The impact of violence during the Mexican Revolution on Migration to the United States

David Escamilla-Guerrero* Edward Kosack† Zachary Ward‡

St Andrews University and IZA Xavier University Baylor University and NBER

June 14, 2023

*****Preliminary: do not circulate or cite*****

Abstract: The number of individuals forcibly displaced by conflicts has been rising in the past few decades. However, we know little about the dynamics—magnitude, timing, and persistence—of conflict-induced migration in the short run. We use novel high-frequency data to estimate the dynamic migration response to conflict for the case of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), one of the deadliest conflicts in world history. We find that, on average, insurgency events led to a large increase in migration rates of about 60 percent that lasted for a few months: after five months, migration rates reverted back to pre-violence levels. This finding masks substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects, as we find permanent increases in migration rates among children and women. We show that violence was the main treatment channel, with variation in the intensity and nature of violence explaining the magnitude and persistence of the migration response. Migrant networks, land ownership, and access to communication and transportation infrastructure moderated the migration response to conflict.

Keywords: migration, refugees, Mexican Revolution

JEL Classification: F22, N31, N32, N36

Acknowledgments: We thank Yannay Spitzer, Ariell Zimran, Felipe Valencia Caicedo, Emily Sellars, Jose-Antonio Espin-Sanchez, Noel Maurer, Lorenzo Neri, David Jaeger, Christian Ambrosius, Sandra Rozo, and Ana María Ibañez for their insightful comments. We benefited from presenting at the Yale Economic Growth Center, University of Southern Denmark, University of St Andrews, and Inter-American Development Bank. We also benefited from presenting at the Southern Economic Association and Royal Economic Society annual meetings. This research was developed with the financial support of the 2020 Carnevali Research Grant, Economic History Society.

*School of Economics and Finance, Castlecliffe, The Scores, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9AZ, Scotland. e-mail:david.escamilla-guerrero@st-andrews.ac.uk

†Department of Economics, Williams College of Business, Xavier University, ML 1212, 3800 Victory Parkway, Cincinnati, OH 45207, USA. e-mail: kosacke@xavier.edu

‡Department of Economics, Hankamer School of Business, Baylor University, One Bear Place 98001, Waco, TX 76798, USA. e-mail: zach.a.ward@gmail.com

1. Introduction

The number of people forcibly displaced due to conflict has more than doubled from around forty million in 2011 to nearly ninety million in 2021 (UNHCR, 2022). These large-scale displacements have reshaped migration patterns in the last few years. However, it's not clear whether these changes will continue long after conflict has stopped. Refugees, after settling in a new country, may encourage their friends and family to join them years or decades later, and thus permanently alter migration flows between two countries. On the other hand, displacement may only be temporary, and migration may soon return to pre-conflict levels.

In this paper, we use newly collected data on migration and conflict between 1910 and 1915 to estimate how insurgency events affected migration during the Mexican Revolution. The Revolution is of significant interest for several reasons. First, it was one of the deadliest conflicts in world history, resulting in the death of approximately 1.4 million individuals, about 10% of the population, with estimates of 350,000 people moving north across the border (McCaa, 2003). Second, because there were virtually no legal restrictions on Mexican migration to the United States during that period, we can estimate how migrants responded to conflict in the absence of significant barriers to immigration. Third, as we have data on the exact day migrants entered the United States and the occurrence of insurgency events, we can estimate the dynamic response to conflict at the local level. This information helps us to systematically examine the magnitude, timing, and persistence of the migration response.

Understanding migration during the Mexican Revolution is also important because previous historical research this episode fundamentally changed migration to the United States. Before the 1910s, migration to the United States was relatively uncommon, but after the Revolution, Mexico became one of the top countries sending migrants to the US in the 1920s (Escamilla-Guerrero, 2020; Kosack and Ward, 2014). Since the 1920s, migration has followed a consistent pattern in which the Mexican states with high levels of migration back then still have high migration rates today. This suggests that the social networks that encouraged migration throughout the 20th century may have been formed during the Revolution (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). On the other hand, some people point to growing labor market opportunities due to the labor shortage of World War I as the major force causing migration during the 1910s, rather than the revolution pushing people out (Cardoso, 1980; Gamio, 1930; McCaa, 2003).[1]

To estimate the effect of conflict on migration dynamics, we collect two novel data sources that are unique in terms of the frequency and completeness. First, we collect monthly data on migration flows between 1910 and 1920 from individual border crossings registered at 24 entry points along the US-Mexico border. Second, we digitize daily data on insurgency events between 1910 and 1915 from military reports compiled in the "Military History of the Mexican Revolution" (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983). The information contained in these reports allows us to assign insurgency events to a given day and a specific location (i.e., latitude and longitude), as well as to record information about the intensity of violence such as the length of the event, the number of military casualties, and the events' military classification (i.e., shooting, combat, battle, or siege). We link these two sources together at the municipality level (comparable to a county in the United States) and construct a month-by-municipality panel.

We employ a fully flexible event-study design to estimate the impact of conflict events on migration. Specifically, we compare monthly migration rates from municipalities that experienced a conflict event to municipalities that had not yet experienced or never experienced a conflict event. We first show that migration did not change in anticipation of conflict, indicating that our method is able to identify the average treatment effect for municipalities that experienced a conflict event. We find that conflict caused a significant short-run increase in migration rates of 60% relative to pre-event levels. This large effect only lasted for few months after an event. After five months, migration rates returned to pre-event levels, and we do not find any permanent impact of conflict on migration rates beyond five months. This finding, however, masks heterogeneity in treatment effects across population groups. The results show that male migration rates returned to pre-event levels after the second month, while migration rates among children and women increased permanently. We provide evidence that these effects changed the sex composition of the migration flow during the period of analysis. Among the elderly population, we observe a one-month delayed, relatively weak migration response.

We show that violence was the main treatment channel, with the intensity and nature of violence explaining the magnitude and persistence of the migration response. Our analysis exploits variation in the number of casualties across events to examine whether more violent conflicts lead to stronger

[1] McCaa (2003) speculates that about half of the 350,000 who moved northward during the 1910s was due to pull factors rather than push factors.

out-migration responses. We find that violence intensity significantly mediated the migration response, with municipalities where conflict events caused casualties experiencing a large transitory increase in migration that lasted for about three months. In contrast, the effects for municipalities where conflict events did not cause casualties are mostly negative and statistically insignificant. This result is in line with recent literature arguing that living in a violent context makes life shorter and less predictable (Aburto et al., 2023), which pushes individuals to move to places where the returns to human and physical capital are greater in the short- and long-run (Becker, Mukand and Yotzov, 2022; Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano, 2018). To provide further evidence on the treatment channel, we use alternative violence metrics, including the length of the event and information on whether the winner left or remained in the area where the event occurred. We find a large and permanent migration response to insurgency events that lasted more than three days and involved the occupation of territory by the victors.

In addition, we examine key factors that are likely to moderate the migration response to conflict, namely migrant networks, land ownership, and access to communication and transportation infrastructure. We define municipalities as "networked" if we observe a history of migration before the occurrence of the first conflict.[2] When we divide the sample by networked and non-networked municipalities, we find a large and temporary increase in migration in networked municipalities, but no migration response to conflict in non-networked municipalities. This result suggests that contacts abroad were needed for being able to escape conflict, a result that aligns with research showing that networks make feasible the migration decision in contexts of armed conflict or persecution (Becker et al., 2021; Buggle et al., 2023; Spitzer, 2021). Our analysis suggests that this trend applies to temporary conflict, in contrast to ethnicity-based violence that may reflect prolonged discrimination over time.

As for land ownership, pre-revolutionary Mexico was characterized by a high concentration of land (Chevalier, 1970; Florescano, 1987; Knight, 2016), with about 800 families owning more than 90% of the arable land. We use data on land concentration in 1900 from Sellars and Alix-Garcia (2018)—the share of population living in large estates (haciendas or ranches) by municipality—to study how conflict affects migration in municipalities with different land ownership structures. In particular, we estimate the impact of conflict events for municipalities below and above the 75th percentile of the land concentration distribution. We find that conflict events had no effect on migration in municipalities with high land concentration, while in municipalities with low land concentration, we observe a large

[2]The data allows us to observe migration in the months prior to the event even in municipalities that were treated at the onset of the revolution. We can also observed migration between 1906 and 1908 based on data from Escamilla-Guerrero (2020).

increase in migration rates of 50 to 90% over the baseline. This finding supports the view that land ownership facilitates migration from areas affected by conflict, but also highlights that the structure of land ownership is likely to moderate the magnitude of the migration response.

We contribute to a long interdisciplinary literature on the relationship between conflict and migration.[3] One of our key contributions is the use of high-frequency within-country data, which allows us to more accurately pinpoint the dynamics and timing of migration in response to conflict and violence. Prior studies in this field have often relied on cross-country and cross-year variation in conflict intensity (e.g., Schmeidl (1997); Melander and Öberg (2006); Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003)). Others have used within-country variation in conflict or violence but measured migration annually, potentially missing crucial dynamics surrounding the event (Spitzer, 2021; Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano, 2018).[4] To our knowledge, the only study that estimates how within-county variation in violence affects *monthly* migration is Williams et al. (2012), which estimates the effect of conflict during the Nepalese Civil War on international migration between 2001 and 2006. Our paper differs by estimating the dynamics of migration, where we find a large short-run response that only lasts for about four months. Our setting is also unique in that there were limited migration restrictions between Mexico and the United States, allowing us to identify the effect free from policy constraints.

The second contribution we make is the identification of the effect of generalized conflict on migration. Most historical studies on forced migration or displaced people examine ethnic-based persecution (Becker and Ferrara, 2019; Becker, 2022; Becker et al., 2020; Becker, 2022; Becker et al., 2021; Spitzer, 2021). However, there are many instances where conflict makes life dangerous for everyone and so changes the costs and benefits of migration. The Mexican Revolution is one such conflicts where no group was targeted for persecution, but where the violence was equally deadly for all who were exposed to it. We show that in the absence of persecution, violent conflicts can induce increases in migration rates and thus increases in refugee flows.

The third contribution we make is to improve our historical understanding of one of the most important migration flows of the 20th century (Borjas, 2007). Many have argued for the importance of the Mexican Revolution for transforming Mexican migration and the American Southwest.[5] However, we are the first

[3]See Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011); Stanley (1987); Schmeidl (1997); Williams et al. (2012)

[4]There is a small literature on how shocks from natural disasters affect international migration (e.g., Halliday (2006); Mahajan and Yang (2020); Spitzer, Tortorici and Zimran (2020), but this literature also focuses on yearly migration rates.

[5]In one recent example, prominent historian Kelly Lytle Hernandez stated in an interview that "[the] refugee population that arrived in the United States between 1910 and ... 1920 is the foundation of the growth of the Mexican American population

to provide direct, quantitative evidence on the impact that this conflict had on the scale and composition of flow at the local level. Our findings suggest that migration was influenced by the Mexican Revolution, but it did not have a long-lasting impact after violence had dissipated. Unfortunately, with our data we cannot observe who stayed within the United States or who returned, which makes it difficult to pinpoint the full demographic consequences of violent conflict.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we address the historical context of the research focusing on the characteristics of the Mexican Revolution. We then describe our data sources and present some descriptive statistics. After that, we describe the identification strategy that we use to estimate the impact of violence on migration rates. We discuss the results in the section that follows, and then end with some concluding remarks.

