



# 1 Introduction

Economists have recently turned the attention to the role of state capacity as an engine of economic growth. Effective states – centralized organizations with the ability to raise revenue and provide public goods through a vast territory – are only a recent historical phenomenon, and are still lacking in several developing countries (Dincecco and Katz (2016)). Most of this literature has focused on the analysis of rulers’ incentives to set up a state apparatus.<sup>1</sup> Less attention has been devoted to the natural next step in the process of establishment of state capacity: once rulers have an *incentive* to establish a state apparatus, how do they concretely *organize* it to effectively perform its functions?

Building on a long tradition in sociology (Weber (1978); Kiser and Schneider (1994)), in this paper we stress the importance of agency problems in influencing the growth and evolution of modern state organizations. At the hearth of this theory is the observation that the principal-agent problems that characterize all organizations – how to monitor the behavior of agents whose incentives are not perfectly aligned with those of the principal – are particularly severe for states, because of the need to monitor officials over vast territories. How does a government solve this organizational problem?

In this paper, we turn to the development of the U.S. federal state apparatus over the nineteenth century to explore this question. We show that the ability of a state apparatus to grow, and the way in which it is organized at different stages of development, are significantly affected by the development of technological innovations that ameliorate the monitoring problems faced by the government when managing the state apparatus.

Our study relies on a large data collection effort, which allows us to study the evolution of the U.S. federal bureaucracy over most of the nineteenth century. We construct a new micro-database which combine newly digitized federal employees’ personnel records for the period 1817-1905 and hand-collected information on the internal organization of the bureaucratic state. Leveraging this unique data, the first part of the paper shows a series of descriptive facts on the growth and organizational development of the U.S. federal state over the nineteenth century. We argue that innovations in the government’s monitoring capacity, which allowed to ameliorate agency problems between the government and its agents throughout the territory, are an important driver of these empirical facts. The second part of the paper provides evidence in support of our hypothesis by exploiting the introduction across time and space of the railroad and the telegraph networks – which increased the government’s monitoring capacity by decreasing communication and transportation costs.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Building on Tilly (1975)’s argument that “war made states,” the threat of external conflict has been considered a relevant driver of investment in state capacity (Besley and Persson (2008, 2010)).

<sup>2</sup>Importantly, as we discuss at length, many alternative mechanisms are likely to be important drivers

In order to build our dataset, we start by digitizing personnel records of the U.S. federal bureaucracy between 1817 and 1905. We digitize every volume of the Official Register of the United States, a biennial government publication that listed the names of all the employees of the federal government, together with their occupation, salary, department and office of employment, location of employment, and place (state or foreign country) of birth.<sup>3</sup> We link employees over time, in order to track their careers in the federal bureaucracy. We further complement this data in several ways. First, we re-construct the hierarchy of this organization throughout our sample period. Second, we categorize each job in the data into homogeneous occupational categories, dividing employees into homogeneous layers based on the type of work that they perform. Third, we geo-code each place of employment. This unique dataset allows us to investigate the internal organization of a state over an unusually long time-span, and during a period of intense technological and economic development of a nation.

The first contribution of our paper is to show a series of novel descriptive facts on the growth and organizational development of the U.S. federal state over the nineteenth century. First, we show that the federal state apparatus grew very modestly throughout the first part of the nineteenth century, and experienced a very rapid growth thereafter. We document that the ability of the state to reach more locations throughout the territory was an important driver of this growth, and that this ability was limited in the first part of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, we show that the presence of federal bureaucrats does not substitute for state capacity by other levels of government (Wallis, 2000).

Second, we show that the level of manufacturing activity was positively correlated with the presence of the state in a location, consistent with greater incentives to increase state capacity in response to economic growth. However, in the first half of the nineteenth century, this link between economic growth and state presence is significantly weaker for locations that are more distant from the headquarter of the organization (Washington DC); distance does not play this moderating role in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Third, we show that the organization of the federal state changed significantly over the nineteenth century. Until the 1850s, the organization was characterized by high employee turnover (especially in years of turnover in the party of the President), by a tight link between a worker's career and her supervisor's career, and by very limited delegation of managerial power outside of the headquarter. These patterns were increasingly less significant in the

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of the facts that we document. Our goal is to show that changes in the government's monitoring capacity are a significant driver of these facts, without denying the importance of alternative drivers of the evolution of the U.S. federal state over the nineteenth century.

<sup>3</sup>For reasons explained in Section 2, we digitize information on employees throughout all departments with the exception of the Postal Office.

second half of the century: turnover rates decreased, the career of a worker was less correlated with that of her supervisor, and locations outside of DC were delegated significantly more managerial power.

While the descriptive facts that we present are obviously driven by many historical developments, we argue that a decrease in the monitoring costs faced by the principal over the nineteenth century significantly affected the evolution of the federal bureaucracy. In the early years of the American federal state, Presidents and their cabinet (the principals) had low monitoring capacity in their relationship with federal employees (the agents), given the presence of high communication and transportation costs. In light of these constraints, a second best solution was to rely on the employment of trusted individuals: the optimal organizational form was of a *personal* nature, with relationships of trust between principals and employees, or between supervisors and their immediate subordinates, replacing effective monitoring of performance (Crenson, 1975). Given the limited supply of individuals who could be trusted, this organization faced difficulties in growing and in delegating managerial power away from the headquarter, especially in places located further away from DC.<sup>4</sup> In addition, it was characterized by high turnover rates, as new principals or new supervisors needed to replace old employees with new, trusted ones. As technological innovations lowered communication and transportation costs, principals' greater ability to control agents led to the gradual establishment of a modern, *bureaucratic* organizational form. The lower need to rely on trust to ensure performance allowed faster organizational growth, made it easier to delegate decision power away from the headquarter, and decreased reliance on employee turnover.

The second contribution of our paper is to provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. We show that changes in monitoring capacity are an important driver of the evolution of the U.S. federal state that we document.<sup>5</sup> To do this, we exploit the introduction and expansion across space of the two most prominent technological innovations that increased a principal's ability to control agents across space in the nineteenth century's U.S. – the railroad and the telegraph networks.

We use data on the expansion of the railroad network from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) to calculate the travel time between Washington DC and each county for each decade between 1820 and 1900. We then investigate whether counties that experience larger de-

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<sup>4</sup>This argument echoes Lucas Jr (1978)'s argument that high monitoring costs reduce firm size by decreasing managers' span of control. It is also consistent with an extension of cognitive models of the firm (Garicano, 2000), in which employees can take "wrong" actions in the performance of their delegated tasks, and in which higher level of trust allows the organization to grow by increasing delegation of decision power from principals to subordinates (Bloom et al., 2012).

<sup>5</sup>In section 4.4 we discuss additional interpretations for the facts that we document.

creases in travel time to DC experience greater changes in the presence and organizational features of the federal bureaucracy. Importantly, we take several steps to ensure that our estimates capture the effect of decreased monitoring costs faced by DC, rather than other factors that are correlated with both railroads construction and the development of the federal state in a location. First, since railroads construction in a county is likely correlated with local economic growth, we directly control for local railroad construction in a county. By doing so, our estimates of the impact of travel distance to DC are identified from more-distant changes in the railroad network, which are thus arguably uncorrelated with local economic shocks in the county. Second, since more-distant changes in the railroad network are associated with changes in market access (the ability of a county to trade with other counties), which in turn affected county’s agricultural land values (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016) and manufacturing activity (Hornbeck and Rotemberg, 2021), we directly control for a measure of a county’s market access. By doing so, we identify our effect of interest by comparing counties that, following an expansion of the railroad network, (i) have similar local railroad construction in their territory, (ii) have similar changes in their market access, but (iii) experienced different changes in their travel time to DC *specifically*.

Consistent with our interpretation, we show that decreasing transportation and communication costs between D.C. and a county significantly increased the presence of the federal state in the county. We also show that, conditional on our set of controls, travel times to a set of other important economic centers are not associated with a larger presence of the federal state: these placebo tests lend further support to our interpretation that travel time to DC is associated with state presence through a monitoring mechanism. We also find that, consistent with our hypothesis, the development of the railroad network also affected the way in which the federal state was organized in a location: conditional on the federal state being present in the county, a lower travel time to DC increased the probability of observing delegation of managerial power to the county, and decreased turnover among the county’s workforce. Importantly, we do not see differential pre-trends in the development of the federal state associated with changes in travel time between a county and DC. We also show that our estimates are very similar when we focus exclusively on states that were already part of the U.S. at the beginning of our sample period: this suggests that our results are not significantly driven by different dynamics of state development on the frontier (Bazzi et al., 2020), whose westward expansion was facilitated by the development of the railroad network.

We obtain similar results when we exploit the expansion of the telegraph network between 1845 and 1852 (Wang, 2020): counties that have more telegraph connections to DC have a larger presence of the state, more delegation of managerial power, and lower employee

turnover.<sup>6</sup> Differently from our empirical strategy focusing on the railroads, we have limited ability to address the possible endogeneity of the timing of the expansion of the telegraph network. However, we view the fact that we obtain similar results when focusing on a county's communication costs to DC via the telegraph as further corroborating our interpretation linking monitoring capacity and state development.

Finally, we provide indirect evidence pointing to the role of increased monitoring capacity substituting for trust relationships between the headquarter and the federal agents. We show that, after the Civil War, there was a sizable decline in the share of Southern-born federal bureaucrats, consistent with a lower level of trust towards individual from former confederate states. However, a better connection between a location and DC reduces the North-South employment gap: counties that become better connected to DC thanks to the expansion of the railroad network experience an increase in the share of Southern-born federal employees.

### ***Related Literature.***

Our findings contribute to three broad literatures. First, we speak to a growing literature on state formation and the development of state capacity, dating back to Zophy (1975), Tilly (1990), and Bonney (1999). Recent contributions document the relationship between state capacity and economic development (Besley and Persson, 2011, 2013; Dincecco and Katz, 2016). Previous work has emphasized the role of the threat of war in providing incentives to set up a centralized state apparatus as a way to raise revenue and provide defense (Besley and Persson (2008, 2010); Gennaioli and Voth (2015); Cantoni et al. (2019); Becker et al. (2022)). Other papers study state formation as a result of citizens' need to solve collective actions problems (Allen et al. (2020)) or of rulers' desire for extraction (Scott (2017); Mayshar et al. (2022); Allen (1997); Schönholzer (2017); Mayoral and Olsson (2019)). While a common denominator among the previous studies is their focus on rulers' incentive to set up a state apparatus, our paper studies the natural next step in this process: once these incentives are in place, how does a government organize its state apparatus to concretely perform its functions?

In emphasizing how the evolution of the state organization depends on developments in technologies of control, our paper resonates with theories linking state centralization to fiscal legibility, namely the ability of rulers to obtain information about the population and the state of the economy (Scott, 1998; Lee and Zhang, 2017; Mayshar et al., 2017; Garfias and Sellars, 2021).

Second, we speak to a burgeoning literature studying the personnel economics of the pub-

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<sup>6</sup>Given the fast expansion of the telegraph network, after 1852 all major U.S. towns and cities had a telegraph connection, limiting the time period for which we can rely on meaningful variation in connection to DC.

lic sector (see Finan et al. (2017) and Besley et al. (2022) for recent reviews). An important strand of this literature provides micro-level evidence on how to best select (Dal Bo et al. (2013); Deserranno (2019); Ashraf et al. (2020); Weaver (2021)) and incentivize (Ashraf et al. (2014); Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011); Duflo et al. (2012); Khan (2023); Bandiera et al. (2021)) bureaucrats to solve principal-agent problems within these organizations. Our paper underlines how these principal-agent relationships are crucial not only to our understanding of the functioning of bureaucracies at a given point in time, but also to explain their growth and organizational evolution over the process of development. In doing so, our paper attempts to move from a study of bureaucracies from a personnel economics perspective to an organizational economics of the state. In a similar spirit, in a recent theoretical contribution, Snowberg and Ting (2019) model a bureaucracy as a knowledge hierarchy and study how politicians' incentives affect the structure of this hierarchical organization.<sup>7</sup>

A related strand of this literature examines the costs (Iyer and Mani (2012); Xu (2018); Colonnelli et al. (2020); Akhtari et al. (2022); Riaño (2021)) and potential benefits (Voth and Xu (2020); Spenkuch et al. (2021)) of political discretion in the selection of bureaucrats, and the effects of transitioning to a merit-based Weberian organization (Evans and Rauch (1999, 2000); Folke et al. (2012); Ujhelyi (2014); Ornaghi (2016); Moreira and Pérez (2020, 2022); Aneja and Xu (2023)). A key advantage of our study is the ability to observe the internal organization of a bureaucracy over a long period of time. This allows us to describe how different systems for organizing the state might be optimal at different stages of development, characterized by different levels of government's monitoring capacity.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the relationship between managers' monitoring ability, trust, and the growth of firms, first underlined by Lucas Jr (1978). Jayachandran et al. (2020) and Shahe Emran et al. (2021) argue that many firms, especially in developing countries, have a limited scale because of the high costs of monitoring their workforce. Kelley et al. (2021) shows that technologies that improve owners' monitoring ability lead them to expand the size of their firm. Bloom et al. (2012) theorizes, and show evidence consistent with, a positive relationship between trust and the willingness to delegate decision power from the firm's headquarter to its subsidiaries, which in turn leads to larger firm size. Our work highlights that similar theoretical mechanisms are also relevant to understand the process of development of state capacity.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The model in Snowberg and Ting (2019) abstracts from agency problems within the organization. Our paper offers a complementary view by stressing the importance of agency problems in shaping the evolution of state organizations.

<sup>8</sup>As we discuss in section 4.4, this is not inconsistent with an increase in efficiency after the introduction of objective and meritocratic selection procedures, which might accelerate the transition to a less personalistic organization.

<sup>9</sup>In exploiting the introduction of the railroads and of the electric telegraph as shocks to the government's



## 2 Data Collection

Our study relies on a novel micro-database combining federal employees’ personnel records and hand-collected information on the internal organization of the U.S. federal state between 1817 and 1905. In this section, we describe our data collection effort and the sources of the data. Full details are reported in the Online Appendix.

### 2.1 Personnel records from the U.S. Official Registers

Personnel records of the U.S. federal bureaucracy come from the Official Registers of the United States (Registers henceforth). The Registers were compiled and published biennially, in every odd year from 1817 until 1959.<sup>10</sup> We digitized all issues of the Registers between 1817 and 1905. The first book, for 1817, is 33 pages long and it contains 1056 employees. The last book of our sample period, for 1905, is 1254 pages long and it contains more than 120,000 employees. We have digitised a total of 15,801 pages. Online Appendix Figure A1 shows the cover page of the 1817’s Register, and the first page of the Treasury Department in the 1875’s Register.

We focus on civilian employees of the executive branch of government. That is, we drop the names of members of the army, of the judiciary, and of offices that were under the direct control of Congress (e.g., the government printing office, or the library of Congress). Importantly, we have digitized information for employees working in all executive departments except the Postal Office. Our choice is motivated by the size of this department, which would have significantly increased our data collection effort, and by the more limited information on these employees.<sup>11</sup> Finally, we drop employees in navy yards and in the engineer department at large. We impose this data restriction since employees rosters from these offices seem to be missing from the Registers before 1881 and between 1845 and 1879, respectively.<sup>12</sup> Our final dataset includes a total of 810,942 employee-year observations.

This data source allows us to observe a rich set of characteristics of all the individuals employed by the Federal government.<sup>13</sup> For each employee, the Register reports their full

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monitoring capacity, we also contribute to the rich literature on the expansion of the railroads (Fogel (1965); Nerlove (1966); Atack et al. (2010); Atack and Margo (2011); Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016); Hornbeck and Rotemberg (2021)) and of the telegraph (Field (1992); Wang (2020); García-Jimeno et al. (2022)).

<sup>10</sup>The Registers were initially compiled and published by the Department of State, and since 1861 by the Department of Interior.

<sup>11</sup>Employees in the Postal Office span 97 pages in the 1817 Register, and 1922 pages in the 1905 Register. The Registers usually exclude information on place of birth and appointment of postal office employees, and often report only the initials of the first names.

<sup>12</sup>None of the central results of the paper are affected by this choice.

