

Mobile Money, Interoperability, and Financial Inclusion*

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Abstract

This paper investigates the tradeoff between competition and financial inclusion resulting from the vertical integration between mobile network and money operators. Joining newly assembled data on mobile money fees through the WayBack machine, with sources on network coverage and financials, we examine the staggering across African operators and countries of platform interoperability – a policy that promotes transactions and competition across mobile money operators. Our results show that interoperability benefits users by lowering mobile money fees and their dispersion across operators. However, these positive effects are offset by a decrease in mobile towers and network coverage, especially in rural and poor districts, which, in turn, leads to a lower financial inclusion. We note that combining interoperability with subsidies for rural telecommunications delivers lower fees without hurting coverage.

Keywords: Mobile Money, Interoperability, Financial inclusion

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1 Introduction

Mobile money has emerged as one of the most widespread digital payment systems (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). Its diffusion resulted in tangible changes in various economic and financial indicators like risk-sharing (Jack and Suri (2011); Blumenstock et al. (2016)), remittances (Riley (2018); Aker et al. (2020)), lending (Suri et al., 2021) and savings (Breza et al., 2022), among others. Despite these significant developments, research on the functioning and regulation of the corresponding financial institution, the mobile money company, remains limited.

This paper investigates the role of competition on the behaviour of mobile money companies and its corresponding effects on financial inclusion. Specifically, we examine the effects of a competition-promoting policy, platform interoperability, which facilitates transactions between users of different mobile money operators. By mitigating the barriers to exchange payments, this regulatory intervention can impact the profit margins of mobile money operators and influence their pricing, network, and infrastructure investment.

Our paper proposes conceptually and explores empirically a novel tradeoff between competition and financial inclusion in the context of mobile money. It is crucial first to introduce the typical structure of this market, which comprises two main players: mobile network companies that offer phone and internet services; and mobile money companies that focus on payment exchanges. Typically, these two actors are vertically integrated as discussed by Bourreau and Valletti (2015), which creates a limited competitive environment (Williamson (1979); Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart et al. (1990)) and results in higher fees charged to mobile money users. At the same time, this lack of competition may also provide incentives for mobile network companies to extend their reach to underserved locations, enhancing financial inclusion. Consequently, low levels of competition may increase the size of the mobile network, which may be labelled as the extensive margin of financial inclusion. Nonetheless, this scenario may harm the poorest users within covered areas due to high transaction fees, which weakens the intensive margin of inclusion.

To guide our empirical analysis, we build a compact theoretical framework inspired by the work of Laffont et al. (1997) and Bianchi et al. (2022). These papers examine respectively the role of competition in the telecommunication market and the mechanics of interoperability in mobile money. Our contribution lies in introducing the margin of infrastructure via tower installation. We show that interoperability breaks the possibility for platforms to exercise monopoly power by inducing competition on fees. At the same time, this reduction in the profit margin of the mobile company leads to a decline in tower installation and network provision. One central aspect of this paper is the role of mobile network towers. We model this via the tower infrastructure that moves with economic

incentives and is not necessarily fixed and unresponsive to the underlying economic characteristics. This assumption, which we validate empirically, is inspired by the market structure of mobile towers in Africa, which we describe in detail in Section 2.3. In short, mobile towers in Africa present high variable costs given that most are disconnected from electricity and powered through expensive power-generating commodities, such as diesel fuel. This cost structure implies that companies respond by reducing their tower network in response to a negative shock to mobile revenue, since towers in this setting are not a sunk cost.

The empirical challenge is to identify a source of quasi-experimental variation, which increases the competition between mobile money companies and affects the extent of the money-phone integration. To do this, we exploit a unique natural experiment taking place in Africa: the staggered introduction of interoperability across operators and countries that has been taking place between 2010 and 2020. In this context, interoperability is a policy that induces mobile money companies to permit and facilitate the exchange of payments with mobile money users that operate on a different platform. The introduction of interoperability does not appear to be related to specific conditions of the mobile money industry. It is instead a reform initiated by the central bank, which expands the country infrastructure of payment systems involving banks, merchants and correspondingly mobile operators. This fact is documented in the paper appendix and validated by the presence of balanced economic characteristics in our country sample and parallel trends in the pre-period across our empirical specifications.

We combine this source of variation with numerous novel datasets. Our innovative contribution in terms of data is to construct a panel dataset on mobile money fees per company, which covers 129 operators across 42 countries in Africa from 2010 onward. Building this data was particularly challenging, since this information is not publicly available and retrospective surveys asking users for fees tend to be inaccurate. To address these gaps, we used the “Wayback Machine”: an online archive that routinely scans most websites and takes screenshots of their pages. We digitized this information and created the panel, which reveals some original descriptive findings on the functioning of this market.

Mobile money fees in Africa are high and penalize small transactions, which are generally used more extensively by poorer people (Yao et al., 2022). The average cost of sending a transfer to another user on the same mobile money company accounts for an average of 4% of the total, if the user has a different company this fee levitates at 10%. As presented in the paper, small payments are particularly hit by high fees, which exceed 30% of the transferred amount for amounts placed in the smallest brackets. Beyond their level, fees are also highly dispersed across operators, with small payments exhibiting the most intense variation.¹

¹In evaluating fees, we refer to the nominal cost of a transaction, which in this setting transcends from

To join a measure of prices with quantities and network, we partnered with the GSM Association (GSMA), the leading organisation grouping mobile telecommunications operators to access various datasets on mobile network companies. First, we employ data on the second-generation cellular network technology (also referred to as 2G) used for mobile money transactions across the entire African continent through rasters of 250×250 meters, containing information on the presence of mobile signal and number of companies operating. This information is then aggregated at the district level for all countries in Africa, using maps from the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM). Second, we received access to a source of operator-specific information on financials as well as other statistics (towers, market penetration, price for other services). In addition, we use the World Bank Global Findex Survey and IMF Financial Access Survey to shed additional light on the effects of interoperability on financial inclusion.

Our results validate the existence of a tradeoff between financial inclusion and competition. In terms of prices, an event study setting shows that the fees of companies operating in different countries lie on parallel trends prior to the introduction of interoperability and sharply fall thereafter. A difference-in-difference specification quantifies the decline in fees after interoperability to be at 0.3 percentage points for on-network transactions, which are transactions between users on the same network (20% of the mean) and at 1.3 percentage points cross-network transactions, which are transactions between users across the different networks (35% of the mean). This decline is almost entirely due to small payments that become substantially cheaper, with fees falling by 20% for on-network transactions and more than 45% for cross-network ones. At the same time, we show that the dispersion of mobile money fees drops by more than 50% with the introduction of interoperability, with small payments presenting the strongest decline.

We exploit the granularity of our data and the ability to measure the network coverage for each operator across multiple districts to study the impact of interoperability at the operator-district level. We document that interoperability induces an overall decline in coverage and probability that a district is covered by a company. These results are confirmed by a different dataset on operators and their yearly financials. Companies operating in countries where interoperability was implemented experienced a decline of 18% in share of population covered, 22% in market penetration, 29% in revenue and 12% in the number of towers. The profits of mobile network companies seem to be negatively affected as well, though the estimates are imprecise.

In addition to this evidence at the operator-district level, we also present results regarding network availability within districts to understand the overall effects of this policy. We find that the arrival of interoperability lowers various measures of network coverage. In all cases, we present event study specifications showing the existence of parallel trends

misconducts of financial intermediaries, who may overcharge specific demographics beyond the nominal expenses as noted by Annan (2022).

before the treatment and use a difference-in-difference specification to quantify the average effects. We find that districts in countries that introduce interoperability experience a 5% drop in the share of the district covered by mobile network coverage (almost 8% of the mean), a 3.4% decline in the probability of presenting any coverage (4% of the mean) and a 19% lower number of mobile network companies operating in the geographic unit. Furthermore, districts that may present high ex-ante costs of tower installation and therefore be marginal for mobile companies (rural, poorer) before the policy are the ones presenting the strongest hit. In fact, the relative decline in their telecommunication access is severe both in terms of coverage and the number of operators. These findings highlight that the lack of competition and untargeted regulation can shape the geographic access to goods and services, both financial and non-financial, and promote within-country inequality (Alesina et al., 2016).

To investigate the effect of interoperability on financial inclusion, we take advantage of the Global Findex dataset and find that individuals in countries introducing interoperability see a reduction in the likelihood of sending and receiving remittances, and in the likelihood of saving for their own business activity. At the same time, the IMF FAS dataset reveals that as interoperability is launched, countries experience a reduction in the aggregate number of mobile money transactions, agents and users. We show that these effects are driven by those countries with a stronger pre-existent mobile money network: these results can be seen as the consequences of a reduction in mobile network coverage both at the extensive margin (i.e. in terms of geographical outreach) and the intensive margin (i.e. in terms of signal quality) following the introduction of interoperability. We further validate our results using also data from the DHS surveys.

In terms of policy implications, our study focuses on a source of market imperfection behind the competition-inclusion tradeoff: the prevalence of uniform pricing across different locations. As discussed by (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019), it is common for businesses to apply uniform or nearly-uniform prices across various locations, regardless of the local demographic characteristics and competitive landscape. While such pricing scheme may be good since it potentially alleviates economic differences between groups coexisting in the same country (Alesina et al., 2016), it also presents some significant side effects. In fact, if mobile companies were able to discriminate their fees based on the local cost of providing connection services, increased competition would reduce mark-ups without affecting service provision. Although such mechanisms of price discrimination do not exist in telecommunications, neither in Africa nor elsewhere, we draw a close analogy from a policy that creates de facto heterogeneous fees: the presence of subsidies to promote rural telecommunications. These policies result in price discrimination between urban and rural locations once the subsidy is combined with the fee. To investigate this further, we collected data on policies aimed at promoting access to telecommunication services in remote areas and note a crucial heterogeneity of our key findings to these poli-

cies. Our empirical results validate that the combination of interoperability and these subsidies presents a promising opportunity to lower fees for users while maintaining the scale of the mobile network.

We conclude our paper with a set of the robustness tests of our results through different approaches. First, we use the methods for dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) and the framework for difference-in-differences designs with staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous causal effects proposed by Borusyak et al. (2021). Second, we replicate our main results weighting for the district's population, and also using alternative clustering methods for the standard errors. In addition to this, we explore several other tests: for example, we verify that the introduction of interoperability does not affect operations of Mergers and Acquisitions between mobile network operators, we provide several heterogeneity analysis using different measures of local urban development, and we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of time-varying country-specific characteristics.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that a higher level of competition between mobile money providers has mixed effects on consumers and infrastructure investment. This intuition applies more broadly to telecommunications and tower installation technology, and to digital payment systems and the underlying server infrastructure. Our work is in line with studies that highlight the mixed effects of competition on consumers and infrastructure, for example Ferrari et al. (2010) show that banks underinvest in their ATM network in Belgium due to the prohibition to charge additional fees on users of other banks, which resembles the concept of interoperability that we study in this paper. Genakos et al. (2018) study the tradeoff between market power and efficiency in the OECD telecommunication industry, showing that a higher market concentration is associated with both higher mobile telecommunication fees and investment. Through a study of the Rwandan network, Björkegren (2022) relates the role of competition to the intrinsic networked nature of mobile networks to study welfare and investment, finding that the free interconnection of systems can lower the incentives to invest. Brunnermeier et al. (2022) show that enforcing interoperability in the digital money market reduces ledger controllers' rents, but also lowers credit extension in the economy. Related to this literature, there are two important review articles: Bourreau and Valletti (2015) offer a comprehensive analysis of the economic features of mobile payment systems in developing countries, while Bianchi et al. (2022) connect various streams of academic literature to shed light on how the degree of interoperability in mobile payments affects market outcomes and welfare. This paper advances this literature by combining granular and innovative data on the mobile market with an empirical design exploiting a plausible source of variation.

At the same time, our paper is related to the growing literature on mobile money. Jack and Suri (2011), Jack et al. (2013) and Jack and Suri (2014) have pioneered this stream

of research, by using survey data to understand the role of mobile money in attenuating the effect of negative income shocks by fostering risk sharing. Blumenstock et al. (2016) also studies the response to shocks (in the context of an earthquake in Rwanda) using administrative data on mobile phone records, airtime purchases, and transfers of airtime. Suri and Jack (2016) show that increased access to mobile money has increased long-term consumption in Kenya and reduced the number of households in extreme poverty. Riley (2018) underlines how developing countries have gained increased access to remittances through the introduction of mobile money services. Suri et al. (2021) study how a new digital loans system operating over the rails of mobile money helps households in facing negative income shocks. Breza et al. (2022) finds that a financial technology that allows individuals to automatically receive their wage on their mobile money account leads to higher savings and stronger resilience. Our paper brings a perspective focusing on the supply of mobile money, exploring their functioning and corresponding regulation. This paper is also related to the literature studying how access to mobile networks can foster economic development.²

The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework of competition in the mobile money sector, offers details about the institutional aspects of mobile money interoperability, and provides an insight on how the telecommunication infrastructure works in Africa. It describes the data we use, comprehensive of a newly self-collected dataset on mobile money fees across African operators, and offers insights on the the identification strategy that exploits the staggering of interoperability across African countries. Section 3 investigates the effects of interoperability at different levels. It first provides evidence on operators' fees, financials and network coverage. It then presents aggregate results at geographical level, by also showing the implications for financial inclusion. Eventually, it provides several heterogeneity analyses and a set of robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.

2 Theoretical framework, Data and Identification

The aim of this section is twofold. We first present a theoretical framework relating mobile money interoperability, competition between operators and financial inclusion. We then introduce the institutional changes experienced in the mobile money industry across African operators and countries, by also providing an insight on the relation between

²Among the prominent contributions in this literature is the work of Jensen (2007), which shows how mobile network and towers can improve market allocation efficiency and lead to uniform prices in the fishing industry in India. Aker and Mbiti (2010) explore the main channels through which mobile phones can affect economic outcomes and appraise current evidence of its potential to improve economic development. Blumenstock et al. (2020) present experimental evidence on the economic impacts of mobile phone access: the introduction of mobile phones had large and significant impacts on household income and expenditure, particularly for wage workers. Riley (2022) shows that providing microfinance loan in a private mobile money account positively impacts the businesses of female microfinance borrowers.

phone cell towers and network coverage. In the remaining part of the section, we describe the data we use, comprehensive of a newly collected dataset on mobile money fees across African operators. We eventually offer insights on the identification strategy, that exploits the staggering of interoperability across African countries.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 Economic Environment

This theoretical framework is built on the work of Bianchi et al. (2022) and Laffont et al. (1997), it is a simplification meant to guide our empirical analysis and provide a compact and original setting to think about the role of competition in the mobile money sector.

The market for mobile customers is composed by a continuum of locations on a unit line, and each point is populated by a household engaging in a set of mobile money transactions. The mobile company decides how many towers to open, $m \in [0, 1]$, which is costly, but allows it to reach a new locus and to interact with agents. If $m = 1$, then all locations are reached, whereas with $m = 0$, no towers are operating. When a tower is installed, the mobile company interacts with a client and decides on a fee f for transactions. This model presents the following two stages: (1) the mobile company invests in financial inclusion, deciding on the number of towers, m ; (2) the company decides on its fee f given the user demand for mobile services. The game can be solved by backward induction.

2.1.2 Setting

2.1.2.1 Consumer Utility

The utility function of users reached by a mobile tower can be described by $U = \tau + \beta m - f$, in which τ expresses a taste parameter, β is a parameter capturing the network externality of the overall number of connected households and f is the fee to make mobile money transfers.

In principle, users can also keep the same mobile network services, while choosing an alternative provider only for the mobile money service. The utility function in this case can be described by $U = \tau + \beta m - f_{other}$ as users in this case need to pay a fee to the other company, f_{other} , to continue to use their mobile network and use the mobile money service from the new company.

2.1.2.2 Mobile Company Profits

The profit function of the mobile money company in a location conditional on this being reached by a tower m is given by $\pi(m) = f - c$ in which the profit margin of the company is

given by the difference between its fee, f , minus the marginal cost of the communication, c , for those on network.

2.1.2.3 Mobile Tower Installation

In the first period, the mobile company decides how many mobile towers m to install, given the profit margin in each location π , the fee f and some convex cost of tower installation $c(m)$. Its convexity is due to the fact that further towers are worse connected to the electricity grid and present higher costs of energy supply and maintenance, as documented in Section 2.3.

This financial inclusion problem can be written as $\max_{m \geq 0} \Pi = \pi(m) - \eta \frac{m^2}{2}$. Note that in this setting, we introduce a new parameter η : this is a tower-installation technology parameter affecting both the average and marginal cost of branch opening.

2.1.3 Solution

In this subsection, we solve this problem for two cases: 1) the case without interoperability, in which the mobile company is a monopolist; 2) the case with interoperability, in which the mobile company faces competition.

2.1.3.1 No Interoperability

This setting can be interpreted as one in which there is no alternative mobile money platform available. This market structure gives the mobile company the possibility to extract all rents from consumers by setting their utility function to zero, making their participation constraint binding, which defines f^M as the monopoly fee: $f_{on}^M = \tau + \beta m$. In this case the company appropriates not only the utility from using the service, expressed by τ , but also the network externalities reported by βm . As a result, the tower-installation problem simplifies to $\max_{m \geq 0} (\tau + \beta m)m - \eta \frac{m^2}{2}$ leading to the following solution for the decisions of the mobile company $m^M = \frac{\tau}{\eta - 2\beta}$ and $f^M = \tau \frac{\eta - \beta}{\eta - 2\beta}$ this relies on the assumption that the costs of tower installation exceeds the network externalities in the utility, $\eta > 2\beta$, otherwise the problem simplifies to a full installation of towers in all cases and undefined fees.

2.1.3.2 Interoperability

We model interoperability as a policy allowing individuals to operate an alternative mobile money service, without switching the mobile network service. In our setting, this is modelled as a competing company, which offers transactions at a fee $f_{other} = \theta$.

This changes the competitive nature of the market, since the former monopolist can no longer extract all rents from this market and will have to compete on prices. Suppose

that individuals pay an individual switching cost κ in moving exclusively their mobile money services from the former monopolist to the new company (i.e. cost of infrastructure, account opening). Then the fee of the former monopolist emerges from solving the following incentive compatibility constraint: $\tau + \beta m - f \geq \tau + \beta m - \theta - \kappa$ stating that the utility of the user remaining on the network of the former monopolist is higher or equal to the utility of an individual switching network and paying a fee θ and a switching cost κ . Under the plausible assumptions that this fee exceeds the marginal cost of operating in an area, $\theta + \kappa > c$, and that competition benefits consumers, $\theta + \kappa < \tau$, then this change in the competitive structure leads to a decline in fees and in availability of mobile network, since the optimal f and m are now: $m^C = \frac{\theta + \kappa}{\eta}$ and $f^C = \theta + \kappa$. Therefore the arrival of interoperability leads to lower fees since $\theta + \kappa < \tau$ and $\frac{\eta - \beta}{\eta - 2\beta} > 1$ but also to lower mobile tower installation for the same reason. The proposition below summarizes these results and presents an additional heterogeneity.

Proposition

In the presence of a mobile company that decides on fees and tower installation, the introduction of interoperability leads to lower mobile money fees and a reduction in tower installation and signal. One central heterogeneity emerge from this setting: locations with higher costs of tower installation experience a stronger decline in towers and coverage. In Online Appendix C - Theoretical Framework we provide the derivation of this proposition.

2.2 A new dataset on mobile money fees

The literature on mobile money lacks information on the fee structure of operators. A comprehensive dataset on mobile money operators' tariffs does not exist,³ and hence for the purpose of this paper we are the first to introduce such a dataset, comprehensive of most mobile money service providers operating in Africa. We collected monthly data on each operator's fees, spanning the year 2010-2021, calculated as a share of the paid amount. The main source of our data is the website of each Mobile Money provider, as the tariff plans are usually available not only to the agent offices but also online. However, operators rarely keep their past fees structure publicly available on their website: to overcome this issue, we rely on the Wayback Machine, which is a tool that enables the recovery of web pages that are no longer available. For instance, as shown in Figure B.1 of Online Appendix B - Additional Figures, if we want to find all the previous "versions" of the Telma (the first operator launched in Madagascar) webpage, we can type the URL of today's webpage in the search bar and choose the year/month we are interested in.

In most cases, the web pages are available and the tariff plans published, so it is

³See the article on IPA's two-year pilot by Blackmon and Pizatella-Haswell (2022): www.poverty-action.org/blog/tracking-real-cost-mobile-transactions-ipas-new-two-year-pilot.

possible to browse the archived website and find the information needed. However, finding the rates for each year is not easy: different problems can hamper our search, such as images or documents not visible/downloadable, absence of screens for entire years, issues in loading pages, fees not present on the web pages, etc. For this reason, we rely on additional sources to fill in the gaps. Secondary sources are 1) providers' pages in different social networks like Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn, where photos of tariff plans are often published, 2) articles concerning Mobile Money fees published in newspapers online or blogs. In Data Appendix D - Fees & Interoperability, we provide a detailed description of how data on Mobile Money fees are built. Figure B.2 in Online Appendix B - Additional Figures shows the complexity of the structure of mobile money tariff plans, which are not constant across transaction values. We build two main datasets, containing the mobile money fees charged by each operator over time. We differentiate between fees charged to transfer money to subscribers to the same operator ("on-network") and fees charged to send money to subscribers of other operators ("cross-network"). The first output is a panel data set that includes the operator name, country, year, and the yearly fees' median value for on-network and cross-network transactions. The second data set is more detailed, because it includes tariffs for all transaction ranges ("brackets") defined by companies' tariff plans. To this aim, we take the most disaggregated fee structure in the country and adjust all operators' rates (in that country) accordingly, as explained in Data Appendix D - Fees & Interoperability. Figure 1 shows how fees change across brackets: we plot the mean yearly fees for a mobile money transfer between two users belonging to the same company, i.e. on-network transaction. This is plotted for each operator and is different depending on the amount of the mobile money transaction. In particular we document that higher fees are applied to lower transactions: Figure 1 shows that the first and second bracket of lowest-value payments experience the highest fee, on average 30% and 10% respectively, with such fees declining progressively and regressively as the underlying value of the transaction increases. In Figure 7 and Table A.37 we show how the introduction of interoperability decreases the dispersion of transaction fees across and within brackets. The top left and right panels of Figure 7 show the distribution of operators' on net fees, across brackets, before and after interoperability, respectively. From the two figures it comes out that after interoperability the dispersion of fees in the lowest transaction brackets decreases. This is confirmed by Table A.37, where we regress the standard deviation of fees across interoperable and non-interoperable operators in a given year and a given bracket, on a dummy taking value 1 for interoperable operators. We show that the standard deviation of on net fees is lower for interoperable operators. In Table A.37 we also confirm that the dispersion of fees is higher for lower transaction brackets. These results hint at the convergence of prices across markets and can be rationalized through the law of one price.