2. Historical Background

At the turn of twentieth century, Mexico was engulfed in an economic and political crisis, whose origin can be found in an outdated agrarian system and persistent social inequalities (Rosenzweig, 1965). The agricultural sector was based on large estates (haciendas) owned by a small group of elite landowners since colonial times (Chevalier, 1970; Florescano, 1987; Knight, 2002).[6] Although relatively modern machinery and irrigation systems were used in some haciendas, productivity in the vast majority of these estates was based on the exploitation of labor (Tannenmbaum, 1935). Landowners also used coercive mechanisms of debt bondage that restricted internal migration and forced the great majority of the population to work permanently in the haciendas (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2009; Sellars and Alix-Garcia, 2018).

In addition, living standards decreased due the stagnation of wages and rising inflation. Commodity prices had increased by 25% since 1900, with some regions experiencing increments of up to 91% (Colegio de México, 1965). This lead to widespread poverty and jointly with the high concentration of land, lack of democracy and freedom of speech, and a poor implementation of justice—characteristics of the Díaz dictatorship (1877-1910)—generated an increasing discontent among the peasant population and the urban middle class. These conditions influenced the creation of the Anti-Reelectionist National Party lead by Francisco Madero, with the objective of overthrowing Díaz in the 1910 elections. However,

today. So many families across the United States today can trace their origins north of the border to the Mexican Revolution." (NPR 2022).

[6]Using tax records, Sellars and Alix-Garcia (2018) document that the haciendas had an average size of 15,500-13,000 ha. By the early 1900s, 95% of the arable land was owned by 835 families (Manzanilla Schaffer, 1963).

Madero was jailed before the elections and Díaz claimed to be re-elected for the eighth time (Dell, 2012; Garcíadiego, 2004).

As a response, Madero called the population to rebel and fight against the regime. By March 1911, there were numerous organized insurgency movements across the country, primarily fighting for a better distribution of land, better living conditions, and a democratic electoral system (Knight, 1986*a*). These factions were popular social movements in which peasants, miners, railwaymen, rural communities, and urban workers participated. In May 1911, Díaz was defeated, and Madero was elected president shortly after. However, he was assassinated in a counter-revolutionary coup in 1913, which increased insurgency against the federal government until mid-1914. Afterwards, the revolution became a multi-sided conflict between different revolutionary factions until the end of 1915, when the Constitutionalist faction, lead by Venustiano Carranza, defeated the *Division del Norte* army, lead by Pancho Villa. After 1915, the revolution was reduced to local guerrilla movements that mainly took place in the south of Mexico and lasted until 1917 (Knight, 1986*b*; Sánchez Lamego, 1983).

The revolution had a profound impact, with the total demographic cost estimated at 2.1 million people, of which two-thirds correspond to excess of deaths: casualties and deaths caused by war-related factors such as famines and diseases (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2009). This high death toll was influenced by the generalized use of modern warfare technologies such as the machine gun and air raid. Although historical literature argues that migration to the United States may account for one-third of the population loss (Gamio, 1930), recent quantitative research suggests that 350 to 400 thousand moved to the United States (McCaa, 2003; Ordorica and Lezama, 1993). Note that these estimates are based on figures from the 1920 US Census and therefore do not take into account return migration flows. Overall, we know little about the impact that violence during the Mexican Revolution had on Mexico-US migration patterns. One reason is that previous scholarship did not have access to fine-grained immigration data.

3. Data

3.1 Immigration: Border Crossing Records

To estimate the impact of violence on migration, we compile migration data from the Mexican Border Crossing Records between 1910 and 1920. These records are analogous to ship manifests used to research European migration to the United States; however, most Mexicans crossed into the United States via train or on foot. We use the universe of existing records available on Ancestry.com, recording 280,570 individual border crossings.[7] For each record, we observe information on first name, last name, age, place of birth, port of arrival, and date of crossing (day, month, and year).

Key to our analysis is linking the migration decision with insurgency events during the Revolution. To identify the migrant's location of origin, we classify places of birth into municipalities using the 1910 Census Catalogue of Localities (Mexico Secretary of Finance, 1918) and the Mexican Historical Archive of Localities (AHL), both maintained by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).[8] Although most records include information (state and town of birth) on the location of origin, 2.5% (7,094) of them do not report sufficient information to be accurately classified, which we exclude from the analysis. We exclude duplicate records across publications and records for non-Mexican individuals—Asians or Europeans who first migrated to Mexico before entering the United States. We also limit the data to individuals who crossed the border before 1915, as afterward the revolution was reduced to local guerilla movements present mainly in the Southeast of Mexico (see Figure A.17 for guidance). Finally, we use the individuals' first name, if clearly reported, to infer sex. Following these refinements, our final sample contains 196,893 unique individuals who crossed the border between January 1910 and December 1915.

We collapse the individual-level data to estimate monthly migration rates by municipality: the main unit of analysis. We estimate migration rates (per 1,000 inhabitants) as the number of migrants over the municipality's population level according to the 1910 Census. To gauge whether violence had a larger impact on different demographic groups, we also estimate age-cohort- and sex-specific migration rates using the relevant denominator for the population at risk of migration. The age cohorts that we analyze are 1-15, 16-40, and over 40 years. Considering that in 1910 life expectancy at birth in Mexico was about 30 years (McCaa, 2003, p. 392), these demographic groups capture children, adults, and elderly, respectively.

[7] The initial data collection was performed in 2015. We use data from National Archives and Records Administration publication A3365 (Brownsville and Others, Texas), A3370 (Columbus, New Mexico), A3372 (Naco, Arizona), A3377 (Ajo and Others, Arizona), A3379 (Laredo, Texas), A3395 (Del Rio, Texas), A3406 (El Paso, Texas), A3412 (El Paso, Texas), A3423 (Brownsville, Texas), A3431 (Laredo, Texas), A3437 (Laredo, Texas), A3466 (Presidio, Texas), A3467 (Calexico, CA), A3492 (Hidalgo, TX), M1502 (Brownsville, TX), M1754 (El Paso, TX), M1755 (El Paso, TX), M1759 (Douglas, AZ), M1760 (Douglas, AZ), M1767 (San Ysidro, CA), M1769 (Nogales, CA), M1770 (Rio Grande City, TX), M1850 (Sasabe, AZ), M2030 (Campo, CA)

[8] The AHL records changes in names of localities beginning in 1900 and counting at approximately 10-year intervals.

3.2 Insurgency Events: Military Reports

We combine the migration data with newly digitized data on insurgency events during the Mexican Revolution. These data come from military reports of all the factions that participated in the conflict. These reports are compiled in eight volumes that constitute the "Military History of the Mexican Revolution" (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983). From these reports, we identify 2,411 unique insurgency events spanning from November 1910 to December 1915. Each report contains precise information on the place where the event occurred, which allows us to assign latitude and longitude coordinates to each location and classify them into municipalities. In addition, diverse features of the event are systematically reported, including the length of the conflict (days or hours), the number of military casualties, whether civil infrastructure was damaged during the event (railways, telegraph offices, bridges, and town halls are the most common cases), whether the winner remained in the conflict's location, and the winning faction.[9] The reports also include the event's military category: shooting, combat, battle, or siege (see Figure A.1).

In Table 1 we present the characteristics of insurgency events by military category. Shootings were the least violent of the events. They lasted about one day, caused 36 casualties on average, and less than 5% produced damages to civil infrastructure or the occupation of territory. Combats lasted slightly longer, but caused one hundred times more casualties and were more likely to induce the occupation of territory. Although sieges and battles represented only 2% of the insurgency events, they were significantly more violent, causing on average about 1,800 and 3,500 casualties, respectively. One in three sieges induced the occupation of territory by the victor and half of the battles caused damages to civil infrastructure. Hence, these military categories capture the variation in violence intensity across conflict events. This information also allows us to examine how the intensity of violence varied over time. Figure A.2 shows that the majority of events (about 70%) occurred during the third and fourth year. However, those lasting more than three days, characterized by greater violence, took place throughout the entire period. Events in which the victor remained in the conflict's location occurred mainly in the first, third, and fourth year of the revolution, and those associated with infrastructure damage were intermittent all over the period of analysis.

Figure 1 illustrates the variation in violence intensity—measured as days of conflict—at the local level. Almost all states experienced conflict events, but the intensity of violence varied substantially across

[9]In some cases the number of civil casualties is also reported.

municipalities. We also observe municipalities within each state where conflict events did not occur during the revolution (see zoomed in region). Table 2 compares demographic and economic characteristics for two municipality groups: never with conflict and ever with conflict. Column 5 presents estimates of differences between these groups conditional on state fixed effects. We observe no statistically significant differences in pre-revolution migration rates, sex composition or illiteracy. We also find no differences in altitude, distance to the US border, distance to the nearest train station, or distance to the border by train. This evidence suggests that both municipality groups had a similar population composition and that their inhabitants faced equivalent migration costs. However, we find differences in population levels, number of large states, and access to communication and transportation technology, suggesting that conflict events were more likely to occurred in municipalities with with local relevance within states—that is, with higher economic and strategic value (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006). Next, we leverage this variation in our insurgency data to study the dynamics of conflict-induced migration.

4. Identification Strategy

Our identification strategy exploits variation in conflict across municipalities and over time to identify the impact of violence on migration to the United States. Particularly, we are interested in the dynamics of migration—that is, how does migration change following a conflict event and when are these changes observed, if any. To identify these dynamics, we use a flexible event-study design:

$$y_{mt} = \mu_m + \lambda_t + \underbrace{\sum_{j=-5}^{-2} \beta_j D_m \cdot \mathbb{1}\{t - T_m^* = j\}}_{leads} + \underbrace{\sum_{j=0}^{5} \beta_j D_m \cdot \mathbb{1}\{t - T_m^* = j\}}_{lags} + \varepsilon_{mt}. \tag{1}$$

We regress the migration rate y_{mt} for municipality m in month-year t (January 1910, February 1910, ..., December 1915) on a binary indicator variable D_m for municipalities where a conflict event ever occurred. This variable is interacted with indicators for the five months before the first violent event (T_m^*) is observed (leads) and with indicators for the five months following the event (lags). The β_j coefficients are interpreted as the difference in migration rate between treated and control groups relative to the difference in migration rate in the omitted base period, the month prior to the event (lead -1). These leads and lags capture the migration dynamics surrounding the event—that is, the magnitude, timing, and persistence of the migration response in the months following a violent event.[10] Observations that

[10]We assume staggered treatment adoption—once a unit is treated, it remains treated—as using variation in repeated events requires further assumptions on when outcomes (migration rates) return to baseline levels (Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021).

are more than five months before or after the event are included in lead -5 and lag 5, respectively. Thus, the estimated effect of the last lag $D_m \cdot \mathbb{1}(t - T_m^* \geq 5)$ provides information about the persistence of the response: whether conflict led to a transitory or "permanent" increase in migration (Clarke and Tapia-Schythe, 2021; Freyaldenhoven et al., 2021). Note that the estimate for the fifth lag is the weighted average of the effect in all future months, and thus reflects changes in migration that persisted until the end of the period examined (December 1915).

