Information, Norms, and Female Employment: An Experiment in India*

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Abstract

Information interventions are among the lowest cost interventions available to policymakers, but can they change outcomes rooted in strong social norms? I study this question in the context of women's employment in India. I randomized whether women's family members were shown a six-minute video with promotional information on an employment program for women. The treatment increased participation in the program by over 75% in the short-run. I also find short-run increases in women's empowerment in the household and mobility, and suggestive evidence that family members' attitudes about women's work became more progressive. However, the treatment reduced women's leisure time rather than changing time spent on household chores. Perhaps because chores were not reallocated, the effect on employment did not persist.

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1 Introduction

For every three men in low- and middle-income countries who participate in the labor force, only two women participate (World Bank, 2022). Increasing women's employment is of great interest to development policymakers (World Bank, 2012). At a macroeconomic level, female employment could improve the allocation of talent in an economy (Hsieh et al., 2019), while at a microeconomic level, employment could raise women's empowerment and increase investments in children's health and education (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Atkin, 2009; Majlesi, 2016; Qian, 2008).

Women's employment may not appear an easy outcome to change as it is rooted in strong social norms. Male breadwinner norms, social restrictions on women's mobility, and gendered assignment of household chores are among the norms that could limit women's employment in developing countries (Jayachandran, 2021). Gender norms appear to be quite sticky (Alesina et al., 2013), and while Dhar et al. (2022) find such norms can be changed through intervention, theirs was a relatively intensive intervention.

On the other hand, limited experience with female employment could mean families simply lack information about jobs for women; such information constraints would be much easier to address than social norms. Low take-up of existing jobs for women or the introduction of new jobs could result in families lacking key information about female employment. Note that many female employment opportunities in developing countries are new, since the expansion of jobs for women is a key part of the development process (Goldin, 1995; Heath and Jayachandran, 2018). Families may be able to acquire basic details about jobs – like the fact that they exist, or the official pay and hours – relatively easily, but it may be hard for them to know what female workplaces are actually like or how women's work would affect household life without firsthand experience. Disseminating images of the workplaces or firsthand accounts of workers through video format may be an inexpensive way to close these information gaps.

In this paper, I evaluate a video intervention that provided promotional information on a new job for women in Uttar Pradesh, India. Gender gaps in labor force participation are high in this setting; across India, just one woman works for every three men, and the ratio is one to six in the state of Uttar Pradesh (NITI Aayog, 2018). I partnered with Obeetee, one of India's largest carpet producers. Carpet weaving is a common occupation in the setting but, like most occupations, is typically done by men. The firm recently began a program that offers women four months of paid training in weaving, followed by long-term weaving employment for any women who complete training. The training pay is substantial, close to what women ultimately earn as weavers. Both the training and employment occur

in all-female weaving centers located in women's villages. I partnered with the firm as it introduced the program in six villages. My sample included 490 women from these villages who were married, aged 18 to 40, and eligible for the program.[1] Just 15% of them were employed at baseline.

I randomized whether women's husbands and parents-in-law were shown a video promoting the female weaving program. Reports from this setting suggest these family members are often opposed to women working (Lowe and McKelway, 2022). Indeed, men worldwide voice less support than women for women's employment outside the home (Bursztyn et al., 2023). In the week before households could apply for Obeetee's program, the research team informed women and, separately, their husbands and parents-in-law about the program. Family members assigned to the control group were given only basic details about the program, like the pay, the hours, and the fact that it included both training and work. Treated family members were given the basic details and also shown a promotional video. All women, regardless of treatment status, were both given basic details and shown the video.

The video, six-minutes long, included testimonials from individuals involved in the program interspersed with shots of the workplace. The speakers included program supervisors, female weavers, and a weaver's husband, all from villages where the program had already been established. They talked about the cordial, all-female work environment, and how participants managed their household chores while working, among other topics. Interspersed with the testimonials were shots of women's workstations and loom center facilities.

The treatment produced large increases in women's take-up of the program. I measure participation using the firm's attendance registers. Four months after the intervention, and three months into the program's training phase, 8.9% of women in the control group had ever participated. The treatment increased this by 6.9 percentage points, a 77.5% increase.

I also find increases in women's general employment. One week post intervention, treated women were 7.3 percentage points (57.5%) more likely to report working for income off their households' farms. The firm's program had not yet begun at one week, suggesting some information in the treatment applied to employment outside of the program. There was also an effect on general employment four months post treatment, at which point the program had begun, but this effect is not significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.136$).

To understand what information in the treatment changed women's labor supply, I conducted a survey experiment in a separate sample of husbands and parents-in-law. These individuals lived in villages where the firm would soon be introducing its female weaving program. The research team informed individuals about the program, with a randomization

[1] This sample is the group of women assigned to the control group for the psychosocial intervention studied in McKelway (2023).

determining whether basic details or basic details plus the promotion were given. Surveyors then elicited detailed opinions about the opportunity. The questions were asked immediately after information was provided, meaning effects on opinions reflect information in the treatment itself and not information acquired through women's employment.

I find strong effects on perceptions of the financial value and physical workspace of the firm's program. The latter could be due to the images of the workplace in the video, while the former could be because the firsthand accounts in the video lent credibility to the compensation details given to both the treatment and control groups. Firsthand accounts and images are two sorts of information that are transmitted particularly well in video format. There is also some evidence that the treatment made family members more open to women's employment in general; it made them think the firm's program was less unusual and had a positive but insignificant effect on progressive attitudes about women's employment. On the other hand, I find no effects on beliefs of how women's participation in the firm's program would affect household life.

Providing families with promotional information about female employment could have shifted intra-household bargaining power by raising assessments of women's earnings potential. This could occur whether or not women actually started working, though work could compound the effect by developing women's skills and employability. I find the treatment increased women's reported involvement in household decision-making four months post intervention in the main experiment. In line with a shift in bargaining power, there was an effect on women's reported involvement in decisions about spending of their husbands' earnings. I also see effects on an incentivized outcome. Women were entered into a lottery, the prize of which was their choice between (i) their husbands' allocation of 500 rupees across women's and men's goods, or (ii) an allocation of $500-P$ that their husbands would choose after a discussion with them. A randomization set P, the price of discussion, to 0, 50, or 100. In theory, greater bargaining power could make women more or less likely to choose discussion; greater control in the discussion should incentivize them to choose that option, while greater control of money outside the lotteries could make the discussion not worth the effort. The greater P, the weaker the first force would be. Consistent with an effect on bargaining power in this framework, the treatment made women more likely to choose discussion when there was no price, but less likely at the highest price.

I also find effects on other measures of women's empowerment. The treatment made family members' attitudes about women's employment more progressive, though the effect is not quite significant ($p = 0.101$). The treatment also increased women's mobility. This effect can be explained by the time women spent out of their homes for work.

I then investigate how the treatment affected women's time use. The promotion increased

the hours women spent on paid work at four months, decreased hours spent on leisure activities, and had no effect on hours devoted to household chores. Remarkably, women averaged over eight hours a day on chores. This is consistent with households in this setting having many members, few modern home appliances, and often small farms to take care of.

Why were chores not reallocated when women gained more control in their households? One explanation is that discussion in the video of women managing their household chores while working made family members expect their wives or daughters-in-law to do the same. However, I see no effect in the opinions survey experiment on family member expectations about the allocation of chores should their wives or daughters-in-law participate in the firm's program. Instead, household chores may not have been reallocated because women did not want them to be. In a setting with a strong norm that women are homemakers, housework may be an important piece of women's identity. Indeed, over 80% of women believed a woman's main role should be housework, and the treatment did not affect this.

Perhaps because chores were not reallocated, the effects on employment faded. There were no treatment effects on women's participation in the firm's program or on their overall employment one year post intervention. Balancing employment with a large amount of household chores was presumably difficult for women. Indeed, the treated women who dropped out of employment between the short- and long-run endlines were the ones who spent more time on housework in the short run. I find no evidence that women stopped work because they did not like it. In fact, treated women had more favorable opinions of the firm's program at one year than control women.

In sum, I find an information intervention can raise women's employment in the short run despite the social norms that constrain it. Policymakers or firms could implement such interventions at relatively low cost through brochures or advertisements. However, interventions may need to also address norms to achieve longer-term effects, particularly the norm of women as homemakers.

My results contribute to research on constraints to women's employment in development countries (see Heath and Jayachandran (2018) for a summary of existing work). In particular, I contribute to research on information constraints. Bursztyn et al. (2020) evaluate the effects of providing information on the social acceptability of female employment, while Jensen (2012) studies an intervention that provided factual information on BPO jobs. In contrast, I evaluate an intervention that provided promotional information in video format. Dean and Jayachandran (2019) evaluate a similar video intervention and find no effects, but they only consider effects at 13 months whereas I consider both short- and long-run effects. My results also relate to research on household constraints to women's employment (Field et al., 2021; Heath and Tan, 2020; Lowe and McKelway, 2022); the large effects from a light-touch

intervention targeting family members' preferences speaks to these individuals' importance in decisions about women's labor supply.

This paper also contributes to evidence on how employment opportunities for women affect their control in the household. Much of the existing work is non-experimental (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Atkin, 2009; Majlesi, 2016; Qian, 2008), whereas my paper joins a smaller body of experimental evidence (Abebe et al., 2020; Hussam et al., 2022). Moreover, the existing studies either infer changes in control through changes in household outcomes or present effects on reports of who makes household decisions. I present effects on such reports but also on a novel measure of bargaining power from an incentivized choice.

Finally, I contribute to evidence on how female employment opportunities affect the allocation of household chores. Existing work is non-experimental and finds mixed results on whether job opportunities change time women spend on chores or leisure (Newman, 2002; Skoufias, 1993).[2] I provide experimental evidence from a setting with a strong norm around the allocation of housework that suggests work comes at the cost of women's leisure rather than reallocating chores.

2 Experimental Design

2.1 Setting and Partner Firm

The experiment was conducted in rural Uttar Pradesh, India. Uttar Pradesh is a state in northern India and is one of India's poorest and least developed states (NITI Aayog, 2018). Gender gaps in employment and other dimensions are high in India (Jayachandran, 2015), and Uttar Pradesh has some of the highest levels of gender inequality of India's states (NITI Aayog, 2018). In my sample at baseline, just 15% of women were working for income off their households' farms. Family attitudes appear to be important constraints to women's work; Lowe and McKelway (2022) find husbands in this setting rate women working outside the home as less appropriate than wives do, and husbands' attitudes are more predictive than wives' attitudes of take-up of the women's employment opportunity I study here.

I partnered with Obeetee, one of India's largest carpet producers. The area where its manufacturing is based and where the study was conducted has been referred to as India's "carpet belt." Carpet weaving is a common occupation among lower castes in this setting but, like many occupations in the setting, is typically done by men.

The firm recently began a program to train and employ women as hand-knotted carpet

[2]Hussam et al. (2022) present effects of employment on women's time use, but their experimental work task required only 2.5 hours a day and, perhaps as a result, they see no effects on time use.

weavers. The program provides four months of paid training in carpet weaving, and any women who complete the training can work long-term as weavers. Both the training and the ultimate employment occur in newly-constructed, all-female weaving centers. The centers are located in villages and owned by village households. Each center recruits 20 women from the surrounding village neighborhoods. Female weavers are paid identically to male weavers, and the pay during training is close to what women ultimately earn as weavers. As much as possible, payments are deposited in bank accounts that are in women's names, which often means bank accounts are created in women's names when they begin the program.[3] Key aims of the program from the firm's perspective are to make up for shortages of male weavers and to meet corporate social responsibility requirements. Participation in this program is correlated with women's empowerment (McKelway, 2022).

The experiment was conducted in the catchment areas for six women's weaving centers. The centers were set to open on November 1, 2017 and were the first female centers in these catchment areas. The start date, and other key study dates, are visualized in the timeline in Figure 1. The catchment areas were neighborhoods selected by loom owners for recruiting women for the program. The neighborhoods included were in close proximity to the weaving center and were neighborhoods where lower castes – other backwards castes (OBC), scheduled castes (SCs), or scheduled tribes (STs) – lived. As mentioned above, male weavers typically come from lower castes.