2.3 Mobile network coverage and infrastructures

Mobile money services are vertically integrated with the network operator providing the service. This means that the mobile money service can be used exclusively where a given mobile network operator's connection covers the area (Bourreau and Valletti, 2015). Therefore, it is important to understand the infrastructure enabling the network coverage, and in particular the economics behind the installation and maintenance of towers. It is key to clarify that mobile network towers are not necessarily a sunk and long-term investment, as they present sizeable operating costs.

The towers used for the commercial transmission of mobile signals are typically powered through an electrical connection: they are "on-grid", as they receive power from the electrical grid as an input and release signal as an output. However, there are instances in which it is impossible to operate on-grid towers, because the grid may be unreliable or the tower may be in a remote location. In this case, the technology for transmitting the mobile signal is through an "off-grid" system: The electricity supply is provided through the installation of a diesel-powered generator, which is used as the main or backup source of electricity.

As a result, mobile operators in Africa face challenges to power their mobile networks, because of unavailable or unreliable power supply and consequential heavy reliance on expensive diesel power generators. Major infrastructural and operational challenges make it extremely costly for mobile network provider to expand their coverage or to keep it active in marginal areas. The most common costs faced by mobile operators as pointed out by Kumar (2014) are due to: limited or no road access infrastructure which increase Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs of sites, higher cost of security and monitoring systems to protect assets and infrastructure to prevent diesel theft, equipment theft and vandalism of site equipment, lack of local skilled technical resources that causes a further increase in the costs of operations. These infrastructural impediments translate in the lack of economic incentives for mobile network operators to provide their services in remote areas.

The limited reach of grid infrastructure and inadequate power generation capacities has greatly affected the availability and quality of electricity supply to mobile network sites, and therefore impacted the configuration and geographic spread of mobile networks in Africa. The majority of telecom tower sites in Africa are deployed in either off-grid areas or problematic grid areas with unreliable power supply (Ahmad et al., 2015). This observation is in line with the fact that the growth in mobile networks has tremendously outpaced the local expansion of grid infrastructure across countries in Africa. As a result, the majority of the tower sites are deployed in off-grid areas. The necessity for diesel generators, and increasingly battery backups, is not limited to off-grid towers in Africa, but includes also a large share of on-grid towers. This is due to the fact that energy

provision planning was traditionally ignored by the network expansion teams during the aggressive network roll-out (Kumar, 2014). The limited reach of grid infrastructure and its snail-paced expansion further widened the demand-supply gap and have adversely affected the availability (with more frequent/longer power cuts) as well as quality of power supply.

In this respect, energy costs constitute a major chunk of network operational expenditure (OPEX) for mobile operators in Africa. As reported by Kumar (2014), for a typical tower site in Africa, the share of energy costs is as high as 40% of the overall network OPEX, and the power consumption from diesel is about a factor 10-20% higher than the power requirements of the cell base stations.

2.4 Data

We employ several different and novel sources of data. We do not only provide new self-collected datasets on mobile money fees and mobile money institutions, but also a new dataset on individual network operators' coverage, as well as their financial and non-financial information. The main databases employed in this research are listed as follows:

1. Mobile Money fees. As explained in Section 2.2, we introduce a new panel dataset on mobile money fees for all mobile money operators providing their service across African countries. We collected yearly data for 129 mobile money operators, operating in 42 African countries, in a time span of 12 years, from 2010 to 2021. To make the panel reliable and usable, we spell the mobile money tariffs as percentage of the total transaction, and then define the median transaction across brackets to make fees comparable across operators, countries and years. We provide a comprehensive dataset including fees for all types of transactions and for all transaction brackets harmonized at the country level.

2. Mobile network operator coverage. We use a new dataset on mobile network coverage by operator over the years 2010-2021. This is a novel use of data collected by Harper Collins and the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSMA) for research purposes. The collection of this dataset works as follows: every year GSMA collects coverage data from each mobile network operator worldwide. We are hence able to see the development of individual operators' coverage over the last decade. Data are detailed for different kind of connections (1G, 2G, 3G, 4G and, now, 5G) and are provided at a raster level of approximately 250 squared meters. This means that we observe for the entire African continent the presence of mobile network signal for each raster by each operator and over time. For our empirical analysis, we aggregate this data for each operator at the smallest administrative unit in each country, as defined by the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM).⁴ We use data on 2G coverage only, as this is

⁴The Database of Global Administrative Areas is a comprehensive database of country administrative

the mobile technology that enables the usage of mobile money.

3. GSMA Intelligence Mobile Network Data. This is the most comprehensive source of mobile industry insights, forecasts and research, available. GSMA collects data on every mobile network operator (MNO) in every country worldwide. They provide yearly data on several financial, usage and performance indicators of MNOs. We exploit data of 253 mobile network operators, operating in 57 African countries over a period of 22 years spanning from 2000 to 2021.⁵ In the analysis, outliers above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile are excluded.

4. Interoperability data. As later explained in Section 2.5, we also construct and provide a novel dataset on the introduction of mobile money interoperability across African countries. We register each policy change regarding interoperability, i.e. the possibility to exchange mobile money between different mobile money operators introduced in each African country. We are also able to identify whether mobile money interoperability was initiated by the local Government, or whether interoperability was introduced by the operators themselves, without the presence of a clear institutional framework.

5. Global Findex World Bank data. We exploit the Global Findex dataset provided by the World Bank, based on nationally representative surveys and containing updated indicators on access to and use of formal and informal financial services and digital payments. We exploit this dataset to investigate the effects of the introduction of interoperability on financial inclusion. Data are taken from about 150'000 surveyed adults, in 48 African countries, for the years in which the survey was conducted (2011, 2014, 2017, 2021).

6. IMF Financial Access Survey. To further study the effect of interoperability on financial inclusion, we exploit country level data on measures of financial access in Africa provided by the IMF. The IMF FAS contains yearly data on access to and use of financial services, including mobile money. Our dataset covers 57 countries spanning more than 10 years. In order to avoid our results being driven by outlier, the observations above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile are excluded.

7. Geographical data on urban development and nighttime light intensity. We exploit the dataset introduced by Cattaneo et al. (2021) to create a district's measure of urban development. In this dataset, raster pixel are assigned a value ranging from 1 to 30, where 1 identify most urban areas and 30 most rural areas. The district's measure of urban development is hence constructed as the average of the pixel values in the district's itself. We then divide our districts into rural and urban following the classification proposed by

units, published with the objective of standardizing and uniforming information across countries and time periods.

⁵While this dataset does not contain information on contribution of mobile money services to the network operators' financials, in Data Appendix E - Mobile Network Operators Balance Sheets we provide, as an example, balance sheets (financial statements and revenue breakdowns) from selected MNOs also reporting revenues and costs of their mobile money service. In this restricted sample, the revenue from mobile money services lies between 7.7% for the overall Airtel group to 38.3% for Safaricom both in 2021.

Cattaneo et al. (2021). We also exploit the data on nighttime light intensity provided by the National Centers for Environmental Information. They provide pixels with value ranging from 0 (no light) to 63 (maximum light intensity), all over the globe. We construct a district’s measure of light intensity by averaging nighttime light intensity across all pixels contained in the district.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. Panel A presents two variables with a subscript it , which labels a variable that varies by mobile money operator i during year t : *Fees on network* describes the average yearly fee applied to transaction between users of the same operator over the transaction value; *Fees cross network*, instead, represent the relative cost of the transaction when this is done between users of different mobile money networks. Panel B present summary statistics for performance and usage indicators of mobile network providers taken from the GSMA Intelligence dataset. Variables are expressed in log and vary by mobile network operator i over year t . Panel C and Panel D summarize the coverage variable at operator-district level and at district level, respectively. Variables in Panel C vary by operator i in district d over year t , while variable in Panel D vary by district d over year t . These two panels also report summary statistics for *Interoperability*, an indicator of the presence of interoperability in the mobile money market. In Panel C an operator-specific measure of interoperability is reported (which takes value 1 when the operator effectively became interoperable), while Panel D reports a country-specific measure of interoperability (which takes value 1 when the national legislation starts requiring mobile money operators to be interoperable). Panel E reports the summary statistics for the World Bank Global Findex Survey: we report three variables that we use as a proxy of financial inclusion and resilience. Variables vary by individual j in country c in year t . Panel F reports summary statistics for the IMF Financial Access Survey, that contains country-level data on mobile money usage. In Panel F, variables are reported in log, and vary by country c in year t .

2.5 Identification: the staggering of Interoperability

In line with Naji (2020), we define Interoperability as the possibility given by Mobile Money Operators to transfer money between two accounts in different mobile money schemes. While mobile money was born as a stand-alone service, in which transfers were allowed only within the same network, in the following years, it experienced an integration process that brought the connection of operators between themselves and other payment services. While we are aware that different types of interoperability exist depending on the level of integration of systems, as explained in Data Appendix D - Fees & Interoperability we focus on the case of wallet-to-wallet interoperability, i.e. the possibility to transfer mobile money between users of different operators. Indeed, as we document,

institutional regulations about interoperability and bilateral agreements between mobile money providers in African countries always request this level of integration between mobile money systems. In recent years, various development organizations, industry bodies, and regulators have embarked on enabling mobile money interoperability between digital financial services providers in different markets across the globe.⁶ We exploit the staggered deployment of mobile money interoperability across African countries as main source for our identification scheme.

In the legal system of African countries, in fact, mobile money is generally settled together with other payment instruments. This means that mobile money interoperability is defined and enacted within the regulatory framework of financial operators. However, discrepancies between the regulatory framework and the actual adoption of interoperability by mobile money operators might arise. This is due to several causes, that differ across countries. Indeed, we might observe both countries where interoperability is introduced by the regulator but not yet adopted by operators, and countries where operators allow interoperable transactions even in the absence of a institutional regulation. The first case might arise when the new regulatory framework concerning the introduction of interoperability is not clear and does not specify the details through which this policy should be enacted.⁷ The second case might instead arise when operators themselves see potential benefits from the introduction of interoperability or when they want to precede a regulation that, soon or later, will be enacted by the regulator.⁸ We are able to identify both cases. By collecting information coming from national law bulletin and from operators' websites, we are able to differentiate whether in a given country the regime of interoperability is introduced by the law or if it is the operator itself that makes its system interoperable. In some cases, in fact, bilateral agreements between mobile money providers precede the formal introduction of interoperability by the local political institution. In Data Appendix D - Fees & Interoperability we provide details about the introduction of mobile money interoperability for each African country in which such policy was enacted.

Figure 2 presents the staggering of interoperability until 2021. Up to date, 20 African countries and 58 mobile money operators have introduced mobile money interoperability.

⁶In September 2014 the mobile financial services industry in Tanzania signed its first agreement on interoperability, making Tanzania one of the first countries in the world with an industry-agreed interoperable market for mobile financial services (Naji, 2020).

⁷For example, the Bank of Botswana in 2019 published the “Electronic Payment Services Regulations”, where it was stated that “the resources shall be a system which is interoperate with other payment system within Botswana”: this regulation requires payment systems to be interoperable, but no technical standards for interoperability are prescribed, hence leaving to the operators too much discretion about how and when to enact interoperability.

⁸This is the case of Airtel Money and Safaricom’s MPESA in Kenya, which in January 2018 undertook a pilot phase, enabling the seamless transfer of funds between mobile accounts on different networks. In April 2018, in a press release, the Central Bank of Kenya welcomed the implementation of interoperability of mobile financial services, stressing its benefits and importance to Kenya’s mobile money market.

Our empirical strategy revolves around three different empirical specifications, which all rely on the economic characteristics of countries adopting and not-adopting interoperability to be balanced both at baseline and over time, as shown respectively in Tables A.1 and A.2 in Online Appendix A - Additional Tables.

3 Empirical Model and Results

We develop our analysis adopting three main empirical approaches. First, we develop an event study design meant to test for pre-trends and to investigate the dynamics of the treatment effect. Second, we implement a staggered difference-in-difference specification using two-way fixed effects regressions. The staggered difference-in-difference provides compact estimates of the average treatment effect under the assumptions of no pretrends. Third, we test the heterogeneities described by our proposition by studying the effect of interoperability in rural and poor districts. This allows us to draw specific policy implications and bring more clarity in the debate about the effects of mobile money interoperability (Bourreau and Valletti, 2015).

Following the structure of the paper, this section is divided into four subsections. In the first, we study the effect of interoperability introduced at the operator level. We first show how an interoperable system fosters competition between mobile money operators. We show that mobile money operators lower their tariffs, reduce their coverage, and register a decrease in revenues and investments. We conclude this subsection with an instrumental variable approach. The second subsection provides aggregate results on the effect of interoperability at the district and at the country level, and shows the negative effects of interoperability on financial inclusion. In the third subsection we provide heterogeneity analysis, which confirm previous results on financial inclusion. In the last subsection, we present several robustness checks.

3.1 Evidence at the operator level

3.1.1 Fees

We exploit the staggering of interoperability by African operators to study its effect on the fee structure of mobile money services. Our main variables of interest are: *On Net Fees_{it}*, the median fee over transaction values for transactions between users of the same operator, *Cross Net Fees_{it}*, the median fee over transaction values for transaction between users of different operators.

The first exercise that we propose is an event study as defined in the following equation:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \sum_{k=-5}^5 \gamma_k I\{K_{ict} = k\} + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ict} represents the dependent variable for operator i in country c in year t ; α_i and β_t are operator and year fixed effects. The observation window is 2010–2021, while we restrict the event window to be the interval $[-5; +5]$ from the year of the adoption of interoperability by operator i . K_{ict} is the relative year from the adoption of interoperability by operator i in country c . We set the year before the adoption of interoperability as the baseline category, as is standard in the literature. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level. Figure 3 reports the results of Equation 1, in particular those of coefficients γ_j for $j = -5, \dots, 5$. The left panel refers to on net fees, i.e. fees of transactions between users of the same operator, and shows no pre-trends; this means that before the introduction of interoperability, the point estimates are close to zero, and none of them are statistically significant. The coefficients become negative and statistically significant when interoperability is introduced. In particular, we observe an immediate jump, where the on-net fees register a decrease of 0.5%, followed by a similar decrease in the following years. The right panel refers to cross net fees, i.e. those paid when transacting mobile money to a different operator. Similar to before, no pre-trends can be detected and the coefficients are negative and decreasing starting from year 0, and they are statistically different from zero from period 1. The decrease over years is starker in this case: coefficients show a decrease in cross-net fees of more than 1% after 1 year from the introduction of interoperability, and this drop remains stable over the following years. Overall, we interpret these results as a negative effect of the introduction of interoperability on tariffs imposed by mobile money providers.

The second exercise we propose is a staggered difference-in-differences specification as specified below:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha_i + \beta_y + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ict} + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (2)$$

where, again, Y_{ict} represents the dependent variable, for operator i in country c in year t ; α_i and β_t are operator and year fixed effects; and $\text{Interoperability}_{ict}$ is a dummy variable that equals one after the operator adopts interoperability. Table 2 reports the estimates from the staggered difference-in-difference specification as defined in equation 2. This two-way fixed effects regression provides a compact measure of the average causal effect of interoperability on our two mobile money tariffs outcomes. It imposes no pre-trends and assumes constant treatment effects. The results from Table 2 confirm those from the event studies. Introduction of mobile money interoperability is associated with a significant decrease in mobile money tariffs, both on net and cross net. The estimates are also large in magnitude: introducing interoperability decreases on net tariffs by 20% and

cross net by 35%, with respect to the mean value before the policy change. We propose the same analysis of Table 2, but now differentiating between different transaction brackets.

As explained in Section 2.2, mobile money operators apply different tariffs for different transaction values. In particular, these tariffs happen to be regressive, in the sense that fees are relatively higher for lower transactions. We harmonize transaction brackets at country level, for all operators. We define the first bracket as the lowest transaction bracket in a given country. Consequently, the second bracket will be the second lowest bracket, and so on. Table A.3 present results for pairs of transaction brackets. We group transaction brackets in seven pairs and obtain estimates of the following equation:

$$Y_{bjict} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma_b + \sum_{j=1}^7 \delta_j Interoperability_{ict} \times \mathbf{1}_j + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (3)$$

where α_i is the operator’s specific fixed effects, β_t the year fixed effect, γ_b if bracket b fixed effects. Brackets are paired in seven groups, denoted by j : $\mathbf{1}_j$ indicate whether bracket b belongs to group j . We interact the groups’ indicator variables with the $Interoperability_{ict}$ dummy. Our coefficients δ_j will hence show the effect of operator-level interoperability on brackets belonging to group j . In Table A.3 and Figure 4 we report the coefficients of Equation 3. We show that our results are driven by the lowest two transaction brackets, that decrease of about 20%, which corresponds to a drop of more than 60% with respect to the pre-policy average. This corroborates our hypothesis that interoperability fosters competition between mobile money operators. In so doing, they try to attract more people in their network by decreasing the tariffs for the lowest transaction values. This is line with many policy reports, that mention that low-value transactions constitute the bulk of mobile money operations (Yao et al., 2022).

3.1.2 Coverage

In this section, we provide an analysis of how operator coverage in districts evolves over time and its response to interoperability. This means, that we consider as unit of analysis the operator-district pair. Using the GADM database, we focus on the district as our geographic unit of observation. In most cases, districts are designed as second-level administrative units and in rare cases as third-level or above. We harmonize this administrative definition across countries to study a consistent set of comparable geographic units. This section shows the main results of our analysis, providing evidence of how Mobile Network Operators change their coverage after the introduction of mobile money interoperability. This analysis is of particular interest because it also allows us to provide an insight on the heterogeneous effect of interoperability depending on the dominance of a given operator in the local market. Indeed, the same operator might decide to behave differently in different areas, depending on its coverage in the areas before the policy

change. We exploit an event study and a difference-in-differences approach. The event study will take the following form:

$$Y_{idct} = \alpha_{id} + \beta_t + \sum_{k=-5}^5 \gamma_k I \{K_{ict} = k\} + \varepsilon_{idct} \quad (4)$$

The staggered difference-in-differences will instead be of the following type:

$$Y_{idct} = \alpha_{id} + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ict} + \varepsilon_{idct} \quad (5)$$

In both cases the variable Y_{idct} refers to the outcome of operator i in district d in country c at time t . We include operator-district fixed effects α_{id} , and year fixed effects β_t . The outcome variables are: the operator's coverage in a given district, i.e. the share of coverage relative to the district's area, in percentage; and the probability of signal of the operator in the district, which is a dummy that takes value 1 if the operator has signal in the district.

Table 3 provides insights on the behavior of operators at the local level when interoperability is introduced. Both column (1) and column (2) suggest a general decrease in the total coverage of an operator at the district level and its lower probability of keeping signal. In particular, individual operator's coverage decreases by almost 4 percentage points after the introduction of interoperability, while the probability of signal decreases by almost 5 percentage points. To further investigate our mechanism, in Table A.4 in Online Appendix A - Additional Tables we show that the drop in total coverage is driven by dominant operators.

Figure 4 reports the results of the event study, which is in line with our difference-in-differences approach. It shows the presence of parallel trends, and the significant effects of the introduction of interoperability for both variables.

3.1.3 Operator's performance

In this section, we verify whether the registered drop in coverage of mobile network operators goes parallel with a reduction in operator's market penetration and investment in infrastructure, and whether this has an impact on its financial performances. We exploit the staggered introduction of interoperability to also study the effects on mobile network operators' performance. To this aim, we use the same specification as the one described in Equation 5. Our estimates show how interoperability affects performances, investments and usage of the operator, and explore the response of operators to prices of different services they provide, such as calls, texts and internet.

Table 4⁹ confirms that the total coverage of mobile network operators linked to mobile

⁹In Table 4 outcome variables are expressed in log.

money services drop after the introduction of interoperability: this, of course, has a repercussion on the operator’s market penetration as well. The increased competition to which mobile money interoperability leads increases the marginal cost of covering the “last mile”, and hence operators disinvest in infrastructure. Column (1) shows results for the percentage of population covered: we register a decrease of 18% in the country’s population covered by the mobile network. Column (4) shows that after the introduction of interoperability, the number of towers decreases by 12%. This is in line with what we have highlighted in Section 2.3 about the high cost of maintaining infrastructure that allows coverage in more remote areas. Similarly, revenues decrease by 30%.

In Table A.5 we test whether increased competition in mobile money affect also prices for other services provided by mobile network operators. We find no significant effect on prices for calls, messages or internet data. For the three categories of prices coefficients are close to 0 and not significant. In Table A.6 we instead show that interoperability has no effect on the probability of mobile network operators to take part in a M&A operation. We do this to ensure that interoperability does not affect the structure of the mobile network market.

