A Generalized Measure of Bargaining Power, with an Application to EU Law-Making

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Abstract

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a measure of bargaining power that can be applied to any game. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player’s preferences affect outcomes. In the context of two-player games, we show that no other function satisfies a number of desirable properties. We use our measure to investigate the relative influence of the institutions of the European Union on EU legislation. To do so, we structurally estimate a model of legislative bargaining based on observed decisions during the negotiations over each legislative proposal. We find that the distribution of bargaining power is driven by veto rights: While the Treaty of Lisbon substantially increased the power of the European Parliament by giving it a veto, the combined influence of the Commission and the Council of Ministers far exceeds that of the Parliament. This result arises because the status quo is more favourable to the Commission and the Council, making their vetoes more effective.

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1 Introduction

Bargaining power and its sources have long interested economists and social scientists more generally. Examples that have received particular attention include bargaining between buyers and sellers (Dunlop & Higgins 1942, Taylor 1995, Loertscher & Marx 2022), employers and labour unions (Hamermesh 1973, Svejnar 1986, Manning 1987), husband and wife (Basu 2006, Browning et al. 2013, Andenberg et al. 2016), the members of a political alliance (Diermeier et al. 2003, Francois et al. 2015), or legislators (Snyder et al. 2005, Kalandrakis 2006, Ali et al. 2019). In cooperative game theory, a vast literature deriving power indices exists with the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley & Shubik 1954) or the Penrose-Banzhaf index (Penrose 1946, Banzhaf 1965, Dubey & Shapley 1979) being the most famous examples. Cooperative game theory, however, does not model the process through which players interact with one another and is thus not able to answer question such as how the bargaining power of a player depends on their ability to make a counter offer, delay agreement, or veto certain proposals. Understanding the role of such features is important for institutional design, for instance. In non-cooperative game theory, on the other hand, the structure of the interaction between players forms an explicit part of a game, but in this context much less effort has been invested in developing measures of power. A common approach is to assume transferable utility (henceforth TU) and self-interested players, in which case bargaining power can be measured by the expected share of the surplus that each participant receives. But if utility is non-transferable or at least one player feels some degree of altruism, the utility a player achieves in equilibrium need not be informative about this player’s bargaining power. To see this, consider the following example: Three countries form a military alliance and need to decide how to respond to foreign aggression. Country A is hawkish, country B is dovish, and country C prefers a measured response. If the agreed policy coincides with that favoured by country C, it is not clear that this outcome is due to the dominance of Country C or represents a compromise between countries A and B. How can we put a number on the bargaining power of each country?

In this paper, we provide a measure of bargaining power that can be applied across a wide range of contexts. More specifically, we introduce a procedure for calculating each player’s influence in any non-cooperative game of bargaining. We start by introducing a number of axioms that a measure of bargaining power should satisfy. The key idea underlying these axioms is that bargaining power should depend on the degree to which changes in a player’s preferences translate
into changes in the outcome of the game. For example, we call a player a dictator if only this player’s preferences matter for the outcome and specify that such a player should be assigned a bargaining power of one. In the context of two-player games, we show that there exists a unique function satisfying all axioms. This function measures the bargaining power of player $n$ as the degree to which changes in this player’s preferences affect everyone’s utility relative to the case where player $n$ is a dictator. We then propose an extension of this measure to settings with more than two players and show that this function also satisfies all axioms.

We establish conditions under which, for games of transferable utility, our measure is equal to the expected share of the total surplus a player receives in equilibrium, and thus equivalent to the conventional approach to calculating bargaining power in this setting. Whereas the two approaches often coincide, they can also produce notably different results as illustrated by the following example: Suppose there are two players who need to divide a cake among themselves and each player’s utility is given by the share of the cake they receive. With probability .9 the whole cake is given to player 1 and the game ends. With the remaining probability, player 2 is given the opportunity to propose a split. If player 1 accepts such an offer, the split proposed by player 2 is implemented. If player 1 rejects, both players receive nothing. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, player 2 proposes to keep the whole cake and player 1 accepts. The share of the cake (and of the available surplus) that player 1 receives in expectation is therefore equal to .9. However, the preferences of player 1 do not matter for the outcome. For example, the outcome of the game would not change even if player 1 preferred to give all of the cake to player 2. Given that our measure is based on the degree to which changes in a player’s preferences lead to changes in the outcome, it assigns player 1 a bargaining power of zero rather than 0.9. While arguments in favour of either approach to measuring bargaining power exist, the key advantage of our method is that it is not limited to TU settings and can be applied to any game of bargaining.

To demonstrate the usefulness of our measure of bargaining power, we apply it to the legislative process of the European Union. The EU has the power to introduce laws that immediately become binding in all member states. Passing such legislation is a shared responsibility of three institutions, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers. The relative influence of these institutions has been a source of controversy. In particular, a perceived weakness of the European Parliament as the only directly elected institution of the EU has led to claims of a “democratic deficit”. Partly in response to
this criticism, the Treaty of Lisbon sought to strengthen the role of the European Parliament. To evaluate the extent to which this goal was achieved, we formulate a model of the legislative process of the EU. This model is closely tailored to the formal rules that negotiations are subject to, known as the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). We estimate the structural parameters of our model based on data that contain information on the nature and timing of all decisions taken as part of the OLP during the seventh and eighth term of the European Parliament between 2009 and 2019.

Based on the estimated model, it is straightforward to apply our measure of bargaining power. The results show that individually the Parliament has the strongest influence on EU legislation under the OLP. We find that the outcomes of the legislative process are mostly driven by veto rights, since the interests of the Commission and the Council are often diametrically opposed to those of the Parliament. The relatively close alignment between the Commission and the Council has the consequence that the vetoes of these institutions are individually redundant, making them appear weak. We show, however, that collectively their influence far exceeds that of the Parliament. The reason is that the Commission and the Council are favoured by the status quo, making their vetoes more effective in preventing unwanted policy shifts. Additional results reveal that the rules of the OLP by themselves create a fairly level playing field among institutions and that the Treaty of Lisbon substantially strengthened the role of the Parliament by giving it the ability to veto legislation. The predominance of veto rights means that reforms of the legislative process that leave vote rights in place are largely inconsequential for the distribution of bargaining power.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we place our study in the context of the literature, before introducing our measure of bargaining power in Section 3. Section 4 presents the application to the legislative process of the European Union, while Section 5 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our main contribution to the literature is to provide a method for calculating the bargaining power of a player that can be applied to any non-cooperative model of bargaining. In cooperative game theory, a vast literature exists that develops power indices for so-called simple games with a particular interest in voting games (see, for example, Penrose 1946, Shapley & Shubik 1954, Banzhaf 1965, Deegan & Packel 1978, Johnston 1978, Holler 1982, Owen & Shapley 1989). Since a non-
A cooperative game can generally not be expressed as an in some sense equivalent cooperative game. There is no general way to apply power indices intended for cooperative games to non-cooperative games. In non-cooperative game theory, in contrast, the only approach to measuring power that is widely applied is to assume transferable utility and selfish players, in which case power can be measured by the share of the total surplus a player receives (Taylor 1995, Haller & Holden 1997, Kambe 1999, Fréchette et al. 2003, Snyder et al. 2003, Kalandrakis 2006, Ali et al. 2019). Yet, transferable utility is a strong assumption since it requires that players have access to a common currency with constant marginal utility (Myerson 1991, p. 384). When utility is non-transferable, it is in some cases possible to express the equilibrium of the bargaining game as a weighted mean of each player’s most preferred outcome, either in terms of physical outcomes or in terms of utilities. In games with more than two players such weights are often not unique, however, as in the example of the military alliance we provide in the introduction or in our application to EU legislation. Larsen & Zhang (2021) follow this approach to derive a measure of bargaining power for two-player games. Their measure is outcome-based in the sense that it assigns a player a high bargaining power if their utility is close to their best-possible outcome. The same is not necessarily true for our measure, as illustrated by the example in the introduction where player 1 receives almost all of the surplus but is assigned a bargaining power of zero since their preferences have no influence on the allocation. Steunenberg et al. (1999) develop a power measure for games where players’ utilities are a function of the distance between the outcome and their ideal point. They assume a distribution that players preferences and the status quo are drawn from and that the power of a player is inversely proportional to the average distance between their ideal point and the outcome across all possible draws. This procedure is computationally intensive and cannot calculate power conditional on a specific constellation of ideal points. Napel & Widgrén (2004) explore the idea of power as the sensitivity of the outcome of a game to changes in preferences and their approach is in this sense closest to ours. They propose a measure for games

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1Papers that connect cooperative and non-cooperative game theory typically seek to provide a non-cooperative justification for a cooperative solution concept by finding a specific non-cooperative game that generates the same distribution of payoffs as the cooperative solution. See, for example, Hart & Mas-Colell (1996), Krishna & Serrano (1996), Serrano & Vohra (1997), and Laruelle & Valenciano (2008).

2Although in our case power depends both on the rules of the game and preferences, our measure can equally be used to calculate power in an ex-ante sense (before preferences are drawn), by averaging the results across the possible permutations of player preferences. We illustrate this in Section 4.4.
with a one-dimensional outcome space and suggests different ways in which their approach can potentially be generalised. The basis of their measure is the extent to which changes in a player’s ideal outcome shift the outcome of the game, while our axiomatic approach produces a measure of bargaining power that depends on how much a player can affect both their own and the utility of all other players. Furthermore, their focus on marginal shifts in preferences can produce misleading results. We thus go beyond the existing literature by providing a new measure of bargaining power, which is the first measure that can be applied to any non-cooperative game of bargaining. Furthermore, we provide the first axiomatization of a measure of bargaining power in the field of non-cooperative game theory.

We demonstrate the value of our approach in an empirical context by applying it to a structurally estimated model of legislative bargaining in the EU. Empirical approaches to estimating bargaining power broadly fall into three categories. A first class of papers implicitly or explicitly assumes transferable utility so that bargaining power can be equated with observed resource shares (Hamermesh 1973, Knight 2008). A second group of papers relies on data from surveys that elicit information on decision-making power directly from respondents (Allendorf 2007, Lépine & Strobl 2013). By far the most common approach to evaluating bargaining power empirically is based on a cooperative model, namely generalized Nash bargaining (Nash 1950, Roth 1979). Svejnar (1986) and Doiron (1992) estimate models of wage bargaining between employers and labour unions while Draganska et al. (2010) consider bargaining between manufacturers and retailers. Generalized Nash bargaining is also widely used in the search-and-matching literature (See for example Shimer 2005, Cahuc et al. 2006). The collective model of the household (Chiappori 1992) is a cooperative model with a close connection to Nash bargaining. Empirical implementations of this model yield insights into the factors influencing the bargaining between husband and wife, for instance (Chiappori et al. 2002, Browning et al. 2013). A possible drawback of relying on Nash bargaining is that it assumes efficient outcomes. Furthermore, relying on a cooperative approach has the same caveat as in a theoretical setting, namely that the

3 Consider the following example: Two players need to agree on a point on the real line. Each players’ utility is equal to minus the distance between the chosen point and their ideal point. The ideal point of player 1 is equal to 1 and that of player 2 equal to 2. There is a status quo given by 2.5. Player 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to player 2. Player 2 only accepts if the offer is weakly above 1.5 and player 1 thus offers 1.5. A marginal shift in the ideal point of player 1 leaves the outcome unchanged and the measure of Napel & Widgrén thus assigns player 1 a bargaining power of zero. However, player 1 clearly has an influence on the outcome of the game. Our measure assigns both players a bargaining power of .5.