<sup>13</sup>From 1817 until 1877, the Registers included all individuals employed as of September 30, while since 1879 they included all individuals employed as of June 30.



name, state (or foreign country) of birth, and state of appointment (i.e., of residence at the time of appointment). It also provides detailed information on the job that each employee performs in the bureaucracy: we observe information on employees’ occupation, location of employment, and compensation.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the layout of the Registers allows us to observe the hierarchical division of this organization into departments, offices, and divisions, and to assign each employee to the specific organizational unit in which they are employed (see section 2.3).

We link employees over time, in order to track their careers in the federal bureaucracy. We match employees using several steps of matching, based on their full name, place of birth, state of residence at time of appointment, gender, and department of employment.<sup>15</sup>

## 2.2 Geo-location of places of employment

The Register contains information on each worker’s location of employment. Online Appendix Figure C11 shows an extract from the 1875 Register, highlighting the locations under the “where employed” column.

We harmonize the locations of employment across years, and we manually collect information on the geographic coordinates of each location. This allows us to assign each location to its county and state. Since county boundaries change over time, we maintain consistent geographic units over time by holding constant county boundaries in 1890 throughout our sample period. We follow the procedure in Hornbeck (2010) and we harmonize all the county-level covariates used in the analysis to reflect 1890 county boundaries.<sup>16</sup>

Of the 810,942 observations in our dataset, 800,538 (or 98.7%) have non missing information on the location of employment. Of these, 32,497 (or 4%) correspond to workers employed in a foreign country. Of the remaining 768,041 observations that are located within the United States, we can recover information on the county of employment for 95% observations. For the remaining 5% of observations, either the Register reports only the State of employment, or it reports vague geographic information (such as “on a river” or “along the coast”), which prevents us from assigning precise coordinates. In total, the data include 9,651 unique geo-located places of employment.

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<sup>14</sup>Employees could be paid either a fixed annual amount, or a variable amount depending on the days, weeks, or months of employment throughout the year. We calculate each employee’s total annual compensation by multiplying daily, weekly, or monthly pay rates and assuming that the individual was employed for the entire year. In relatively rare cases, the compensation is expressed as a variable amount depending on a number of tasks performed (e.g., “per inspection” or “per drill hole”).

<sup>15</sup>We use information on the department of employment only in some matching steps, in order to allow movements of workers across departments.

<sup>16</sup>This procedure uses area-based weights to harmonize county boundaries across years.

## 2.3 Construction of the hierarchical structure

To construct a consistent hierarchy of the US Federal bureaucracy across time we exploit the fact that, from 1817 to 1905, the Official Register was arranged in a tabular format. This layout provided us with a picture of the organizational structure of the federal bureaucracy at each point in time.

Relying on a series of publications on the history of the U.S. federal state, we construct a consistent hierarchy of the organization by following the evolution of its units over time.<sup>17</sup> This step is crucial, since units were often added, deleted, or transferred within the organization, or experienced changes in their name.

We identify, and divide the organization into, four hierarchical layers. The first layer is composed of the departments (e.g., Treasury, War, Navy, Interior). The second layer is composed of the offices (or bureaus) within each department. Some examples of offices within the Treasury department are the Office of the Secretary, the First Comptroller Office, and the Customs Office; some examples within the Interior Department are the General Land Office and the Indian Office. The third layer is composed of the divisions within each office. We use the generic term division to refer to the different sub-units in which offices can be divided. For example, the Customs Office is composed of several customs districts; the General Land Office is composed of several surveyor districts. The fourth layer is composed of the different local offices within each division. For example, the Providence customs district in 1853 has three local offices (Providence, Pawtucket, and East Greenwich). Figure 1 provides a partial graphical representation of the hierarchy in 1853.<sup>18</sup>

The reconstruction of this hierarchy allows us to recover the chain of command in the organization, assigning all workers to their direct supervisor. The direct supervisor can either be present in the specific location, in case we observe a worker employed in a supervisory or managerial capacity in the location, or can be someone at a higher organizational layer (at the division, or at the office/bureau level).<sup>19</sup>

## 2.4 Categorization of job positions

The Registers contain information on the specific occupation of each employee. After standardizing the names of the job titles in the data, we obtain a total of 11,930 unique occupation

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<sup>17</sup>Specifically, we mostly relied on *"The Development of National Administrative Organization in the United States"* (Short, 1923); *"The Executive Departments of The United States at Washington"* (Elmes, 1879); *"The United States Government: Its Organization and Practical Workings"* (Lamphere, 1881)

<sup>18</sup>The hierarchy is not complete. That is, in any given year, we can find departments that are not organized in offices, offices that are not organized in divisions, or divisions that are not organized in local offices.

<sup>19</sup>See the next subsection for a description of our grouping of jobs into occupational categories.

codes.

We group occupations into five categories based on the type of task performed.<sup>20</sup> The first category includes the top managers of the organization: the heads of department, deputy heads of department, and heads of offices. The second category includes workers employed in a supervisory or managerial capacity (for example: chief of divisions, chief clerks, chief of regional offices). The third category includes clerical occupations (for example: clerks, copyists). The fourth category includes professional occupations (for example: engineers, doctors). Finally, the fifth category includes jobs requiring a relatively low level of skills (for example: laborer, messengers). Of the 11,930 occupation codes in the data, 2.1% are categorized as top managers, 11.8% as supervisors/managers, 26.6% as clerical workers, 34.5% as professionals, and 25% as low skills workers.

These five occupational categories can be arranged in a hierarchy, with top managers at its top, followed by managers, by clerical and professional occupations, and finally by low skills workers. Importantly, this hierarchy of jobs maps into the average annual pay that we observe in the data for each of these categories: on average, top executives earn \$3,709, managers earn \$2,230, workers in clerical positions earn \$1,179, those in professional occupations earn \$974, and those in lower skills positions earn \$524.

## 3 Descriptive Facts on the Development of the U.S. State

In this section, we show a series of novel descriptive facts on the growth and organizational development of the U.S. federal state. We divide these facts into three broad groups. First, we document the extent, timing, and sources of the growth in the presence of the federal state over the nineteenth century. Second, we document where the federal state was more likely to be present. Third, we document the evolution in the way in which the federal state was organized.

### 3.1 Timing and sources of the growth in state presence

#### 3.1.1 Timing of growth

Figure 2, Panel A, plots the total number of federal employees in each year between 1817 and 1905. The federal state grew very slowly in size in the first part of the nineteenth century.

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<sup>20</sup>A similar occupational classification is employed in *The Executive Civil Service of the United States of Commerce and Labor* (Census, 1904). We heavily rely on this publication in our manual coding of occupations.

Starting from the early 1860s, the size of the state started to increase at a rapid pace.<sup>21</sup> These patterns are even clearer when we normalize the size of the federal workforce by the U.S. population (Appendix Figure A2) Panel B of Figure 2 shows that most of the growth in the size of the state in the 1860s is driven by a sudden and significant increase in the number of employees in DC. The number of employees in the field grows more moderately in the 1860s and starts to grow faster in the 1870s.

What were the main goals of the federal state over the nineteenth century? Figure 2, Panel C, breaks down the growth of the state by department. Throughout the entire 1817-1905 period, the Treasury was the largest department, consistent with the relevance of its primary tasks – raising revenues and supervising their expenditure by other departments. Until the 1880s, the only other sizable departments were War, Navy, and Interior.<sup>22</sup> By the 1880s, a large number of additional, smaller departments started to employ a large number of employees. Appendix Table A1 shows the main tasks of the federal state outside DC, listing the bureaus with the largest overall number of employees between 1817 and 1905. The two largest bureaus – customs and internal revenue – were responsible for the collection of the two main sources of federal revenue in the nineteenth century, namely custom duties on imports and excise taxes on goods such as tobacco and liquor.

Figure 2, Panel D, provides a breakdown of employees by occupational category. The number of individuals in managerial positions (left axis) did not significantly increase until the 1850s – something that we will further explore in section 3.3.3. In contrast, the number of employees employed in clerical, professional, and low skills positions (right axis) slowly but steadily increased between 1817 and the end of the 1850s. By the end of the sample period, the U.S. federal bureaucracy exhibits a pyramidal structure, with the bottom of the hierarchy (low skills employees) comprising the largest group, followed by an intermediate layer of clerical and professional employees, and by a smaller layer of managers.

Interestingly, as we show in Appendix Figure A3, the presence of federal bureaucrats is, if anything, positively correlated with the presence of employees of local and state governments in a county, suggesting that state capacity at the federal level does not substitute for state

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<sup>21</sup>The Official Register of 1817 lists the names of 917 employees; by 1859, this number increased to 5,856, with an average of 235 added jobs per year. The federal bureaucracy added an average of 1,286 jobs per year from 1861 to 1869, 1,493 jobs per year from 1871 to 1879, 3,157 jobs per year between 1881 and 1889, and 5,537 jobs per year between 1891 and 1905. In the last year covered by our data, the federal state employs 79,835 individuals.

<sup>22</sup>In this figure we combine the War and Navy departments, but they were distinct departments throughout the entire period. Besides being responsible for the defense of the country, the War and Navy departments were also tasked with the building of critical infrastructure. The Interior department, established in 1849, was responsible for a variety of functions broadly related to domestic affairs, including the disposition of public lands, pensions, Indian affairs, and the granting of patents.

capacity by more local level of governments.<sup>23</sup>

### 3.1.2 Drivers of growth

There are three possible sources of growth in a state organization. First, a state can grow because it starts to perform a higher number of functions (the “functions” component of state growth). Second, a state can grow because it increases the number of locations across the territory in which it is present (the “geographic expansion” component). Third, a state can grow by increasing the intensity of its presence, i.e. by increasing the number of employees performing a given function in a given location (the “intensity” component).

Figure 3, Panel A, shows the growth in the number of offices (or bureaus) of the U.S. federal state over the nineteenth century, which we consider as a proxy for a specific function performed by the state. Their number steadily increased in the first half of the century, from 25 in 1817 to 46 in 1859. The rate of growth was higher in the second half of the century, when the organization added an average of 3.7 new functions every two years, reaching a total of 132 separate offices in 1905.

In contrast, as shown in Figure 3, Panel B, the state did not start to expand its geographical presence until the 1860s. We plot the share of U.S. counties where we observe a presence of the federal state (i.e. with at least one individual employed within the county borders).<sup>24</sup> This share hovered around 15 percent between 1817 and 1859, and does not display any increasing trend over this period. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the state begins to increase its presence across the territory: it is present in 24% of counties by 1871, in 38% of counties by 1881, and in 61% of counties by 1905.<sup>25</sup> Figure 4 shows the presence of the state across space at four points in time. While by 1859 the frontier had moved West, the portion of the territory with state presence had remained constant, while by 1881 we observe a marked increase in state presence across the territory.

In Figure 3, Panel C, we show how the average number of employees for each county-office pair, i.e. our measure of the intensity of state presence, changed over time. We observe a steady growth in this measure during the sample period, from 1.9 average employees in 1817 to 6.7 in 1859 and to 14.5 in 1905.

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<sup>23</sup>We measure the number of individuals employed as local or state government employees in the full-count census in each county between 1850 and 1900. Unfortunately, data on individuals’ occupation is not available before the 1850 census.

<sup>24</sup>For each year, the number of counties with potential state presence (i.e., the denominator of this share) is the number of counties in States and Territories that were included in the most recent census. In this way, we account for the enormous territorial expansion of the U.S. over the nineteenth century.

<sup>25</sup>In Appendix Figures A4 and A5 we show that we see similar trends if we limit the sample only to counties in states that were already part of the U.S. in 1817 (which shows that these patterns do not depend by the westward expansion of the country over the nineteenth century), or if we weight each county by the fraction of the U.S. population living in the county in a specific year.

To provide a formal decomposition of state growth between these three sources, we define the total number of workers employed by the state in year  $t$  as:

$$\text{Workers}_t = B_t \times \frac{1}{B_t} \sum_b L_{bt} \times \frac{1}{\sum_b L_{bt}} \sum_{blt} W_{blt} \quad (1)$$

where  $B_t$  is the number of offices at in year  $t$ ,  $L_{bt}$  is the number of counties where office  $b$  is present in  $t$ , and  $W_{blt}$  is the number of workers employed in office-county  $bl$  in  $t$ . The three terms captures the function, geographic expansion, and intensity components, respectively. We compute each of the three terms for 1817, 1859, and 1905, and their change from 1817 to 1859 and from 1859 to 1905. Finally, we compute counterfactual growths in  $\text{Workers}_t$  between 1817 and 1859, and between 1859 to 1905, had each of the three components remained constant at its level at the beginning of the period.

The results are presented in Figure 3, Panel D. The growth of the U.S. federal state between 1817 and 1859 was entirely driven by the functions component and by the intensity component, which were responsible for about 40 percent and 60 percent of the growth, respectively. Consistent with the trends in Panel B of the figure, the geographic expansion component did not lead to any state growth in the 1817-1859 period. In contrast, after 1859, the geographic expansion component accounted for about 29 percent of the growth of the state, with the intensity component accounting for 32 percent and the functions component for the remaining 39 percent.

We can summarize this first set of descriptive facts with the following:

**Descriptive fact. 1:** *The U.S. federal state grew mainly since the 1860s, and started to expand to new locations:*

*(1a) There was a slow growth in the size of the state before the 1860s, and significantly higher growth since the 1860s.*

*(1b) An important driver of growth since the 1860s was the increased presence of the state in more locations across the territory. This driver of growth was not present before the 1860s.*

### 3.2 Where was the state more likely to be present?

We first investigate whether economic growth is associated with greater state presence. To this end, we construct a panel at the county-year level. Our measure of economic growth is the logarithm of the share of a county's population that is employed in manufacturing.

We rely on this measure since it is available in all decades throughout the entire 1820-1900 period, with the exception of 1830.<sup>26</sup>

The first column of Table 1, and Panel A of Figure 5, present results of a regression of an indicator for the presence of a federal employee in the county on the share of manufacturing employment, controlling for county and state-year fixed effects. A one standard deviation increase in the share of manufacturing employment is associated with a 2.7 percentage points increase in the probability of state presence. The relationship between state presence and manufacturing growth is strong also when using an extensive margin measure, namely the logarithm of one plus the total number of federal employees in the county (column 2 of Table 1 and Panel B of Figure 5).<sup>27</sup>

These results are consistent with theories on the determinants of state creation that emphasize the link between state presence and incentives for extraction by the state, as counties with greater presence of manufacturing have greater potential to generate revenue. Additionally, to the extent that counties with greater manufacturing intensity have higher returns from public goods, our results are also consistent with theories of state formation emphasizing citizens' demand for government.<sup>28</sup>

Next, we investigate how a location's distance from the headquarter of the organization limits the ability of the state to establish its presence in response to growth in manufacturing. Specifically, we interact the share of manufacturing employment with a variable measuring the distance (in thousands miles) between a county's centroid and DC. We separately estimate this specification for the pre-bellum and the post-bellum periods, since physical distance represented a more significant impediment in the first part of the nineteenth century. Columns 3-6 of Table 1 present the results. In the 1817-1859 period, the association between a county's manufacturing employment share and state presence (column 3) or total employees (column 5) is significantly weakened by an increase in distance between the county and DC. This is not true for the period 1861-1905 (columns 4 and 6).

We can summarize this second set of descriptive facts with the following:

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<sup>26</sup>Since the variable takes value zero for about 8 percent of the observations, we use the logarithm of one plus the manufacturing employment share. The variable is available at the decade-county level, thus each county-year  $ct$  is assigned the value of county  $c$ 's manufacturing employment share at the beginning of  $t$ 's decade. In essence, we ask whether a county's level of manufacturing development at the beginning of a decade is associated with a greater presence of the state in the following ten years.

<sup>27</sup>Throughout this section, we do not consider DC in our analysis, given that we are interested in the presence of the federal government outside of its center of power. We also drop the two administrative divisions of the Alaska Territory (the Northern and the Southern Districts), which account for 26 county-year observations, and have zero employees throughout the sample period. Including the Alaska Territory leaves the results virtually identical.

<sup>28</sup>The positive association between state presence and manufacturing employment exists both when we focus only on "extractive" bureaus, namely customs and internal revenue and when we focus only on the other, non-extractive bureaus (see Online Appendix Table A2).