We include municipality fixed effects μ_m, which control for unobserved unit-specific factors that are constant over time and may influence migration, such as distance to the US border, pre-existing migration networks, or degree of urbanization. We also include time (month-year) fixed effects λ_t, which control for unobserved time-specific forces such as seasonal variation in migration. The month-year indicators also control for turning points in the direction of the Revolution that may have led to migration in all municipalities, such as the assassination of Francisco Madero in February 1913 or the defeat of the Federal Army in July 1914. Since not all municipalities experienced conflict, we use not-yet- and never-treated units as control group, which allows us to avoid potential identification issues present in event study designs where treatment rolls out for the full sample (Sun and Abraham, 2021).[11] In our baseline specification, we cluster standard errors at the treatment level, i.e., by municipality (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).

For our empirical strategy to estimate average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), four identifying assumptions most hold: parallel trends in baseline outcomes, no anticipatory behavior prior to treatment, treatment effect homogeneity, and no interference between units in treatment assignment (Rosenbaum, 2007; Sun and Abraham, 2021). The parallel trend assumption states that conditional on municipality and time fixed effects, migration rates in treated municipalities would follow the same trend as the migration rates in untreated municipalities if the treated municipalities had never experienced conflict. No anticipatory behaviour requires differences in migration rates between treated and control groups to be equal to the baseline difference in periods close to the event. No interference between units implies the absence of spillover effects across municipalities, and treatment effect homogeneity implies treatment effects to follow the same path among all municipalities first treated in the same time period. We will provide evidence supporting these assumptions as we present our results.

[11] For never-treated units $T_m^* = \infty$ and we set $D_m = 0$ for all leads and lags.

5. Results

Figure 2 shows our baseline estimates. We find a transitory surge in migration in the first four months after a conflict event. Relative to a baseline monthly migration rate (0.08 per thousand), migration increased by about 25 percent in the month when the event happened. This estimate, however, is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level and thus potentially captures the period during which individuals assess the opportunity cost of migration after experiencing conflict for the first time. We will later show that this delay in the response time is unlikely to reflect travelling times to the border. The magnitude of the effect grew larger for the first and second month after the event, with migration increasing 60 percent relative to the baseline level. After this initial two-month surge, migration rates then slowly reverted back to baseline levels such that there was no permanent change in migration. In the third and fourth months migration rates fell to a 30 percent increase relative to the baseline and reverted back to pre-treatment levels from the fifth month onward. This transitory effect is clearer when we increase the time window of analysis to ten months. Figure A.3 shows a similar pattern: migration rates effectively returned to baseline levels in the sixth month and leveled off afterward. The p-value (0.32) of a Wald test for the last post-event coefficients (9 and +10) being equal confirms the transitory effect of violence on migration.

After estimating our event-study specification, we examine the presence of pretrends in migration rates before the event. There could be time-varying unobservables particular to treated municipalities such that those untreated does not provide an appropriate counterfactual trend in the absence of conflict. Clearly, this is a concern given that our specification does not include control variables due to the lack of historical data varying at the municipality-month level. Figure 2 shows that in the five months leading up to the event, there is no statistically different trend in migration rates between treated and untreated municipalities. We also present the p-value (0.63) of a Wald test for all pretreatment coefficients being equal to zero, which further supports the parallel trend assumption. Another concern is the presence of anticipatory behavior prior to treatment. For instance, locals may have known that a combat would occur beforehand, causing individuals to flee before the event. The point estimates on the pre-treatment coefficients and our test on the lack of pretrends provide evidence of no anticipation effects—that is, violence was sudden and unexpected for local residents.

It is also possible that migration had increased in municipalities that were eventually or never treated in response to events that occurred in neighboring locations. If the effects of conflict extend over control units that are close to treated units, these control units would fail to identify the counterfactual trend and thus our identification strategy would produce biased estimates (Butts, 2021). To examine the presence of spillover effects, we assign treatment to all municipalities belonging to the same district based on the time period when the first municipality of the district first experienced conflict. This approach assumes that spillovers were local and therefore experienced within districts only. If spillover effects were significant, we would expect to observe migration dynamics similar to those captured by our baseline estimates, as municipalities affected by spillovers would experience changes in outcomes similar to those of treated municipalities. Figure A.9 shows that the coefficients of all leads and lags are relatively small and not statistically significant—that is, the ATT dissipates when units potentially affected by spillovers are considered as treated. This provides suggestive evidence that locations close to municipalities affected by conflict experienced non-significant spillover effects, if any.

A recent body of literature has shown that in settings where the timing of treatment varies across units, the coefficients on leads and lags can capture treatment effects from periods other than the ones they measure (see, for example, Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021; de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Sun and Abraham, 2021). This bias—known as treatment effects heterogeneity—implies that the coefficients on leads are uninformative about the presence of pretrends or anticipatory behavior, and the coefficients on lags will not capture the migration dynamics caused by conflict. To correct for heterogeneity in treatment effects across adoption cohorts, we implement the interaction weighted estimator developed by (Sun and Abraham, 2021), which captures the cohort-specific average difference in outcomes relative to never being treated—that is, the cohort average treatment effects on the treated (CATT). Figure A.4 shows estimates robust to treatment effects heterogeneity. We find very similar migration dynamics: a large increase in migration during the first and second month that effectively reverted back to pre-treatment levels after the fifth month. The estimates also support the absence of pretrends and anticipatory behavior. Figure A.4 also shows that our findings hold when implementing the estimators of Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) and de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020).

In sum, our analysis suggests that our baseline estimates are unlikely to be biased by confounders, anticipatory behavior, interference between units in treatment assignment, or treatment effects heterogeneity, and therefore uncover the true effect of violence on migration for treated municipalities. The identification of these migration dynamics, however, is feasible due to the monthly frequency of our data. In Figure A.5, we present estimates using conflict and migration data varying at a lower frequency. Although less precisely estimated, we continue observing migration dynamics similar to the baseline estimates with data varying quarterly. However, no dynamics can be identified with data varying semiannually, highlighting the importance of using high-frequency data to more precisely identify the migration dynamics caused by conflict events. This exercise also suggests that results in previous literature using low-frequency data may capture the effects of unobserved confounds such as migrant networks.

5.1 Robustness Checks

We perform a series of robustness checks to address potential threats to identification. One concern is that municipalities that never experienced conflict may not be an appropriate control group, as these locations may be very different from municipalities that were eventually treated. Table 2 shows that there were some differences between ever- and never-treated locations. We follow Sun and Abraham (2021, p. 178) and Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021, p. 205) and drop all never-treated municipalities from the control group. In Figure A.6 we present estimates of Equation 1 using municipalities that had not yet experienced conflict as control group (Panel A). We observe a very similar migration response to conflict in terms of magnitude, timing, and persistence as in our baseline specification (Panel B). These migration dynamics are robust to clustering standard errors at different levels (municipality, district, municipality-time, or district-time) and remain virtually unchanged after we correct standard errors for temporal and spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019; Conley, 1999) (see Table A.2).

A second concern is that a large number of never-treated municipalities concentrate in Oaxaca (see Figure A.17). Historically Oaxaca has been highly fragmented, with about 40% of the municipalities that existed in 1910 belonging to this state. The overrepresentation of Oaxaca municipalities in the control group may bias our estimates if the evolution of outcomes in these locations differs significantly from that in eventually-treated municipalities. Relatedly, Figure 1 shows that conflicts lasting more than 15 days concentrated in Mexico City and neighboring states (Mexico and Morelos). It is possible that the dynamics of the migration response in this region could be importantly influencing our findings. To address these concerns, we first estimate Equation 1 excluding municipalities of Oaxaca and then excluding municipalities of the Mexico City region. Figure A.7 shows that our findings hold after performing these robustness tests, confirming that the migration dynamics previously described are not driven by the composition of our control group or specific regional responses.

A third concern is that our findings may be driven by how we assign treatment. Recall that we assign treatment based on the first event and assume staggered treatment adoption. Our finding showing a transitory migration response could only be capturing the impact of less violent conflicts if these are overrepresented among events that happened first. To rule out this possibility, we assign treatment based on events other than shootings, which were the least violent conflict events by any metric (see Table 1). Similarly, our result showing that migration rates returned to baseline levels after five months implies that events other than the first one did not significantly affect migration. As robustness test, we estimate Equation 1 for units that experienced three events assigning treatment based on the second occurrence. Figure A.8 shows that the migration response is virtually the same when shootings are not considered for treatment assignment. It also shows that events experienced after the first occurrence were unlikely to induce migration; therefore the characteristics of events experienced for the first time played a major role in shaping the migration response to conflict.

5.2 *Heterogeneous Effects of Conflict*

Our finding of a large transitory increase in migration may mask heterogeneous responses to conflict, as the ability to cope with a conflict experience is likely to vary across individuals (Ibáñez, 2014; Morrison and May, 1994). To examine the heterogeneity in the migration response to conflict events, we estimate Equation 1 for men, women, and three age cohorts: children (1-15 years old), adults (16-40 years old), and elderly (over 41 years old).[12]

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 show that the temporary surge in migration was similar for men and women for the first two months after the event. However, there is one major difference: while we do not find a permanent increase in migration for men, the estimate for the 5+ period suggests a permanent increase in migration among women. In Figure A.11, we present suggestive evidence that, at least during the period of analysis, conflict events significantly changed the sex composition of the migration flow. The female to male ratio constantly increased until the end of 1915, when widespread insurgency ceased and the revolution transitioned to local guerrilla movements. Figure A.11 also shows that the sex ratio did not return to pre-revolution levels until the beginning of 1917, when the First Bracero Program was implemented.[13]

Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3 show that there was a stronger and more permanent migration response among children. While we find a similar increase in migration rate for children and adults in the first month after the event, this effect is not statistically significant for the latter in subsequent months. The point estimates also suggest a return to baseline migration levels among adults in the third month after the event. In contrast, the migration of children increased by 0.07 per thousand inhabitants in the second

[12] We define the age cohorts based on life expectancy at the time (McCaa, 2003).

[13] This guest-worker program was created to satisfy the demand of agricultural labor force in the American Southwest caused by the participation of the United States in the First World War.

month after the event—an increase about 20 to 50 percentage points greater than for prime-age adults and elderly—which persists up to the fourth month. Like for women, the coefficient on the +5 period suggests a permanent increase among children only. Based on these results, it appears that conflict events led to a strong response for mothers and their children to flee for about 6 months after experiencing conflict. The shorter response and null permanent effect for men may be due to an increase in enrollment rates into the federal army (revolutionary factions) and consequently a higher mortality among men. Although historical literature has argued that all factions, revolutionary and federal, used compulsory service to fill their ranks (Chávez Leyva, 1998; Knight, 1986*a*,*b*), to our knowledge there are no military records on deaths (or for recruitment) to test whether this mechanism explains the aforementioned differences in migration responses across population groups.

