

Attacking Women or their Policies?

Understanding Violence against Women in Politics

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Motivation

Women are still underrepresented in politics.

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- Only a small percentage in executive government positions.

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Focus on a major material barrier to women participation: [violence against female politicians](#).

Violence Against Women in Politics

Studies suggest that women are more often victims of political violence. (Håkansson, 2021; Krook, 2020; Krook and Sanin, 2021; Bardall et al., 2020; Serrano Oswald, 2022; Herrick et al., 2019) .

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3. Nor on the effect of attacks on women political careers.

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→ Combine rich set of data to identify the conditions under which the gap in violence emerges.

3. Effect of attacks on women political careers.

→ Measure the consequence of attacks.

Data

Data

Is there a Gender Gap in Violence?

Explaining Violence Against Women in Politics

Consequences of Violence

Appendix

Data on Violence against Politicians

We digitize the yearly reports by the NGO *Avviso Pubblico* [▶ More](#) :
N = 4,285 attacks to Italian public officials 2010-2021.

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- Representative: covers all politicians in Italy.
- Detailed: date, municipality, victim, type of attack, description of event. [▶ Examples](#)
- Includes both threats and violence. [▶ Types](#) [▶ Targets](#)
- Indicates when attacks are denounced by the victim(s) or confirmed by the police, allowing us to test for reporting bias.

Is there a Gender Gap in Violence?

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Close Elections RDD

$$\text{Attacks}_{i,t} = \tau_t + \phi_r + \theta X'_{i,t-1} + \beta \text{FMayor}_{i,t} + \gamma f(\text{FMargin})_{i,t} + \\ + \lambda \text{FMayor} \times f(\text{FMargin})_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Local 1st order polynomial with data-driven bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014) and robust, bias-corrected SEs.

Close Elections RDD


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Validity checks:


1. Tests of no-sorting assumption. [▶ Go](#)
2. Balance of covariates at cutoff. [▶ Go](#)
3. Other characteristics of female mayors.

Female Mayors Not a Compound Treatment



Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

Gender Gap in Violence



Female Mayors Are 3 Times As Likely to Be Attacked

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks})$		$\ln\text{HSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor	.100*** (.036)	.106*** (.034)	.079*** (.030)	.087*** (.027)	.102*** (.038)	.111*** (.034)
Mean Depvar	.057	.057	.045	.049	.058	.065
SD Depvar	.233	.232	.198	.209	.255	.274
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	18.62	18.72	17.56	19.00	17.55	19.47
Effective N	1,304	1,272	1,234	1,293	1,233	1,312
N Left	767	748	722	763	722	776
N Right	537	524	512	530	511	536

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

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Mean Depvar	.057	<div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #ffe6e6; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> If there was no gender gap in politics we would see +324 more attacks (+46%) </div>			.058	.065
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Placebo and Robustness Tests

1. Differential reporting. [▶ Go](#)
2. Placebo with other victims. [▶ Go](#)
3. Placebo with lag of attacks. [▶ Go](#)
4. Placebo with irrelevant cutoffs. [▶ Go](#)
5. Robustness to bandwidth choice. [▶ Go](#)
6. Robustness to dependent variable in levels. [▶ Go](#)
7. Excluding one region at a time. [▶ Go](#)
8. Excluding one election year at a time. [▶ Go](#)

Explaining Violence Against Women in Politics

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Explaining Violence Against Women in Politics

1. **Agency:** Reaction against women's policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Pande and Ford, 2009) **and** behavior while in office (Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Baskaran and Hessami, 2019)

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1. **Agency:** Reaction against women's policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Pande and Ford, 2009) **and** behavior while in office (Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Baskaran and Hessami, 2019)
2. **Identity:** Backlash against outgroup becoming empowered economically, demographically, or politically (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2020; Cikara et al., 2022; Zonszein and Grossman, 2022) .

Explaining the Gender Differential in Attacks


Agency?

Policymaking

- Collect data on expenditures of municipal governments.
- Test RDD for women election on spending choices.