Loertscher & Marx (2022) introduce a framework that, like Nash bargaining, relies on an exogenous vector of bargaining weights, but does not assume efficient outcomes.
process of bargaining itself is not modelled. The role of any formal or informal features of this process in determining the influence of different players, such as the order of moves or veto rights, is therefore difficult or impossible to recover. Our approach makes it possible to explicitly model the process of bargaining and then calculate the bargaining power of each player based on the estimated model.

Our empirical application contributes to the literature evaluating the balance of power among the institutions of the EU. An extensive literature uses voting power indices to analyse the distribution of power within the Council of the European Union (Leech 2002, Felsenthal & Machover 2004, Barr & Passarelli 2009 to give just a few examples). Papers interested in the distribution of power between institutions often use formal models to generate insights into the distribution of influence without providing a quantification (Tsebelis & Garrett 1996, Crombez 1997, Tsebelis 2002). Steunenberg et al. (1999) and Napel & Widgrén (2006, 2011) apply their respective measures of power discussed above to theoretical models of EU politics. A prominent strand of empirical work in this context is based on data collected by the Decisionmaking in the European Union project (Thomson et al. 2006, 2012), which selected 125 legislative proposals and used expert interviews to elicit information on the positions of key actors as well as the final outcome within the context of each proposal. Thomson & Hoshi (2006) and Costello & Thomson (2013) use these data to compute weights that yield the policy that legislators agree on as a weighted average of each of their positions. These studies find that the Council is the most powerful institution. Expert interviews are also used by König et al. (2007) to evaluate relative bargaining power in the Conciliation Committee, which represents a final attempt to achieve agreement on a legislative text. Our quantitative analysis instead uses the entirety of legislative proposals during two terms of the European Parliament as a basis for the calculation of bargaining power. By estimating a structural model, we can account for the strategic choice of proposals and amendments by each institution, and provide insights into the role of individual rules of the European Union’s legislative procedure.

3 A Measure of Bargaining Power

In this section we present our approach to measuring bargaining power. We start by formally defining the setting in which we develop our theory.
3.1 Theoretical Framework

Let $\Gamma$ be a bargaining game. Play of a game $\Gamma$ leads to a physical outcome $o$, such as a distribution of resources, a contract, or a law. The set of all possible outcomes is given by $O$ and contains at least two elements, that is, $|O| \geq 2$. $\mathcal{N}$ denotes the set of players with $N = |\mathcal{N}|$ and $2 \leq N < \infty$. The preferences of player $n$ over the set $O$ are represented by a utility function $u_n$. We assume that $u_n$ attains a maximum on $O$, that is, there exists an outcome $\bar{o} \in O$ such that $u_n(\bar{o}) \geq u_n(o)$ for any $o \in O$. Denote by $\mathcal{U}$ the set of all such utility functions. For a given game, $\mathbf{u}$ is the vector of all players’ utility functions, while $\mathbf{u}_{-n}$ denotes the utility functions of all players other than player $n$.

Due to possible moves of nature or mixed strategies, an equilibrium of $\Gamma$ generates a probability distribution over the set of outcomes $O$. We assume there exists a function $o^*$ that maps vectors of utility functions $\mathbf{u} \in \mathcal{U}^N$ into distributions over the set outcomes $O$. This assumption is satisfied if the equilibrium of $\Gamma$ is always unique, possibly subject to some method of equilibrium selection.

The indirect utility function of player $n$ is defined as the expected utility of the player under the equilibrium distribution $o^*(\mathbf{u})$ over outcomes, that is,

$$v_n(u_n, \mathbf{u}) = \int_O u_n(o) \, d o^*(\mathbf{u}) .$$

(1)

Let $\mathbf{v}$ denote the vector of all players’ indirect utility functions. Note that the utility function of player $n$ appears twice in the definition of the indirect utility function: once explicitly and once as part of the vector $\mathbf{u}$. Importantly, we do not require these utility functions to coincide. The indirect utility function can thus be used to evaluate “hypothetical” outcomes that would occur if the utility function of player $n$ contained in $\mathbf{u}$ was different from the first argument $u_n$. To avoid confusion, we henceforth follow the convention that (vectors of) utility functions such as $u_n$, $\mathbf{u}$, or $\mathbf{u}_{-n}$ refer to the utility functions contained in the definition of the game $\Gamma$. We call these the “endowed” utility functions. In contrast, symbols such as $u'$ or $\mathbf{u}'$ denote arbitrary (vectors of) utility functions. Since we never consider indirect utilities where the first argument is different from player $n$’s

\footnote{All theoretical results below are unaffected if further restrictions are placed on the utility functions contained in $\mathcal{U}$. In particular, any redundant utility functions that represent the same preferences as some other element of $\mathcal{U}$ can be excluded without loss of generality.}

\footnote{While it would be interesting to extend the results to games with multiple equilibria, it is clear that such an approach has limits. For example, in the Baron-Ferejohn model (Baron & Ferejohn 1989), any possible distribution of resources among players can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium unless the additional restriction of stationarity is imposed. It is not clear how such a large set of equilibria would permit any insights about bargaining power.}
endowed utility function, we simplify notation by suppressing dependence on the first argument and simply write $v_n(u)$.

We refer to the indirect utilities that arise if all players were to share the same preferences as agreement payoffs. To define these formally, let $1_{u'}$ be an $N$-vector such that each element is equal to the same utility function $u' \in \mathcal{U}$.

**Definition 1 (Agreement Payoffs).** An agreement payoff of player $n$ is an indirect utility of the form $v_n(1_{u'})$ for some $u' \in \mathcal{U}$.

Since utility functions are bounded from above on $O$, the same is true of agreement payoffs. We interpret the agreement payoff $v_n(1_{u_n})$ as the best feasible payoff from player $n$’s perspective\footnote{The validity of the interpretation of $v_n(1_{u_n})$ as the best-possible payoff for player $n$ hinges on equilibrium selection. The question is not whether an equilibrium refinement selects the best equilibrium for player $n$ among those that exist given that all players share the preferences of player $n$. Instead, what matters for our purpose is that the payoff $v_n(1_{u_n})$ is at least as high as the payoff that player $n$ achieves in the equilibrium selected under any other constellation of preferences.}. For example, in a public goods game, agreement on player $n$’s utility function would imply an equilibrium where all players apart from player $n$ contribute.

All games we consider satisfy the following assumption:

**Assumption 1 (Conflict of Interest).** For any player $n$ there exists a player $m$ such that $v_n(1_{u_n}) > v_n(1_{u_m})$. Furthermore, for any two players, $n$ and $m$, $v_n(1_{u_n}) > v_n(1_{u_m})$ implies $v_m(1_{u_m}) > v_m(1_{u_n})$.

Assumption \footnote{1\textsuperscript{st}} states that every player can be paired with another player such that each strictly prefers agreement on their own utility function over agreement on the other player’s utility function. This assumption requires not only that there are two players with distinct preferences, but also that players collectively have at least some influence on the outcome. Assumption \footnote{1\textsuperscript{st}} thus rules out any “game” where the outcome is independent of any players’ choices. On the other hand, a game where all players have the same most-preferred alternative can satisfy Assumption \footnote{1\textsuperscript{st}} as long as players do not have the ability to implement the mutually preferred outcome with certainty and some players disagree in their ranking of other outcomes. Assumption \footnote{1\textsuperscript{st}} could thus be summarised as requiring that there is a conflict of interest between players across the outcomes that are actually achievable.

Given a suitable method of equilibrium selection, the above framework covers a very broad range of games in general and any game of bargaining that we are
aware of in particular. For example, we define TU-games in our context as games that can be represented in the following form.

**Definition 2 (TU-Games).** A game \( \Gamma \) satisfies transferable utility if \( O = \{ o \in [0,1]^N \mid \sum_{n=1}^{N} o_n \leq 1 \} \) and each player’s utility function is given by \( u_n(o) = o_n \).

The outcome of a TU-game is a vector that assigns each player a share of the available surplus and each player’s utility is equal to the share they receive. Any such game satisfies Assumption[1] as long as for any player \( n \) there exists another player \( m \) such that the share of the surplus that player \( n \) receives if all players agree that player \( n \) should receive the entire surplus is infinitesimally larger than the share that player \( n \) receives if all players agree that player \( m \)’s should receive the entire surplus, while the opposite is true for player \( m \).

### 3.2 Axioms

Our aim is to derive a real-valued function \( \rho_n(v) \) that uses the information contained in the indirect utility functions \( v \) to assign a number to player \( n \) that can be interpreted as this player’s bargaining power. Below we introduce axioms that this function should satisfy, which require the following definitions. First, a player \( n \) is a dictator if the outcome of the game is always equal to the outcome that would arise if all other players shared the preferences of player \( n \), no matter what the utility function of player \( n \) actually is.

**Definition 3 (Dictator).** Player \( n \) in some game \( \Gamma \) is said to be a dictator if \( o^*(u') = o^*(u_n') \) for any \( u' \in \mathcal{U}^N \).

A null player, on the other hand, is a player who never has any impact on the outcome of the game. Let \( u_{u_n \leftarrow u'} \) represent the vector of utility functions created by taking the vector \( u \) and replacing the utility function of player \( n \) with some function \( u' \in \mathcal{U} \).

**Definition 4 (Null Player).** Player \( n \) in some game \( \Gamma \) is said to be a null player if \( o^*(u') = o^*(u_{u_n \leftarrow u'}) \) for any \( u' \in \mathcal{U}^N \) and \( u'' \in \mathcal{U} \).

Assumption[1] rules out that a player could simultaneously be a dictator and a null player[2].