Variation in conflict risk across individuals can also explain heterogeneous migration responses, as armed groups can persecute specific population groups with the aim of expropriating land and assets, separating rebel groups from their support base, or generating fear among the population (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Balcells and Steele, 2016; Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Ibáñez, 2014; Stanley, 1987). In the case of the Mexican Revolution, however, no ethnic group or social class was particularly targeted. The indigenous and non-indigenous population participated equally in the conflict as well as peasants, industrial workers, middle class politicians, and land owners (Gonzales, 2002; Knight, 1986*a*). In addition, the Mexican Revolution was not led by a single faction or political party, but rather it was a multi-sided civil war in which various factions united against the federal government, broke apart, and fought against each other throughout the conflict (Dell, 2012; Garcíadiego, 2004). As Table 2 suggests, differences in the economic and strategic value of territory were likely to influence conflict risk rather than individual or household characteristics (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006).

6. Treatment Channel and Moderating Factors

Episodes of conflict may not necessarily induce migration due to (in)voluntary immobility (Becker, 2022; Lubkemann, 2008)—about 19 percent of the countries that experienced conflict events from 1990 to 2007 did not report forced displacement (Ibáñez, 2014). While previous literature tends to agree that violence is the main channel through which conflict induces migration (see, for example, Apodaca, 1998; Balcells and Steele, 2016; Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997; Schultz, 1971), it does not provide causal evidence about this relationship. Furthermore, factors such as local economic conditions, immigration restrictions, and social networks can moderate the migration response to conflict and violence (Alvarado and Massey, 2010; Boustan, 2007; Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Ibáñez, 2014; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989). In this section, we exploit variation in the intensity and type of violence across conflict events to identify the effect of violence on migration and study the role of migration costs, migrant networks, and land ownership in shaping the migration response.

Violence

Lifetime uncertainty—the perception about uncertainty of survival—influences decision making in fundamental aspects such as investing in education and health, or engaging in childbearing (Becker et al., 2020; Chiovelli et al., 2021; Barro and Friedman, 1977; Nettle, 2010; Padilla-Romo and Peluffo, 2023; Sasson, 2016). Recent literature shows that exposure to violence plays a major role in shaping lifetime uncertainty, as violence increases the risk of premature death and long-lasting health and psychological problems (Aburto et al., 2023). Hence, living in violent contexts makes life shorter and less predictable, which push individuals to migrate to places where the returns to human and physical capital are greater in the short- and long-run (Becker, Mukand and Yotzov, 2022; Buggle et al., 2023; Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano, 2018).

To examine whether violence mediated the migration response to conflict, we first use war casualties to proxy for violence intensity (Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011; Kondylis, 2010) and focus on municipalities that were first treated with a combat, which represent about 85% of the units that ever experienced conflict. Crucial for our analysis is that 40% of combats did not cause civil or military casualties, allowing us to compare migration responses between units that experienced the same kind of event but whose degree of violence varied. Since combats may have occurred in locations with specific unobservable characteristics, we use units that were eventually first treated with a combat as control group. Figure 3 shows that violence significantly induced migration, with municipalities where combats caused casualties experiencing a large transitory increase in migration that lasted for about three months. In contrast, the leads and lags for units where combats did not cause casualties are mostly negative and statistically insignificant, confirming that conflicts with low levels of violence are unlikely to induce migration (Morrison and May, 1994; Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011). Aburto et al. (2023) also argue that the effects of violence are magnified for populations that experience structural inequalities, such as children and women. The estimates in Figure A.10 confirm that the migration response to violent combats was not only larger but permanent among females.

To provide further evidence on violence as treatment channel, we use conflict length as an alternative violence metric. Figure A.12 shows that conflict length positively correlates with the number of casualties, implying that the migration response should be stronger in locations affected by long-lasting conflicts. To test this hypothesis, we classify events into three categories that roughly split ever-treated units into thirds: conflicts that lasted less than one day (33%), 1 to 3 days (32%), and more than three days (35%). Figure 4 shows that in municipalities that experienced conflicts lasting more than three days, migration increases drastically in the month when the event occurs and grows larger over the next two months. Afterward migration decreases but stabilizes at a level representing a 50% increase over the baseline (0.08)—that is, the migration response to long-lasting conflicts was permanent. Note, however, that the estimated coefficient on the -5+ lag is statistically different from zero, which suggests the presence of trending confounds in pre-event periods. Following Dobkin et al. (2018), we fit a linear trend based on pre-event period information and then estimate the effect relative to the linear extrapolation. In Figure A.13 we show that our finding holds after controlling for these confound dynamics. In contrast, conflicts that lasted less than one day or between 1 to 3 days had *zero* impact on migration.

In addition to fighting, the presence of armed forces can induce migration. Previous research shows that armed forces remaining in the conflict's location disrupts economic and social interactions, as the occupiers may expropriate resources and/or increase mistrust among the population (Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt, 2013; Grosjean, 2014; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013). Military presence may also increase violent behaviour among the population and the likelihood of future conflict (Aburto et al., 2023; Fontana, Nannicini and Tabellini, 2018; Vishwasrao, Schneider and Chiang, 2019). The occupation of territory by armed forces is thus a manifestation of violence that can increase lifetime uncertainty and migration (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008). Our conflict data captures variation in the occupation of territory across conflict events: whether the winner left or remained in the area where the event occurred. Based on the military reports, most conflicts consisted of situations where two factions fought in a given town and both left afterward. This occurred for two-thirds of the events. Figure 5 shows that in situations where the winner remained, there was a stronger and more permanent migration response, whereas in places where the winner left, there was only a transitory response for two months. The presence of confound dynamics is clearer in municipalities where the winner remained, with estimates on the -5+ and -4 periods being statistically different from the baseline. However, we continue observing a permanent effect after controlling for these confound dynamics (Figure A.14).

While previous descriptive studies have documented the association between violence and migration—see Ibáñez (2014) for a review—our results provide strong causal evidence that violence mediated the migration response to conflict events during the revolution. Our analysis also shows that different types of violence are likely to have differentiated impacts on the magnitude and persistence of migration.

Migration costs

While refugee migration is influenced by factors outside the control of migrants, in many contexts individuals that experience conflict or are at risk of conflict have some agency in the decision to migrate—that is, they weigh the benefits and costs of leaving and evaluate when to leave (Becker, 2022; Becker, Mukand and Yotzov, 2022). Hence, migration costs may moderate the response to conflict, as individuals facing high costs may choose to delay migration or stay (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008). Previous research has documented that in contexts of conflict a greater distance between origin and destination reflects larger travel, psychological, and information costs (Morrison and May, 1994; Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010). We follow this literature and estimate Equation 1 for municipalities located at different distances from the US border. We perform this analysis using distance estimates from Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), who compute the distance by train from each municipality to the border according to the railway network that existed in the early 1900s. Note that for municipalities without direct access to railways, the estimates consider the distance to the nearest train station.

Table 4 presents the results of our analysis. We find inconclusive evidence about the impact of conflict in municipalities located less than 200 km from the border. Although the point estimates are large, most coefficients are statistically insignificant (column 2). This finding suggests that conflict may not necessarily induce migration in contexts where the costs of leaving and returning home are low. Similar to our baseline result, we find statistically significant transitory effects in municipalities located 200 to 700 km from the border, with migration increasing 60 to 80 percent relative to the baseline level in the month when the event occurs and during the following two months (column 3). We also find that migration increased more than 100 percent relative to the baseline level in municipalities located more than 700 and up to 1,200 km from the border (column 4). Although migration rates in these municipalities were considerably smaller than in locations closer to the border, our results suggest that the increase in migration—observed from the third month after the event—persisted throughout the period of analysis and potentially after the end of the revolution. For very distant places, municipalities located more than 1,200 km from the border, we find close to zero and statistically insignificant effects.[14]

The migration dynamics described above provide strong evidence that migration costs did not preclude refugee flows, but rather moderated the time of response to conflict. Since we observe refugee flows at the border, one possibility is that our results may reflect travelling times. This is unlikely to be case, as a journey by train from central Mexico to the border took 45 to 60 hours depending on the route (De Cardona, 1892).[15] Another possibility is that the response time was longer in locations far from the border due to conflict dynamics. For example, conflict events may have affected railway infrastructure in these areas. To test this hypothesis, we estimate Equation 1 for municipalities where, according to the military reports, no infrastructure was damaged or destroyed as a result of conflict events. The results show very similar migration dynamics: the migration response occurs with a three-month delay in municipalities located far from the border (columns 5 to 8). We also find similar results when using the linear distance from the municipality centroid to the nearest border point as an alternative proxy for migration costs (Table A.3).

Our analysis provides causal evidence that time of response to conflict increases with migration costs. In our setting, it is plausible that individuals from municipalities located far from the border had to sell assets to finance the migration process, which could have taken time considering that conflict disrupts markets. A third-class ticket from central Mexico to El Paso, Texas cost 30 pesos—roughly equivalent to three months' wage for a laborer—which confirms that migrating from distant municipalities was expensive.

Migrant Networks

A growing body of literature has documented that the presence of migrant networks is fundamental to explain the migration response to conflict (see Munroe et al. (2023) for a review). Indeed, one possibility is that conflict events only induced migration in locations where the population had a network connection in the United States. To test this hypothesis, we identify the presence of historical and recent networks at the municipality level. We consider that a municipality had access to historical networks if someone had migrated to the United States between 1906 and 1908—that is, two years before the beginning of

[14]Note that these municipalities are located in the Southeast region, where few insurgency events took place and migration to the United States was almost non-existent before the revolution.

[15]Travelling times are for the routes Mexico City-Brownsville and Mexico City-El Paso, respectively.

the revolution.[16] Similarly, we consider that a municipality had access to recent networks if someone had migrated either one or six months before the first conflict was experienced. Figure 6 shows the effect of conflict events across networked and non-networked municipalities. We find that migration rates increased by 0.1-0.12 per thousand inhabitants in the first and second months after the event in municipalities with networks, an effect two times greater than our baseline result (0.05) and about ten times greater than that for non-networked units. This finding holds when we limit the analysis to violent events—that is, conflicts with military or civil casualties.

In Figure A.15 we present estimates across all network categories. Panel A shows that conflict induced similar migration responses in terms of magnitude, timing, and persistence in municipalities with historical or recent migration flows prior to the event. Panel B shows estimates for places with no prior migration. Although the effects are much smaller and less precise (note that the scale of the vertical axis is different in Panel A and Panel B), there is some evidence that locations without recent migration before the conflict experienced a permanent increase in migration: the coefficient on the 5+ period suggests a permanent increase of 0.007-0.010 per thousand inhabitants relative to pre-event levels.

In general, our findings are in line with previous research showing that networks facilitate migration from conflict-affected areas (see, for example, Becker et al., 2021; Buggle et al., 2023; Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003; Schmeidl, 1997; Spitzer, 2021). Our analysis of high-frequency data, however, provides a key insight on how networks shape migration dynamics in the short run. Our results show that networks were *necessary* to migrate and their presence did not affect the timing or persistence of migration but only its magnitude. This implies that the spatial distribution of pre-existing networks is likely to moderate conflict effects. Figure 7 shows the geographic composition of the flow before the revolution (Panel A) and after the end of the most violent period (Panel B). There are clear changes in the intensity of migration captured by local migration rates, but the migrants' sources remain largely the same. For example, migration from the Center was negligible before the revolution and remained so despite intense conflict took place in this region. This finding provides strong evidence on the validity of the diffusion hypothesis of migration in contexts of conflict and violence. This hypothesis states that regardless of the strength of the incentive to migrate, individuals generally will not do so unless one of their close contacts has already migrated (Spitzer and Zimran, 2023, p. 1).