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- Test RDD for women election on spending choices.
- Female mayors do not spend differently



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	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks})$		$\ln\text{HSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor (RDD coeff)	.099*** (.034)	.109*** (.033)	.078*** (.029)	.088*** (.027)	.100*** (.037)	.112*** (.035)
Mean Depvar	.054	.054	.045	.045	.058	.057
SD Depvar	.226	.226	.199	.199	.257	.255
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	17.19	16.82	16.77	16.78	16.74	16.91
Effective N	1,209	1,151	1,181	1,148	1,180	1,155
N Left	705	665	683	663	682	668
N Right	504	486	498	485	498	487

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Not Driven by Political Ideology

	(1)	(2)
	<i>Left-Wing</i>	<i>Right-Wing</i>
Female Mayor (RDD coeff)	.201*** (.076)	.140** (.060)
Mean Depvar	.111	.040
SD Depvar	.318	.197
Region FEs	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Bandwidth	11.70	12.94
Effective N	105	187
N Left	45	124
N Right	60	63

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

No Differential Corruption

- Using corruption charges. [▶ Results](#)
- Using fishy procurement practices.
 - Bunching, Subcontracting, Non-negotiated procedures [▶ Results](#)
- Effect not driven by mafia areas or mafia-perpetrated attacks.
[▶ Not Driven by Criminal Attacks](#)

Explaining the Gender Differential in Attacks

Identity?

Identity-driven violence

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
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 - Expectation: \uparrow violence where restrictive gender norms.
- ⇒ **Not supported:** same rate of attacks where
 - Voted against abortion and divorce [▶ Referenda](#)
 - Low female labor force participation [▶ Female Labor](#)

Identity-driven violence


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- Violence where women are most empowered.
 - Expectation: \uparrow violence where women are more empowered politically and occupy positions in office.


Driven by Municipalities with Gender Quotas



with More Women Elected in Council




where Female Presence Has Been Growing



Note: Growth from 1993 to election under consideration.

where there is a Female Regional President



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



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- We use 4 measures: budget surplus (Carreri, 2021), education, skills, and political dynasty.

Bad Female Mayors Are Punished More than Bad Male Mayors



Recap

- (No) Women are not targeted based on their actions.
- (No) Violence is not explained by restrictive gender norms.
- (Yes) Backlash against a large and ↑ female presence in power.
- (Yes) Double standards in the judgement of women in power.

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Consequences of Violence

- On policymaking
- On political persistence
 - While in office – resignation.
 - After term – rerunning.

Effect of Attacks on Policymaking

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
$$Policies_{i,y,t} = \delta_{i \times t} + \rho_y + \psi PostAttack_{i,y} + \gamma(PostAttack * Female)_{i,y,t} + \epsilon_{i,y,t}$$

Effect of Attacks on Policymaking


Do women adjust their policies more after an attack?

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Expenditures



Corruption




▶ Null Effect on Resignations

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Attacked Female Mayors Less Likely to Re-Run

(1)	
<i>All Mayors</i>	
Female Mayor (RDD coeff)	.000 (.043)
Mean Depvar	.431
SD Depvar	.495
Region FEs	Yes
Controls	Yes
Bandwidth	22.67
Effective N	1,536

Notes: The sample only includes mayors not subject to term limits.

Attacked Female Mayors Less Likely to Re-Run

	(1)	(2)
	<i>All Mayors</i>	<i>Not Attacked</i>
Female Mayor (RDD coeff)	.000 (.043)	.039 (.051)
Mean Depvar	.431	.440
SD Depvar	.495	.497
Region FEs	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes
Bandwidth	22.67	16.95
Effective N	1,536	1,093

Notes: The sample only includes mayors not subject to term limits.

Attacked Female Mayors Less Likely to Re-Run

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>All Mayors</i>	<i>Not Attacked</i>	<i>Attacked</i>
Female Mayor (RDD coeff)	.000 (.043)	.039 (.051)	-.487*** (.124)
Mean Depvar	.431	.440	.552
SD Depvar	.495	.497	.506
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	No
Bandwidth	22.67	16.95	12.95
Effective N	1,536	1,093	74

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If no attack took place, there would be zero gap in female selection out of office

Conclusions

- First causal evidence of a gender gap in violence against politicians.
- Logic behind attacks: identity (and not policy) motives.
 - Violence as a tool to preserve men's hegemony over political power (Bardall et al., 2020).
- Consequences: discouraging women from rerunning.
 - Gender gap in violence \uparrow gender gap in representation.
 - Gap in selection *out* (not only into) politics.
- Targeted policies protecting women in politics are important for victims, representation, and democracy.

Thank You!

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
Additional Results

- Types and targets ▶
- McCrary ▶
- Balance ▶
- TWFE ▶
- Other victims ▶
- Lag Attacks ▶
- Reporting bias ▶
- Jackknife ▶
- Public vs Private ▶
- Sexist attacks ▶
- Online attacks ▶
- Expenditures: Year 1 ▶
- Share Total ▶
- Financial Performance ▶
- Corruption ▶
- Procurement ▶
- Mafia ▶
- Criminal Attacks ▶
- Referenda ▶
- Female Labor Force ▶
- Resignations ▶
- Previous Mayor ▶


What is Avviso Pubblico?