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[1] A player is both a dictator and a null player if and only if the outcome of the game is constant. The if-part is immediate. To see the only if-part, suppose there exist \( u', u'' \in \mathcal{U}^N \) such that \( o^*(u') \neq o^*(u'') \). If player 1 is a null player, it follows that \( o^*(u') \neq o^*(u'') = o^*(u_{u'_1 \leftarrow u''_1}) \). This contradicts that player 1 is a dictator since in that case it would have to hold that \( o^*(u') = o^*(u_{u'_1 \leftarrow u''_1}) \). Assumption[1] is thus sufficient to ensure that a player cannot be a dictator and a null player at once since it implies that the outcome of a game is not constant.
Finally, a compound game is a game that starts with a random draw that determines which of a number of other games is played. Importantly, all players are aware of which game is selected and—given that equilibrium is assumed to be unique—the behaviour of players is thus identical to the case where each game is played in isolation. The constituent games of a compound game need to be compatible in the sense that they share the same sets of outcomes and players.

**Definition 5 (Compound Game).** \( \Gamma \) is said to be a compound game if

i. there exists a finite set of games \( \Gamma = \{\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \ldots, \Gamma_G\} \) possessing equal sets of outcomes \( O \) and players \( N \), and

ii. the game \( \Gamma \) begins with a commonly-observed move of nature that selects one game from \( \Gamma \) to be played subsequently, and each game \( \Gamma_g \in \Gamma \) is chosen with probability \( \lambda_g \).

We write

\[
\Gamma = \sum_g \lambda_g \Gamma_g .
\]

We can now state our axioms:

**A1 (Dictators):** Suppose player \( n \) is a dictator in a game with a vector of indirect utility functions \( \mathbf{v} \). Then \( \rho_n(\mathbf{v}) = 1 \).

**A2 (Null Players):** Suppose player \( n \) is null player in a game with a vector of indirect utility functions \( \mathbf{v} \). Then \( \rho_n(\mathbf{v}) = 0 \).

**A3 (Compound Games):** Let \( \Gamma = \lambda \Gamma_1 + (1 - \lambda)\Gamma_2 \) and denote by \( \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}_1, \) and \( \mathbf{v}_2 \) the indirect utility functions corresponding to these games. If \( \Gamma_1 \) and \( \Gamma_2 \) share the same agreement payoffs, then for any player \( n \)

\[
\rho_n(\mathbf{v}) = \lambda \rho_n(\mathbf{v}_1) + (1 - \lambda)\rho_n(\mathbf{v}_2) .
\]

**A4 (Equal Gains):** Suppose in a two-player game \( \Gamma \) with associated indirect utility functions \( \mathbf{v} \) it holds that

\[
\frac{v_1(u) - v_1(1_{u_2})}{v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})} = \frac{v_2(u) - v_2(1_{u_1})}{v_2(1_{u_2}) - v_2(1_{u_1})} . \tag{2}
\]

Then \( \rho_1(\mathbf{v}) = \rho_2(\mathbf{v}) = .5 \).
In the presence of Axioms $A3$ and $A4$, Axioms $A1$ and $A2$ merely amount to normalisations of the value of $\rho_n$. The Axiom of Compound Games states that the bargaining power assigned to a player in a compound game $\Gamma$ should be equal to a weighted average of the bargaining power assigned to this player in each of the constituent games of $\Gamma$. This property is desirable since equilibrium uniqueness and the assumption that players are aware of which game is selected ensures that behaviour in each constituent game is the same as if this game were played on its own. The outcome of the game as a whole is thus a weighted average of the outcomes in each constituent game, as are the indirect utility functions. For example, let $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_2$ be two two-player games with identical sets of outcomes and players such that in each game $\Gamma_n$ player $n$ is a dictator. The Axioms of Dictators and Null Players thus require that player 1 is assigned a bargaining power of 1 in $\Gamma_1$ and a bargaining power of 0 in $\Gamma_2$. In the compound game $\Gamma = .5\Gamma_1 + .5\Gamma_2$ either players is equally likely to be a dictator or a null players and it thus seems natural to require that both are assigned a bargaining power of .5.

Importantly, the Axiom of Compound Games applies only to compound games constructed from constituent games with identical agreement payoffs. This qualification is necessary since there would otherwise be no function that satisfies all of the axioms: Below we show that in the context of two-player games there is a unique function satisfying all axioms. However, this function violates the stronger version of Axiom $A3$ without the restriction to games with equal agreement pay-offs.
To understand the Axiom of Equal Gains, recall that $v_1(1_{u_1})$ is the utility of player 1 if all players shared the same utility function as player 1. $v_1(1_{u_2})$, on the other hand, is the utility of player 1, given player 1’s endowed utility function, under the outcome that would arise if all players shared the same preferences as player 2. The expression $v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})$ is thus the maximal utility gain that player 1 can achieve relative to the best-possible outcome for player 2. The left-hand side of Equation (2) can therefore be interpreted as the utility gain that player 1 realizes in equilibrium relative to the situation where player 2 was a dictator, expressed as a share of the maximal gain possible. In the context of a two-player game, we refer to this value simply as the “gain” of a player. If both players achieve the same gain, then the Axiom of Equal Gains requires that both are assigned a bargaining power of .5. Such a situation is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 1 where the horizontal axis represents the outcome space $O$, which is in this case given by the interval $[0, 1]$. Player 1 prefers to shift the outcome as far to the left as possible, while the opposite is true for player 2. For the sake of the example, assume that players having the same utility functions would imply that they achieve their most preferred outcome with certainty. Note that it is always possible to rescale utility functions such that the level of utility associated with a player’s own most preferred outcome is equal to one, while the utility in case the other player’s ideal outcome is realized is equal to 0. It is therefore without loss of generality to draw the figure accordingly. Now suppose the equilibrium of the game produces the outcome $o_1$ with certainty. Since $o_1$ is close to the most preferred outcome of player 1, the impression may arise that player 1 has the upper hand over player 2. However, the utility function of player 2 is steep between 0 and $o_1$ and player 2 actually achieves most of the possible utility gain relative to 0 at $o_1$. In fact, both players experience the same gain at $o_1$ and this justifies assigning both the same bargaining power.

If the utility function of player 2 instead had the shape as represented in Panel (b) of Figure 1, the outcomes $o_1, o_2, \text{ and } o_3$ would all satisfy equal gains. Since the outcome $o_1$ Pareto dominates both $o_2$ and $o_3$, one may wonder what game would produce the latter results. This is not of concern for our purpose here, however. Axiom $A4$ simply requires that if the equilibrium of a game satisfies equal gains, both players are assigned a bargaining power of one half. Axiom $A4$ imposes no restrictions on the value of $\rho_n$ if the equilibrium does not satisfy equal gains.
3.3 Two-Player Games

Based on Axioms A1 to A4, we can derive the following result for two-player games.

**Theorem 1.** Let $\Gamma$ be a two-player game satisfying Assumption 1 with associated indirect utility functions $v$.

Then a function $\rho_n(v)$ satisfies Axioms A1, A2, A3, and A4 if and only if

$$\rho_n(v) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{v_n(u) - v_n(1_{1-n})}{v_n(1_{1-n}) - v_n(1_{1-n})} + \frac{v_{-n}(1_{1-n}) - v_{-n}(u)}{v_{-n}(1_{1-n}) - v_{-n}(1_{1-n})} \right]. \quad (3)$$

**Proof.** See Appendix A

The measure of bargaining power introduced in Theorem 1 is simply the average of the gain of player $n$ and the forgone gain of the other player. If player $n$ is a dictator, both these numbers are equal to one, while they are both equal to zero if player $n$ is a null player. The bargaining power of a player thus depends on the degree to which they achieve a favourable outcome, but also on how much resistance from their opponent they are able to overcome. Equation (3) thus echoes Max Weber’s definition of power as “a person’s ability to impose his will upon others despite resistance” (this translation is taken from Blau 1963, p. 306). Note that in a two-player game $1_{1-n}$ equals $u_{n+u-n}$. A possible interpretation of Equation (3) is therefore the following: the bargaining power of player $n$ is the degree to which a shift in this player’s preferences affects the utility of all players, measured as a share of the effect that would occur if player $n$ was a dictator. According to this interpretation, the measure $\rho_n$ is cardinal in nature and possesses a natural zero that corresponds to a player not having any impact on the outcome of the game. The power coefficients $\rho_1$ and $\rho_2$ always sum to one, which can be shown straightforwardly by writing down the sum of the two expressions and simplifying. The key to this result is that a player’s gain and forgone gain always add up to one.

A crucial insight underlying the proof of Theorem 1 is that any game can be combined with a second game to create a compound game that satisfies equal gains. This principle is illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose that under the given utility functions some bargaining game $\Gamma$ with associated indirect utilities $v$ generates the outcome $o_1$ with certainty. As is visible in Figure 2, the gain of player 2 in this equilibrium exceeds the gain of player 1. It is then possible to construct a second game, $\Gamma'$, in which player 1 is a dictator and the outcome is equal to 0 with certainty. Let $v'$ denote the vector of indirect utilities associated with $\Gamma'$. 

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The expected utility of each player in the compound game $\Gamma^* = \lambda \Gamma + (1 - \lambda)\Gamma'$ as a function of $\lambda$ is indicated by the dashed lines in the figure. Since the lines intersect, there exists a value for $\lambda$ such that $\Gamma^*$ satisfies equal gains. This value of $\lambda$ can be calculated and turns out to be a function of the same indirect utilities that appear in Equation (3).

Based on the preceding paragraph, $\rho_1$ can then be constructed as follows: The Axioms of Compound Games and Equal Gains together imply

$$\lambda \rho_1(v) + (1 - \lambda) \rho_1(v') = .5.$$  

Since the Axiom of Dictators requires $\rho_1(v') = 1$, the preceding equation can be solved for $\rho_1(v)$ and inserting the previously calculated value of $\lambda$ yields Equation (3).

In the context of TU games, the conventional measure of bargaining power is the expected share of the total surplus that player $n$ receives, that is, $v_n(u)$. When the equilibrium outcome of a TU game is inefficient, some of the surplus is wasted such that $v_1(u) + v_2(u) < 1$. Since $\rho_1$ and $\rho_2$ sum to one, it is then impossible that $\rho_n = v_n(u)$ holds for both players. In fact, the relationship between player $n$’s expected utility and the bargaining power assigned to player $n$ by Equation (3) hinges on the efficiency of the outcome function more generally.

**Proposition 1.** In a TU game with two players, $\rho_n(v) = v_n(u)$ if the equilibrium outcome $o^*(u)$ and the agreement outcomes $o^*(1_{u_1})$ and $o^*(1_{u_2})$ are Pareto
efficient.

Proof. The proposition follows from the more general result of Proposition 3 below.

