A Macroeconomic Perspective on Taxing Multinational Enterprises

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Motivation

MNEs shift large portions of their profits to tax havens, reducing tax revenues in their home countries by hundreds of billions of dollars per year

- Tørsløv et al. (2022): 36% of global MNE profits shifted to tax havens
- OECD: $240 bn. (10%) of global corporate tax revenues lost annually

In October 2021, 136 countries representing 90% of global GDP signed onto historic policy framework designed by OECD/G20 to address profit shifting

- Pillar 1: Sales-based allocation of profit taxation rights
- Pillar 2: Global minimum corporate income tax

This paper:

- How does profit shifting affect MNEs’ production decisions at the micro level?
- What are the aggregate consequences of these micro effects?
- How will the OECD/G20 framework affect the global economy?
Overview

What we do

1. Develop theory of profit shifting and intangible investment
2. Embed theory in multi-country, heterogeneous-firm GE model
3. Calibrate to data on profit shifting under current international tax regime
4. Evaluate impact of OECD/G20 proposal

What we find

1. Profit shifting increases intangible investment, leading to higher output in all of an MNE’s subsidiaries, both foreign and domestic
2. The OECD/G20 plan will largely eliminate profit shifting, but also reduce global output
Our theory of profit shifting in brief

- MNEs shift profits by transferring nonrival intangible capital to affiliates in tax havens
- Tax-haven affiliates charge parent (and other affiliates) licensing fees
- Empirical evidence
  - Delis et al. (2021): R&D-intensive firms shift more profits
  - Accoto et al. (2021): Profit shifters import IP services from tax havens
- End result: increases after-tax return on intangible investment

“95 percent of Apple’s R&D... is conducted in the United States... [During] 2009 to 2012, ASI [Apple Ireland] paid... $5 billion to [Apple USA] as its share of the R&D costs. Over that same time period, ASI received profits of $74 billion. The difference between ASI’s costs and the profits, almost $70 billion, is how much taxable income [should] have flowed to the United States.”

— U.S. Senator Carl Levin, May 21, 2013
THEORY OF PROFIT SHIFTING
Environment: Basics

• MNE operates in $N$ countries that differ in TFP ($A_i$), prices ($p_i, w_i$), corporate taxes ($\tau_i$)
  - $i$: Parent division in home country
  - $j \neq i$: Foreign affiliates
  - $i^*$: Tax haven with $\tau_{i^*} = \min \{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_N\}$

• Production technology in country $j$:
  \[
  F_j(z, l_j) = A_j z^\phi l_j^\gamma,
  \]
  - $z$: Non-rival (within MNE) intangible capital, purchased in home country
  - $l_k$: Rival factors, purchased locally in $k$
  - $\phi + \gamma < 1$: Decreasing returns to scale

• MNE’s goal: maximize global after-tax profits $\sum_{j=1}^{N} (1 - \tau_j) \pi_j$
Environment: Transfer pricing and profit shifting

- Transfer pricing:
  - Foreign affiliates pay licensing fees $q_j$ to use intangible capital
  - Arm’s-length principle: $q_j = \phi p_j \left( A_j^{\phi-1} f_j^\gamma \right)$

- Profit shifting:
  - Parent division can sell fraction $\lambda$ of intangible capital licensing rights to tax haven
  - Sale occurs at markdown $\varphi \leq 1$ below arm’s-length price $\sum_j q_j$
  - Incurs convex cost $C(\lambda) = \lambda - (1 - \lambda) \log(1 - \lambda)$ per unit value of $z$

- Characterize solution to MNE’s problem in two cases:
  - No profit shifting: $\lambda = 0$
  - With profit shifting: $\lambda$ chosen optimally
Profit accounting

No profit shifting:

[Parent] \[ \pi_i = p_i (A_i z^\Phi l_i^\gamma) - w_i l_i - p_i z + \sum_{j \neq i} q_j z \]

[Affiliate] \[ \pi_j = p_j (A_j z^\Phi l_j^\gamma) - w_j l_j - q_j z, \quad \forall j \neq i \]

With profit shifting:

[Parent] \[ \pi_i = p_i (A_i z^\Phi l_i^\gamma) - w_i l_i - p_i z + \left[ \varphi \lambda \sum_{j} q_j - \lambda q_i + (1 - \lambda) \sum_{j \neq i} q_j - C(\lambda) \sum_{j=1}^{N} q_j \right] z \]

[Tax haven] \[ \pi_{i^*} = p_{i^*} (A_{i^*} z^\Phi l_{i^*}^\gamma) - w_{i^*} l_{i^*} + \left[ \lambda \sum_{j \neq i^*} q_j - (1 - \lambda) q_{i^*} - \varphi \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{N} q_j \right] z \]

[Affiliate] \[ \pi_j = p_j (A_j z^\Phi l_j^\gamma) - w_j l_j - q_j z, \quad \forall j \neq i, i^* \]
Solution to MNE’s problem

No profit shifting:

\[ z = \left( \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \phi \Lambda_j}{p_i} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\phi-\gamma}} \]

- \( \Lambda_j \) is a constant that depends on \( A_j, p_j, \) and \( w_j \)
- Unaffected by corporate taxes. Transfer pricing \( \Rightarrow \) costs and benefits of \( z \) are taxed in \( i \)

With profit shifting:

\[ z = \left( \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \phi \Lambda_j}{p_i} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\phi-\gamma}} \left( 1 - C(\lambda) + \frac{\lambda (1 - \varphi)(\tau_i - \tau_i^*)}{(1 - \tau_i)} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\phi-\gamma}} \]

- Profit shifting increases \( z \) \( \Rightarrow \) higher output in all production locations
- Effect increasing in \( \tau_i \), decreasing in \( \varphi \) and \( \tau_i^* \)
Policy implications and additional results

**Key tradeoff:** profit shifting reduces high-tax countries’ corporate tax bases, but also increases MNEs’ incentives to invest in intangible capital

- Global minimum tax (i.e., increase in $\tau_{i^*}$) and other policies intended to curb profit shifting have adverse macroeconomic side effects

Effects of OECD/G20 pillar 1 (sales-based allocation of profit taxation rights):

- Similar effects as raising $\tau_{i^*}$ or $\varphi$: Reduces profit shifting but also intangible investment
- Makes profit shifting and intangible investment less sensitive to tax rates $\Rightarrow$ global minimum tax and profit reallocation are substitutes
QUANTITATIVE MODEL & CALIBRATION
Model environment

- Quantitative version of model accounts for importance of firm heterogeneity in MNE activity and profit shifting
  - Firms are heterogeneous in productivity
  - **Endogenous selection** to exporting and establishing foreign affiliates
  - In terms of #: non-exporters > exporters > MNEs > profit-shifting MNEs
  - In terms or size: non-exporters < exporters < MNEs < profit-shifting MNEs

- $N$ productive regions
  - Representative consumer, gov’t, and measure of firms
  - Differ in population, TFP, trade/FDI openness, corporate taxes

- 1 unproductive region ("tax haven")
  - Gov’t earns revenue by taxing profits of foreign MNEs’ affiliates
Calibration

Aggregate countries into 5 regions:

• High-tax regions: North America (NA), Europe (EU), Rest of the World (RW)
• Profit-shifting destinations identified by Tørsløv et al. (2022) split into
  – Low tax (LT): Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands, Ireland etc.
  – Tax haven (TH): Antigua, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados etc.
  – NA, EU, and RW firms can shift profits to LT and/or TH (after paying fixed FDI costs)

Identification of key parameters:

• TFP ($A_i$) and prod. dispersion ($\sigma_a$): GDP and firm size dist.
• Intangible share ($\phi$): Foreign MNEs’ intangible share
• Trade costs ($\kappa^X, \xi$): Num. exporters, trade flows
• FDI costs ($\kappa^F, \sigma$): Num. MNEs, foreign MNEs’ VA shares
• Corporate tax rates ($\tau$): taken from Tørsløv et al. (2022)
• Profit shifting costs ($\varphi_i$): Lost profit estimates from Tørsløv et al. (2022)
  – Lost profits/GDP: 0.6% for NA, 1.4% for EU, 0.7% for RoW.
Validation

1. Share of corporate income taxes paid by foreign MNEs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>RW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>16.65</td>
<td>41.58</td>
<td>72.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>24.40</td>
<td>40.56</td>
<td>73.30</td>
<td>18.54</td>
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2. Firm-level semi-elasticity of domestic parent profits w.r.t. int’l tax gap