**Descriptive fact. 2:** *The state grew more in more prosperous locations. Distance from the headquarter (DC) offsets this relationship, but only in the first half of the nineteenth century.*

### 3.3 How was the state organized at different stages of development?

#### 3.3.1 Employee Turnover

Our dataset can be used to document how the organization of the state changed over the nineteenth century.

The first dimension that we analyze is the degree of employee turnover in the organization. Our data allow us to provide the first full quantification of this phenomenon throughout the nineteenth century and for the entire U.S. federal bureaucracy. We compute the share of employees who leave the organization in each year  $t$  from 1819 to 1905, defined as the share of employees who were present in the Official Register in year  $t - 2$  but not anymore in year  $t$ .<sup>29</sup>

Figure 6, panel A, plots the evolution of turnover rates over the nineteenth century, together with a local polynomial fit with 95 percent confidence bands. The red vertical lines indicate years with a change in the party controlling the federal government. Two patterns emerge from the data. First, turnover exhibits large spikes in the years of a presidential transition. Second, the rate of turnover steadily increases until the end of the 1850s, and is on a declining trend thereafter. Specifically, during the 1861 transition 72 percent of employees left the organization, up from 60-63 percent during the 1849 and 1853 transition and from 52-53 percent during the 1841 and 1845 transitions; the turnover rate dropped to 55 percent during the 1869 transition, to 44-48 percent during the 1885, 1889, and 1893 transitions, and to 35 percent during the 1897 transition.<sup>30</sup>

In Panel B of the figure we separately plot turnover rates in DC and outside of DC (i.e. “in the field”). Turnover rates are consistently lower in DC than in the field. This is not due to the different nature of jobs and bureaus between DC and the field: when we regress an indicator equal to one if the employee leaves the organization on an indicator for DC,

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<sup>29</sup>Since the Register does not list the reason for an employee’s exit, we do not know whether departing employees were fired, resigned, or died. While we would ideally only focus on exits because of firing or resignation, it is important to note that U.S. life expectancy at age twenty did not significantly increase over the nineteenth century (Hacker, 2010). Thus, the rate of employees’ exit because of death can be assumed roughly constant over our sample period.

<sup>30</sup>Online Appendix Figure A6 plots turnover by occupational category. We observe similar temporal trends for all the categories, with a steady increase in turnover until the end of the 1850s and a declining trend thereafter. In the first half of the nineteenth century, spikes in turnover were significantly higher for managerial positions and professional positions, followed by low skills positions, and by clerical occupations.

including a set of year-bureau-position type fixed effects, being employed in DC is associated with a 40 percent reduction in turnover probability (Online Appendix Table A3).

### 3.3.2 Link between employees’ and supervisors’ careers

The second organizational dimension that we analyze is the link between an employee’s career and that of her supervisor. Specifically, we ask whether the turnover of a supervisor leads also her direct subordinates to leave. We assign employees in each year and organizational unit (i.e., a specific local office of a division within a bureau) to their direct supervisor (or supervisors), as described in section 2.3.

We employ our panel at the employee-year level, and we estimate the following model:

$$\text{Turnover}_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_{b(it)} + \delta_{l(it)} + \sum_{\tau} \beta_{\tau} \text{Share Supervisor Turnover}_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

The variable  $\text{Turnover}_{it}$  is an indicator equal to one if employee  $i$  leaves her organizational unit in year  $t$ . We are interested in whether an employee’s turnover is related to the turnover of her most immediate supervisors,  $\text{Share Supervisor Turnover}_{it}$ , namely the share of  $i$ ’s supervisors who leave the organizational unit in year  $t$ .<sup>31</sup> We include year fixed effects,  $\alpha_t$ , which absorb any time-level shock affecting organizational turnover (e.g. presidential transitions). We further include bureau fixed effects,  $\gamma_{b(it)}$ , and location fixed effects,  $\delta_{l(it)}$ , in order to account for the tendency of some bureaus and some locations, respectively, to exhibit high personnel turnover. We allow the relationship between  $\text{Share Supervisor Turnover}_{it}$  and  $\text{Turnover}_{it}$  to vary over time, estimating its effect for four periods of roughly the same length: before 1841, between 1841 and 1859, between 1861 and 1881, and after 1881.

Figure 6, panel C, presents the standardized effects, namely the coefficient  $\beta$  normalized by the mean sample probability that an employee leaves when none of her supervisors do. Before 1841, moving from none to all supervisors leaving the organizational unit increases turnover probability among subordinates by 37 percent. This effect is similar between 1841 and 1859. In the subsequent twenty years period, the effect drops substantially, to 22 percent, and remains roughly constant after 1881.

In summary, there exists a tight link between supervisors’ career and the career of their subordinates, but this link is significantly more pronounced before 1861.

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<sup>31</sup>An employee has a median of 3 supervisors.

### 3.3.3 Delegation of managerial power

The third organizational dimension that we explore is the extent to which managerial power was delegated outside of DC. In Figure 7, Panel A, we plot the number of employees in managerial positions located away from DC (i.e., in the field), for each year in the 1817-1859 period. There is no growth in the number of field managers between 1817 and 1859, with the number of field managers actually decreasing during the 1820s, and staying constant until the mid-1850s. Their number started growing in the 1860s, and experienced a sustained growth over the second half of the nineteenth century: by 1905, the number of field managers has approximately tripled relative to the 1850s.

We also show that this increase went hand in hand with the likelihood that a local office outside of DC had an additional managerial layer between them and the top managers in DC (i.e. we observe a worker employed in a managerial occupation either in the local office, or at the division level in the hierarchy). We estimate a regression at the local office - year level:

$$\text{Additional layer}_{ot} = \alpha_{l(o)} + \gamma_{b(o)} + \sum_{\tau} \beta_{\tau} \mathbb{1}[\text{year}_t \in \tau] + \delta_1 W_{ot} + \delta_2 W_{ot}^2 + \epsilon_{ot} \quad (3)$$

where  $\text{Additional layer}_{ot}$  is an indicator equal to one if local office  $o$  has an additional managerial layer in year  $t$ . We estimate how the probability of having an additional layer varied over the nineteenth century, by including three indicators for the same periods of equation 3 (between 1841 and 1859, between 1861 and 1881, and after 1881, with the years before 1841 as excluded category). We include location fixed effects ( $\alpha_{l(o)}$ ) and bureau fixed effects ( $\gamma_{b(o)}$ ) to account for specific characteristics of a location or of a bureau that might affect their organization. We additionally include a second order polynomial in the size of the workforce in the local office, in order to control for the fact that an average increase in office size might mechanically increase the probability of observing an additional managerial layer.

Figure 7, Panel B presents the coefficients  $\beta_{\tau}$  normalized by the mean of the dependent variable in the years before 1841. The likelihood that workers in a local office have an additional managerial layer between them and DC is similar between 1841 and 1859 relative to the pre-1841 period. This likelihood increases by 5 percent between 1861 and 1881 and by 6 percent post 1881.

In summary, the first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by the absence of growth in delegation of managerial power outside of DC, while this growth was significant over the second half of the nineteenth century. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of managerial layers of local offices.

We can summarize this third set of descriptive facts with the following:

**Descriptive fact. 3:** *The organization of the state apparatus started to change since the 1860s:*

*(3a) In the period 1817-1850s, there was an increasing presence of employee turnover when the party of the President changed.*

*(3b) In the period 1817-1850s, there was a tight link between workers' and their supervisors' careers.*

*(3c) In the period 1817-1850s, there was no growth in delegation of power outside DC.*

*(3d) Since the 1860s, these patterns started to become less and less significant.*

## 4 Interpreting the Descriptive Facts

### 4.1 Delegation and monitoring problems in state organizations

Delegation from principals to lower-level agents is crucial to ensure the growth of an organization. By delegating tasks to production workers and decision-making authority to lower level managers, a principal can leverage her ability over a larger number of subordinates, allowing organizational growth (Lucas Jr, 1978). This force is at the center of cognitive models of the firm (Garicano, 2000), in which the optimal degree of delegation is the result of a trade-off between the cost of acquiring the relevant information and the cost of communication between different levels of the organization. The increasing need to delegate tasks to subordinates as an organization seeks to expand in size was emphasized by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, who in 1778 wrote to Secretary of War McHenry, that *"I observe you plug in a vast mass of details. I know from experience that it is impossible for any man, whatever his talents or diligence, to wade through such a mass. It is essential to the success of the minister of a great department, that he subdivide the objects of his care, distribute them among competent assistants, and content himself with a general but vigilant superintendence."* (Hamilton, 1795, p. 484)

However, delegating tasks goes hand in hand with agency problems: how can the principal (in this case, the politicians in power in DC) ensure that the agents (in this case, the individuals employed in the federal bureaucracy) will not follow their own personal interests at the expense of the interest of the principal?<sup>32</sup> While these agency problems are present in any organization, they are particularly challenging for states, since the principal employs

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<sup>32</sup>Bloom et al. (2012) present an extension of the cognitive model by Garicano (2000) in which employees can take "wrong" actions in the performance of the tasks that are delegated to them.

agents throughout a vast territory. Politicians in DC encountered frequent challenges in supervising the behavior of the field employees. This was true both for workers involved in simple tasks, and for agents that were delegated significant decision powers. For instance, Land Office administrators “*strung out along the frontier [...] were relatively secure from the prying eyes of Washington bureaucrats,*” leading to frequent cases of fraud and corruption, or of “*plain indifference to public duties*” (Crenson, 1975, pp. 86-87). Cases of corruption and lack of effort in the performance of duties were common among employees in the custom houses (Prince and Keller, 1989). Custom collectors, whose pay was partially a function of the amount of trade at their port, often undervalued imports, in order to attract ships to their port and secure higher fees for themselves. (White, 1954, p. 179).

## 4.2 Low monitoring capacity and personal state organization

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, high communication and transportation costs made monitoring of field employees difficult. Systems of supervision were sometimes used, but the large distances between DC and the various field offices made these tools insufficient to ensure adequate monitoring. For example, while the Commissioner of the Land Office had established a system of inspections of local offices, the inspectors visited each office only once a year, making it easy for local officials to conceal any wrongdoing in the performance of their duties (Crenson, 1975, pp. 92). Some officials, like the collectors of the customs, were incentivized to exert effort by having their compensation partially dependent on the value of the goods ascertained at their port. However, as discussed above, when coupled with a lack of adequate monitoring, this system was likely to introduce distortions.

In this context, the presence of trust between principals and agents can substitute for effective monitoring. The U.S. federal government focused mainly on the selection margin to ensure an adequate performance by federal bureaucrats. Political leaders frequently underlined the individual’s fitness for office, moral character, and political opinions friendly to the administration as important requirements for selection (Fish, 1905). Writing about his goals in selecting federal bureaucrats, President Washington noted: “*[I have tried] as far as my own knowledge extended, or information could be obtained, to make fitness of character my primary object*” (Washington, 1855, pp. 57). The First Comptroller believed that “*the only safeguard for the public security against fraud and embezzlement upon which entire reliance can be placed is to be found in the heart and conscience of the individual intrusted with the receipt and disbursement of the public funds*” (Senate Doc. 1 25th Congress, 1837).

A higher level of trust between the principal and the subordinates allows the organization to grow: principals expect higher workers’ performance, and, as in the model by Bloom et al.

(2012), are more willing to delegate decision power to lower level managers.

Personal networks were an essential tool in order to identify individuals who could be trusted to adequately and dutifully perform their tasks.<sup>33</sup> Defending his own choice for the position of collector of the customs of New Haven, Thomas Jefferson writes that *“From private sources it was learned that his understanding was sound, his integrity pure, his character unstained.”* (Jefferson, 1854). Similarly, department leaders often relied on personal connections to identify possible candidates for appointment. For instance, Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1851 asked a correspondent for *“the name of a man, the fittest, within your knowledge, to be Naval Officer. He must be a firm an energetic friend to the present Administration; not too old, all together trustworthy and enjoying public confidence”* (Webster, 1904). Members of Congress were often asked to identify trustworthy individuals from their districts (White, 1954, p. 116). In turn, personal relationships between office chiefs and their subordinates were also common and considered essential to ensure trust within each organizational unit: subordinates were tied to their chief *“by personal loyalty, friendship, and, not infrequently, kinship.”* (Crenson, 1975, p. 72).

In sum, the U.S. federal state during the first decades of the nineteenth century can be defined as a “personal,” rather than “bureaucratic”, organization. It was based on the personal character of the individuals employed, and on relationships of trust between leaders and subordinates, while bureaucratic procedures for monitoring behavior were scarce and often ineffective (Crenson, 1975). The government’s discretionary power over appointments and removals allowed political leaders to assign federal jobs to individuals who could be sufficiently trusted.

While a personal organization might be an efficient response to structural conditions that make monitoring difficult, it has two important drawbacks. First, frequent turnover of officials led to loss of experience in the bureaucracy.<sup>34</sup> Second, since the supply of trustworthy individuals that can be found through personal networks is limited, this places constraints on the organization’s growth potential.

This is consistent with the descriptive facts that characterized the federal bureaucracy in the first half of the nineteenth century. The importance of trust in filling bureaucratic

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<sup>33</sup>In a letter written in 1801, Thomas Jefferson remarked that *“Of the various executive duties, no one excites more anxious concern than that of placing the interests of our fellow citizens in the hands of honest men, with understandings sufficient for their stations. No duty, at the same time, is more difficult to fulfill. The knowledge of the characters possessed by a single individual is, of necessity, limited”* (Jefferson, 1854, pp. 402).

<sup>34</sup>As William Coleman, the editor of the New York Evening Post, remarked in 1801: *“If every change of a chief magistrate is to produce a similar change of subordinate officers [...] their places are to be supplied by a new set of men who have every thing to learn [...] Government will be entirely deprived of all the benefits of experience, and the management of public offices, perpetually shifting from one tyro in office to another, will forever be kept in infancy and weakness”* (Coleman, 1801).

positions led to high employee turnover (Fact 3a), as a new administration needed to fill positions with trusted bureaucrats. In addition, the need to maintain relationships of trust between supervisors and subordinates led to a tight link between their careers (Fact 3b). Since reliance on personal networks for staffing an organization naturally leads to a limited supply of trusted individuals, this limited the ability of the state to (i) grow in size (Fact 1a), (ii) expand its presence across the territory (Fact 1b), especially in more remote locations (Fact 2), and (iii) delegate managerial power to the periphery (Fact 3c).

### 4.3 Decrease in monitoring costs and transition to a modern bureaucratic organization

Innovations in technologies of control are important drivers of the transition from a personal organization to a bureaucratic one. By increasing political leaders' monitoring ability, these innovations allow principals to develop an organization characterized by a fixed hierarchy of officials – rather than one based on frequent turnover, – where each agent can be effectively monitored to ensure adequate performance. This insight dates back to Max Weber, who underlined how *“a certain degree of development of the means of communication [...] is one of the most important prerequisites for the possibility of bureaucratic administration.”* (Weber (1978), p. 973). The role of increases in rulers' monitoring ability has been theorized to be an important driver of the transition from tax farming regimes to bureaucratic state apparatuses in charge of tax collection in Europe (Kiser and Schneider (1994); Kiser (1994); White (2004)).

In this paper, we hypothesize that the same mechanism might have been important to influence the transition of the U.S. federal bureaucracy from a small, personal bureaucracy to a larger, more modern, “Weberian” bureaucracy. Over the course of the nineteenth century – and especially in the second half of the century, – the expansion of the electric telegraph and of the railroad networks decreased communication and transportation costs between DC and the rest of the nation. By increasing political leaders' capacity to monitor agents throughout the territory, and thus possibly removing them for poor performance or following acts of corruption, this made it optimal to progressively adopt a modern bureaucratic organization of the state apparatus.

This is once again consistent with the descriptive facts that we showed. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, employee turnover and the link between workers' and their supervisors' careers decreased in importance, and delegation of managerial power outside of DC became more common (Fact 3d); the substitution of reliance on trust with effective monitoring as a way to ensure performance allowed the organization to grow (Fact 1a) and



expand to new locations (Fact 1b).