- An NGO, founded in 1996, aimed at improving lawfulness and transparency in public administration.
- Among other initiatives, it has hundreds of staff members daily checking offline and online newspapers for news on attacks to public administrators.
- While not coming from a governmental source, its reports have been used to inform policymaking in recent years.

Type of attacks [▶ Back](#)



Targets of attacks [▶ Back](#)





Examples of Reports

23 APRIL 2015 – CAPACI (Palermo) – *A threatening letter was sent to the mailbox of Vicemayor Roberto Tarallo. The letter says “You are going to die” and “You will end up like the mayor of Partinico”. Mr. Tarallo, when denouncing the episode to the authorities, hypothesized that the threat might refer to the issue of waste management in the municipality.*

19 DECEMBER 2016 – CROSIA (Cosenza) *Threat to the Public Works Aldermen, Mr. Saverio Capristo. His car, parked in front of his house, was set on fire during the night.*

Note: Original reports in Italian, translation is our own.

Density Tests



Left: McCrary (2008). Right: Cattaneo et al. (2016).

▶ Back

Covariates Balance at Cutoff

▶ Back


Dependent Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)	Dependent Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)
Log Surface	-.191	(.224)	Anti-Women VS Referenda	-.017*	(.009)
Log Longitude	.003	(.007)	Anti-Abortion VS	-.001	(.005)
Log Latitude	-.001	(.001)	Abortion Restriction VS	-.025**	(.012)
Log Elevation	-.070	(.146)	Anti-Divorce VS	-.025	(.016)
Provincial Capital	-.019	(.022)	Mafia Dissolutions (Pre 2006)	-.003	(.013)
Log Km from Reg. Capital	-.030	(.099)	Mafia Seizures (Pre 2006)	.070	(.053)
Log Population	-.009	(.093)	Mafia Killings (Pre 2006)	.001	(.028)
Pop. Above 10,000	.015	(.072)	Log Transcrime Index	-.004	(.013)
Pop. Above 15,000	.006	(.060)	Mayor Independent (t-1)	-.016	(.088)
Log Population Density	.127	(.134)	Mayor Far Left (t-1)	.058	(.060)
Log Foreigners x 100 Inhab.	.016	(.080)	Mayor Far Right (t-1)	.019	(.034)
Had SPRAR	-.026	(.031)	Mayor Left (t-1)	-.043	(.040)
Average Age	.424	(.321)	Mayor Right (t-1)	.024	(.044)
% High School	-.004	(.006)	Mayor Aligned Nat. (t-1)	-.033	(.033)
% Unemployed	-.001	(.003)	Mayor Aligned Reg. (t-1)	-.063	(.057)
% Youth Unemployed	-.001	(.009)	Mayor Nat. Party (t-1)	-.058	(.058)
% Agriculture	-.003	(.007)	Mayor College (t-1)	-.094	(.060)
% Industry	.001	(.011)	Mayor Local (t-1)	.083	(.070)
N. of Candidates	-.020	(.231)	Mayor's Age (t-1)	-.604	(1.291)
N. of Councillors	-.067	(.720)	Mayor's Education (t-1)	-0.252	(.005)
Turnout National Election	.006	(.004)	Mayor High Skilled (t-1)	-.026	(.446)
VS Center Right	.001	(.010)	Mayor Male (t-1)	.005	(.065)

TWFE Results: Attacks to Mayor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks})$		$\text{InvHSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor	.035*** (.011)	.037*** (.011)	.026*** (.010)	.028*** (.010)	.033** (.013)	.035*** (.013)
Mean Depvar	.088	.089	.074	.075	.096	.097
SD Depvar	.284	.285	.252	.254	.326	.328
Municipality FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,026	7,903	8,026	7,903	8,026	7,903

Controls: Log population, log population density, log foreign residents per 100 inhabitants, average age, % high-school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Placebo with Other Victims



Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.


▶ Back

Placebo with Lag of Attacks


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks})$		$\text{InvHSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor	.000 (.032)	-.006 (.030)	-.012 (.027)	-.018 (.025)	-.016 (.035)	-.024 (.033)
Mean Depvar	.076	.076	.063	.063	.082	.080
SD Depvar	.265	.265	.236	.237	.306	.306
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	22.73	23.00	19.60	18.70	19.47	18.55
Effective N	1,479	1,456	1,303	1,231	1,297	1,225
N Left	899	889	771	725	765	719
N Right	580	567	532	506	532	506

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Placebo with Irrelevant Cutoffs



Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths




Robustness: MLE for Intensive Margin


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Poisson Regression		Negative Binomial	
Female Mayor	1.502*** (.441)	1.314*** (.379)	1.521*** (.413)	1.402*** (.379)
SD Depvar	.198	.200	.169	.169
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	17.96	21.08	17.96	21.08
Observations	1,163	1,328	1,163	1,163

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Not Driven by Any Single Region



Not Driven by Any Single Year



Robustness: Excluding Attacks Denounced

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks})$		$\text{InvHSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor	.114*** (.034)	.122*** (.032)	.090*** (.028)	.098*** (.026)	.116*** (.036)	.126*** (.034)
Mean Depvar	.048	.047	.037	.039	.048	.048
SD Depvar	.214	.212	.178	.181	.230	.230
Bandwidth	17.31	17.50	17.11	17.36	17.12	17.10
Effective N	1,219	1,197	1,205	1,187	1,206	1,172
N Left	711	699	702	692	703	682
N Right	508	498	503	495	503	490

Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.