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer et al. (2020)</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johansson et al. (2017)</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
OECD/G20 plan: effects on profit shifting and output

(a) Change in lost profits (%)  
(b) Change in real GDP (%)

North America  Europe  Rest of world

Profit reallocation  Global min. tax rate  Both pillars
OECD/G20 plan: effects on profit shifting and output

Both pillars reduce profit shifting, but also GDP
OECD/G20 plan: effects on profit shifting and output

Global min tax has larger effect on profit shifting, but smaller effect on output
OECD/G20 plan: effects on profit shifting and output

Combined effect of both pillars on profit shifting similar to effect of global min tax. Combined effect on GDP similar to effect of profit reallocation.
OECD/G20 plan: varying the pillar parameters (NA only)
OECD/G20 plan: varying the pillar parameters (NA only)

Effect of OECD/G20 plan on profit shifting can be achieved with smaller output loss by raising global min tax slightly and eliminting profit reallocation rule
CONCLUSION
Takeaways

**Methodology:** Develop theory in which MNEs shift profits by transferring IP to tax havens. Integrate into quantitative GE model.

**Theoretical insight:** Profit shifting increases’ MNEs’ incentives to invest in intangible investment. Boosts output both at home and abroad.

**Quantification:** OECD/G20 reform will materially reduce global GDP. Despite small number of firms targeted, similar magnitude to welfare effects of major trade liberalizations.

- U.S. gained 0.06% from NAFTA (Caliendo and Parro, 2014)
- OECD gained 0.15% from China trade (di Giovanni et al., 2014)

**Key inputs** affecting the magnitudes of macro effects:
- Volume of shifted profits
- Elasticity of booked profits w.r.t. tax wedge
- Elasticity of intangible investment w.r.t to effective corporate income tax for MNE
- Elasticity of labor supply (GE effects)
## Calibration Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value(s)</th>
<th>Target/source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \varrho )</td>
<td>EoS between products</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N_j )</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_j )</td>
<td>Corporate income tax rate</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Tørsløv et al. (2021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi )</td>
<td>Technology capital share</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>MNEs’ intangible income share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( A_i )</td>
<td>Total factor productivity</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Real GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_i )</td>
<td>Productivity dispersion</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Large firms’ employment share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \psi_i )</td>
<td>Utility weight on leisure</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>( L_i = N_i/3 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \xi_{ij} )</td>
<td>Variable export cost</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Bilateral imports/GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa_i^X )</td>
<td>Fixed export cost</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Pct. of firms that export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_i )</td>
<td>Variable FDI cost</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Foreign MNEs’ share of value added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa_i^F )</td>
<td>Fixed FDI cost</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Avg. emp. of firms w/ foreign affiliates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \psi_{iLT} )</td>
<td>Cost of shifting profits to LT</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Total lost profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \psi_{iTH} )</td>
<td>Cost of shifting profits to TH</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Share of profits shifted to TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa_i^{TH} )</td>
<td>Fixed cost of TH affiliate</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Avg. emp. of firms w/ TH affiliates</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Calibration: Region-specific target moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Low-tax</th>
<th>RoW</th>
<th>Tax haven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (NA = 100)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,323</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real GDP (NA = 100)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80.78</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>297.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporate tax rate (%)</td>
<td><strong>22.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.3</strong></td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td><strong>3.3</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign MNEs’ VA share (%)</td>
<td><strong>11.12</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.82</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.55</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total lost profits ($B)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lost profits to TH (%)</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports from… (% GDP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>North America</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12.39</td>
<td>3.78</td>
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<td>Low tax</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Row</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>6.78</td>
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## Calibration: Internally-calibrated parameter values

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<th>RoW</th>
<th>Tax haven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFP ((A_i))</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prod. dispersion ((\eta_i))</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utility weight on leisure ((\psi_i))</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.09</td>
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<td>Fixed export cost ((\kappa_i^X))</td>
<td>1.7e-3</td>
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<td>Variable FDI cost ((\sigma_i))</td>
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<td>Fixed FDI cost ((\kappa_i^F))</td>
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<td>Cost of shifting profits to LT ((\psi_{iLT}))</td>
<td>3.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of shifting profits to TH ((\psi_{iTH}))</td>
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<td>1.25</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed FDI cost to TH ((\kappa_i^{TH}))</td>
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<td>Variable trade cost from...</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>3.21</td>
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<td>1.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoW</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>–</td>
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</table>
OECD/G20 plan details