I evaluate a light-touch informational intervention delivered as women were being recruited for this program. This is a setting where both information and norms constraints to women's employment are likely to be particularly strong. The low levels of female employment, and high gender inequality more generally, suggest strong norms around women's work. But the low employment also suggests households have little experience with formal employment for women and may therefore lack key information about what women's work would look like for their families or what female workplaces are like. Information constraints to participating in Obeetee's program would have been particularly strong since the program was being introduced in these catchment areas for the first time. While the introduction of new employment is certainly an important feature of my study, it is not unique; there are parallels to the growth of garment-sector and BPO jobs for women in Bangladesh and India studied by Heath and Mobarak (2015) and Jensen (2012). More generally, expansion of jobs suitable for women is an important part of development (Goldin, 1995; Heath and Jayachandran, 2018), and there are likely to be information constraints when such work is

[3]Field et al. (2021) argue that depositing pay in women's own accounts could increase their bargaining power. The payment system thus represents one channel through which work could have empowered women in my setting.

initially introduced.

2.2 Sample and Treatment Assignment

In August 2017, surveyors went door-to-door in the catchment areas to invite eligible women to participate in the study. Women who were eligible met seven criteria: (i) were aged 18 to 40, (ii) were not disabled, (iii) were available to speak in person when a surveyor visited their home, (iv) had no plans to leave the village for an extended period in the following six months, (v) were married, widowed, divorced, or separated, (vi) had not had permission to participate in the study denied by family members, and (vii) were not the mother-in-law[4] of another eligible woman in their household. (i) and (ii) are requirements from the partner firm for women to be eligible to participate in their weaving program, (iii) eased logistics of consenting and taking baseline surveys with women, (iv) was imposed to minimize attrition, (v) meant all women in the sample had been married, (vi) helped to prevent future issues with women's households, and (vii) prevented individuals from participating in the study as both women and mothers-in-law. During subject recruitment, field staff introduced themselves as part of a J-PAL/IFMR research team but did not mention any affiliation with the partner firm. Decisions to enroll in the study were thus not based on opinions of the partner firm or the women's weaving program. 41.7% of all adult women on household rosters were eligible to participate in the study, and 62.8% of all women in the age range on household rosters were eligible. 98.4% of eligible women consented for the study.

This paper studies a subsample of the women who enrolled in the study. The full sample of 1,022 women is studied in McKelway (2023), and the present paper studies women assigned to the control group for the psychosocial intervention studied in that paper.[5] I further exclude three women who did not have family members eligible to receive the promotion intervention (see the following subsection for details on which family members were eligible), and 17 women who left the study before the promotion intervention was delivered. This gives a sample of 490 women from 443 households.

[4]The vast majority of women in the sample were living in their in-laws' villages. For those living in their own natal villages, parents replaced parents-in-law in all study activities. Throughout the paper, for brevity, I say "parents-in-law" to refer to both parents-in-law of women in their in-laws' villages and parents of women in their natal villages.

[5]McKelway (2023) studies the effects of a psychosocial intervention on women's economic outcomes, including their employment, and also how those effects compare to and interact with the promotion intervention. The present paper focuses only on the promotion, presenting its effects on employment but also investigating how it raised employment, its effects on women's empowerment and time use, and why the employment effects did not persist. The psychosocial control group was an active control group, meaning the women in this group spent time answering group questions about life in the village in addition to the surveys and treatments described here.

Promotion treatment was assigned at the household level with 50% probability. The randomization was stratified by psychosocial treatment assignment and by neighborhood.[6]

Table 1 presents baseline characteristics and balance tests. The baseline data come from a survey taken in conjunction with study enrollment. Just one of the 10 treatment-control comparisons is significant at the 10% level, and none are significant at the 5% or 1% levels. This suggests the randomization was successful.

2.3 Promotion Intervention

The promotion intervention was delivered across one week in early October 2017. During this time, surveyors delivered information about the firm's program in individual meetings with each woman and separate meetings with each woman's family member(s). Family members eligible to participate were husbands of married women, and women's mothers-in-law and fathers-in-law if they were living in the women's households. The research team had not mentioned its affiliation with the partner firm up to this point in the study. Prior to giving job information, surveyors said the firm had asked the research team to provide information on the program and the research team was interested in opinions on the program as part of its goal of understanding daily lives of women.

Promotion treatment assignment determined what information was given to women's family members. Those in the control group were given only basic details about the program, including the location, the fact that it included both training and employment, the pay, the hours, and how to apply. Family members in the treatment group were given the basic details plus a promotion for the program. All women, regardless of treatment status, were given both basic details and the promotion.

The promotion intervention was designed to provide information about the program that was promotional in nature and that would address common concerns women's family members have about women working. Surveyors told individuals assigned the promotion information about a few job perks – the loom center facilities, the policy of allowing women to bring young children to work, and the fact that all weavers in the center would be female – and then showed them a six-minute video. The video began with a message from a man at Obeetee who oversees the program. This was followed by testimonials from a female loom owner, the husband of a loom owner, two female participants, and the husband of a participant, all from villages where the program was well established. Among other topics, the speakers talked about the cordial, all-female workplace, and discussed how women in the program were able to manage their usual household chores. Interspersed with the testimo-

[6]Small neighborhoods in the same village were pooled together to form a single stratum.

nials were shots of the weaving centers, women weaving, and completed carpets. Appendix D provides the transcript of the video and a screenshot from it.

The research team successfully gave the assigned job details and/or promotion to 86.5% of women and 80.8% of family members. Non-compliance came from meetings not happening; those who had meetings got the information intended for them. Compliance is balanced by treatment status (columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A.1).

2.4 Program Application and Start

Women could apply for the program by attending an application day, which occurred two to eight days after individuals had been informed about the program. Women wishing to apply came to their catchment area's loom center that day and completed a 10-minute application process administered by a surveyor. Women were required to be accompanied by their husbands, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law, or household heads to ensure they were applying with the support of their households. The ages of women wishing to apply were verified, either with an identification card or by checking with their village heads, and only those who met the partner firm's age requirement for participation (i.e. 18 to 40) could apply.

Some women (8% of applicants) completed the application process without attending the official application day. This occurred primarily through an alternate application day. Women who had not applied on the official day were invited to come with their family members to apply on an alternate date two weeks after the official application day. There were also a few cases of individuals completing the application process informally after both application days, having contacted the research team about their interest in the program.

In five of the six centers, more women applied than there were slots for, so I randomly determined who could begin the program on its first day and who was placed on a randomly-ordered waitlist. In the sixth center, all women who applied could begin the program. At the end of October 2017, surveyors visited households of women who had applied and told them whether the woman could start the program or was on a waitlist. The program began in November 2017. The research team monitored retention during training and drew women from the waitlist when participants dropped out.

3 Data, Outcomes, and Empirical Specification

3.1 Participation in Firm's Program

I observe whether women applied for the program and whether they attended in the first few months of training. The application data come from records kept during the application

process. The attendance data come from paper records of trainees' daily attendance and performance maintained by loom centers that surveyors digitized. Whenever surveyors found in these records that women in the sample had dropped out of the program, they inquired about and recorded the reasons for dropout.

3.2 Endline Surveys

The outcomes that capture women's empowerment, attitudes about women's employment, and time use come from a survey done four months after the promotion intervention. Both women and family members were surveyed at four months. Family member surveys were taken with husbands, in person or over the phone, whenever possible. When husbands were not available, family member surveys were taken with mothers- or fathers-in-law, provided those individuals lived in women's households. The four-month surveys were administered verbally, in private, and, except for some phone surveys with husbands, in person. To minimize experimenter demand effects, surveyors were assigned different participants at endline than when delivering the program details and/or promotion, and indeed, less than 1% of endline respondents were surveyed by the individual who had informed them about the program. I also use survey data on women's employment and opinions about the firm's program from surveys with women and family members one week after the intervention, and from surveys with women at one year.

At four months, 79.8% of women's and 77.3% of family members' surveys were taken. Rates of attrition do not differ by treatment assignment (columns (5) and (6) of Appendix Table A.1). Rates of woman and family member survey completion were 84.9% and 77.1%, and these rates also do not differ by treatment status (columns (3) and (4)). Attrition was higher at one year, in part due to logistical constraints, with 68.2% of women being surveyed. However, attrition was also not affected by treatment at this endline (column (10)).

Importantly, the paper's key results replicate when I account for attrition with entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). I generate weights that ensure balance on the baseline variables in Table 1 amongst respondents who did not attrit. My key treatment effects are very similar when estimated with these weights (Appendix Table A.2).

3.3 Opinions Survey Experiment

I conducted a survey experiment in a separate sample of households to better understand how the promotion affected family members' opinions. The experiment was conducted in early 2018 in the catchment areas for two weaving centers Obeetee planned to open later that year. Surveyors went door-to-door in these areas and identified women who met eligibility

requirements (i), (ii), (iv), (v), and (vii) for participation in the main study (see Section 2.2 for details on the main study eligibility requirements). Surveyors then asked to speak in private and individually with the husbands of the married women, and with the mothers- and fathers-in-law of the women if they were living in the women's households. In these meetings, participants were informed about the women's weaving program Obeetee would offer in the area later that year. A randomization at the start of each household survey determined whether individuals in the household received the program details only, or both the details and the promotion. Immediately after providing this information, surveyors elicited detailed opinions about the opportunity and asked about gender attitudes more broadly.

I analyze the data at the woman level, using responses from a single family member. The family member is the husband, but if he was not surveyed, the mother-in-law, and if neither surveyed, the father-in-law. In total, I identified 463 women from these surveys and have family member opinions for 371 (80.1%) of them.

This survey experiment was done in response to effects on application for the firm's program in the main sample. The goal was to understand the immediate effects of the treatment on opinions about the program rather than longer-run effects that would reflect both the information in the treatment and information acquired through women's actual employment. This meant the survey experiment had to be done in a separate sample. Working in a separate sample had two additional benefits. First, I was able to use a relatively lengthy questionnaire in the main sample, whereas I sought to keep each survey in the main sample as short as possible given that sample was asked to participate in many study activities. Second, it allows me to avoid the concern that simply being asked detailed questions about the program affected the behavioral responses to it that I measure. A concern with working in a separate sample is that effects may have been different in the main sample. However, I document similar effects in a more limited opinions questionnaire I administered in the main sample at one week.

3.4 Outcomes and Pre-Registration

I consider effects on three categories of outcomes. The first is women's employment, both in the firm's program and in general, and both in the short- and long-run. Second, I analyze outcomes from the opinions survey to understand what about the treatment increased female labor supply. Finally, I consider effects on downstream outcomes that could have been affected by the changes in women's employment and in family opinions about women's employment: women's empowerment in the household, household attitudes about female employment, women's mobility, and women's time use. I use measures of these outcomes

from the four-month survey. The one-week survey would be too soon to expect effects on many of these outcomes, and the effect on employment had faded by one year. Appendix C provides details on the outcome variables.

I pre-registered the full experiment, which included the promotion and the cross-randomized psychosocial intervention and which is studied in McKelway (2023), on the AEA RCT Registry (McKelway, 2019). When analyzing results from the full experiment, I saw that the promotion intervention given on its own increased women's employment. I decided to write a separate paper to better understand this effect, both investigating how the treatment shifted family opinions and estimating effects on downstream outcomes. I uploaded a supporting document to the registration detailing the outcomes I would consider. The opinions outcomes come from the opinions survey and are listed as secondary outcomes, while the downstream outcomes come from surveys in the main sample and are listed as primary outcomes. The document was uploaded after the data had been collected but before I analyzed effects on the primary outcomes. Effects on many of the secondary outcomes had been analyzed when the document was uploaded.