Robustness: Excluding Sexist Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks} + 1)$		$\ln\text{HSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor	.082** (.034)	.088*** (.033)	.062** (.027)	.068*** (.026)	.080** (.034)	.088*** (.033)
Mean Depvar	.047	.047	.037	.040	.047	.052
SD Depvar	.211	.212	.180	.191	.232	.247
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	18.51	18.68	17.16	17.69	17.13	17.69
Effective N	1,296	1,271	1,207	1,210	1,206	1,210
N Left	760	748	704	709	703	709
N Right	536	523	503	501	503	501

Robustness: Excluding Online Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack		$\ln(\text{Attacks} + 1)$		$\ln\text{HSin}(\text{Attacks})$	
Female Mayor	.080*** (.031)	.085*** (.030)	.062** (.025)	.069*** (.024)	.080** (.033)	.089*** (.031)
Mean Depvar	.040	.041	.033	.032	.042	.042
SD Depvar	.196	.197	.164	.162	.211	.210
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	18.14	18.26	17.67	18.06	17.68	18.31
Effective N	1,296	1,271	1,207	1,210	1,206	1,210
N Left	760	748	704	709	703	709
N Right	536	523	503	501	503	501


Public vs. Private Attacks




Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

▶ Back

No Difference in Year 1



No Difference with Share Total Expenditures



No Difference in Financial Performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Large Excess of Budget Surplus</i>		<i>Log Liabilities Accumulated</i>		<i>Dependency on External Finance</i>	
Female Mayor	-.036 (.053)	-.030 (.051)	.006 (.020)	.012 (.021)	.022 (.018)	.030 (.018)
Mean Depvar	.682	.678	.472	.467	.065	.067
SD Depvar	.466	.468	.163	.169	.107	.110
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	16.98	18.73	22.44	16.76	17.03	14.53
Effective N	1,119	1,273	1,009	760	565	486
N Left	691	749	613	440	327	268
N Right	500	524	396	320	238	218

No Effect of Female Mayors on Corruption Charges

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Count of Corruption Charges</i>		<i>Charges per 1,000 Inhabitants</i>		<i>Charges per 1Mil EUR Spent</i>	
Female Mayor	1.353* (.763)	1.130 (1.005)	-.014 (.019)	-.007 (.018)	-.003 (.003)	-.002 (.003)
Mean Depvar	1.34	.924	.056	.055	.009	.057
SD Depvar	1.34	.924	.056	.055	.009	.057
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	13.83	8.95	19.08	18.86	21.73	18.35
Effective N	492	310	644	627	711	609
N Left	274	154	382	373	430	362
N Right	218	156	262	254	281	247


Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Little Effect of Female Mayors on Procurement Practices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Bunching of Contract Values</i>		<i>Log N. of Firms Invited</i>		<i>Probability of Subcontracting</i>	
Female Mayor	.024* (.013)	.022 (.014)	-.013 (.097)	-.010 (.093)	-.032* (.018)	-.036** (.018)
Mean Depvar	-.020	-.020	1.68	1.68	.103	.104
SD Depvar	.109	.111	.823	.818	.154	.152
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bandwidth	20.77	19.16	20.95	22.19	17.65	16.61
Effective N	1,416	1,293	1,206	1,239	1,192	1,096
N Left	848	763	721	746	695	626
N Right	568	530	485	493	497	470



Controls: Log surface, log longitude, log latitude, log elevation, log distance from regional capital, log population, log population density, log foreigners per 100 inhabitants, indicator for provincial capital, average age, % high school educated, unemployment rate, % employed in agriculture, mafia-presence index (2006), vote share in women related referenda, turnout and vote share of the right-wing coalition in the most recent parliamentary election.

Not Driven by Mafia Affected Areas





Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

Not Driven by Criminal Attacks




Notes: Dependent variables are standardized.

Voting in referenda for divorce and abortion




▶ Back

Female Labor Force Participation



Had Previously Elected a Female Mayor



Effect on Resignations

Do women resign at higher rates after an attack?

