γ_t are year fixed effects. The error term ν_{ist} is comprised of four components: the persistence of test-score value-added $\rho\lambda_{st}$, the school's contribution to longer-run outcomes that is orthogonal to its contribution to test score gains β_{st} , a school-by-year common shock θ_{st} , and a student-level noise term e_{ist} . The parameter $\pi_{st} \equiv \rho\lambda_{st} + \beta_{st}$ is the total contribution of school *s* in year *t* to postsecondary schooling.

The primary parameter of interest is ρ , which measures the relationship between a school's contribution to 11th grade test score gains and postsecondary schooling outcomes. In other words, ρ reflects the extent to which test score value-added "persists" to long-run outcomes. When ρ is large and positive this indicates schools that generate sizable test score gains also tend to induce significant numbers of students to enroll in college. Knowing the sign and magnitude of this parameter is of interest, for example, for school accountability programs that rely mainly on test performance to evaluate schools.

Estimates of ρ are shown in Table 4.¹⁷ These estimates are scaled so that they reflect the percentage point difference in college enrollment associated with a one-standard deviation change in estimated test score value-added.¹⁸ The first two rows present results for the persistence of ELA value-added and the second two rows present results for the persistence of math value-added, while each column represents a different combination of outcomes, samples and controls. Columns 1-4 show results for two-year enrollment outcomes and columns 5-8 show results for four-year enrollment outcomes.

The pattern of results suggest several important findings. Consistent with results in Figures 5 and 6, there is, if anything, a negative relationship between test score value-added and two-year college enrollment. In fact, results in Panel B, column 4, indicate that a one standard deviation increase in math test score value-added is associated with a statistically significant 0.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of students enrolling in a two-year college. Second, there is a strong positive relationship between test score value-added and four-year college enrollment. For ELA, the estimated ρ of 0.012 in column 8 indicates that schools one-standard deviation above the mean in ELA test score value-added (i.e., test scores are improved

¹⁷To estimate ρ we estimate equation (3) by regressing Y_{ist} on X_{ist} , γ_t , and the estimated test score value-added $\hat{\lambda}_{st}$.

 $^{^{18}}$ This approach is a reweighted equivalent of the methodologies employed by Jacob, Lefgren and Sims (2010) and Carrell and West (2010).

by roughly 0.142 standard deviations) increase four-year college enrollment by roughly 1 percentage points (2.9 percent). Third, the estimates of ρ are substantially larger for math value-added compared to ELA valueadded. Results in column 5 indicate a one standard deviation increase in math value-added is associated with a 3.3 (9.9 percent) percentage point increase in four-year college enrollment.¹⁹ Finally, when adding additional controls in columns 6-8, the estimates of ρ become smaller in magnitude, but remain statistically significant for four-year enrollment. These results indicate that test score value-added is more strongly correlated with college enrollment when excluding important controls, such as neighborhood characteristics and peer averages. This suggests that schools that generate test score gains also tend to be ones that serve students from neighborhoods and families that have higher average college enrollment rates.

At first glance, the negative persistence of math test score value-added on two-year college enrollment is somewhat surprising. To further understand the relationship between test score value-added and twoyear college enrollment, we conduct two additional analyses. First, in unreported results, we estimate the persistence of test score value-added on *any* college enrollment (i.e., two-year or four-year). Results show the estimates of ρ are positive and significant for both ELA (0.019) and math (0.028). Hence, these results indicate overall college enrollment is higher in schools with higher test score value-added.

Second, to get a better understanding of how test score value-added influences the various margins of college enrollment (e.g., no college vs. two-year vs. four-year), we examine heterogeneity in our estimates of ρ across students based on pre-high school student achievement. To do so, we re-estimate equation (3) including interactions between $\hat{\lambda}_{st}$ and decile of a student's pre-high school test score decile. We do these analyses separately for prior math and ELA test scores.²⁰ Results from this exercise are presented in Figures 5 and 6 for both ELA and math value-added. For two-year enrollment a clear patter of results emerges showing that higher test score value-added schools *increase* two-year enrollment for lower ability students and *decrease* two-year enrollment for higher ability students. This relationship is particularly robust for math value-added. For four-year enrollment, results show that higher test score value-added schools increase the probability of enrollment for students of all abilities, though the effects are largest in the middle and upper end of the ability distribution. Combined, these heterogeneity results suggest that higher test score value-added schools likely improve college enrollment outcomes on both margins. That is, the lowest ability students are moved from no enrollment to two-year college enrollment, while students in the middle and upper end of the ability distribution are moved from two-year college enrollment.

 $^{^{19}}$ In results not reported, we show that when we estimate persistence of both math and ELA value-added in the same regression, the persistence of math value-added dominates ELA value-added, as the coefficient on ELA value-added is small and not statistically different than zero. The graphical evidence in Figures 3 and 4 also shows the positive association between test score and college enrollment value-added.

 $^{^{20}}$ We use 6th grade scores for math and 8th grade scores for ELA. Decilies are based on the statewide distribution of all test scores in a particular grade-year. In results not reported, we obtain very similar estimates to the "restricted sample, full controls" specification when we also include distance to college as a covariate.

5.2 Contribution of Test Score Value-Added to College Enrollment Value-Added

The preceding results indicate that schools vary substantially in school quality as measured by both standardized test scores and college enrollment, and that test score impacts persist in the sense that schools that generate larger test score gains also tend to generate better longer-run outcomes. An important remaining question is how much of the variation in long-run valued added is explained by the persistence of test score value-added?

We use two approaches to answer this question. First, we compare the variance in college enrollment value-added obtained by estimating Equation (1) with the full controls to that obtained by estimating Equation (3) with our full set of controls while also including math and ELA test score value-added as additional controls. The ratio of these variances provides a measure of how much of the total value-added in college enrollment remains after accounting for the correlation between test score value-added and college enrollment.

Results in panel A of Table 5 for two-year enrollment are consistent with previous findings and indicate that test score value-added persistence accounts for virtually none of the variance in two-year enrollment value-added. Results in panel B for four-year enrollment indicate that between 17 and 27 percent of the variance in four-year college enrollment value-added is explained by the persistence of test score value-added. As such, these finding indicate that, despite test score value-added being correlated with four-year college enrollment, most of the variation in school effects on postsecondary enrollment is due to factors orthogonal to schools' effects on test scores.