I make three key deviations from what is outlined in the document. First, I exclude a number of primary outcomes due to concerns about statistical power. Second, I do not consider primary outcomes from the one-year survey because the employment effects had faded by then. Third, I focus only on a set of key secondary outcomes rather than the full set listed for brevity. Appendix B lists all deviations and details the rationale for each. Effects on any of the registered outcomes that are not presented in the paper are available upon request.

3.5 Empirical Specification

To analyze results in the main sample, I estimate the following regression

$$Y_{i,h} = \beta T_h + \mu_s + X_{i,h}\delta + \varepsilon_{i,h} \tag{1}$$

$Y_{i,h}$ is the outcome of interest for woman i from household h, and T_h an indicator for promotion treatment assignment. μ_s denotes strata fixed effects.[7] $X_{i,h}$ is a set of baseline covariates selected from 292 potential covariates using the post-double-selection (PDS) Lasso method of Belloni et al. (2014). Standard errors are clustered by household. To study effects in the opinions survey experiment, I estimate an analogous regression that excludes covariates and strata (the randomization for the opinions survey experiment was not stratified).

[7]When, because of attrition, some strata do not have at least one observation from each treatment cell, I pool such strata with others to ensure each fixed effect represents a group with individuals from both cells.

4 Results: Short Run

4.1 Effects on Employment

What were the effects of the light-touch, promotional intervention on women's employment in the short run? I begin by considering women's participation in the employment opportunity offered by Obeetee that the intervention promoted. The treatment made women more likely to apply to the program (column (1) of Table 2). 23.0% of women in the control group applied to the program, either on the official application day, the alternate date, or outside the two dates. The treatment increased the application rate by 10.1 percentage points. This effect represents a 43.9% increase and is highly significant ($p = 0.006$).

The effect on application translated into a large increase in participation in the program. In the control group, 8.9% of women ever participated in the first three months of the program's paid training period (column (2) of Table 2). Recall there was oversubscription for the program and a randomization allocated slots, which partly explains the gap between the application and participation rates. The promotion treatment increased participation by 6.9 percentage points, or by 77.5% ($p = 0.012$).

I also find effects on women's general employment in the short run. On their surveys, women were asked if they had done any work for income in several common employment sectors in the preceding two weeks. The treatment increased the percent of women who were working off their households' farms at one week from 12.7% to 20.0% ($p = 0.026$) (column (3) of Table 2). Notably, the firm's program had not yet begun at one week (Figure 1) so these effects cannot be driven by participation in the firm's program. This result suggests the promotion made families more interested in women's employment in general and not just in the firm's program.

There was also a positive effect on general employment at four months, though it is only marginally significant. Four months after the intervention, and three months into the firm's program, 18.9% of the control group was working off their households' farms (column (4) of Table 2). The treatment increased this by 6.2 percentage points, though the effect is not significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.136$). Appendix Table A.3 estimates the effect on employment outside of the firm's program, and finds a 2.7 percentage point increase that was not significant ($p = 0.428$). This implies most of the increase in general employment at four months came from participation in the firm's program. The fact that the treatment increased work outside the program at one week but not at four months could be because some women who worked at one week had switched to work in the program at four months and others had stopped working by four months.

In column (5) of Table 2, I present effects on an indicator for any short-run measure of

work – that is, an indicator for attending the firm's program before the four-month survey, working at one week, or working at four months. This effect could miss some work outside of the firm's program that occurred between the two endlines since the survey measures only reflect employment in the preceding two weeks. It is nevertheless useful for estimating the total number of women whose employment may have been affected by the treatment. I find an effect of 11.2 percentage points ($p = 0.003$) on this outcome in the full sample. I also present effects in the sample of women surveyed at four months, as this is the sample for which I observe the empowerment, norms, mobility, and time use outcomes I consider in subsequent subsections (column (6)). I find an effect of 12.9 percentage points ($p = 0.004$) in this sample.

These are remarkable effects given the intervention was very light-touch and delivered in a setting where norms against female employment are strong. These results suggest there were information constraints to women's employment that the promotion treatment was able to overcome. My results are similar to those of Bursztyn et al. (2020), who also deliver a light-touch informational intervention to husbands and evaluate effects on women's work in the following few months. Specifically, the authors find that telling husbands about other men's support for women's employment increased the likelihood that men signed their wives up for a job matching service immediately after the treatment by 36%, and increased the likelihood that women were working four months later by 28%, though the latter is not statistically significant. I now turn to effects on opinions about the firm's program and about women's employment in general to understand what information in the promotion might have changed household decisions about women's labor supply.

4.2 How did the treatment affect opinions about employment?

I use the opinions survey experiment to investigate how the treatment affected opinions about: the work and workplace in the firm's program, how participation would affect household life, and women's employment in general. Note that these outcomes are from questions asked immediately after respondents were informed about the program. Effects on the outcomes therefore reflect the information conveyed in the treatment itself and not information acquired through the employment that the treatment led to.

Results suggest the treatment gave family members more favorable opinions of the financial value and workplace of the firm's program. I form an index of favorable opinions of the pay, hours, and work stability, and another index of favorable opinions on the loom center facilities and safety of participants (see Appendix Section C.2 for full details on these indices and the rest of the opinions outcomes discussed in this subsection). The treatment increased

the former by 0.443 standard deviations ($p = 0.000$) and the latter by 0.285 standard deviations ($p = 0.010$) (columns (1) and (2) of Table 3). In contrast, I see no effect on an index of favorable opinions of workplace interactions, which includes opinions of interactions between participants, between participants and supervisors, and between participants and men outside of their households (column (3)).

It is perhaps unsurprising that a video including shots of the physical workplace changed opinions on the workplace, but it is more surprising that the treatment affected opinions on the financial value of the program. Basic information on the compensation and hours was given to both the treatment and control groups. The fact that the treatment nevertheless made family members view these details more favorably could be because hearing directly from program participants made the information surveyors were providing seem more credible or assuaged concerns that female workers would be exploited by their employers.

On the other hand, the treatment does not appear to have shifted beliefs on how participation would affect household life. I find no effects on an index with respondents' opinions on whether chores would be reallocated if their wife or daughter-in-law participated (column (4) of Table 3). Recall that speakers in the video talked about how women managed their usual household chores while participating; the fact that the treatment did not affect the chores index suggests that what the speakers were saying was aligned with what respondents would expect if they had not seen the video. I also consider an index of beliefs about women gaining control in the household by participating and find it was not affected by the treatment (column (5)).

Lastly, I investigate whether the treatment affected opinions about women's employment in general and not just in the firm's program. I form an index of progressive attitudes related to work and gender. The treatment effect on this index is positive (0.157 standard deviations) but not significant ($p = 0.156$) (column (6) of Table 3). Respondents were also asked how often households in their village get opportunities like the one the firm was offering. The majority (69.8%) of the control group said never, but the treatment decreased this by 9.6 percentage points ($p = 0.097$) (column (7)). This suggests the treatment made family members think there may exist other desirable employment opportunities for women.

To summarize, the treatment gave family members more favorable opinions of the financial value and physical workspace of the firm's program, both of which could explain effects on program participation. The effects on financial value could come from the credibility offered by firsthand accounts, while the effects on the physical workspace could come from shots of the workspace in the video. Note that both firsthand accounts and images are types of information that are transmitted particularly well in video format. In contrast, I find no effects on perceptions of workplace interactions or on beliefs of how participation would affect

household life. There is also suggestive evidence that the treatment made family members more open to female employment in general, which could explain the effect on employment outside of the firm's program.

One concern with these results is that the opinions survey experiment was conducted in a separate sample and could reveal effects that are different from those experienced in the main sample. The one-week survey done in the main sample had a short questionnaire on opinions about the firm's program which I use to corroborate the results from the opinions survey experiment. This survey was done after the official application day but before the program actually began. Family members were asked what reasons they saw for and against applying for the program. Similar to what I find in the opinions survey experiment, the treatment made family members in the main sample more likely to say extra money and learning a valuable skill were reasons to apply for the program, but had no effect on whether they cited too many household duties or the inappropriateness of women working outside the home as reasons not to apply (Appendix Table A.4). The changes in opinion of family members appear to have been transmitted to women; women were asked the same questions on their one-week surveys, and effects on their responses look very similar to those of their family members (Appendix Table A.4).

4.3 Effects on Women's Empowerment in the Household

Providing families with promotional information about women's employment could have shifted intra-household bargaining power. Results from the opinions survey suggest the treatment raised household assessments of women's earnings potential; it made family members see more financial value in the firm's program and feel such opportunities were less unusual, while at the same time alleviating perceived constraints to women's employment such as concerns about the workplace environment and norms against women's work. In standard theory, these changes could have increased women's threat points and thus their intra-household bargaining power (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).[8] The theory does not require women actually start work to experience such effects, though employment could compound the effect by developing womens skills and employability. In principle, the treatment could have affected empowerment in the household through other channels, for instance by persuading family members that working women deserve to decide how their earnings are spent. However, such messages do not appear in the transcript of the video, and I see no effect on such beliefs in the opinions survey experiment

[8]The standard threat point in household models is divorce, which is very uncommon in my setting and perhaps not a realistic threat. Instead one can view the threat point as non-cooperation within marriage, as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993).

(column (5) of Table 3). I now test whether the treatment empowered women in household decision-making, first using survey measures of empowerment and then turning to incentivized choices.

4.3.1 Survey Measures of Decision-Making

At four months, surveyors asked women who in their households usually makes decisions about spending on food, spending on clothing, spending on education, whether to purchase large household items, how much to save, what to do if a child falls sick, and how money their husbands earn is spent. I define seven indicators that take the value of one when women said they make a particular decision alone or make it together with others, and zero otherwise. I aggregate the indicators into a summary index.

The promotion treatment increased women's reports of making decisions. It increased the summary index by 0.184 standard deviations ($p = 0.045$) (column (1) of Table 4). Figure 2a visualizes the kernel densities of this index for the treatment and control groups, finding the treatment shifted mass from the lower to higher ends of the distribution. There are positive effects on women's reports of making all seven individual decisions in the index, and significant effects on four of them: food spending, education spending, how much to save, and spending of husband's earnings (Figure 3). This change in women's decision-making could reflect an increase in their intra-household bargaining power, an interpretation supported by the fact that the treatment gave them greater control over their husbands' earnings.

I also consider effects on an analogous index based on husbands' reports. I have husbands' responses for only 278 of women as many family member surveys were taken with parents-in-law, though the treatment did not affect whether husbands were surveyed (Appendix Table A.1). The treatment effect on the index of husbands' reports is not significant ($p = 0.417$), but it is positive (0.095 standard deviations) (Appendix Table A.5), and the point estimate is in the 90% confidence interval around the effect on the index of women's reports. The kernel densities based on husbands' reports suggest the treatment did shift some mass from the lowest range of the distribution to higher ranges, though not to the highest range (Appendix Figure A.1a). Several of the effects on individual components of the index are positive, but only the effect on education spending is significant (Appendix Figure A.3). In sum, the effects on husbands' reports are inconclusive; the effects are positive but generally not significant, and I have husbands' reports for just 278 of the women in the sample. To the extent that effects were indeed more muted on husbands' reports, one possible explanation is that men in settings with very strong gender norms are reluctant to admit their wives make many household decisions.

4.3.2 Decision-Making Measures from Incentivized Choices

Women who took the four-month surveys were invited to enter lotteries at no cost. Each lottery offered various prizes and women had to choose during the survey the prizes they would want in case they won. The prize for the winner of the first lottery would be 500 rupees allocated as she wished across four goods: women's bangles, men's sunglasses, women's saris/salwar suits, and men's pants/kurtas. The prize in the second lottery was the winner's choice between: (1) an allocation of 500 rupees across the four goods that her husband had or would choose during his four-month survey,[9] and (2) an allocation of $500-P$ rupees her husband would choose after a discussion with her. A randomization set P, the price of discussion, to 0, 50, or 100. The discussion, if women chose that option, would happen at a later time and only happen if women actually won. 356 of the 391 surveyed women entered the lotteries. The treatment did not affect whether women entered (Appendix Table A.1), and like the other key treatment effects, effects on women's lottery decisions replicate when the data are re-weighted to account for attrition (Appendix Table A.2).