3.1.4 Instrumental Variable approach

We develop an instrumental variable approach, where we instrument our operator-specific measure of interoperability, with the country-specific one. Table A.7 presents the first stage estimates. Tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 reproduce the results from Tables 2, 3 and 4, by adopting the instrumental variable and this IV appears to be relevant and strong, with the first stage F statistic higher than 20, depending on the sample size of each regression. At the same time, we note that these results are very close in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical precision. The main reason for which these different estimations yield similar results is to be found in the high correlation between operator-level and country-level mobile money interoperability. In fact, while some companies appear to voluntarily introduce interoperability, sometimes anticipating the official country-wide introduction led by policy-makers, most companies appear to follow the introduction of this policy. In addition to this, the use of the IV allows us to preempt possible concerns related to the determinants of company-level interoperability adoption, by showing that the most relevant proxy, namely the country-level policy, appears to drive the vast majority of our underlying variation.

3.2 Evidence at the District and Country level

3.2.1 Coverage at the District level

This section studies the effect on interoperability on mobile network coverage at the local level. We extend the results presented in Section 3.1.2 by providing aggregate evidence at the district level. Here, we focus on coverage at sub-national units, hence aggregating individual operator level data at the smallest geographical unit as defined by the maps provided by GADM, as explained in Section 2.4. The dataset used for the analysis in this section is hence composed by 47'480 administrative units, over a period of 12 years spanning 2010-2021, for a total of about 570'000 observation. We exploit a more aggregate version of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, where the unit of analysis is now given by the district d . In particular, we estimate the following event study design:

$$Y_{dct} = \alpha_d + \beta_t + \sum_{k=-5}^5 \gamma_k I \{K_{ct} = k\} + \varepsilon_{dct} \quad (6)$$

and the following two-way fixed effects model:

$$Y_{dct} = \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ct} + \varepsilon_{dct} \quad (7)$$

where the dependent variable is defined Y_{dct} and refers to a district d in country c in year t . It represents the following variables: *Total Coverage_{dct}*, which is the percentage of district's area covered by any mobile network operator (i.e., 0 means that no mobile network operator has signal in the district, while 100 means that the district is completely covered by mobile connection); *Probability of signal in district_{dct}* is instead a dummy variable taking value 1 whether at least one operator is active in the district, while it takes value 0 when there is no operator covering that given district; *Number of MNOs_{dct}* is the log of the number of operators active in the district. Figure 6 reports the event study specified in Eq. 6, and Table 5 reports the results of Eq. 7. The left panel of Figure 6 shows parallel trends in the pre-period and then the negative effect of the introduction of interoperability on mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district's area. After one year, we register a decrease of 5 percentage points in coverage. This decrease grows in the following year, up to 10 percentage points. Similarly, the right panel shows a decrease in the number of operators in the district, after the introduction of interoperability. The number of mobile network operators decreases by more than 20% after one year from the introduction of interoperability, and this decrease is even higher in the following years. In the lower central panel, we show that the probability of signal in the district decreases by more than 3 percentage points in the three years following the introduction of interoperability.

3.2.2 Financial Inclusion

The debate around mobile money interoperability has increasingly focused on the effects on financial inclusion (Bourreau and Valletti, 2015). Because mobile money is seen as a tool that enhances financial inclusion and gives access to digital financial services to the poorest and those ones living in the most remote areas of developing countries (Suri and Jack, 2016), any policy change on this payment system needs to take into account the potential implications on individuals that are unbanked and financially-underserved.

To investigate the implication of interoperability for financial inclusion, we present results both from survey data and from country-level data. We use the World Bank Global Findex dataset on the following empirical model:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha_c + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ct} + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (8)$$

where Y_{ict} refers to answers to the survey questions of individual i living in country c , α_c and β_t are respectively country c and year t fixed effects.

We present results from the World Bank Global Findex in the first three columns of Table 6. In Panel A we show that interoperability negatively affects several measures of financial inclusion, and that access and usage of mobile money transactions for different purposes (e.g. sending and receiving remittances) decreases. After the introduction of interoperability, individuals are 7% less likely to send remittances with mobile phones, 6% less likely to receive remittances with mobile phones, 2% less likely to save for their business and 6% less likely to have access to funds in case of an emergency.

While estimates are not precise, we further investigate the underlying mechanism showing that countries with a stronger pre-existent mobile money network are significantly more affected by the introduction of interoperability. In Panel B of Table 6 we replicate the results of Eq. 8 by adding an interaction term between interoperability and a measure of the strength of the mobile money network before the introduction of the policy:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha_c + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ct} + \delta \text{Interoperability}_{ct} \times \text{Mobile Money Network}_c + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (9)$$

where $\text{Mobile Money Network}_c$ is the standardized number of all survey respondents with a mobile money account in country c before the introduction of interoperability. We show that our results are hence amplified by network effects, in line with the work of Björkegren and Karaca (2022). These results can be seen as the consequences of a reduction in mobile network coverage both at the extensive margin (i.e. in terms of geographical outreach) and the intensive margin (i.e. in terms of signal quality) following

the introduction of interoperability. Indeed, for one standard deviation increase in the number of mobile money users, we register a significant decrease of 20% for sending domestic remittances through mobile phones, a decrease of 18% for receiving domestic remittances through mobile phones, a decrease of 10% for saving for own business activity and of 8% for having access to emergency funds.

In the last three columns of Table 6, we provide similar results for data aggregated at country level in the IMF FAS dataset. In Panel A, we first document a decrease in the number of users and outlets (mobile money agents), as well as in the number of transactions. Panel B shows further evidence that the pre-existing strength of the mobile money network drives our results. Again, we provide a heterogeneity analysis by interacting the dummy for interoperability with a standardized measure of the number of registered mobile money accounts in the country before the introduction of interoperability. Also in this case, the coefficients of the interaction show that the negative effects of interoperability on all the measures of financial inclusion are amplified by network effects. A 10% increase in the number of mobile money accounts with respect to the pre-policy mean, leads to a significant reduction of 3.5% in the number of mobile money agents, a reduction of 2.5% in the number of mobile money accounts, and a significant decrease of 5% in the number of mobile money transactions, after the introduction of interoperability.

To further validate our results, in Table A.32 of Online Appendix A - Additional Tables, we use the DHS data and report the effect of interoperability on the the probability of having made a transaction using mobile money in the last month. Interoperability has a negative impact on this probability, especially in rural areas. In Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 we eventually provide further heterogeneous analysis confirming the differential effect that interoperability has on rural and urban areas, by exploiting our granular data on network coverage and different measures of local urban development.

3.3 Additional Heterogeneities

This section provides additional heterogeneity analyses aimed at further investigating the mechanism leading our results. We confirm the differential effect that interoperability has on urban and rural areas, by showing that less developed districts are more affected by the introduction of interoperability. We also provide evidence that the negative effect of interoperability is attenuated in countries with a stronger network of Mobile Money agents.

3.3.1 Rural

In Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 7 we differentiate between rural and urban areas, to study the differential effect of interoperability depending on local development, and test our proposition, which predicts that the negative effects of interoperability are stronger

in area with higher costs of tower installation. We identify rural districts by following the approach proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2021): see Section 2.4 for further details. We create a dummy variable, Rural Area_d , which takes value 1 for rural districts and 0 otherwise. We hence use the following specification:

$$Y_{dct} = \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ct} + \rho \text{Interoperability}_{ct} \times \mathbf{1} \text{Rural Area}_d + \varepsilon_{dct} \quad (10)$$

where interoperability is now interacted with Rural Area_d . As outcome variables, we still use the mobile network coverage as percentage of the district's area, the probability of signal in the district and the number of mobile network operators active in the district. In this specification, since we are using district-time varying variation, we change the clustering at district level. Table 7 shows that less developed rural districts are negatively affected by the introduction of interoperability, which leads to a decrease of 2.4 percentage points in the network coverage, in a 0.5 percentage points decrease in the probability of signal in the district, and in a 5.1% decrease in the number of operators active in the district, more than urban districts.

3.3.2 Night Lights

Similarly, we exploit Nighttime Lights data to provide a measure of the district's urban development. We exploit the following model:

$$Y_{dct} = \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ct} + \rho \text{Interoperability}_{ct} \times \mathbf{1} \text{Night Lights}_{dc} + \varepsilon_{dct} \quad (11)$$

where as independent variable we use the dummy for interoperability and its interaction with $\text{Night Light Above Median}_{dc}$, which is a dummy taking value 1 for those district whose Night Light activities is above the median of night light activity of all districts. We define the variable on the subsample of illuminated districts; i.e., we exclude from the analysis all those districts that have no nightlight activity at all. To construct our measures of night light activity, we use the data provided by the National Centers for Environmental Information. Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 7 displays the results. As for Table 7, we cluster standard errors at the district level, because we are using district-time varying variation. The negative effect of interoperability is attenuated in those districts that register nighttime lights above the median. Again, these results confirm the ones already shown comparing rural and urban districts.

3.3.3 Mobile Money Agents' network

We here show the differential effect of interoperability on network coverage, depending on the strength of the Mobile Money Agents' network. In Table A.11 we first show that the introduction of interoperability has a negative effect on the number of Mobile Money agents. We show that interoperability negatively affects different measure of the Mobile Money agents' networks: we show the effect on the log number of agents, on the log number of agents per 1'000 squared kilometers, and the log number of agents per 100'000 adults. As in Section 3.2.2, we also provide an heterogeneity analysis looking at the differential effect of interoperability depending on the strength of the Mobile Money users' network in the pre-policy period.

In Table A.12 we show that districts in countries with a stronger network of Mobile Money agents are less affected by the introduction of interoperability. In Table A.12 we interact the dummy for interoperability with a dummy taking value 1 if the number of Mobile Money agents in country c in the pre-policy period is above the median value. We show that districts in countries with a higher number of Mobile Money agents register a significant lower reduction in their network coverage by 13% with respect to districts in countries with a lower number of agents.

3.4 Policy implications

Our study proposes a policy that complements our research and is based on a theoretical intuition regarding a crucial source of market imperfection contributing to the competition-inclusion tradeoff at the heart of this paper: the prevalence of uniform pricing across different locations. As discussed by (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019), it is common for businesses to apply uniform or nearly-uniform prices across various locations, regardless of the local demographic characteristics and competitive landscape. This aspect assumes particular significance in our context, as if mobile companies were able to discriminate their fees based on the local cost of providing connection services, increased competition would lead to reduced mark-ups without affecting service provision. Although such mechanisms of price discrimination do not exist in African telecommunications, we draw a close analogy from countries that implement subsidies for mobile operators to facilitate rural telecommunications. Consequently, this results in de facto price discrimination between urban and rural locations once the subsidy is combined with the fee. To investigate this further, we collected data on policies aimed at promoting access to telecommunication services in remote areas and show a crucial heterogeneity of our key findings to these policies. Our empirical results validate that the combination of interoperability and these subsidies presents a promising opportunity to lower fees for users while maintaining the scale of the mobile network. In Table A.36 we propose the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{dct} = & \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ct} + \\
& \theta \text{Subsidy}_{ct} + \\
& \rho \text{Interoperability}_{ct} \times \text{Subsidy}_{ct} + \varepsilon_{dct}
\end{aligned}
\tag{12}$$

where Subsidy_{ct} is a time-varying dummy variables that takes value 1 after country c provides subsidies for rural telecommunications. In Table A.36 we show the differential effect that interoperability has on total network coverage for rural and urban districts, conditional on subsidies for the development of rural telecommunications. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.36 we run the above regression on the subsamples of rural and urban districts, respectively. We classify districts following the methodology proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2021). In Column (3) and (4), instead, we differentiate between districts whose level of nighttime light intensity is below or above median, respectively. For all subsamples we show that the general effect of interoperability is negative. However, Columns (1) and (3) show that the effect is attenuated for those less developed districts in countries providing subsidies for rural telecommunications: indeed, for the subsamples of rural districts or districts with nighttime light intensity below median, the interaction term between $\text{Interoperability}_{ct}$ and Subsidy_{ct} is positive and significant. These attenuated effects is not registered in urban and more developed districts.

3.5 Robustness Checks

In this section, we include additional checks to test the robustness of our results. In Online Appendix A - Additional Tables we show that our key results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications: 1) we first replicate our main results using the latest methods for dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021); 2) we then apply the framework for difference-in-differences designs with staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous causal effects proposed by Borusyak et al. (2021); 3) we propose alternative clustering methods of standard errors; 4) we weight our main regression specifications with a measure of district's population 5) we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of time-varying country-specific characteristics. These robustness checks complement the ones already presented in previous sections. As explained in Section 3.1.3, we construct a novel dataset on network operators' M&A activities, and show that the introduction of interoperability has no effect on the probability of mobile network operators in taking part in mergers and acquisitions. In 3.1.4 we replicated our analyses at the operator level adopting an instrumental variable approach. In Section 3.3 we provided several heterogeneity analyses, showing also that our estimates are robust to different measures of local urban development.

3.5.1 New methods in difference-in-differences and event study design: Sun and Abraham (2021) and Borusyak et al. (2021)

We replicate our main results of Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 using the methods proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) and Borusyak et al. (2021). Estimates do not differ from the ones previously obtained, nor in their sign, nor in their magnitude, neither in their significance.

Figures B.3 and B.4 replicate the event studies for On Net and Cross Net fees and for the different measures of coverage at the operator-district level.

In Table A.13, A.14, A.15 and A.16 we replicate our main results using the method proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021). Our coefficient of interest is the average treatment effect, which is obtained by averaging the estimation weighted estimators for the first four years after the introduction of interoperability.

Table A.17, A.18, A.19 and A.20, and Figures B.3, B.4 and B.5 respectively present the treatment effect estimation and the pre-trend testing in event studies obtained from the difference-in-differences designs with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). This method is particularly adapt to our setting, as it is designed to estimate the effects of a binary treatment with staggered roll-out allowing for arbitrary heterogeneity and dynamics of causal effects. The benchmark case of this method considers each unit i getting treated as of period t and remaining treated forever: indeed, when interoperability is deployed, it is never retracted in our case.

3.5.2 Alternative clustering and population weight

We here include three additional robustness checks on our main results at the operator and at the district level. First, in Tables A.21, A.22 and A.23 we replicate the results of Tables 2, 3 and 4 by clustering standard errors at the country-level. As we were suggesting in Section 3.1.4, operator-level introduction of interoperability might be the response to a changing local market or institutional framework at the country level. The staggering of interoperability between operators in the same country might hence be correlated with country specific characteristics. We do this to clean out all possible country-time specific variations from our estimates.

Second, in Tables A.24, A.25, A.26 and A.27 we replicate the results of Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 computing standard errors using the wild cluster bootstrap methodology. Estimates remain significantly different from zero.

Last, in Tables A.28 and A.29, we replicate the results of Tables 3 and 5 using weighted least squares, where we weight for the district's population count. We retrieve data from Warszawski et al. (2017) to construct our measures of population at the district level. Warszawski et al. (2017) provide data at raster level. We hence aggregate raster level data at the district level: population count is the log of people living in the district. Weights

for population allow us to verify that operators cut coverage in general, even once the population is taken into account. The smaller magnitudes of the reduction in coverage are aligned with the fact that areas with a lower population see larger declines than areas with a higher one. This is consistent with a standard model in which operators cut more extensively marginal markets, as our findings on rural and poorer districts show.

3.5.3 Additional tests

We provide two different tests aimed at understanding whether the introduction of interoperability changes the propensity and convenience of mobile users to own multiple SIMs, and at understanding whether countries where users hold multiple SIMs are differentially affected by the introduction of interoperability. To tackle the first point, in Table A.30 we present results from a regression where the independent variable is a dummy taking value 1 when interoperability is enacted at the country level, and where the dependent variable is the number of mobile phone subscriptions, both as the number of SIM cards over 100 inhabitants and in absolute terms. No effect of interoperability on the number of SIMs is detected. To tackle the second point, we instead leverage granular data at the operator-district pair. Table A.31 in Online Appendix A - Additional Tables reports an OLS regression where interoperability is interacted with a country specific measure of mobile phone subscriptions (i.e. number of SIM cards over 100 inhabitants). Estimates show that there is no differential effect of interoperability depending on the number of mobile phone subscriptions. Indeed, coefficients of the interaction term are extremely small and non significant.

Eventually, to test the robustness of our results to the macroeconomic environment, in Tables A.33, A.34 and A.35 we replicate the analysis of Tables 2, 3 and 5 by including time-varying country-specific controls such as real GDP and GDP growth.

4 Conclusions

This paper investigates the effects of competition on the behavior of mobile money companies and its corresponding effects on financial inclusion. The study focuses on competition induced by a specific policy framework: the introduction of platform interoperability, a regulatory intervention that facilitates transactions between users of different mobile money operators. The objective is to relate this change in competition to the profit margins of mobile money operators and their investment in pricing, network, and infrastructure.

Our study finds that there is a trade-off between competition and financial inclusion in the context of mobile money. The vertical integration between mobile network and mobile money companies results in higher fees charged to mobile money users, which

lowers consumer welfare and financial inclusion on the intensive margin. At the same time, this lack of competition also provides incentives for mobile network companies to extend their reach to underserved locations, enhancing financial inclusion on the extensive margin.

To test this hypothesis, we construct a novel panel which collects information on more than 120 mobile operators across all African countries from 2010 onward. This is done by using the “Wayback Machine”, which is a digital repository that systematically scans a vast number of websites and captures screenshots of their pages. By digitizing this information, we have constructed a panel that presents novel descriptive insights into the operation of this market. This information has been further combined with extensive documentation on companies network coverage across all districts of Africa and financial and non-financial documentation. This empirical exercise requires the identification of a source of quasi-experimental variation that generates higher competition between mobile money companies. For this reason, we leverage a natural experiment that has unfolded in Africa over the period spanning from 2010 to 2020: the staggered deployment of platform interoperability.

In line with the main hypothesis, our findings show that the introduction of this policy lowers fees on mobile money transactions and this particularly large for small-value payments. At the same time, interoperability also has negative effects on network availability, as districts in countries that introduce interoperability experience a drop in their coverage, which is particularly severe for rural districts.

Overall, the study highlights the need for policymakers to strike a balance between competition and financial inclusion in the mobile money market. The findings suggest that competition-promoting policies such as platform interoperability can have a positive effect on inducing lower fees but also have negative effects on network availability. Additionally, the study provides valuable insights into the functioning and regulation of mobile money companies, an area that remains largely unexplored in the literature. By proposing and exploring this novel trade-off, our study contributes to a better understanding of the implications of digital payment systems for financial inclusion.

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Tables

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Panel A: Mobile Money Fees</i>					
Fees on network _{it}	617	.04	.1	0	1.25
Fees cross network _{it}	418	.1	.14	0	.98
<i>Panel B: GSMA Intelligence Mobile Network data</i>					
Total cellular connection _{it}	2335	13.75	2.36	4.06	18.18
3G connections _{it}	1810	12.7	2.25	3.3	17.79
Total cellular network coverage; by population _{it}	210	4.31	.32	2.71	4.61
Total revenue; cellular _{it}	3007	17.43	2.07	7.69	22.1
Recurring revenue; cellular _{it}	3015	17.53	2.08	7.72	22.53
Non-Recurring revenue; cellular _{it}	2950	14.46	2.3	4.29	21.1
Total Capex _{it}	683	17.36	1.67	9.07	20.71
<i>Panel C: Network coverage at operator-district level</i>					
Total coverage _{idt}	1113012	75.1	33.98	0	100
Probability of signal in district _{idt}	1113012	.96	.19	0	1
Interoperability _{it}	1113012	.1	.3	0	1
<i>Panel D: Network coverage at district level</i>					
Total coverage _{dt}	569760	71.21	38.26	0	100
Probability of signal in district _{dt}	569760	.88	.33	0	1
Number of MNOs _{dt}	569760	1.88	1.19	0	5
Interoperability _{ct}	569760	.14	.35	0	1
<i>Panel E: WB Global Findex Survey</i>					
Recived domestic remittances w mobile phone _{jct}	25681	.41	.49	0	1
Sent domestic remittances w mobile phone _{jct}	21444	.44	.5	0	1
Saved for own business activity _{jct}	77478	.2	.4	0	1
<i>Panel F: IMF Financial Access Survey</i>					
Number of mobile money transactions _{ct}	267	16.48	3.51	0	21.98
Outstanding balances on active mobile money accounts, Domestic Cur _{ct}	157	20.23	4.09	9.15	29.26
Number of registered mobile money agent outlets _{ct}	271	8.89	2.42	1.1	13.4
Number of registered mobile money accounts _{ct}	293	14.18	2.36	6.79	18.01

Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the main datasets used in the analysis. The columns respectively report the variable's name, the number of observations (Observations), its mean value (Mean), its standard deviation (Std. Dev.), its minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) value. All datasets are observed at the yearly frequency. We report six different panels. Panel A summarizes the dataset we constructed containing information on the fees structure of Mobile Money Operators. Fees are reported as transaction value share. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the main variables (in log) in the GSMA Intelligence dataset. Panel C and D report summary for mobile network operators' coverage and interoperability. Panel E and Panel F reports survey based individual- and country-level data on financial inclusion, respectively. In Panel F, variables are reported in log.