As an alternative approach, we also report the unexplained variation $(1-R^2)$ in a school-level regression of college-enrollment value-added on both ELA and math value-added.²¹ These results are consistent with our previous finding and again show that test-score value-added is largely uncorrelated with two-year enrollment value-added (panel A), while between 8 and 15 percent of the of the variation in four-year enrollment value-added is explained be test-score value-added.

6 Mechanisms: Correlation between Value-Added and Student, Teacher, and Parent Perceptions

Our findings indicate there is substantial variation across schools in both shorter-run test score outcomes as well as longer-run college going outcomes. Additionally, our results show that schools that are better at improving test scores, particularly in mathematics, also improve college enrollment outcomes. Given this,

²¹We weight these regressions by the number of students that contributed to the value-added estimates.

a natural question is what exactly do higher value-added schools do to improve test scores and/or college outcomes? To date, relatively little is known regarding the mechanisms that drive school quality. In related work to ours, Naven (2022*a*) shows that school and district-level finance and staffing variables such as school spending or teacher to student ratios are largely uncorrelated with school value-added. However, some of the best evidence to date regarding the effectiveness of various school inputs comes from examining charter schools in Boston and New York. For example, Angrist, Pathak and Walters (2013) find that large test score gains found in Boston urban charter schools is primarily driven by the "No Excuses" model, which emphasizes school discipline and longer school days. Likewise Hoxby and Murarka (2009) find in New York charters that more effective schools tend to have longer school years, more time devoted to ELA instruction, a "small rewards/small penalties disciplinary policy", and teacher pay which provides performance incentives.

To get a better understanding of the potential mechanisms driving our results, we examine the relationship between our value-added estimates and school-level survey responses from students, parents, and teachers surveys from the California School Climate, Health, and Learning Surveys (CalSCHLS).²² We use these data to generate three school-level average indices measuring (1) school climate, (2) teacher and staff quality, and (3) counseling supports.²³ The "school climate" index measures perceptions about the overall environment of the school - e.g., whether it is welcoming, has a good learning environment, and whether students have a sense of belonging to the school. The teacher and staff quality index captures beliefs about whether school staff provide rigorous, high-quality instruction, and whether the staff care about students. The counseling index reflects perceptions of the adequacy of counseling services for students' socioemotional needs and college planning.

We relate these indices to value-added by estimating the following equation (4):

$$\hat{\lambda}_s = \phi_0 + \phi_1 X_s + \phi_2 Index_s + \epsilon_{ist} \tag{4}$$

Where, $\hat{\lambda}_s$ is a value-added estimate (e.g., ELA, math, 2-year or 4-year enrollment), X_s is a vector of mean school level characteristics²⁴, and $Index_s$ is a vector of estimated indices measuring school climate, teacher and staff quality, and school support. We estimate models with each index separately as well as a specification that includes all three indices in the same regression.

Results from this exercise are shown in Table 6. Panel A presents results when regressing our estimated $\hat{\lambda}_s$'s on each index measure separately, while Panel B presents results when including all three indices in

²²For more information on the surveys see: https://calschls.org/survey-administration/downloads/#staff_csss.

 $^{^{23}}$ Our indices are averages across several questions within each category. The wording of the survey items used to construct these indices is listed in Appendix Online Appendix B:. Because the survey is not administered in every year at every school, we take school-level averages across all years of the survey from 2017-19, and standardize these so each index has a standard deviation of one.

 $^{^{24}}$ We include the means of all baseline demographic characteristics and prior test scores included in our value-added estimates.

the same regression. Odd numbered columns show results for our baseline value-added estimates and even numbered columns show results for our fully specified value-added estimates when including sibling, peer, and neighborhood controls.

Starting with Table 6 Panel A, the pattern of results suggest several important findings. First, save for two-year enrollment, all three index measures are significantly positively correlated with our various value-added measures. As such, students, parents and teachers perceptions of school climate, teacher and staff quality, and the level of counseling support is positively correlated with schools that are better at improving shorter-run test score outcomes and longer-run four-year college enrollment. Second, two-year college enrollment is generally negatively correlated with our indices. This result provides a validation of our previous findings which test score value had a weak correlation with two-year enrollment value-added. Finally, results show the largest effects for our index measuring school climate and the smallest effects for our index measuring school support.

To further explore the relative importance of each index measure, in Table 6 Panel B we present results when regress value-added on all three indices in the same regression. Confirming our previous findings and largely consistent with Angrist, Pathak and Walters (2013); Hoxby and Murarka (2009), we find that our school climate is the school-level factor most associated with increases in student learning. In the multivariate regression with all three survey indices, we find school climate to be significantly positively correlated with schools' value-added for test score outcomes, as well as schools' value-added for four-year college enrollment. We also find that the level of counseling support becomes uncorrelated with schools' value-added on test score and post-secondary enrollment. Counseling support also becomes largely uncorrelated with these valueadded measures, with the exception of being negatively correlated with ELA and Math test score value-added as well as two-year college enrollment value-added in the specification with base covariates.

To check the internal consistency of our constructed survey indices, we calculate Cronbach's Alpha for all three index measures. We find that the alpha for the school climate index is 0.94, 0.90 for the teacher and staff quality index, and 0.66 for the counseling support index. The relatively lower alpha for the counseling support index is likely due to the smaller number (4) of questions in the index, compared to the school climate index (20 questions) and teacher and staff quality index (17 questions). Overall, this provides evidence that our constructed survey index measures are highly reliable.

7 Conclusion

This paper examines high school quality in California. We use rich data from California that links K-12 student records to data on college enrollment to examine high schools' contribution to test score performance,

postsecondary schooling outcomes, and the relationship between the two. We estimate "value-added" models by adapting the procedure Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) use to estimate teacher effects.

We examine the link between a school's impact on test scores and its effects on post-secondary enrollment to examine the extent to which test score gains "persist" to longer-run outcomes. We also estimate valueadded models using postsecondary schooling as the outcome to measure a school's effect on college-going. Finally, using results from student and parent surveys, we explore potential mechanisms.