Pillar 1: Sales-based profit allocation
- Allocate rights to tax 25% of an MNE’s global residual profits based on countries’ shares of its global sales
- Residual profits defined as reported profits above pre-determined share of revenues
- Independent of a physical presence; export destinations without foreign affiliates get a cut

Pillar 2: Global minimum corporate income tax
- If firm from $i$ reports profits in $j$ with $\tau_j < \tau = 15\%$, then $i$ taxes these profits at rate $\tau - \tau_j$
- Does not require tax havens to change their tax rates or affect their tax revenues (unless firms react by shifting fewer profits). Parent corporate in $i$ just pays larger tax bill.
OECD/G20 plan: decomposition of output effects (NA vs. LT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Value added (% chg.)</th>
<th>Intang. capital (% chg.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non MNEs</td>
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<td>(a) Pillar 1: Profit reallocation</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
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<td>(b) Pillar 2: Global minimum tax rate</td>
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<td>North America</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Pillars 1 &amp; 2 together</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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Output falls in both high- and low tax regions, but for different reasons.
OECD/G20 plan: decomposition of output effects (NA vs. LT)

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</tbody>
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In high-tax regions, losses come primarily from domestic MNEs’ lower intangible investment. But foreign MNEs matter too.
OECD/G20 plan: decomposition of output effects (NA vs. LT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Value added (% chg.)</th>
<th>Intang. capital (% chg.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non MNEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit reallocation (a)</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global minimum tax rate (b)</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillars 1 &amp; 2 together (c)</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In low-tax region, losses come solely from foreign MNEs’ lower intangible investment. Note domestic firms actually invest and produce more.
Inspecting the mechanism: macro effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Lost profits (% GDP)</th>
<th>Corp. tax rev. (% chg.)</th>
<th>Value added (% chg.)</th>
<th>Tech. capital (% chg.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non MNEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic MNEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(a) Effects of transfer pricing (FT → TP)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-2.17</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(b) Effects of profit shifting (TP → PS)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-3.82</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>-4.37</td>
<td>23.52</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inspecting the mechanism: value added decomposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Value added (% chg.)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Non MNEs</th>
<th>Domestic MNEs</th>
<th>Foreign MNEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Effects of transfer pricing (no transfer pricing vs. no shifting)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Effects of profit shifting (no shifting vs. baseline)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inspecting the mechanism: intuition (NA only)

Effect of transfer pricing (FT $\rightarrow$ TP)

- Partial equilibrium:
  - Domestic MNEs: after-tax marginal revenue product of $z \downarrow \rightarrow z \downarrow \rightarrow$ output $\downarrow$
  - Non MNEs: no direct effect
  - Corporate tax base $\uparrow/\downarrow$

- General equilibrium
  - Reallocation effect: Wages $\downarrow \rightarrow$ non MNEs $z$, $Y \uparrow$
  - FDI effect: Wages $\downarrow \rightarrow$ foreign MNEs $z$, $Y \uparrow$
  - Corporate tax base $\uparrow$

Effect of profit shifting (TP $\rightarrow$ PS)

- Opposite direction for all effects
- Allowing MNEs to shift profits undoes adverse effects of transfer pricing regulations
Model details: consumer’s problem

Consumers choose labor supply $L$ and consumption $C$:

$$U(C_i, L_i) = \max_{C_i, L_i} \left[ \log \left( \frac{C_i}{N_i} \right) + \psi \log \left( 1 - \frac{L_i}{N_i} \right) \right]$$

subject to

$$P_i C_i = W_i L_i + (1 - \tau_i) D_i$$
Firms in quantitative model

- Productivity heterogeneity and monopolistic competition as in Chaney (2008)