[16]Pre-revolution immigration data come from Escamilla-Guerrero (2020).

Land Ownership

Another factor that can moderate the migration response to conflict is land ownership. While land can be sold or used as collateral to finance migration, markets are unlikely to fully operate in contexts of conflict, which affects the price and liquidity of land (Ibáñez, 2014; Ibáñez and Moya, 2016). Empirical work has also shown that land owners may face higher opportunity costs from migration, as recovering abandoned land is difficult for returning refugees (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007). Conversely, the incentives to migrate may increase for land owners if their assets are expropriated as a result of conflict (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008). Conflict may also induce migration among the landless population if land ownership is highly concentrated, particularly in agrarian societies (Boberg-Fazlić, Lampe and Sharp, 2023). Hence, the extent to which land tenure moderates the migration response is ambiguous.

One characteristic of pre-revolutionary Mexico was the high concentration of land by a small elite (Chevalier, 1970; Florescano, 1987; Knight, 2016). It is documented that at the time haciendas could have an extension of up to 500 thousand hectares, with some families controlling nearly three million hectares across several estates. As a result of this concentration, 835 families owned more than 90% of the arable land and haciendas became practically the only source of employment in many regions (Manzanilla Schaffer, 1963). In the states of Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí, for example, 76 and 82 percent of the population lived or worked in haciendas, respectively (Easterling, 2012, p. 18-20). Moreover, landowners used coercive mechanisms of debt bondage to keep labor attached to haciendas (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2009).

To examine the role of land ownership in moderating the migration response to conflict, we use data on land concentration in 1900 from Sellars and Alix-Garcia (2018): the share of population living in large estates by municipality. Figure A.16 confirms that land concentration was particularly high in the West-Central region, with several municipalities having more than 60% of their population living in haciendas or ranches. These data allow us to examine the impact of conflict events in municipalities with different levels of land concentration. In particular, we estimate Equation 1 for municipalities below and above the 75th percentile of the land concentration distribution. In municipalities below the 75th percentile, on average, 10% of the population lived in large estates and private holdings had an extension of 50 hectares, while in municipalities above this threshold 60% of the population lived in estates of 13-15.5 thousand hectares (Sellars and Alix-Garcia, 2018).

Our results show that conflict events had no effect on migration in municipalities with high land concentration. In contrast, in municipalities with low land concentration we observe a large increase in migration rates of 0.05-0.09 per thousand inhabitants, representing an increase of 50 to 90% over the baseline (0.099). While our finding supports the argument that land ownership facilitates migration from areas affected by conflict (Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011), it also highlights that the structure of land ownership is likely to moderate the magnitude of the migration response. A more equal land ownership structure reflects stronger property rights and more efficient rule of law, which increases the liquidity of land and reduces opportunity costs from migration for relatively small landowners (Chernina, Dower and Markevich, 2014; Ibáñez, 2014).

Information and Transportation

Local conditions can also influence the migration response to conflict. For example, the decision to leave may critically depend on the access to information and the availability of transportation infrastructure. To examine the role of information and transportation in mediating the migration response to conflict, we exploit variation in the location of telegraph offices (Mendoza Vargas, 2014) and railway stations (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). These data allow us to identify the municipalities that by the turn of the twentieth century had either a telegraph office or train station and those that did not. The access to telegraphs may have provided information about the direction of the revolution and facilitated the communication with migrant networks in the United States. Similarly, the access to railroads may have enabled to flee more promptly.

In Figure 9 we present estimates for the above-mentioned groups of municipalities. Note that we limit the analysis to municipalities where conflict events did not cause damages to civil infrastructure. We find significant increases in migration rates for both groups, which suggests that access to information or transportation was not a necessary condition for individuals to flee northward. Further, we do not detect any pretrends to migration in places with infrastructure, suggesting that there was no anticipatory response. However, there is one difference between the two groups: the migration response is slightly delayed for places with no infrastructure. While our baseline results find an increase in migration one month after the event, for municipalities with no infrastructure, we first detect an increase in migration two months after the event.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we estimate whether conflict events during the Mexican Revolution affected migration to the United States. We find that the impact of conflict was large but temporary: monthly migration rates at the municipality level increased by 60 percent in the first few months after the event. However, migration rates revert back to pre-conflict levels after five months. At the same time, this result masks heterogeneity in the impact of conflict on migration. We find larger and more persistent effects for women and children than for men.

We also show that violence was the main treatment channel, with variation in the intensity and nature of violence explaining the magnitude and persistence of the migration response. Our results confirm that more violent events lead to larger changes in migration rates, which persisted throughout the period of analysis. In addition, we examine diverse factors that are likely to moderate the decision to migrate in contexts of conflict. We provide strong evidence showing that migrant networks and land ownership moderated the migration response.

Our main contribution is to use high-frequency data to more precisely identify the migration dynamics caused by conflict events in a context where conflict risk was relatively homogeneous across population groups. Most studies on forced migration use data varying annually (or at a lower frequency) to examine conflicts characterized by the persecution of a specific ethnicity, religious group, or social class. We also improve our historical understanding of the Mexican Revolution and the Mexico-US migration history. We know from anecdotal and indirect evidence that migration flows from Mexico to the United States increased during the Mexican Revolution. However, we are the first to provide direct, quantitative evidence on the impact that this conflict had on the scale and composition of flow at the local level.

References

Aburto, José Manuel, Vanessa Di Lego, Tim Riffe, Ridhi Kashyap, Alyson Van Raalte, and Orsola Torrisi. 2023. "A global assessment of the impact of violence on lifetime uncertainty." *Science advances*, 9(5): eadd9038.

Alvarado, Steven Elias, and Douglas S Massey. 2010. "In Search of peace: Structural Adjustment, Violence, and International Migration." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 630(1): 137–161.

Apodaca, Clair. 1998. "Human Rights Abuses: Precursor to Refugee Flight?" *J. Refugee Stud.*, 11: 80.

Azam, Jean-Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(4): 461–485.

Balcells, Laia, and Abbey Steele. 2016. "Warfare, political identities, and displacement in Spain and Colombia." *Political Geography*, 51: 15–29.

Barro, Robert J, and James W Friedman. 1977. "On Uncertain Lifetimes." *Journal of Political Economy*, 85(4): 843–849.

Becker, Sascha O. 2022. "Forced displacement in history: Some recent research." *Australian Economic History Review*, 62(1): 2–25.

Becker, Sascha O, and Andreas Ferrara. 2019. "Consequences of forced migration: A survey of recent findings." *Labour Economics*, 59: 1–16.

Becker, Sascha O, Irena Grosfeld, Pauline Grosjean, Nico Voigtlander, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2020. "Forced migration and human capital: Evidence from post-WWII population transfers." *American Economic Review*, 110(5): 1430–63.

Becker, Sascha O, Sharun Mukand, and Ivan Yotzov. 2022. "Persecution, pogroms and genocide: A conceptual framework and new evidence." *Explorations in Economic History*, 101471.

Becker, Sascha O, Volker Lindenthal, Sharun Mukand, and Fabian Waldinger. 2021. "Persecution and Escape: Professional Networks and High-Skilled Emigration from Nazi Germany." IZA Institute of Labor Economics Working Paper 14120.

Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. "How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(1): 249–275.

Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. 2010. "Civil War." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1): 3–57.

Boberg-Fazlić, Nina, Markus Lampe, and Paul Sharp. 2023. "The sleeping giant who left for America: Danish land inequality and emigration during the age of mass migration." *Explorations in Economic History*, Forthcoming.

Bohra-Mishra, Pratikshya, and Douglas S Massey. 2011. "Individual decisions to migrate during civil conflict." *Demography*, 48(2): 401–424.

Borjas, George J. 2007. “Introduction to "Mexican Immigration to the United States.” In *Mexican Immigration to the United States*. 1–12. University of Chicago Press.

Borusyak, Kirill, Xavier Jaravel, and Jann Spiess. 2021. “Revisiting Event Study Designs: Robust and Efficient Estimation.” *Working Paper*.

Boustan, Leah Platt. 2007. “Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants? Assessing the Persecution Theory of Jewish Emigration, 1881–1914.” In *The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson*. 267–90. MIT Press.

Buggle, Johannes, Thierry Mayer, Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, and Mathias Thoenig. 2023. “The Refugee’s Dilemma: Evidence from Jewish Migration out of Nazi Germany*.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Forthcoming.

Butts, Kyle. 2021. “Difference-in-Differences Estimation with Spatial Spillovers.” Cornell University.

Callaway, Brantly, and Pedro HC Sant’Anna. 2021. “Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods.” *Journal of Econometrics*, 225(2): 200–230.

Cardoso, Lawrence A. 1980. *Mexican emigration to the United States, 1897-1931: Socio-economic patterns.* University of Arizona Press Tucson.

Cassar, Alessandra, Pauline Grosjean, and Sam Whitt. 2013. “Legacies of violence: trust and market development.” *Journal of Economic Growth*, 18: 285–318.

Chávez Leyva, Yolanda. 1998. “I Go to Fight for Social Justice: Children as Revolutionaries in the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920.” *Peace & Change*, 23(4): 423–439.

Chernina, Eugenia, Paul Castañeda Dower, and Andrei Markevich. 2014. “Property rights, land liquidity, and internal migration.” *Journal of Development Economics*, 110: 191–215.

Chevalier, François. 1970. *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda.* Univ of California Press.

Chiovelli, Giorgio, Stelios Michalopoulos, Elias Papaioannou, and Sandra Sequeira. 2021. “Forced Displacement and Human Capital: Evidence from Separated Siblings.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 29589.

Clarke, Damian, and Kathya Tapia-Schythe. 2021. “Implementing the panel event study.” *The Stata Journal*, 21(4): 853–884.

Colegio de México. 1965. *Estadísticas Económicas del Porfiriato: Fuerza de Trabajo y Actividad Económica por Sectores.* El Colegio de México.

Colella, Fabrizio, Rafael Lalive, Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, and Mathias Thoenig. 2019. “Inference with Arbitrary Clustering.” *IZA Discussion Paper No. 12584*.

Conley, Timothy G. 1999. “GMM Estimation with Cross Sectional Dependence.” *Journal of Econometrics*, 92(1): 1–45.

Davenport, Christina, Will Moore, and Steven Poe. 2003. “Sometimes you just have to leave: Domestic threats and forced migration, 1964-1989." *International Interactions*, 29(1): 27–55.

De Cardona, S. Adalberto. 1892. *De México a Chicago y Nueva York: guía para el viajero en la que se describen las principales ciudades y ferrocarriles.* New York:Moss Engraving Co.

de Chaisemartin, Clément, and Xavier D'Haultfoeuille. 2020. "Two-way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects." *American Economic Review*, 110(9): 2964–2996.