## 4.4 Alternative mechanisms

While we argue that innovations in the government’s monitoring capacity, and the corresponding transition from trust to monitoring as a tool to ensure performance, is a relevant driver of the descriptive facts that we showed in section 3, this is obviously not the only mechanism that is consistent with these facts. In this section, we discuss three alternative mechanisms.

### 4.4.1 Demand shocks

The large increase in the size of the federal bureaucracy in the second half of the nineteenth century is also consistent with higher incentives to invest in state capacity because of demand-side shocks. Two relevant shocks during this period were the American Civil War and the progressive industrialization of the country. As the principals responded to these shocks by increasing the size of the workforce, and its presence across the territory, the need to manage a larger state apparatus might have also facilitated the shift to a more bureaucratic form of organization.

In particular, the American Civil War represents a potentially relevant driver of the development of the federal bureaucracy, as the federal government needed to invest in state capacity in order to repay the debt accumulated during the war years. A common argument among both historians and economists is that the prospects of external war may lead to the development of more effective states. The relationship between the American Civil war and the development of the federal state is debated among scholars of American history. On the one hand, some consider the war a major turning point in the development of the American State (Beard, 1927; Hacker, 1940), labeling it the “Second American Revolution” (Ransom, 1998), as the war concentrated power away from states and in the hands of the federal government. On the other hand, other scholars have argued that the civil war might have retarded industrialization and, in turn, the development of state capacity (Cochran, 1961).

In Figure 2, we show that the beginning of the civil war in 1861 coincides with an important inflection point in the growth path of the U.S. federal bureaucracy, consistent with the incentive to invest in state capacity to repay the federal debt playing an important role. Importantly, all our results in the next section control for year fixed effects, in order to account for aggregate time-varying shocks in the federal government’s incentive to increase the size of the federal bureauacracy.

#### 4.4.2 Patronage as electoral tool

The monitoring mechanism on which we focus takes a benevolent view of the principals in DC, who are interested in organizing the federal state in order to maximize its productivity. However, staffing of the federal bureaucracy also responded to electoral considerations, and federal employment was an important tool to build support for the party. The political discretion over appointments and removals over most of the nineteenth century not only allowed politicians to employ individuals that could be trusted, but also opened the door to a “spoils system” where political support could substitute for qualifications (Fish, 1905; Hoogenboom, 1968).

The large spikes in turnover in the years of presidential transitions, shown in Figure 6, are also consistent with this mechanism. Interestingly, we see some evidence that turnover starts declining before the meritocratic reforms which decreased the President’s control over bureaucratic hiring.<sup>35</sup> Our results in the next section show that increases in monitoring capacity were associated with a reduction in turnover, as trust relationships between principals and agents were less necessary in determining performance. However, higher monitoring capacity does not decrease electoral incentives to hire copartisans. Thus, our results are not inconsistent with an increase in efficiency after the passage of reforms that curbed the electorally motivated turnover that still in part characterized the federal bureaucracy at the end of the nineteenth century.

#### 4.4.3 Decrease in communication costs in absence of agency problems

Cognitive models of organizations predict a relationship between communication costs, size, and delegation of decision power, even in absence of agency problems (Bloom et al., 2014; Gumpert et al., 2022). Workers tasked with production in a location face problems for which they might need the help of the principal in the headquarter. Each location might employ a manager, who solve some of the problems that would otherwise flow to the principal. Lower communication costs with the headquarter decrease the amount of time that the principal needs in order to solve problems arising in the location. This, in turn, has two effects. First, it increases the probability of observing employment, and the size of the workforce, in the location. Second, it decreases the amount of managerial delegation to the location, holding the size of employment in the location fixed.

Thus, similar to a mechanism of higher monitoring capacity, also these models predict that lower communication costs between DC and a location should increase the presence

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<sup>35</sup>The 1883 Pendleton Act introduced meritocratic hiring in the federal bureaucracy, but initially only a small share of positions were affected by the reform. Most of the positions transitioned to meritocracy only in subsequent decades.

of the federal government in the location. However, while looking at a decrease in communication costs through the prism of a higher principal’s monitoring ability predicts *more* decentralization of managerial power, abstracting from agency problems predicts *less* decentralization as communication becomes cheaper.

Both forces are likely at play in our context: the development of the railroad and the telegraph networks allowed principals in DC both to monitor field offices better and also, abstracting from agency problems, to communicate information more cheaply. However, the results in the next section – where we find increases in managerial delegation as a location becomes better connected to DC, holding fixed the size of the workforce – are consistent with the historiography underlining the presence of severe agency problems in the relationships between the principals in DC and federal agents in the field in the nineteenth century U.S.

## 5 Innovations in Monitoring Capacity as Drivers of State Development

In this section, we provide an empirical test of our hypothesis. First, we exploit the expansion of the railroad network, whose features allow us to develop an identification approach to control for a host of factors correlated with both increases in DC’s monitoring ability and with the development of the federal state in a location. Second, we show that we obtain similar results when exploiting the expansion of the telegraph network. Third, we provide evidence that suggests that lower monitoring costs are associated with a reduction in reliance on trust as a way to staff the organization.

### 5.1 The expansion of the railroad network

#### 5.1.1 Data and estimating equation

Our goal is to measure how the expansion of the railroad network decreased the travel time between DC and different counties and to study whether this had an impact on the presence and the organization of the Federal State. To do so, our starting point is the transportation network database by [Donaldson and Hornbeck \(2016\)](#), based on initial GIS railroad files by [Atack \(2013\)](#). The database contains both the location of the time-varying railroad network in each decade from 1830 to 1900, and the time-invariant locations of canals, navigable rivers, and other natural waterways. The database is then overlaid to a map of 1890 county boundaries.

Following [Donaldson and Hornbeck \(2016\)](#), we calculate the shortest path between DC

and the centroid of each county. These shortest paths are calculated as the shortest travel times (measured in minutes), using a combination of travel by wagon, navigation, and railroad. Relative to [Donaldson and Hornbeck \(2016\)](#), who are interested in the lowest-cost freight routes and thus need to specify transportation cost parameters, we specify travel time parameters. The resulting measure, *Log Time to DC*<sub>ct</sub>, is a continuous treatment variable that provides the log travel time (in minutes) in year  $t$ , between DC and the centroid of county  $c$ .<sup>36</sup> Online Appendix [A7](#) shows the expansion of the railroad network over time. Online Appendix Figure [A8](#) shows how the average travel time between DC and other counties decreased over time between 1830 and 1900, from more than 100 hours in 1830 to less than 40 hours in 1900.

With this measure at hand, we estimate the following regression model on a county-year panel between 1821 and 1905:<sup>37</sup>

$$y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \beta^R \text{Log Time to DC}_{ct} + \delta_t \text{Distance}_c + X_{ct}\theta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

where  $y_{ct}$  is one of our outcomes of interest measured in county  $c$  and year  $t$ . We include a set of county fixed effects ( $\alpha_c$ ), which capture time-invariant county-specific unobservables which affect the development of the state, and of year fixed effects ( $\gamma_t$ ), which account for aggregate time-varying shocks in federal state development (e.g., for the Civil War). The matrix  $X_{ct}$  includes a set of controls which we discuss in the next section. The coefficient  $\beta^R$  measures whether outcome  $y_{ct}$  changes differentially in counties that become better connected to DC (i.e. which experience a decrease in travel time to DC).<sup>38</sup> We also control for the straight line distance between county  $c$  and DC, interacted with year fixed effects, allowing for differential changes over time in the outcome variables in counties with different geographic distances from DC.

### 5.1.2 Threats to identification

The key threat to identification is that the expansion of the railroads network, and in particular the way in which this affects travel time between a county and DC at a given point in time, might be endogenous: counties that experience a reduction in travel time to DC

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<sup>36</sup>In other words, we exploit variations in travel time to DC that are driven by the expansion of the network across time and space, and not the staggered arrival of railroads in a specific county which, as discussed in the next section, is arguably endogenous.

<sup>37</sup>Given the near absence of any railroad in 1830, the travel times between DC and each county is the same before 1830, which allows us to extend the sample used for estimation back to 1821.

<sup>38</sup>Since the railroads network database is available at 10-years interval, each county-year  $ct$  is assigned the value of *Log Time to DC*<sub>ct</sub> at the beginning of  $t$ 's decade. Results in which the sample is restricted to the first year of each decade give qualitatively similar results.

thanks to new railroads construction could have experienced a change in the presence and organization of the federal state even absent a decrease in the monitoring costs faced by DC. In particular, two are the main concerns for identification.

First, as discussed by [Atack et al. \(2010\)](#), railroad promoters and investors sought locations with high profitability, and were more likely to target counties with higher growth in population density and agricultural productivity. In addition, new railroad construction might increase local manufacturing activity through higher demand for construction materials ([Fishlow, 1965](#)). A crucial concern is then that changes in the presence and organization of the state associated with a reduction in *Log Time to DC*<sub>ct</sub> are the result of time-varying shocks in a county’s economic growth rather than a decrease in travel time between county *c* and DC.

In order to address these concerns, as in [Donaldson and Hornbeck \(2016\)](#), we can exploit the fact that variation in travel time between county *c* and DC is driven by both (1) railroad construction in county *c*, and (2) changes in other, more distant portions of the railroad network. This allows us to shut down variation driven by (1), by controlling for railroads construction in county *c*, and to only rely on variation driven by (2), i.e. exploiting only variation in *Log Time to DC*<sub>ct</sub> driven by railroads expansion in other parts of the network (and thus arguably uncorrelated with local economic shocks in county *c* and year *t*). Specifically,  $X_{ct}$  includes an indicator taking value one if county *c* contains any railroad track in year *t*, and a variable measuring the length of railroad track in county *c* and year *t*. After the inclusion of these controls,  $\beta$  is identified from more-distant changes in the railroads network that lead to a decreased travel time between county *c* and DC.

A second, and related, concern is that more distant changes in the railroad network which reduced *Log Time to DC*<sub>ct</sub>, are also associated with an increase in county *c*’s market access.<sup>39</sup> Since this in turn led to an increase in county agricultural land values ([Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016](#)) and manufacturing activity ([Hornbeck and Rotemberg, 2021](#)), this might create a spurious correlation between *Log Time to DC*<sub>ct</sub> and our outcomes of interest. In order to account for this, we directly control for a measure of market access as in [Hornbeck and Rotemberg \(2021\)](#).<sup>40</sup> In doing so, we exploit the fact that expansions of the network which create similar changes in a county’s market access do not necessarily result in equal changes in a county’s travel time to DC. To illustrate this point, Online Appendix Figure [A9](#)

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<sup>39</sup>Market access captures how easily county *c* can trade with all other U.S. counties, assigning higher weights to counties with greater population.

<sup>40</sup>Formally, we control for log market access, where market access of county *c* at time *t* is defined as  $MA_{ct} = \sum_{d \neq c} (1 + t_{c dt}/P)^{-\theta} L_{dt}$ , where  $t_{c dt}$  is the per ton county-to-county transportation costs (as in [Donaldson and Hornbeck \(2016\)](#)),  $P$  is the average price per ton of transported goods between counties *c* and *d* at time *t*,  $\theta$  is a measure of trade elasticity, and  $L_{dt}$  is the population of county *d* in year *t*. We follow [Hornbeck and Rotemberg \(2021\)](#) and use a value for  $\theta$  of 3.05 and a value for  $P$  of 38.7.

shows the relationship between a county’s change in *Log Time to DC<sub>ct</sub>* between 1880 and 1890 and the county’s change in log market access over the same period. While there is a significant negative relationship between the two changes, this correlation is not perfect, and two counties with similar increases in market access might experience different decreases in travel time to DC.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, our identifying assumption is that, conditional on our set of controls, state development in a county with decreased travel time to DC would have been similar to other counties, if not for the increase in DC’s ability to monitor the workforce in that county. While it is impossible to directly test this assumption, we believe that our identification strategy makes the exclusion restriction (that a lower travel time to DC affects state development only through enhanced monitoring ability) plausible, as it relies on the comparison of counties that, as the railroad network expands, (i) have similar local railroad construction in their territory, (ii) experience similar changes in their ability to trade, but (iii) experience different changes in their travel time to DC *specifically*.

Moreover, we also present two indirect tests that lend additional support to this assumption. First, we show that a shorter travel time between a county and other important cities did not increase the presence of the state in the county: it is time distance to DC specifically that predicts the presence of the federal state. Second, we show that changes in *Log Time to DC<sub>ct</sub>* are not associated with differential pre-trends in the development of the federal state.<sup>42</sup>

### 5.1.3 DC’s monitoring capacity and state presence

Table 2 presents results from estimating equation 4. Column 1 reports estimates from the simple specification including only year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and the straight line distance between the county and DC interacted with year fixed effects. A faster connection between a county and DC thanks to the expansion of the railroad network increases the probability of observing a presence of the federal state in the county. Specifically, a one standard deviation decrease in *Log Time to DC<sub>ct</sub>* is associated with an increase in the probability of state presence of 0.34 standard deviations.

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<sup>41</sup>In all our specifications, we also control for log population and for the share of manufacturing employment in the county. Given the possibility that these constitute “bad controls,” as state presence might itself affect population and manufacturing growth, we also show that their exclusion does not affect the estimates.

<sup>42</sup>A common approach to identify the effect of railroad network expansions is the “inconsequential units approach,” which identifies the effect for economically small units lying between large cities. The intuition behind this approach is that these units will be connected to a railroad only because they lie along a convenient route between two large cities (Redding and Turner, 2015). This approach is infeasible with the data that we use: the GIS network database from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) and Atask (2013) does not include detailed information that can allow to identify which cities were meant to be connected by the construction of new lines.

Column 2 reports estimates from a specification that also controls for local railroad construction in the county. While the estimated impact of travel time to DC decreases once we exploit only variation stemming from more distant changes in the network, it remains significant and substantial in magnitude. This estimate is not significantly affected when we additionally control for a county’s market access (column 3), or for a county’s population and share of manufacturing employment (column 4). The estimate in column 4 shows that a one standard deviation decrease in travel time to DC led to an increase in the probability of observing the federal state in the county by 0.26 standard deviations.

Columns 5-7 investigate which specific occupations were mostly affected by the increased monitoring ability of DC. In counties with state presence, reducing the traveling time to DC by one standard deviation increases the size of the clerical force by about 0.26 standard deviations. In contrast, we find no intensive margin effects for professional and relatively low skills positions.

Appendix Table A4 shows that we obtain very similar estimates if we limit the sample only to counties in states that were already part of the U.S. in 1821 (at the beginning of the sample period). This suggests that the results are not merely driven by the ability of the railroads to extend westward the American frontier (Bazzi et al., 2020).

A possible concern is that, even after accounting for a county’s overall market access, a better connection to DC might per se matter for state development because of the specific economic significance of this city, and not because it is the capital of the federal government. To check whether this is the case, we re-estimate equation 4 with the inclusion of a set of additional variables (*Log Time to P<sub>ct</sub>*) measuring the travel time in year *t* between county *c* and city *P*. Each “placebo city” *P* was an important economic center but, differently from DC, was not the center of power of the federal government.<sup>43</sup> We report the results in Figure 8 where we plot the estimated effect for DC as well as for New York, Boston, New Orleans, Chicago, San Francisco, Saint Louis and Cincinnati.<sup>44</sup> Consistent with our interpretation, after accounting for local railroad construction and for overall market access, only travel time to DC explains the presence of the federal state in a county, while travel time to other important cities is not associated with differences in state presence.

Finally, Figure 9 shows that changes in travel time to DC are not associated with differential pre-trends in the development of the federal state. We re-estimate equation 4 additionally including the travel time to DC in the previous and in the next decade (as well

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<sup>43</sup>We additionally control for the straight line distance between the county and each city *P* interacted with year fixed effects.

<sup>44</sup>New York was the largest U.S. city. Boston, New Orleans, and San Francisco were the largest cities in New England, in the South, and in the West, respectively, over the sample period. Chicago, Saint Louis and Cincinnati were the largest city in the Midwest at some point during our sample period.



as controls for previous and future local railroad construction and market access). Panels A and B of the figure show that only current travel time to DC is associated with a larger presence of the state. In contrast, future travel time to DC (the estimates corresponding to  $t + 1$  in the figure) does not predict the development of the state in a location. Thus, conditional on our controls, we see similar pre-trends in state development in counties that will experience different changes in travel time to DC in the future. This lends further support to our assumption that counties that experience similar local railroad construction and similar changes in market access, but lower decreases in travel time to DC, represent a good control group for counties experiencing a faster decrease in travel time to DC in the same decade.<sup>45</sup>

#### 5.1.4 DC’s monitoring capacity and the organization of the state

Table 3 shows that a lower time travel between a county and DC not only influenced whether the federal state was present in a county, but also the way in which the state was organized in that county. Importantly, the estimates are once again robust to the inclusion of the most stringent set of controls.