- Choices of firm based in region $i$:
  - $J_X \subseteq \{1, \ldots, N\} \setminus \{i\}$: set of export destinations, subject to fixed cost $\kappa_{ij}^X$
  - $J_F \subseteq I\{1, \ldots, N\} \setminus \{i\}$: set of foreign affiliate locations, subject to fixed cost $\kappa_{ij}^F$
  - $z \geq 0$: Intangible investment, requires R&D labor in home country
  - $\ell_j, k_j \geq 0$: rival local factors for $j \in J_F \cup \{i\}$
  - $\lambda > 0$: share of intangible capital to shift

- Allow simultaneous exporting and FDI ($J_X \cap J_F \neq \emptyset$) as in Garetto et al. (2019) and McGrattan and Waddle (2020)

- Interdependence between $z$ and $(J_F, \lambda)$ makes MNEs (especially those that shift profits) more intangible-intensive, but also makes for complex combinatorial optimization problem
Model details: final goods producer

The final goods producer of region $i$ combines intermediate goods with a CES technology:

$$Q_j = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{J} \int_{\Omega_{ji}} q_{ji}(\omega)^{\frac{\varrho-1}{\varrho}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\varrho}{\varrho-1}}$$

- $\Omega_{ji}$: the set of goods from $i$ available in $j$.
- $q_{ji}$: quantity of inputs
- $\varrho$: elas. of sub. between varieties

Demand curves:

$$p_{ji}(\omega) = P_i Q_i^\frac{1}{\varrho} q_{iji}(\omega)^{-\frac{1}{\varrho}}, \quad (1)$$

The price index is :

$$P_j = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{J} \int_{\Omega_{ji}} p_{ji}(\omega)^{1-\varrho} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varrho}}$$
Model details: technology

Technology of firm $\omega$ in region

\[
y_j(\omega) = \sigma_{ij} A_j a(\omega) (N_j z(\omega))^\gamma \ell_j(\omega)^\phi. \tag{2}
\]

where

- $\sigma_{ij}$ is openness of $j$ to FDI from $i$
- $A_j$ is TFP in region $j$
- $a$ is the firm-specific productivity
- $N_j$ is population in region $j$
- $z$ is firm’s intangible capital
- $\ell_j$ is labor hired in $j$
- $\gamma$ and $\phi$ are returns to scale parameters
Model details: trade and FDI

• Firms from region $i$ can serve the domestic market freely.

• Two options for serving foreign markets:
  – Export domestically produced goods. Fixed cost: $\kappa_{ijX}$
  – Open a foreign affiliate and produce locally. Fixed cost: $\kappa_{ijF}$

• The firm’s resource constraints

$$y_i = q_{ii} + \sum_{j \in J_X} \xi_{ij} q_{ij}^X$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

$$y_j = q_{ij}, \ j \in J_F$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)$$

where

– $J_X \subseteq J \setminus i$: set of foreign destinations to which the firm exports
– $J_F \subseteq J \setminus i$: set of foreign destinations in which the firm operates a subsidiary
We use non-exporting foreign affiliate as an example.

Given \( z \), an affiliate of firm \( \omega \in \Omega_i \) in region \( j \) chooses labor input \( l \) to maximize profit:

\[
\pi_{ij}^F(a, z) = \max_{q, l} p_{ij}(q) q - W_i l
\]

\[
= \max_l P_j Q_j^\frac{1}{\epsilon} (\sigma_{ij} A_j a) \left( N_j z \right)^{\gamma e^{-1}} \left( N_j z \right)^{\gamma e^{-1}} l^{\frac{\phi e^{-1}}{e}} - W_j l
\]

From the FOC, \( l \) can be solved as:

\[
l = \left\{ \left[ \frac{\phi (e - 1)}{e} \right]^e \left( \frac{P_j}{W_j} \right)^e Q_j (\sigma_{ij} A_j a)^{e^{-1}} \left( N_j z \right)^{\gamma e^{-1}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\phi + e - \phi e}}
\]
Model details: intangible capital choice

R&D technology: number of workers required to produce 1 unit of intangible capital in country \( j \) is \( B_j \)

Under free transferability, the optimal choice of \( z \) is

\[
z = \left\{ \left( \frac{\phi + \varrho - \varphi}{\gamma(\varrho - 1)} \right) \left[ \frac{(1 - \tau_i) W_i / A_i}{(1 - \tau_i) \left( \overline{R}_{ii} - \overline{C}_{ii} \right) + \sum_{j \in J_F} (1 - \tau_j) \left( \overline{R}_{ij} - \overline{C}_{ij} \right)} \right]^{\frac{\phi + \varrho - \varphi}{\gamma \varrho - \gamma \varphi - \varrho}} \right\}
\]