I consider effects on spending on women's goods and on women's decisions to talk with their husbands. I discuss how to interpret these outcomes in the following paragraphs, but I note now that, to my knowledge, these measures have not been used previously in the literature. One benefit of them relative to other games used to measure empowerment in the household (e.g. the one used by Schaner (2017)) is that they do not require surveyors meet with husbands and wives simultaneously, which can be logistically challenging.

I first present effects on the amount of money women allocated to women's goods in the first lottery. Kabeer (1999) argues part of disempowerment is an internalization of a lesser status that affects women's preferences. The money women allocated towards women's goods could be seen as reflecting this preference dimension of empowerment. It is also possible that this outcome captures women's control in joint household decisions since the winner's prize would not necessarily be hidden from her husband. However, the average woman in the control group spent 411 of the 500 rupees on women's goods and the modal woman allocated all 500 to women's goods (column (2) of Table 4 and Figure 2b); it seems unlikely that women in this setting would spend so much on women's goods if they were deciding based on their control in joint household decisions. But regardless of whether the outcome reflects preferences or control, greater spending on women's goods would be consistent with greater empowerment.

I find the treatment increased women's spending on women's goods by 20 rupees, from

[9]Women were not told what their husbands had chosen, and often their husbands had not yet been surveyed when women made their choices, so this decision reflects what women thought their husbands would choose.

411 in the control group ($p = 0.085$) (column (2) of Table 4). The standard deviation of spending among women in the control group was 114, so this effect represents an increase of 0.175 standard deviations. The kernel density of spending in the control group has peaks around 300 and 500 rupees, and the treatment appears to have shifted women from the first to the second peak (Figure 2b).

I then turn to effects on husbands' spending. I am missing choices for many husbands as family member surveys were often taken by parents-in-law, but the treatment did not affect whether husbands were surveyed or whether they entered the lotteries (Appendix Table A.1). I also present effects on women's predictions of husbands' spending, which were elicited just before women made their choices for their second drawing. I see no effects on husbands' spending on women's goods or on women's predictions of husbands' spending (Appendix Table A.5, and Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2).

Finally, I consider effects on women's decisions in their second drawing. In making this decision, a woman would have traded off the utility she expected to gain from a joint allocation of $500-P$ rupees rather than her husband's allocation of 500 rupees, against a utility cost representing the time and effort of having a discussion. Increasing women's bargaining power could make women more or less likely to choose discussion. Greater bargaining power would give women greater control in the discussion and thus motivate them to choose that option. But greater bargaining power would also mean women had more money in their control outside of the lotteries that they could spend on women's goods; provided utility is concave, higher bargaining power could make discussing this particular spending decision not worth the time and effort. Importantly, the price of discussion would vary the strength of these two forces. The higher the price, the less money to be bargained over in the joint decision, and the weaker the first force would be. Thus an increase in bargaining power could make women more likely to choose discussion at low prices, but less likely at high prices.

The pattern of effects is consistent with this theory. With no price, the promotion treatment made women more likely to choose discussion, moving the percentage of women that choose discussion from 69.6 to 83.6 (column (3) of Table 4). This effect is significant ($p = 0.070$) and large in magnitude, representing a 20.1% increase in the discussion sign-up rate and nearly halving the proportion of women who chose not to discuss. On the other hand, at the highest price, the treatment made women less likely to choose discussion, reducing the percentage who chose discussion from 57.4 to 40.9. This difference is significant ($p = 0.079$) and represents a large, 28.7% decrease. Positive and negative effects appear to have offset each other at the middle price, where there was no treatment effect.

These effects – 14.0 percentage points at no price and 16.5 at the highest price – appear too large to have come from employment alone; some of the effects may have come from

women who did not start work but who gained more bargaining power from greater household assessments of women's earnings potential. The effect on any measure of short-run employment among women surveyed at four months is 12.9 percentage points (column (6) of Table 2), and 14.8 percentage points if I further restrict to those who participated in the second lottery (Appendix Table A.3). As discussed in Section 4.1, this outcome may miss some work outside of the firm's program that occurred between the two short-run endline surveys. But even so, for the effects on discussion to come only from the effects on employment, virtually all of the women led to work by the treatment would also have to have been led to change their discussion decision. It seems more likely that some of the discussion effects come from women who did not start work but whose bargaining power increased because their households had higher assessments of their earnings potential. This story is consistent with household theory (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).

An increase in bargaining power is just one possible explanation for the effects on the discussion decision, but other stories seem unlikely to explain the pattern of results. The treatment did not affect how much women expected their husbands to allocate to women's goods, suggesting changes in women's beliefs of their husbands' preferences cannot explain the results. A treatment effect on women's preferences for women's goods could explain the positive effect at zero price but not the negative effect at the highest price. An increase in household income from women's employment could have produced a negative effect on discussion decisions for the same reason that higher bargaining power could have, but this could not explain the positive effect at zero price and the size of the negative effect suggests some of the effect came from women who did not start work.

4.4 Effects on Norms and Women's Mobility

I find that a light-touch, informational intervention had short-run effects on women's employment, an outcome rooted in entrenched social norms. But did the treatment also change social norms? Households' experience with women's employment could have changed their beliefs about the acceptability of women's work, or perhaps the video itself made women's work appear more acceptable (the opinions survey provided suggestive evidence of the latter).

The treatment appears to have shifted family members' attitudes about women's employment at four months. I form an index of progressive attitudes based on questions that asked if it was alright if women worked, if a woman's main role should be household chores, if both genders should contribute financially to the household, if a husband should earn more than his wife, and how acceptable it would be for women to work in three common occupations (construction, weaving, and teaching). The treatment increased an index of family

members' responses by 0.175 standard deviations, though the effect is not quite significant ($p = 0.101$) (column (1) of Table 5). This effect appears to be driven by modest positive effects on several components of the index (Appendix Figure A.4).

The effect on women's attitudes is positive (0.137 standard deviations) but not significant ($p = 0.193$) (column (2) of Table 5).[10] One reason the effects on women's attitudes may have been more muted than effects on family members' attitudes is that women hold more progressive opinions to start with. Differences between family and woman responses in the control group support this idea (Appendix Table A.6).

The social practice of constraining women's mobility represents another cultural constraint to women's work in my setting, but mobility is also something that work outside of the home would affect. Using data from a time use module, I consider effects on the number of hours women spent outside the home the day before their four-month surveys.[11] The average woman in the control group spent about 75 minutes outside her home the preceding day, and treatment increased this by around 30 minutes ($p = 0.059$) (column (3) of Table 5). This effect appears to be driven by the time women spent at work; it is similar in magnitude to the effect on time spent on paid work outside the home discussed below, and I see no effect on time spent on activities outside the home that were not paid work (Appendix Table A.7). The effect on mobility nevertheless represents an important change in women's lives from the treatment. Indeed, mobility is often seen as a measure of female empowerment (Glennerster et al., 2018).

4.5 Effects on Women's Time Use

Next, I investigate how the treatment affected women's time use. Mechanically, time spent on work has to come at the cost of other activities, but it is not obvious whether women would sacrifice leisure time or arrange for household chores to be reallocated to other family members.[12] An increase in bargaining power could also allow women to shift their time allocation, even if they are not working. It is also possible that the video would have affected women's time use directly by suggesting women continue doing their usual chores when they start work, but results from the opinions survey experiment suggest this channel was not at play.

As mentioned above, the four-month survey had a time use module. Women were asked

[10] See Appendix Figure A.5 for effects on individual components of the index.

[11] As much as possible, surveys were scheduled so that the previous day would not have been a Sunday or a holiday.

[12] Given many family members are nearby, there would seem to be a number of individuals who could potentially help with chores, even if norms dictated they be female – mothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, or older daughters could in principle help.

when they woke up and went to bed the previous day, and what they did each hour between those two times. As mentioned in footnote 11, surveys were scheduled, as much as possible, so that the previous day would not have been a Sunday or a holiday. From women's responses, I estimate the number of hours women devoted the previous day to paid work outside the home, household chores, leisure, and night sleep.[13] To interpret magnitudes, I also present effects on an indicator for reporting any paid work the previous day.

The treatment increased time devoted to paid work outside the home. The average woman in the control group spent around 45 minutes on such work, and the treatment raised this by about 30 minutes ($p = 0.034$), a roughly two-thirds increase (column (2) of Table 6). 11.3% of the control group reported any paid work, and the treatment increased this by 7.1 percentage points (column (1) of Table 6). Combining these estimates suggests that women who work spend six to seven hours a day on work.

Women in this setting spend a great deal of time on household chores. The average woman in the control group had spent around eight hours and 45 minutes of the previous day on chores (column (3) of Table 6). Appendix Figure A.6 visualizes the average time devoted to each type of chore in the control group; the most time-intensive activities, each taking between one and 2.5 hours of the day, are preparing/serving food, cleaning, and caring for young children. The time required for household work is indeed high in this setting, where households often have many members, few modern home appliances, and small farms to tend to. Coupled with this is a strong norm that women do the chores. One question that makes up the index of attitudes about female employment is whether a woman's main role should be to tend to household chores – in the control group, 85.6% of family members and 83.1% of women replied affirmatively (Appendix Table A.6).

Though the treatment increased the time women spent working outside the home, it did not significantly reduce the amount of time they spent on household chores. Treated women did spent about 15 minutes less on chores than control women, but the difference is not significant ($p = 0.461$) (column (3) of Table 6). Likewise, the treatment did not affect the amount of time the family members surveyed at four months spent on chores (Appendix Table A.7). One way to reconcile these findings with an effect on women's bargaining power is that women did not want to give up housework; where there are strong norms of women as homemakers, housework could be an important piece of women's identities. As mentioned above, over 80% of family members and women agreed that a woman's main role should be household chores. While women report more progressive views than family members on several topics related to women's work, women's role as homemakers is one topic where their

[13]Note that the time on these four activities will not necessarily total to 24 because some activities – such as eating and bathing – do not fall into one of these four categories.

opinions do not differ (Appendix Table A.6). Further, the treatment did not affect women's or family members' attitudes about a woman's main role (Appendix Figures A.5 and A.4).

Work appears to have come at the cost of women's leisure time. The average woman in the control group had spent around one hour and 40 minutes on leisure activities the previous day (column (4) of Table 6). The treatment reduced women's leisure time by about 25 minutes ($p = 0.033$). This effect accounts for 73.5% of the effect on time spent working. There was no effect on nighttime sleep (column (5)).

My results suggest that, in this setting, employed women may work a "second shift" (Hochschild and Machung, 1989) at home. The drop in leisure combined with the positive effects on empowerment in decision-making suggests ambiguous effects on women's welfare. Indeed, the treatment had no overall effect on women's self-reported happiness at four months (Appendix Table A.7). My time use results are consistent with Skoufias (1993), who finds higher female wages reduce women's leisure time in India, and also reminiscent of Bertrand et al. (2015), who find the gap in time spent on home production between wives and husbands is larger when wives earn more than husbands. In contrast, Newman (2002) finds greater demand for female labor reduced the amount of time women in Ecuador spent on housework.

5 Results: Long Run

5.1 Effects on Employment

The effects of the promotion treatment on women's employment did not persist. I find no effects on women's employment at one year (column (1) of Table 7). The data from that survey also reveal no effects on work in the firm's program (column (2)). The level of employment in the control group at one year (18.6%) is similar to that at four months (18.9%), suggesting the fading of the treatment effect came from treatment women leaving work rather than control women starting work.