We find a significant effect of decreased monitoring costs on the degree of delegation of managerial power outside of DC. The estimate in column 4 shows that a one standard deviation decrease in  $\text{Log Time to DC}_{ct}$  is associated with an increase of about 0.35 standard deviations in the probability of observing managerial delegation to the county. Importantly, since the presence of employees with managerial responsibilities might simply be a by-product of having a larger workforce, these specifications additionally control for a full set of fixed effects for the total number of federal employees in the county.

In addition, increased monitoring capacity is also associated with less employee turnover. In counties with a longer traveling time to DC, the share of employees who leave the bureaucracy within the next two years (i.e. they are not present in the subsequent volume of the Official Register) is significantly higher. Two counties that are one standard deviation apart in their travel time to DC have a turnover rate that differs by 0.15 standard deviations.<sup>46</sup>

Panels C and D of Figure 9 show that we do not see differential pre-trends in these outcomes in counties that will experience different changes in travel time to DC in the future. We do find that past travel time to DC is associated to changes in managerial delegation and personnel turnover, suggesting that changes in monitoring capacity leads to more gradual

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<sup>45</sup>Interestingly, we do not see an effect of travel time to DC in the previous decade (the estimates corresponding to  $t - 1$  in the figure), consistent with an immediate response of DC to improved monitoring capacity.

<sup>46</sup>We exclude from this specification observations in 1905, since we do not have information on which employees leave by 1907.

adjustments along these margins than along the margin of state presence. Finally, Appendix Table A5 shows that we obtain very similar estimates if we limit the sample only to counties in states that were already part of the U.S. in 1821.

## 5.2 The expansion of the telegraph network

In this section, we leverage the expansion of the telegraph network across the U.S., in order to measure the ease of communication between DC and different locations at different points in time. The first telegraph line, connecting DC with Baltimore, opened in 1844. Private investors soon expanded the telegraph network, which by the early 1850s had connected all major urban centers (Highton, 1852).

We rely on data from Wang (2020), who collected information on the year in which different locations were connected to the telegraph network between 1844 and 1852.<sup>47</sup> The data collection effort by Wang (2020) ends in 1852 since comprehensive information on the telegraph network after 1852 is unavailable. In addition, the rapid expansion of the network limits the extent of variation after the mid-1850s, as by then most major centers had a telegraph connection. For each year between 1844 and 1852, we compute the variable *Telegraph Connections*<sub>ct</sub>, namely the number of telegraph stations in each county *c* and year *t*. Online Appendix Figure A10 shows the geographical distribution of the variable from 1845 to 1853.

With this measure at hand, we estimate the following regression model on a county-year panel between 1839 and 1953.<sup>48</sup>

$$y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \beta^T \text{Telegraph Connections}_{ct} + \delta_t \text{Distance}_c + X_{ct} \theta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (5)$$

where all variables are defined as in equation 4, and  $X_{ct}$  includes log population and the share of manufacturing employment. The coefficient  $\beta^T$  measures whether outcome  $y_{ct}$  changes differentially in counties that become better connected to DC thanks to a higher number of telegraph stations.

The identifying assumption is that, absent the telegraph, the presence and organizational features of the federal state would have evolved similarly in counties connected to DC via the telegraph and in counties without this connection. In this case, our ability to assuage concerns regarding the identifying assumption is more limited relative to our analysis exploiting the development of the railroads. This is due to the technological features of the

<sup>47</sup>We are very grateful to Tianyi Wang for providing access to the data.

<sup>48</sup>We pick the year 1939 as the first year in this estimating sample in order to include three years (1939, 1941, 1943) in the “pre-telegraph” era. Results in which we restrict the sample to the 1841-1853 period or to the 1843-1853 period are qualitatively similar.

telegraph network: if a location has a telegraph, it is connected with the same speed to DC and to all other nodes of the network, irrespective of the specific structure of the network.

Importantly, we find that a county’s change in federal state presence between 1833 and 1843 (i.e. in the decade immediately before the beginning of the telegraph era) is uncorrelated with its future number of telegraph connections.<sup>49</sup> Notwithstanding, we acknowledge that the identification assumption in this section is less likely to be perfectly satisfied, even conditional on controls, and thus these results should be seen as more suggestive.

Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation 5. Increasing telegraph connections does not increase the probability that a county switches to having a state presence, but, conditional on state presence, we observe a significant increase in both the number of clerks and of blue collar workers: a one standard deviation increase in the number of locations with telegraph connections in a county is associated with increases in clerical and blue collar workers of 0.06 and 0.03 standard deviations, respectively. We also observe significant effects of telegraph connections on the organizational features of the federal bureaucracy: counties with access to more telegraph connections to DC are more likely to be delegated managerial power and have a lower turnover of their workforce.

Despite the more suggestive nature of this empirical exercise, we view the fact that we obtain results that are similar to those obtained exploiting the expansion of the railroad networks as further corroborating our interpretation linking monitoring capacity to state development.

### 5.3 Monitoring capacity reduces reliance on trust

The results in the previous sections show that lower communication and transportation costs between DC and a county are associated with an increased likelihood of state presence, a larger presence of the state, more delegation of managerial power, and lower employee turnover in the county. Our interpretation for these results is that innovations in technologies of control, by increasing the government’s monitoring capacity, created the conditions for a shift from a personal organization to a more modern bureaucratic organization, with lower reliance on networks of trust as a way to select bureaucrats.

In order to further corroborate our theory, we now provide suggestive evidence that a lower time distance between a county and DC decreased reliance on trust as a way to staff the bureaucracy in that county. We show that counties that become “better connected” to DC thanks to the railroads network expansion see an increased presence of workers who are

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<sup>49</sup>A regression of the change in *State Presence* between 1833 and 1843 on the number of telegraph connections between 1843 and 1852, controlling for the change in county’s population and in the county’s share of manufacturing employment, give a coefficient of -0.005 (standard error 0.011).

relatively less trusted by the government after the civil war, namely those born in former confederate states.

Figure 10 motivates our empirical test. It plots the evolution over time in the number of federal employees, differentiating between those who were born in a confederate state (i.e., Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) and those who were born in any other state. We normalize the two series by the population of these two regions. Employees from confederate states were less represented in the federal bureaucracy even before the civil war, with about 0.1 employees per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to about 0.2 employees per 1,000 inhabitants for the other states. However, the representation of the two groups starts to diverge significantly after the civil war. At the onset of the conflict, there is a sizeable decline in the number of Southern-born federal bureaucrats. More surprisingly, the North-South employment gap is persistent (see gray series): while the numbers of Southern-born and Northern-born bureaucrats constantly increase after 1861 as the federal state expands its scope, the difference in employees per capita between Southern and Northern states increases from about 0.1 in 1859 to about 0.3 in 1865, and remains constant over the next decades. We interpret this as evidence of the federal government’s lower trust towards workers from former confederate states after the end of the conflict. We exploit this fact to investigate whether an increase in the federal government’s monitoring capacity is associated with an attenuation of this North-South employment gap.

Table 5 reports the results of estimating Equation 4, using as dependent variable the share of employees in county  $c$  and year  $t$  who were born in a confederate state.<sup>50</sup> The estimate in column 1 implies that a one standard deviation decrease in travel time to DC increases the share of workers born in a confederate state by 0.3 standard deviations. Consistent with a role of increased monitoring capacity in substituting for reliance on trust as a way to staff the bureaucracy, the entire effect is concentrated in the post-civil war period. In the 1861-1905 period, a one standard deviation decrease in  $LogTimeToDC$  leads to an increase in the share of southern-born employees of 0.76 standard deviations. In contrast, in the 1831-1859 period, there is no significant relationship between DC’s monitoring capacity and the share of southern-born employees in a county.

We interpret this result as suggestive of the theoretical mechanism behind our results. Lower transportation and communication costs, by enhancing the government’s ability to monitor the behavior of its agents throughout the territory, decrease the need for employing trusted individuals. In addition, the results in Table 5 points towards an important role

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<sup>50</sup>Since our data on the telegraph network ends before the civil war (in 1852), we cannot exploit the expansion of the telegraph for the analysis in this section.

of higher monitoring capacity in attenuating persistent employment discrimination against groups who are relatively less trusted by the government.

## 6 Conclusion

Mann (1984) defines *infrastructural power* as “the capacity to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm”. A large literature has investigated the incentives to set up a state apparatus with the capacity to implement these decisions. However, once these incentives are in place, how is a state concretely organized? In this paper, we study this broad question leveraging a unique dataset that allows us to investigate the internal organization of a state over an unusually long time-span. We assembled a new micro-database which combine personnel records of the U.S. federal bureaucracy over the period 1817-1905, and hand-collected information on the internal organization of the bureaucracy.

Our novel data allow us to document a number of novel descriptive facts on the development of the U.S. federal bureaucracy. First, we show that the state expanded in size mainly since the 1860s, and that an important driver of this growth was its ability to reach new locations. Second, the presence of the federal state was higher in more prosperous locations, but, in the first part of the nineteenth century, distance from DC limited the association between state presence and growth. Third, the organization of the state started to change since the 1860s, with a lower reliance on employee turnover, a less tight link between workers’ and their supervisors’ careers, and an increasing delegation of managerial power away from DC.

We interpret these facts through the lenses of principal-agent theory. In presence of low monitoring capacity, the state had low growth potential, and the optimal way to manage the state apparatus resembled a personal organization, with relationships of trust replacing effective monitoring. Technological innovations that lowered monitoring costs were conducive to organizational change, making it optimal to adopt a bureaucratic organizational form, and allowing faster organizational growth. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the railroads and telegraph network across different locations over the nineteenth century, we provide evidence in support of our interpretation.

Our results underline how principal-agent relationships are crucial not only to understand the functioning of bureaucracies at a given point in time, but also to explain their growth and organizational evolution over the process of development: changes in a ruler’s ability to monitor state agents affect both the growth potential of a state apparatus and its organizational form. This highlights how different systems for organizing a state might be optimal at different stages of development.

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
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
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Figure 1: Example Hierarchy




*Notes:* The figure shows a partial graphical representation of the hierarchy of the U.S. federal bureaucracy in 1853.


Figure 2: Growth of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy, 1817-1905




(a) Total number of employees



(b) Employees in DC vs South vs Outside South




(c) Number of employees by department




(d) Number of employees by occupational category

Notes: The figure shows the evolution over time of: total number of employees (Panel A); number of employees in DC per 10 inhabitants (in black) in Southern states per 1,000 inhabitants (in red) and on other states per 1,000 inhabitants (in green) (Panel B); number of employees by main department (Panel C); number of employees by occupational category (Panel D).


Figure 3: Decomposing the Sources of Growth




(a) Number of offices/bureaus



(b) Share of counties with state presence



(c) Average workers in county-office




(d) Decomposition

Notes: The figure shows the number of offices/bureaus over time (Panel A), the share of counties with state presence over time (Panel B), the average number of workers in county-offices over time (Panel C), the share of each component's contribution to state growth between 1817-1859 and 1861-1905, following equation 1 (Panel D).




Figure 4: The Geographic Expansion of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy




Notes: The figure shows the number of federal employees in each U.S. county (using fixed 1890 county border), in 1817 (Panel A), 1859 (Panel B), 1881 (Panel C), 1905 (Panel D).

Figure 5: Manufacturing Growth and State Presence




(a) State Presence Indicator




(b) Number of Employees

*Notes:* The figure shows the partial relationship between an indicator for state presence in a county (Panel A), or the logarithm of one plus the total number of employees employed in the county (Panel B), and the share of manufacturing employment in the county, in a bin scatter plot. The relationship shown is after partialing out county fixed effects, state-year fixed effects, and the log of a county's total population (see columns 1 and 2 of Table 1). The sample includes all odd years between 1821-1905, with the exception of 1831-1839.


Figure 6: Employee Turnover



(a) Turnover




(b) Turnover - DC vs Field




(c) Correlation between a worker's and her supervisor's turnover

Notes: The figure shows turnover over 1817-1905 (Panel A), turnover over time, separately for employees in DC and outside of DC (Panel B), and the standardized coefficients on  $\beta_\tau$  from equation 3, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the organizational unit times year level (Panel C). The red vertical lines in Panels A and B indicate years in which the party of the President changes.

**Figure 7: Growth in delegation of power**




(a) Number of field managers



(b) Additional managerial layer in local offices


**Notes:** Panel A: the red line plots, for each year in the 1817-1905 period, the number of employees in managerial positions located away from DC. Panel B: the red line plots the growth in the probability that a local office has an additional managerial layer (besides the top manager in DC), in the 1841-1859, 1861-1881, and post 1881 period, relative to the 1841 period, after partialling out location fixed effects, bureau fixed effects, and controlling for a second order polynomial in the size of the local office. See section 3.3.3 for additional details.

Figure 8: Travel time from other cities is not associated with state presence




Notes: The figure shows results of estimating the specification in column 4 of Table 2 with the additional inclusion of 5 variables (*Log Time to P*) which are the log of total time (in minutes) between city  $P$  and the county's centroid, as well as the straight line distance between the county and each city  $P$  interacted with year fixed effects. We report the estimated effect for DC (in red) as well as for the 5 additional cities (in black), with 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure 9: Past and future travel time to DC and the development of the state



Notes: The figure shows the impact of the contemporaneous value of *Log Time to DC* (time  $t$ ), as well as of past (time  $t - 1$ ) and future (time  $t + 1$ ) values of *Log Time to DC*, on the dependent variable shown at the bottom of each panel. The figure plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the county level. Estimates in red indicate a  $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ . Each regression includes as right-hand side variables all the variables included in the specification in column 3 of Table 2, and additionally includes the following variables: *Log Time to DC* ten years in the future, *Log Time to DC* ten years in the past; an indicator taking value one if the county contains any railroad track ten years in the future, an indicator taking value one if the county contained any railroad track ten years in the past; the length of railroad track in the county ten years in the future; the length of railroad track in the county ten years in the past.

Figure 10: Civil War and decline in Southerners' employment



Notes: The figure plots the evolution over time in the number of federal employees who were born in a confederate state (i.e., Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia) (in blue) and those who were born in any other state (in red). Both series are by the population of these two regions. The gray line plots the difference in employees per capita between the two regions.