Our results suggest that schools make important contributions to both test scores and college enrollment. A one standard deviation increase in the "total" estimated school effectiveness is associated with roughly a 0.15 standard deviation increase in test scores and a 9.9 percentage point increase in the probability of enrolling in a four-year college. We also find that test score impacts are strongly related to improved college going. An one-standard deviation increase in a school's math test score impact is associated with a roughly 3 percentage point increase in four-year college attendance. Notably, these effects shrink considerably, but remain meaningful when isolating the malleable component of school quality that accounts for factors outside of the control of the school administration including the quality of peers, neighborhoods and family.

Importantly, we find that higher test score value-added schools increase college enrollment across multiple margins – lower ability students move from no college to two-year enrollment and higher ability students mover from two-year to four-year enrollment. Using student and parent survey data, we also find that higher value-added schools are associated with better perceptions of school climate, teacher and staff quality, and counseling support.

References

- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Joshua D Angrist, Yusuke Narita, and Parag A Pathak. 2017. "Research design meets market design: Using centralized assignment for impact evaluation." *Econometrica*, 85(5): 1373–1432.
- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Joshua D Angrist, Yusuke Narita, and Parag A Pathak. 2022. "Breaking ties: Regression discontinuity design meets market design." *Econometrica*, 90(1): 117–151.
- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A Pathak, Jonathan Schellenberg, and Christopher R Walters. 2020. "Do parents value school effectiveness?" American Economic Review, 110(5): 1502–39.
- Altonji, Joseph G, and Richard K Mansfield. 2011. "The Contribution of Family, School, and Community Characteristics to Inequality in Education and Labor Market Outcomes." in Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children's Life Chances edited by Duncan G., Murnane R., 349–58.
- Altonji, Joseph G, and Richard K Mansfield. 2018. "Estimating group effects using averages of observables to control for sorting on unobservables: School and neighborhood effects." American Economic Review, 108(10): 2902–46.
- Angrist, Joshua D, Parag A Pathak, and Christopher R Walters. 2013. "Explaining charter school effectiveness." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(4): 1–27.
- Angrist, Joshua D, Peter D Hull, Parag A Pathak, and Christopher R Walters. 2017. "Leveraging lotteries for school value-added: Testing and estimation." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2): 871–919.
- Angrist, Joshua, Peter Hull, and Christopher R Walters. 2022. "Methods for Measuring School Effectiveness."
- Angrist, Joshua, Peter Hull, Parag A Pathak, and Christopher Walters. 2021. "Credible school value-added with undersubscribed school lotteries." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 1–46.
- Bacher-Hicks, Andrew, Mark J Chin, Thomas J Kane, and Douglas O Staiger. 2017. "An evaluation of bias in three measures of teacher quality: Value-added, classroom observations, and student surveys." National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Bacher-Hicks, Andrew, Thomas J Kane, and Douglas O Staiger. 2014. "Validating teacher effect estimates using changes in teacher assignments in Los Angeles." National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Beuermann, Diether W, C Kirabo Jackson, Laia Navarro-Sola, and Francisco Pardo. 2023. "What is a good school, and can parents tell? Evidence on the multidimensionality of school output." *The Review of Economic Studies*, 90(1): 65–101.
- Bloom, Nicholas, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen. 2015. "Does management matter in schools?" The Economic Journal, 125(584): 647–674.
- Card, David. 1993. "Using geographic variation in college proximity to estimate the return to schooling."
- Carrell, Scott E, and James E West. 2010. "Does professor quality matter? Evidence from random assignment of students to professors." *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(3): 409–432.
- Chetty, Raj, John N Friedman, and Jonah E Rockoff. 2014. "Measuring the impacts of teachers I: Evaluating bias in teacher value-added estimates." *The American Economic Review*, 104(9): 2593–2632.
- Chiang, Hanley. 2009. "How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement." Journal of Public Economics, 93(9-10): 1045–1057.
- Coleman, James S., Ernest Q. Campbell, Carol J. Hobson, James McPartland, Alexander M. Mood, Frederic D. Weinfeld, and Robert L. York. 1966. Equality of Educational Opportunity. Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education.
- Davis, Jonathan Ryan, and Nathan Warner. 2018. "Schools matter: The positive relationship between New York City high schools' student academic progress and school climate." Urban Education, 53(8): 959– 980.
- Dee, Thomas S. 2005. "A teacher like me: Does race, ethnicity, or gender matter?" American Economic Review, 95(2): 158–165.
- Dee, Thomas S, Brian Jacob, and Nathaniel L Schwartz. 2013. "The effects of NCLB on school resources and practices." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 35(2): 252–279.
- **Deming, David J.** 2014. "Using school choice lotteries to test measures of school effectiveness." *The American Economic Review*, 104(5): 406–411.
- Deming, David J, Justine S Hastings, Thomas J Kane, and Douglas O Staiger. 2014. "School choice, school quality, and postsecondary attainment." *American Economic Review*, 104(3): 991–1013.
- Deming, David J, Sarah Cohodes, Jennifer Jennings, and Christopher Jencks. 2016. "School accountability, postsecondary attainment, and earnings." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 98(5): 848–862.

- **Dobbie, Will, and Roland G Fryer.** 2020. "Charter schools and labor market outcomes." Journal of Labor Economics, 38(4): 915–957.
- **Dobbie, Will, and Roland G Fryer Jr.** 2013. "Getting beneath the veil of effective schools: Evidence from New York City." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4): 28–60.
- **Everson, Kimberlee C.** 2017. "Value-added modeling and educational accountability: are we answering the real questions?" *Review of Educational Research*, 87(1): 35–70.
- Figlio, David N, and Cecilia Elena Rouse. 2006. "Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools?" *Journal of Public Economics*, 90(1-2): 239–255.
- Figlio, David N, and Josh Winicki. 2005. "Food for thought: the effects of school accountability plans on school nutrition." *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(1-2): 381–394.
- Goldstein, Dana. 2018. "New York's Schools Chancellor Is Talking About Integration. Can He Make It Happen?" The New York Times.
- Hoxby, Caroline M, and Sonali Murarka. 2009. "Charter schools in New York City: Who enrolls and how they affect their students' achievement." National Bureau of Economic Research.

Hubbard, Daniel. 2017. "More Gains Than Score Gains? High School Quality and College Success."