This dropout from employment is similar to results of Artiz Prillaman et al. (2017), who find short employment tenures following vocational training in India, and to results of Blattman and Dercon (2018), who document high dropout rates from industrial jobs in Ethiopia. Also similar is the result from Dean and Jayachandran (2019) that a video intervention very similar to mine and also delivered in India had no effect on women's employment 13 months later.

5.2 Why did the employment effects not persist?

The fact that unpaid labor was not reallocated within the household when women began work might explain why the employment effects did not persist. The average woman in the sample spent over eight hours a day on household chores, and the treatment did not significantly reduce this. Perhaps women left paid work because it was difficult to balance with their many responsibilities at home.

Consistent with this explanation, the treated women who dropped out of employment between four months and one year were the ones who spent more time on chores at four months; among treated women who were working at four months, time spent on chores at that endline is negatively related to employment at one year (column (3) of Table 7). The relationship between chores and retention is significantly more negative in the treatment group than the control group (column (4)).[14] The relationship between chores and retention is actually slightly positive in the control group,[15] and at the lowest levels of chores, retention was higher in the treatment group than the control group. These results suggest the treatment led some women to take up employment for whom household chores made employment unsustainable.[16]

Additional support for the idea that household chores led the effects on employment to fade comes from information surveyors recorded on reasons for women dropping out of the firm's program. A caveat is that this information was only recorded during the first three months of training in the firm's program, but it nevertheless can provide some indication for why women in this setting leave employment. Having too many household chores was the most common reason provided for dropping out, provided 50.0% of the time (Appendix Figure A.7).[17] The second most common reason, work in a November agricultural harvest, would not have applied between four months and one year.[18] If one excludes this reason, the second most common reason (husbands/in-laws refusing to let women continue) was provided just 12.5% of the time.

I find limited support for other possible explanations for the fading of the employment

[14]To interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, note that the average hours spent on chores among women working at four months was 6.4 in the treatment group and 7.0 in the control group.

[15]This could be due to an omitted variable correlated with both chores and retention, for example, demand for leisure or financial need.

[16]I cannot estimate heterogeneity in treatment effects by time spent on chores at baseline as I did not measure this variable at baseline.

[17]I do not split the data by treatment because just 16 women in my sample participated in the program and dropped out within the first three months.

[18]There is other agricultural work women do during those months, but they are permitted to return to work in the firm's program afterwards. This was not permitted during November 2017 because that was the first training month, and there were waitlisted women who could join if one of the women initially selected for the program left to work in agriculture.

effect. I find no evidence for the theory that women did not like the work itself; at one year, assessments of how good an opportunity the firm's program was were significantly higher among women in the treatment group than in the control group (column (4) of Table 7). Likewise, very few women cited problems with the work/workplace as reasons for dropping out of the firm's program in its first three months (Appendix Figure A.7). Another potential explanation is that family members in the treatment group became less supportive of women's employment over time. This is difficult to test in my data, but I note that refusal from husbands or parents-in-law to allow women to continue work was provided just 12.5% of the time as a reason for dropping out of the firm's program in the first three months (Appendix Figure A.7). A final possibility is that the effects did not actually fade, but the group of women who were surveyed at one year were women who were not affected by the treatment. While attrition was higher at that endline than at others, the short-run employment effects among the women surveyed at one year (Appendix Table A.8) look similar to those in the full sample (Table 2).

I can only speculate on why treated women would have begun work if they were ultimately going to drop out. One explanation is that the treatment made households overoptimistic about how easy it would be for women to balance work and chores. Indeed, the women in the video were women who were participating in the program and had found a way to do both the job and chores; the video did not show women who had dropped out. Another explanation is that treated households knew it would be unsustainable for women to work for more than a few months at a time, but the treatment made them think even a few months of women working would be a good idea.

6 Conclusion

This paper investigates whether a light-touch, informational intervention can increase women's employment in India. There are wide gender gaps in labor force participation in low and middle income countries (World Bank, 2022), and closing such gaps is of great interest to development policymakers (World Bank, 2012). This is particularly true in India, which has one of the lowest female employment rates in the world (Fletcher et al., 2018). Women's employment would seem difficult to move as it is rooted in entrenched social norms (Jayachandran, 2021). However, households' limited experience with female employment, due both to low take-up of existing jobs for women and to the introduction of new jobs, could create information constraints to women's work. These sorts of constraints would be much easier to change than social norms; policymakers or firms could address them at relatively low cost through brochures or advertisements.

I evaluate an intervention that provided family members promotional information about an employment program for women in video format. The treatment produced large increases in women's work in the short run, increasing participation in the program by over 75% and also increasing general employment. Data suggest that the firsthand accounts and images of the workplace shown in the video were particularly persuasive, two types of information that can be conveyed especially well in video format. I also find short-run effects on women's mobility and empowerment in the household, and suggestive evidence that family members' attitudes about women's employment became more progressive.

However, the treatment did not reduce the amount of time women spent on household chores, despite increasing the time they devoted to paid work and raising their empowerment in the household. This could be because of the strong norm that women tend to household chores, which women themselves have internalized. Perhaps because chores were not reallocated, the effect on women's employment did not persist.

Future research should investigate how gains in women's employment could be sustained. An intervention that addressed both information constraints and social norms, especially the norm that women take care of household chores, could be particularly effective. One could think of addressing the housework norm by changing the norm directly or by helping families work around it. Some interventions that might work would be providing home appliances to speed up housework, offering job amenities like childcare, alleviating contracting frictions to shifting household responsibilities to family members or neighbors, making it more socially acceptable to shift household responsibilities, or offering a psychosocial intervention to help women entering the labor market evaluate what they want their main role in life to be.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Baseline Characteristics and Balance

	Control Mean (Std Dev) (1)	Treat Mean (Std Dev) (2)	Reg Coeff [P-Value] (3)
Age	29.484	29.355	-0.172
	(5.830)	(5.629)	[0.740]
Married (=1)	0.992	0.992	0.000
	(0.090)	(0.091)	[0.962]
Lives in In-Laws' Village (=1)	0.992	0.975	-0.014
	(0.090)	(0.156)	[0.193]
Number of Adults in HH	4.157	4.074	-0.046
	(2.528)	(2.606)	[0.865]
Parent-in-Law in HH (=1)	0.556	0.533	-0.018
	(0.498)	(0.500)	[0.697]
Number of Children	2.681	2.599	-0.083
	(1.506)	(1.609)	[0.558]
Pregnant (=1)	0.073	0.083	0.012
	(0.260)	(0.276)	[0.607]
From Scheduled Caste or Tribe (=1)	0.488	0.525	0.009
	(0.501)	(0.500)	[0.755]
No Education (=1)	0.419	0.504	0.075
	(0.494)	(0.501)	[0.098]
Working off Own Farm (=1)	0.145	0.136	-0.004
	(0.353)	(0.344)	[0.889]
Observations	248	242	490

Notes: Data in this table come from women's baseline surveys. Columns (1) and (2) present the means of given baseline variables in the control and treatment groups. Standard deviations are below the means in parentheses. Column (3) presents the coefficients from regressions of given baseline variables on a treatment indicator. The regressions include strata fixed effects and cluster standard errors by household. P-values are below the coefficients in brackets.

Table 2: Effects on Women's Employment in the Short Run

	Firm's Program		Working off Own Farm		Any Short-Run Work	
	Applied	Attended	at 1 Week	at 4 Months	Full Sample	Surveyed at 4 Months
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Promo Treat	0.101	0.069	0.073	0.062	0.112	0.129
	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.044)
	[0.006]	[0.012]	[0.026]	[0.136]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.230	0.089	0.127	0.189	0.226	0.276
N	490	490	416	391	490	391

Notes: The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) come from records on participation in the firm's program. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for ever applying for the firm's program. The outcome in column (2) is an indicator for ever attending the firm's program prior to the four-month endline survey. The outcomes in columns (3) and (4) are from surveys with women one week and four months after the intervention. They are indicators for women having worked for income off their households' farms in the two weeks preceding the survey. The outcome in columns (5) and (6) is an indicator for any of the outcomes in columns (2)-(4) equaling 1. Column (5) presents effects in the full sample, while the sample in column (6) is restricted to women who took the four-month endline survey. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table 3: Effects on Opinions in Survey Experiment

	Work and Workplace (Indices)			Implications for HH Life (Indices)		General Female Employment	
	Financial Value	Physical Space	Workplace Interactions	Chores Allocation	Women's Control	Attitudes Index	Opportunity Unique (=1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Promo Treat	0.443	0.285	0.070	0.075	0.017	0.157	-0.096
	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.058)
	[0.000]	[0.010]	[0.553]	[0.508]	[0.881]	[0.156]	[0.097]
Control Mean	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.698
N	371	371	370	370	370	370	370

Notes: The data are from family members' responses in the opinions survey experiment, described in Section 3.3. The outcomes in columns (1)-(3) are indices of favorable opinions on the financial value of the program (including the pay, hours, and work stability), the physical workspace (including loom center facilities and safety of participants), and workplace interactions (including interactions between participants, between participants and supervisors, and between participants and men outside their households). The outcome in columns (4) and (5) are indices reflecting how the respondent expected women's participation in the program would affect the allocation of household chores and women's control in the household. Higher values of the indices reflect more reallocation of chores and more control for women in the household. The outcome in column (6) is an index of attitudes about women's employment. Higher values of the index reflect more progressive attitudes. The outcome in column (7) is an indicator for saying households in the village never get opportunities like the one the partner firm offers. See Appendix Section C.2 for full details on the outcomes in this table. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table 4: Effects on Women's Empowerment in Household Decision-Making

	Woman Decides Index	Woman's Spending on Women's Goods (Rs)	Chose Discussion
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Promo Treat	0.184	19.871	0.140
	(0.092)	(11.503)	(0.077)
	[0.045]	[0.085]	[0.070]
Mid Price			-0.196
			(0.089)
			[0.028]
Promo Treat X Mid Price			-0.136
			(0.126)
			[0.282]
High Price			-0.122
			(0.089)
			[0.172]
Promo Treat X High Price			-0.305
			(0.121)
			[0.012]
P-Value: Treat + Treat X Mid = 0			0.969
P-Value: Treat + Treat X High = 0			0.079
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes
Omitted Group Mean	0.000	411.017	0.696
N	390	356	353

Notes: The outcomes are from women's four-month surveys. Women were asked who in their households usually makes decisions about spending on food, spending on clothing, spending on education, whether to purchase large household items, how much to save, what to do if a child falls sick, and how money their husbands earn is spent. I define indicators that take the value of one if the woman said she made the decision alone or together with others, and zero otherwise. I aggregate the indicators into a summary index, which is the outcome in column (1). The outcomes in columns (2) and (3) are from the incentivized choices described in Section 4.3.2. The outcome in column (2) is the amount, in rupees, women allocated to women's goods, and the outcome in column (3) is an indicator for women choosing to discuss with their husbands. Column (2)'s outcome is only observed for women who entered the lotteries, and column (3)'s outcome is only observed for women who entered and who were married. The "mid price" and "high price" covariates are indicators for the price of discussion with the husband being 50 and 100 rupees, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table 5: Effects on Attitudes about Women's Employment and on Women's Mobility

	Female Employment Attitudes Index		Hours Woman Spent Out
	Family	Woman	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Promo Treat	0.175	0.137	0.530
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.279)
	[0.101]	[0.193]	[0.059]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	-0.000	0.000	1.255
N	374	390	390

Notes: The outcomes are from women's and family members' four-month surveys. The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) are indices of attitudes about women's employment reported by family members and by women. Higher values of the indices reflect more progressive attitudes. The outcome in column (3) is the number of hours women spent the day preceding their surveys outside of their homes. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table 6: Effects on Women's Time Use

	Worked Outside Yesterday (=1)	Hours Woman Spent Yesterday on:			
		Work Outside	Chores	Leisure	Night Sleep
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Promo Treat	0.071	0.532	-0.249	-0.391	0.028
	(0.034)	(0.250)	(0.337)	(0.182)	(0.171)
	[0.039]	[0.034]	[0.461]	[0.033]	[0.869]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.113	0.732	8.764	1.631	8.626
N	390	390	390	390	390