Table 2: Fees and interoperability

	Fees	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	613	411
Adj. R sq.	0.783	0.701
Mean Dep. Var.	0.009	0.035

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are On Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1); and Cross Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as percentage of transaction value. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table 3: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-4.811** (2.149)	-0.036* (0.021)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012
Adj. R sq.	0.808	0.276
Mean Dep. Var.	75.153	0.957

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if operator i is interoperable. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table 4: Mobile Operators and Interoperability

	Total network coverage	Market penetration mobile connections	Total Revenue	Towers	EBIT	EBITDA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.186*** (0.033)	-0.224** (0.112)	-0.293** (0.134)	-0.123* (0.063)	-0.097 (0.336)	-0.062 (0.224)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366	565
Adj. R sq.	0.789	0.884	0.866	0.974	0.811	0.861
Mean Dep. Var.	4.354	2.213	17.909	7.061	16.164	16.279

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's share of population covered in country c (1); the operator's market penetration of mobile connection in country c (2); the operator's total revenue (3); the number of towers used by the operator for its coverage (4); the operator's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the operator's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in column (5) and (6), respectively. Dependent variables are expressed in log. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table 5: Network Coverage and Interoperability - District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ct}	-5.024** (2.147)	-0.034* (0.020)	-0.186** (0.077)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569760	569760	569760
Adj. R sq.	0.903	0.873	0.912
Mean Dep. Var.	69.606	0.860	1.762

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability of mobile network signal in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether at least one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active in the district (2); the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district (3). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. In column (3) we report the mean of the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district, not expressed in log. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table 6: Financial inclusion: WB Global Findex & IMF Financial Access

	WB Global Findex				IMF Financial Access		
	Saved for own business	Access emergency fund	Sent remittances w mobile phone	Received remittances w mobile phone	MM Agents	MM Accounts	MM Transactions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Interoperability							
Interoperability _{ct}	-0.018 (0.044)	-0.060* (0.032)	-0.069 (0.078)	-0.062 (0.080)	-0.242 (0.255)	-0.380 (0.333)	-0.740** (0.342)
Panel B: Network effects							
Interoperability _{ct}	-0.098** (0.047)	-0.083** (0.032)	-0.195*** (0.046)	-0.182*** (0.049)	-0.123 (0.257)	-0.409 (0.316)	-0.437 (0.358)
Interoperability _{ct} × Mobile Money Network _{ct₀}	-0.117** (0.023)	0.000 (0.046)	-0.231** (0.051)	-0.207* (0.198)	-0.439*** (0.136)	-0.322 (0.285)	-0.657*** (0.183)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	77258	90309	21380	25613	283	247	286
Adj. R sq.	0.078	0.149	0.365	0.358	0.894	0.902	0.898
Mean Dep. var	0.189	0.467	0.442	0.401	8.799	12.998	16.314

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates on two different datasets. In Columns (1), (2) and (3) we use data from the World Bank Global Findex Survey, where the unit of observation is individual respondent's i in year t . In Columns (4), (5) and (6) we use data from the IMF Financial Access Survey, where the unit of observation is country c in year t . Country and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. For the WB Global Findex Survey observations span all available years between 2010 and 2021. Controls for individual respondent's specific characteristics are included. The dependent variables are dummy variables taking value 1 if in the last month the respondent has saved for own business (1); has had easy access to funds in case of any emergency (2); has sent domestic remittances through mobile money (3); has received domestic remittances through mobile money (4). For the IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS) the observations span the years 2010-2021. The dependent variables, expressed in log, are the total number of registered Mobile Money agents in country c in year t (5); the total number of Mobile Money accounts in country c in year t (6); the total number of Mobile Money transactions in country c in year t (7). In Panel A, the outcome variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if interoperability is active in country c . In Panel B, we add the interaction between $Interoperability_{ct}$ and $Mobile\ Money\ Network_{ct_0}$, a measure of the size of the mobile money network in country c before the introduction of interoperability. We construct the measure using data from the same dataset of the outcome variable. For the WB Global Findex, we standardize the total number of survey respondents who own a mobile money account in country c , before the introduction of interoperability. For the IMF FAS we standardize the average number of registered mobile money accounts in country c before the introduction of interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. Column (4), (5) and (6) report the mean in millions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.


Table 7: Network Coverage, Rural area, Nightlights and Interoperability - District Level

	Rural area			Nightlight intensity		
	Total coverage (1)	Probability of signal in district (2)	Number of MNOs (3)	Total coverage (4)	Probability of signal in district (5)	Number of MNOs (6)
$Interoperability_{ct}$	-4.058*** (0.080)	-0.032*** (0.000)	-0.166*** (0.002)	-1.803*** (0.187)	-0.006*** (0.000)	-0.046*** (0.002)
$Interoperability_{ct} \times Rural\ area_d$	-2.393*** (0.231)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.051*** (0.002)			
$Interoperability_{ct} \times Night\ Light\ above\ median_d$				0.480** (0.198)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.029*** (0.002)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of Districts	47480	47480	47480	15768	15768	15768
Obs.	569760	569760	569760	189216	189216	189216
Adj. R sq.	0.903	0.873	0.912	0.946	0.961	0.970
Mean Dep. Var.	69.606	0.860	1.762	85.325	0.934	2.360

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t , as specified in Eq. 10. In all columns we include district and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the district level. The dependent variable is the mobile network coverage as percentage of the district's area, the probability of signal in the district and the number of mobile network operators active in the districts. The dependent variable is regressed over two variables. The first is $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The second is a measure of local development. For columns (1), (2) and (3) we include the interaction between $Interoperability_{ct}$ and $Rural\ area_d$, a dummy taking value 1 if the district is classified as rural using geographical characteristics as proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2021). In Columns (4), (5) and (6) we include the interaction between $Interoperability_{ct}$ and $Night\ Light_d$, a continuous variables that represents the standardized nighttime light intensity of the district, according to the data on Nighttime lights provided by the National Centers for Environmental Information, kept fixed at the year 2012, i.e. before that interoperability was introduced in any country. $Rural\ area_d$ and $Night\ Light\ Intensity_d$ are district-specific constants. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. In column (3) we report the mean of the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district, not expressed in log. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.


Figures

Figure 1: Fees and brackets




Notes: This figure plot the yearly fees for sending a mobile money transfer between two agents belonging to the same operator, i.e. on-network transaction. Fees are expressed as percentage of transaction values. In Panel (a) each dot within a bracket corresponds to an operator-year observation. Brackets represent cross-country harmonized transaction value ranges as explained in Section 2.2. Panel (b) shows the average fees across all operators and all years, for each bracket.

Figure 2: Deployment of Interoperability




Notes: These maps show the staggered introduction of interoperability across African countries. Interoperability is currently active in 20 African countries and 58 mobile money operators. The maps present four reference years, 2015 (a), 2017 (b), 2019 (c) and 2021 (d), in which countries colored in blue are those ones in which interoperability is active. Interoperability is never retracted.

Figure 3: Fees and interoperability



Notes: This figure reports the coefficients of the event study specification described in Equation 1. Both left and right panels display the value of the coefficients, γ_k , which describe differential evolution of the fees applied by mobile money operators operating under interoperability relative to operators operating in the absence of interoperability. In the left panel we present results for fees applied to transactions between subscribers of the same operator, i.e. on-network transactions. The right panel presents results for fees applied to transaction between subscribers of different operators, i.e. cross-network transactions. The year marking the introduction of interoperability is year 0 on the x-axis and exhibits a vertical black line. The reference year is the year -1. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level, and the empirical specification includes year and operator fixed effects.

Figure 4: Fees and interoperability




(a) On Net Fees

(b) Cross Net Fees


Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is fee bracket b of operator i in country c in year y . We report the δ_j coefficients of Equation 3, which are displayed in Table A.3. Bracket, operator and year fixed effects are included in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator, in the left panel; the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators, in the right panel. Both dependent variables are expressed as share of transaction value. We pair brackets in seven groups, and show the differential effect that the introduction of interoperability at the operator level has on different transaction brackets, where brackets represent cross-country harmonized transaction value ranges as explained in Section 2.2. Dependent variables are regressed over the interaction between $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability, and an indicator variable $\mathbf{1}_j$, indicating to which pair bracket b belongs. The table hence reports the estimates of coefficients δ_j of Equation 3. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level.

Figure 5: Event Study - Operator-District analysis




Notes. This figure reports the coefficients of the event study specification described in Equation 4. The three panels display the value of the coefficients, γ_k , which describe differential evolution of the outcome variables for the pairs operator-district for which interoperability is active relative to operator-districts with no interoperability. In the left panel we present results for operator's i network coverage in district d , i.e. the percentage of district's d area covered by mobile network operator i . The right panel presents results for the probability that the operator i is active in district d . The year marking the introduction of interoperability is year 0 on the x-axis and exhibits a vertical black line. The reference year is the year -1. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level, and the empirical specification includes year and operator-district fixed effects.

Figure 6: Event Study - District level



Notes: This figure reports the coefficients of the event study specification described in Equation 6. Both left, right and central panels display the value of the coefficients, γ_k , which describe differential evolution of the outcome variables for district where interoperability is active relative to districts with no interoperability. In the left panel we present results for district's mobile network coverage, i.e. the percentage of district's area covered by mobile network operators. The right panel presents results for the number of mobile network operators active in the district. The central panel presents results for the probability of mobile network signal in the district. The year marking the introduction of interoperability is year 0 on the x-axis and exhibits a vertical black line. The reference year is the year -1. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the country level, and the empirical specification includes year and district fixed effects.

Figure 7: Fees dispersion by transaction bracket



Notes: This figure plot the yearly fees for sending a mobile money transfer between two agents belonging to the same operator, i.e. on-network transaction. Fees are expressed as percentage of transaction values. In the top panel on the left each dot within a bracket corresponds to an operator-year observation, for only those operators which are not interoperable yet. The top right panel, instead, shows interoperable operators. Brackets represent cross-country harmonized transaction value ranges as explained in Section 2.2. The left and right panels on the bottom display the average fees across all operators and all years, for each bracket, for non interoperable and interoperable operators respectively. These figures show that the dispersion of fees across brackets diminishes after the introduction of interoperability.

Online Appendix

Online Appendix A - Additional Tables

A.1 Balance Tables

Table A.1: Balance Table - Selection into interoperability

	Non Interoperable			Interoperable			Difference
	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	
Real GDP (Log Mn)	8.07	4.53	565	9.49	2.10	219	1.364
GDP growth (%)	1.62	18.06	532	-1.03	21.40	201	-3.133
Export of Goods and Services (Log Mn)	6.77	5.07	431	8.95	1.30	105	2.222*
Import of Goods and Services (Log Mn)	7.23	5.04	413	9.19	1.30	105	2.027
Government Consumption Exp (Log Mn)	6.25	5.03	412	8.38	1.44	101	2.209
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Log Mn)	6.76	4.93	407	8.55	1.02	89	1.778
Households Expenditure (Log Mn)	8.66	2.35	353	9.82	1.60	105	1.165
Unemployment rate (%)	11.12	8.52	192	8.20	5.21	97	-3.772
Domestic Claims (Log Mn)	7.42	2.23	600	8.14	1.88	240	0.929
Net Foreign Assets (Log Mn)	7.19	2.07	631	7.40	1.76	255	0.309
Broad Money Liabilities (Log Mn)	2.49	0.22	632	2.54	0.19	258	0.073

Notes: This table is the balance table for interoperability. We compare African countries that never introduced interoperability (Non Interoperable), with African countries that eventually introduced interoperability (Interoperable). For Interoperable countries we use data only on the years before the introduction of interoperability. Our data span from 2000 to 2021. The table shows averages for baseline (Mean), their standard deviation (St. Dev.) and the number of observations (N). The Difference column is the coefficient of an OLS regression of a dummy taking value 1 for those countries that eventually introduced mobile money interoperability (and 0 otherwise) on the reported variable, with clustered standard errors at the country level. Regressions include year fixed effects. Country fixed effects are not included as the interoperability dummy, as here defined, is constant at the country level. This table shows that there is no selection into introducing interoperability at the country level, as country specific characteristics do not differ between countries in the two groups. The variables we take into consideration are, in order, Real GDP, the GDP growth, the value of Exports of goods and Services, the value of Import of goods and services, the value of Government Consumption Expenditure, the Gross fixed Capital Formation, the Household Expenditures, the Unemployment rate, the Domestic claims, the Net Foreign Assets and the Broad Money Liabilities. All variables are expressed as the logarithm of the US \$ value in Millions. GDP growth and Unemployment rate are expressed as percentage. The Difference column is the coefficient of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the interoperability dummy as above defined on the variable, with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.2: Balance Table - Interoperability in time series

	Non Interoperable			Interoperable			Difference
	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	
Real GDP (Log Mn)	8.47	4.05	784	9.98	1.95	73	-0.186
GDP growth (%)	0.89	19.05	733	-2.68	17.46	73	1.114
Export of Goods and Services (Log Mn)	7.20	4.66	536	9.51	1.29	42	0.048
Import of Goods and Services (Log Mn)	7.62	4.61	518	9.52	1.04	42	-0.191
Government Consumption Exp (Log Mn)	6.67	4.63	513	8.72	1.26	42	-0.243
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Log Mn)	7.08	4.54	496	9.44	1.20	38	0.120
Households Expenditure (Log Mn)	8.93	2.26	458	10.56	1.44	42	-0.119
Unemployment rate (%)	10.14	7.69	289	7.18	5.21	28	1.516
Domestic Claims (Log Mn)	7.63	2.16	840	9.53	1.86	66	0.027
Net Foreign Assets (Log Mn)	7.25	1.99	886	8.05	1.77	70	-0.120
Broad Money Liabilities (Log Mn)	2.50	0.21	890	2.68	0.15	67	0.024

Notes: This table shows the difference in country specific characteristics between interoperable and non-interoperable countries. We compare African countries that never introduced interoperability or that have not introduced interoperability yet (Non Interoperable), with African countries that have introduced interoperability (Interoperable). Our data span from 2000 to 2021. The table shows averages for baseline (Mean), their standard deviation (St. Dev.) and the number of observations (N). The Difference column is the coefficient of an OLS regression of a dummy taking value 1 when interoperability is enacted at the country level (and 0 otherwise) on the reported variable, with clustered standard errors at the country level. Regressions include year and country fixed effects. The interoperability dummy varies across time, as it takes value 1 only when the country introduces interoperability. This table shows that country-specific characteristics do not differ between countries in the two groups. The variables we take into consideration are, in order, Real GDP, the GDP growth, the value of Exports of goods and Services, the value of Import of goods and services, the value of Government Consumption Expenditure, the Gross fixed Capital Formation, the Household Expenditures, the Unemployment rate, the Domestic claims, the Net Foreign Assets and the Broad Money Liabilities. All variables are expressed as the logarithm of the US \$ value in Millions. GDP growth and Unemployment rate are expressed as percentage. The Difference column is the coefficient of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the interoperability dummy as above defined on the variable, with country and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.2 Fees by bracket

Table A.3: Fees by bracket and Interoperability

	On net	Cross net
	(1)	(2)
Bracket 1-2	-0.197** (0.085)	-0.475** (0.215)
Bracket 3-4	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.071* (0.042)
Bracket 5-6	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.031 (0.029)
Bracket 7-8	0.007 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.030)
Bracket 9-10	0.017** (0.009)	0.014 (0.032)
Bracket 11-12	0.024** (0.010)	0.030 (0.036)
Bracket 13+	0.018** (0.008)	0.039 (0.038)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Bracket FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	11442	7546
Adj. R sq.	0.085	0.265
MDV Bracket 1-2	0.310	0.827
MDV Bracket 3-4	0.049	0.211
MDV Bracket 5-6	0.027	0.091
MDV Bracket 7-8	0.019	0.052
MDV Bracket 9-10	0.012	0.040
MDV Bracket 11-12	0.009	0.033
MDV Bracket 13+	0.006	0.022

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is fee bracket b of operator i in country c in year t . We report the δ_j coefficients of Equation 3. Bracket, operator and year fixed effects are included in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator, in Column (1); the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators, in Column (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as share of transaction value. We pair brackets in seven groups, and show the differential effect that the introduction of interoperability at the operator level has on different transaction brackets, where brackets represent cross-country harmonized transaction value ranges as explained in Section 2.2. Dependent variables are regressed over the interaction between $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability, and an indicator variable $\mathbf{1}_j$, indicating to which pair bracket b belongs. The table hence reports the estimates of coefficients δ_j of Equation 3. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.3 Dominant operators and competition

To further investigate our mechanism, we provide a heterogenous effect analysis and study whether the effects of interoperability differs depending on the dominance of the operator

in the local market. We exploit the following:

$$Y_{idct} = \alpha_{id} + \beta_t + \gamma \text{Interoperability}_{ict} + \rho \text{Interoperability}_{ict} \times \mathbf{1} [> \text{Dominant}]_{idct_0} + \varepsilon_{idct} \quad (13)$$

where $\mathbf{1} [> \text{Dominant}]_{idct_0}$ indicates whether the operator covered more than 30% of the district's area in which it was operating the year before the introduction of interoperability. Table A.4 shows that results on total coverage, column (1), are driven by dominant operators. Those are the ones that drive the drop in total coverage. Indeed, dominant operators reduce their coverage by 10% more than non dominant operators, after the introduction of interoperability.

Table A.4: Network Coverage, Dominant Operators and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict₀}	4.021 (4.525)	-0.049** (0.023)
Interoperability _{ict₀} × Dominant _{jdct₀}	-10.206** (4.851)	0.015 (0.013)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012
Adj. R sq.	0.809	0.276
Mean Dep. Var.	75.153	0.957

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over two variables. The first is *Interoperability*_{ict}, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if operator i is interoperable. The second is the interaction between *Interoperability*_{ict} and *Dominant*_{id_{t₀}}, a dummy taking value 1 if the operator i was covering more than 30% of the district d 's area before the arrival of interoperability at t_0 . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.4 Evidence of Mobile Network tariffs and M&A operations

Table A.5: Mobile Network Fees and Interoperability

	Voice Price per minute	Data Price per GB	Messages Price per SMS
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.002 (0.007)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	392	52	121
Adj. R sq.	0.681	0.767	0.736
Mean Dep. Var.	0.055	0.003	0.015

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's price per minute of call (1); the operator's price per megabyte of Internet usage (2); the operator's cost of text messages (3). Dependent variables are expressed in dollars. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.6: M&As in the mobile network market and Interoperability

	Mergers and Acquisitions	
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.018 (0.017)	
Interoperability _{ct}		-0.010 (0.007)
Unit FE	Operator	Operator
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	3408	3408
Adj. R sq.	0.023	0.022
Mean Dep. Var.	0.008	0.009

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the mobile network operator i in year y . In all columns we include operator and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 when a mobile network operator is involved in an M&A operation. The dependent variable is regressed over two different measures of interoperability. Column (1) uses as independent variable an operator-specific dummy, that takes value 1 when the operator provides an interoperable mobile money service. Column (2), that presents the estimates for $Interoperability_{ct}$, uses a country-specific dummy that takes value 1 when interoperability is enacted by the national regulatory framework. The table suggests no relation between interoperability and the probability of mobile network operators to take part in a M&A operation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.5 Robustness check: Instrumental Variable approach

Table A.7: First stage - IV

	First stage
	(1)
Interoperability _{ct}	0.330*** (0.102)
Operator FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Obs.	2340
Adj. R sq.	0.435
F-stat	10.405
Mean Dep. Var.	0.034

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the mobile network operator i is interoperable. The dependent variables is regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the country c where operator i is present is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.8: Fees and interoperability - IV

	IV		Reduced form	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)	On Net (3)	Cross Net (4)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.018* (0.010)		
Interoperability _{ct}			-0.001 (0.001)	-0.010* (0.005)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yeas FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	589	395	589	395
F-stat	31.837	22.324		
Mean Dep. Var.	0.008	0.035	0.008	0.035

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are On Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1, 3); and Cross Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2, 4). Both dependent variables are expressed as percentage of transaction value. In Column (1) and (2) we present the results of the Instrumental Variable approach, where the independent variable $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy taking value 1 if operator i is interoperable, is instrumented by $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if interoperability is active in country c . In Column (3) and (4) we present the results of the reduced form, where the dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. Column (1) and (2) report the F statistic of the First Stage. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.9: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level - IV

	IV		Reduced form	
	Total coverage (1)	Probability of signal in district (2)	Total coverage (3)	Probability of signal in district (4)
Interoperability _{ict}	-10.046** (4.552)	-0.108* (0.063)		
Interoperability _{ct}			-5.353** (2.311)	-0.058* (0.032)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012	1113012	1113012
F-stat	206.803	206.803		
Mean Dep. Var.	74.937	0.953	74.937	0.953

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). In Column (1) and (2) we present the results of the Instrumental Variable approach, where the independent variable $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy taking value 1 if operator i is interoperable, is instrumented by $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if interoperability is active in country c . In Column (3) and (4) we present the results of the reduced form, where the dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. Column (1) and (2) report the F statistic of the First Stage. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.10: Mobile Operators and Interoperability - IV

	Total network coverage (1)	Market penetration mobile connections (2)	Total Revenue (3)	Towers (4)	EBIT (5)	EBITDA (6)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.186*** (0.034)	-0.333* (0.178)	-0.168 (0.211)	-0.218* (0.127)	0.466 (0.566)	0.143 (0.396)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366	565
Adj. R sq.	-0.118	-0.007	-0.006	-0.064	-0.094	-0.048
F-stat		52.193	36.097	38.512	49.851	53.312
Mean Dep. Var.	4.296	1.523	17.451	6.819	15.992	16.019

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the operator's share of population covered in country c (1); the operator's market penetration of mobile connection in country c (2); the operator's total revenue (3); the number of towers used by the operator for its coverage (4); the operator's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the operator's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in column (5) and (6), respectively. Dependent variables are expressed in log. We present the results of the Instrumental Variable approach, where the independent variable $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy taking value 1 if operator i is interoperable, is instrumented by $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. All columns report the F statistic of the First Stage. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.11: Number of MM agents

	MM Agents Total		MM Agents over 1k sq. km		MM Agents over 100k adults	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interoperability _{ct}	-1.025 (0.681)	-0.845 (0.646)	-0.705 (0.436)	-0.550 (0.418)	-0.830 (0.494)	-0.662 (0.475)
Interoperability _{ct} × Std Num of MM accounts _c		-0.447** (0.198)		-0.401*** (0.128)		-0.429*** (0.147)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	270	261	270	261	270	261
Adj. R sq.	0.793	0.800	0.869	0.879	0.752	0.765
Mean Dep. Var.	3.1e+04	3.1e+04	228.662	228.662	308.201	308.201