- Jackson, C. Kirabo, Shanette C. Porter, John Q. Easton, Alyssa Blanchard, and Sebastián Kiguel. 2020. "School Effects on Socioemotional Development, School-Based Arrests, and Educational Attainment." American Economic Review: Insights, 2(4): 491–508.
- Jacob, Brian A. 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: The impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools." *Journal of public Economics*, 89(5-6): 761–796.
- Jacob, Brian A, Lars Lefgren, and David P Sims. 2010. "The persistence of teacher-induced learning." Journal of Human resources, 45(4): 915–943.
- Jennings, Jennifer L, David Deming, Christopher Jencks, Maya Lopuch, and Beth E Schueler. 2015. "Do differences in school quality matter more than we thought? New evidence on educational opportunity in the twenty-first century." *Sociology of Education*, 88(1): 56–82.
- Kane, Thomas J, and Douglas O Staiger. 2008. "Estimating teacher impacts on student achievement: An experimental evaluation." National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Kane, Thomas J, Jonah E Rockoff, and Douglas O Staiger. 2008. "What does certification tell us about teacher effectiveness? Evidence from New York City." *Economics of Education review*, 27(6): 615– 631.
- Kraft, Matthew A, William H Marinell, and Darrick Shen-Wei Yee. 2016. "School organizational contexts, teacher turnover, and student achievement: Evidence from panel data." American Educational Research Journal, 53(5): 1411–1449.
- Mbekeani, Preeya P, John Papay, Ann Mantil, and Richard J Murnane. 2023. "Understanding High Schools' Effects on Longer-Term Outcomes."
- Meyer, Robert H. 1997. "Value-added indicators of school performance: A primer." Economics of education Review, 16(3): 283–301.
- Mountjoy, Jack. 2022. "Community colleges and upward mobility." *American Economic Review*, 112(8): 2580–2630.
- Naven, Matthew. 2022*a*. "Human-Capital Formation During Childhood and Adolescence: Evidence from School Quality and Postsecondary Success in California."
- Naven, Matthew. 2022b. "Within-School Heterogeneity in Quality: Do Schools Provide Equal Value Added to All Students?"
- Neal, Derek, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach. 2010. "Left behind by design: Proficiency counts and test-based accountability." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(2): 263–283.
- Phillips, Meredith. 1997. "What Makes Schools Effective? A Comparison of the Relationships of Communitarian Climate and Academic Climate to Mathematics Achievement and Attendance During Middle School." American Educational Research Journal, 34: 633–662.
- Purkey, Stewart C, and Marshall S Smith. 1983. "Effective schools: A review." The elementary school journal, 83(4): 427–452.
- **Reback, Randall.** 2008. "Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of student achievement." *Journal of public economics*, 92(5-6): 1394–1415.
- Rockoff, Jonah, and Lesley J Turner. 2010. "Short-run impacts of accountability on school quality." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(4): 119–147.
- Rothstein, Jesse. 2009. "Student sorting and bias in value-added estimation: Selection on observables and unobservables." *Education finance and policy*, 4(4): 537–571.

- Rothstein, Jesse. 2010. "Teacher quality in educational production: Tracking, decay, and student achievement." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1): 175–214.
- Rothstein, Jesse. 2017. "Measuring the impacts of teachers: Comment." American Economic Review, 107(6): 1656–1684.
- Sammons, Pam, et al. 1995. Key characteristics of effective schools: A review of school effectiveness research. ERIC.
- **Veiga, Christina.** 2021. "NYC reconsiders elimination of high school attendance zones, borough admissions priorities." *Chalkbeat New York.*
- Willms, J Douglas, and Stephen W Raudenbush. 1989. "A longitudinal hierarchical linear model for estimating school effects and their stability." *Journal of educational measurement*, 26(3): 209–232.




Figure 1: Value-Addded Correlations: Base Controls, Base vs. Restricted Sample

Each data point represents a high school's value-added in a given year for two different samples. Value-added is estimated using the base set of controls described in equation (1) for both samples. The vertical axis gives value-added estimates for the base value-added sample. The horizontal axis gives value-added estimates for the restricted value-added sample that can be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.




Figure 2: Value-Added Correlations: Restricted Sample, Base vs. Full Controls

Each data point represents a high school's value-added in a given year for two different specifications. Value-added is estimated using the restricted value-added sample that can be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics for both specifications. The vertical axis gives value-added estimates controlling for the base value-added controls described in equation 1. The horizontal axis gives value-added estimates that additionally control for peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.




Figure 3: ELA Test Score Value-Added vs. Postsecondary Enrollment Value-Added

Each data point represents a high school's value-added in a given year for two different outcomes. In Figures 3a and 3b, the horizontal axis gives ELA value-added and the vertical axis gives 2-year enrollment value-added. In Figures 3c and 3d, the horizontal axis gives ELA value-added and the vertical axis gives 4-year enrollment value-added. In Figures 3a and 3c, value-added is estimated on the base value-added sample using the base set of controls described in equation (1). In Figures 3b and 3d, value-added is estimated on the restricted value-added sample and additionally controls for peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.





Figure 4: Math Test Score Value-Added vs. Postsecondary Enrollment Value-Added

Each data point represents a high school's value-added in a given year for two different outcomes. In Figures 4a and 4b, the horizontal axis gives math value-added and the vertical axis gives 2-year enrollment value-added. In Figures 4c and 4d, the horizontal axis gives math value-added and the vertical axis gives 4-year enrollment value-added. In Figures 4a and 4c, value-added is estimated on the base value-added sample using the base set of controls described in equation (1). In Figures 4b and 4d, value-added is estimated on the restricted value-added sample and additionally controls for peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.



Contracting the second second

Figure 5: Heterogeneity of ELA Value-Added on Postsecondary Enrollment

(a) 2-Year Enrollment: Base Sample, Base Controls

<u>8</u>

8

Coefficient Estimate


5

0

ò

2

(b) 2-Year Enrollment: Restricted Sample, Full Controls



(c) 4-Year Enrollment: Base Sample, Base Controls

4 6 Prior ELA Score Decile 8

(d) 4-Year Enrollment: Restricted Sample, Full Controls

Each figure represents one regression. Each bar represents the coefficient estimate from a regression of college enrollment on ELA value-added interacted with a student's prior ELA score decile. Each regression also includes the controls included in the estimation of school value-added. The plunger associated with each bar gives the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimate. In Figures 5a and 5b, the dependent variable is 2-year college enrollment. In Figures 5c and 5d, the dependent variable is 4-year university enrollment. In Figures 5a and 5c, value-added is estimated on the base value-added sample using the base set of controls described in equation (1). In Figures 5b and 5d, value-added is estimated on the restricted value-added sample and additionally controls for peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.