**Table 1: Manufacturing Growth, Distance from DC, and State Presence**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	State presence	Log tot. employees	State presence	State presence	Log tot. employees	Log tot. employees
Log Share Manu. Emp.	0.340*** (0.109)	2.386*** (0.349)	1.265*** (0.432)	-0.260 (0.227)	1.592*** (0.560)	2.530*** (0.812)
Log Share Manu. Emp. X Distance			-1.352*** (0.455)	0.140 (0.117)	-1.758*** (0.626)	-0.117 (0.404)
Observations	89,870	89,870	28,985	60,885	28,985	60,885
Sample	All	All	1817-1859	1861-1905	1817-1859	1861-1905
Std dev Dep. Var.	0.465	0.988	0.359	0.488	0.629	1.092
Std dev Log Share Manu. Emp.	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.036	0.038	0.036
Std dev Distance	-	-	0.664	0.864	0.664	0.864

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. State presence takes value one if the federal state is present in the county. Log tot. employees is the logarithm of one plus the total number of employees employed in the county. Log(Share Manu. Emp.) is the logarithm of the share of a county's population that is employed in manufacturing. Distance is the distance (in thousands miles) between the county's centroid and DC. All specifications control for county fixed effects and state-year fixed effects. The sample in columns 1-2 includes all odd years between 1821-1905, with the exception of 1831-1839, while it includes all odd years between 1821-1859, with the exception of 1831-1839 in columns 3, 5, and all odd years between 1861-1905 in columns 4, 6. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 2: Railroad expansion, DC's monitoring capacity, and state presence**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
					Log Clerks	Log Profess.	Log Low skills
		State presence					
Log Time to DC	-0.193*** (0.030)	-0.136*** (0.031)	-0.146*** (0.032)	-0.149*** (0.032)	-0.268** (0.107)	-0.057 (0.107)	0.113 (0.135)
Local Railroads		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Market Access			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	99,673	99,673	99,673	97,618	29,418	29,418	29,418
Sd dep. var.	0.4583	0.4583	0.4583	0.4595	0.9261	0.9484	1.1160
Sd Log Time to DC	0.8019	0.8019	0.8019	0.8048	0.8815	0.8815	0.8815

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. *State presence* takes value one if the federal state is present in the county. *Log Clerks*, *Log Profess.*, *Log Blue Collar* are the logarithm of the total number of employees employed in clerical, professional, and low skills positions, respectively. *Log Time to DC* is the log of total time (in minutes) between DC and the county's centroid. All specifications control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the straight line distance between the county and DC interacted with year fixed effects. In columns 2 to 7 we additionally control for an indicator taking value one if the county contains any railroad track, and the length of railroad track in the county. In columns 3 to 7 we additionally control for the county's log market access. In columns 4 to 7 we additionally control for the log of the county's total population and the log of the share of the county's population that is employed in manufacturing. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 3: Railroad expansion, DC’s monitoring capacity, and state organization**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Manager Delegation				Share Leave Bureaucracy			
Log Time to DC	-0.277*** (0.053)	-0.186*** (0.059)	-0.180*** (0.059)	-0.184*** (0.060)	0.055* (0.032)	0.051 (0.034)	0.057* (0.034)	0.062* (0.035)
Local Railroads		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Log Market Access			✓	✓			✓	✓
Additional controls				✓				✓
Observations	30,239	30,239	30,239	29,366	28,068	28,068	28,068	27,193
Sd dep. var.	0.4708	0.4708	0.4708	0.4673	0.3781	0.3781	0.3781	0.3771
Sd Log Time to DC	0.8805	0.8805	0.8805	0.8812	0.8928	0.8928	0.8928	0.8940

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. *Manager Delegation* is an indicator equal to one if there is at least one manager in the county. *Share Leave Bureaucracy* is the share of employees who left the federal bureaucracy between year  $t$  and year  $t - 2$ . *Log Time to DC* is the log of total time (in minutes) between DC and the county’s centroid. All specifications control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the straight line distance between the county and DC interacted with year fixed effects. In columns 2-4 and 6-8 we additionally control for an indicator taking value one if the county contains any railroad track, and the length of railroad track in the county. In columns 3-4 and 7-8 we additionally control for the county’s log market access. In columns 4 and 8 we additionally control for the log of the county’s total population and the log of the share of the county’s population that is employed in manufacturing. In columns 1-4 we additionally control for a set of fixed effects for the total number of federal employees in the county. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 4: Telegraph connections, DC’s monitoring capacity, and the development of the state**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	State Presence	Log Clerks	Log Profess.	Log Blue Collar	Manager Delegation	Share Leave Bureaucracy
Telegraph Connections	-0.001 (0.008)	0.081*** (0.030)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.034* (0.018)	0.027** (0.011)	-0.046*** (0.015)
Observations	15,583	2,212	2,212	2,212	2,167	2,212
Std. dev. dep. var.	0.3555	0.7776	0.9406	0.7459	0.4945	0.3805
Mean dep. var.	0.1484	0.6946	0.7545	0.4963	0.4255	0.5248
Std. dev. Telegraph	0.3259	0.5563	0.5563	0.5563	0.5541	0.5563

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. *Telegraph Connections* is the number of locations connected to the telegraph in the county. *State presence* takes value one if the federal state is present in the county. *Log Clerks*, *Log Profess.*, *Log Blue Collar* are the logarithm of the total number of employees employed in clerical, professional, and low skills positions, respectively. *Manager Delegation* is an indicator equal to one if there is at least one manager in the county. *Share Leave Bureaucracy* is the share of employees who left the federal bureaucracy between year  $t$  and year  $t - 2$ . All specifications control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, the straight line distance between the county and DC interacted with year fixed effects, the log of the county’s total population, and the log of the share of the county’s population that is employed in manufacturing. In column 5 we additionally control for a set of fixed effects for the total number of federal employees in the county. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 5: Increased monitoring capacity increases the share of Southern employees**


Dep. var. is Share of workers born in a Confederate state	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>Full sample</i>	<i>Post civil war</i>	<i>Pre civil war</i>
Log Time to DC	-0.137*** (0.036)	-0.357*** (0.051)	0.031 (0.054)
Observations	27,153	21,945	5,058
Std. dev. dep. var.	0.3996	0.3963	0.4132
Std. dev. Log Time to DC	0.8740	0.8410	0.9285

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. The dependent variable in all columns is the share of a county's employees who were born in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. Log Time to DC is the log of total time (in minutes) between DC and the county's centroid. Controls are the same as in column 4 of Table 2. The sample in column 1 includes all counties with state presence in all odd years between 1821-1905. The sample in column 2 is limited to the 1861-1905 period, and the sample in column 3 is limited to the 1821-1859 period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

# ONLINE APPENDIX (not intended for publication)

## A Additional figures and tables

Figure A1: Examples of pages in the Official Register




(a) 1817 Register

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.				
Names and offices.	Where employed.	Where born.	Whence appointed.	Compensation.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY.				
<i>Secretary.</i>				
Benjamin H. Eristow .....	Washington .....	Kentucky .....	Kentucky .....	\$8,000 00
<i>Assistant Secretaries.</i>				
Charles F. Conant .....	Washington .....	New Hampshire .....	New Hampshire .....	4,500 00
Curtis F. Burman .....	do. ....	Kentucky .....	Kentucky .....	4,500 00
<i>Chief Clerk and Superintendent of Treasury Buildings.</i>				
.....	.....	.....	.....	3,000 00
<i>Stenographer to Secretary.</i>				
Elisha J. Babcock .....	Washington .....	New York .....	New York .....	2,400 00
<i>Disbursing Clerks.</i>				
Danrosd Birch .....	Washington .....	New York .....	Illinois .....	2,800 00
Thomas J. Hobbs .....	do. ....	Maine .....	Maine .....	3,000 00
DIVISIONS OF THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE.				
AFFIDAVIT.				
<i>Chief.</i>				
Louis G. Martin .....	Washington .....	New York .....	New York .....	5,500 00
<i>Assistant Chief.</i>				
George N. Langbehn .....	Washington .....	Connecticut .....	Connecticut .....	2,400 00
<i>Clerks.</i>				
Charles H. Dow .....	Washington .....	Maine .....	Maine .....	2,100 00
John P. Butler .....	do. ....	Ohio .....	Georgia .....	1,600 00
Walter S. Eaton .....	do. ....	Massachusetts .....	Massachusetts .....	1,600 00
John G. Elliott .....	do. ....	Indiana .....	Illinois .....	1,400 00
David Kolbet .....	do. ....	New York .....	North Carolina .....	1,450 00
James E. Shepherd .....	do. ....	Indiana .....	Indiana .....	1,500 00
Mattie G. More .....	do. ....	New York .....	New York .....	900 00
Mary M. Wilson .....	do. ....	Pennsylvania .....	Ohio .....	900 00
<i>Temporary Clerks.</i>				
James Toback .....	Washington .....	Virginia .....	Dist. Columbia .....	1,000 00
Alex. M. Stout, jr. ....	do. ....	Kentucky .....	Virginia .....	720 00
<i>Messengers.</i>				
William T. Simpson .....	Washington .....	Maryland .....	Dist. Columbia .....	840 00
Robert Johnson .....	do. ....	Virginia .....	do. ....	840 00
WARRANTS, ESTIMATES, AND AFFIDAVITS.				
<i>Chief.</i>				
J. T. Power .....	Washington .....	Pennsylvania .....	Pennsylvania .....	3,000 00
<i>Assistant Chief.</i>				
W. F. Maclean .....	Washington .....	Connecticut .....	New York .....	2,400 00

(b) 1875 Register

Notes: The figure shows the cover page of the 1817's Register, and the first page of the Treasury Department in the 1875's Register.


Figure A2: Number of federal employees normalized by U.S. population



Notes: The figure shows the number of federal employees normalized by U.S. population (divided by 1,000).




Figure A3: Does the federal state substitute for local and state governments?




Notes: The figure shows the partial relationship between the number of federal employee per 1,000 people and the number of local and state public employees per 1,000 people. The unit of observation is a county-year, with the sample limited to 1855, 1865, 1875, 1885, 1895, and 1905. The relationship shown is after partialing out county fixed effects and year fixed effects. The p-value is from a regression clustering at the county level.

Figure A4: Share of counties with state presence – sample of states as of 1817




Notes: The figure shows share of U.S. counties with state presence, limiting the sample to counties in states that were already part of the U.S. in 1817.

Figure A5: Share of counties with state presence – weighting by population




Notes: The figure shows share of U.S. counties with state presence, weighting each county by the fraction of the U.S. population living in the county in that year.


Figure A6: Turnover by occupational category




(a) Managers



(b) Clerical




(c) Professionals



(d) Low skills


Notes: The figure shows aggregate turnover over 1817-1905 for employees employed as managers (Panel A), in clerical occupations (Panel B), as professionals (Panel C), and in relatively low skills occupations (Panel D). The red vertical lines indicate years in which the party of the President changes.

**Figure A7: Expansion of the railroad network over time**




*Notes:* The figure shows the expansion of the railroad network over time. Source: transportation network database by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), based on initial GIS railroad files by Atack (2013).

**Figure A8: Average travel time between DC and other counties, 1830-1900**




*Notes:* The figure shows the average travel time (in hours) between DC and other counties in each decade 1830 and 1900.

**Figure A9: Changes in travel time to DC and changes in market access, 1880-1890.**



*Notes:* The figure shows the relationship between changes in log market access and changes in log travel time to DC between 1880 and 1890.

Figure A10: Expansion of the telegraph network over time



Notes: The figure shows the number of locations in each county connected to the telegraph network in each year between 1845 and 1853. Source: Wang (2022).

**Table A1: Largest bureaus outside of DC**

<i>Bureau</i>	<i>Employees</i>
Customs	134,136
Internal revenue	49,969
Indian office	43,939
Ordnance - War	33,001
Quartermaster - War	28,253
Lighthouse board	27,644
Mint	16,247
General land office	13,281
Life saving service	11,863
Weather bureau	7,404
Other bureaus	69,170

**Table A2: Manufacturing Growth and State Presence - Extractive vs Non-Extractive Bureaus**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	State	Log tot.	State	Log tot.
	presence	employees	presence	employees
Log Share Manu. Emp.	0.539***	1.729***	0.518***	2.177***
	(0.114)	(0.254)	(0.115)	(0.334)
Observations	89,870	89,870	89,870	89,870
Type of Bureau	Extractive	Extractive	Other	Other

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. State presence takes value one if the federal state is present in the county. Log tot. employees is the logarithm of one plus the total number of employees employed in the county. Log(Share Manu. Emp.) is the logarithm of the share of a county's population that is employed in manufacturing. All specifications control for county fixed effects, state-year fixed effects, and the log of a county's total population. The sample includes all odd years between 1821-1905, with the exception of 1831-1839. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



**Table A3: Turnover is Lower in DC than in the Field**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Turnover	Turnover	Turnover
Employed in DC	-0.185*** (0.001)	-0.191*** (0.002)	-0.173*** (0.003)
Observations	657,325	657,230	652,708
Mean Turnover in Field	0.433	0.433	0.433
Fixed effects	Year	Year-Bureau	Year-Bureau-Occ. layer

*Notes:* The unit of observation is the employee-year. Turnover takes value one if the employee leaves the organization. Employed in DC takes value one if the employee is employed in DC. Column 1 includes year fixed effects, column 2 includes year-bureau fixed effects, column 3 includes year-bureau-occupational layer fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A4: Railroad expansion, DC’s monitoring capacity, and state presence – Only states as of 1821**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
					Log Clerks	Log Profess.	Log Low skills
		State presence					
Log Time to DC	-0.251*** (0.032)	-0.186*** (0.034)	-0.184*** (0.034)	-0.192*** (0.034)	-0.271** (0.120)	-0.023 (0.122)	0.047 (0.152)
Local Railroads		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Market Access			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	83,944	83,944	83,944	82,664	24,375	24,375	24,375
Sd dep. var.	0.4553	0.4553	0.4553	0.4565	0.9222	0.9204	1.0631
Sd Log Time to DC	0.7818	0.7818	0.7818	0.7825	0.7923	0.7923	0.7923

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. The table presents results from the same specifications as in Table 2, restricting the sample to counties in states that were already part of the U.S. in 1821. See notes to Table 2 for additional details. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A5: Railroad expansion, DC’s monitoring capacity, and state organization  
– Only states as of 1821**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Manager Delegation				Share Leave Bureaucracy			
Log Time to DC	-0.306*** (0.062)	-0.222*** (0.069)	-0.216*** (0.069)	-0.222*** (0.069)	0.070* (0.036)	0.054 (0.039)	0.065* (0.038)	0.068* (0.038)
Local Railroads		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Log Market Access			✓	✓			✓	✓
Additional controls				✓				✓
Observations	24,470	24,470	24,470	24,315	22,667	22,667	22,667	22,507
Sd dep. var.	0.4663	0.4663	0.4663	0.4667	0.3836	0.3836	0.3836	0.3834
Sd Log Time to DC	0.7921	0.7921	0.7921	0.7920	0.8036	0.8036	0.8036	0.8035

*Notes:* The unit of observation is a county-year. The table presents results from the same specifications as in Table 3, restricting the sample to counties in states that were already part of the U.S. in 1821. See notes to Table 3 for additional details. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county-level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

# DATA CONSTRUCTION APPENDIX

## (not intended for publication)

### B Individual identifiers, gender, and matching of employees over time

In order to match workers across years, we start by assigning to each employee in each year an identifier. Specifically, for each year, individuals with the same full name, employed in the same department, with the same place of birth, and (starting in 1851) with the same place of appointment, are assigned the same identifier. This allows for individuals to appear multiple times in each year of the Official Register, if they are employed in multiple positions.

We then build the variable *gender*. We infer that an employee is a female in several ways. First, most female employees appear in the data with the prefix “miss” or “mrs”. Second, some employees appear in the Official Register employed simply as “ladies”. Third, we infer that the employee is a female based on the occupation titles (e.g., “matron”, “waitress”, “housemaid”, “directress”).

We then match workers across years in several steps of matching, based on their first name, midname, last name, suffix, place of birth (state, or foreign country), place of residence at time of appointment, gender and department. We employ different combinations of these characteristics in different steps of matching, to allow for typos in the spelling of the full name, for missing information on place of birth or of residence in some years, and for individuals’ movements across departments. In total we employ 133 different steps of matching. Importantly, our matching algorithm directly takes into account the fact that bureaus can change departments across years.

In order to allow for cases in which an employee leaves the federal bureaucracy only temporarily, our matching algorithm allows a worker in time  $t$  not matched in  $t + 1$  to be matched again in any year after  $t + 1$ . More specifically, we start by matching workers in year 1817 to workers in year 1819. We then match workers in year 1819 to workers in year 1821, and then we match workers in year 1817 who were not matched to workers in year 1819 to workers in year 1821. We repeat this procedure for all years: for each year  $t$ , we match workers in year  $t - 1$  to workers in year  $t$ ; we then match workers in year  $t - 2$  who were not found in year  $t - 1$  to workers in year  $t$ , and we repeat the same procedure for all years before year  $t$ .

Finally, we assign a unique time-invariant individual identifier to each employee, in order to trace their career in the federal bureaucracy.

We implement the following 133 steps of matching.