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is country c in year t . Country and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the number of registered Mobile Money agents, in columns (1) and (2); the number of registered Mobile Money agents per 1'000 squared kilometers, in columns (3) and (4); the number of registered Mobile Money agents per 100k adults, in columns (5) and (6). Dependent variables are expressed in log. Dependent variables are regressed over two variables. The first is $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The second is the interaction between $Interoperability_{ct}$ and Mobile Money Network_{ct0}, a measure of the size of the mobile money network in country c before the introduction of interoperability: We construct the measure by standardizing the average number of mobile money accounts in country c before the introduction of interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported, in absolute value, in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.12: Network Coverage, Interoperability and MM Agents Network

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ct}	-16.021** (6.364)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.214* (0.108)
Interoperability _{ct} × N. Agents above median _{ct0}	13.628** (6.445)	0.011 (0.009)	0.125 (0.091)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	395400	395400	395400
Adj. R sq.	0.897	0.897	0.931
Mean Dep. Var.	76.095	0.922	2.114

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t . In all columns we include district and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the mobile network coverage as percentage of the district's area, the probability of signal in the district and the number of mobile network operators active in the districts. The dependent variable is regressed over two variables. The first is $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The second is the interaction between $Interoperability_{ct}$ and N. Agents above median_{ct0}, a dummy taking value 1 if the log of the mean number of Mobile Money agents in country c before the introduction of interoperability is above the median value. N. Agents above median_{ct0} is a country-specific constant. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. In column (3) we report the mean of the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district, not expressed in log. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.6 Robustness check: Sun & Abraham

Table A.13: Fees and Interoperability

	Fees	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)
ATE	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.007** (0.003)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	613	411
Mean Dep. Var.	.009	.035

Notes: This table presents estimates obtained from the method proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021). The coefficient of interest is the average treatment effect, which is obtained by averaging the estimation weighted estimators for the first four years after the introduction of interoperability. The unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1); the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as share of transaction value. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.14: Operator-district level geographical analysis

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
ATE	-11.893*** (4.177)	-0.105** (0.053)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012
Mean Dep. Var.	75.10	.96

Notes: This table presents estimates obtained from the method proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021). The coefficient of interest is the average treatment effect, which is obtained by averaging the estimation weighted estimators for the first four years after the introduction of interoperability. The unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.15: GSMA Intelligence yearly outcomes

	Total network coverage	Market penetration mobile connections	Total Revenue	Towers	EBIT	EBITDA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATE	-0.230*** (0.087)	-0.251* (0.148)	-0.316* (0.171)	-0.115** (0.058)	-0.020 (0.425)	-0.060 (0.275)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366	565
Mean Dep. Var.	4.354	2.213	17.909	7.061	16.164	16.279

Notes: This table presents estimates obtained from the method proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021). The coefficient of interest is the average treatment effect, which is obtained by averaging the estimation weighted estimators for the first four years after the introduction of interoperability. The unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's share of population covered in country c (1); the operator's market penetration of mobile connection in country c (2); the operator's total revenue (3); the number of towers used by the operator for its coverage (4); the operator's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the operator's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in column (5) and (6), respectively. Dependent variables are expressed in log. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.16: Sub-national unit geographical analysis

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ATE	-9.211*** (2.645)	-0.074* (0.041)	-0.418** (0.174)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569760	569760	569760
Mean Dep. Var.	69.606	.86	1.762

Notes: This table presents estimates obtained from the method proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021). The coefficient of interest is the average treatment effect, which is obtained by averaging the estimation weighted estimators for the first four years after the introduction of interoperability. The unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability of mobile network signal in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether at least one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active in the district (2); the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district (3). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.7 Robustness check: Borusyak, Jaravel & Spiess

Table A.17: Fees and interoperability

	Fees	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)
ATE	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.004)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	599	382
Mean Dep. Var.	0.010	0.037

Notes: This table presents the treatment effect estimation obtained from the difference-in-differences designs with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1); the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as share of transaction value. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.18: Operator-district level geographical analysis

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
ATE	-5.688** (2.602)	-0.042 (0.031)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012
Mean Dep. Var.	67.439	0.856

Notes: This table presents the treatment effect estimation obtained from the difference-in-differences designs with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.19: GSMA Intelligence yearly outcomes

	Total network coverage	Market penetration mobile connections	Total Revenue	Towers	EBIT	EBITDA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATE	-0.196*** (0.021)	-0.227** (0.111)	-0.307** (0.128)	-0.128** (0.064)	-0.060 (0.374)	-0.057 (0.220)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	137	1842	1684	282	369	570
Mean Dep. Var.	4.307	1.523	17.451	6.776	15.964	16.010

Notes: This table presents the treatment effect estimation obtained from the difference-in-differences designs with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's share of population covered in country c (1); the operator's market penetration of mobile connection in country c (2); the operator's total revenue (3); the number of towers used by the operator for its coverage (4); the operator's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the operator's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in column (5) and (6), respectively. Dependent variables are expressed in log. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.20: Sub-national unit geographical analysis

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ATE	-5.755*** (1.530)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.230** (0.095)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569760	569760	569760
Mean Dep. Var.	69.606	0.860	1.762

Notes: This table presents the treatment effect estimation obtained from the difference-in-differences designs with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability of mobile network signal in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether at least one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active in the district (2); the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district (3). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.8 Additional robustness: Country Clustering

Table A.21: Fees and Interoperability

	Fees	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	613	411
Ad. R sq.	0.783	0.701
Mean Dep. Var.	0.010	0.037

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are On Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1); and Cross Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as percentage of transaction value. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.22: Operator-district level geographical analysis

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict₀}	-4.811** (2.215)	-0.036 (0.022)
Operatora-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012
Adj. R sq.	0.808	0.276
Mean Dep. Var.	67.439	0.856

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.23: GSMA Intelligence yearly outcomes

	Total network coverage	Market penetration mobile connections	Total Revenue	Towers	EBIT	EBITDA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.186*** (0.034)	-0.224* (0.119)	-0.293** (0.136)	-0.123** (0.060)	-0.097 (0.333)	-0.062 (0.221)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366	565
Adj. R sq.	0.789	0.884	0.866	0.974	0.811	0.861
Mean Dep. Var.	4.296	1.523	17.451	6.819	15.992	16.019

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the operator's share of population covered in country c (1); the operator's market penetration of mobile connection in country c (2); the operator's total revenue (3); the number of towers used by the operator for its coverage (4); the operator's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the operator's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in column (5) and (6), respectively. Dependent variables are expressed in log. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.9 Additional robustness: Wild Cluster Bootstrap

Table A.24: Fees and interoperability

	Fees	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	613	411
Adj. R sq.	0.783	0.701
Mean Dep. Var.	0.010	0.037

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are computed through the wild cluster bootstrap method and clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are On Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1); and Cross Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as percentage of transaction value. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.25: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict0}	-4.811** (2.063)	-0.036 (0.026)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1113012	1113012
Adj. R sq.	0.808	0.276
Mean Dep. Var.	67.439	0.856

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are computed through the wild cluster bootstrap method and clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over *Interoperability*_{ict}, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if operator i is interoperable. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.26: GSMA Intelligence yearly outcomes

	Total network coverage	Market penetration mobile connections	Total Revenue	Towers	EBIT	EBITDA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.186** (0.082)	-0.224* (0.119)	-0.293** (0.127)	-0.123** (0.057)	-0.097 (0.312)	-0.062 (0.242)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	125	1842	1684	280	366	565
Adj. R sq.	0.789	0.884	0.866	0.974	0.811	0.861
Mean Dep. Var.	4.296	1.523	17.451	6.819	15.992	16.019

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are computed through the wild cluster bootstrap method and clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the operator's share of population covered in country c (1); the operator's market penetration of mobile connection in country c (2); the operator's total revenue (3); the number of towers used by the operator for its coverage (4); the operator's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and the operator's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in column (5) and (6), respectively. Dependent variables are expressed in log. These are regressed over *Interoperability*_{ict}, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. Dependent variables are regressed over *Interoperability*_{ct}, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability. The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.27: Network Coverage and Interoperability - District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ct}	-5.024*	-0.034	-0.186**
	(2.765)	(0.024)	(0.084)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569760	569760	569760
Adj. R sq.	0.903	0.873	0.912
Mean Dep. Var.	69.606	0.860	1.762

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are computed through the wild cluster bootstrap method and clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability of mobile network signal in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether at least one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active in the district (2); the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district (3). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. In column (3) we report the mean of the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district, not expressed in log. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.10 Additional robustness: Weighting for district's population

Table A.28: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict₀}	-4.882**	-0.035**
	(2.022)	(0.017)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1112880	1112880
Adj. R sq.	0.826	0.250
Mean Dep. Var.	67.441	0.856

Notes: This table presents weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if operator i is interoperable. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. Estimations are weighted for the district's population. Data on population are retrieved from Warszawski et al. (2017). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.29: Network Coverage and Interoperability - District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ct}	-4.838** (2.220)	-0.030 (0.019)	-0.165** (0.077)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569664	569664	569664
Adj. R sq.	0.913	0.893	0.926
Mean Dep. Var.	69.613	0.860	1.762

Notes: This table presents weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability of mobile network signal in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether at least one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active in the district (2); the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district (3). Dependent variables are regressed over *Interoperability_{ct}*, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. In column (3) we report the mean of the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district, not expressed in log. Estimations are weighted for the district's population. Data on population are retrieved from Warszawski et al. (2017). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.11 Additional tests

Table A.30: Mobile subscriptions and Interoperability

	Mobile subscriptions (SIMs)		Fixed telephone subscriptions	
	100 inhabitants (1)	Total (Log) (2)	100 inhabitants (3)	Total (Log) (4)
Interoperability _{ct}	-2.210 (3.746)	-0.043 (0.059)	-0.324 (0.309)	0.024 (0.219)
Unit FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
St. Err.	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered
N. of operator-district	55	55	55	55
Observations	640	640	629	629
R2	0.894	0.983	0.968	0.867
F-stat	0.348	0.550	1.096	0.013
Mean Dep. Var.	79.617	15.600	3.754	10.750

Notes: This table shows ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is country c in year t . We regress outcome variables over interoperability, a dummy taking value 1 after interoperability is introduced in country c . Regressions include year and country fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. Outcome variables include: the number of registered mobile users (i.e. the number of SIM cards) per 100 inhabitants (1); the log of the number of total mobile phone subscriptions (2); the number of registered fixed phone users per 100 inhabitants (3); the log of the number of total fixed phone subscriptions (4). Data on phone subscriptions are taken from the World Bank Data Portal. This table shows that there is no relation between the number of mobile phone subscribers (i.e. number of SIM cards) and interoperability at the country level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.31: Network Coverage, Mobile Subscriptions and Interoperability - District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ct}	-8.415 (6.248)	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.149 (0.102)
Interoperability _{ct} × SIMs (100 inhab) _c	0.057 (0.077)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	569712	569712	569712
Adj. R sq.	0.903	0.872	0.912
Mean Dep. Var.	69.613	0.860	1.762

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t , as specified in Eq. 10. In all columns we include district and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the district level. The dependent variable is the mobile network coverage as percentage of the district's area, the probability of signal in the district and the number of mobile network operators active in the districts. The dependent variable is regressed over two variables. The first is $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The second is the interaction between $Interoperability_{ct}$ and $SIMs_c$, a continuous variable for the number of mobile phone subscriptions over 100 inhabitants in country c prior to the introduction of interoperability. $SIMs_c$ is a country-specific constant. Coefficients are extremely small, suggesting almost no differential effects of interoperability on countries, depending on their number of mobile phone subscriptions. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.32: DHS

	Transactions with mobile phone	
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ct}	-0.203*** (0.021)	-0.200*** (0.022)
Rural _{ict}		-0.242*** (0.029)
Interoperability _{ct} × Rural _{ict}		0.034 (0.029)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	105478	105478
Adj. R sq.	0.135	0.185
Mean Dep. Var.	0.480	0.480

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is individual respondent's i in year t . Country and year fixed effects are present in all columns and standard errors are clustered at the country level. Data are taken from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Observations span the years 2008-2021. The impossibility to trace respondents through years impedes the usage of individual respondent's fixed effects. In order to partially overcome this issue we control for individual respondent's specific characteristics, such as gender, education and income. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the last month the respondent has done any transaction through mobile phone. In Column (1), this is regressed over $Interoperability_{ct}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual i is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . In Column (2), we include the interaction with the variable $Rural_{ict}$, which is a dummy indicating whether the respondent lives in a rural area. The dependent variable's mean and standard deviation are reported as the last two rows of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A.12 Additional robustness: Controlling for time-varying country-specific characteristics

Table A.33: Fees and interoperability

	Fees	
	On Net (1)	Cross Net (2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.012** (0.005)
Operator FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	491	330
Adj. R sq.	0.742	0.678
Mean Dep. Var.	0.010	0.038

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is operator i in year t . Operator and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are On Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscribers of the same operator (1); and Cross Net, which is the operator's fees for mobile money transactions to subscriber of different operators (2). Both dependent variables are expressed as percentage of transaction value. These are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the operator i is subject to mobile money interoperability. In this regression we add time-varying country-specific characteristic taken from the IMF. Namely we use real GDP and GDP growth. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.34: Network Coverage and Interoperability - Operator-District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district
	(1)	(2)
Interoperability _{ict}	-5.833** (2.716)	-0.051 (0.032)
Operator-District FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1057315	1057315
Adj. R sq.	0.808	0.305
Mean Dep. Var.	75.488	0.956

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the pair operator i district d , in year t . Operator-district and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level. The dependent variables are the individual mobile network operator i coverage in district d , expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability that the mobile network operator is active in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether the operator i has signal in the district d (2). Dependent variables are regressed over $Interoperability_{ict}$, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the pair operator-district id is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if operator i is interoperable. In this regression we add time-varying country-specific characteristic taken from the IMF. Namely we use real GDP and GDP growth. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.35: Network Coverage and Interoperability - District Level

	Total coverage	Probability of signal in district	Number of MNOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{ct}	-5.224** (2.089)	-0.031** (0.014)	-0.185*** (0.047)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	531261	531261	531261
Adj. R sq.	0.899	0.857	0.903
Mean Dep. Var.	70.926	0.870	1.783

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area (1); the probability of mobile network signal in the district, i.e. a dummy taking value 1 whether at least one Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is active in the district (2); the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district (3). Dependent variables are regressed over *Interoperability_{ct}*, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . In this regression we add time-varying country-specific characteristic taken from the IMF. Namely we use real GDP and GDP growth. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. In column (3) we report the mean of the number of Mobile Network Operators active in the district, not expressed in log. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.36: Network Coverage, Interoperability and Rural subsidies

	Local development		Night Light intensity	
	Rural (1)	Urban (2)	Below median (3)	Above median (4)
Interoperability _{ct}	-7.613*** (0.417)	-2.453*** (0.193)	-5.433*** (0.624)	-0.485*** (0.145)
Subsidy _{ct}	-1.079*** (0.324)	-4.088*** (0.123)	-1.684*** (0.201)	-0.930*** (0.052)
Interoperability _{ct} × Subsidy _{ct}	5.527*** (0.452)	-3.205*** (0.201)	4.107*** (0.626)	-0.559*** (0.152)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	183660	386100	94608	94608
Adj. R sq.	0.927	0.888	0.949	0.917
Mean Dep. Var.	61.147	73.380	75.490	94.427

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is district d in year t . District and year fixed effects are present in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The dependent variable is the total mobile network coverage, expressed as percentage of the district d area. The dependent variable is regressed over three variables. The first is *Interoperability_{ct}*, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the district d is subject to mobile money interoperability, i.e. if interoperability is active in country c . The second is *Subsidy_{ct}*, which is a time varying dummy taking value 1 from the year in which country c has received subsidies to promote telecommunications in rural areas. The third variable is an interaction between *Interoperability_{ct}* and *Subsidy_{ct}*. The dependent variable's mean in the pre-policy period is reported in the last row of the table. We report four different regressions. In Column (1) we report the estimates on the subsample of districts that are classified as rural adopting the methodology of Cattaneo et al. (2021); similarly, Column (2) provides the analysis on the subsample of districts classified as urban. Columns (3) and (4), instead, provide estimates of the subsample of districts whose nighttime light activity is respectively below and above median. The coefficient of the interaction in Columns (1) and (3) shows how the negative effect of interoperability is attenuated in more rural and developed districts in those countries who provided subsidies to telecommunications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Table A.37: Fee dispersion, Transaction brackets and Interoperability


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interoperability _{bt}	-0.057*** (0.011)	-0.215*** (0.045)	-0.203*** (0.036)
Bracket _b		-0.055*** (0.008)	
Interoperability _{bt} × Bracket _b		0.034*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.007)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bracket FE	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.	150	150	150
Adj. R sq.	0.723	0.520	0.772
Mean Dep. Var.	0.107	0.107	0.107

Notes: This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is the transaction bracket b in year t . The outcome variable is the standard deviation of fees for a given transaction bracket b over a given year t , across respectively interoperable and non interoperable countries. Our first independent variable is *Interoperability*_{bt}, which is a dummy taking value 1 if the outcome variable is constructed over the sample of interoperable countries, 0 otherwise. *Bracket*_b is the rank of the transaction bracket. We include year and transaction bracket fixed effects. Standard errors are robust. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Online Appendix B - Additional Figures

B.1 Fees dataset construction

Figure B.1: Wayback Machine



Notes: This figure shows a screenshot of the online tool we exploited in order to retrieve webpages that are no longer available and that contained information regarding mobile money operators' tariff plans, as explained in Section 2.2. In this example, we are retrieving the webpage of Telma Madagascar in 2012.

Figure B.2: Tariff plans for different companies in the same country.

Rising		Transfer	
Minimum	Maximum	To Orange Money subscribers	To other operators and financial institutions *
200	1,000	50	25
1,001	5,000	50	120
5,001	10,000	100	250
10,001	25,000	200	400
25,001	50,000	400	880
50,001	100,000	800	1,300
100,001	250,000	1,500	3,000
250,001	500,000	1,500	4,500
500,001	1,000,000	2,500	6,900
1,000,001	2,000,000	3,000	11,500
2,000,001	3,000,000	3,000	14,000
3,000,001	4,000,000	3,000	17,600
4,000,001	5,000,000	3,000	18,600
5000001	6000000	3,000	21,000
6000001	7000000	3,000	24,000
7000001	8000000	3,000	28,000
8000001	9000000	3,000	32,000
9000001	10000000	3,000	37,000

(a) Orange Madagascar


Rising		Money transfer fees	
Minimum	Maximum	To Airtel Money subscribers	To other operators
300	1 000	50	300
1 001	5 000	50	700
5 001	10 000	100	800
10 001	20 000	200	1 200
20 001	25 000	300	1 400
25 001	30 000	300	2 800
30 001	40 000	400	2 800
40 001	50 000	600	2 800
50 001	60 000	600	3 600
60 001	80 000	800	3 600
80 001	100 000	800	3 600
100 001	150 000	1 500	7 600
150 001	250 000	1 500	7 600
250 001	500 000	1 500	10 000
500 001	1 000 000	2 500	13 600
1 000 001	2 000 000	3 000	23 000
2 000 001	3 000 000	3 000	30 000
3 000 001	4 000 000	3 000	38 000
4 000 001	5 000 000	3 000	44 000

(b) Airtel Madagascar

Notes: This figure compares the tariff plans of two mobile money operators in the same country, Orange Madagascar (a) and Airtel Madagascar (b). These tariff plans are relative to the year 2012. As pointed out in Section 2.2, we can notice that the transaction ranges specified by the two operators differ, and, in particular, Airtel's tariff plan is more disaggregated.


B.2 Robustness check: Borusyak, Jaravel & Spiess

Figure B.3: Event Study Robustness Borjusak




Notes: This figure reports the coefficients of the event study design with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The two panels display the value of the coefficients which describe differential evolution of the outcome variables for the unit of observation for which interoperability is active relative to units with no interoperability. In the left panel we present results for operator's i On Net fees, i.e. fees applied to mobile money transactions between users of the same network. The right panel present results for operator's i Cross Net fees, i.e. fees applied to mobile money transactions between users of different networks. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level, and the empirical specification includes year fixed effects.

Figure B.4: Event Study Robustness Borjusak et al. - Operator-District



Notes: This figure reports the coefficients of the event study design with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The two panels display the value of the coefficients which describe differential evolution of the outcome variables for the unit of observation for which interoperability is active relative to units with no interoperability. In the left panel we present results for operator's i network coverage in district d , i.e. the percentage of district's d area covered by mobile network operator i . The right panel present results for the probability of signal of the operator in the district. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the operator level, and the empirical specification includes year fixed effects.

Figure B.5: Event Study Robustness Borjusak et al. - District



Notes: This figure reports the coefficients of the event study design with staggered adoption of treatment, using the imputation approach of Borusyak et al. (2021). The two panels display the value of the coefficients which describe differential evolution of the outcome variables for the unit of observation for which interoperability is active relative to units with no interoperability. In the left panel we present results for district's mobile network coverage, i.e. the percentage of district's area covered by mobile network operators. The right panel present results for the number of mobile network operators active in the district. The central panel presents results for the probability of mobile network signal in the district. The year marking the introduction of interoperability is year 0 on the x-axis and exhibits a vertical black line. The reference year is the year -1. The bars around each observation represent the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the country level, and the empirical specification includes year and district fixed effects.

Online Appendix C - Theoretical Framework

We can define the change in mobile tower installation induced by the arrival of interoperability as follows

$$\Delta m = \frac{\theta + \kappa}{\eta} - \frac{\tau}{\eta - 2\beta} = (\eta - 2\beta)(\theta + \kappa - \tau) + 2\beta\tau$$

by taking the difference in the equilibrium number of towers between the post-policy amount, $\frac{\theta + \kappa}{\eta}$, and the pre-policy variable, $\frac{\tau}{\eta - 2\beta}$. Our analysis of the heterogeneous effects of the policy is developed as a comparative static over this expression.