Notes: The outcomes are from women's four-month surveys. The outcomes in columns (2)-(4) are the number of hours women spent the preceding day on: paid work outside of the home, household chores, leisure activities, and nighttime sleep. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for spending any time the preceding day on paid work outside of the home. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table 7: Effects on Women's Employment in the Long Run

	Working off Own Farm, at 1 Year (1)	Working in Program, at 1 Year (2)	Working off Own Farm, at 1 Year (3)	Working off Own Farm, at 1 Year (4)	How Good Program Is (Std Dev) (5)
Promo Treat	-0.014	0.019		0.443	0.225
	(0.042)	(0.020)		(0.226)	(0.093)
	[0.731]	[0.353]		[0.054]	[0.016]
Hrs Chores at 4 Mon			-0.036	0.037	
			(0.019)	(0.023)	
			[0.069]	[0.112]	
Promo Treat X Hrs Chores at 4 Mon				-0.073	
				(0.030)	
				[0.018]	
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Control Mean	0.186	0.017		0.419	0.000
Treatment Mean			0.375		
Sample	All Surveyed	All Surveyed	Treatment & Working at 4 Mon	Working at 4 Mon	All Surveyed
N	334	334	40	71	334

Notes: The outcomes are from women's one-year surveys. The outcome in columns (1), (3), and (4) is an indicator for women having worked for income off their households' farms in the two weeks preceding the survey. The outcome in column (2) is an indicator for women having worked in the firm's program in the preceding two weeks. At one year, women were asked how good of an opportunity for women they thought the firm's program was. The outcome in column (5) is their response, reported in units of standard deviations from the control group mean. The sample in column (3) is restricted to women in the treatment group who worked for income off their households' farms in the two weeks preceding their four-month surveys. The sample in column (4) includes both treatment and control women who were working at four months. The "Hrs Chores at 4 Mon" covariate is the hours women spent on household chores the day preceding their four-month surveys – it is the outcome in column (3) of Table 6. The average hours spent on chores among women working at four months was 6.4 in the treatment group and 7.0 in the control group. Standard errors are robust in column (3) and clustered by household in all other columns. Standard errors are in parentheses, and P-values are in brackets.

Figure 1: Study Timeline



Figure 2: Kernel Densities of Woman Decides Index and of Woman's Spending on Women's Goods



Notes: This figure presents kernel densities, separately for the treatment and control groups, of the outcomes in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.

Figure 3: Effects on Women's Reports of Making Particular Decisions



Notes: This figure presents effects on the components of the index in column (1) of Table 4. The treatment-control differences are estimated conditional on strata fixed effects and covariates selected using PDS Lasso. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample sizes for the seven regressions are 390, 390, 389, 390, 390, 389, and 390.

Appendix A: Supplementary Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Balance in Compliance and Attrition

	Attended Info Meeting		Surveyed at 1 Week		Surveyed at 4 Months			Entered Lotteries		Surveyed at 1 Year
	Woman	Family	Woman	Family	Woman	Family	Husband	Woman	Husband	Woman
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	-0.000	-0.025	-0.007	0.033	0.010	0.018	-0.029	0.017	-0.010	-0.028
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.043)
	[0.990]	[0.479]	[0.820]	[0.398]	[0.800]	[0.627]	[0.519]	[0.681]	[0.824]	[0.510]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.867	0.823	0.855	0.758	0.790	0.766	0.581	0.714	0.484	0.694
N	490	490	490	490	490	490	490	490	490	490

Notes: The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) are indicators for women and women's family members, respectively, attending the meetings in which the job details and/or promotion were given. The outcomes in columns (3)-(6) are indicators for women and family members being surveyed at one week and at four months. The outcome in column (7) is an indicator for four-month family member surveys being taken by husbands. The outcomes in columns (8) and (9) are indicators for women and husbands entering the lotteries that were part of the four-month surveys. The outcome in column (10) is an indicator for women being surveyed at one year. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table A.2: Tables 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 Reweighted for Attrition (Part 1/2)

	Firm's Program		Working off Own Farm		Any Short-Run Work		Woman Decides Index	Woman's Spending	Chose Discussion
	Applied	Attended	at 1 Wk	at 4 Mon	Full Sample	Surveyed at 4 Mon		(Rs)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Promo Treat	0.106	0.072	0.069	0.074	0.112	0.127	0.208	19.629	0.136
	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.095)	(11.990)	(0.079)
	[0.005]	[0.010]	[0.039]	[0.066]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.028]	[0.103]	[0.087]
Mid Price									-0.211
									(0.093)
									[0.024]
Promo Treat X Mid Price									-0.121
									(0.129)
									[0.349]
High Price									-0.148
									(0.092)
									[0.109]
Promo Treat X High Price									-0.278
									(0.123)
									[0.025]
P-Value: Treat + Treat X Mid = 0									0.884
P-Value: Treat + Treat X High = 0									0.138
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weighted Omitted Group Mean	0.232	0.092	0.126	0.179	0.223	0.266	0.013	411.357	0.700
N	490	490	416	391	490	391	390	356	353

Notes: See notes for the second part of the table (next page).

Table A.2: Tables 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 Reweighted for Attrition (Part 2/2)

	Employment Attitudes Index		Hours Spent Out	Worked Out Yesterday	Hours Woman Spent Yesterday on:				Working off Own Farm	Working in Program	How Good Program Is
	Family	Woman		(=1)	Work Out	Chores	Leisure	Sleep	at 1 Year	at 1 Year	(Std Dev)
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Promo Treat	0.172	0.101	0.584	0.077	0.565	-0.277	-0.351	-0.077	-0.019	0.028	0.256
	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.279)	(0.034)	(0.250)	(0.344)	(0.188)	(0.174)	(0.043)	(0.020)	(0.099)
	[0.108]	[0.354]	[0.037]	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.421]	[0.063]	[0.660]	[0.661]	[0.159]	[0.010]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weighted Control Mean	0.029	0.044	1.219	0.105	0.703	8.846	1.554	8.712	0.200	0.013	-0.016
N	374	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	334	334	334

Notes: This table replicates analyses done in Tables 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 but weights the data to account for attrition.

Table A.3: Additional Short-Run Employment Analyses

	Working Elsewhere, at 4 Months	Any Work, Short Run
	(1)	(2)
Promo Treat	0.027	0.148
	(0.034)	(0.047)
	[0.428]	[0.002]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.107	0.297
N	391	353

Notes: The outcome in column (1) is from women's four-month surveys. It is an indicator for women having done work for income in the two preceding weeks that was off their households' farms and not in the firm's program. The outcome in column (2) is the same as the outcome in column (5) of Table 2. The sample is limited to women for whom I observe the outcome in column (3) of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table A.4: Effects on Opinions from One-Week Surveys

	Family Said Reason For/Against Applying Was (=1):				Woman Said Reason For/Against Applying Was (=1):			
	Money	Learn Skill	Chores	Inappro-priate	Money	Learn Skill	Chores	Inappro-priate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Promo Treat	0.113	0.074	-0.050	-0.023	0.116	0.066	-0.069	-0.020
	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.022)
	[0.014]	[0.033]	[0.323]	[0.393]	[0.010]	[0.071]	[0.142]	[0.370]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.340	0.106	0.473	0.069	0.434	0.160	0.476	0.071
N	378	378	378	378	416	416	416	416

Notes: The data are from family members' and women's one-week surveys. Respondents were asked what reasons they saw for and against applying to the firm's program. The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) are indicators for family members citing the household earning extra money and the woman learning a valuable skill as reasons to apply. The outcomes in columns (3) and (4) are indicators for family members saying the woman having too many household duties and it being inappropriate for a woman to work outside of the home as reasons to not apply. The outcomes in columns (5)-(8) are the same variables from women's surveys. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table A.5: Effects on Husbands' Reports of Decision-Making and Spending on Women's Goods

	Woman Decides Index, Husband's Reports	Husband's Spending on Women's Goods (Rs)	Woman's Prediction of Husband's Spending (Rs)	
			Don't Know Missing	Don't Know = 250
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Promo Treat	0.095	-16.766	5.580	4.385
	(0.116)	(24.902)	(23.407)	(19.033)
	[0.417]	[0.502]	[0.812]	[0.818]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.000	326.500	192.361	202.571
N	278	235	288	353

Notes: The outcomes are from women's and family members' four-month surveys. The outcome in column (1) is the same as the outcome in column (1) of Table 4 except that it uses husbands' rather than women's reports. The outcomes in columns (2)-(4) are based on the incentivized choices described in Section 4.3.2. The outcome in column (2) is the amount, in rupees, husbands allocated to women's goods. The outcomes in columns (3) and (4) are women's predictions of husbands' spending on women's goods, but the two outcomes differ in their handling of "don't know" responses – such responses are set to missing in column (3), while in column (4) are coded as 250, the expected value with a uniform belief distribution. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table A.6: Differences between Family Members' and Women's Attitudes about Women's Employment in the Control Group

	Family Mean (Std Dev) (1)	Woman Mean (Std Dev) (2)	Reg Coeff [P-Value] (3)
Ok for Women to Go Out to Work for Money (=1)	0.622	0.774	0.152
	(0.486)	(0.419)	[0.001]
A Woman's Main Role Should Be Chores (=1) X -1	-0.856	-0.831	0.026
	(0.352)	(0.376)	[0.491]
Both Women and Men Should Earn to Contribute to HH (=1)	0.963	0.964	0.001
	(0.190)	(0.187)	[0.945]
A Husband Should Earn More than Wife (=1) X -1	-0.856	-0.800	0.056
	(0.352)	(0.401)	[0.144]
Appropriateness (1-5) of Women Working in Construction	2.585	3.000	0.415
	(1.788)	(1.847)	[0.026]
Appropriateness (1-5) of Women Working as Weaver	3.005	3.200	0.195
	(1.834)	(1.841)	[0.301]
Appropriateness (1-5) of Women Working as Teacher	4.399	4.559	0.160
	(1.294)	(1.117)	[0.197]
Observations	188	195	383

Notes: The data are from family members' and women's four-month surveys. The sample is limited to the control group. Column (1) presents the means of each component of the female employment attitudes index for family members (the outcome in column (1) of Table 5). Standard deviations are below the means in parentheses. Column (2) presents the same statistics using women's responses. Column (3) presents the coefficients from regressions of each attitude variable on an indicator for the response coming from women rather than family members. P-values, based on robust standard errors, are below the coefficients in brackets.

Table A.7: Effects on Mobility Excluding Paid Work, Family Members' Time Spent on Chores, and Women's Happiness

	Hrs Woman Spent Out and Not Working	Hrs Family Member Spent on Chores	Woman's Happiness (Std Dev)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Promo Treat	-0.009	0.336	0.039
	(0.136)	(0.336)	(0.093)
	[0.948]	[0.318]	[0.674]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.523	3.287	-0.000
N	390	374	391

Notes: The outcomes are from women's and family members' four-month surveys. The outcome in column (1) is the number of hours women spent the preceding day on activities outside of their homes that were not paid work. The outcome in column (2) is the number of hours the surveyed family member spent the preceding day on household chores. The outcome in column (3) is women's reports of how happy they are overall in life, reported in units of standard deviations from the control group mean. Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.

Table A.8: Effects on Short-Run Employment Among Women Surveyed at One Year

	Firm's Program		Working off Own Farm		Any Short-Run Work
	Applied	Attended	at 1 Week	at 4 Months	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Promo Treat	0.122	0.101	0.061	0.066	0.136
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.048)
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.140]	[0.194]	[0.005]
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.273	0.110	0.139	0.208	0.267
N	334	334	310	296	334

Notes: This table does the same analyses as in columns (1)-(5) of Table 2 except the sample here is limited to women who were surveyed at one year.