Figure 6: Heterogeneity of Math Value-Added on Postsecondary Enrollment

(c) 4-Year Enrollment: Base Sample, Base Controls

(d) 4-Year Enrollment: Restricted Sample, Full Controls

Each figure represents one regression. Each bar represents the coefficient estimate from a regression of college enrollment on math value-added interacted with a student's prior math score decile. Each regression also includes the controls included in the estimation of school value-added. The plunger associated with each bar gives the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimate. In Figures 6a and 6b, the dependent variable is 2-year college enrollment. In Figures 6c and 6d, the dependent variable is 4-year university enrollment. In Figures 6a and 6c, value-added is estimated on the base value-added sample using the base set of controls described in equation (1). In Figures 6b and 6d, value-added is estimated on the restricted value-added sample and additionally controls for peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.

Panel A: 11th Grade Characteristics							
	Full Sample	Base Sample	Restricted Sample				
11th Graders per School	440	475	498				
Age in Years	16.8	16.7	16.7				
Male	0.512	0.493	0.490				
Hispanic or Latino	0.525	0.527	0.499				
White	0.253	0.251	0.265				
Asian	0.127	0.140	0.169				
Black or African American	0.062	0.051	0.037				
Other Race	0.042	0.031	0.030				
Economic Disadvantage	0.561	0.545	0.507				
Limited English Proficiency Status	0.101	0.053	0.040				
Disabled	0.101	0.048	0.029				
ELA Z-Score	0.000	0.175	0.291				
Math Z-Score	-0.000	0.161	0.305				
Prior ELA Z-Score	0.021	0.122	0.238				
Prior Math Z-Score	0.022	0.127	0.259				
Observations	1,913,221	$1,\!232,\!262$	410,947				
Panel B: Postsecondary Outcomes							
Enrolled at a 2-Year College	0.347	0.378	0.363				
Enrolled at a 4-Year University	0.278	0.332	0.374				
Observations	1,822,742	1,208,514	409,286				

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Values are the mean of the variable listed on the left. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years. "Full Sample" refers to all 11th-grade students, "Base VA Sample" refers to the subset of students that meet the restrictions for our base value-added sample, and "Restricted VA Sample" refers to the subset of the base value-added sample that can be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. Panel A contains the sample used to estimate ELA test score value-added (summary statistics for the sample used to estimate math value-added are nearly identical; the variable "math z-score" is the dependent variable in the math value-added models). With the exception of 11th graders per school, the variables in Panel A are the base controls used in the estimation of school value-added. Panel B contains the subset of panel A students who could be linked to the NSC data. The base ELA test score value-added sample contains 1,232,262 observations and 1,208,514 of these were linked to the NSC data. The school value-added ELA test score value-added sample contains 410,947 observations and 409,286 of these were linked to the NSC data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: ELA						
Sample Controls	Base Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base $+$ ACS	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Restricted} \\ \text{Base} + \text{LO} \\ \text{score} + \text{sib} + \\ \text{ACS} \end{array}$	Restricted Base + LO score + sib + ACS + Distance
Peer Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SD of VA Spec Test FB: LO Score	$0.146 \\ 0.974 \\ (0.018)$	0.122 1.003 (0.026) -0.007^*	0.109 1.009 (0.027) -0.010**	$0.105 \\ 1.008 \\ (0.028) \\ -0.009^*$	$0.105 \\ 1.007 \\ (0.028)$	$0.105 \\ 1.007 \\ (0.028)$
FB: Sibling		$(0.004) \\ \{15000.0\} \\ 0.001^{***} \\ (0.000)$	$(0.003) \\ \{15000.0\} \\ 0.001^{***} \\ (0.000)$	$(0.003) \\ \{15000.0\} \\ 0.001^{***} \\ (0.000)$		
FB: ACS		$\{ 65.7 \} \\ 0.023^{***} \\ (0.004) \\ \{ 87.3 \} \}$	$ \begin{cases} 67.5 \\ 0.005^{**} \\ (0.002) \\ {37.2} \end{cases} $	<i>{</i> 61.4 <i>}</i>		
FB: Distance	$0.002 \\ (0.001) \\ \{59.6\}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \\ (0.003) \\ \{53.9\} \end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{c} (0.12)\\ 0.007\\ (0.004)\\ \{75.2\}\end{array} $	$0.005 \\ (0.003) \\ \{48.2\}$	$0.002 \\ (0.003) \\ \{28.8\}$	
Panel B: Math						
Sample Controls	Base Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base + ACS	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Restricted} \\ \text{Base} + \text{LO} \\ \text{score} + \text{sib} + \\ \text{ACS} \end{array}$	Restricted Base + LO score + sib + ACS + Distance
Peer Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SD of VA Spec Test	0.151 0.946^{***} (0.013)	0.127 0.993 (0.018)	$0.109 \\ 1.024 \\ (0.019)$	0.101 1.021 (0.021)	0.101 1.022 (0.020)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.101 \\ 1.021 \\ (0.020) \end{array}$
FB: LO Score		0.001 (0.001) {1888.2}	-0.004^{**} (0.001) {1585.9}	-0.004^{**} (0.001) {1512.3}		
FB: Sibling		0.002^{***} (0.000) $\{205.2\}$	0.003^{***} (0.000) $\{216.6\}$	0.002^{***} (0.000) {194.8}		
FB: ACS		$\begin{array}{c} 0.088^{***} \\ (0.012) \\ \{521.6\} \end{array}$	(0.026^{***}) (0.005) $\{151.5\}$	(<u>)</u>		
FB: Distance	0.013^{***} (0.003) {581.1}	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017^{***} \\ 0.004) \\ \{238.3\} \end{array}$	(0.016^{***}) (0.004) $\{175.3\}$	0.006^{*} (0.003) {69.0}	0.004 (0.002) {46.9}	