Dell, Melissa. 2012. "Path dependence in development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution." *Harvard University, Unpublished Working Paper*.

Dobkin, Carlos, Amy Finkelstein, Raymond Kluender, and Matthew J Notowidigdo. 2018. "The Economic Consequences of Hospital Admissions." *American Economic Review*, 108(2): 308–52.

Easterling, Stuart. 2012. *The Mexican Revolution: A Short History, 1910-1920.* Haymarket Books.

Engel, Stefanie, and Ana María Ibáñez. 2007. "Displacement due to violence in Colombia: A Household-Level Analysis." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 55(2): 335–365.

Escamilla-Guerrero, David. 2020. "Revisiting Mexican migration in the Age of Mass Migration: New evidence from individual border crossings." *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History*, 53(4): 207–225.

Florescano, Enrique. 1987. "The Hacienda in New Spain." In *Colonial Spanish America*. , ed. Bethell Leslie, 250–285. Cambridge University Press.

Fontana, Nicola, Tommaso Nannicini, and Guido Tabellini. 2018. "Historical roots of political extremism: The effects of Nazi occupation of Italy." CESifo Working Paper 6838.

Freyaldenhoven, Simon, Christian Hansen, Jorge Pérez Pérez, and Jesse M Shapiro. 2021. "Visualization, Identification, and Estimation in the Linear Panel Event-Study Design." *National Bureau of Economic Research, WP 29170*.

Gamio, Manuel. 1930. *Mexican immigration to the United States.* University of Chicago Press.

Garcíadiego, Javier. 2004. "La Revolución." In *Nueva historia mínima de México*. 225–261. El Colegio de México.

Gonzales, Michael J. 2002. *The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940.* UNM Press.

Goodman-Bacon, Andrew. 2021. "Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing." *Journal of Econometrics*, 225(2): 254–277.

Grosjean, Pauline. 2014. "Conflict and social and political preferences: Evidence from World War II and civil conflict in 35 European countries." *Comparative Economic Studies*, 56: 424–451.

Halliday, Timothy. 2006. "Migration, risk, and liquidity constraints in El Salvador." *Economic development and cultural change*, 54(4): 893–925.

Ibáñez, Ana María. 2014. "Growth in forced displacement: cross-country, sub-national and household evidence on potential determinants." In *International Handbook on Migration and Economic*

Development. 350–387. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Ibáñez, Ana María, and Andrés Moya. 2016. "Who stays and who leaves during mass atrocities?" In *Economic aspects of genocides, other mass atrocities, and their prevention*. 251–273. Oxford University Press.

Ibáñez, Ana María, and Carlos Eduardo Vélez. 2008. "Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia." *World Development*, 36(4): 659–676.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The logic of violence in civil war.* Cambridge University Press.

Knight, Alan. 1986*a*. *The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 1, Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants.* Cambridge University Press.

Knight, Alan. 1986*b*. *The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 2, Counter Revolution and Reconstruction.* Cambridge University Press.

Knight, Alan. 2002. *Mexico: Volume 2, The Colonial Era.* Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press.

Knight, Alan. 2016. *The Mexican Revolution: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford University Press.

Kondylis, Florence. 2010. "Conflict displacement and labor market outcomes in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Journal of Development Economics*, 93(2): 235–248.

Kosack, Edward, and Zachary Ward. 2014. "Who crossed the border? Self-selection of Mexican migrants in the early twentieth century." *The Journal of Economic History*, 74(4): 1015–1044.

López-Alonso, Moramay. 2015. *Estar a la altura. Una historia de los niveles de vida en Mexico, 1850-1950.* Mexico City:Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Lozano-Gracia, Nancy, Gianfranco Piras, Ana Maria Ibáñez, and Geoffrey JD Hewings. 2010. "The Journey to Safety: Conflict-Driven Migration Flows in Colombia." *International Regional Science Review*, 33(2): 157–180.

Lubkemann, Stephen C. 2008. "Involuntary Immobility: On a Theoretical Invisibility in Forced Migration Studies." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21(4): 454–475.

Mahajan, Parag, and Dean Yang. 2020. "Taken by storm: Hurricanes, migrant networks, and US immigration." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 12(2): 250–77.

Manzanilla Schaffer, Y. 1963. "La reforma agraria en México." In *México: 50 años de Revolución. La economía, la vida social, la política, la cultura*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.

McCaa, Robert. 2003. "Missing millions: The demographic costs of the Mexican Revolution." *Mexican Studies*, 19(2): 367–400.

McKenzie, David, and Hillel Rapoport. 2010. "Self-selection patterns in Mexico-US migration: The Role of Migration Networks." *the Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(4): 811–821.

Melander, Erik, and Magnus Öberg. 2006. "Time to go? Duration dependence in forced migration."

International Interactions, 32(2): 129–152.

Mendoza Vargas, Héctor. 2014. "El Territorio y la Innovación: La Red Telegráfica Mexicana, 1850-1910." *Investigaciones Geográficas*, 84: 96–111.

Mexico Secretary of Finance. 1918. *Third Population Census of Mexico. Verified on 27 October 1910.* Statistics Directorate.

Moore, Will H, and Stephen M Shellman. 2004. "Fear of persecution: Forced migration, 1952-1995." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(5): 723–745.

Moreno-Brid, Juan Carlos, and Jaime Ros. 2009. *Development and growth in the Mexican economy: A historical perspective.* Oxford University Press.

Morrison, Andrew R, and Rachel A May. 1994. "Escape from terror: Violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala." *Latin American Research Review*, 29(2): 111–132.

Munroe, Ellen, Anastasiia Nosach, Moisés Pedrozo, Eleonora Guarnieri, Juan Felipe Riaño, Ana Tur-Prats, and Felipe Valencia Caicedo. 2023. "The Legacies of War for Ukraine." *Economic Policy*, Forthcoming.

Nettle, Daniel. 2010. "Dying young and living fast: Variation in life history across English neighborhoods." *Behavioral Ecology*, 21(2): 387–395.

Ordorica, Manuel, and José Luis Lezama. 1993. "Consecuencias Demográficas de la Revolución Mexicana." In *El Poblamiento de México: Una Visión Histórico Demográfica*. Consejo Nacional de Población México.

Orozco-Aleman, Sandra, and Heriberto Gonzalez-Lozano. 2018. "Drug Violence and Migration Flows. Lessons from the Mexican Drug War." *Journal of Human Resources*, 53(3): 717–749.

Padilla-Romo, María, and Cecilia Peluffo. 2023. "Violence-induced migration and peer effects in academic performance." *Journal of Public Economics*, 217(104778): 1–34.

Rohner, Dominic, Mathias Thoenig, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2013. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and Conflict." *Review of Economic Studies*, 80(3): 1114–1147.

Rosenbaum, Paul R. 2007. "Interference between units in randomized experiments." *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 102(477): 191–200.

Rosenzweig, Fernando. 1965. "El Desarrollo Económico de México de 1877 a 1911." *El Trimestre Económico*, 32(127(3)): 405–454.

Sánchez Lamego, Miguel A. 1956. *Military History of the Constitutionalist Revolution. First Part.* National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution.

Sánchez Lamego, Miguel A. 1957. *Military History of the Constitutionalist Revolution. Second Part.* National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution.

Sánchez Lamego, Miguel A. 1960. *Military History of the Constitutionalist Revolution. Third Part.* National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution.

Sánchez Lamego, Miguel A. 1976. *Military History of the Revolution in the Maderista Era.* Vol. 1-3, National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution.

Sánchez Lamego, Miguel A. 1979. *Military History of the Zapatista Revolution under the Huerta Regime.* National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution.

Sánchez Lamego, Miguel A. 1983. *Military History of the Revolution in the Convencion Era.* National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution.

Sasson, Isaac. 2016. "Trends in life expectancy and lifespan variation by educational attainment: United States, 1990–2010." *Demography*, 53(2): 269–293.

Schmeidl, Susanne. 1997. "Exploring the causes of forced migration: A pooled time-series analysis, 1971-1990." *Social Science Quarterly*, 284–308.

Schultz, T Paul. 1971. "Rural-urban migration in Colombia." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 53(2): 157–163.

Sellars, Emily A, and Jennifer Alix-Garcia. 2018. "Labor scarcity, land tenure, and historical legacy: Evidence from Mexico." *Journal of Development Economics*, 135: 504–516.

Spitzer, Yannay. 2021. "Pogroms, networks, and migration: The Jewish migration from the Russian Empire to the United States 1881–1914." Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel Working Paper 21.03.

Spitzer, Yannay, and Ariell Zimran. 2023. "Like an ink blot on paper: Testing the diffusion hypothesis of mass migration, Italy 1876-1920." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 30847.

Spitzer, Yannay, Gaspare Tortorici, and Ariell Zimran. 2020. "International Migration Responses to Modern Europe's Most Destructive Earthquake: Messina and Reggio Calabria, 1908"." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 27506.

Stanley, William Deane. 1987. "Economic migrants or refugees from violence?: A time-series analysis of Salvadoran migration to the United States." *Latin American Research Review*, 22(1): 132–154.

Sun, Liyang, and Sarah Abraham. 2021. "Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects." *Journal of Econometrics*, 225(2): 175–199.

Tannenmbaum, Frank. 1935. "La Organización Económica de la Hacienda." *El Trimestre Económico*, 2(6): 189–217.

UNHCR. 2022. "Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2021." United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

Vishwasrao, Sharmila, Matthew Schneider, and Eric P Chiang. 2019. "The Effects of Military Occupation on Growth." *Kyklos*, 72(1): 183–207.

Williams, Nathalie E, Dirgha J Ghimire, William G Axinn, Elyse A Jennings, and Meeta S Pradhan. 2012. "A micro-level event-centered approach to investigating armed conflict and population responses." *Demography*, 49(4): 1521–1546.

Woodruff, Christopher, and Rene Zenteno. 2007. "Migration networks and microenterprises in Mexico." *Journal of development economics*, 82(2): 509–528.

Zolberg, Aristide R, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. 1989. *Escape from violence: Conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world.* Oxford University Press.

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Insurgency Events



Source: Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The map shows the spatial distribution and intensity (days of conflict) of 2,411 insurgency events that occurred from November 1910 to December 1915. We assign latitude and longitude coordinates to each event and use a 15 km radius buffer. Bright colors denote longer events. Armed conflicts occurred across the country with the exception of the Yucatan Peninsula and some states in Southern Mexico. Although intense conflicts occurred in all regions, events lasting more than 15 days concentrated in Mexico City—the seat of the federal government—and nearby states.