If all players agree that some player \( n \) should receive all of the available surplus, then the only outcome that is Pareto efficient is that player \( n \) does indeed receive the whole surplus. If the agreement outcome \( \sigma^*(1_{un}) \) is efficient, the corresponding payoffs are therefore given by \( v_n(1_{un}) = 1 \) and \( v_{-n}(1_{un}) = 0 \). Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium outcome \( \sigma^*(u) \) further implies \( v_n(u) + v_{-n}(u) = 1 \). Equation (3) then simplifies to \( \rho_n(v) = v_n(u) \). To understand the intuition behind this result, recall the example from the introduction where player 1 receives all of the surplus with probability .9 independently of any players’ choices. In this game, the agreement outcome where both players prefer that player 2 receives everything is inefficient since players do not have the ability to give the whole surplus to player 2. In contrast, efficiency of the agreement payoffs implies that the players collectively have full control over the outcome of the game. In that case, the best-possible outcome for player \( n \) is that they receive all of the surplus, while the worst-possible outcome is that they get nothing. The gain of player \( n \) is accordingly equal to their share of the surplus. If the equilibrium outcome itself is also efficient, then the gain of player \( n \) is equal to the utility loss that they impose on the other player and the average of the two is simply equal to \( v_n(u) \). Inefficiency of any of the outcomes listed in Proposition 1 implies that \( \rho_n(v) = v_n(u) \) does not hold in general, even though inefficiency of both agreement outcomes combined with efficiency of the equilibrium outcome can produce this result coincidentally.

### 3.4 N-Player Games

Extending the result of Theorem 1 to settings with more than two players is not straightforward. In a two-player game, one player being a null player implies that the other player is a dictator\(^9\). The gain of a player can thus be measured relative to the best-possible outcome of their opponent. With three or more players, a player may be a null player even though no dictator is present. As a consequence, the Axiom of Equal Gains has no equivalent in the \( N \)-player case since it may not be clear what the equilibrium would be in the counterfactual game where

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\(^9\) Suppose player 1 in a two-player game is a null player. The definition of a null player implies \( \sigma^*(u^t) = \sigma^*(u^t_{-1} - u^t_2) = \sigma^*(1_{u^t_2}) \) for any \( u^t \in U^2 \) and player 2 is therefore a dictator.
one player has no ability to influence the final agreement. In addition, there are many functions that yield Equation (3) as a special case when applied to a two-player game. These functions often differ in minor aspects and produce comparable results. We are thus not able to provide a uniqueness result in the spirit of Theorem 1. We can, however, propose a measure of bargaining power for $N$-player games that satisfies Axioms $A_1$ to $A_4$ and possesses additional desirable properties.

Our aim is to construct a measure based on the logic revealed by Theorem 1, namely that the power of a player can be calculated as the effect that a shift in this player’s preferences has on all players’ utilities, expressed as a share of the effect that would occur if the player in question was a dictator. Doing so requires us to answer two questions: which shifts in a player’s preferences should the measure be based on and how do we incorporate the resulting changes in all players’ utilities? Regarding the former question, the answer suggested by Theorem 1 is that “large” changes in preferences are more revealing about a player’s influence: in Equation (3), the preferences of player $n$ are shifted all the way to equate them to those of player $n$’s opponent. A small change in a player’s preferences may fail to resolve deadlock between players, for example, which can make a player appear less influential than they in fact are (see Footnote 3 for an example illustrating this point). In the $N$-player context, we therefore consider shifts in player $n$’s preferences that equate this player’s utility function with those of the players most opposed to player $n$. To operationalise this idea, define

$$N_{\exists n} = \arg \min_{m \in \mathcal{N}} v_n(1_u_m),$$

that is, $N_{\exists n}$ is the set of players such that agreement on any of their utility functions would generate the worst outcome from player $n$’s perspective among all the possible agreement outcomes. $N_{\exists n}$ is non-empty since the number of players is finite, and it does not contain player $n$ by Assumption 1.

Now suppose we want to calculate the extent to which a shift in player $n$’s utility function to that of some player $m \in N_{\exists n}$ affects the utilities of all players. In analogy to Equation (3), the expression $[v_k(u) - v_k(u_{n \leftarrow u_m})]/[v_k(1_u) - v_k(1_u_m)]$ in principle measures how said shift affects some player $k$ relative to the case where

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10 The problem is that this counterfactual game is not well-defined if the roles of players are inherently asymmetric. For example, the legislative process of the EU gives the Commission the sole right to initiate new legislation. In the game representing the counterfactual scenario where the Commission has no influence, should the right of initiative be passed on to the Parliament, to the Council, or to a neutral arbiter?
player $n$ is a dictator. However, the value of the preceding expression may not be defined if $k$ is not equal to $n$ or $m$. In that case, player $k$ may be indifferent between agreement on player $n$’s or player $m$’s utility function, leading to division by zero. To avoid such singularities, we calculate the effect of a shift in player $n$’s preferences on sums of utilities instead of individual utilities. Grouping players according to their preference over the two agreement outcomes in question creates a measure that is guaranteed to be well-defined, as will become clear momentarily. Specifically, denote by $\mathcal{N}_{n \geq m}$ the set of players who weakly prefer agreement on player $n$’s utility function over agreement on player $m$’s, that is,

$$\mathcal{N}_{n \geq m} = \{ k \in \mathcal{N} \mid v_k(1u_n) \geq v_k(1u_m) \}.$$ 

Similarly, let $\mathcal{N}_{m \succ n}$ be the set of players for whom the preference between the two agreement outcomes is strict. The sum of such players’ utilities is then given by $V_{n \geq m}(u') = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}_{n \geq m}} v_k(u')$ with $V_{n \succ m}(u')$ defined accordingly.

We thus propose to measure the bargaining power of player $n$ in an $N$-player game as

$$\rho_n(v) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{N}_{\geq n}|} \sum_{m \in \mathcal{N}_{\geq n}} \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{V_{n \geq m}(u) - V_{m \geq m}(u_{u_n \leftarrow u_m})}{V_{n \geq m}(1u_n) - V_{m \geq m}(1u_m)} \right] + \frac{V_{m \geq n}(u_{u_m \leftarrow u_n}) - V_{m \geq n}(u)}{V_{m \geq n}(1u_m) - V_{m \geq n}(1u_n)}. \quad (4)$$

The expressions that appear in the denominators in Equation (4) are non-negative, since, for example, all players belonging to $\mathcal{N}_{m \geq n}$ weakly prefer agreement on player $m$’s utility function over agreement on that of player $n$. Furthermore, the preference is strict for player $m$ by the definition of the set $\mathcal{N}_{\geq n}$ in combination with Assumption 1, which ensures that the value of the expression is in fact positive. The value of Equation (4) is therefore well-defined and the interpretation of this measure is the same as in the two-player case: the bargaining power of player $n$ is their ability to shift all players’ utilities expressed relative to the case where player $n$ is fully in control. What is more, this function satisfies all axioms.

**Proposition 2.** Let $\Gamma$ be a game satisfying Assumption 1 with associated indirect utility functions $v$. Then the function $\rho_n(v)$ as defined by Equation (4) satisfies Axioms $A_1, A_3, A_4$, and $A_2$.

**Proof.** See Appendix A. \qed

Given that the value of Equation (4) is well-defined under Assumption 1, $\rho_n$
satisfies the Axioms of Dictators and Null Players in analogy to Equation (3). The
Axiom of Compound Games, on the other hand, is fulfilled since \( \rho_n \) is an affine
function of all included indirect utilities that are not agreement payoffs. Finally,
Equation (4) simplifies to Equation (3) in case of a two-player game and therefore
satisfies the Axiom of Equal Gains.

Another attractive feature of this measure of bargaining power is that it extends
the result of Proposition 1 to \( N \)-player games: in a TU game, Equation (4) is equal
to the expected share of the surplus that player \( n \) achieves if certain outcomes are
Pareto efficient.

**Proposition 3.** In a TU game, \( \rho_n(v) = v_n(u) \) if the outcomes \( o^*(u) \), \( o^*(u_{m\leftarrow u_n}) \),
\( o^*(1_{u_n}) \), and \( o^*(1_{u_m}) \) are Pareto efficient for any \( m \in N_{\neq n} \).

**Proof.** See Appendix A. \( \square \)

The proof of Proposition 3 proceeds by using the definition of a TU-game and
the assumption of Pareto efficient outcomes to determine the values of the indi-
rect utilities entering \( \rho_n \). First, Pareto efficiency implies that one player receives
all resources if all players agree that this would be the ideal outcome. Under
the original utility functions, however, the only player who strictly prefers the
allocation where player \( n \) receives everything over the allocation where player \( m \)
receives everything is player \( n \) herself. In the case of player \( m \), the preference is
reversed, while all other players are indifferent. It thus holds that \( N_{n>m} = \{n\} \)
and \( N_{m>n} = N \setminus \{n\} \). Furthermore, Pareto efficiency implies that no resources
are wasted and payoffs thus sum to one. It follows that \( V_{m>n}(u) = 1 - v_n(u) \).
Substituting accordingly in Equation (4) yields the desired result.

### 3.5 Examples and Practical Considerations

Before applying our measure of bargaining power to the dynamics of EU legisla-
tion, we illustrate its use through some simpler examples and discuss issues that
may arise in practice. Consider a game in which three players need to agree on
a point in the set \([0, 1]\) and bargaining takes place with an infinite time horizon.
In the first period, player 1 makes an offer to player 3. If player 3 accepts, this
offer is implemented and the game ends. If player 3 rejects the initial offer, one
of players 1 and 2 is chosen with equal probability to play Rubinstein bargaining
with player 3 from the second period onwards. More specifically, player 3 and the
chosen opponent alternate in making offers until an offer is accepted by the other
player, with player 3 making the first offer. The utility of player \( n \in \{1, 2, 3\} \) depends on the accepted offer \( o \) and the period of agreement \( T \), and is given by

\[
    u(o, T) = \delta^T[1 - |o - i_n|],
\]

where \( \delta \) is a common discount factor and \( i_n \) is the ideal point of player \( n \), with \( i_1 = 0, i_2 = .5 \) and \( i_3 = 1 \). In this setting, replacing one player’s utility function with that of another player simply requires shifting the former player’s ideal point to match that of the latter.

The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in the limit as \( \delta \) approaches 1 can be characterized as follows: In the subgame starting in period 2 where player \( n \in \{1, 2\} \) has been selected, player 3 offers the outcome \((i_3 + i_n)/2\) and player \( n \) accepts (Rubinstein 1982). Given that player 3 is risk neutral, in period 1 player 3 is willing to accept any offer they like at least as much as the mean of the two outcomes that may arise in period 2. Player 1 offers their preferred outcome among those that player 3 accepts and the game ends in period 1. Under the ideal points given above, the outcome of the game is equal to .625.

Note that the game described in the preceding paragraph is similar in terms of the constellation of ideal points to the example of the military alliance in the introduction. As in that example, the outcome of the game by itself allows only limited insights into the distribution of bargaining power. In the current example one can conclude that player 3 must have some influence, but the relative importance of players 1 and 2 remains unclear. After going through the calculations required to apply Equation (4), the results are \( \rho_1 = .19, \rho_2 = .19, \) and \( \rho_3 = .44. \) Players 1 and 2 are equally powerful despite their asymmetric decision rights: Due to the patience of player 3, player 1 is not able to achieve any improvement in period 1 over the expected outcome of period 2. The expected outcome of period 2, in turn, is equally influenced by players 1 and 2. Player 3, in contrast, is guaranteed to have a say over the outcome at any point, giving this player the upper hand.