Table 2: ELA and Math Value-Added Distributions and Validity Tests

Each column represents a separate set of value-added estimates. Panel A reports results for ELA value-added, and Panel B reports results for math value-added. The first row of each panel denotes the sample used to estimate value-added. "Base" refers to the base value-added sample. "Restricted" refers to the subset of students that can additionally be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. The second row of each panel denotes the controls used in the estimation of valueadded. "Base" includes the base set of controls described in equation (1). "ACS" refers to American Community Survey Census tract characteristics. "LO score" refers to one additional leave-out prior score. "Sib" refers to indicator variables for whether an older sibling attended a 2-year college or 4-year university. "Distance" refers to the distance from a student's high school to the nearest 2-year college and 4-year university. The third row of each panel indicates whether peer (jackknife) averages of the controls are included as additional controls. The fourth row of each panel contains the standard deviation of the school-year value-added estimates. The fifth row of each panel contains the coefficient for a bivariate regression of test score residuals u_{ist} on school value-added $\hat{\lambda}_{st}$. Statistical inference is conducted under the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 1. The sixthninth rows of each panel contain the coefficient for a bivariate regression of test scores, as predicted by residualized excluded observables \hat{u}_{ist} , on school value-added $\hat{\lambda}_{st}$. Statistical inference is conducted under the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0. Standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. The F-statistic for the excluded variables from the regression of test scores on excluded variables is presented in brackets. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years. * p < 0.05) ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2 Year Enrollment						
Sample Controls	Base Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base + ACS	Restricted Base + LO score + sib + ACS	Restricted Base + LC score + sik + ACS + Distance
Peer Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SD of VA Spec Test	0.098 0.985^{**} (0.006)	0.088 0.992 (0.008)	$0.066 \\ 0.996 \\ (0.012)$	$0.061 \\ 1.005 \\ (0.013)$	0.047 1.027 (0.019)	$0.046 \\ 1.029 \\ (0.019)$
FB: LO Score	()	0.000 (0.000) {118.2}	0.001 (0.000) {153.4}	0.001 (0.000) {133.5}	()	()
FB: Sibling		(0.020^{***}) (0.001) $\{994.6\}$	(100.1) $(0.021^{***}$ (0.001) $\{922.3\}$	(100.01) (0.001) $\{874.0\}$		
FB: ACS		$\begin{array}{c} (0.041,0)\\ 0.147^{***}\\ (0.009)\\ \{484.0\}\end{array}$	(0.007) (172.1)	[014.0]		
FB: Distance	0.046^{***} (0.008) {1023.1}	$(101.0) \\ 0.031^{***} \\ (0.005) \\ \{249.6\}$	$(1.2.1)$ 0.047^{***} (0.008) $\{285.0\}$	0.045^{***} (0.009) $\{232.5\}$	0.031^{***} (0.008) $\{134.6\}$	
Panel B: 4 Year Enrollment						
Sample Controls	Base Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base	Restricted Base + ACS	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Restricted} \\ \text{Base} + \text{LO} \\ \text{score} + \text{sib} \\ + \text{ACS} \end{array}$	Restricted Base + LC score + sil + ACS + Distance
Peer Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SD of VA Spec Test	0.099 1.004 (0.005)	0.091 1.025^{***} (0.006)	0.075 1.028^{**} (0.010)	$0.063 \\ 1.025^{*} \\ (0.011)$	$0.048 \\ 1.041^* \\ (0.018)$	$0.048 \\ 1.042^{*} \\ (0.018)$
FB: LO Score	(0.000)	(0.000) (0.004^{**}) (0.001) $\{1048.9\}$	(0.010) (0.001) (990.3)	$(0.001) \\ (0.001) \\ \{880.2\}$	(0.010)	(0.010)
FB: Sibling		$ \begin{array}{c} (1040.5)\\ 0.026^{***}\\ (0.001)\\ \{1835.2\}\end{array} $	(0.001) (1772.9)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0012) \\ (0.001) \\ \{1670.3\} \end{array}$		
FB: ACS		$ \begin{array}{r} \{1855.2\} \\ 0.174^{***} \\ (0.014) \\ \{686.0\} \end{array} $	$\{1772.9\}\\0.082^{***}\\(0.010)\\\{429.8\}$	11010.3}		
FB: Distance	0.067^{***} (0.007) $\{1794.3\}$	$\{080.0\}\ 0.043^{***}\ (0.006)\ \{417.6\}$	$\{429.8\}\ 0.036^{***}\ (0.006)\ \{267.0\}$	0.027^{***} (0.006) {148.0}	0.011^{*} (0.005) $\{58.9\}$	

Table 3: 2-Year and 4-Year Enrollment Value-Added Distributions and Validity Tests

Each column represents a separate set of value-added estimates. Panel A reports results for 2-year enrollment value-added, and Panel B reports results for 4-year enrollment value-added. The first row of each panel denotes the sample used to estimate value-added. "Base" refers to the base value-added sample. "Restricted" refers to the subset of students that can additionally be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. The second row of each panel denotes the controls used in the estimation of value-added. "Base" includes the base set of controls described in equation (1). "ACS" refers to American Community Survey Census tract characteristics. "LO score" refers to one additional leave-out prior score. "Sib" refers to indicator variables for whether an older sibling attended a 2-year college or 4-year university. "Distance" refers to the distance from a student's high school to the nearest 2-year college and 4-year university. The third row of each panel indicates whether peer (jackknife) averages of the controls are included as additional controls. The fourth row of each panel contains the standard deviation of the school-year value-added estimates. The fifth row of each panel contains the coefficient for a bivariate regression of test score residuals u_{ist} on school value-added $\hat{\lambda}_{st}$. Statistical inference is conducted under the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 1. The sixth-ninth rows of each panel contain the coefficient for a bivariate regression of test scores, as predicted by residualized excluded observables \hat{u}_{ist} , on school value-added $\hat{\lambda}_{st}$. Statistical inference is conducted under the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0. Standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. The F-statistic for the excluded variables from the regression of test scores on excluded variables is presented in brackets. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years. * p < 0.05) ** p < 0.01*** p < 0.001.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		2-Year E	2-Year Enrollment			4-Year Enrollment		
ELA VA	0.001	-0.001	-0.008**	-0.001	0.022^{***}	0.021^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Ν	$1,\!273,\!999$	427,979	427,979	427,793	$1,\!273,\!999$	427,979	427,979	427,793
Math VA	-0.003	-0.012^{**}	-0.017^{***}	-0.006*	0.035***	0.038***	0.029***	0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
N	$1,\!273,\!929$	427,963	427,963	427,781	$1,\!273,\!929$	427,963	427,963	427,781
Peer	Ν	Ν	Y	Y	Ν	Ν	Y	Y
Regression Controls	Match VA	Match VA	Match VA	Match VA	Match VA	Match VA	Match VA	Match VA
VA Sample	Base	Restricted	Restricted	Restricted	Base	Restricted	Restricted	Restricted
VA Controls	Base	Base	Base	Leave Out	Base	Base	Base	Leave Out
				Score + ACS +				Score + ACS +
				Sibling				Sibling