Figure A.1: Kernel Densities of Woman Decides Index from Husband's Reports and of Husband's Spending on Women's Goods

(a) Woman Decides Index, Husband's Reports



(b) Husband's Spending on Women's Goods



Notes: This figure presents kernel densities, separately for the treatment and control groups, of the outcomes in columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A.5.

Figure A.2: Kernel Densities of Woman's Prediction of Husband's Spending on Women's Goods



Notes: This figure presents kernel densities, separately for the treatment and control groups, of the outcomes in columns (3) and (4) of Appendix Table A.5.

Figure A.3: Effects on Husbands' Reports of Women Making Particular Decisions



Notes: This figure presents effects on the components of the index in column (1) of Appendix Table A.5. The treatment-control differences are estimated conditional on strata fixed effects and covariates selected using PDS Lasso. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample sizes for the seven regressions are 278, 278, 278, 278, 277, 277, and 277.

Figure A.4: Effects on Family Members' Attitudes about Female Employment



Notes: This figure presents effects on the components of the index in column (3) of Table **??**. The treatment-control differences are estimated conditional on strata fixed effects and covariates selected using PDS Lasso. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample sizes for the seven regressions are 374, 374, 374, 374, 373, 373, and 373.

Figure A.5: Effects on Women's Attitudes about Female Employment



Notes: This figure presents effects on the components of the index in column (2) of Table **??**. The treatment-control differences are estimated conditional on strata fixed effects and covariates selected using PDS Lasso. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample size for each of the seven regressions is 390.

Figure A.6: Time Spent on Specific Household Chores in Control Group



Notes: This figure visualizes how much time is spent on the various activities that constitute the time spent on chores outcome in column (3) of Table 6. The sample is restricted to the control group.

Figure A.7: Reasons for Dropping Out of Firm's Program in First Three Months



Notes: This figures visualizes the reasons women dropped out of the firm's program in the first three months of training, the months for which I recorded reasons for dropout. Each bar represents the percentage of women for whom a given reason was provided. Multiple reasons could be selected for each woman. The sample is restricted to women who (1) applied and were invited to participate (either when the program began or later from the waitlist), (2) attended at least once, and (3) later dropped out.

Appendix B: Deviations from Registered Outcomes

Here I detail deviations from the outcomes described in the document uploaded to the original study's registration. See Section 3.4 for background on the document and registration.

B.1 Primary Outcomes

1. Due to power concerns, I only include outcomes that represent changes nearly all women with "first stage" effects (i.e. effects on their employment or on their households' assessments of their earnings potential) would experience. Specifically, I exclude outcomes in the categories: women's risk taking, generalized self-efficacy, gender attitudes about topics aside from women's employment,[19] husbands' work, household saving, fertility, and children's education.[20] The rationale is best illustrated with an example. One of the registered outcomes that I do not consider is whether women had a savings goal at four months. I conduct a power calculation for this outcome using the realized control mean, sample and cluster sizes, intra-cluster correlation, correlation between covariates and the outcome, and assumptions of $\alpha = 0.1$ and $\beta = 0.8$. I estimate that I am powered to detect an increase of 12 percentage points on this outcome, off a base of 35.4%. The effect on any measure of short-run employment for women surveyed at four months was 12.9 percentage points (column (6) of Table 2). As discussed in Section 4.3, I do not observe all short-run employment, and the treatment could have affected primary outcomes even if women did not start work by changing beliefs about women's earnings potential. Suppose the true, unobserved first stage were 20 percentage points, meaning the intervention changed employment decisions or beliefs of earnings potential for 20 percent of women. That is, 60% of women who experienced a first stage effect would need to develop savings goals for me to detect an effect on that outcome. 60% seems implausibly high given any effect of employment or perceived earnings potential on savings goals is likely to be quite indirect.

2. I do not consider outcomes measured at one year since there was no effect on employment at that time.

3. I do not present effects on women's involvement in household decisions regarding their work (i.e. whether they work and how their earnings are spent) because: (i) the pro-

[19] i.e. Attitudes about women's involvement in household decision-making, women's ideas, domestic violence, and female children.

[20] I include the following categories of outcomes: household decision-making, women's time use, women's mobility, women's happiness, and household attitudes about women's employment.

motion could have had a direct effect on family members' involvement in decisions on women's work, separate from any indirect effect via employment or perceived earnings potential, and (ii) the treatment would have affected whether women had earnings and not just who controlled them.

4. I make two modifications to the attitudes about women's employment outcomes: (i) I do not exclude outcomes for which over 75% of control group responses are the same because doing so would produce indices of different attitudes for women and for family members, and (ii) I use responses of any family member surveyed and not just husbands because the attitudes of parents-in-law are also important for decisions about women's labor supply.

B.2 Secondary Outcomes

1. For brevity, I focus on six categories of secondary outcomes rather than the full set of 20 listed. The six I focus on are outcomes that are strongly affected by the treatment and document how the treatment changed opinions, outcomes that were not affected but which were discussed a great deal in the treatment, or outcomes that investigate potential channels through which the treatment could have affected primary outcomes.

2. To match what I do for primary outcomes, I study outcomes at the woman level rather than at the family-member level or separately for husbands, mothers-in-law, and fathers-in-law.

3. I make three modifications to the secondary outcomes on basic program details and exposure to men: (i) I exclude opinions on distance to the loom center because many respondents said the loom center was too close to their house for a woman in their household to participate, which suggests the question was not well understood, (ii) I split the index into indices on the financial value of the program, the physical workspace, and workplace interactions as this makes it clearer which opinions about the program were changed, and (iii) I put the outcome on exposure to men in the workplace interactions index as exposure to men is a component of workplace interactions.

4. I exclude one item – woman will be part of enrollment decision – from the index on women's control in the household. The two items I consider provide a more direct test of a potential channel for effects on the primary outcomes related to women's empowerment in the household.

5. The choice set for the exposure to men and rarity of opportunity outcomes included various time intervals,[21] never, and don't know. I use indicators for saying never rather than more continuous variables reflecting frequency because (i) this offers a natural coding for don't know's, and (ii) it is not clear how to define a cardinal scale for the various time intervals.

6. To match what is done for the primary outcomes, I do not exclude outcomes on attitudes about women's employment for which over 75% of control group responses are the same.

B.3 Additional Notes

1. I present effects on several outcomes that were not in the document: (i) reasons family members and women provided for and against applying for the firm's program at one week, (ii) the time women spent on paid work outside the home the day before their four-month surveys, (iii) whether women had done any work outside the home the day before their four-month surveys, (iv) women's predictions of husbands' spending on women's goods in the lottery on the four-month survey, and (v) women's opinions about the firm's program at one year. (i) is useful for validating results from the opinions survey experiment and confirming that women adopted changes in their family members' beliefs. (ii) is useful for interpreting effects on other categories of time use, and (iii) is useful for estimating how much time working women spend working each day. I present effects on (iv) because it is useful for interpreting women's decisions to discuss the lottery prize with their husbands and because husbands' actual spending is often missing. (v) is useful for understanding why effects on employment faded.

2. The document mentions aggregating outcomes by creating summary indices and by conducting tests of joint significance. I do the former but not the latter. This is because I use post-double-selection Lasso to select control variables for primary outcomes, which results in different controls being selected for different outcomes. It is not obvious which of these controls should be included when conducting a joint test for multiple outcomes.

[21] i.e. Once every few months, once a month, 2-3 times a month, once a week, 2-6 times a week, once a day, and more than once a day.

Appendix C: Details on Outcome Variables

C.1 Employment Outcomes

Applied. This outcome is an indicator for women applying to the firm's program on the official application day, the alternate application day, or outside of the two application days, and being in the correct age range (18-40).

Attended. This outcome is an indicator for women having ever attended the firm's program prior to the average date of women's four-month surveys.

Working off Own Farm. On their surveys, women were asked whether they had worked for income in any of several common employment sectors in the preceding two weeks. The employment sectors were agriculture on own household's land, agriculture off own household's land, husbandry of own household's animals, husbandry of animals not owned by own household, own household's micro-enterprise, casual non-farm labor, employment at a firm, anganwadi work, teaching, and NREGA. Participants were able to report work that did not fit into one of these sectors in an other category. On the surveys done after the firm's program began (the four-month and one-year surveys), the program was added as its own sector. This outcome takes the value of 1 when women reported work in any sector except agriculture on own household's land and husbandry of own household's animals; it takes the value of 0 when women had worked only on their own farms, had done no work, or selected don't know.

Any Short-Run Work. This outcome is an indicator for *Attended*, *Working off Own Farm* at one week, or *Working off Own Farm* at four months equaling 1.

Working Elsewhere. This outcome comes from the same question as *Working off Own Farm*. The outcome takes the value of 1 when women reported work in any sector except agriculture on own household's land, husbandry of own household's animals, and the firm's program; it takes the value of 0 when women had worked only on their own farms or in the firm's program, had done no work, or selected don't know.

Working in Program. This outcome comes from the same question as *Working off Own Farm*. The outcome takes the value of 1 when women reported working in the firm's program; it takes the value of 0 when women had worked only in other sectors, had done no work, or selected don't know.

C.2 Opinions Outcomes

Financial Value Index. This outcome is an index of three variables from the opinions survey experiment. The first comes from a question asking family members if they thought the amount women in the firm's program would be paid is too low, too high, or reasonable. The first variable takes the value of 1 if they said the pay was reasonable or too high, and 0 if they said too low or don't know. Family members were also asked if they thought the hours women would be expected to work are too long, too short, or reasonable. The second variable takes the value of 1 if they said reasonable or too short, and 0 if they said too long or don't know. The third comes from a question asking family members to assess on a 1-4 scale how stable they thought the work in the program was. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

Physical Space Index. This outcome is an index of two variables from the opinions survey experiment. The variables come from questions asking family members to assess on a 1-4 scale how good the facilities in the loom center would be and how safe women participating in the program would be. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

Workplace Interactions Index. This outcome is an index of three variables from the opinions survey experiment. The first two come from questions asking family members to assess on a 1-4 scale the extent to which women participating in the program would get along well with one another and the extent to which they would be respected by people who supervise them during work. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3. The third variable comes from a question asking family members how often they thought women participating in the program would be around men who are not in their households. The options were never, once every few months, once a month, 2-3 times a month, once a week, 2-6 times a week, once a day, more than once a day, and don't know. The third variable in the index takes the value of 1 when family members said never; it takes the value of 0 when they provided any other response, including don't know.

Chores Allocation Index. This outcome is an index of two variables from the opinions survey experiment. Family members were asked if they would expect their wife/daughter-in-law to do the same amount of household chores as she does now if she enrolled in the firm's program. The first variable takes the value of -1 if they said yes, and 0 if they said no or don't know. The second variable comes from a question asking family members if they would plan

to do more household chores than they do now if the woman enrolled. The second variable takes the value of 1 if they said yes, and 0 if they said no or don't know.

Women's Control Index. This outcome is an index of two variables from the opinions survey experiment. Family members were asked who in their households they thought would decide how money their wife/daughter-in-law earned were spent if she enrolled in the firm's program. The first variable takes the value of 1 if they said the woman alone or the woman and other household members would decide; it takes the value of 0 if they said others would decide or said don't know. The second variable comes from a question that asked family members to assess on a 1-4 scale the extent to which they thought participation in the firm's program would lead their wife/daughter-in-law to make more important decisions in their households. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

Attitudes Index. This outcome is an index of four variables from the opinions survey experiment. The first two come from questions asking family members if it is alright if women go out for work to earn money, and if both women and men should earn money to contribute financially to the household. Yes's are coded as 1, and no's and don't know's are coded as 0. The third and fourth variables come from questions asking family members if they think a husband should earn more than his wife, and if they think a woman's main role should be to tend to household chores like cooking, cleaning, and managing children. Yes's are coded as -1, and no's and don't know's are coded as 0.