Within the square bracket (the exponent outside is negative):

- The numerator is the marginal cost of producing \( z \).
- The denominator is the marginal benefit.
- Adding transfer pricing and profit shifting will change optimal \( z \) through the denominator.
Model details: profit shifting choice

From the FOC, optimal $\lambda$ can be solved as (independent of $z$):

$$\lambda = (C')^{-1} \left[ (1 - \varphi) \frac{(\tau_i - \tau^*)}{1 - \tau_i} \right]$$

We can see that $\lambda$:

- decreases with the discount factor $\varphi$.
- decreases with lowest tax rate $\tau^*_i$. 
Model details: firm’s problem (no transfer pricing)

\[
d_i^{FT}(\omega) = \max_{z,\ell,J_X,J_F,q} \left\{ (1 - \tau_i) \left[ p_{ii}(q_{ii})q_{ii} + \sum_{j \in J_X} (p_{ij}^X(q_{ij}^X)q_{ij}^X - W_{ij}K_{ijX}) - W_i(\ell_i + z/A_i) - W_i \sum_{j \in J_F} K_{ijF} \right] \\
+ \sum_{j \in J_F} (1 - \tau_j) \left[ p_{ij}(q_{ij})q_{ij} - W_j\ell_j \right] \right\}
\]

subject to (1), (2), (3), and (4).

Simplify the notation:

\[
\pi_i^D(a, z, J_X) = \max_{q_{ii}, \{q_{ij}^X\}_{j \in J_X}, \ell_i} \left\{ p_{ii}(q_{ii})q_{ii} + \sum_{j \in J_X} p_{ij}(q_{ij}^X)q_{ij}^X - W_i\ell_i \right\}
\]

s.t \[ q_{ii} + \sum_{j \in J_X} \xi_{ij}q_{ij} = y_i = A_i a(N_i z)^\gamma \ell_i^\phi \]

and

\[ F_0^\text{D}(a, \tau_0, q, \ell, \xi_{ij}) \]
Model details: firm’s problem (no transfer pricing)

Thus, the conglomerate’s problem can be written more succinctly as

$$d_i^{FT}(\omega) = \left\{ (1 - \tau_i) \left[ \pi_i^D(a, z; J_X) - W_i \left( \frac{z}{A_i} + \sum_{J \in J_X} \kappa_{ijX} + \sum_{j \in J_F} \kappa_{ijF} \right) \right] + \sum_{j \in J_F} (1 - \tau_j) \pi_{ij}^F(a, z) \right\}$$
Model details: firm’s problem (transfer pricing)

Building upon $d^{FT}(a)$, the TP version of the problem can be written as

$$d_i^{TP}(\omega) = \max_{z, J_X, J_F} \left\{ (1 - \tau_i) \left[ \pi_i^D(a, z; J_X) - W_i \left( \frac{z}{A_i} + \sum_{j \in J_X} \kappa_{ijX} + \sum_{j \in J_F} \kappa_{ijF} \right) + \sum_{j \in J_F} \vartheta_{ij}(z) z \right] \right\}$$

$$+ \sum_{j \in J_F} (1 - \tau_j) \left[ \pi_i^F(a, z) - \vartheta_{ij}(z) z \right]$$

Licensing fees

Licensing fee
Model details: firm’s problem (profit shifting)

\[ d_{i}^{PS}(\omega) = \max_{z, J_X, J_F, \lambda_{LT}, \lambda_{TH}} \left\{ (1 - \tau_i) \left[ \pi_{i}^{p}(a, z; J_X) - W_i \left( z/A_i + \sum_{j \in J_X} \psi_{ij}X + \sum_{j \in J_F} \psi_{ij}F \right) \right] \right. \]

\[ + \sum_{j \in J_F} (1 - \lambda_{LT} - \lambda_{TH}) \theta_{ij}(z) + (\phi_i \lambda_{LT} + \phi_i \lambda_{TH}) v_i(z)z \]