1. full name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
2. full name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
3. full name, place of birth, department, gender
4. full name, place of first appointment, department, gender
5. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
6. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
7. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, department, gender
8. first name, midname, last name, place of first appointment, department, gender
9. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
10. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
11. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, department, gender
12. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment, department, gender
13. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
14. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
15. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, department, gender
16. first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment, department, gender
17. first name, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
18. first name, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
19. first name, last name, suffix, place of birth, department, gender
20. first name, last name, suffix, place of first appointment, department, gender
21. first name, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
22. first name, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender

23. first name, last name, place of birth, department, gender
24. first name, last name, place of first appointment, department, gender
25. full name, place of birth, gender
26. full name, place of first appointment, gender
27. full name, department, gender
28. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, gender
29. first name, midname, last name, place of first appointment, gender
30. first name, midname, last name, department, gender
31. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, gender
32. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment, gender
33. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, department, gender
34. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, gender
35. first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment, gender
36. first name, initial midname, last name, department, gender
37. first name, last name, suffix, place of birth, gender
38. first name, last name, suffix, place of first appointment, gender
39. first name, last name, suffix, department, gender
40. first name, last name, place of birth, gender
41. first name, last name, place of first appointment, gender
42. first name, last name, department, gender
43. full name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department
44. full name, place of birth, place of first appointment
45. full name, place of birth, department
46. full name, place of first appointment, department
47. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department

48. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment
49. first name, midname, last name, place of birth, department
50. first name, midname, last name, place of first appointment, department
51. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, department
52. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment
53. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, department
54. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment department
55. first name, initial midname, last name,place of birth, place of first appointment, department
56. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment
57. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, department
58. first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment, department,
59. first name, last name,suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, department
60. first name, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment
61. first name, last name, suffix, place of birth, department
62. first name, last name, suffix, place of first appointment, department
63. first name, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, department
64. first name, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment
65. first name, last name, place of birth, department
66. first name, last name, place of first appointment, department
67. Full name, place of birth
68. Full name, place of first appointment
69. Full name, department,
70. first name, midname, last name, place of birth
71. first name, midname, last name, place of first appointment

72. first name, midname, last name, department
73. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth
74. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment
75. first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, department
76. first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth
77. first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment
78. first name, initial midname, last name, department
79. first name, last name,suffix, place of birth
80. first name, last name, suffix, place of first appointment
81. first name, last name, suffix, department
82. first name, last name, place of birth
83. first name, last name, place of first appointment
84. first name, last name, department
85. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, department, gender
86. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
87. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, department, gender
88. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment,department, gender
89. initial first name, initial midname, last name,place of birth, place of first appointment,department, gender
90. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
91. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, department, gender
92. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment,department, gender



93. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, gender
94. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment, gender
95. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, department, gender
96. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, gender
97. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment, gender
98. initial first name, initial midname, last name, department, gender
99. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment,department
100. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, place of first appointment
101. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth, department
102. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment,department
103. initial first name, initial midname, last name,place of birth, place of first appointment,department
104. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment
105. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth, department
106. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment,department
107. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of birth
108. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, place of first appointment
109. initial first name, initial midname, last name, suffix, department
110. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of birth
111. initial first name, initial midname, last name, place of first appointment
112. initial first name, initial midname, last name, department
113. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, department, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
114. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender

115. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, department, place of birth, gender
116. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, department, place of first appointment, gender
117. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, place of birth, gender
118. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, place of first appointment, gender
119. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, last name, department, gender
120. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, department place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
121. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
122. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, department, place of birth, gender
123. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, department, place of first appointment, gender
124. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, place of birth, gender
125. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, place of first appointment, gender
126. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: first name, initial last name, department, gender
127. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, department, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
128. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, place of birth, place of first appointment, gender
129. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, department, place of birth, gender
130. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, department, place of first appointment, gender
131. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, place of birth, gender

132. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, place of first appointment, gender
133. fuzzy matching on full name, blocking on: initial first name, initial last name, department, gender

## C Cleaning and geo-location of places of employment

Information on an employee’s place of employment is typically contained in the column “where employed” of the Official Register (see Figure C11).<sup>51</sup> In some cases in which this column contains only the state of employment, more information on the precise location can be obtained by manually reviewing the pages of the Official Register. For example, as can be seen from the extract of the 1865 Register shown in Figure C12, the specific Indian agencies of the Indian Office are listed as sections of the Register, with the list of individuals employed in each agency, while the “where employed” column simply contains the state where the agency is located.

We then manually code each observation in order to build three variables. The variable *Location* contains the name of the location of employment. In the majority of cases, this is a city or a town; in some cases, this can be a river, a lake, a county, or a lighthouse located in an isolated location. In some cases, the “where employed” column contains the name of a specific building (e.g., “Washington barracks, d c” or “Watertown arsenal”) which we assign to the corresponding location. In the cases in which the location is an agency, we assign the location of the headquarter of the agency, whenever this information can be found through an online search. The variable *State* contains the name of the state (or the territory) where the employee is located. The variable *Foreign Country* is an indicator taking value one if the individual is employed abroad. We harmonize the names of the locations to account for different spellings of the same location. We obtain a total of 11,873 locations in the United States

We then manually assign coordinates to each of these 11,873 locations through extensive online searches. While in most cases the geolocation does not present any issue, and we can simply rely on Google Maps in order to geolocate a city or a town, the geolocation of some cases is worth discussing. First, the name of the location might not appear in Google Maps if the location has an historical name or is no longer inhabited today: in these cases, we conduct additional online searches in order to recover the original geolocation. Second, in cases in which the location is a river or a lake, we assign the coordinates only if (i) the

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<sup>51</sup>The column is sometimes labeled “residence”, or “where located”.

river/lake is small in size, so that it is entirely contained in a county, or (ii) the Register contains additional information about the location of the employee in the river/lake (e.g., “Mississippi river near friars point”). We are able to precisely geolocate a total of 10,236 out of 11,873 locations.<sup>52</sup> We are unable to assign coordinates to all locations since in a minority of cases the Register reports only the State of employment, or it reports vague geographic information (such as “on a river” or “along the coast”).

Finally, we use ArcGIS to overlay the coordinates of each location to a map of the U.S. counties as of 1890, and assign to each location its 1890 county.

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<sup>52</sup>In the paper, after the minor data restrictions that we impose, we are left with 9,651 unique locations.

Figure C11: “Where employed” column from the 1875 Official Register

Customs Service.		
Name.	Office.	Where employed.
William R. Perry . . .	Deputy collector and inspector.	Superior, Wis . . .
Phillip H. Payne . . .	do . . . . .	Torch Lake . . . . .
Joseph Flesheimer . . .	do . . . . .	Menomonee . . . . .
Edward L. Wright . . .	do . . . . .	Houghton . . . . .
Charles J. Linke . . . . .	do . . . . .	White Fish Point . . . . .
Orrin W. Robinson . . .	do . . . . .	Houghton . . . . .
Peter C. Bird . . . . .	do . . . . .	Eagle Harbor . . . . .
Albert C. Hayward . . .	do . . . . .	Bayfield, Wis . . . . .
Henry C. Carleton . . .	do . . . . .	Detour . . . . .
Hiram K. Cole . . . . .	do . . . . .	Isle Royale . . . . .
Josiah R. Brooks . . . . .	do . . . . .	Menomonee . . . . .
Alfred Meade . . . . .	do . . . . .	Ontonagon . . . . .
John A. French . . . . .	do . . . . .	Marquette . . . . .
John Q. Bernard . . . . .	do . . . . .	L'Anse . . . . .
Hylor A. Downs . . . . .	Special inspector . . . . .	Marquette . . . . .
Ashbell Roach . . . . .	Inspector . . . . .	Sault Ste. Marie . . . . .
William Newcomb . . . . .	do . . . . .	do . . . . .

Notes: The figure shows an extract from the 1875 Register, highlighting the locations under the “where employed” column.

Figure C12: Agency of employment from the 1865 Official Register

134 INTERIOR DEPARTMENT.

*Indian Office.*

Names and offices.	Where employed.	Where born.
<i>Omaha Agency.</i>		
R. W. Furnas . . . . . agent . . . . .	Nebraska . . . . .	Ohio . . . . .
Hiram Chase . . . . . interpreter . . . . .	do . . . . .	Nebraska . . . . .
<i>Otoe and Missouri Agency.</i>		
William Daily . . . . . agent . . . . .	Nebraska . . . . .	Indiana . . . . .
Baptiste Barnaby . . . . . interpreter . . . . .	do . . . . .	Nebraska . . . . .
James Bevins . . . . . blacksmith . . . . .	do . . . . .	Pennsylvania . . . . .
M. Lodge . . . . . asst. blacksmith . . . . .	do . . . . .	Otoe Nation . . . . .
L. A. Stebbins . . . . . farmer . . . . .	do . . . . .	New York . . . . .
A. L. Tinkham . . . . . miller . . . . .	do . . . . .	Vermont . . . . .
Ebbin Jordan . . . . . engineer . . . . .	do . . . . .	Maine . . . . .
<i>Pawnee Agency.</i>		
Daniel H. Wheeler . . . . . agent . . . . .	Nebraska . . . . .	do . . . . .
Milo Tillow . . . . . farmer . . . . .	do . . . . .	Pennsylvania . . . . .
James Welch . . . . . blacksmith . . . . .	do . . . . .	England . . . . .
Henry P. Coolidge . . . . . gunsmith . . . . .	do . . . . .	Ohio . . . . .
Co-low-ah, (Indian) . . . . . asst. smith . . . . .	do . . . . .	Nebraska . . . . .

Notes: The figure shows an extract from the 1865 Register (page 134).

## D Re-construction of the organizational hierarchy

### D.1 Bureaus in the Treasury Department

Figure D21 shows the organization in bureaus of the Treasury Department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the Treasury Department are listed in D21. Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **United States Mint.** Despite being formally an independent body until 1873, it was connected to the Treasury Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 196-198.
- **Customs.** Customs has been under the First Comptroller until 1849 and then again from 1894. In the period between these two years it is a separate office with a commission as its head. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 145, 279.
- **Lighthouse Administration.** From 1817, the Lighthouse administration has been under the Fifth Auditor until the creation of the lighthouse board in 1852. The source is <https://uslhs.org/history-administration-lighthouses-america>. It was then moved to the Commerce and Labor Department in 1903. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 281.
- **Commissioner of Claims.** The commissioner of claims has been abolished in 1818 and its duties have been transferred to the Third Auditor. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 143.
- **Commissioner of Internal Revenue.** The Commissioner of internal revenue has been created in 1862 to provide internal revenue support to government. It works directly under the Secretary of the treasury. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 269.
- **Solicitor of the Treasury.** The Solicitor of the treasury has been created in 1830. Before that, the duties of this office were performed by the First Comptroller or Fifth Auditor, then moved to the Justice Department in 1870. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 144 and 272.

- **Land Patents.** The secretary for signing land patents has been created in 1833 (and appears in 1835 in Register for the first time), and then goes under the General Land Office. Source: <https://scrc1.wordpress.com/2010/12/10/when-the-president-signed-every-land-grant/>
- **Second Comptroller.** The Second Comptroller has been abolished in 1894. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 279.
- **Coast and Geodetic Survey.** The Coast and Geodetic Survey has been created under the Treasury department in 1836 and remained there until 1903; before then, under it was under the Navy but with only Navy officials, not civilians and, hence, it is not in our dataset. The Coast and Geodetic Survey was in Treasury also between 1832 and 1834, but it did not start operating. Importantly, the **Weights and Measures** was also part of the the Coast and Geodetic Survey. It then moved to the Commerce and Labor Department in 1903. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 152-154 and 281.
- **Office of the Sixth Auditor.** The Office of the Sixth Auditor has been created in 1836. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 144.
- **Office of the Chief Clerk.** Importantly, the chief clerk of the Treasury is in charge of the "Office of the Chief Clerk", with supervision among other things of buildings of the Treasury, and in charge of "*direction of those persons employed as engineers, machinists, firemen, or laborers, who are paid from appropriation for contingent expenses of the Department*". Hence, the chief clerk and all these other employees are part of the divisions of Secretary Office. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 50.
- **General Land Office.** The General land office has been part of the Treasury and moved to the Interior when the Department has been created. In 1836, several positions within General land office were added (solicitor, recorder, principal clerks,...). *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 148 and 149.
- **Supervising Architect Office.** The Supervising Architect Office, originally known as the Bureau of Construction, has been created in 1852 but it appears for the first time

in the US Official Register in 1855. Source: <https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/historic-preservation/historic-building-stewardship/architecture-and-government/a-timeline-of-architecture-and-government>

- **Steamboat Inspection Service.** The SteamBoat Inspection Service has been created in 1838, with judges at the management of it. In 1852 it has been placed under Treasury Department. However, it appears for the first time in the Official Register in 1859. In 1903 it is then moved to the Department of Commerce and Labor. Sources: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), pages 158, 159, 161.<sup>53</sup>
- **Comptroller of the Currency.** The Comptroller of the Currency has been created in 1863. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 270. In 1902, a new statute specifically added employees of the comptroller of the currency, including bank examiners, receivers, attorneys for receivers, and clerks in national banks outside DC.<sup>54</sup>
- **Bureau of Engraving and Printing.** The Bureau of Engraving and Printing has been created in 1862, known as "First Division of National Currency Bureau". We decided to list it as independent bureau since 1862 because a) its importance and b) right from its early days it looks a separate organization within the Treasury Department. Note: the Comptroller of the Currency declares he has no supervision over the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. It has been recognised by Congress as bureau formally only in 1875. Sources: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 269.
- **Bureau of Statistics.** The Bureau of Statistics has been created in 1866. It has then moved to the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903. Sources: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 271 and 281.
- **Marine Hospital.** The Marine Hospital has been under the responsibility of Customs, until the establishment of the Supervising Surgeon of the Martine Hospital (then renamed Surgeon General) in 1870 with the first Supervising Surgeon appointed in 1871. It appears for the first time has separate office in the US Official Register starting in

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<sup>53</sup>See also: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steamboat\\_Inspection\\_Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steamboat_Inspection_Service)


<sup>54</sup>See also: <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2004/winter/genealogy-official-register.html>. Note: these employees are dropped from our sample.



1873. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 157 and 158.

- **Revenue Cutters/Revenue Marine Service.** Similarly to Customs, the Revenue Cutters has been under the responsibility of the First Comptroller until 1843. After 1843 it is placed under Customs. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 154 and 155.
- **Life Saving Service.** The Life Saving Service was placed un the customs until 1878 and, after that, it became a separate bureau. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 274.
- **Bureau of Navigation.** The Bureau of Navigation has been established in 1884. In 1903 it was moved under the Department of Commerce and Labor Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 275 and 281.
- **Bureau of Immigration.** The Bureau of Immigration has been established in 1891. In 1903 it was moved under the Department of Commerce and Labor Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 276 and 281.
- **National Bureau of Standards.** The National Bureau of Standards has been created as separate bureau in 1901. Before that it was under the responsibility of the Coast and Geodetic Survey. In 1903 it was moved under the Department of Commerce and Labor Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 280 and 281.

Figure D13: Bureaus in the Treasury Department



Notes: The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the Treasury department for each year between 1817 and 1905.

## D.2 Bureaus in the War Department

Figure D14 shows the organization in bureaus of the War department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the War Department are listed in D14. Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **Indian Affairs.** The Indian Affairs is placed under the supervision of the Secretary of War. It is transferred to the Interior Ministry, upon its creation in 1849. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 125 and 137.
- **Adjutant and Inspector General's Office.** The Adjutant and Inspector General's Office is split in 1821 into Adjutant Office and Inspector Office. The Inspector general office is not an office/bureau of the war department until 1972. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 132 and page 271.
- **Adjutant General.** The Adjutant General Bureau is active in the War Department until 1904 when it is merged with Record and Pension Office in 1904 to create the new Military Secretary's office. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 249.
- **Pension office.** The Pension Office has been created in 1833. Before that, some clerks in the general department were in charge of pensions. Indeed the Official Register started including "pensions agents" starting from 1827. However, we do not consider them in our dataset since they appear on and off depending on the year. We focus from 1833 onwards. In 1849, the Pension Office has been transferred to the Department of Interior. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 249.
- **Bounty Land Office.** The Bounty Land Office appears for the first time as a separate office in the US Official Register in 1833. Before 1833 it was called "office" but, in reality, it was place under the responsibility of the Office of the Secretary. We consider it a separate bureau starting in 1833, following the classification of the US Official Register. This bureau is then moved to the Pension Office from 1843. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 136 and 137.
- **Topographical Bureau.** The Topographical Bureau has been created in 1831, but in the US Official Register it appears as separate bureau from 1835. In 1863 it be-

comes part of the Engineer Office. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 134 and 237.