Opportunity Unique (=1). Family members in the opinions survey experiment were asked how often households in their villages get opportunities like the one the firm was offering. The options were never, once every few months, once a month, 2-3 times a month, once a week, 2-6 times a week, once a day, more than once a day, and don't know. This outcome takes the value of 1 when family members said never; it takes the value of 0 when they provided any other response, including don't know.

Family Said Reason For/Against Applying Was (=1): Money, and *Learn Skill.* These two outcomes come from a question on family members' one-week surveys that asked what the main reasons they considered for enrolling in the firm's program were. The options were: household would earn extra money, their wife/daughter-in-law would learn a valuable skill, friends or family members were enrolling, their wife/daughter-in-law insisted she enroll, her husband insisted she enroll, her in-laws/parents insisted she enroll, other reason, no reasons

to enroll, and don't know. Family members could select multiple options. The *Money* outcome takes the value of 1 if responses included the first option; it takes the value of 0 if reasons aside from the first were selected, if respondents said there were no reasons, or if respondents said don't know. *Learn Skill* is defined analogously for the second option.

Family Said Reason For/Against Applying Was (=1): Chores, and *Inappropriate.* These two outcomes come from a question on family members' one-week surveys that asked what the main reasons they considered for not enrolling in the firm's program were. The options were: their wife/daughter-in-law had too many duties at home, she had other employment outside of the home, she was pregnant or had a health issue, there was a problem with this particular opportunity (i.e. dislike of weaving, issue with loom owner, hours long, wage low, far from home, etc.), the household did not need extra money, it wasn't appropriate for a woman to work outside of the home, friends and family members were not enrolling, their wife/daughter-in-law refused to enroll, her husband refused to let her enroll, her in-laws/parents refused to let her enroll, other reason, no reasons to not enroll, and don't know. The *Chores* outcome takes the value of 1 if responses included the first option; it takes the value of 0 if reasons aside from the first were selected, if respondents said there were no reasons, or if respondents said don't know. *Inappropriate* is defined analogously for the sixth option.

Woman Said Reason For/Against Applying Was (=1): Money, Learn Skill, Chores, and *Inappropriate.* These four outcomes come from women's one-week surveys. They are based on questions analogous to the ones that generated the *Family Said Reason For/Against Applying Was (=1): Money, Learn Skill, Chores,* and *Inappropriate* outcomes, and they are defined analogously to those outcomes.

C.3 Empowerment in Decision-Making Outcomes

Woman Decides Index. Women were asked who in their households usually makes decisions about: spending on food, spending on clothing, spending on children's education, whether to purchase large household items, how much money to save, what to do if a child falls sick, and how husband's earnings will be spent. For each category of decisions, I create an indicator that takes the value of 1 if women said they alone or they plus others make such decisions, and 0 if they said others make such decisions, don't know, or not applicable (because their households do not make such decisions). This outcome is an index of these seven indicators.

Woman Decides Index, Husbands Reports. This is the same as *Woman Decides Index* except that reports come from husbands rather than women.

Woman's Spending on Women's Goods. This outcome is the amount women allocated towards saris/salwar suits and bangles in their first lotteries. This outcome is in rupees, and women allocated a total of 500 rupees.

Husband's Spending on Women's Goods. This is the same as *Women's Spending on Women's Goods*, except that it reflects choices made by husbands rather than women.

Woman's Prediction of Husband's Spending, Don't Know Missing. Women were told their husbands would be entered into a lottery that was identical to women's first lotteries. They were asked how much they thought their husbands would allocate to each of the four goods. This outcome is the sum of the amounts women thought their husbands would spend on saris/salwar suits and bangles. The outcome is set to missing if women said they didn't know how their husbands would allocate the money. It is only observed for married women who entered the lotteries.

Woman's Prediction of Husband's Spending, Don't Know = 250. This outcome is the same as *Woman's Prediction of Husband's Spending, Don't Know Missing* except that don't know's are coded as 250, the expected value with a uniform belief distribution.

Chose Discussion. This outcome comes from the second lottery for women. It is an indicator for women choosing to discuss allocation of prize money with their husbands instead of getting the same allocation their husbands chose. Women were not told what their husbands had chosen, and often their husbands had not yet been surveyed when women made their choices, so this decision reflects what women thought their husbands would choose. This outcome is only observed for married women.

C.4 Household Attitudes about Women's Employment Outcomes

Female Employment Attitudes Index, Woman. This outcome is an index of seven variables. The first four are the same variables in the *Attitudes Index* described in Section C.2 above, except they are based on responses of women in the main sample rather than family mem-

bers in the opinions survey experiment. The last three variables come from questions asking women how appropriate, on a 1-4 scale, it would be for women in their households to hold full-time jobs outside of the home as: construction laborers, weavers, and teachers. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

Female Employment Attitudes Index, Family. This is the same as *Female Employment Attitudes Index, Woman* except that it includes the responses of family members in the main sample rather than women in the main sample.

C.5 Time Use and Mobility Outcomes

These outcomes come from a time-use module that asked women what time they woke up and went to bed the previous day (rounded to the nearest hour) and then asked what they did each hour in between. As much as possible, surveys were scheduled so that the previous day would not have been a Sunday or a holiday. The activities for each hour in between were categorized across 36 options:

1. Sleeping or resting
2. Personal hygiene (e.g. bathing, getting dressed, urinating/defecating, etc)
3. Eating
4. Preparing/serving food
5. Cleaning (e.g. cleaning the home, cleaning utensils, etc)
6. Washing clothes
7. Fetching water or firewood
8. Tending to own livestock
9. Tending to own field
10. Producing item for household consumption (e.g. cow dung cakes, baskets, blankets, making/repairing clothes, etc)
11. Building or repairing own home
12. Caring for young children (e.g. bathing young children, supervising young children, playing with young children, etc)
13. Educating children (e.g. helping children with homework/studies, taking children to school, etc)

14. Going to market or store
15. Work for in kind payment, at home
16. Work for in kind payment, outside home
17. Work for income, at home
18. Work for income, outside home
19. Seeking health care for self
20. Seeking health care for child
21. Seeking health care for other adult
22. In transit to destination outside of neighborhood
23. Spending time with friends or family, at home
24. Spending time with friends or family, outside of home but in village
25. Spending time with friends or family, outside of village
26. Talking on phone with household member
27. Talking on phone with friend or family member who lives outside of home but in village
28. Talking on phone with friend or family member who lives outside of village
29. Studying or learning something new
30. Gambling
31. Watching television or listening to music
32. Praying at home
33. Visiting temple
34. Attending organized village activity outside of home (e.g. village fair, self-help group meeting, panchayat meeting, wedding, funeral)
35. Other
36. Don't know

To estimate time spent on a particular activity, any don't know's for waking hours are counted as 0 time. When multiple options are selected for a waking hour, I allocate the hour evenly across the options.

Hours Woman Spent on Work Outside. This outcome is the hours women devoted to activities 16 or 18.

Hours Woman Spent on Chores. This outcome is the hours women devoted to activities 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.

Hours Woman Spent on Leisure. This outcome is the hours women devoted to activities 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, or 34.

Hours Woman Spent on Night Sleep. This outcome is the hours women devoted to nighttime sleep, and is computed based on the time women reported waking up and going to bed the previous day. If the women said they woke up before 12am the preceding day, their wake-up time is treated as 12am. If they reported going to bed after 12am on the current day, they are treated as having gone to bed at 12am.

Hours Woman Spent Out. This outcome is the hours women devoted to activities 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 33, or 34.

Hours Woman Spent Out and Not Working. This is the same as *Hours Woman Spent Out*, except that it excludes hours devoted to activities 16 and 18.

Hours Family Member Spent on Chores. This is the same as *Hours Woman Spent on Chores* except that it is based on the time use of the surveyed family members rather than the women.

C.6 Miscellaneous Outcomes

Women's Happiness. Women were asked if overall in life they were not at all happy, not very happy, rather happy, or very happy. I assign these responses values of 1, 2, 4, and 5, respectively, and assign don't know responses the value of 3. I then convert the variable into units of standard deviations from the control group mean.

How Good Program Is. Women were asked how good on a 1-4 scale they think the firm's weaving training and employment opportunity for women is. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3. I then convert the variable into units of standard deviations from the control group mean.

Appendix D: Additional Information on Promotion Intervention

Transcript of Promotional Video

Female Narrator: Greetings. I want to tell you about a unique and exciting opportunity your household has been selected for. This is a special woman's weaving training and employment program arranged by Obeetee. Now let us talk to an Obeetee official.

Obeetee Official: I am [name, omitted from transcript to protect confidentiality] and I manage all of Obeetee's hand-knotted carpet weaving business. The working environment for people who work here is really good and the weavers who are associated with the company also work under a good environment. I would like to reiterate that all of you should be aware about this program and come to work under this program.

Female Narrator: Today we will meet a few households who have participated in this program in other villages. Now, let us talk to a loom owner.

Female Loom Owner: Only females work in this loom. The male loom center is located separately. Only the female center is located here and only females work here. They live nearby. I am responsible for ensuring the safety of the women who work here. If any need arises, if their children have any problem, they tell me and I solve them as much as I can. For very small kids, we have arranged a cradle. The females feed their children and put them to sleep in the cradle after that. The children keep sleeping while women continue their work. Once the child wakes up, she can check up on them since they're nearby. There is also a toilet facility and water supply available. People don't have to go outside since everything is available here. They come between 8-8:30am and work for around 4 hours and go home at 12pm. The lunch lasts for 1 hour. When they leave at 12pm, they eat food, solve any issues at home and return after an hour. If they live far away, there are arrangements for them. There is a room for them to have lunch and it also has a water facility available. They wash their tiffins and keep them here itself.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to the husband of another loom owner.

Husband of Another Loom Owner: The unemployed women from 2-3 nearby villages came to our loom and work in the loom operated by Obeetee. Only females work in the female center, not males. Their household members are very satisfied with their work because they complete household chores both in the morning and in the afternoon. They come during the day and work from 8am to 5pm and have lunch in the afternoon and also earn money.

The place is also safe for them to work. Till 8am, they finish off all their household chores and because they live nearby and in case of emergencies, because they live nearby, they can go home easily since there are no hindrances. They maintain a cordial relationship with each other and are positively predisposed to each other. If need be, they can borrow and lend amongst one other. I also maintain a brotherly relationship with them and help them overcome any problems. This helps them out and this improves their household financial status.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to a female weaver.

Female Weaver 1: I wake up at 5 in the morning and then I keep something to cook on the stove, then I prepare tiffins for my children. Then after washing clothes, I report to the loom at 8am to work. Then I go back to my home after 5pm. Then I meet my kids and ask them what they were taught in school that day. Then they tell me, then I give them some homework which they complete while I complete other household work. The loom is always very clean. The atmosphere is also very cordial and all the females working here are my friends. I like meeting and talking to them. Spending time with them helps me overcome any emotional trouble and I get to learn something new. The atmosphere is also very cordial.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to another female weaver.

Female Weaver 2: I feel very happy that I am working here and I want that if I am working, so should everyone else. Eating and drinking facilities are also available here. There is an electric handpump installed nearby. I am very happy that everything is really nice here.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to a female weaver's husband.

Husband of a Female Weaver: My wife is weaving at the center. I feel really good. She needs to wake up a little early in the morning to do household chores, she finishes off her work by 8am and then reaches the center. After that, when her shift gets over at 5pm, she takes a little bit more time than usual and finishes off her household chores like cooking and washing utensils by 9pm, which she earlier used to be done by 8pm. She thinks positively that if everybody works in the household, the household will progress and this is why she is very satisfied (with her work). Earlier, fewer women used to work in the loom but after watching them work, more women started working.

Female Narrator: As you can see, this is a very attractive and unique training and employment opportunity. I hope you make the best out of this unique and exciting opportunity. Thank you.

Figure D.1: Screenshot from Promotional Video

Notes: This figure shows a screenshot of the video used in the promotion intervention. In it, a female weaver in the firm's program is giving a testimonial about her experience in the program while seated at her workstation.