Figure 2: The Effect of Conflict on Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that violence induced emigration in the first three months after the event. During this period monthly emigration rates increased more than 50 percent. The average value of the outcome of interest in t-1 (baseline omitted period) is 0.08. The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. pretrends: Wald test for all the pre-event coefficients being equal to 0. Leveling off: Wald test for the last post-event coefficients (4 and 5+) being equal. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Conflict Mortality and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that violence, proxied by conflict mortality, significantly induced migration, with municipalities where combats caused casualties experiencing a large transitory increase in migration that lasted for about three months. In contrast, the leads and lags for units where combats did not cause casualties are mostly negative and statistically insignificant. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Conflict Length and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that monthly migration rates increased permanently only in municipalities that experience more than 3 days of conflict during the period of analysis—on average, treated units experienced two days of conflict. Note that estimated coefficient on time period (-5+) is statistically different from zero, suggesting the presence of confound dynamics in pre-event periods. In Figure A.13 we show that our finding holds after controlling for confound dynamics. The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure 5: Occupation of Territory and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that monthly migration rates increased permanently only in municipalities where the winner remained after the conflict. Note that estimated coefficient on time period (-5+) is statistically different from zero, suggesting the presence of confound dynamics in pre-event periods. In Figure A.14 we show that our finding holds after controlling for confound dynamics. The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure 6: Networks and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that the access to networks mediated the migration response to insurgency events. Changes in monthly migration rates are about 10 times greater in municipalities with access to migrant networks. We identify municipalities with access to networks as those with migration flows during between January and November 1910, or between 1906 and 1908 Escamilla-Guerrero (2020). The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure 7: Mexican Migration to the United States



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records.
Notes: The map shows (average)annual migration rates per 1,000 inhabitants by municipality.

Figure 8: Land Concentration and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that land concentration mediated the migration response to insurgency events, with monthly migration rates only increasing in municipalities with an intermediate land concentration. Land concentration is measured as the share of population living in large estates (haciendas or ranchos), which proxies for the share of population without land. The average land extension of haciendas and ranchos was 15,500 ha and 13,500 ha, respectively, while the average private property holding was about 50 ha. Data on land concentration comes from Sellars and Alix-Garcia (2018). The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure 9: Information/Transportation and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that the access to communication (telegraphs) and/or transportation (trains) infrastructure moderated the timing of the migration response. In municipalities with no train stations or telegraph offices, the migration response was delayed by one time period relative to municipalities with communication and/or transportation infrastructure. The estimates are conditional on no damage to civil infrastructure reported. We do not observe statistically significant changes on migration rates in municipalities where insurgency damaged civil infrastructure (estimates available upon request). The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Table 1: Characteristics of Insurgency Events

	Full Sample	Shooting	Combat	Siege	Battle
Mean length (days)	1.61	1.08	1.30	16.58	19.88
Mean military casualties	355.15	36.32	357.02	1,806.04	3,472.92
Damage to infrastructure (share)	0.09	0.05	0.09	0.21	0.52
Occupation of territory (share)	0.14	0.04	0.15	0.29	0.24
Observations	2,411	361	2,001	24	25

Source: Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Note: The table presents characteristics of insurgency events during the Mexican Revolution by military category. The average event lasted 1.6 days and had 355 military casualties. These figures vary across military categories, which capture differences in the intensity of violence.

Table 2: Municipality Characteristics by Treatment Status

	1	2	3	4	5
	All units	Ever with Conflict	Never with Conflict	Difference	Conditional Difference
Pre-revolution migration rate	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.07^{***}	0.02
Population (thousands)	19.48	10.55	22.13	-11.59^{***}	3.24^{***}
Sex ratio	1.02	1.01	1.03	-0.02^{***}	-0.00
Share of illiterate population	0.54	0.50	0.55	-0.05^{***}	-0.01^{*}
Number of large estates	16.14	23.70	13.89	9.81^{***}	6.48^{***}
Share of population in large estates	0.21	0.33	0.17	0.16^{***}	0.00
Altitude (m)	1,327.75	1,328.15	1,327.63	0.52	-44.53
Distance to the US border (km)	796.83	606.99	853.22	-246.23^{***}	-4.79
Distance to nearest train station (km)	150.24	84.95	169.63	-84.68^{***}	-1.06
Distance to the US border by train (km)	891.79	684.48	953.37	-268.89^{***}	-3.38
Share with train station	0.23	0.43	0.17	0.26^{***}	0.18^{***}
Share with telegraph office	0.15	0.27	0.11	0.16^{***}	0.15^{***}
Observations	2,787	638	2,149	2,787	2,787

Source: Conflict data are from the Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983). Average monthly migration rates are for the period January 1910 to June 1910. Estates (haciendas and ranchos) and population data are for 1900 (Sellars and Alix-Garcia, 2018). Distance by train and railways data are for the early 1900s (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). Telegraphs data are for ca. 1895 (Mendoza Vargas, 2014).
Note: The table presents means of municipality characteristics. We estimate differences (column 4) and differences conditional on state fixed effects (column 5) between ever with conflict and never with conflict municipalities. * = Significant at 10% level; ** = Significant at 5% level; *** = Significant at 1% level.

Table 3: The Impact of Conflict on Migration by Population Group

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Baseline	Males	Females	Children	Prime Age	Elderly
Leads						
-5+	0.010	0.016	0.004	0.007	0.014	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
-4	0.002	−0.003	0.006	0.003	0.004	−0.016
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.018)
-3	0.006	0.004	0.007	−0.007	0.014	0.011
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.015)
-2	0.011	0.017	0.004	0.016	0.006	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Lags						
0	0.021	0.025	0.016	0.021	0.018	0.034
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.027)
1	0.045***	0.042**	0.047**	0.055**	0.047**	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.019)
2	0.053***	0.044**	0.064***	0.074***	0.040	0.049*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)
3	0.027*	0.022	0.034*	0.059**	0.001	0.030
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.025)
4	0.030*	0.019	0.040*	0.052*	0.015	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.019)
5+	0.010	0.001	0.020*	0.024*	0.002	−0.005
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Observations	199,944	199,800	199,800	199,800	199,800	199,728
R-squared	0.409	0.356	0.326	0.274	0.367	0.221
Outcome t-1	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.07
Pretrends	0.59	0.40	0.99	0.60	0.86	0.27
Leveling off	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.37	0.21

Source: 1910 Population Census of Mexico, Mexican Border Crossing Records, and Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).

Note: The table shows that conflict induced migration in the first three months after the event (lag 0). The age cohorts analyzed are 1-15 (children), 16-40 (prime age adults), and over 40 years (elderly). Life expectancy at birth in Mexico was about 30 years (McCaa, 2003, p. 392). Population data by age cohort and sex is not reported for some municipalities. The control group consists of not-yet- and never-treated units. Outcome t-1 is the average value of the outcome of interest in the omitted period. Pretrends: Wald test p-value for all the pre-event coefficients being equal to 0. Leveling off: Wald test p-value for the last post-event coefficients (4 and 5+) being equal. * = Significant at 10% level; ** = Significant at 5% level; *** = Significant at 1% level. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

Table 4: The Impact of Conflict on Migration by Distance to the Border

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Distance by Train (km)				**Distance by train (km) - No Damage**		
	0 - 200	201 - 700	701 - 1200	Over 1200	0 - 200	201 - 700	701 - 1200	Over 1200
Leads								
-5+	−0.010	0.021	0.003	−0.005	0.124	0.015	0.003	−0.005
	(0.160)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.113)	(0.024)	(0.003)	(0.003)
-4	−0.056	0.006	0.002	0.000	0.058	0.006	0.002	0.000
	(0.198)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.198)	(0.031)	(0.003)	(0.004)
-3	−0.013	0.013	0.000	0.004	0.206	0.003	−0.000	0.004
	(0.256)	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.307)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.004)
-2	0.083	0.012	0.002	0.004	0.164	0.008	0.002	0.004
	(0.124)	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.150)	(0.032)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Lags								
0	−0.063	0.063**	−0.001	−0.003	−0.126	0.076**	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.181)	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.230)	(0.039)	(0.001)	(0.003)
1	0.412*	0.067**	0.001	−0.006	0.362**	0.081**	0.002	−0.006
	(0.214)	(0.031)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.178)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.004)
2	0.368	0.093**	0.003	−0.007	0.377*	0.105*	0.003	−0.007
	(0.231)	(0.044)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.204)	(0.058)	(0.004)	(0.004)
3	0.214	0.040	0.005**	−0.001	0.352	0.029	0.004*	−0.001
	(0.243)	(0.031)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.226)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.004)
4	0.382	0.031	0.003	−0.002	0.664	0.020	0.004	−0.002
	(0.324)	(0.029)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.412)	(0.038)	(0.004)	(0.005)
5+	0.015	0.014	0.006***	0.001	0.055	0.016	0.006**	0.001
	(0.157)	(0.020)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.161)	(0.027)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	156,024	171,648	179,712	154,584	155,448	166,608	175,968	154,584
R-squared	0.398	0.381	0.363	0.358	0.390	0.378	0.363	0.358
Outcome t-1	0.78	0.11	0.004	0.000	0.65	0.11	0.005	−0.005
Pretrends	0.95	0.59	0.52	0.02	0.75	0.93	0.52	0.03
Leveling off	0.13	0.37	0.19	0.45	0.07	0.85	0.27	0.43

Source: 1910 Population Census of Mexico, Mexican Border Crossing Records, and Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Note: The table shows that migration costs, measured as distance to the border by train, moderated the timing of the response to conflict. We use distance estimates are from Woodruff and Zenteno (2007). The control group consists of not-yet- and never-treated units. Outcome t-1 is the average value of the outcome of interest in the omitted period. Pretrends: Wald test p-value for all the pre-event coefficients being equal to 0. Leveling off: Wald test p-value for the last post-event coefficients (4 and 5+) being equal. * = Significant at 10% level; ** = Significant at 5% level; *** = Significant at 1% level. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

Online Appendix

Figure A.1: Abstract of military report

Combat in Santa Barbara (29-30 March 1911)

Knowing that the revolutionaries had occupied Santa Barbara (27 km southwest of Parral, Chihuahua), the Lieutenant Colonel Arizmendi sent 5 officers and 65 soldiers of the 7th Regiment and 18 members of the Rural Army to this place on March 29. Upon its arrival, this force fought against the revolutionaries who were in the mountains that surrounded the town. After fighting all day, the revolutionaries moved into the town. The fighting continued on March 30, when the revolutionaries were defeated and ran away, leaving in the field 7 dead and 27 horses. The federal army had 4 death and 8 wounded (F. 1146, Exp. 62, AHSDN).

Source: Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows an example of the digitized military reports. Each report contains precise information on the place where the event occurred, which allows us to assign latitude and longitude coordinates to each location and classify them into municipalities. Diverse features of the event are also systematically reported, including the length of the conflict (days or hours), the number of military casualties, whether civil infrastructure was damaged during the event (railways, telegraph offices, bridges, and town halls are the most common cases), whether the winner remained in the conflict's location, and the winning faction.

Figure A.2: Distribution of Insurgency Events Over Time



Source: Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows the density distribution of insurgency events during the period of analysis. Although the bulk of the events occurred during the second and third year of the revolution, the nature of the events varied significantly in terms of length (number of days), occupation of territory (whether the winner leaves or remains in the conflict's location), and damage to civil infrastructure (whether infrastructure such as bridges, telegraph offices, town halls, or train stations were damaged or destroyed during the event).