Proposition: locations with higher cost of tower installation before interoperability, see a more extensive decline in signal.

$$\frac{\partial \Delta m}{\partial \eta} = -\frac{\theta + \kappa}{\eta^2} + \frac{\tau}{(\eta - 2\beta)^2} < 0$$

This result is always true if tower installation costs are especially high and exceed a threshold $\eta > \tilde{\eta}$, with $\tilde{\eta} = 2\beta \left[1 - \left(\frac{\tau}{\theta + \kappa} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right]^{-1}$.

Data Appendix

Data Appendix D - Fees & Interoperability

D.1 Fees

We here detail the procedure we followed for the construction of our dataset containing information of fees of Mobile Money operators.

We build two main datasets, containing the mobile money fees charged by each operator over time. We differentiate between fees charged to transfer money to subscribers to the same operator (“on-network”) and fees charged to send money to subscribers of other operators (“cross-network”)¹⁰. The first output is a panel data set that includes the operator name, country, year, and the yearly fees’ average value for on-network and cross-network transactions. The second data set is more detailed, because it includes tariffs for all transaction ranges defined by companies’ tariff plans. To this aim, we take the most disaggregated fee structure in the country and adjust all operators’ rates (in that country) accordingly, as explained in the next paragraph.

It is important to highlight that the structure of mobile money tariffs is complex. Different tariffs are in fact applied for sending mobile money on-network or cross-network, and within operation types different tariffs are applied for different amounts of money exchanged. In Panel (a) of Figure 1, for example, we plot the average yearly fees for sending a mobile money transfer between two agents belonging to the same company, i.e. on-network transaction. This is plotted for each operator and is different depending on the amount of the mobile money transaction. Because fees are different by amount transacted and correspondingly by currency, in order to create a simpler measure which makes fees comparable, we create a “bracket” for all companies operating in the same country: bracket 1 reports the fees for transactions of the lowest amount, bracket 2 for the second lowest and so on.

For example, let us consider the case of Madagascar. In Madagascar, Orange Madagascar and Airtel Madagascar are two active operators, among others, offering the Mobile Money services. Orange’s Mobile Money tariff plans differ from those of Airtel. Figure B.2 in the Online Appendix B - Additional Figures compares the 2022 tariff plans for these companies. We first notice that the minimum and maximum amounts that can be transferred differ between the two companies: while Orange’s subscribers (Panel (a)) can transfer a minimum of 200 and a maximum of 10 million Malagasy ariary (the currency of Madagascar), Airtel’s subscribers (Panel (b)) can transfer between 300 and 5 million ariary. Second, it has to be noticed that Airtel’s and Orange’s amount ranges differ: in particular, Airtel’s tariff plans are more disaggregated. For example, while Orange sets the same tariff for all on-network transactions between 10’000 and 25’000 ariary (hence

¹⁰We also collected fees for other types of operations (such as those for withdrawal of cash from mobile money accounts by operator’s subscribers and by non-subscribers, for deposit, for payments to merchants, and for transfer of money from the Mobile Money account to the bank account, and viceversa), but the data happen to be partially lacking.

specifying one tariff for this range), Airtel applies different fees for on-network transactions between 10'000 and 20'000 ariary, and between 20'000 and 25'000 ariary. In order to make tariff plans of different companies within the same country and across different years comparable, we define new country-specific brackets by adopting the shortest common ranges across all companies within the country in all years. For example, we will disaggregate Orange's tariffs for transactions between 10'000 and 25'000 ariary into the new ranges 10'000-20'000 and 20'000-25'000, so that they match Airtel's tariff ranges: Orange will hence now display two different ranges, to which the same tariff is applied. Obviously, transaction ranges will span from the minimum value to the maximum values that can be found across all companies. The country-specific bracket 1, in this example, will range from 200 and 300 ariary: for this range, Airtel does not provide the possibility to exchange money and will be hence shown as missing, while Orange will display the tariff that is applied for its range 200-1000 ariary. Similarly, for brackets ranging between values greater than 5 million ariary, Airtel will be displayed as missing.

In order to make tariffs comparable across countries, we express them as percentage of the transaction values. While in many cases tariff plans are already defined in percentage by mobile money operators, in other cases, as the one we take as example, they are defined as a fixed sum for the transaction whole bracket. In those cases, we express the fee as percentage of the mean value of the bracket. In Panel (b) of Figure 1, we notice not only a higher dispersion of tariffs in the lowest brackets, but also how rates decrease for higher brackets. This fee structure hence burdens on those users who make smaller transactions.

D.2 Interoperability

A core concept of our analysis is mobile money interoperability. In line with the GSMA (2020) report, we define account-to-account (A2A) Interoperability as the possibility given by Mobile Money Providers (MMPs) for customers to transfer money between two accounts in different mobile money schemes. While mobile money was born as a stand-alone service, in which transfers were allowed only within the same network, in the latest years, it experienced an integration process that brought the connection of MMPs between themselves. By studying the development of the Mobile Money market in each African country, we aim to identify where the regulatory environment provides requirements or recommendations for interoperability. It is not a trivial effort as the regulatory frameworks vary widely between African countries, and the role of authorities in obliging the adoption of interoperability is sometimes uncertain. For each country, we report a brief overview of the introduction of interoperability from a regulatory perspective. In Table D.1 we summarize key information regarding the introduction of interoperability and its initiator for the African countries in which mobile money interoperability is active.

Table D.1 clearly shows the growing involvement of institutional regulators in interoperability matters. In Naji (2020) and Mhella (2020) we can find different definitions of interoperability, depending on the level at which the integration of systems is developed. In particular, we can distinguish between (a) wallet-to-wallet interoperability: i.e. the possibility to exchange mobile money between accounts of different operators; (b) agent interoperability: which consists in the removal of exclusivity of agents, i.e. the possibility for agents to serve more than one operator; (c) wallet-to-bank (or other financial services) interoperability: i.e. the possibility to exchange money between a mobile money account and a bank account or other financial technologies. In our paper, we consider the case of wallet-to-wallet interoperability, which allows account-to-account transfers between users of different mobile money operators. As it can be seen below from country specific regulations, the introduction of mobile money interoperability in African countries has always entailed wallet-to-wallet interoperability.

Table D.1: Interoperability proponents in Africa

Reason for interoperability	Country	Year effective
Central Bank regulation	Botswana	2019
	Cameroon (BEAC)	2020
	Chad (BEAC)	2020
	Central African Republic (BEAC)	2020
	Egypt	2016
	Equatorial Guinea (BEAC)	2020
	Gabon (BEAC)	2020
	Ghana	2018
	Liberia	2014
	Malawi	2017
	Morocco	2018
	Nigeria	2013
	Rwanda	2021
	Republic of Congo (BEAC)	2020
	Sudan	2016
	Tanzania	2015
Uganda	2018	
Zimbabwe	2020	
Agreement between providers	Kenya (Airtel, Safaricom, Telkom)	2018
	Madagascar (Airtel, mVola, Orange)	2016

Notes: This table reports information about the proponent of interoperability in the African countries where interoperability is currently active. While the majority of countries introduce interoperability following an institutional regulation issued by the national Central Bank, there are cases in which agreements between mobile money operators preceded the regulator. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo are part of The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), an organization of states of Central Africa that share a common currency: In their case, interoperability was proposed by the Bank of Central African States (Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale, BEAC).

D.2.1 Botswana

The relevant regulatory framework in Botswana, which applies to mobile money providers, is the Electronic Payment Service Regulations, issued in January, 2019, by Bank of Botswana (the Central Bank of Botswana). According to the GSMA report “Mobile Money Regulatory Index 2021”, the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) in Botswana can offer mobile money and to provide this service they must apply for a license directly from Bank of Botswana and comply with the Electronic Payment Services Regulations (2019). As regards Interoperability, Part III, Art. 16 (2) (c) of the regulation reads: [...] *The resources shall be a system which is interoperate with other payment system within Botswana.* This regulation hence requires payment systems to be interoperable.

D.2.2 Cameroon

Being Cameroon a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), its mobile money market is regulated by The Bank of Central African States (BEAC). In 2012, the Groupement Interbancaire Monétique d’Afrique Centrale (GIMAC) was created by the CEMAC with the purpose of promoting interbank electronic banking, regulation, supervision and the provision of processing services. Since 2018, GIMAC has been in charge of implementing full mobile money interoperability in accordance with instruction 001/GR/2018 from the Governor of BEAC.¹¹ In April 2020, after a pilot phase, an integrated electronic payment service, known as GIMACPAY, was introduced in all six countries of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa.¹² Among other services, this platform allows people to transfer money between mobile money accounts of different operators, therefore, guarantees mobile money interoperability within the region. Since we found no evidence for any CEMAC countries of the introduction of domestic interoperability and since this regional interoperability also implies interoperability within each country (the possibility to transfer money between different MNOs in the same country), we consider April 2020 as the date of the launch of Interoperability for all countries in the region.

D.2.3 Central African Republic

Although the Central African Republic is a member of the CEMAC, we do not consider the presence of Interoperability since just one mobile operator (Orange) is providing mobile money services.

¹¹See link

¹²Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon

D.2.4 Egypt

According to the 2013 Regulations Governing Provision of Payment Orders through Mobile Phones issued by the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), only banks operating under the supervision of the CBE may, subject to CBE’s approval, issue electronic money units. Accordingly, to offer mobile money services, the MNOs must contract with the banks as only banks can be responsible for customer accounts.¹³ In a bank-led model, a bank is the service provider. The role of the MNO is peripheral, limited to providing either the communications infrastructure, agency services or both. Consistently with GSMA (2021), we consider applicable to mobile money services the “Regulations for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services (2016)”, issued by the Central Bank of Egypt in November 2016. These regulations determine the activation of interoperability between different payment schemes. Specifically, they require all banks providing mobile payment services with the CBE authorization to guarantee the interoperability service within six months.¹⁴

In addition, in June 2017, the Central Bank of Egypt, in collaboration with the the Ministry of Finance and the Egyptian Banks Company (EBC), introduced the mobile Interoperability scheme Ta7weel.¹⁵ Through this platform, users of different mobile payment schemes are able to transact with each other directly. We set as Interoperability introduction the date of the issuance of the “Regulations for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services (2016)”, i.e., November 2016, since they explicitly require providers of mobile banking services (and therefore mobile money) to become interoperable.

D.2.5 Ghana

The commitment to achieve payment systems Interoperability began in 2007 when the Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement Systems Limited (GhIPSS) was established by Bank of Ghana (the Central Bank of Ghana). This wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bank of Ghana is responsible for implementing and managing interoperable payment system infrastructures for banks and non-bank financial institutions in Ghana.¹⁶ According to GSMA (2020), Bank of Ghana’s 2008 and 2015 Branchless Banking Guidelines mandated a “many-to-many” model whereby MNOs were required to interconnect with a minimum of three banks to issue electronic money, as well as share agents. In 2015, more progressive guidelines were introduced replacing those of 2008. Ghana has reached full interoperability in May 2018 through the Interbank Payment and Settlement Systems (GhIPSS). Indeed, the existing payment switch Gh-Link was upgraded to give access also to Mobile Money Operators (MMOs). The connection to this platform enabled the link of different payment systems, such as mobile money accounts, bank accounts, and e-zwitch cards.

¹³See link

¹⁴See link

¹⁵See link

¹⁶See link

Therefore, mobile money users can seamlessly transfer money wallet-to-wallet across networks. Although payment aggregator Nsano has enabled interoperability between MNOs since 2016,¹⁷ we take the launch of hub-based mobile money interoperability by GhIPSS as the starting date.

D.2.6 Kenya

In January 2018, the three mobile money providers networks, Airtel, Safaricom, and Telkom, reached an agreement regarding the implementation of interoperability. On the 22nd of the same month, Safaricom’s M-Pesa and Airtel Money undertook a pilot phase, enabling the seamless transfer of funds between mobile accounts on different networks. In a press release, the Central Bank of Kenya welcomed the implementation of interoperability of mobile financial services on the 10th of April 2018, stressing its benefits and importance to Kenya’s mobile money market: accordingly, we set April 2018 as the date of the introduction of interoperability.

D.2.7 Liberia

In May 2014, the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) issued the Mobile Money Regulations, requiring all authorized institutions to provide interoperable systems. In this regards, Part III, Art. 17 reads: *All Authorized Institutions should endeavor to render systems interoperable with systems provided by other Authorized Institutions, in such a way that transactions between Authorized Institutions are executed to allow a realtime customer experience for customers of both Institutions, as the services mature [...]*

D.2.8 Madagascar

Intending to reduce cash in the Madagascar economy, in 2014 the Mobile Money Providers (MMPs) engaged GSMA, a project facilitator, to advance sector-wide discussions on account-to-account (A2A) interoperability.¹⁸ According to GSMA in September 2016 Airtel Money, mVola, and Orange Money signed a deal to launch interoperable mobile money services across the entire country; this made Madagascar the second market in Africa, after Tanzania, to allow seamless transactions on all MMPs.¹⁹ Similarly to Tanzania, the implementation of Interoperability in Madagascar was market-led, with the presence of a facilitator (GSMA) that helped the providers to finalize bilateral agreements and connections. Although there was no mandate from the judicial authorities, we set September 2016 as Interoperability, as it is the date of the formal launch.

¹⁷See link

¹⁸See link

¹⁹See link

D.2.9 Malawi

In September 2017, the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) passed the Payment System Act, mandating interoperability of Payment Systems through the connection to a National Switch. Specifically, Part IV, Art. (6) (1) states: *Any authorized or licensed payment service provider offering payment services on auto-teller machines, point of sale devices, mobile payment systems, internet based payments and all other related payment channels as approved by the Bank, shall connect its infrastructure that supports interoperability to the National Switch.*

D.2.10 Morocco

In November 2018, The Morocco’s Central Bank Al-Maghrib and the National Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ANRT) launched *m-wallet*, a new means of payment by mobile phone, in collaboration with banks, payment institutions, telecom operators and Hightech Payment Systems (HPS) Switch. The “*Décision Réglementaire Relative au Paiement Mobile Domestique*”²⁰ issued by the Central Bank of Morocco includes the rules and specifies the technical standards for interoperability. Article 5 reads: *The payment services offered by m-wallet are interoperable and instantaneous.* This tool entails not only interoperability between mobile money operators but also across all payment systems.

D.2.11 Nigeria

With the aim of ensuring the interoperability of all authorized schemes, in December 2012 the Central Bank of Nigeria required the Mobile Money Operators to connect to the National Central Switch (NCS).²¹ In particular, the “*Timeline for Interoperability and Interconnectivity*” released by the Central Bank of Nigeria reads: *In furtherance of the CBN’s efforts at ensuring effective and robust mobile payments system, all MMOs are hereby directed to fully connect to the National Central Switch (NCS) on or before February 28, 2013, to ensure interoperability and interconnectivity of their schemes.*

D.2.12 Rwanda

As early as 2012, the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) issued Regulation N°06/2012 governing Payment Service Providers concerning interoperability. Specifically, Article 21 requires that *Financial institutions and Mobile Network Operators shall be interconnected to offer services to virtually all banked and unbanked customers in order to achieve interoperability and to substantially increase the financial services outreach to the unbanked*

²⁰See link

²¹See link

communities. In addition, Article 26 outlined the timeframe for this clause implementation: it provided that the connection would take place within one year of the effect of the regulation.²² However, according to the "Interoperability Policy" issued in June 2014, the Bank of Rwanda recognizes the complexity of achieving interoperability given the differences among the several payment streams, schemes, and systems: *The implementation of this regulation has lagged while the complexity and diversity of the Rwandan payment market have grown. BNR recognizes that the question of how to promote interoperability in payment systems is a complex one that may be considered in the general case but must rather be defined and addressed in respect of particular payment types. BNR has therefore decided to review its policy approach towards interoperability so that it can achieve the objectives set out in this policy.* In response to this recognition, the policy document was aimed at setting the general guidelines for promoting greater interoperability over the five year period from 2014 to 2019. In October 2015, Airtel and Tigo launched a six-month bilateral pilot project for interoperability, an initiative strongly supported by the National Bank of Rwanda. In December 2017, Airtel signed an agreement with Millicom to acquire Tigo Rwanda, creating a duopoly in the mobile money market. The two market leaders MTN and Airtel did not reach interoperability until 2021. Indeed, the New Times (Rwanda's leading daily)²³ reports that in June 2021, a draft law governing payment systems proposed a new provision that allows the Central Bank to impose interoperability and that the government was in negotiations with RSwitch to provide the interoperability system, operational in a short time. In December 2021, the national e-payment switch of Rwanda, RSwitch, was upgraded to connect all payment schemes, including MNOs.

D.2.13 Sudan

According to GSMA (2021) the Central Bank of Sudan is the only entity allowed to issue money in Sudan. Banks, by purchasing e-money directly from the Central Bank, play the role of Financial Service Providers (FSP), while the MNOs play most the customer facing functions. As far as it concerns interoperability, GSMA report reads: *The mobile payment system in Sudan is centralised thereby imposing on technical requirements for all financial system operators are required to inter-link their platforms to be interoperable.* Moreover, the 2017 Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) report "National retail payment systems to support financial inclusion" claims that the Central Bank of Sudan implemented the National Switch in 2006 that provides interoperable, robust national payments infrastructure, to provide payment services for all cardholders through ATMs and POS terminals, across the nation; as well through Short Messaging Service (SMS). Among the terminals integrated with this National Switch, Mobile payments are included.

²²See link

²³See link

Following these sources, we consider the regulation requiring all the payment systems to be interoperable. As a result, since their launch year in 2016, the mobile money platforms have been meeting the interoperability requirements.

D.2.14 Tanzania

Tanzania has been the first country to reach full mobile money Interoperability in Africa. Discussion on account-to-account ininteroperability started as early as 2013, mandated by the Bank of Tanzania, after the intergration between the MMPs and the banking sector (GSMA, 2016). The interconnection between the four MMPs, Tigo, Airtel, Zantel, and Vodacom, took place the following years through bilateral/multilateral agreements. First, Airtel and Tigo signed a deal on interoperability in September 2014. Then in December 2014, Tigo connected with Zantel, and, in February 2016, Vodacom announced the joining of the interoperability agreement. In terms of legislation, the National Payment Systems (NPS) Act 2015 and the Bank of Tanzania Act 2006 assign to Bank of Tanzania the responsibility to regulate and supervise the payment systems services and products offered by both banks and non-bank institutions in Tanzania.²⁴ As far as it concerns interoperability, the National Payment Systems (NPS) Act, passed in May 2015, reads “A payment system that may be eligible to be licenced by the Bank shall have any of the following objects: [...] facilitation of interoperability of payment systems and services between payment systems providers and consumers.” In addition to the interoperability standard, the legislation mandates non-discriminatory pricing for cross-net and on-net person-to-person (P2P) transactions (GSMA, 2020). As interoperability has been market-driven and achieved gradually, we set as introduction of interoperability the date on which the National Payment Systems (NPS) law was passed.

D.2.15 Uganda

In 2013 the Bank of Uganda issued some guidelines²⁵ to mobile money service providers, recommending to “*utilize systems capable of becoming interoperable with other payment systems in the country and internationally in order to facilitate full interoperability*”. In September 2017, this recommendation became more pressing as the Bank of Uganda issued the National Payment System (NPS) Policy Framework²⁶, which required all mobile money providers to achieve interoperability within a few months, without providing technical standards. The two market leaders, MTN and Airtel, initially used the Pegasus aggregator and then connected bilaterally in 2019. They still make use of Pegasus for interconnection with smaller MMPs (GSMA, 2020).

²⁴See link

²⁵See link

²⁶See link

D.2.16 Zimbabwe

The Statutory Instrument 80 of 2020 (Banking Money Transmission, Mobile Banking and Mobile Money Interoperability) Regulations released by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, in section 4 “ Additional requirements for provision of money transmission and mobile banking services” reads: “*It shall be mandatory for every money transmission provider and mobile banking provider shall be connected to a national payment switch, as shall be directed by written notice by the Reserve Bank from time to time that enables interoperability of payments systems and services.*” In a press statement of June 2020, The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe announced the designation of Zimswitch as a national payment switch with immediate effect. Therefore, as required by section 4 of the Regulations above, all money transmission providers and mobile money providers had to complete the necessary installation or deployment, or commissioning of infrastructure and connection protocols, credentials, and documentation to connect to Zimswitch, by no later than 15 August 2020.

Data Appendix E - Mobile Network Operators Balance Sheets

In this appendix we report the financial statement and revenue breakdown for the Fiscal Years 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 for the main mobile network operators (MNOs) in Africa offering mobile money services.

Table E.1: Summary of financial revenues of MNOs

Mobile Network Operator (MNO)	Mobile Money Company	Countries	Financial Services Revenues 2020-2021 (as % of Total Revenues)	Financial Services Revenues 2021-2022 (as % of Total Revenues)
Vodacom	M-Pesa	Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania Mozambique, Lesotho	34.2%	37.7%
Safaricom	M-Pesa	Kenya	33%	38.3%
MTN	MTN MoMo	Sudan, South Sudan, Rwanda, Cameroon, Eswatini, Guinea Bissau, Uganda, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Benin	10.6%	10%
Airtel	Airtel Money	Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Niger, Seychelles, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia	7.7%	9%

Notes: This table summarizes information about the financial revenues of major mobile network operators in Africa. The last two columns of the table report the financial service revenues as percentage of total revenues. We also report the countries in which MNOs operate and the name of the mobile money service they provide.

In Table E.1 we summarize the information about the revenues of financial services offered by these MNOs.

Airtel Money, the mobile money service provided by Airtel in Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, accounted for 9% of total revenues of Airtel in the Fiscal Years 2022.

MTN MoMo, in 2022, accounted for 10% of total revenues in the countries where MTN operates (Sudan, South Sudan, Rwanda, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Eswatini, Guinea Bissau, Uganda, Nigeria, Benin).