Another notable aspect of the preceding example is that in games with more than two players the power coefficients need not sum to one. In fact, it is possible to construct games where all players are assigned a bargaining power of zero. Assuming the same sets of outcomes and players as above, consider a game with a status quo equal to .5 where each player can veto agreements they like less than that outcome. Without fully specifying the rules of the game, it is clear that as long as player 2’s ideal point remains at .5, player 2’s veto prevents any shifts of the outcome away from the status quo. Even if player 2’s preferences change, the
opposing preferences of players 1 and 3 equally preclude any outcome other than \( \frac{1}{2} \). Shifting any single player’s ideal point thus has no effect on the outcome of the game and each player is assigned a bargaining power of zero. This example suggests that a sum of power coefficients smaller than one is the result of deadlock between players that no single player has the ability to resolve. For the purpose of comparing the relative bargaining power of players, especially across games that are similar but vary in the degree of deadlock, it can thus be useful to rescale the bargaining powers, for example such that they sum to one.

Finally, a question that can arise in applications is the specification of the set of outcomes \( O \). One possibility is to choose the set \( O \) such that it reflects all aspects of the final agreement between players, but not other outcomes that are merely by-products of the bargaining process. In the example at the beginning of this section, \( O \) would then equal \([0, 1]\). The alternative to this “narrow” definition of the set of outcomes is to incorporate all aspects of the game affecting players’ utilities. In the example this would entail also including the period of agreement \( T \in \mathbb{N} \), letting \( O = [0, 1] \times \mathbb{N} \). While the theoretical results presented above are true irrespective of this choice, the bargaining power assigned to each player can be affected. To see this, consider the following modification of the game above: After player 1 makes their offer, player 3 receives this offer with probability one-half, while the game moves directly to the second period with the remaining probability. Given that players are patient and player 1’s initial offer does not differ from the expected outcome of period 2, bargaining powers are not affected by this change. Now suppose that player 1 has a discount factor \( \delta_1 \) specific to period 1 that is lower than 1, while applying the common discount factor \( \delta \) from period 2 onwards. This change in player 1’s patience does not affect player 1’s behaviour, nor that of any of the other players. The outcome of the game is thus independent of \( \delta_1 \), whether \( O \) is specified as \([0, 1]\) or \([0, 1] \times \mathbb{N}\). Accordingly, it is hard to argue why the bargaining power of player 1 should depend on \( \delta_1 \). Yet, if \( O \) is chosen to include the period of agreement, then \( \rho_1 \) does become a function of \( \delta_1 \). We therefore favour the narrow specification of the outcome set: Bargaining power as the ability to achieve a favourable agreement should depend exclusively on said agreement.

4 Legislative Bargaining in the European Union

In this section we illustrate our generalized measure of bargaining power in an application to the legislative process of the European Union.
4.1 Institutional Setting and Data

Legislation in the EU involves three institutions: the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Commission. The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, with elections held every five years. The Council consists of ministers belonging to the national governments of member states and meets in different configurations depending on the subject of the law being debated. The members of the Commission, which forms the executive branch of the European Union, are appointed by the governments of member states at the start of each term of the Parliament and have to be confirmed by a parliamentary vote.

In our empirical analysis, we focus on laws subject to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), which applies to the vast majority of legislative proposals discussed and implemented. The process starts with the introduction of a new legislative proposal by the European Commission. This proposal is then debated and potentially amended by the Parliament and the Council through the course of up to three readings.

![Figure 3: Timing of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure - First Reading](image)

The timing of the OLP is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. After a proposal by the Commission has initiated the first reading, the Parliament can either accept the legislative draft as it is, introduce amendments, or reject the proposal. In the former two cases, the proposal is then forwarded to the Council, while rejection implies failure of the process. If the Council accepts the proposal it receives from the Parliament, the process ends and the act is adopted. If the Council instead introduces amendments of its own, the process moves on to the second reading. Importantly, the majority requirements in the Council depend on the opinion of the Commission on the amendments introduced by the Parliament. If the Commission disagrees with any of the proposed changes, the Council can only accept these amendments by a unanimous vote. If the Commission agrees with all
amendments, on the other hand, a qualified majority\(^{11}\) in the Council usually\(^{12}\) suffices to adopt the act. The Council can also reject a proposal.

The second reading is illustrated in Figure 4. The Parliament again has the options of accepting the proposal in its current state, proposing amendments, or rejecting. Unlike at first reading, acceptance of the proposal leads to the immediate adoption of the act. In the case of amendments, the Council holds a vote on whether it accepts the proposal. As in the first reading, the majority requirements in the Council depend on the opinion of the Commission. Acceptance leads to the adoption of the act, otherwise the process moves on to the third reading. The Council is not able to propose any amendments of its own during the second reading.

![Figure 4: Timing of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure - Second Reading](image)

If the third reading is reached, the so called Conciliation Committee convenes, which is made up of representatives of all three institutions. This step represents a final attempt to find a text that is acceptable to both the Parliament and the Council, with the Commission officially playing a mediating role. If no compromise can be found, the proposal fails. A proposal may also fail at earlier stages if it is rejected by the Parliament or the Council or withdrawn by the Commission, which may do so at any point during the first reading.

An important part of the practice of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure are meetings between representatives of the institutions called “trilogues”. During these meetings, the legislative draft is discussed with the aim of finding a compromise acceptable to all sides. The participants stay in touch with their home institutions and if an agreement is reached, this agreement is considered to be binding. Any subsequent votes in the Parliament or the Council required to pass the agreed text thus become formalities and usually take place within a few weeks.

\(^{11}\)The Council accepts a proposal if at least 55 percent of member states representing at least 65 percent of the EU population vote in favour.

\(^{12}\)Proposals relating to certain areas such as taxation or defence always require unanimity.
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Table 1: Probabilities of Decisions on Legislative Proposals During the Seventh and Eighth Term of the European Parliament

Trilogues may be initiated at any point after the publication of the initial proposal by the Commission.

Our data on the Ordinary Legislative Procedure is taken from the EUR-Lex database, which provides detailed information on all relevant decisions taken by the participating institutions. The focus of our analysis is on the seventh and eighth term of the Parliament, which lasted from 2009 to 2014 and from 2014 to 2019, respectively. Each of the 1,016 observations in our dataset is thus an independent legislative proposal subject to the OLP for which at least one decision was taken during the seventh or eighth term. Table 1 lists the decisions observed at different stages of the OLP, which form the basis of the structural estimation of the model presented below. Failure of a proposal usually manifests itself in the halt of any further activity, while a formal rejection is an extremely rare event. Further details of the construction of the data set and the calculation of the numbers in Table 1 can be found in Appendix B.

In the seventh (eighth) term, the Parliament amends 89% (82%) of proposals. During the 10 years we consider, only 7 proposals were formally rejected. The probabilities of approval in Table 1 are calculated for all proposals that were not rejected at the stage in question.

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13 During the 10 years we consider, only 7 proposals were formally rejected. The probabilities of approval in Table 1 are calculated for all proposals that were not rejected at the stage in question.
during the first reading, but only 43% (11%) of proposals during the second reading. The Commission approves a high share of these amendments during both readings. The Council, on the other hand, accepts most proposals if there were no amendments introduced by the Parliament or if all amendments were accepted by the Commission, but rejects most proposals if the amendments of Parliament were at least partially rejected by the Commission. A notable feature of the numbers is that the approval of a proposal is more likely at any point of the process during the eighth term compared to the seventh term. As the final rows of Table IV show, about one in seven proposals of the 7th term fail and never become law.

4.2 The Model

This section sets out our model of the legislative process of the EU. The subject of bargaining is a new piece of legislation $p \in [-1, 1]$. The time horizon is infinite, so that the process of bargaining generates an infinite sequence $p$ of policies that are effective during each period. There is a status quo $q \in [-1, 1]$ that remains in place until agreement is reached, which is not guaranteed. If agreement is achieved, policy takes the value specified by the agreed-upon proposal and then remains at that level during all subsequent periods.

Players: Throughout, the letter $b$ will refer to the Commission (located in Brussels), $c$ will refer to the Council, and $s$ will refer to the European Parliament (located in Strasbourg). Each institution is represented by a single player who can be thought of as the pivotal member. The preferences of the player representing an institution $z \in \{b, c, s\}$ over sequences of policies are given by

$$u_z(p, P_b) = -\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta_t^z \left( p_t - i_z \right)^2 - P_b \cdot k,$$

where $i_z$ and $\delta_z$ are the ideal point and discount factor of institution $z$, respectively. The utility of the Commission in addition depends on their choice to initiate negotiations. Introducing a new proposal requires the Commission to carry out a lengthy consultation of experts and stakeholders, which we capture by assuming that an initial proposal is associated with a fixed cost $k$. The variable $P_b$ is

\[\text{\footnotesize 14}\]

Since negotiations may continue beyond the end of a term, at the time of writing it was not possible to determine whether some proposals from the eighth term have failed or are simply facing long delays between decisions. We therefore target only the share of failed proposals from the 7th term in our structural estimation. The model of course also allows for failure of proposals during the eighth term.

\[\text{\footnotesize 15}\]

The parametrization of our model accounts for the different majority requirements in the Council described in the previous section.
therefore equal to 1 if the utility function is that of the Commission and the Commission decides to initiate a proposal, while \( P_b = 0 \) otherwise.

**Timing:** The timing of the game is tailored closely to the protocol of the OLP. The key choices that players make are tabling a new proposal and responding to a proposal already on the table. If the Commission decides to introduce an initial proposal instead of leaving the status quo in place, it picks a point \( p \in [-1, 1] \). When the Parliament or the Council have the opportunity to table a new proposal, on the other hand, they face two options: the first is to initiate a trilogue and negotiate directly with the other institutions, while the second is to introduce a new proposal without consulting the remaining players. We assume that trilogues produce a predictable result, referred to as a “safe proposal”, that is immediately accepted by everyone. A proposal produced without engaging in trilogues, in contrast, may be amended or rejected by the other institutions and is referred to as a “risky proposal”.

**Making a safe proposal:** In order to be accepted by all participants, the result of a trilogue has to belong to the set of points that each institution prefers over the status quo, known as the winset (Tsebelis 2002). More specifically, we assume that a trilogue produces a policy given by a weighted average of each institution’s most preferred element of the winset. The weight on the most preferred element of institution \( z \) is given by \( \delta_z / (\delta_b + \delta_s + \delta_c) \). If the third reading is reached, the Conciliation Committee produces the same outcome as a trilogue.