\[ - (\lambda_{LT} + \lambda_{TH}) \theta_{ii}(z) - W_i \kappa_{iTH} 1(\lambda_{TH} > 0) - C(\lambda_{TH} + C(\lambda_{LT})) \nu_i(z)z \]

\[ + (1 - \tau_{LT}) 1(\lambda_{LT} \in J_F) \left[ \pi_{iLT}^{p}(a, z) + \sum_{j \in J_F \cup \{i\} \setminus \{LT\}} \lambda_{LT} \theta_{ij}(z) + \phi_i \lambda_{LT} v_i(z)z \right] \]

\[ + (1 - \tau_{TH}) 1(\lambda_{TH} > 0) \left[ \sum_{j \in J_F \cup \{i\}} \lambda_{TH} \theta_{ij}(z) + \phi_i \lambda_{TH} v_i(z)z \right] \]

\[ + \sum_{j \in J_F \setminus \{LT\}} (1 - \tau_j) \left[ \pi_{ij}^{F}(a, z) - \theta_{ij}(z)z \right] \}

Licensing fee receipts

Proceeds from selling z

Licensing fee payments

Tax haven affiliate cost

Cost of shifting z

Cost of buying z

Licensing fee pay

Cost of buying z

Licensing fee receipts
Model details: accounting measures

Nominal GDP:

\[ GDP_i = \sum_{j=1}^{I} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_j, i \in J_F(\omega)} p_{ji}(\omega) y_{ji}(\omega) \ d\omega. \]

Goods Trade:

\[ EX^G_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_i} p_{ij}^X(\omega) (1 + \xi_{ij}) q_{ij}^X(\omega) \ d\omega, \]

\[ IM^G_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_j} p_{ji}^X(\omega) (1 + \xi_{ji}) q_{ji}^X(\omega) \ d\omega. \]
Model details: accounting measures

Services Trade:

- high-tax regions

\[ EX^S_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_i} [1 - \lambda_{LT}(\omega) - \lambda_{TH}(\omega)] \vartheta_{ij}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega \]

\[ IM^S_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_i} [\lambda_{LT}(\omega) + \lambda_{TH}(\omega)] \vartheta_{ij}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega + \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_j} \vartheta_{ji}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega \]

- low-tax regions:

\[ EX^{S_{LT}}_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_i} [1 - \lambda_{TH}(\omega)] \vartheta_{ij}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega + \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_j} \lambda_{LT} \vartheta_{ji}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega \]

\[ IM^{S_{LT}} = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_i} \lambda_{TH}(\omega) \vartheta_{ij}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega + \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_j} [1 - \lambda_{LT}(\omega)] \vartheta_{ji}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega \]

- tax haven:

\[ EX^S_{TH} = \sum_{j=1}^{l} \int_{\Omega_j} \lambda_{TH} \vartheta_{ji}(\omega) z(\omega) \, d\omega \]
Model details: accounting measures

Net factor receipts and payments:

\[ NFR_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_i} (1 - \tau_j) \pi_{ij}^{PS}(\omega) d\omega \]

\[ NFP_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \int_{\Omega_j} (1 - \tau_i) \pi_{ji}^{PS}(\omega) d\omega \]
Model details: market clearing

Labor market:

\[
L_i = \sum_{j=1}^{I} \int_{\Omega_j} \ell_{ji}(\omega) \, d\omega + \int_{\Omega_i} z(\omega)/A_i \, d\omega + \int_{\Omega_i} \left( \sum_{j \in JX(\omega)} \kappa^X_i + \sum_{j \in JF(\omega)} \kappa^F_i + \lambda_{TH}(\omega) > 0 \kappa^{TH}_i \right) \, d\omega
\]

\[
+ \int_{\Omega_i} (C_{i,TH}(\lambda_{TH}) + C_{i,LT}(\lambda_{LT})) \nu(\omega)z(\omega) \, d\omega
\]

Government Budget Constraint:

\[
T_i = \tau_i \sum_{j=1}^{I} \int_{\Omega_j} \pi^{PS}_{ji}(\omega) \, d\omega.
\]

Balance of Payments:

\[
EX_i^G + EX_i^S - IM_i^G - IM_i^S + NFR_i - NFP_i = 0.
\]