Vodacom in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania, and Safaricom in Kenya, instead, registered revenues for about 38% from their mobile money service M-Pesa. Vodacom and Safaricom have the same mobile money service because Vodacom is the major owner of Safaricom's stocks, holding the 35% of its shares.

Below, we attach the financial statements and revenue breakdowns of these mobile network operators.²⁷

²⁷We also information for Orange, which, in Africa, operates in following countries: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Morocco, DRC, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Tunisia, Egypt. However, the Financial Statement of Orange is consolidated for all the countries where the company operates, including European ones, and as a consequence there is not a clear entry for Mobile Money Revenues.

Figure E.1: Airtel's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

Consolidated statement of comprehensive income

(All amounts are in US\$ millions unless stated otherwise)

	Notes	For the year ended	
		31 March 2021	31 March 2020
Income			
Revenue	6	3,908	3,422
Other income		11	17
		3,919	3,439
Expenses			
Network operating expenses		694	628
Access charges		376	376
Licence fee/spectrum usage charges		198	189
Employee benefits expense	7	275	234
Sales and marketing expenses		187	148
Impairment loss/(reversal) on financial assets		7	(2)
Other operating expenses		382	333
Depreciation and amortisation	9	681	632
		2,800	2,538
Operating profit		1,119	901
Finance costs	10	432	440
Finance income	10	(9)	(67)
Non-operating income	11	-	(70)
Share of profit of associate		(1)	(0)
Profit before tax		697	598
Income tax expense	12	282	190
Profit for the year		415	408
Profit before tax (as presented above)		697	598
Less: Exceptional items (net)	11	(14)	(65)
Underlying profit before tax		683	533
Profit after tax (as presented above)		415	408
Less: Exceptional items (net)	11	(50)	(112)
Underlying profit after tax		365	296
Other comprehensive income (OCI)			
Items to be reclassified subsequently to profit or loss:			
Net losses due to foreign currency translation differences		(138)	(219)
Net (loss)/gain on net investments hedge		(11)	5
Net loss on cash flow hedge		-	(2)
		(149)	(216)
Items not to be reclassified subsequently to profit or loss:			
Re-measurement (loss)/gain on defined benefit plans		(0)	1
Tax credit/(expense) on above		0	(0)
		(0)	1
Other comprehensive loss for the year		(149)	(215)
Total comprehensive income for the year		266	193
Profit for the year attributable to:		415	408
Owners of the company		339	370
Non-controlling interests		76	38
Other comprehensive loss for the year attributable to:		(149)	(215)
Owners of the company		(140)	(224)
Non-controlling interests		(9)	9
Total comprehensive income for the year attributable to:		266	193
Owners of the company		199	146
Non-controlling interests		67	47
Earnings per share			
Basic	13	9.0c	10.3c
Diluted	13	9.0c	10.3c

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.2: Airtel's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

6. Revenue continued

Investment elimination upon consolidation and resulting goodwill impacts are reflected in the 'eliminations/adjustment' column.

Summary of the segmental information and disaggregation of revenue for the year ended and as of 31 March 2021 is as follows:

	Nigeria	East Africa	Francophone Africa	Unallocated	Eliminations	Total
Revenue from external customers						
Voice revenue	896	649	558	0	-	2,103
Data revenue	549	354	254	-	-	1,157
Mobile money revenue ²	0	227	74	-	-	301
Other revenue ¹	104	147	96	-	-	347
	1,549	1,377	982	0	-	3,908
Inter-segment revenue	3	4	3	-	(10)	-
Total revenue	1,552	1,381	985	0	(10)	3,908
Segment results: Underlying EBITDA	839	631	364	(30)	(12)	1,792
Less:						
Depreciation and amortisation	236	221	207	2	15	681
Finance costs						432
Finance income						(9)
Share of profit of associate						(1)
Charitable donation	1	2	1	2	-	6
Exceptional items pertaining to operating profit	-	-	(14)	-	-	(14)
Profit before tax						697
Other segment items						
Capital expenditure	275	249	88	2	-	614
As of 31 March 2021						
Segment assets	1,889	2,042	1,791	25,622	(21,352)	9,992
Segment liabilities	1,192	2,989	2,715	16,895	(17,152)	6,639
Investment in associate (included in segment assets above)	-	-	4	-	-	4

1. Intra-segment elimination of \$100m adjusted with mobile money revenue. It includes \$54m pertaining to East Africa and balance \$36m pertaining to Francophone Africa
2. This includes messaging, value added services, enterprise, site sharing and handset sale revenue

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.3: Airtel's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Consolidated statement of comprehensive income

(All amounts are in US\$ millions unless stated otherwise)

	Notes	For the year ended 31 March 2022	31 March 2021
Income			
Revenue	6	4,714	3,908
Other income		10	11
		4,724	3,919
Expenses			
Network operating expenses		817	694
Access charges		407	376
Licence fee and spectrum usage charges		244	198
Employee benefits expense	7	297	275
Sales and marketing expenses		224	187
Impairment loss on financial assets		5	7
Other operating expenses		451	382
Depreciation and amortisation	9	744	681
		3,189	2,800
Operating profit		1,535	1,119
Finance costs	10	441	432
Finance income	10	(19)	(9)
Other non-operating income	11	(111)	-
Share of profit from associate		(9)	(1)
Profit before tax		1,224	697
Income tax expense	12	469	282
Profit for the year		755	415
Profit before tax (as presented above)		1,224	697
Less: exceptional items (net)	11	(60)	(14)
Underlying profit before tax		1,164	683
Profit after tax (as presented above)		755	415
Less: exceptional items (net)	11	(62)	(50)
Underlying profit after tax		693	365
Other comprehensive income (OCI)			
Items to be reclassified subsequently to profit or loss:			
Loss due to foreign currency translation differences		(4)	(147)
Tax (expense)/credit on above		(3)	9
Share of OCI of associate		1	0
Net loss on net investments hedge		(8)	(11)
		(14)	(149)
Items not to be reclassified subsequently to profit or loss:			
Remeasurement loss on defined benefit plans		(0)	(0)
Tax credit on above		0	0
		(0)	(0)
Other comprehensive loss for the year		(14)	(149)
Total comprehensive income for the year		741	266
Profit for the year attributable to:			
Owners of the Company		631	339
Non-controlling interests		124	76
Other comprehensive loss for the year attributable to:			
Owners of the Company		(14)	(149)
Non-controlling interests		(2)	(9)
Total comprehensive income for the year attributable to:			
Owners of the Company		619	199
Non-controlling interests		122	67
Earnings per share			
Basic	13	16.8 cents	9.0 cents
Diluted	13	16.8 cents	9.0 cents

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.4: Airtel's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Summary of the segmental information and disaggregation of revenue for the year ended and as of 31 March 2022 is as follows:

	Nigeria	East Africa	Francophone Africa	Unallocated	Eliminations	Total
Revenue from external customers						
Voice revenue	984	782	592	-	-	2,358
Data revenue	734	457	334	-	-	1,525
Mobile money revenue ²	0	326	98	-	-	424
Other revenue ²	157	146	104	-	-	407
	1,875	1,711	1,128	-	-	4,714
Inter-segment revenue	3	6	3	-	(12)	-
Total revenue	1,878	1,717	1,131	-	(12)	4,714
Segment results: underlying EBITDA	1,037	848	464	(38)	(0)	2,311
Less:						
Depreciation and amortisation	268	240	203	33	0	744
Finance costs						441
Finance income						(19)
Other non-operating income (net)						(111)
Share of profit of associate						(0)
Exceptional items pertaining to operating profit	-	32	-	-	-	32
Profit before tax						1,224
Other segment items						
Capital expenditure	251	271	125	9	-	656
As of 31 March 2022						
Segment assets	2,254	2,394	1,720	27,422	(23,426)	10,364
Segment liabilities	1,437	2,869	2,495	14,491	(14,577)	6,715
Investment in associate (included in segment assets above)	-	-	6	-	-	6

1 Intra segment elimination of \$129m adjusted with mobile money revenue. It includes \$85m pertaining to East Africa and a balance of \$44m pertaining to Francophone Africa
2 It includes messaging, value added services, enterprise, site sharing and handset sale revenue

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.5: MTN's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

Group income statement

for the year ended 31 December 2021

	Note	2021 Rm	2020 Rm
Revenue	2.1, 2.2	181 646	179 361
Other income	9.4.2.4, 9.4.2.5	677	99
Direct network and technology operating costs		(27 649)	(28 208)
Costs of handsets and other accessories		(10 584)	(11 093)
Interconnect and roaming costs		(9 622)	(10 992)
Staff costs	2.3	(11 716)	(12 741)
Selling, distribution and marketing expenses		(22 452)	(21 158)
Government and regulatory costs		(6 895)	(6 823)
Impairment and write-down of trade receivables and contract assets	2.3	(1 116)	(2 169)
Other operating expenses		(12 570)	(9 584)
Depreciation of property, plant and equipment	5.1	(21 181)	(22 704)
Depreciation of right-of-use assets	6.5.3	(7 216)	(7 204)
Amortisation of intangible assets	5.2	(6 243)	(5 743)
Impairment of goodwill and investment in joint ventures	5.2, 9.2	(583)	(1 065)
Gain on disposal of investment in associates	9.4.1; 9.4.2.1	1 212	6 129
Loss on deconsolidation of subsidiary	9.4.2.3	(4 720)	-
Impairment loss on remeasurement of non-current assets held for sale	9.4.2.1; 9.4.2.3	(53)	(1 510)
Finance income	2.4	1 198	1 493
Finance costs	2.4	(15 646)	(19 726)
Net monetary gain		275	1 582
Share of results of associates and joint ventures after tax	9.2	2 054	1 142
Profit before tax		28 816	29 086
Income tax expense	3.1	(11 822)	(9 439)
Profit after tax		16 994	19 647
Attributable to:			
Equity holders of the Company		13 750	17 022
Non-controlling interests		3 244	2 625
		16 994	19 647
Basic earnings per share (cents)	2.5	763	946
Diluted earnings per share (cents)	2.5	744	936

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.6: MTN's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

2 **RESULTS OF OPERATIONS** (continued)
2.1 **Operating segments** (continued)

These exclusions have remained unchanged from the prior year, apart from the fair value gain on acquisition of subsidiary, loss on deconsolidation of subsidiary, gain on exit in Yemen, gain on disposal of subsidiary and impairment loss on Yemen property, plant and equipment and intangible assets. Impairment losses on property, plant and equipment and intangible assets are generally included in the CODM EBITDA as they are operational in nature. As the impairment of Yemen's property, plant and equipment and intangible assets arises from the MENA exit strategy, it is not considered reflective of Yemen's performance for the period.

Irancell proportionate results are included in the segment analysis as reviewed by the CODM and excluded from reported proportionate results for revenue, CODM EBITDA and capital expenditure (capex) due to equity accounting for joint ventures. The results of Irancell in the segments analysis exclude the impact of hyperinflation accounting.

Revenue 2021	Network services Rm	Mobile devices Rm	Inter-connect and roaming Rm	Digital and fintech Rm	Other Rm	Revenue from contracts with customers Rm	Interest revenue Rm	Total revenue Rm
South Africa	31 030	9 271	4 070	2 429	1 521	48 321	395	48 716
Nigeria	50 241	107	5 594	3 216	892	60 050	-	60 050
SEA	11 830	211	759	3 598	557	16 955	-	16 955
Uganda	5 728	84	378	2 199	160	8 549	-	8 549
Zambia	1 606	77	108	596	42	2 429	-	2 429
Other SEA	4 496	50	273	803	355	5 977	-	5 977
WECA	34 371	223	2 499	9 750	1 162	48 005	-	48 005
Ghana	13 046	56	642	5 151	292	19 187	-	19 187
Côte d'Ivoire	6 022	47	879	1 456	499	8 903	-	8 903
Cameroon	5 475	38	385	1 262	84	7 244	-	7 244
Other WECA	9 828	82	593	1 881	287	12 671	-	12 671
MENA	5 209	13	1 055	200	73	6 550	-	6 550
Sudan	1 619	6	548	43	10	2 226	-	2 226
Afghanistan	1 670	7	341	57	17	2 092	-	2 092
Other MENA ¹	1 920	-	166	100	46	2 232	-	2 232
Major joint venture – Irancell ²	5 831	128	289	324	138	6 710	15	6 725
Head office companies ³	1 515	-	5 076	188	12 183	18 962	134	19 096
Eliminations	(438)	(1)	(5 303)	(206)	(11 635)	(17 583)	(130)	(17 713)
Hyperinflation impact	(229)	1	226	(5)	(6)	(13)	-	(13)
Irancell revenue exclusion	(5 831)	(128)	(289)	(324)	(138)	(6 710)	(15)	(6 725)
Consolidated revenue	133 529	9 825	13 976	19 170	4 747	181 247	399	181 646

¹ Syria and Yemen segment analysis has been included until the Group lost control of MTN Syria on 25 February 2021 and the Group exited Yemen on 17 November 2021. Refer to note 9.4.2.3 and note 9.4.2.4.
² Irancell proportionate results are included in the segment analysis as reviewed by the CODM. This is, however, excluded from IFRS reported results due to equity accounting for joint ventures.
³ Head office companies consist mainly of revenue from GlobalConnect Solutions Limited (GlobalConnect), the Group's central financing activities and management fees from segments.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.7: MTN's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Group income statement
for the year ended 31 December 2022

	Note	2022 Rm	2021 Rm
Revenue	2.1; 2.2	207 003	181 646
Other income	6.5.5	410	677
Direct network and technology operating costs		(32 854)	(27 649)
Costs of handsets and other accessories		(12 055)	(10 586)
Interconnect and roaming costs		(11 288)	(9 622)
Staff costs	2.3	(12 675)	(11 716)
Selling, distribution and marketing expenses		(24 819)	(22 452)
Government and regulatory costs		(7 610)	(6 895)
Impairment and write-down of trade receivables and contract assets	2.3	(1 579)	(1 116)
Other operating expenses		(13 431)	(12 570)
Depreciation of property, plant and equipment	5.1	(20 812)	(21 181)
Depreciation of right-of-use assets	6.5.3	(7 840)	(7 216)
Amortisation of intangible assets	5.2	(5 999)	(6 243)
Impairment of goodwill and investment in joint ventures	5.2; 9.2	(625)	(583)
Gain on disposal of investment in associates	9.4.1.1	-	1 212
Loss on deconsolidation of subsidiary	9.4.1.3	-	(4 720)
Impairment loss on remeasurement of non-current assets held for sale	9.4.2.4	(1 263)	(53)
Finance income	2.4	2 042	1 198
Finance costs	2.4	(19 728)	(15 646)
Net monetary gain		1 251	275
Share of results of associates and joint ventures after tax	9.2	3 369	2 054
Profit before tax		41 497	28 816
Income tax expense	3.1	(17 236)	(11 822)
Profit after tax		24 261	16 994
Attributable to:			
Equity holders of the Company		19 337	13 750
Non-controlling interests		4 924	3 244
		24 261	16 994
Basic earnings per share (cents)	2.5	1 071	763
Diluted earnings per share (cents)	2.5	1 044	744

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.8: MTN's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Notes to the Group financial statements (continued)
for the year ended 31 December 2022

2 RESULTS OF OPERATIONS (continued)
2.1 Operating segments (continued)

Revenue	Network services Rm	Mobile devices Rm	Inter-connect and roaming Rm	Digital and Fintech Rm	Other Rm	Revenue from contracts with customers Rm	Interest revenue Rm	Total revenue Rm
2022								
South Africa	32 018	9 792	4 359	2 417	1 573	50 159	481	50 640
Nigeria	65 721	237	6 518	4 087	697	77 260	-	77 260
SEA	12 732	240	872	5 019	479	19 342	-	19 342
Uganda	6 518	90	400	2 932	186	10 126	-	10 126
Zambia	2 096	104	184	869	63	3 316	-	3 316
Other SEA	4 118	46	288	1 218	230	5 900	-	5 900
WECA	35 510	204	2 294	8 920	1 351	48 279	-	48 279
Chana	12 920	62	590	4 170	289	18 031	-	18 031
Côte d'Ivoire	6 446	46	663	1 116	647	8 918	-	8 918
Cameroon	5 829	28	354	1 422	94	7 727	-	7 727
Other WECA	10 315	68	687	2 212	321	13 603	-	13 603
MENA	5 005	27	1 007	146	27	6 212	-	6 212
Sudan	3 276	19	642	78	17	4 032	-	4 032
Afghanistan	1 729	8	365	68	10	2 180	-	2 180
Major joint venture – Irancell ¹	7 093	183	362	702	206	8 546	18	8 564
Head office companies ²	1 856	-	6 180	-	15 100	23 136	255	23 391
Eliminations	(957)	(3)	(5 571)	(22)	(13 810)	(20 363)	(242)	(20 605)
Hyperinflation impact ³	1 988	13	419	49	15	2 484	-	2 484
Irancell revenue exclusion	(7 093)	(183)	(362)	(702)	(206)	(8 546)	(18)	(8 564)
Consolidated revenue	153 873	10 510	16 078	20 616	5 432	206 509	494	207 003

¹ Irancell proportionate results are included in the segment analysis as reviewed by the CDM. This is, however, excluded from IFRS reported results due to equity accounting for joint ventures.
² Head office companies consist mainly of revenue from GlobalConnect Solutions Limited (GlobalConnect), the Group's central financing activities and management fees from segments.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.9: Orange's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Consolidated income statement

(in millions of euros, except for per share data)

	Note	2022	2021	2020
Revenue	4.1	43,471	42,522	42,270
External purchases	5.1	(18,732)	(17,973)	(17,691)
Other operating income	4.2	747	783	604
Other operating expenses	5.2	(413)	(700)	(789)
Labor expenses	6.1	(8,920)	(9,917)	(8,490)
Operating taxes and levies	10.1.1	(1,882)	(1,926)	(1,924)
Gains (losses) on disposal of fixed assets, investments and activities	3.1	233	2,507	228
Restructuring costs	5.3	(125)	(331)	(25)
Depreciation and amortization of fixed assets	8.2	(7,035)	(7,074)	(7,134)
Depreciation and amortization of financed assets	8.5	(107)	(84)	(55)
Depreciation and amortization of right-of-use assets	9.1	(1,507)	(1,481)	(1,384)
Impairment of goodwill	7.1	(817)	(3,702)	-
Impairment of fixed assets	8.3	(56)	(17)	(30)
Impairment of right-of-use assets	9.1	(54)	(91)	(57)
Share of profits (losses) of associates and joint ventures	11	(2)	3	(2)
Operating income		4,801	2,521	5,521
Cost of gross financial debt excluding financed assets		(775)	(829)	(1,099)
Interests on debts related to financed assets		(3)	(1)	(1)
Gains (losses) on assets contributing to net financial debt		48	(3)	(1)
Foreign exchange gain (loss)		(97)	65	(103)
Interests on lease liabilities		(145)	(120)	(120)
Other net financial expenses		52	106	11
Finance costs, net	13.2	(920)	(782)	(1,314)
Income taxes	10.2.1	(1,265)	(962)	848
Consolidated net income		2,617	778	5,055
Net income attributable to owners of the parent company		2,146	233	4,822
Non-controlling interests	15.6	471	545	233
Earnings per share (in euros) attributable to parent company	15.7			
Net income				
- basic		0.73	0.00	1.72
- diluted		0.73	0.00	1.71

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.10: Orange's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

1.2 Segment revenue														
(in million of euros)	France ⁽¹⁾	Spain ⁽²⁾	Europe Other European countries ⁽³⁾		Total ⁽⁴⁾	Africa & Middle-East	Emerging M ⁽⁵⁾	Total ⁽⁶⁾	International Carriers & Shared Services ⁽⁷⁾	Eliminations	Total Network activities	Mobile Financial Services	Eliminations Network activities financial services	Orange consolidated financial statements
December 31, 2022														
Revenue ⁽⁸⁾	11,981	4,647	4,339	(14)	10,962	6,914	7,308	695	1,340	(3,236)	42,680	-	(9)	42,671
Convergence services	4,817	1,210	369	-	2,836	-	-	-	-	-	7,687	-	-	7,687
Mobile-only services	2,332	790	2,079	-	2,801	2,272	609	-	-	(36)	11,053	-	(9)	11,053
Fixed-only services	2,767 ⁽⁹⁾	426	763	-	1,219	600	3,488 ⁽¹⁰⁾	-	-	(193)	9,121	-	(1)	9,120
IT & Integration services	41	423	-	-	411	40	3,489	-	-	(194)	3,817	-	(9)	3,811
Wholesale	4,038	678	864	(14)	1,526	663	41	695	1,090	(1,895)	7,266	-	(9)	7,266
Equipment sales	1,321	892	307	-	1,519	154	275	-	-	(7)	3,266	-	(9)	3,264
Other revenue	146	8	116	-	137	36	-	-	-	(86)	1,366	-	-	1,366
External	17,228	4,586	6,270	-	10,855	6,760	7,540	113	1,317	(2,992)	43,471	-	(9)	43,471
Inter-company payments	758	61	599	(14)	130	(85)	387	379	377	(3,236)	-	-	(9)	-
December 31, 2021														
Revenue ⁽⁸⁾	10,882	4,726	4,870	(11)	10,576	6,381	7,797	n/a	1,915	(1,796)	42,538	-	(7)	42,532
Convergence services	4,697	1,070	305	-	2,770	n/a	-	-	-	-	7,417	-	-	7,417
Mobile-only services	2,278	880	2,007	-	2,867	4,884	636	n/a	-	(31)	10,692	-	(9)	10,692
Fixed-only services	3,677 ⁽⁹⁾	426	1,622	-	1,881	664	3,817 ⁽¹⁰⁾	n/a	-	(166)	9,989	-	(1)	9,989
IT & Integration services	6,313	14	338	-	282	31	3,195	n/a	-	(187)	3,411	-	(4)	3,407
Wholesale	1,226	900	989	(11)	1,894	664	42	n/a	1,054	(1,348)	7,262	-	-	7,262
Equipment sales	1,226	821	369	-	1,486	112	250	n/a	-	(9)	3,070	-	(8)	3,070
Other revenue	708	1	178	-	127	36	-	n/a	-	(82)	1,368	-	(9)	1,369
External	17,489	4,672	6,776	(11)	10,449	6,216	7,211	n/a	899	(1,796)	42,522	-	(7)	42,522
Inter-company payments	693	45	94	(11)	131	(35)	386	n/a	317	(1,796)	-	-	(7)	-
December 31, 2020														
Revenue ⁽⁸⁾	10,461	4,581	4,638	(9)	10,588	5,834	7,897	n/a	1,490	(1,895)	42,277	-	(7)	42,270
Convergence services	4,630	1,084	770	-	2,711	n/a	-	-	-	-	7,276	-	-	7,276
Mobile services only	2,245	1,072	2,029	-	3,008	4,420	649	n/a	-	(30)	10,317	-	(8)	10,317
Fixed services only	3,987 ⁽⁹⁾	471	811	-	1,463	382	3,817 ⁽¹⁰⁾	n/a	-	(175)	9,278	-	(9)	9,277
IT & Integration services	5,890	918	1,017	-	2,101	25	3,088	n/a	-	(190)	3,268	-	(4)	3,262
Wholesale	1,187	818	817	(9)	1,584	665	40	n/a	1,038	(1,318)	6,261	-	-	6,259
Equipment sales	1,187	647	408	-	1,275	89	175	n/a	-	(8)	2,821	-	(8)	2,801
Other revenue	644	72	272	-	324	63	-	n/a	-	(105)	1,073	-	-	1,072
External	17,794	4,600	5,500	(9)	10,407	6,090	7,400	n/a	844	(1,895)	42,270	-	(7)	42,270
Inter-company payments	697	42	78	(9)	117	(18)	400	n/a	606	(1,895)	-	-	(7)	-

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.11: Vodacom's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

Condensed consolidated income statement

for the year ended 31 March

Rm	Notes	2021 Reviewed	2020 Audited
Revenue	3	98 302	90 746
Direct expenses ¹		(36 269)	(32 075)
Staff expenses		(6 990)	(6 421)
Publicity expenses		(1 718)	(1 907)
Net credit losses on financial assets ¹		(1 078)	(802)
Other operating expenses		(12 973)	(12 024)
Depreciation and amortisation		(15 117)	(13 955)
Impairment losses		(6)	-
Net profit from associate and joint ventures		3 501	4 149
Operating profit		27 652	27 711
Net loss on disposal of subsidiaries	4.4	(70)	(819)
Finance income		767	884
Finance costs		(4 190)	(4 702)
Net loss on remeasurement and disposal of financial instruments		(378)	(16)
Profit before tax		23 781	23 058
Taxation		(6 710)	(6 414)
Net profit		17 071	16 644
Attributable to:			
Equity shareholders		16 581	15 944
Non-controlling interests		490	700
		17 071	16 644

1. Net credit losses on financial assets were included in direct expenditure in prior periods. The reclassification had no impact on any reported totals, headline earnings per share or on any amounts presented in the statement of financial position.