Figure A.3: The Effect of Insurgency on Migration. Alternative time window



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that the main result holds when the time window is expanded. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. pretrends: Wald test for all the pre-event coefficients being equal to 0. Leveling off: Wald test for the last post-event coefficients (5+) being equal. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.4: The Effect of Insurgency on Migration. Estimates robust to treatment effects heterogeneity



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that our baseline results (OLS) hold after correcting for treatment effects heterogeneity. We find very similar results when implementing the estimators proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), and de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020). Markers represent weighted average of cohort-specific dynamic treatment effect estimates (CATT), with weights corresponding to the cohort share estimates. For Sun-Abraham estimates, lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals. For Callaway-Sant'Anna and de Chaisemartin-D'Haultfoeuille estimates, lines indicate 90% confidence intervals that are valid for the entire path of dynamic effects.

Figure A.5: The Effect of Insurgency on Migration. Alternative data frequency



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure highlights the importance of using high-frequency data to more precisely identify the migration dynamics caused by conflict events. Although less precisely estimated, we continue observing similar migration dynamics with data varying quarterly (every 3 months). However, no dynamics are observed with data varying semiannually (every six months). Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.6: Alternative Control Group



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that insurgency induced emigration in the first two months after the event. This finding is robust to using different control groups and clustering standard errors at different levels. We omit leads 1 and 2 to avoid underidentification when there are no never-treated units in the control (see Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess, 2021). Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.7: Control Group Composition and Regional Migration Responses



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: We perform two robustness checks to our main results. First, we exclude the state of Oaxaca from the analysis. In 1910, about 40% of the municipalities belonged to this state (see Figure A.17), with the great majority not experiencing violence (see Figure 1). This implies that municipalities in Oaxaca will be over-represented in the control group, which could be a source of bias. Second, we exclude the Mexico City region. Figure 1 also shows that conflicts lasting more than 15 days concentrated in Mexico City and neighboring states (Mexico and Morelos). It is possible that our findings could be importantly influenced by the characteristics of the migration response in this region. The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.8: Alternative Treatment Assignment



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that our findings are robust to assigning treatment based on events other than shootings, which were the least violent conflicts. It also shows that conflict events experienced after the first occurrence were unlikely to induce migration. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.9: Spillover Effects



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows the absence of spillover effects. We assign treatment to all municipalities belonging to the same district using as reference the time period when the first municipality was first treated. This approach assumes that spillovers were local and therefore experienced within districts only. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.10: Conflict Mortality and Migration by Sex



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that the effects of violence—proxied by the number of casualties—are magnified for populations that experience structural inequalities, such as children and women. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.11: Sex Composition of Migration Flows



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records
Notes: The figure shows that before the Mexican Revolution, men were over-represented in the migration flow. As the conflict developed, the sex composition of the flow changed, with women accounting for the majority of the border crossings. The shaded area covers the period of analysis.

Figure A.12: Binned Scatter Plot of Conflict Length and Casualties



Source: Military History of the Mexican Revolution Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The underlying regression controls for type of event (shooting, combat, siege, or battle) and region fixed effects.

Figure A.13: Controlling for Confound Dynamics
Municipalities with Three or More Days of Conflict



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: We follow Dobkin et al. (2018) and Freyaldenhoven et al. (2021) to control for confound dynamics. We extrapolate a linear event-time trend from the five immediate pre-event periods (Panel A). We then overlay the event-time coefficients for the trajectory of the dependent variable and the extrapolated linear trend. The estimated treatment effect is the deviation from the extrapolated linear trend (Panel B). Circles represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.14: Controlling for Confound Dynamics
Municipalities where the Winner Remained After the Conflict



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: We follow Dobkin et al. (2018) and Freyaldenhoven et al. (2021) to control for confound dynamics. We extrapolate a linear event-time trend from the five immediate pre-event periods (Panel A). We then overlay the event-time coefficients for the trajectory of the dependent variable and the extrapolated linear trend. The estimated treatment effect is the deviation from the extrapolated linear trend (Panel B). Circles represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.15: Historical/Recent Networks and Migration



Source: Mexican Border Crossing Records and Sánchez Lamego (1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Notes: The figure shows that the access to recent and historical networks mediated the migration response to insurgency events. Changes in monthly migration rates are about 10 times greater in municipalities with access to migrant networks (note the difference in the scale of Panel A and B). We identify municipalities with access to recent networks as those with migration flows during the first or six months immediately preceding the event. We identify municipalities with access to historical networks as those with migration flows before the Mexican Revolution (1906-1908). The data on Mexican migration before the revolution comes from Escamilla-Guerrero (2020). The control group consists of not-yet and never-treated units. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Markers represent point estimates. Lines indicate 90% pointwise confidence intervals.

Figure A.16: Land Concentration in 1910



Source: Data from Sellars and Alix-Garcia (2018).
Notes: The map shows the share of population living in large states (haciendas or ranchos), which proxies for land ownership at the local level. Land concentration was particularly high in the West-Central region.

Figure A.17: Map for Guidance



Source: Adapted from López-Alonso (2015).
Notes: The map displays the geographic regions of Mexico.

Table A.1: Characteristics of Insurgency Events by Region

	Full Sample	North	West Central	Center	Southeast
Panel A. Full Sample					
Mean length (days)	1.61	2.12	1.59	1.34	1.27
Mean military casualties	355.15	434.94	462.28	220.98	395.89
Damage to civil infrastructure (share)	0.09	0.12	0.11	0.06	0.02
Occupation of territory (share)	0.14	0.15	0.13	0.12	0.18
Observations	2,411	652	650	952	157
Panel B. Shooting					
Mean length (days)	1.08	1.17	1.06	1.04	1.08
Mean military casualties	36.32	3.17	110.06	0.45	0.19
Damage to civil infrastructure (share)	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.00
Occupation of territory (share)	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.12
Observations	361	88	116	131	26
Panel C. Combat					
Mean length (days)	1.30	1.48	1.24	1.21	1.30
Mean military casualties	357.02	456.68	432.65	232.12	414.50
Damage to civil infrastructure (share)	0.09	0.12	0.11	0.06	0.02
Occupation of territory (share)	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.20
Observations	2,001	549	519	808	125
Panel D. Siege					
Mean length (days)	16.58	36.00	22.00	11.40	1.67
Mean military casualties	1,806.04	157.33	—	2,025.90	1,722.83
Damage to civil infrastructure (share)	0.21	0.43	0.00	0.20	0.00
Occupation of territory (share)	0.29	0.57	0.00	0.30	0.00
Observations	24	7	1	10	6
Panel E. Battle					
Mean length (days)	19.88	26.50	17.14	15.00	—
Mean military casualties	3,474.92	3,906.38	3,793.71	836.67	—
Damage to civil infrastructure (share)	0.52	0.50	0.57	0.33	—
Occupation of territory (share)	0.24	0.38	0.14	0.33	—
Observations	25	8	14	3	—

Source: Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).
Note: The table presents characteristics of insurgency events during the Mexican Revolution by region and military category. The average event lasted 1.6 days and had 355 military casualties. These figures vary across regions, with the North and West Central experiencing deadliest and longest events. The data are consistent with the reported military categories, which capture the intensity of violence.

Table A.2: Error Correction for Temporal and Spatial Correlation

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Baseline	SC 100 km	SC 200 km	SC 300 km	SC 100 km TC 6 mo.	SC 100 km TC 12 mo.	SC 100 km TC 12 mo. H
Leads							
-5+	0.010						
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
-4	0.002						
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
-3	0.006						
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
-2	0.011						
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Lags							
0	0.021						
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.011)*	(0.011)*	(0.012)*
1	0.045***						
	(0.016)	(0.020)**	(0.023)**	(0.023)*	(0.017)***	(0.017)***	(0.018)**
2	0.053***						
	(0.020)	(0.020)***	(0.023)**	(0.023)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)**
3	0.027*						
	(0.016)	(0.016)*	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)*	(0.016)*	(0.016)*
4	0.030*						
	(0.018)	(0.017)*	(0.018)*	(0.018)*	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)*
5+	0.010						
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	199,944	199,944	199,944	199,944	199,944	199,944	199,944
R-squared	0.409	0.409	0.409	0.409	0.409	0.409	0.409

Source: 1910 Population Census of Mexico, Mexican Border Crossing Records, and Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).

Note: The table presents estimates with standard errors corrected for temporal and spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019; Conley, 1999). Standard errors are clustered at the treatment level (municipality) in the baseline (column 1). We use different distance cutoffs (kilometers) beyond which the correlation of the error term between municipalities is assumed to be zero (columns 2-4). We also use different temporal cutoffs (months) beyond which the temporal correlation among observations of the same municipality is assumed to be zero (columns 5-6). Column 7 reports hetroskedasticity-robust standard errors corrected for temporal and spatial correlation. * = Significant at 10% level; ** = Significant at 5% level; *** = Significant at 1% level.

Table A.3: The Impact of Conflict on Migration by Distance to the Border

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Linear Distance (km)				**Linear Distance (km) - No Damage**			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Leads								
-5+	0.024	0.006	0.002	0.004	0.043	0.002	0.002	0.004
	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.043)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.006)
-4	−0.004	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.020	0.000	0.003	0.002
	(0.049)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.061)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.005)
-3	0.015	0.001	0.004	−0.002	0.043	−0.004	0.005	−0.004
	(0.056)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.073)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)
-2	0.025	0.008	0.002	0.003	0.045	−0.002	0.001	0.003
	(0.042)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.057)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Lags								
0	0.079	0.007	0.001	−0.002	0.093	0.004	0.001	−0.003
	(0.054)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.074)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.003)
1	0.183***	−0.009	0.001	0.002	0.206***	−0.010	0.002	0.002
	(0.060)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.072)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)
2	0.193**	0.012	0.002	0.005	0.231**	0.001	0.002	0.006
	(0.077)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.098)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.010)
3	0.103	−0.004	0.006**	0.003	0.124*	−0.013	0.006**	0.003
	(0.063)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.068)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)
4	0.109	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.151	−0.004	0.007	0.002
	(0.071)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.096)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.007)
5+	0.026	−0.000	0.006***	0.008*	0.038	−0.001	0.006***	0.008
	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.050)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Observations	165,528	165,456	165,528	165,456	161,928	163,224	163,584	163,872
R-squared	0.407	0.358	0.357	0.363	0.400	0.357	0.357	0.363
Outcome t-1	0.28	0.03	0.002	0.007	0.28	0.02	0.002	0.009
Pretrends	0.68	0.95	0.51	0.65	0.82	0.82	0.55	0.16
Leveling off	0.10	0.73	0.96	0.19	0.12	0.63	0.75	0.16

Source: 1910 Population Census of Mexico, Mexican Border Crossing Records, and Military History of the Mexican Revolution (Sánchez Lamego, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1976, 1979, 1983).

Note: The table shows that migration costs, measured as the linear distance to the border, moderated the timing of the response to conflict. Distance estimates are from the municipality centroid to the nearest border point. The control group consists of not-yet- and never-treated units. Outcome t-1 is the average value of the outcome of interest in the omitted period. Pretrends: Wald test p-value for all the pre-event coefficients being equal to 0. Leveling off: Wald test p-value for the last post-event coefficients (4 and 5+) being equal. * = Significant at 10% level; ** = Significant at 5% level; *** = Significant at 1% level. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.