**Making a risky proposal:** When an institution makes a risky proposal, it can choose any point on \([-1, 1]\). The response of the remaining institutions is uncertain, however. To model this uncertainty, we assume that the responding institution draws a random shock from an extreme value distribution \( F_z \) on each of the continuation values that the possible choices of the institution imply. The chosen alternative is then the one that maximises the sum of continuation value and random shock. The options an institution has when responding to a proposal are determined by the protocol of the OLP. The Parliament and the Council can accept, amend, or reject a proposal when it is their turn to move. The Commission can generally agree or disagree with a proposal by the Parliament, and during the first reading additionally has the option withdraw the proposal. The decision of the Commission to disagree with a proposal of the Parliament implies that the Council can only accept the proposal through a unanimous vote, while otherwise

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16 Institution \( z \) prefers a proposal \( p \) over the status quo \( q \) if and only if \(- (p - i_z)^2 \geq - (q - i_z)^2\).  
17 In the second reading the choice of the Council to “amend” implies that the Conciliation Committee convenes.
a qualified majority suffices. We capture this by assuming that the shock on the choice of accepting is drawn from a shifted distribution $F_\tilde{\tau}$ if the Commission announces disagreement, while all other shocks specific to the Council follow a distribution $F_c$.

We refer to the periods in which negotiations are ongoing as the active phase of the game. The active phase ends either if agreement is achieved or a proposal has been rejected or withdrawn. A period within the active phase ends whenever an institution decides to amend a proposal.

**Equilibrium:** The legislative bargaining game features uncertainty due to the shocks affecting the response to a proposal. However, the realisations of uncertain variables and all actions are observed by all players and preferences are common knowledge. The game is therefore one of multiple stages and observed actions, and the appropriate equilibrium concept is subgame perfection [Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, p. 70]. In addition, although the time horizon is infinite, the active phase of the game has finite length, and the game can therefore be solved by backward induction. A subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of proposals tabled at the various stages, probability distributions over the possible responses by institutions as a function of the proposal on the table, as well as the initial decision of the Commission to initiate negotiations. Given that the shocks determining the responses to a proposal are assumed to follow extreme value distributions, the choice probabilities take the familiar logistic form. Optimal proposals, on the other hand, can be computed numerically when solving the model for a given parameter vector.

### 4.3 Empirical Implementation and Basic Results

We estimate the structural parameters of the model presented in the previous section using the observed decisions by each institution over the course of the legislative process. To do so, we calculate the choice probabilities predicted by our model, which can then be used to construct moment conditions that are informative about the model’s parameters. Calculating the solution of the model requires us to specify the status quo. The dimension of conflict in models of EU politics is typically interpreted as the degree of EU integration. Along this dimension, existing legislation in the areas of agriculture and taxation, for example, differs

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18 Suppose that some institution $z$ chooses between $C$ options at some point of the game. Denote by $V_{z,c}$ the continuation value corresponding to option $c \in C$. Then the probability that institution $z$ chooses $c$ is given by

$$\frac{\exp(V_{z,c})}{\sum_{c' \in C} \exp(V_{z,c'})}.$$
strongly in the degree of policy harmonisation across member states that has already been achieved. Accounting for this variation is essential since the status quo plays a crucial role in the process of bargaining. We therefore assume that there is a distribution of status quos across all perceivable policy areas for which a proposal could be initiated, which we normalise to a uniform distribution on the policy space \([-1, 1]\).\(^{19}\)

While the distribution of seats in the Parliament or the composition of the Council certainly matter for EU policy, the position of each institution on the question of EU integration is influenced by the nature of the institution itself. For example, the Council represents the governments of member states, for whom further EU integration implies a loss of direct decision-making power. For members of the European Parliament, on the other hand, more integration implies the ability to have a more tangible impact on citizens’ lives and raise the Parliament’s profile. We therefore assume that ideal points are an institutional feature and thus constant across the period we consider. Since the members of the Commission are proposed by the governments of member states, who are also represented in the Council, and subsequently approved by the Parliament, we restrict the ideal points of the Commission to lie in between the ideal points of the Parliament and the Council.

To capture differences in acceptance probabilities across terms, we allow the variance of the shock distributions that determine choice probabilities to differ between the eighth and the seventh term. The general increase in the probability of acceptance across stages of the OLP visible in the data plausibly reflects learning by the participating institutions, since the OLP was only introduced at the beginning of the seventh term.\(^{20}\) Such learning would be reflected in a decrease in the variance of shock distributions.

Given that the requirement of unanimity reduces the probability that the Council accepts a proposal, we allow the mean of the shock distribution \(F_{\tilde{c}}\) to be smaller than that of the otherwise relevant distribution \(F_{c}\) and estimate the difference.\(^{21}\)

The above choices leave us with nine parameters to estimate: three ideal points (\(i_b\), \(i_s\), and \(i_c\)), three discount factors (\(\delta_b\), \(\delta_s\), and \(\delta_c\)), the standard deviation

\(^{19}\)In practice, we need to discretise the support of the status quo distribution and choose an evenly spaced grid of 1001 points ranging from -1 to 1.

\(^{20}\)The OLP is largely identical to what was known as Co-Decision prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, but which applied to much fewer policy areas.

\(^{21}\)With the exception of the distribution \(F_{\tilde{c}}\), all shocks are assumed to have mean zero. Since we can only identify the change in variance across terms, we set the variance of shock distributions in the seventh term equal to one.
of preference shocks during the eighth term of the European Parliament, the difference \( \Delta_c \) between the means of the shock distributions \( F_c \) and \( F_{\tilde{c}} \), and the cost \( k \) of introducing an initial proposal. Given values for these parameters, we can calculate the solution of the model.

Out of the probabilities listed in Table 1, we decided not to use any values that are equal to zero or one or that are based on less than ten observations. As an additional moment, we include the ratio between the numbers of proposals introduced by the Commission during the seventh and the eighth term, resulting in 15 moments and nine parameters to estimate. Despite all parameters being identified jointly under the model, many are associated closely with specific moments. The shift \( \Delta_c \) in the mean of the shock distribution of the Council acting under unanimity is identified by the probabilities that the Council accepts proposals by the Parliament with which the Commission has formally disagreed. The standard deviation \( \sigma_8 \) determines the difference in the average probability of acceptance across terms. Variation in the number of proposals across terms identifies the cost \( k \) to the Commission of introducing an initial proposal: If the value of \( k \) is sufficiently close to zero, the Commission introduces a new proposal for every status quo in both terms. This is the case since the veto of the Commission ensures that any accepted proposal is at least as attractive as the status quo. For higher values of \( k \), the Commission is more selective in the use of its right of initiative and thus more responsive to changes in uncertainty across terms. What remains is to establish the separate identification of ideal points and discount factors. A lower discount factor implies that an institution is more willing to accept the proposal currently on the table. Similarly, an institution whose ideal point is far from the status quo finds delays in agreement more costly and therefore also has a higher willingness to accept. However, the discount factor affects choices equally across readings, while the average distance of the ideal point from the status quo changes across readings. The latter effect is due to selection: Under a status quo equally disliked by all institutions, agreement is likely to be achieved during the first reading. Proposals that reach the second reading tend to be more controversial. Discount factors are thus identified by the average probability that an institution accepts across readings, while identification of ideal points rests on the difference in the probability of acceptance across readings.

Appendix C provides further details on identification and estimation, including the model’s fit to the observed moments. The same appendix also lists the estimated structural parameters of our model. Following the notion that the policy dimension reflects the degree of EU integration, we can interpret the estimates
as indicating that the European Parliament favours further integration for most policy areas. The ideal points of the Council (representing member states) and the Commission (which is appointed by the governments of member states) are estimated to be relatively close to one another, with the Council being most in favour of shifting more responsibility back to member states. Our estimates for institutions’ discount factors range between 0.88 and 0.98, with the Commission being most impatient. The degree of uncertainty about institutions’ future choices, as measured by the standard deviation of random shocks to acceptance decisions, decreases by 32% between the 7th and the 8th parliamentary term. When acceptance of a proposal by the Council requires unanimous approval, the distribution of shocks on acceptance is shifted left by 0.29 of its standard deviation during the 7th term. While its absolute magnitude is difficult to interpret, the cost of initiating a legislative proposal by the Commission is substantial enough to induce a rather selective choice of policy areas, as we discuss in more detail below.

4.4 The Distribution of Bargaining Power

This section uses our estimation results to determine the relative bargaining power of the three co-legislators of the European Union. For the purpose of calculating the measure of bargaining power \( \rho_n \) as given by Equation (4), we define the outcome space \( O \) of the game as the interval \([-1, 1]\), which is the policy space of the model.\(^{22}\) The utility of institution \( z \in \{b, s, c\} \) under some outcome \( p \in O \) is given by \(- (p - i_z)^2\). Based on the estimated parameter values, we can calculate the distribution over \( O \) implied by the equilibrium for any constellation of ideal points and the status quo in a policy area. Given this equilibrium distribution, we can further compute the corresponding indirect utility of each institution as defined in Equation (1). The bargaining power of an institution is then calculated based on the indirect utilities integrated over all status quos.

The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 2. The upper panel reports bargaining powers when applying Equation (4), whereas the values in the lower panel are rescaled such that the numbers for each legislative term sum to one as suggested in Section 3.5. We find that the European Parliament has the strongest impact on EU legislation. The influence of the Council and the Commission is not negligible, albeit considerably smaller. The power coefficients are almost identical across legislative terms, indicating that the variance of shock

\(^{22}\) Alternatively, we could specify the outcome space such that it also includes the timing of agreement. As we discuss in Section 3.5, excluding the timing of agreement is preferable.
Table 2: Bargaining Power Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure at Baseline and in Counterfactual Scenarios

Notes: The counterfactuals considered in the table are 1. Ideal Points: The ideal points of the Parliament and the Council are exchanged; 2. Right of Initiative: The Commission is forced to initiate legislation for every status quo and loses the ability to withdraw proposals; 3. No Unanimity: The Council always votes subject to qualified majority; 4. Consult. Procedure: A simulation of the Consultation Procedure.

distributions has little impact on the balance of power, which is also confirmed by the counterfactuals included in Table 2. We thus present all subsequent results focusing on the seventh term.