Cents	Notes	2021 Reviewed	2020 Audited
Basic earnings per share	4	978	939
Diluted earnings per share	4	956	923

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.12: Vodacom's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

Revenue is further disaggregated into product type below.

Rm	South Africa	International	Corporate and elimination	Total	Safaricom ¹
31 March 2021 – reviewed					
Mobile contract revenue	20 829	1 469	(6)	22 292	3 420
Mobile prepaid revenue	25 359	18 009	(2)	43 366	30 153
Customer service revenue:	46 188	19 478	(8)	65 658	33 573
Mobile interconnect	1 742	1 330	(544)	2 528	1 426
Fixed service revenue	3 556	1 233	(390)	4 399	1 429
Other service revenue	4 919	105	(35)	4 989	1 172
Service revenue	56 405	22 146	(977)	77 574	37 600
Equipment revenue	14 672	285	(21)	14 936	1 527
Non-service revenue	5 299	303	(183)	5 419	500
Revenue from contracts with customers	76 376	22 734	(1 181)	97 929	*
Interest income recognised as revenue	296	12	–	308	*
Other ²	65	–	–	65	*
Revenue	76 737	22 746	(1 181)	98 302	39 627

1. The Group has a 34.94% effective interest in Safaricom Plc (Safaricom) through its subsidiary Vodafone Kenya Limited, which the Group equity accounts for as an investment in an associate at 39.93%. Due to the significance of this investment, and the information available for review by the chief operating decision maker, Safaricom is presented as a separate segment. The above results represent 100% of the results of Safaricom.

2. Other revenue largely represents lease revenues recognised under IFRS 16 "Leases".

* Not reviewed by the chief operating decision maker.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.13: Vodacom's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Condensed consolidated income statement
for the year ended 31 March

Rm	Note	2022 Reviewed	2021 Audited
Revenue	3	102 736	98 302
Direct expenses		(38 624)	(36 269)
Staff expenses		(7 266)	(6 990)
Publicity expenses		(1 886)	(1 718)
Net credit losses on financial assets		(704)	(1 078)
Other operating expenses		(14 419)	(12 973)
Depreciation and amortisation		(14 657)	(15 117)
Impairment losses		–	(6)
Net profit from associates and joint ventures		3 056	3 501
Operating profit		28 236	27 652
Net loss on disposal of subsidiaries		–	(70)
Finance income		554	767
Finance costs		(4 229)	(4 190)
Net gain/(loss) on remeasurement and disposal of financial instruments		2	(378)
Profit before tax		24 563	23 781
Taxation		(6 829)	(6 710)
Net profit		17 734	17 071
Attributable to:			
Equity shareholders		17 163	16 581
Non-controlling interests		571	490
		17 734	17 071

Cents	Note	2022 Reviewed	2021 Audited
Basic earnings per share	4	1 013	978
Diluted earnings per share	4	984	956

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.14: Vodacom's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

Revenue is further disaggregated into product type below.

Rm	South Africa	International	Corporate and elimination	Total	Safaricom ¹
31 March 2022 – reviewed					
Mobile contract revenue	21 985	1 615	(8)	23 592	4 673
Mobile prepaid revenue	25 171	18 294	–	43 465	28 899
Customer service revenue	47 156	19 909	(8)	67 057	33 572
Mobile interconnect	1 703	1 175	(440)	2 438	1 321
Fixed service revenue	3 847	1 011	(325)	4 533	1 508
Other service revenue	5 820	118	(30)	5 908	1 314
Service revenue²	58 526	22 213	(803)	79 936	37 715
Equipment revenue	15 838	373	(7)	16 204	1 925
Non-service revenue	5 990	291	(170)	6 111	346
Revenue from contracts with customers	80 354	22 877	(980)	102 251	*
Interest income recognised as revenue	410	11	–	421	*
Other ³	64	–	–	64	*
Revenue	80 828	22 888	(980)	102 736	39 985

1. The Group has a 34.94% effective interest in Safaricom Plc (Safaricom) through its subsidiary Vodafone Kenya Limited, which the Group equity accounts for as an investment in an associate at 39.93%. Due to the significance of this investment, and the information available for review by the chief operating decision maker, Safaricom is presented as a separate segment. The above results represent 100% of the results of Safaricom.

2. Includes financial services revenue of R2 665 million for South Africa; R4 961 million for International and R14 452 million for Safaricom.

3. Other revenue largely represents lease revenues recognised under IFRS 16 "Leases".

* Not reviewed by the chief operating decision maker.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.15: Safaricom's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2021

STATEMENT OF PROFIT OR LOSS AND OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

Notes	GROUP		COMPANY	
	2021 KSh's'm	2020 KSh's'm	2021 KSh's'm	2020 KSh's'm
Revenue from contracts with customers	5(a) 261,462.3	260,463.8	259,296.3	259,078.7
Revenue from other sources	5(b) 2,564.2	2,091.9	3,153.4	2,326.8
Total revenue	264,026.5	262,555.7	262,449.7	261,405.5
Direct costs	6(a) (80,852.8)	(75,284.9)	(80,334.1)	(75,468.7)
Expected credit losses on financial assets	6(b) (3,009.7)	(1,669.6)	(3,863.7)	(1,418.7)
Other expenses	7 (46,034.8)	(47,559.7)	(45,168.6)	(47,023.1)
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA)	134,129.2	138,041.5	133,083.3	137,495.0
Depreciation of property and equipment	18 (32,624.5)	(31,964.8)	(32,570.4)	(31,925.3)
amortisation – Intangible Rights of Use (IRUs)	19 (406.5)	(301.0)	(406.5)	(301.0)
amortisation – intangible assets	21 (1,628.5)	(1,359.1)	(1,628.1)	(1,358.0)
amortisation – Right of Use (ROU) assets	22(a) (3,304.8)	(2,922.8)	(3,304.8)	(2,922.8)
Operating profit	96,164.9	101,493.8	95,173.5	100,987.9
Finance income	8 2,198.4	3,518.8	2,177.0	3,494.5
Finance cost	9 (4,220.8)	(2,596.6)	(4,405.5)	(2,585.5)
Share of (loss)/profit of associates	23(b) (192.9)	60.9	(192.9)	60.9
Share of (loss)/profit of joint venture	23(b) (314.1)	3,296.1	(314.1)	3,296.1
Profit before income tax	93,635.5	105,773.0	92,438.0	105,253.9
Income tax expense	12(a) (24,959.3)	(32,115.1)	(24,481.4)	(31,969.7)
Profit for the year attributable to the owners of the Company	68,676.2	73,657.9	67,956.6	73,284.2
Other comprehensive income	–	–	–	–
Total comprehensive income for the year attributable to the owners of the Company	68,676.2	73,657.9	67,956.6	73,284.2
Basic and diluted earnings per share (KSh's per share)	13 1.71	1.84	1.70	1.83

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.16: Safaricom Company's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2020-2021

5 Revenue continued

(a) Revenue from contracts with customers continued

Company	31 MARCH 2021			31 MARCH 2020		
	KShs'm At a point in time	KShs'm Over time	KShs'm Total	KShs'm At a point in time	KShs'm Over time	KShs'm Total
Voice revenue	-	82,552.0	82,552.0	-	86,529.9	86,529.9
Interconnect revenue from local partners	-	6,175.2	6,175.2	-	5,039.3	5,039.3
Messaging revenue	-	13,602.4	13,602.4	-	15,403.5	15,403.5
Mobile data revenue	-	44,793.2	44,793.2	-	40,157.5	40,157.5
Fixed data revenue	-	9,507.2	9,507.2	-	8,966.8	8,966.8
M-PESA revenue	80,635.8	-	80,635.8	83,135.6	-	83,135.6
Other Services Revenues*	-	7,624.8	7,624.8	-	7,153.9	7,153.9
Mobile Incoming	-	3,295.2	3,295.2	-	3,442.5	3,442.5
Service revenue	80,635.8	167,550.0	248,185.8	83,135.6	166,693.4	249,829.0
Handset revenue	8,511.7	-	8,511.7	6,631.0	-	6,631.0
Connection revenue	-	1,761.1	1,761.1	-	2,034.8	2,034.8
Construction revenue	-	837.7	837.7	-	583.9	583.9
Total revenue	89,147.5	170,148.8	259,296.3	89,766.6	169,312.1	259,078.7

Service revenue streams have been reclassified to align to new Group reporting needs. Appendix 2 shows the comparative based on old revenues classification.

* Other Services Revenues includes Okoa Jahazi fees, roaming revenues, bulk SMS, digital agriculture revenues.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.17: Safaricom Group's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

5 Revenue

(a) Revenue from contracts with customers

The Group has one reportable operating segment whose revenue is presented below.

Group	31 MARCH 2021			31 MARCH 2020		
	KShs'm At a point in time	KShs'm Over time	KShs'm Total	KShs'm At a point in time	KShs'm Over time	KShs'm Total
Voice revenue	-	82,552.0	82,552.0	-	86,529.9	86,529.9
Interconnect revenue from local partners	-	6,175.2	6,175.2	-	5,039.3	5,039.3
Messaging revenue	-	13,602.4	13,602.4	-	15,403.5	15,403.5
Mobile data revenue	-	44,793.2	44,793.2	-	40,157.5	40,157.5
Fixed data revenue	-	9,507.2	9,507.2	-	8,966.9	8,966.9
M-PESA revenue	82,647.4	-	82,647.4	84,438.0	-	84,438.0
Other services revenues*	-	7,779.2	7,779.2	-	7,236.5	7,236.5
Mobile Incoming	-	3,295.2	3,295.2	-	3,442.5	3,442.5
Service revenue	82,647.4	167,704.4	250,351.8	84,438.0	166,776.1	251,214.1
Handset revenue	8,511.7	-	8,511.7	6,631.0	-	6,631.0
Connection revenue	-	1,761.1	1,761.1	-	2,034.8	2,034.8
Construction revenue	-	837.7	837.7	-	583.9	583.9
Total revenue	91,159.1	170,303.2	261,462.3	91,069.0	169,394.8	260,463.8

Service revenue streams have been reclassified to align to new Group reporting needs. Appendix 2 shows the comparative based on old revenues classification.

* Other Services Revenues includes Okoa Jahazi fees, roaming revenues, bulk SMS, digital agriculture revenues.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2021

Figure E.18: Safaricom's Financial Statements - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2022

Statements of Profit or Loss and other Comprehensive Income

	Notes	GROUP		COMPANY	
		2022 KSh's'm	2021 KSh's'm	2022 KSh's'm	2021 KSh's'm
Revenue from contracts with customers	5(a)	295,441.4	261,462.3	292,556.2	259,296.3
Revenue from other sources	5(b)	2,636.5	2,564.2	3,289.7	3,153.4
Total revenue		298,077.9	264,026.5	295,845.9	262,449.7
Direct costs	6(a)	(91,467.8)	(80,852.8)	(90,613.6)	(80,334.1)
Expected credit losses on financial assets	6(b)	(2,361.2)	(3,009.7)	(2,602.7)	(3,863.7)
Other expenses	7	(55,187.0)	(46,034.8)	(49,545.5)	(45,168.6)
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA)		149,061.9	134,129.2	153,084.1	133,083.3
Depreciation of property and equipment	18	(34,145.2)	(32,624.5)	(33,922.2)	(32,570.4)
Amortisation – Intangible assets (IRUs)	19	(281.3)	(406.5)	(281.3)	(406.5)
Amortisation – Intangible assets	21	(1,850.0)	(1,628.5)	(1,850.0)	(1,628.1)
Amortisation – Right-of-use (RoU) assets	22(a)	(3,656.8)	(3,304.8)	(3,644.2)	(3,304.8)
Operating profit		109,128.6	96,164.9	113,386.4	95,173.5
Finance income	8	2,413.4	2,198.4	2,050.1	2,177.0
Finance costs	9	(8,852.6)	(4,220.8)	(8,895.2)	(4,405.5)
Share of loss of associates	23(b)	(279.8)	(192.9)	(279.8)	(192.9)
Share of loss of joint venture	23(b)	(196.2)	(314.1)	(196.2)	(314.1)
Profit before income tax		102,213.4	93,635.5	106,065.3	92,438.0
Income tax expense	12(a)	(34,717.3)	(24,959.3)	(34,276.0)	(24,481.4)
Profit for the year		67,496.1	68,676.2	71,789.3	67,956.6
Attributable to:					
Equity holders of the parent		69,648.1	68,676.2	71,789.3	67,956.6
Non-controlling interests		(2,152.0)	-	-	-
Other comprehensive loss:					
Items that will subsequently be reclassified to profit or loss					
Exchange differences on translation of foreign operations		(9,536.3)	-	-	-
Total comprehensive income for year		57,959.8	68,676.2	71,789.3	67,956.6
Attributable to:					
Equity holders of the parent		64,335.4	68,676.2	71,789.3	67,956.6
Non-controlling interests		(6,375.6)	-	-	-
Total comprehensive income for year		57,959.8	68,676.2	71,789.3	67,956.6
Basic earnings per share (KSh's per share)	13	1.74	1.71	1.79	1.70
Diluted earnings per share (KSh's per share)	13	1.74	1.71	1.79	1.70

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.19: Safaricom Company's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

5 Revenue continued

(a) Revenue from contracts with customers continued

The Group has one reportable operating segment whose revenue is presented below:

Company	31 MARCH 2022			31 MARCH 2021		
	KSh's'm At a point in time	KSh's'm Over time	KSh's'm Total	KSh's'm At a point in time	KSh's'm Over time	KSh's'm Total
Voice revenue	-	83,211.8	83,211.8	-	82,552.0	82,552.0
Interconnect revenue from local partners	-	6,840.6	6,840.6	-	6,175.2	6,175.2
Messaging revenue	-	10,876.7	10,876.7	-	13,602.4	13,602.4
Mobile data revenue	-	48,441.0	48,441.0	-	44,793.2	44,793.2
Fixed data revenue	-	11,242.5	11,242.5	-	9,507.2	9,507.2
MPESA revenue	105,218.1	-	105,218.1	80,635.8	-	80,635.8
Other services revenues*	-	9,383.8	9,383.8	-	7,624.8	7,624.8
Mobile incoming	-	3,007.6	3,007.6	-	3,295.2	3,295.2
Service revenue	105,218.1	173,004.0	278,222.1	80,635.8	167,550.0	248,185.8
Handset revenue	12,334.7	-	12,334.7	8,511.7	-	8,511.7
Connection revenue	-	1,999.4	1,999.4	-	1,761.1	1,761.1
Construction revenue	-	-	-	-	837.7	837.7
Total revenue	117,552.8	175,003.4	292,556.2	89,147.5	170,148.8	259,296.3

* Other services revenues include Okoa Jahazi fees, roaming revenues, bulk SMS, and digital agriculture revenues.

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Figure E.20: Safaricom Group's Revenue Breakdown - Fiscal Year 2021-2022

5 Revenue

(a) Revenue from contracts with customers

The Group has one reportable operating segment whose revenue is presented below:

Group	31 MARCH 2022			31 MARCH 2021		
	KSh's'm At a point in time	KSh's'm Over time	KSh's'm Total	KSh's'm At a point in time	KSh's'm Over time	KSh's'm Total
Voice revenue	-	83,211.8	83,211.8	-	82,552.0	82,552.0
Interconnect revenue from local partners	-	6,840.6	6,840.6	-	6,175.2	6,175.2
Messaging revenue	-	10,876.7	10,876.7	-	13,602.4	13,602.4
Mobile data revenue	-	48,441.0	48,441.0	-	44,793.2	44,793.2
Fixed data revenue	-	11,242.5	11,242.5	-	9,507.2	9,507.2
MPESA revenue	107,691.8	-	107,691.8	82,647.4	-	82,647.4
Other services revenues*	-	9,795.3	9,795.3	-	7,779.2	7,779.2
Mobile incoming	-	3,007.6	3,007.6	-	3,295.2	3,295.2
Service revenue	107,691.8	173,415.5	281,107.3	82,647.4	167,704.4	250,351.8
Handset revenue	12,334.7	-	12,334.7	8,511.7	-	8,511.7
Connection revenue	-	1,999.4	1,999.4	-	1,761.1	1,761.1
Construction revenue	-	-	-	-	837.7	837.7
Total revenue	120,026.5	175,414.9	295,441.4	91,159.1	170,303.2	261,462.3

Notes: Year ended 31 March 2022

Data Appendix F - Subsidy

In this Appendix, we summarize all the subsidy programs in the telecommunications sector that were enacted in African countries. As of today, the telecommunications market in 23 African countries have been subsidized. In the Table below, for each subsidy program we provide its name, the year in which it started, and the link to the webpage containing the documentation describing the program. These subsidies programs are mostly aimed at promoting telecommunications in rural and peri-urban areas; providing access to electronic communications services, in particular fixed and mobile telephony and Internet, in areas not covered; financing initiatives to make universal access available in geographical areas that are difficult to access; ensuring access to telecommunications services at an affordable price for people living in rural or geographically isolated areas; facilitating the provision of universal access to basic telephony for the unserved and underserved communities.

Table F.1: Subsidy programs to telecommunications in African countries

Country	Year of introduction of subsidy	Name of the subsidy program	Link
Algeria	2018	Fonds d'appui du service universel des communications électroniques	Link
Angola	2010	Fundo de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento das Comunicações (FADCOM)	Link
Botswana	2014	Universal Access and Service Fund (UASF)	Link
Cape Verde	2014	Fundo do Serviço Universal e Desenvolvimento da Sociedade de Informação (FUSI)	Link
Cameroon	2012	Fond Spécial des Télécommunications (FST)	Link
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2002	Fonds de développement des services universels (FDSU)	Link
Gabon	2001	Fonds spécial du service universel des télécommunications	Link
Ghana	2006	Ghana Investment Fund for Electronic Communications (GIPEC)	Link
Kenya	2017	Universal Service Fund (USF)	Link
Malawi	2019	Universal Service Fund (USF)	Link
Morocco	2005	Fonds du Service Universel des Télécommunications (FSUT)	Link
Mozambique	2006	Fundo do Serviço de Acesso Universal (FSAU)	Link
Namibia	2009	Universal Service Fund	Link
Nigeria	2006	Universal Service Provision Fund (USPF)	Link
Republic of the Congo	2019	Fonds pour l'Accès et le Service Universels des Communications Électroniques (FASUCE)	Link
Senegal	2011	Fonds de Développement du Service Universel des Télécommunications (FDSUT)	Link
Sierra Leone	2019	Universal Access Development Fund (UADF)	Link
South Africa	1999	Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF)	Link
South Sudan	2019	Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF)	Link
Tanzania	2010	Universal Communications Service Access Fund (UCSAF)	Link
Togo	2001	Fonds du service universel	Link
Uganda	2003	Rural Communications Development Fund (RCDF)	Link
Zambia	2009	Universal Access and Service Fund (UASF)	Link