Table 4: Persistence of Test Score Value-Added to Postsecondary Enrollment

Each column represents a separate regression of college enrollment on test score value-added. ELA and math are estimated separately. Each estimate gives the coefficient estimate from a regression of college enrollment on test score value-added. Standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. Each regression also includes all of the controls used in the estimation of value-added. The first row at the bottom indicates whether peer (jackknife) averages of the controls are included as additional controls. The third row at the bottom gives the value-added sample. "Base" refers to the base value-added sample. "Restricted" refers to the subset of students that can additionally be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. The fourth row at the bottom gives the controls used in the estimation of value-added. "Base" includes the base set of controls described in equation (1). "ACS" refers to American Community Survey Census tract characteristics. "Leave Out Score" refers to one additional leave-out prior score. "Sibling" refers to indicator variables for whether an older sibling attended a 2-year college or 4-year university. "Distance" refers to the distance from a student's high school to the nearest 2-year college and 4-year university. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years. * p < 0.05) ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: 2 Year Enrollment					
Total Var	0.0095	0.0078	0.0044	0.0037	0.0022
Var Net of Test Score VA	0.0094	0.0074	0.0041	0.0036	0.0022
Net Var/Total Var	0.9915	0.9489	0.9236	0.9642	0.9813
$1 - R^2$	0.9916	0.9709	0.9449	0.9722	0.9872
Panel B: 4 Year Enrollment					
Total Var	0.0097	0.0082	0.0056	0.0039	0.0023
Var Net of Test Score VA	0.0072	0.0060	0.0042	0.0032	0.0019
Net Var/Total Var	0.7384	0.7253	0.7464	0.8150	0.8259
$1 - R^2$	0.8446	0.8373	0.8549	0.9037	0.9225
Sample	Base	Restricted	Restricted	Restricted	Restricted
Controls	Base	Base	Base	Base + ACS	Base + LO
					score + sib
					+ ACS
Peer Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 5: Variance in Postsecondary Enrollment Value-Added Accounted for by Test Score Value-Added

Each column represents a separate set of value-added estimates. Panel A reports results for 2-year enrollment value-added, and Panel B reports results for 4-year enrollment value-added. The first row of each panel gives the variance of school value-added on college enrollment. The second row of each panel gives the variance of school value-added on college enrollment obtained from a model that additionally controls for ELA and math test score value-added. The third row of each panel gives the ratio of the second row to the first row. The fourth row of each panel gives the value of $1 - R^2$ from a regression of enrollment value-added on ELA and math test score value-added, weighted by the number of students that contributed to the value-added estimates. The first row at the bottom denotes the sample used to estimate value-added. "Base" refers to the base value-added sample. "Restricted" refers to the subset of students that can additionally be matched to peer, neighborhood, and sibling characteristics. The second row at the bottom denotes the controls used in the estimation of value-added. "Base" includes the base set of controls described in equation (1). "ACS" refers to American Community Survey Census tract characteristics. "LO score" refers to one additional leave-out prior score. "Sib" refers to indicator variables for whether an older sibling attended a 2-year college or 4-year university. The third row at the bottom indicates whether peer (jackknife) averages of the controls are included as additional controls. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Separate Regressions for Each Index								
School Climate	0.35***	0.26***	0.33***	0.26***	-0.13^{***}	-0.07	0.28***	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Teacher and Staff Quality	0.22^{***}	0.21***	0.22^{***}	0.24***	-0.15^{***}	-0.05	0.22***	0.16^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Counseling Support	0.14^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.22***	-0.03	0.01	0.12**	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Regressions Including All Indices								
School Climate	0.53***	0.26***	0.46***	0.18**	-0.03	-0.11	0.33***	0.27***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Teacher and Staff Quality	-0.20^{**}	-0.06	-0.14^{*}	0.05	-0.18^{**}	0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Counseling Support	-0.02	0.08	-0.04	0.08	0.09	0.06	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
VA	ELA	ELA	Math	Math	2 Year	2 Year	4 Year	4 Year
					Enrollment	Enrollment	Enrollment	Enrollment
Controls	Base	Base + LOS	Base	Base + LOS	Base	Base + LOS	Base	Base + LOS
		+ Sibling $+$		+ Sibling $+$		+ Sibling $+$		+ Sibling $+$
		ACS		ACS		ACS		ACS
Peer	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 6: Relationship Between Value-Added and School Climate Survey Indices

In Panel A, each cell represents a separate regression of school value-added on a single school survey index. In Panel B, each column represents a separate regression of school value-added on all three school survey indices. School value-added estimates are averaged across the years 2015-2018 and school survey indices are averaged across the years 2017-2019. Each regression contains school-level averages of the base value-added controls. The first row at the bottom gives the type of school value-added. The second row at the bottom gives the controls used in the estimation of value-added. "Base" includes the base set of controls described in equation (1). "ACS" refers to American Community Survey Census tract characteristics. "LOS" refers to one additional leave-out prior score. "Sibling" refers to indicator variables for whether an older sibling attended a 2-year college or 4-year university. The third row at the bottom indicates whether peer (jackknife) averages of the controls are included as additional controls. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years. * p < 0.05) ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.

Online Appendix A: Sample Creation

Columns one and three of Table A.1 provide the number of observations in the data conditional on a set of restrictions implemented in order to form the value added sample. Column one provides results for the English language arts (ELA) sample and column three provides results for the math sample. The rows are additive, such that the first row contains all observations, the second row imposes one restriction, the third row imposes two restrictions, and so forth. The first row denotes the total number of 11th-grade students in the California Assessment of Student Performance and Progress (CAASPP) dataset. This constitutes the "full" sample in Table 1.