What explains the strength of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council? An important factor is the high degree of deadlock: for a majority of policy areas, the status quo falls between institutions’ ideal points. In such cases, the legislators use their vetoes to prevent movements in policy away from the status quo that would be to their disadvantage. A shift in the position of the Parliament towards the Council reduces the degree of deadlock and therefore produces a substantial change in the outcome of the game. Accordingly, the Parliament is assigned a relatively high bargaining power. The same logic does not apply to the Commission and the Council, since these institutions have very similar positions. A shift of either institution towards the Parliament does not lower the amount of deadlock, implying that their ability to affect outcomes individually is low. Overall, however, the vetoes of the Commission and the Council
are important for the outcome, suggesting that the collective bargaining power of the Commission and the Council is larger than the sum of its parts. We confirm this through the following exercise: We first set the ideal point of the Commission equal to that of the Council and then calculate the indirect utilities as before. For the purpose of applying Equation (4), however, we treat the Commission and the Council as one player, whose indirect utility is given by the sum of the individual utilities. This implies that instead of shifting one player’s ideal point at a time and observing the effect on players’ utilities, we simultaneously shift the ideal points of the Commission and the Council. The corresponding power coefficient is equal to .631. Collectively, the influence of the Commission and the Council on EU legislation thus exceeds that of the Parliament. The reason is that the joint veto of the former institutions is more effective in preventing unwanted policy shifts than that of the Parliament, since they are located closer to the average status quo. Effectively, the Commission and the Council act as defenders of the status quo against the Parliament, which is pushing for more federalism.

The importance of vetoes is also visible in Figure 5, which plots bargaining powers across status quos. When the status quo is in the vicinity of the ideal point of the Parliament, the veto of the Parliament precludes any meaningful shifts in policy. The position of the Parliament is accordingly close to dictatorial. When the status quo falls next to the ideal points of the Commission or the Council, on the other hand, the individual influence of each institution is close to zero. Agreement between all institution on the need for new legislation is highest when the status quo falls close to -1. Outcomes are then less constrained by veto rights and all institutions are assigned a positive influence, with the Council coming out on top. A noteworthy feature of Figure 5 is that there is a small range of status quos where the power of the Council turns negative. In that range, the Commission initiates new legislation in equilibrium, but refuses to do so if the ideal point of the Council is equal to that of the Parliament. Shifting the ideal point of the Council towards that of the Parliament—as required to calculate Equation (4)—thus produces a small shift in policy in the opposite direction, which explains the negative influence of the Council.

Since we interpret ideal points as an institutional feature, the results presented in this section reflect not just the rules of the legislative process, but the institutional setup of the EU more broadly. We can also ask what the protocol of the OLP by itself implies for the distribution of bargaining power. To abstract from the influence of preference parameters, we set all discount factors equal to that of the Council and draw ideal points and a status quo from a uniform distribution
Figure 5: Bargaining Power Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure Conditional on Status Quo.

Notes: Vertical straight lines represent the ideal points of institutions. Grey shading indicates that the Commission does not make a proposal for the given status quo in equilibrium.

We then calculate bargaining powers for each draw and repeat this process until the average bargaining powers across draws converge, which occurs after about 10,000 draws. The results reveal a surprising parity of power, with the bargaining power of the Commission equal to .205, that of the Parliament equal to .231, and .228 in case of the Council. Veto rights are again an important driver of these results: Given that the status quo often falls between ideal points and each institutions’ veto is equally likely to be binding across draws, institutions are assigned a similar degree of influence. The roles assigned to the Parliament and the Council by the OLP are relatively symmetric in general, while the slightly weaker influence of the Commission reflects the more limited ability of the Commission to intervene in the legislative process after the introduction of the initial proposal.

This approach is essentially the one used previously in the literature to calculate power in an ex-ante sense, that is, before the preferences of players are revealed [Steunenberg et al. 1999, Maaser & Mayer 2016].
4.5 Counterfactual Policy Environments

To gain further insights, we use the estimated model to evaluate a number of counterfactual scenarios. The results are included in Table 2.

Switching Ideal Points: The first counterfactual, presented in Columns 3 and 4, is a switch of the positions of the Parliament and the Council. The consequence is that the bargaining power of the Council becomes essentially equal to that previously assigned to the Parliament, and vice versa. This result once more confirms the point that under deadlock the institution with the most effective veto has most power.

Right of Initiative: A key privilege of the Commission is its right of initiative. Columns 4 and 5 consider the effects of abolishing this right of the Commission. Specifically, we assume that the Commission is forced to initiate legislation for every status quo. Furthermore, in its ruling of April 2015 on case C-409/13, the European Court of Justice stated that the right of the Commission to withdraw a proposal follows from its right of initiative. Conversely, we assume that without the right to initiate legislation, the Commission loses the ability to withdraw proposals. Not surprisingly, this change reduces the influence of the Commission relative to the other institutions (see the normalised coefficients in the lower panel of Table 2). At the same time, the power of the Council increases sharply, such that it exceeds that of the Parliament and comes close the level of the collective power of the Commission and the Council calculated above. This counterfactual thus effectively confers the power held jointly by the Commission and the Council at baseline onto the Council alone.

No Unanimity: Given the predominance of veto rights under the estimated constellation of ideal points, any change to the rules of the OLP that leaves vetoes in place has little consequence for the distribution of bargaining power. We illustrate this through another simulation. The Commission has the ability to formally disagree with amendments introduced by the Parliament, with the consequence that the Council can then only accept these amendments through a unanimous vote. This rule is somewhat peculiar, given the fact that the Commission also states its opinion on amendments of the Council, but this opinion has no formal impact on subsequent proceedings. The special treatment of the amendments of the Parliament seems at odds with official EU publications that often describe the Council and the Parliament as equal co-legislators, while simultaneously assigning a very minor role to the Commission (see, for example, European Commission 2014, p. 10). We thus calculate bargaining powers for a counterfactual protocol.
under which the Council always votes subject to qualified majority. As Columns 7 and 8 of Table show, this change to the OLP has essentially no impact on the distribution of bargaining power. Given that each institution retains its veto, this was also the expected result.

**Consultation Procedure:** The final question we address is the extent to which the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on the first of December 2009, affected the balance of power between the institutions of the EU. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the OLP was referred to as Co-Decision and applied to a smaller set of legislative texts. During the sixth term of the European Parliament, about half of new proposals were instead subject to the Consultation Procedure. Under that procedure, the Commission has the right of initiative as in the case of the OLP. Once the Commission introduces a new proposal, Parliament can propose changes to the legislative text. The Council then has the ability to decide the final version of the text, without being bound by the opinion of the Parliament in any way. We model this process as follows: The introduction of an initial proposal by the Commission works as in our model of the OLP. The Parliament can then delay proceedings by one period. The Council subsequently accepts the proposal on the table, implements a proposal of its own at the cost of an additional period of delay, or rejects the proposal, leaving the status quo in place. We use our estimates of the structural parameters to calculate the bargaining power of the three institutions under this protocol. Not surprisingly, the power of the Council is above .9 under the Consultation Procedure, while that of the Parliament is essentially equal to zero. We thus find that the Treaty of Lisbon succeeded in strengthening the role of the European Parliament.

Our results regarding the bargaining power of the institutions of the EU can be summarised as follows: The crucial factor determining the outcomes of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure are veto rights. Since each institution has the ability to veto proposals, the OLP assigns a fairly equal degree of influence to all of them. In practice, however, the institutional nature of the European Parliament implies that the Parliament pushes for more federalism than is currently the case in most policy areas. The vetoes of the Commission and the Council prevent such outcomes in many cases, which makes these institutions collectively more influential than the Parliament. While we find that the Treaty of Lisbon succeeded in giving the Parliament a say over EU legislation, additional reforms of the legislative process that leave the collective veto of the remaining institutions intact would fail to further empower the Parliament.
5 Conclusion

This paper introduces a novel method for measuring the bargaining power of a player in any non-cooperative game. The power of a player is calculated as the extent to which shifts in this player’s preferences change the utility of all participating players, expressed relative to the changes that would occur if the player in question had full control over the outcome of the game. This measure satisfies a number of axioms and in the context of two-player games we show that no other function has these properties. For the special case of TU-games, we compare our measure to the more conventional approach of interpreting the expected surplus share of a player as their bargaining power. The two approaches coincide when the equilibria of the game are Pareto efficient, but generally yield different results when they are not. Intuitively, inefficiencies imply that players collectively do not have full control over the distribution of the surplus and our measure calculates bargaining power relative to the share of the surplus that players can freely allocate.

Given that non-cooperative games are explicit about the process of bargaining, our measure is particularly valuable when assessing features of this process and their role in determining the influence of a player. Such insights are important. For example, they are crucial when designing institutions that aim to achieve a specific distribution of power among its members. Our application in the context of the legislative process of the European Union illustrates this point well. The de-facto bargaining power of an EU institution is the product of a wide range of factors such as who has the right of initiative, veto rights, the order in which institutions move, or majority requirements in the Council. By structurally estimating a model of this process, we can apply our measure of bargaining power and determine through counterfactual simulations what drives the results.

The often-voiced criticism that the European Commission has a dominant influence on the laws passed by the European Union is not confirmed by our results. Instead, we find that, individually, the European Parliament is the most influential among the institutions of the EU. The Commission and the Council are not powerless though. In particular, our analysis reveals that jointly these two institutions dominate the bargaining power of the Parliament. We further show that the deadlock arising from institutions’ veto power implies that many changes to the bargaining protocol, such as a removal of the right of the Commission to influence the majority requirements in the Council, would have little impact on the distribution of bargaining power across institutions.
References


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Appendix

A Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1. Let $\Gamma$ be a two-player game with associated indirect utility functions $v$. Assume without loss of generality that the gain of player 2 weakly exceeds the gain of player 1, that is,

$$\frac{v_1(u) - v_1(1_{u_2})}{v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})} \leq \frac{v_2(u) - v_2(1_{u_1})}{v_2(1_{u_2}) - v_2(1_{u_1})}.$$

Assumption 1 rules out that the denominators in the preceding expression could be equal to zero. Given that agreement payoffs are bounded from above, the gain of each player is therefore well-defined.

We proceed by constructing a compound game that satisfies equal gains. Let $\Gamma'$ be a game with associated indirect utility functions $v'$ that coincides with $\Gamma$ in terms of outcome space, set of players, and agreement payoffs, but such that player 1 is a dictator while player 2 is a null player. The latter implies $v_1'(u) = v_1'(1_{u_1})$ and $v_2'(u) = v_2'(1_{u_1})$.