- **Topographical Bureau.** The Topographical Bureau was created in 1831, but it appears as an independent bureau in the US Official Register only in 1835. From 1863 it becomes part of Engineer Office. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 134 and 237.
- **Purchasing Department.** The Purchasing Department was abolished in 1842 and its duties were transferred to the Quartermaster Bureau. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 133.
- **Provost Marshal Generals.** The Provost Marshal Generals Bureau was created in 1863. It was then discontinued in 1866 and its duties transferred to Adjutant General. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 237 and 238.
- **Military Justice/Judge Advocate General.** The Judge Advocate General was created in 1864. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 237.
- **Freedmen Bureau.** The Freedmen Bureau was created in 1866 and was then abolished in 1872 with its duties transferred to Adjutant General. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 238.
- **The Signal Office.** The Signal Office was create in 1864. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 237.
- **Office of Inspector of National Cemeteries.** The Office of Inspector of National Cemeteries. We do not consider the Office of Inspector of National Cemeteries as a separate office. It is only present for 2 years and without a head and only with a group of superintendents. Most precisely, it appears in the US official Register in 1873 and then abolished in 1876. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 241.
- **War Record Office.** The War Record Office was created in 1879, but it appears for the first time in the US Register in 1881. In 1899 it was merged with Record

and Pension. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 242.

- **Office of Superintendent of State War and Navy Building.** The Office of Superintendent of State War and Navy Building was created in 1883 as a detached agency. Before this period it was placed un the Engineer Office of the War Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 419.
- **Mississippi River Commission.** The Mississippi River Commission was a temporary commission created in 1879. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 243.
- **Missouri River Commission.** The Missouri River Commission was a temporary commission created in 1884 (and abolished in 1902). Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 243.
- **Record and Pension.** The Record and Pension office was established in 1889 and it was called initially "division" and "bureau" from 1891. In 1899 it was merged with the War Records Office in 1899. It was then merged with the Record and Pension Office in 1904 to create the new Military Secretary's Office. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 242 and 249.
- **Board of Ordinance and Fortifications.** The Board of Ordinance and Fortifications was established in 1888 but it appears for the first time in the US Official Register only starting in 1893. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 242.
- **Insular Affairs.** The Insular Affairs Bureau was established in 1902. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 248.
- **Military Secretary's Office.** The Military Secretary's Office was created from the merge of Adjutant and Record and the Pension Office in 1904. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 249.


- **Board of Road Commission.** The Board of Road Commission was created in 1905 and it was also known as the Alaska Road Commission.<sup>55</sup>
- **Isthmian Canal Commission.** The Isthmian Canal Commission was an administration commission set up to oversee the construction of the Panama Canal in the early years of American involvement. Established the February 26, 1904, reported directly to the Secretary of War.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska\\_Road\\_Commission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Road_Commission)

<sup>56</sup>Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isthmian\\_Canal\\_Commission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isthmian_Canal_Commission)

Figure D14: Bureaus in the War Department



Notes: The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the War department for each year between 1817 and 1905.

### D.3 Bureaus in the Navy Department

Figure D15 shows the organization in bureaus of the Navy department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the Navy Department are listed in D15. Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **Board of Navy Commissioners.** The Board of Navy Commissioners is attached to the Office of the Secretary. It exists until 1842. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 164 and 167. The Navy Yards, the Ordinance of Hydrography, Construction and Repair, Provisions and Clothing, Medicine and Surgery: all these bureaus were created in 1842 out of the Board of Navy Commission which is abolished.
- **Navigation, Steam Engineering, Equipment and Recruiting.** As reflected in D15, these three different bureaus were created in 1862. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 299.
- **Navy Observatory and Hydrographic Office.** The Navy Observatory and Hydrographic Office were both created in 1846. Until 1862 placed under the Bureau of Ordinance and then moved to the newly formed Bureau of Navigation. The Hydrographic Office was transferred to the Bureau of Equipment in 1898. The Naval Observatory has been transferred to the Bureau of Equipment in 1889. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 174, 300, 312, 314.
- **Nautical Almanac Office.** The Nautical Almanac Office was created in 1849. It was placed under the Bureau of Ordinance until 1862 when it was placed under the Bureau of Navigation just formed. It was then transferred to the Bureau of Equipment in 1889. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 174, 300, 312.
- **Judge Advocate General.** The Judge Advocate General was created in 1880. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 337.




- **Marine Corps.** The Marine Corps Office was created in 1798, less than two months after the creation of the Navy Department. The Corps Office was placed under the immediate direction of the Secretary of the Navy by the President and the commandant rendered his reports to the head of the Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 195.
- **Navy Academy.** In 1850, the Navy Academy was placed under the supervision of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. In 1889, the Naval Academy was placed again under the supervision of the Bureau of Navigation. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 339.
- **Navy Proving Ground.** The Navy Proving Ground was placed under the Bureau of Ordnance.<sup>57</sup>
- **Navy Home.** In 1898, the personnel and administration of the United States Naval Home were transferred from the Bureau of Yards and Docks to the Bureau of Navigation. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 341.
- **Navy Intelligence.** In 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence was established as a part of the Bureau of Navigation. The office was placed under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1890, but it was again transferred to the Bureau of Navigation in 1898. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 338.
- **Navy Station.** The Navy Station Office was placed under the Bureau of Ordnance. Source: *new eye for the navy: the origin of radar at the naval research laboratory*, by David K. Allison, page 12.
- **Navy Torpedo Station.** The Navy Torpedo Station was placed under the Navigation Bureau until 1888 and then merged with other stations in the same location and moved under Naval Ordnance. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 310.

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<sup>57</sup>Source: <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/156.html#156.11>

- **Navy War College.** The Navy War College was part of the Bureau of Navigation until 1888 and then transferred under the bureau or Naval Ordinance. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 338.
- **Board of Navy Commission Office.** We assign this office to the category *Temporary Commissions and Offices* until 1841 when it is discontinued.
- **Navy Records of the Rebellion.** We assign this office to the category *Temporary Commissions and Offices* for only two years, 1895 and 1897.

Figure D15: Bureaus in the Navy Department



Notes: The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the Navy department for each year between 1817 and 1905.

## D.4 Bureaus in the Interior Department

Figure D16 shows the organization in bureaus of the Interior department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the Interior Department are listed in D16. Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **General Land Office.** The General Land Office has been transferred in 1849 from the Treasury Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.
- **Patent Office.** The Patent Office has been transferred in 1849 from the State Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.
- **Indian Office.** The Indian Office has been transferred in 1849 from the War Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.
- **Pension Office.** The Pension Office has been transferred in 1849 from the War Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.
- **Census Office.** The Census Office has been transferred in 1849 from the State Department. Subsequently, in 1903, it has been transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.
- **Government Hospital for the Insane.** The Government Hospital for the Insane has been established in 1855 with a superintendent in charge. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 216 and 217.
- **Metropolitan Police.** Since 1861, the board of Metropolitan Police commission of DC submits annual reports to the Secretary of Interior. From 1873, it is transferred to the Justice Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 360.
- **Penitentiary.** The Penitentiary is part of the Department of the Interior until 1863, when it disappears from the US Registry. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.

- **Washington Aqueduct.** We do not assign the Washington Aqueduct as a separate office. It was assigned to the supervision of the Engineer Office in War Department in 1862 and then back to Engineer in 1867. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 359.
- **Commissioner of Public Buildings.** The Commissioner of Public Buildings was transferred to the Engineer War in 1867. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 199 and 238.
- **Jail Dist Columbia.** The Jail Dist Columbia has been transferred from the Interior Department to the Justice Department in 1872. Note: it is absent in the Official Register in 1871. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 333.
- **Architect of the Capitol.** The Architect of the Capitol has been transferred from the War Department to the Interior Department in 1862. However, it appears in the US Official Register only starting 1869. In 1902 its name changed to Superintendent of Capitol Building and Grounds in 1902. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 358 and 365.
- **US Geological Survey.** The US Geological Survey is a new office established in the Interior Department in 1879. However, employees in charge of geographical surveys appear already in 1875 in the Official Register, and so we assign them to Other Employees and Autonomous Divisions and Agencies. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 362.
- **Office of Education.** The Office of Education has been independent until it was placed under the Interior Department in 1868 and renamed Bureau of Education in 1870. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 359.
- **Columbia Hospital for Women.** The Columbia Hospital for Women has been established in 1866 but it appears for the first time in the Interior Department and in the US Register starting 1873. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 229.


- **Freedmen Hospital.** The Freedmen Hospital is placed under control of the secretary of War from 1872 and 1874 and then placed under the Department of Interior after that. It appears for the first time in the US Register in 1877. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 361.
- **Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb.** The Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb has to report to the Secretary of Interior starting in 1857, but since is absent in several years it is listed ad temporary commissions. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 217.
- **The Board of Indian Commission.** The The Board of Indian Commission has been established in 1869, unrelated to the Indian Affairs, and directly responding to the Secretary of Interior. It appears in the Register starting in 1877. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 360.
- **The Commissioner of Railroads.** The The Commissioner of Railroads has been created in 1878. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 361.
- **Ute Commission.** The Ute Commission is a temporary commission present only for one year, in 1881.<sup>58</sup>
- **Bureau of Labor.** The Bureau of Labor was established in 1884 and then moved under the Department of Labor in 1888. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 363.
- **Interstate Commerce Commission.** The Interstate Commerce Commission has been established in 1887 under the Interior Department but then moved as an independent detached agency in 1889. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 420 and 421.
- **Howard University.** Howard University reports to the Secretary of Interior starting from its establishment in 1867. It appears in the US Register for the first time in 1883. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 359.

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<sup>58</sup>Source: <https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6987context=indianserialset>

- **National Parks.** There are several national parks present under the Interior Department. We assign them to Temporary Commission and Other Bodies.

Figure D16: Bureaus in the Interior Department



Notes: The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the Interior department for each year between 1817 and 1905.



## D.5 Bureaus in the State Department

Figure [D17](#) shows the organization in bureaus of the State department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the State Department are listed in [D17](#). Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **The Patent Office.** The Patent Office has been transferred by the Interior Department to the State Department in 1849. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 240.
- **Governors of Territories.** In 1873 the Governors of Territories has been transferred to the Secretary of Interior. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 338.




## D.6 Bureaus in the Justice Department

Figure D18 shows the organization in bureaus of the Justice department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the Justice Department are listed in D18. Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **Jail Dist Columbia.** The Jail Dist Columbia has been transferred from the Interior Department to Justice in 1872. It is absent from the US Official Register in 1871. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 333.
- **Metropolitan police.** Metropolitan Police is moved to Justice Department in 1873. *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 360.
- **Commission Classify Laws.** The Commission Classify Laws has been created in 1897 and it has submitted its last report in 1906. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 335.
- **Forth Leavenworth.** Forth Leavenworth has been created in 1895 and it appears for the first time in the US Register starting in 1899. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 333.
- **Spanish Claims.** The Spanish Treaty Claims Commission has been created in 1901 (until 1910). Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 336.
- **Enforcement of Antitrust Laws.** The Enforcement of Antitrust Laws is an Office headed by an assistant attorney general. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 336.
- **Insular Affairs.** The Bureau of Insular Affairs has been created in 1902. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 336.
- **Penitentiary Atlanta Georgia.** Established in 1899 and its construction ended in 1902. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 333.

- **Solicitor Commerce Labor.** The Solicitor Commerce Labor is created in 1904. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 336.

Figure D18: Bureaus in the Justice Department



Notes: The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the Justice department for each year between 1817 and 1905.


## D.7 Bureaus in the Agriculture Department

The Agriculture Department has been created in 1862 from the Agriculture Division of the Patent Office. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213. All the bureaus of the Agriculture Department are listed in [D19](#). Below we report some notes, and related sources, on the most complicated cases.

- **Bureau of Animal Industry.** The Bureau of Animal Industry is created in 1884. It takes the responsibility of the Signal Office of the War Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 381.
- **Weather Bureau.** The Weather Bureau was created in 1890. It takes the responsibility of the Signal Office of the War Department. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 385.
- **Plant Industry.** The Plant Industry has been created in 1901, consolidating various divisions of the Office of the Secretary. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.
- **Soils.** Soils used to be a division of the Office of the Secretary and elevated to the Bureau in 1901. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.
- **Chemistry.** Chemistry used to be a division of the Office of the Secretary and elevated to the Bureau in 1901. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.
- **Forestry.** Forestry used to be a division of the Office of the Secretary and elevated to the Bureau in 1901. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.
- **Statistics.** Statistics used to be a division of the Office of the Secretary and elevated to the Bureau in 1901. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.

- **Entomology.** Entomology used to be a division of the Office of the Secretary and elevated to the Bureau in 1904. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.
- **Biological Survey.** The Biological Survey was a division of the Office of the Secretary and was elevated to the Bureau status in 1905. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 386.

Figure D19: Bureaus in the Agriculture Department



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Notes: The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the Agriculture department for each year between 1817 and 1905.




## D.8 Bureaus in the Labor Department

The Labor Bureau has been established under the Interior Department in 1884 and then moved under a separate Department (Department of Labor) in 1888. In 1903 it becomes a bureau under the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 363 and 401.

Figure [D20](#) shows the organization in bureaus of the Labor department for each year between 1817 and 1905. All the bureaus of the Labor Department are listed in [D20](#).

**Figure D20: Bureaus in the Labor Department**



*Notes:* The figure shows the organization in bureaus of the Labor department for each year between 1817 and 1905.

## D.9 Other Detached Agencies and Bodies

- **Commissioner of Public Buildings.** The Commission has been independent until 1849. Then, the Commissioner of Public Buildings was transferred to the Engineer War in 1867. Architect of the capitol is an office which responds to the commissioner of public buildings until 1850, when it becomes independent (responding directly to the President), but actually listed in the US Register under Interior. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 199, 213 and 238.
- **Penitentiary.** The Penitentiary is part of the Department of the Interior until 1863, when it disappears from the US Registry. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 213.
- **US Mexico Boundary: Commissioner for Running Boundary Line with Mexico.** The Commissioner, appears in 1835 and 1841, and then after Texas becomes a state between 1848 and 1855 under Interior Department.<sup>59</sup>
- **Police of Capitol.** The Police Capitol appears in 1835 for the first time in the US Official Register, but it was initially created in 1828. It is considered part of the Commissioner of Public Building.
- **Washington City Guard.** The Washington City Guard is part of the Commissioner for Public Buildings
- **Office of Education.** The Office of Education has been independent until it was placed under the Interior Department in 1868 and renamed Bureau of Education in 1870. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 359.
- **National Board of Health.** The National Board of Health exists from 1879 and 1885. It submits annual reports to the Secretary of the Treasury, but it is essentially an independent agency advising all departments on matters of public health. It appears for the first time in the US Register in 1891. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 274 and 275.

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
<sup>59</sup>Source: Treaties and Other International Acts US, page 419 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_and\\_Mexican\\_Boundary\\_Survey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_Mexican_Boundary_Survey)

- **Bureau of Ethnology.** The Bureau of Ethnology is created in 1879 and it is reported as independent detached Agency. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 482.
- **Fish Commission.** The Fish Commission is created in 1871. It is then moved under the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903. It appears for the first time in the US Register in 1881. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 401 and 419.
- **Office of Superintendent of State War and Navy Building.** The office is created in 1883 as a detached agency. Before 1883 it is under the War Department.
- **Civil Service Commission.** The Civil Service Commission is create in 1883 with the Pendleton Act.
- **Interstate Commerce Commission.** The Interstate Commerce Commission is established in 1887 under the Interior Department, but then moved as independent detached agency in 1889. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 420 and 421.
- **Children’s Hospital.** The Children’s Hospital is incorporated in 1870.<sup>60</sup>
- **Industrial Commission.** The Industrial Commission is established in 1898 and lasted until 1902. Source: *Development of the National Administrative organization of the United States* by Lloyd Milton Short (1923), page 424.

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<sup>60</sup>Source: <https://childrensnational.org/about-us/our-history#tab-7>

Figure D21: Other independent agencies in the Federal Bureaucracy



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Notes: The figure shows the other independent agencies in the Federal Bureaucracy for each year between 1817 and 1905.