The second row keeps students who attend high schools that serve grades 9–12. The third row keeps only the first time that a student attempted a grade, and thus drops observations in which a student is repeating a grade. The fourth row keeps only students at "conventional" schools. This includes schools in the following categories defined by the CDE: Preschool, Elementary School (Public), Elementary School in 1 School District (Public), Intermediate/Middle Schools (Public), Junior High Schools (Public), K–12 Schools (Public), High Schools (Public), and High Schools in 1 School District (Public).²⁵ The fifth row drops any schools that enroll 10 11th-grade students or fewer in a given year. The sixth row drops students who are missing a test score in the specific subject for which value added is calculated. The seventh row drops students who are missing any of the demographic controls. The eighth row drops students who are missing the prior test scores used as control variables. The ninth row drops students if fewer than seven observations can be used to estimate value added for their school by year cell, which insures that all value added estimates are based on at least seven observations. The sample in row nine constitutes our "base" sample in Table 1.

The tenth row drops students who are missing 7th grade test scores, which are used as a leave-out variable to estimate forecast bias. The 11th row drops students who could not be matched to older siblings. The 12th row drops students who could not be matched to Census-block data from the American Community Survey (ACS) based on their home address. The final row constitutes our "restricted" sample in Table 1.

Columns two and four of Table A.1 provide the average ELA and math test score, respectively, of the sample. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one on the population of 11th grade students, so the average test score in the first row is effectively zero. Our base and restricted samples are positively selected, with an average test score about 0.17 (base) and 0.3 (restricted) standard deviations above average. The restrictions that most impact the composition of our sample are dropping

²⁵This drops students in the following categories: Special Education Schools (Public), County Community, Youth Authority Facilities (CEA), Opportunity Schools, Juvenile Court Schools, Other County or District Programs, State Special Schools, Alternative Schools of Choice, Continuation High Schools, District Community Day Schools, Adult Education Centers, and Regional Occupational Center/Program (ROC/P).

students who attend "non-conventional" schools, dropping students who lack prior test scores, dropping students who could not be matched to an older sibling, and dropping students who could not be matched to ACS data.

	EI	JA	Ma	ath
	# of Students	Z-Score Mean	# of Students	Z-Score Mean
All Students	1,913,221	6.70e-07	1,913,221	-1.05e-07
+ 9-12 School	1,790,429	.00305	1,790,429	.00863
+ First Test Score for Grade	1,752,542	.00678	1,752,542	.0122
+ Conventional School	1,586,766	.0812	1,586,766	.086
+ 11th Graders per School > 10	$1,\!585,\!957$.0813	$1,\!585,\!957$.0862
+ Nonmissing Subject Test Score	1,494,208	.0813	1,490,647	.0862
+ Nonmissing Demographic Controls	1,486,580	.0817	1,482,922	.0866
+ Nonmissing Prior Test Scores	1,232,514	.174	1,227,174	.161
+ School VA Sample Size ≥ 7	1,232,262	.175	1,226,915	.161
+ Leave Out Scores	1,190,916	.201	1,185,842	.185
+ Leave Out Scores and Sibling	662,094	.259	659,398	.266
+ Leave Out Scores, Sibling, and ACS	410,947	.291	409,332	.305

Values are counts of the number of observations in each sample along with the average test score for the sample. Each row is additive, so the restrictions from all prior rows are also present in the current row. Data comes from public schools in the state of California between the 2014-2015 and 2016-2018 school years.

Online Appendix B: Survey Questions

The survey questions for our school climate, teacher and staff quality, and counseling support indices in equation (4) are the following:

B.1 School Climate Index

Questions for Parents

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about this school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, don't know/NA)

- 1. This school promotes academic success for all students
- 2. This school is a supportive and inviting place for students to learn
- 3. This school allows input and welcomes parents' contributions
- 4. This school encourages me to be an active partner with the school in educating my child

Questions for Students

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly disagree, disagree, neither disagree nor agree, agree, strongly agree)

- 1. I feel close to people in this school
- 2. I am happy to be at this school
- 3. I feel like I am part of this school
- 4. The teachers at this school treat students fairly
- 5. I feel safe in my school
- 6. My school is usually clean and tidy
- 7. Teachers at this school communicate with parents about what students are expected to learn in class
- 8. Parents feel welcome to participate at this school
- 9. School staff take parent concerns seriously

Questions for Staff

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

- 1. This school encourages students to enroll in rigorous courses (such as honors and AP), regardless of their race, ethnicity, or nationality
- 2. This school has high expectations for all students regardless of their race, ethnicity, or nationality
- 3. In this school, adults feel a responsibility to improve this school
- 4. This school motivates students to learn

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

- 1. Students are motivated to learn
- 2. Teachers at this school communicate with parents about what their children are expected to learn in class

How much of a problem AT THIS SCHOOL is... (insignificant problem, mild problem, moderate problem, severe problem)

1. Cutting classes or being truant?

B.2 Teacher and Staff Quality Index

Questions for Parents

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about this school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, don't know/NA)

- 1. This school provides high quality instruction to my child
- 2. This school motivates students to learn
- 3. This school has teachers who go out of their way to help students
- 4. This school has adults who really care about students
- 5. This school has high expectations for all students

Questions for Students

At my school, there is a teacher or some other adult... (Not at all true, a little true, pretty much true, very much true)

- 1. Who really cares about me
- 2. Who tells me when I do a good job
- 3. Who notices when I am not there
- 4. Who always wants me to do my best
- 5. Who listens to me when I have something to say
- 6. Who believes that I will be a success

Questions for Staff

Do you feel you need more professional development, training, mentorship, or other support to do your job in any of the following areas?

- 1. Meeting academic standards
- 2. Evidence-based methods of instruction
- 3. Positive behavioral support and classroom management
- 4. Closing the achievement gap
- 5. Meeting social, emotional, and developmental needs of youth (e.g. resilience promotion)
- 6. Creating a positive school climate

B.3 Counseling Support Index

Questions for Parents

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about this school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, don't know/NA)

1. This school provides quality counseling or other ways to help students with social or emotional needs

How well has this child's school been doing the following things during the school year? (very well, just okay, not very well, does not do it at all, don't know/NA)

1. Providing information on how to help your child plan for college or vocational school

Questions for Staff

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

1. This school provides adequate counseling and support services for students

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your school. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

1. This school provides counseling or other ways to help students with their social-emotional needs