Now consider the compound game $\Gamma^* = \lambda \Gamma + (1 - \lambda)\Gamma'$. Since each constituent game of $\Gamma^*$ forms a subgame and behaviour in a subgame does not depend on previous moves of nature, the indirect utility functions of $\Gamma^*$ are given by $v^*_n(u) = \lambda v_n(u) + (1 - \lambda) v'_n(u)$. Since player 1 (player 2) is a dictator (null player) in $\Gamma'$ and all games under consideration have equal agreement payoffs,

$$v^*_n(u) = \lambda v_n(u) + (1 - \lambda) v'_n(u) = \lambda v_n(u) + (1 - \lambda) v_n'(1_{u_1})$$

$$= \lambda v_n(u) + (1 - \lambda) v_n(1_{u_1}).$$

$\Gamma^*$ thus satisfies equal gains if

$$\frac{\lambda v_1(u) + (1 - \lambda) v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})}{v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})} = \frac{\lambda v_2(u) + (1 - \lambda) v_2(1_{u_1}) - v_2(1_{u_2})}{v_2(1_{u_2}) - v_2(1_{u_1})}.$$

Solving for $\lambda$ yields

$$\lambda = \frac{1}{\left[ \frac{v_2(u) - v_2(1_{u_1})}{v_2(1_{u_2}) - v_2(1_{u_1})} - \frac{v_1(u) - v_1(1_{u_1})}{v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})} \right]}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\left[ 1 + \frac{v_2(u) - v_2(1_{u_1})}{v_2(1_{u_2}) - v_2(1_{u_1})} - \frac{v_1(u) - v_1(1_{u_1})}{v_1(1_{u_1}) - v_1(1_{u_2})} \right]}.$$
Since the gain of player 2 in the game $\Gamma$ weakly exceeds that of player 1, $\lambda \in (0, 1]$.

Now notice that the Axioms of Equal Gains and Compound Games imply

$$\rho_1(v^*) = \lambda \rho_1(v) + (1 - \lambda) \rho_1(v') = .5$$

and

$$\rho_2(v^*) = \lambda \rho_2(v) + (1 - \lambda) \rho_2(v') = .5$$

By the Axioms of Dictators and Null Players, $\rho_1(v') = 1$ and $\rho_2(v') = 0$. Using the value of $\lambda$ derived above, Equations (5) and (6) can thus be solved for $\rho_1(v)$ and $\rho_2(v)$ to yield the desired result.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** As a first step, it will be shown that the value of $\rho_n(v)$ is well-defined if $v$ corresponds to a game satisfying Assumption 1. Since $N < \infty$, the set $N \leftrightarrow n$ is non-empty. Since there exists at least one player $m$ such that $v_n(1_u_n) > v_n(1_u_m)$ by Assumption 1, the same condition must be satisfied for any $m \in N \leftrightarrow n$. Assumption 1 thus implies $v_m(1_u_m) > v_m(1_u_n)$ for any $m \in N \leftrightarrow n$. Now fix some $m \in N \leftrightarrow n$. Then it holds by definition for any player $k \in N_{n\to m}$ that $v_k(1_u_n) \geq v_k(1_u_m)$. Furthermore, it was established above that $v_n(1_u_n) > v_n(1_u_m)$ and since player $n$ is a member of $N_{n\to m}$, it follows that $V_{n\to m}(1_u_n) - V_{n\to m}(1_u_m) > 0$. An analogous argument shows that $V_{m\to n}(1_u_m) - V_{m\to n}(1_u_n) > 0$, which rules out that any denominator included in Expression (4) could be equal to zero.

Given that has thus been established that the value of Equation (4) is well-defined, it can now be shown that $\rho_n$ satisfies all axioms. If player $n$ is a dictator, the numerator of any fraction contained in Equation (4) is equal to the denominator and the expression as a whole is equal to one as required by Axiom A1. Axiom A2 is equally satisfied: if player $n$ is a null player, the numerator of any fraction contained in Equation (4) equals zero, as does the expression as a whole. Axiom A4 holds since Equation (4) simplifies to Equation (3) in case of a two-player game. Finally, all denominators in Equation (4) are constant across games possessing equal sets of players and agreement payoffs, as is the set $N \leftrightarrow n$. $\rho_n$ is therefore an affine function of the indirect utilities that vary across such games and thus satisfies Axiom A3.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** Pareto efficiency implies that if all players agree that a unique outcome would be optimal, then the equilibrium of the game must produce this outcome with certainty. In a TU game, under the vector of utility functions $1_u_m$ all players agree that player $m$ should receive everything. Pareto efficiency of the outcomes $o^*(1_u_n)$ and $o^*(1_u_m)$ thus implies $v_k(1_u_n) = 0 = v_k(1_u_m)$ for any
$k \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{m, n\}$ while $v_n(1_{u_n}) > v_n(1_{u_m})$ and $v_m(1_{u_m}) > v_m(1_{u_n})$. Consequently, $\mathcal{N}_{m \triangleright n} = \{n\}$ while $\mathcal{N}_{m \triangleright n} = \mathcal{N} \setminus \{n\}$. Furthermore, Pareto efficiency of some outcome $o^*(u')$ implies that the utilities of players sum to one in this equilibrium and thus $V_{m \triangleright n}(u') = 1 - v_n(u')$. Based on all of the above, $v_n(1_{u_m}) = V_{m \triangleright n}(1_{u_n}) = 0$ and $v_n(1_{u_n}) = V_{m \triangleright n}(1_{u_m}) = 1$. Finally, Pareto efficiency implies $v_n(u_{u_n \leftarrow u_m}) = 0$ since under the vector of utility functions $u_{u_n \leftarrow u_m}$ all players other than $n$ prefer more for themselves while player $n$ prefers more for player $m$. Given Pareto efficiency, $v_n(u_{u_n \leftarrow u_m}) = 0$ implies $V_{m \triangleright n}(u_{u_n \leftarrow u_m}) = 1$. Using all of the above to substitute in Equation 4, it follows that

$$
\rho_n(v) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{N} \setminus n|} \sum_{m \in \mathcal{N} \setminus n} \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{v_n(u) - 0}{1 - 0} + \frac{1 - (1 - v_n(u))}{1 - 0} \right] = v_n(u).
$$

\[ \Box \]

**B Data Appendix**

The EUR-Lex database in principle provides all the information we require, but has some missing values. We fill these missing values by referring to the Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament. The raw dataset we construct in this manner contains 1,163 proposals with at least one relevant decision taken during the seventh or eighth term of the European Parliament. However, some of these proposals belong to “legislative packages”, which are introduced jointly by the Commission and are then effectively treated as one proposal during the legislative process. To correct for this issues, we first search for groups of proposals where all major decisions were taken on the same day and with the same outcome. We classify such a group as a package if at least three decisions are observed for each proposal belonging to the group. If less than three decisions are observed, we verify manually if the proposals deal with the same subject matter. At the end of this process we are left with 1,016 independent proposals.

Based on this dataset, we calculate decision probabilities for different stages of the OLP. First of all, we compute the likelihood that the first and the second reading both in the Parliament and the Council end with agreement on the proposal currently on the table. Another decision of interest is whether or not the Commission agrees with amendments proposed by the Parliament. As was mentioned in the previous section, this determines the majority requirements if the Council subsequently wants to accept the amendments in question. The opinion
of the Commission is recorded as “agreement”, “partial agreement”, or “refusal”. As even partial agreement means that at least one unanimous vote is required in the Council to accept the proposal of the Parliament, we treat both partial agreement and refusal as “disagreement”. Finally, we compute the probability that a proposal fails. While the Parliament or the Council may explicitly reject a proposal, failure typically manifests itself as an indefinite period of inactivity, which is sometimes ended by the official withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission. We thus treat any proposal as failed that has not seen any legislative activity for at least six years.\footnote{As only four years had passed since the end of the eighth term at the time of writing, this creates an issue of censoring. We therefore compute the probability of failure based only on the seventh term.} As only four years had passed since the end of the eighth term at the time of writing, this creates an issue of censoring. We therefore compute the probability of failure based only on the seventh term.

C Estimation and Identification

We estimate the structural parameters of the model presented in Section 4.2 using a method of moments estimator. For the vector of included empirical moments $\mathbf{m}_D$ we calculate the theoretical counterpart $\mathbf{m}_M(\theta)$ predicted by the model under a parameter vector $\theta$. Our estimates minimize the distance between empirical and theoretical moments calculated as

$$\left(\mathbf{m}_D - \mathbf{m}_M(\theta)\right)'W\left(\mathbf{m}_D - \mathbf{m}_M(\theta)\right),$$

where $W$ is a weighting matrix, for which we use the identity matrix.

A comparison of the empirical and theoretical moments in Table 3 shows that our model fits the data well. The most notable deviation is that we overestimate the probability that the Commission agrees with amendments introduced by the Parliament at first reading.

We list the estimated parameters in Table 4.\footnote{There is no completed first reading in the Parliament and only one completed first reading in the Council that lasted more than six years in our data. The latter case was proposal COM (2005) 507 on the portability of supplementary pension rights. The Council concluded its first reading on this proposal on February 17 2014, about six years and eight months after Parliament concluded its first reading.} Figure 6 presents the gradient matrix of the theoretical moments with respect to model parameters.\footnote{Conceptually, the moments we target are population rather than sample moments. We thus do not calculate standard errors for our parameter estimates. Moreover, one of the moments—namely the ratio between terms of the number of proposals—is observed only once and thus has no standard error.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seventh Term of the European Parliament</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>First Reading</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Approval by EP</td>
<td>0.1056</td>
<td>0.1168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Commission agreement on EP amendments</td>
<td>0.7398</td>
<td>0.9990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval by Council conditional on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) No amendments by EP</td>
<td>0.9531</td>
<td>0.9476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) EP amendments approved by Commission</td>
<td>0.9783</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) EP amendments not approved by Commission</td>
<td>0.1404</td>
<td>0.1765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Second Reading</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Approval by EP</td>
<td>0.6667</td>
<td>0.6242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Commission agreement on EP amendments</td>
<td>0.8000</td>
<td>0.8420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Approval by Council (cond. on Com. approval)</td>
<td>0.8846</td>
<td>0.8598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Share of Failed Proposals</td>
<td>0.1374</td>
<td>0.1738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eighth Term of the European Parliament</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>First Reading</em></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Approval by EP</td>
<td>0.1828</td>
<td>0.2439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Commission agreement on EP amendments</td>
<td>0.8486</td>
<td>0.9901</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approval by Council conditional on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) EP amendments approved by Commission</td>
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<td>0.9933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) EP amendments not approved by Commission</td>
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<td>0.2192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Second Reading</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Approval by EP</td>
<td>0.8919</td>
<td>0.8796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) Ratio of Proposals 8th to 7th Term</td>
<td>0.7697</td>
<td>0.8625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Empirical and Predicted Moments
### Table 4: Structural Parameter Estimates

Notes: The table lists the estimates for the parameters in the model presented in Section 4.2, obtained by targeting the moments listed in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal Points:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i_b$</td>
<td>-.202</td>
<td>$i_c$</td>
<td>-.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i_s$</td>
<td>.925</td>
<td>$\delta_b$</td>
<td>.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_c$</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>$\delta_s$</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shock Distributions:</td>
<td>$\Delta c$</td>
<td>-.294</td>
<td>Cost Initial Proposal:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_8$</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Gradient Matrix of Theoretical Moments with Respect to Parameters.

Notes: The matrix contains derivatives of theoretical moments with respect to parameters. The theoretical moments in rows are listed in the same order as in Table 3.